Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Francesco Silvestri

Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Francesco Silvestri (1474–1528)

Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles

First published 1918

In Book I of the Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (Ferrariensis) expounds Aquinas's treatment of God and the divine attributes. His commentary proceeds through the arguments of the Summa contra Gentiles chapter by chapter. The present edition follows the commentary printed with the Leonine text in volume XIII (1918) and includes Latin, English, and Spanish texts.


Caput I: Quod sit officium sapientis

Caput II: Quae sit in hoc opere auctoris intentio

Assuming those things said in the first chapter about the wise man, St. Thomas sets out his purpose, saying that his intention is to manifest the truth of the Christian faith by eliminating contrary errors. The reason for this purpose is that, trusting in divine mercy, he intends to undertake the office of the wise man, which exceeds his own powers, namely to teach truth and exclude falsehood, as was shown above

He assigns a twofold reason why the office of the wise man is undertaken . The first is that among all the pursuits of men, the pursuit of wisdom is more perfect, more sublime, more useful, and more delightful. More perfect indeed, because through it a man already has some part of true beatitude, according to Ecclesiasticus 14: Blessed is the man who shall abide in wisdom. — More sublime, however, because through this a man especially approaches the divine likeness, which made all things in wisdom; and consequently he is joined to God through friendship, since likeness is a cause of love; hence it is said in Wisdom 7 that wisdom is an infinite treasure by which etc. — More useful indeed, because through wisdom one arrives at the kingdom of immortality, according to Wisdom 6: The desire of wisdom etc. — More delightful, however, because in Wisdom 8: her conversation has no bitterness nor etc.

II. For the clarification of these points, it must first be noted that, since beatitude consists in the contemplation of the divine truth and of the divine essence as it is in itself, when someone devotes himself to the pursuit of wisdom, he participates in some likeness of that supreme beatitude. Hence it is rightly said here that he already possesses some part of true beatitude.

It must be noted, secondly, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in II-II, q. 19, a. 7, that although wisdom among the philosophers is merely cognitive of the highest causes and consists absolutely in speculation alone, among theologians it is nevertheless not only cognitive but also directive of human life, which is directed not only by human reasons but also by divine reasons and rules, as is found in Augustine, XII de Trin. . Therefore one who devotes himself to the study of such wisdom is assimilated to God in a twofold way: first, with respect to the knowledge that God has of Himself; second, with respect to operation. For just as God knows Himself and made all things in wisdom, so the wise man both knows God and is directed in his works not only by human but also by divine rules. Hence it is well said here that man, through the study of wisdom, approaches the divine likeness.

It must be noted, third, that the saying of Saint Thomas, that through wisdom one arrives at the kingdom of immortality, can have a twofold reason. The first is because, as was said, wisdom causes friendship with God, through which we are advanced toward eternal beatitude. — The second, because the wise man, through the study of wisdom, is directed in right works, by which he is prepared for immortal life. For although those who devote themselves to human wisdom often fall away from virtue, those who nevertheless give their attention to divine wisdom, of which we speak, are insofar disposed to immortality, because they are directed in good works by wisdom according to divine rules.

A fourth point must be noted: that the reason why the pursuit of wisdom is said to be more delightful than all other human pursuits can be twofold. First, because, as Aristotle holds in Book XI of the De Animalibus , the lover takes more delight in a small grasp of the beloved than in a great grasp of other things. Second, because, as is said in the same place, the little we can understand about separate substances delights us more than whatever we have come to know about other things. Therefore far more delightful and pleasurable is the knowledge of God than of any other things whatsoever, especially when that knowledge draws one to the love of God.

III. The second reason why the wise man should take up the proposed task is that, according to Hilary's opinion, he considers it his proper office that all his speech and thought should speak of God.

Next he excuses himself for why he does not proceed against each individual error. For he says he does this, first, because the errors of all are not known, so that from those things which are said arguments could be taken for destroying their errors. — Then, because some of them, such as the Mohammedans and the pagans, do not accept the authority of Scripture. Therefore one must have recourse to natural reason, to which all are compelled to assent; which, however, is deficient in divine matters. Where I note that, because our natural light stands as far below divine things as possible, it cannot by its own power rise perspicaciously to them. Hence there are certain errors concerning divine things which we cannot eliminate by effective argument. Therefore, when even such sowers of errors do not accept divine Scripture, they are rather to be passed over than attacked with ineffectual argument.

Finally, Saint Thomas adds that, while investigating some truth, he will at the same time show which errors are excluded by it, and how demonstrative truth accords with the Christian religion.

Caput III: Quis modus sit possibilis divinae veritatis manifestandae

Caput IV: Quod veritas divinorum ad quam naturalis ratio pertingit convenienter hominibus credenda proponitur

Caput V: Quod ea quae ratione investigari non possunt convenienter fide tenenda hominibus proponuntur

Caput VI: Quod assentire his quae sunt fidei non est levitatis quamvis supra rationem sint

Caput VII: Quod veritati fidei Christianae non contrariatur veritas rationis

Caput VIII: Qualiter se habeat humana ratio ad veritatem fidei

Caput IX: De ordine et modo procedendi in hoc opere

Caput X: De opinione dicentium quod Deum esse demonstrari non potest cum sit per se notum

Caput XI: Reprobatio praemissae opinionis et solutio rationum praemissarum

Caput XII: De opinione dicentium quod Deum esse demonstrari non potest sed sola fide tenetur

Caput XIII: Rationes ad probandum Deum esse

Caput XIV: Quod ad cognitionem Dei oportet uti via remotionis

Caput XV: Quod Deus sit aeternus

Caput XVI: Quod in Deo non est potentia passiva

Caput XVII: Quod in Deo non est materia

Caput XVIII: Quod in Deo nulla est compositio

Caput XIX: Quod in Deo nihil est violentum neque praeter naturam

Caput XX: Quod Deus non est corpus

Caput XXI: Quod Deus est sua essentia

Caput XXII: Quod in Deo idem est esse et essentia

Caput XXIII: Quod in Deo non est accidens

Caput XXIV: Quod divinum esse non potest designari per additionem alicuius differentiae substantialis

Caput XXV: Quod Deus non est in aliquo genere

Caput XXVI: Quod Deus non est esse formale omnium

Caput XXVII: Quod Deus non sit forma alicuius corporis

Caput XXVIII: De perfectione divina

Caput XXIX: De similitudine creaturarum

Caput XXX: Quae nomina de Deo possint praedicari

Caput XXXI: Quod divina perfectio et pluralitas nominum divinorum divinae simplicitati non repugnant

Caput XXXII: Quod nihil de Deo et rebus aliis univoce praedicatur

Caput XXXIII: Quod non omnia nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis pure aequivoce

Caput XXXIV: Quod ea quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis dicuntur analogice

Caput XXXV: Quod plura nomina dicta de Deo non sunt synonyma

Caput XXXVI: Qualiter intellectus noster de Deo propositionem formet

Caput XXXVII: Quod Deus est bonus

Caput XXXVIII: Quod Deus est ipsa bonitas

Caput XXXIX: Quod in Deo non potest esse malum

Caput XL: Quod Deus est omnis boni bonum

Caput XLI: Quod Deus sit summum bonum

Caput XLII: Quod Deus est unus

Caput XLIII: Quod Deus est infinitus

Caput XLIV: Quod Deus est intelligens

Caput XLV: Quod intelligere Dei est sua essentia

Caput XLVI: Quod Deus per nihil aliud intelligit quam per suam essentiam

Caput XLVII: Quod Deus intelligit perfecte seipsum

Caput XLVIII: Quod Deus primo et per se solum seipsum cognoscit

Caput XLIX: Quod Deus cognoscit alia a se

Caput L: Quod Deus habet propriam cognitionem de omnibus rebus

Caput LI: Rationes ad inquirendum qualiter multitudo intellectorum sit in intellectu divino

Caput LII: Solutio praemissae dubitationis

Caput LIII: Qualiter divina essentia una et simplex sit propria similitudo omnium intelligibilium

Caput LIV: Quod Deus omnia simul intelligit

Caput LV: Quod cognitio Dei non est habitualis

Caput LVI: Quod cognitio Dei non est discursiva

Caput LVII: Quod Deus non intelligit componendo et dividendo

Caput LVIII: Quod a Deo non excluditur veritas enuntiabilium

Caput LIX: Quod Deus est veritas

Caput LX: Quod Deus est purissima veritas

Caput LXI: Quod divina veritas est prima et summa veritas

Caput LXII: Rationes volentium subtrahere Deo cognitionem singularium

Caput LXIII: Ordo dicendorum circa divinam cognitionem

Caput LXIV: Quod Deus singularia cognoscat

Caput LXV: Quod Deus cognoscit ea quae non sunt

Caput LXVI: Quod Deus cognoscit singularia contingentia futura

Caput LXVII: Quod Deus cognoscit motus voluntatis

Caput LXVIII: Quod Deus cognoscit infinita

Caput LXIX: Quod Deus vilia cognoscit

Caput LXX: Quod Deus cognoscit mala

Caput LXXI: Quod Deus est volens

Caput LXXII: Quod voluntas Dei est eius essentia

Caput LXXIII: Quod principale volitum Dei est divina essentia

Caput LXXIV: Quod Deus, volendo se, vult etiam alia

Caput LXXV: Quod Deus uno actu voluntatis se et alia velit

Caput LXXVI: Quod volitorum multitudo divinae simplicitati non repugnat

Caput LXXVII: Quod divina voluntas ad singula bonorum se extendit

Caput LXXVIII: Quod Deus vult etiam ea quae nondum sunt

Caput LXXIX: Quod Deus de necessitate vult suum esse et suam bonitatem

Caput LXXX: Quod Deus non de necessitate vult alia a se

Caput LXXXI: Rationes ducentes ad inconveniens si Deus alia a se non necessario velit

Caput LXXXII: Quod Deus vult aliquid aliud a se necessitate suppositionis

Caput LXXXIII: Quod voluntas Dei non est impossibilium secundum se

Caput LXXXIV: Quod divina voluntas non tollit contingentiam a rebus, neque eis necessitatem absolutam imponit

Caput LXXXV: Quod divinae voluntatis potest ratio assignari

Caput LXXXVI: Quod divinae voluntatis nihil potest esse causa

Caput LXXXVII: Quod in Deo est liberum arbitrium

Caput LXXXVIII: Quod in Deo non sunt passiones affectuum

Caput LXXXIX: Quod in Deo sit delectatio et gaudium non tamen repugnat divinae perfectioni

Caput XC: Quod in Deo sit amor

Caput XCI: Quomodo in Deo ponantur esse virtutes

Caput XCII: Quod in Deo sunt virtutes morales quae sunt circa actiones

Caput XCIII: Quod in Deo sunt virtutes contemplativae

Caput XCIV: Quod Deus non potest velle malum

Caput XCV: Quod Deus nihil odit, nec odium alicuius rei ei convenire potest

Caput XCVI: Quod Deus est vivens

Caput XCVII: Quod Deus est sua vita

Caput XCVIII: Quod vita Dei est sempiterna

Caput XCIX: Quod Deus est beatus

Caput C: Quod Deus sit sua beatitudo

Caput CI: Quod beatitudo divina perfecta et singularis est excedens omnem aliam beatitudinem

↑ Top of work