Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Therefore, wishing to publish a treatise against the pagans, Saint Thomas first sets forth a prologue divided into nine chapters. In it he does three things principally: for first he makes known his purpose; second, he shows the method of making manifest the truth that he intends, chapter III; third, he hands down the order of proceeding in this work, chapter IX. — With regard to the first, he does two things: first, he sets forth what the office of the wise man is; second, he derives from what has been said what he intends in this book, chapter II.

I. As to the first, then, he lays down five conclusions. The first of these is: It belongs to the wise man to consider the end. It is proved. Those are called wise who order things rightly and govern them well. But the rule of governance and of order for all things that are to be ordered to an end must be taken from the end. Therefore it belongs to the wise man to consider the end.

The major premise is proved. First, from the usage of the many, which the Philosopher holds should be followed in naming things, II Topics, ch. 1: for it has prevailed that such men are called wise. — Second, from the authority of Aristotle, I Metaphysics, who states that it belongs to the wise to order.

The minor is proved in two ways. First. Each thing is best disposed when it is ordered fittingly to its end, since the end of each thing is its good. Supply: But each thing is best disposed when it is ordered fittingly to the good, which is its ultimate perfection. Therefore etc. — Second. In the arts we see that one art is governing and as it were principal over another, to which belongs its end. This is clear in medicine, which holds primacy over the art of pigmentation: for health, with which it is concerned, is the end of all pigments. It is also clear in the art of governing a ship with respect to shipbuilding, and in the military art with respect to horsemanship and all warlike equipment. All of these are called architectonic, as it were principal arts: and their craftsmen, who are called architects, claim for themselves the name of wise men.

Concerning the first proof of the major, it should be noted that one is properly called wise who considers, with certainty, the most difficult and highest causes, as is clear from Aristotle, I Metaph. and VI Ethic.: and thus philosophers use the name of wise man. But because from this notion other conditions of the wise follow, of which in I Metaph.¹ Aristotle makes mention, among which one is to order rightly and govern well, therefore the multitude, perceiving this to be in the wise man, transferred the name of wise man to anyone who orders things rightly; and him we may also call prudent, according to that saying of Prov. x², Wisdom is prudence to a man. For this reason Saint Thomas said that common usage has prevailed that such men are called wise: as if to say, This is not, among philosophers, the complete understanding of the wise man, but among the multitude and the common people.

II. The second conclusion is: It belongs to the wise one simply speaking to consider the end of the universe. It is proved in two ways. First. The aforementioned craftsmen, treating of the ends of certain individual things, because they do not reach the universal end, are not called wise simply speaking, but wise in this or that thing: according to that passage of 1 Cor. 3, As a wise architect I laid the foundation. Therefore the name of wise one simply speaking is reserved to him alone whose consideration is concerned with the end of the universe.

Second. It belongs to the wise one simply speaking, according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics I and Ethics VI, to consider the highest causes. But the end of the universe is the highest cause, which is also the principle of the universe. Therefore etc.

Concerning this proposition, The end of the universe is also the principle of the universe, it must be noted that by this saying Saint Thomas wishes to have it understood that the first agent and the last end are not two distinct things, but are one. For, since other agents act for the sake of some end distinct from themselves, the first agent, as will be shown below³, acts not for the sake of something else distinct from itself, but only for its own sake. Hence the first agent and the last end are really the same.

From this, moreover, it can be understood how the words of the Philosopher in Metaphysics II⁴ are to be taken, when he says that the principles of things that are must always be most true. For they are not to be taken as though he wished there to be several principles really distinct among the things that always are; but because several principles of eternal things are distinct only by reason, namely the first efficient cause and the last end, which the Philosopher, according to the interpretation of St. Thomas at this place, calls the highest causes.

III. The third conclusion is: It belongs to wisdom simply to insist principally upon the consideration of truth. It is proved. It belongs to wisdom simply to consider the end of the universe: by the preceding conclusion. But the end of the universe is truth. Therefore, etc.

The minor is proved. The end of the universe must be the good of the intellect. But this is true. Therefore etc. — The major is proved. The end of each thing is that which is intended by its first author or mover. But the first author and mover of the universe is intellect, as will be shown below, namely in Book II. Therefore the ultimate end of the universe must be the good of the intellect.

It is confirmed first by this sign, that divine Wisdom came into the world for the manifestation of truth: as it itself testifies when it says, John XVIII, For this I was born, that I might bear witness to the truth. — It is confirmed secondly by the authority of Aristotle, who says in II Metaphysics that first philosophy is the science of truth.

Regarding the inference of the principal argument, note that the argument presupposes that the first agent of each thing intends first its own good, and secondarily the good of its effect. Therefore, when St. Thomas ought to have inferred, Therefore the ultimate end of the universe is what the intellect intends, he inferred, Therefore it is the good of the intellect: so as to convey that what is intended first by such an agent and what is its good are the same.

2. Concerning this proposition assumed in the first place for the same reason, Intellect is the first author and mover of the universe, it must be noted that it can be expounded in two ways. First, so that intellect may be called the author and mover as the power by which God produced the universe: just as we say that a craftsman produces his works through intellect, and thus the first cause of the works is the craftsman's intellect. And in this way it is certainly true that the divine intellect is the author and mover of the universe: for, since God acts through will, and will is moved to act from some apprehension, it must be that the first principle of acting on God's part is his intellect. Saint Thomas uses this reason below, book II, chapter XXIV, to show that God produces his effects through his wisdom. — Second, it can be expounded that intellect is the first author and mover of the universe not only as the principle by which, but also as the supposit acting. For which it must be noted that, although God is an intellectual substance just as the other intelligences and man are, there is nevertheless a difference between him and other intellectual things, because created intellectual things are not themselves intellect, but in them intellect is an accident added to their substance, and therefore they are not properly called intellect, but only intellectual substances or having intellect: but God not only has intellect, but is his own intellect, just as all the other things that are in God are the divine substance itself. And therefore, just as it can be said that God acts, so it can be said that the divine intellect acts, and is the author of the universe as the supposit acting. — Although both senses have truth, the second nevertheless seems more intended according to the manner of speaking of the letter.

3. Concerning this proposition, assumed in the same argument, The ultimate end of the universe is truth, it must be considered that an agent sometimes acts for an end either to produce or to acquire for itself, as is evident in one who heals or in that which is moved locally; but sometimes it acts for a preexisting end to be multiplied, communicated, or manifested, just as a natural agent acts in order to communicate its form. Truth, therefore, is not said here to be the end of the universe and the good of the divine intellect as though God, by producing the universe, were to acquire or bring into being truth and the perfection of intellect; but because in producing the universe he intends both to manifest and to communicate his truth. For since the truth of the divine intellect, which is the end of the universe, is nothing other than the conception of the divine intellect, which things are naturally apt to imitate and equal—while things are brought into being, the divine truth is communicated to them, insofar as they receive forms similar to and conformable with the conception of the divine intellect.

IV. The fourth conclusion is: It belongs to wisdom to consider the first truth. It is proved by the authority of Aristotle, in the passage cited above, where he says that first philosophy is the science of that truth which is the origin of all truth, namely, that which pertains to the first principle of being for all things. For the truth of such a principle is the principle of all truth: since things are disposed in truth just as they are in being.

Note, from the teaching of Saint Thomas, Verit. q. XXI, a. 1, that since the true signifies being perfective of another according to the notion of species, the true as it stands on the side of the thing and is convertible with being includes being in its notion and adds that respect of the perfective. Hence the Philosopher rightly says that things are disposed in truth just as in esse: namely because the true is founded in being, and the notion of the true accompanies the notion of being.

The third and fourth conclusions are confirmed together by the authority of Prov. VIII, where it is said, "My mouth shall meditate truth": for divine truth is called truth by way of antonomasia.

V. Concerning what was said in the third and fourth conclusions, two doubts arise. The first is this. Although the will is prior to the intellect simply speaking, nevertheless the will is prior to the intellect as motive, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, Iª, q. LXXXII, a. 4. But to produce things is to move something, or as it were to move. Therefore in the production of things the divine will holds first place, and not the intellect. It is therefore wrongly said that the first author and mover of the universe is the intellect.

The second doubt is this. The ultimate end of all created things below is said to be the divine goodness, book III ⁵. Therefore truth is not the ultimate end of the universe, as it is said to be here.

2. To these difficulties one must respond by beginning with the second, since the solution to the first will be clearer from its solution. It must be known, therefore, first that just as there is a twofold end for lower agents, as is said in II-II, q. 123, a. 7—namely the proximate and the remote—and the proximate is that it may induce a likeness of its form into another, while the ultimate is whatever good follows from this, if it is intended: so too there is a twofold end for the divine intellect. The proximate indeed is that it may induce its form in creatures; but the ultimate is the good which is ultimately intended in creatures through this. And because the form of the divine intellect by which it acts is a conception in whose likeness things are produced, and this conception is the truth of the intellect itself, therefore the creature, inasmuch as it imitates the divine conception, has the truth of the divine intellect as the proximate end of the agent; but because God, in communicating his truth to the creature, also intends that it become a partaker of the divine goodness, therefore the divine goodness is also its ultimate end.

It must be known, second, that the end of some effect can be called ultimate in two ways. In one way, because it is ultimately intended by its efficient causes according to the order of execution. In another way, because the end of its cause that is last in the way of resolution and supreme is its proper end. And in this way, if that ultimate cause itself intends several ends, each of them can be called ultimate in relation to the ends of lower causes: namely, insofar as the ends of the other causes are ordered to the end of the higher cause; but the end of the supreme cause, whatever it may be, is not ordered to any end of a higher cause, since it itself has no higher cause.

3. To the doubt, therefore, it is said that truth is called the ultimate end of the universe only in the second way, namely because it is the proper end of its supreme cause; but not in the first way, as being, that is, ultimately intended. Hence St. Thomas did not say that the ultimate end of each thing is the one ultimately intended by its first author, but absolutely and without distinction the one intended by its first author: so as to give us to understand that every proper end of the supreme cause has the character of an ultimate end in comparison with the ends of other causes, even if it be the proximate end of the latter. But the divine goodness is called the ultimate end of the universe not only in the second way, but also in the first, namely because it is ultimately intended by the supreme cause: for on this account the divine intellect brings into the universe a likeness of its truth, that it may attain the divine goodness. — It must be noted, however, that although truth is the ultimate end of the universe in the second way, as being, that is, intended by its supreme cause, it nevertheless belongs to it to be also the proximate end of the universe, inasmuch as the universe has no other efficient cause besides the supreme one, but the divine intellect itself is both its first and its proximate cause. Hence truth is called the ultimate end of the universe insofar as the intellect is its first and supreme cause: but insofar as the same intellect is also its proximate cause, it can also be called the proximate end.

Second, this difficulty can also be answered by saying that from the fact that truth is posited as the ultimate end of the universe, divine goodness is not excluded, but rather is included. For divine goodness, as is said in II Sent., d. 1, q. II, a. 2, ad 3, according to the order and mode in which it is willed by God, is the end of creatures. But since the willed mode of divine goodness is according to the mode of conception of the divine intellect, it follows that divine goodness, conceived under such a mode of communication, is the ultimate end of the universe. Yet goodness as thus conceived has the character of truth. Therefore, when it is said that truth is the end of the universe, goodness is not excluded; and when it is said that goodness is the end, truth is not excluded; rather they mutually include one another. Hence in this matter there is no contradiction in the doctrine of St. Thomas.

4. From these things the first doubt is easily answered. For it is said that when the intellect is called the first author of the universe, the divine will is not excluded but included: because divine knowledge is not the cause of things except when joined to will, as will be shown below.⁶ Nevertheless, because the form which the divine effect most closely imitates is in the intellect, therefore the divine intellect is said to be the first author of the universe: for this reason also in Sacred Scripture⁷ Wisdom is set down as the creator of things. An example of this can be seen in artificial works: for although the craftsman acts through will, he is nevertheless said absolutely to act through intellect, on account of the reason given.

There is also another argument for this. For although the intellect moves the will and the will the intellect, nevertheless, since there is no process to infinity, there is a stopping point in the intellect, and it is itself simply the first mover in relation to the will: for it can apprehend something without being moved by the will, but the will cannot will anything unless it is moved by the intellect. Hence it is false that the will holds the first place absolutely in moving, since it is not borne toward the unknown. This is clear from the teaching of Saint Thomas in many places, especially Iª, q. lxxxii, a. 4 ⁸: and it is the teaching of Aristotle, VI Ethic. ⁹ Therefore the first author of the universe, as containing its form in himself, is the intellect; but the will is joined to it as applying this cause to acting.

VI. The fifth conclusion is: It belongs to wisdom to attack the falsehood contrary to the truth about the first principle. It is proved first. It belongs to the same person to pursue one of two contraries and to refute the other: this is clear from the example of medicine, which produces health and expels sickness. But it belongs to the wise man especially to meditate on truth about the first principle and to discourse on it with others. Therefore it also belongs to him to attack the falsehood contrary to it.

Second, it is proved by the authority of Proverbs cited above, in which it is said, "And my lips shall detest the wicked." For falsehood against divine truth is called impiety, because it is contrary to religion, which is named piety.

Regarding what was said, that by "impious" falsity is designated against divine truth because it is contrary to religion, which is called piety, it must first be noted, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas in IIa IIae, q. 101, a. 1, that the name of piety, taken properly, signifies a certain virtue that renders honor and worship to parents and to one's homeland; but because by a certain excellence God is called our father, therefore, as is said there at art. 3 ¹⁰, piety is also extended and transferred to the divine worship; on account of which, as Tertio says, d. 9, q. 1, a. 1 ¹¹, the same virtue is called in Greek eusebia or theosebia, but in Latin piety, latria, religion. Religion is therefore called piety not according to the first and proper signification of this name, but according to a certain transference of the name.

It should be noted, second, that since it pertains to latria to show reverence to Sacred Scripture and other divine things, as Saint Thomas holds in the Third Book, d. 34, a. 2 ¹²; and since religion is the same virtue as latria, as has been said; Saint Thomas rightly says that falsehood is contrary to religion because it is opposed to divine truth. For it pertains to irreverence toward God to attack the divine truth and teach the falsehood opposed to it: which manifestly stands against religion, which shows worship and reverence to God.