Commentaria in Summam contra Gentiles, Liber I

Assuming those things said in the first chapter about the wise man, St. Thomas sets out his purpose, saying that his intention is to manifest the truth of the Christian faith by eliminating contrary errors. The reason for this purpose is that, trusting in divine mercy, he intends to undertake the office of the wise man, which exceeds his own powers, namely to teach truth and exclude falsehood, as was shown above ¹

He assigns a twofold reason why the office of the wise man is undertaken ². The first is that among all the pursuits of men, the pursuit of wisdom is more perfect, more sublime, more useful, and more delightful. More perfect indeed, because through it a man already has some part of true beatitude, according to Ecclesiasticus 14: Blessed is the man who shall abide in wisdom. — More sublime, however, because through this a man especially approaches the divine likeness, which made all things in wisdom; and consequently he is joined to God through friendship, since likeness is a cause of love; hence it is said in Wisdom 7 that wisdom is an infinite treasure by which etc. — More useful indeed, because through wisdom one arrives at the kingdom of immortality, according to Wisdom 6: The desire of wisdom etc. — More delightful, however, because in Wisdom 8: her conversation has no bitterness nor etc.

II. For the clarification of these points, it must first be noted that, since beatitude consists in the contemplation of the divine truth and of the divine essence as it is in itself, when someone devotes himself to the pursuit of wisdom, he participates in some likeness of that supreme beatitude. Hence it is rightly said here that he already possesses some part of true beatitude.

It must be noted, secondly, from the doctrine of St. Thomas in II-II, q. 19, a. 7, that although wisdom among the philosophers is merely cognitive of the highest causes and consists absolutely in speculation alone, among theologians it is nevertheless not only cognitive but also directive of human life, which is directed not only by human reasons but also by divine reasons and rules, as is found in Augustine, XII de Trin. ³. Therefore one who devotes himself to the study of such wisdom is assimilated to God in a twofold way: first, with respect to the knowledge that God has of Himself; second, with respect to operation. For just as God knows Himself and made all things in wisdom, so the wise man both knows God and is directed in his works not only by human but also by divine rules. Hence it is well said here that man, through the study of wisdom, approaches the divine likeness.

It must be noted, third, that the saying of Saint Thomas, that through wisdom one arrives at the kingdom of immortality, can have a twofold reason. The first is because, as was said, wisdom causes friendship with God, through which we are advanced toward eternal beatitude. — The second, because the wise man, through the study of wisdom, is directed in right works, by which he is prepared for immortal life. For although those who devote themselves to human wisdom often fall away from virtue, those who nevertheless give their attention to divine wisdom, of which we speak, are insofar disposed to immortality, because they are directed in good works by wisdom according to divine rules.

A fourth point must be noted: that the reason why the pursuit of wisdom is said to be more delightful than all other human pursuits can be twofold. First, because, as Aristotle holds in Book XI of the De Animalibus ⁴, the lover takes more delight in a small grasp of the beloved than in a great grasp of other things. Second, because, as is said in the same place, the little we can understand about separate substances delights us more than whatever we have come to know about other things. Therefore far more delightful and pleasurable is the knowledge of God than of any other things whatsoever, especially when that knowledge draws one to the love of God.

III. The second reason why the wise man should take up the proposed task ⁵ is that, according to Hilary's opinion, he considers it his proper office that all his speech and thought should speak of God.

Next he excuses himself for why he does not proceed against each individual error. For he says he does this, first, because the errors of all are not known, so that from those things which are said arguments could be taken for destroying their errors. — Then, because some of them, such as the Mohammedans and the pagans, do not accept the authority of Scripture. Therefore one must have recourse to natural reason, to which all are compelled to assent; which, however, is deficient in divine matters. Where I note that, because our natural light stands as far below divine things as possible, it cannot by its own power rise perspicaciously to them. Hence there are certain errors concerning divine things which we cannot eliminate by effective argument. Therefore, when even such sowers of errors do not accept divine Scripture, they are rather to be passed over than attacked with ineffectual argument.

Finally, Saint Thomas adds that, while investigating some truth, he will at the same time show which errors are excluded by it, and how demonstrative truth accords with the Christian religion.

After St. Thomas had made known his purpose in this work, he consequently showed what the manner of manifesting divine truth is ¹. Concerning this he does two things: first he enumerates the things that are to be manifested; second, he determines their manifestation itself, in the following chapter.

As to the first, assuming, according to the opinion of Aristotle and Boethius, that a trained man ought to seek concerning each thing only as much of faith as the nature of the thing admits, he sets down this conclusion: Of those things we confess concerning God, some are such that they can be known by the natural light of reason, while others exceed every capacity of human reason. He leaves the first part as evident: because the philosophers, who used natural reason alone, proved most things about God demonstratively, for instance that God exists and that God is one. — He proves the second part first by three arguments, showing that there are certain intelligibles concerning God which altogether surpass the human intellect; then he confirms it with authorities ².

I. The first argument is this. Whatever can be known in all respects by the natural light of the intellect, its substance also can be comprehended by that intellect. But the substance of God cannot be comprehended by our intellect. Therefore our intellect cannot know by its natural light all things knowable about God.

The major premise is proved. The principle of the whole science of a thing is the understanding of its substance: because, according to the Philosopher, the principle of demonstration is what the thing is. Therefore, according to the mode of cognition of a thing's substance will be the mode of those things that are known about that thing. If, then, the substance of some thing, say a stone or a triangle, is comprehended by the human intellect, no intelligible about it will exceed the capacity of human reason. Supply: — Therefore, conversely, if no intelligible about it exceeds natural light, indeed all things about it can be known naturally, and its substance will be able to be comprehended.

The minor is proved. Only those things that do not fall under sense can be grasped by the human intellect whose knowledge can be gathered from the senses, because our intellect, according to the mode of the present life, receives its knowledge from the senses. But from the senses our intellect cannot be led to see the divine substance, because sensible things are effects that do not equal the divine power. Therefore, etc. — He adds, however, that although sensible things do not lead to knowledge of God's substance, they nevertheless make us know of Him that He is, and other things of this kind which must be attributed to the first principle.

2. For the clarification of the major premise, it must be noted that the intention of St. Thomas is to speak of those knowables that belong per se to a subject: for science extends itself to such things, not to per accidens predicates. For such things, which are also called properties, are contained virtually in the substance of the thing as effects in their cause, where they have a distinction outside the intellect: for they are produced, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas ³, from the substance by a certain natural resultance. But where they are not distinguished, as happens with the passions of being, which are not really distinct from being, the ratio of the subject virtually contains the rationes of the passions, and one is the cause and ratio of the other only in intelligible esse. Since, therefore, the passions are contained in the subject as in their cause, whether with respect to real esse or with respect to intelligible esse, all the passions of any thing cannot be known of it unless its quiddity is known totally, nor can the quiddity of a thing be perfectly known unless all its properties naturally resulting from it are known: just as all the effects of a cause cannot be known in the cause except through a comprehension of the cause, nor can the cause, as such, be comprehended except through an inspection of all the effects into which it can issue.

3. As to the minor premise, it must first be noted that St. Thomas did not say simply that the substance of God cannot be known from sensible things, but added, "so that it may be seen in them what it is": for sensible things, when known, do indeed make us know the substance of God, since all things that are in God are his substance; but they cannot lead us to know him quidditatively as he is in himself, which would be properly to know the substance of God.

It must be noted, second, that an object is said to be adequate to a power in one way, and an effect of a cause in another. For an object is said to be adequate to a power according to a certain community of extension: namely, because whatever falls under the ratio of that object can be attained by such a power, and conversely, whatever can be attained by the power is contained under that object. But since it belongs to the ratio of an effect, insofar as it is such, to depend on its cause, the effect is said to be adequate to the cause, as Saint Thomas seems to intend in the Third Book, chapter 49, when in it the whole power of the cause is expressed. Now I take this to be the case when, by the power of the cause, an effect is produced of as great a perfection as the cause. But when the whole power of the cause is not expressed in the effect, namely because it is not of as great a perfection as its cause—which can indeed be discerned when the cause is able to produce an effect nobler than that one—then that effect is inadequate to the cause. Therefore, since there is no effect of the divine power than which it could not produce a nobler one, and none is of as great a perfection as God, no effect is adequate to it.

It must be noted, third, that because a power follows upon the essence of a thing and is proportioned to it, since the effect equals the power of its cause, the essence also seems to equal the essence: just as man begotten, in respect of his essence, equals the man who begets him. For this reason, from quidditative knowledge of an effect the cause can be known quidditatively. But where the effect does not equal the power of its cause, as happens in divine effects, neither can it equal the essence of the cause. And consequently, from the inspection of the effect itself the cause cannot be perfectly known: but only those things about the cause can be known through such an effect which must be found in the cause in order that such an effect be produced by such a cause; just as, in order that something be produced by another as by a first cause, it is necessary that that cause both be, and be intellectual, and be immaterial. Therefore, from knowledge of the effects of the first cause, though unequal effects, we can know that it is, and that it is intellectual and immaterial, and things similar to these.

II. But concerning this argument a doubt arises, because St. Thomas seems to commit the fallacy of figure of speech in the proof of the major. For he proves it thus: According to the mode in which the substance of a thing is known, such is the mode of those things that are known. Therefore, for that whose substance the intellect comprehends, all things intelligible about it can be known. Here, however, there is a transition from mode to the multitude of intellects, and thus from quality to quantity, where the fallacy of figure of speech is manifestly committed.

It is answered that, just as one essence is the one cause of all its passions, so all its passions agree in one account—namely in this, that they are its natural properties; and the mode of knowing a natural passion is proportioned to the mode of knowing the substance. For of that whose essence is known totally, it is necessary that its natural passion also be known totally. But from the fact that a natural passion is to be known and comprehended totally, it follows that there is no natural passion which is not known. Therefore no fallacy is committed: for the passage is not made immediately from mode to quantity; but from the mode of the essence to the mode of the predicate, which mode of things known numerical quantity accompanies. And Saint Thomas, studious of brevity, touched upon quantity explicitly, so as to give us to understand both the mode which immediately follows from the antecedent and the quantity accompanying it. The explicit argumentation will therefore be this: — According to the mode of knowledge of the substance of a thing is the mode of knowledge of the natural passion known of that thing. Therefore, of that whose essence is comprehended and known totally, its natural passion is comprehended and known totally: either actually, namely, or virtually. But then the natural passion of a thing is known totally when there is none which is not known of it. Therefore etc.

III. The second argument is taken from the degrees of intellectual beings. And it is argued thus: the higher and more elevated an intellect is, the more things it can understand which an inferior intellect cannot grasp. But the divine intellect exceeds the human most of all. Therefore God can know in Himself some things which the human intellect cannot grasp at all.

The major proposition can be seen in men. For the intellect of the rustic and the unlearned cannot at all grasp the subtle reasonings of philosophy, which the philosopher and a man of great genius grasps.

The second point is also evident. For the angelic intellect exceeds the human intellect more than the intellect of the best philosopher exceeds that of the most unlearned idiot: since the distance of one man's intellect from another's is contained within the limits of the human species, whereas the angelic intellect is superior in species. This can easily be perceived, because it knows God from a nobler and more abstract effect: for by the very substance of the angel, which is nobler both than sensible things and than the human soul itself, through which the human intellect ascends to God, the angel knows God by natural cognition, as will be shown below ⁴. But the divine intellect exceeds the angelic more than the angelic exceeds the human. This is made manifest because the divine intellect equals the divine substance and therefore perfectly understands itself; but the angelic intellect does not know what God is, since its own substance, by which it knows God, is an effect whose power does not equal its cause; and therefore the angel cannot know by natural cognition all that God knows of Himself. Therefore the divine intellect exceeds the human to the highest degree.

2. For the declaration of the major, with its proof, it must first be known, as Saint Thomas says, that something can come to be unable to be known by a power in two ways: either, I say, because it does not fall under the object of the power, as sound cannot be taken in by sight; or because, although it is contained under the object, it is nevertheless disproportionate to the power, as something very bright cannot be seen by the eye of a bat. Therefore, that certain philosophical subtleties are grasped by the intellect of one man but cannot be taken in by the intellect of another is not for this reason, that they are comprehended under the common object of the one intellect but not under the object of the other intellect; but because they are proportionate to the one intellect and disproportionate to the other intellect, since the one intellect can penetrate the natural quiddities, while the other, by its dullness, cannot.

It must be known, secondly, from the doctrine of St. Thomas (Iª, q. 85, a. 7, and II Sent., d. 32, q. 2, a. 3) that just as all human bodies are of one species, and yet this specific unity admits a breadth of diverse individual degrees—since one man is well-complexioned and adorned with beautiful form and comely appearance, while another is deformed and ugly and badly complexioned—so too, together with the specific unity of souls there stands a diversity of their individual degrees, so that as one body is substantially more perfect than another individually and of nobler complexion, so one soul is individually nobler than another, and by this one man is endowed with a more excellent intellect than another. For individual forms are created commensurate with bodies substantially, such that by its commensuration to this body this soul is distinguished from that one individually. Hence as one body is more nobly complexioned than another, so one soul must be nobler than another. — Yet for all that, one man is not on this account more a man than another, though he is a more perfect man: because we use the word "more" only in forms in which change occurs between more and less; which does not occur in the intellectual soul, since each one preserves immutably that substantial perfection it received from the beginning. One man, therefore, can be of better power in understanding than another because he has a better and nobler soul; although this can also arise from a better disposition of the sensitive powers, inasmuch as the intellect depends upon them for its operation.

IV. The third argument proceeds from the greater. It seems that we know all that is knowable about sensible things rather than all that can be known about God, since the former are closer to us and more proportionate to us. Yet we are ignorant of many properties of sensible things, or we cannot discover their complete explanation. Therefore, much less can we naturally know all that is knowable about God.

V. It is confirmed by the authority of the Philosopher, II Metaphysics, and by many authorities of Sacred Scripture⁵ For Aristotle says that our intellect is related to the most manifest things in nature as the eye of a bat is to the sun. And in Job 11 it is said, "Perhaps you may find traces," etc.; and in chapter 36, "Behold, God is great," etc.; likewise in I Corinthians 13 it is said, "We know in part," etc.

On the authority of the Philosopher, it must be noted that this does not imply total ignorance of divine things, but rather a certain obscure knowledge and difficulty of cognition. For just as the bat cannot fix its keen sight upon the very splendor of the sun, so neither can our intellect naturally understand the divine essence as it is in itself, comprehending its quiddity.

Hence the error of the Manichaeans is refuted, and that of many unbelievers who at once supposed that those things which are revealed by God through the ministry of angels, and which cannot be investigated by human reason, must be rejected as false. The same thing happened to them as to an unlearned man who would say that what philosophers say is false because he could not grasp it.

VI. Concerning this part of the conclusion which Saint Thomas proved⁶, Scotus agrees in part, and in part dissents. For he holds with Saint Thomas that there are many truths about God knowable which no one can discover naturally, since their cognition cannot be caused by the agent intellect and the phantasms. But in this he dissents, because he holds that this cognition is indeed supernatural when the possible intellect is compared to the agent; yet, when it is compared to the actual knowledge in itself, it is natural to it, since the possible intellect is naturally perfected by any cognition whatsoever, and is naturally inclined toward any cognition whatsoever. Saint Thomas holds the opposite of this, taking natural potency properly, and not as extending itself also to the obediential, in III Sent., d. XXVI, q. 1, a. 2, and De Veritate, q. XVIII, a. 2, where, on the mind of the Commentator, IX Metaphysics, he holds that a natural passive potency does not extend itself except to those things to which its natural active potency extends itself. From this, in the question in De Veritate, he concludes that the possible intellect is not naturally in potency except to those forms which are made intelligible by the agent intellect.

The position of Saint Thomas is confirmed by the course and reasoning of Aristotle in Book III of De Anima, where he proves the necessity of the agent intellect, text 17⁷. For by this argument he proves that there must be posited in the soul an agent intellect, because in a nature in which there is a passive potency, an active potency must be posited. Now it is clear that Aristotle is speaking of a proximate and proportionate active potency; otherwise his argument would not prove his thesis. Therefore, if some passive potency is naturally inclined toward some act, it must be that it can receive that act from some natural and proportionate agent.

But if it is pressed further, as Scotus presses it, IV Sent., d. XLIX, q. XI, ad 2, that in the body there is a receptive potency for the intellectual soul, and yet it cannot be produced by any natural agent — it is answered, according to the mind of St. Thomas, Pot. q. III, a. 9, ad 5 and 6, that it is not necessary for every natural agent to produce the essence of the form; it suffices that it be a dispositive cause of the matter, and be the cause of the union of the form with the matter. For if the form is not subsistent, the natural cause is the cause of the form itself; but if the form is subsistent, as is the rational soul, the natural cause is the cause of the disposition of the matter and of the union of the form to the matter, but not the cause of the form. Hence this consequence is denied: No created agent, whether natural or otherwise, can produce the intellectual soul; therefore, matter cannot be reduced to act with respect to the intellectual soul by any natural agent — for it is said that the opposite of the consequent can stand together with the antecedent: for a natural agent can reduce matter to the act of the form by causing the dispositions toward the form and the union of the form to the matter, and yet not cause the form itself.

After Saint Thomas has shown that there is a twofold truth concerning God, he now declares the manner of manifestation of each truth ¹. In regard to this he does two things: first, he determines absolutely the manner of manifestation of this kind of truth; second, comparatively, in chapter VII. — In regard to the first he does two things: first, he determines the manner of such manifestation insofar as it lies on the part of the teacher; second, insofar as it lies on the part of the learner, in chapter VI. — In regard to the first he does two things: first, he treats of the manner of those things that can be known of God naturally; second, of the manner of those things that exceed natural reason ².

I. As to the first point, lest it perhaps seem to anyone, as he says, that since such truth can be attained by reason, it was handed over in vain to be believed by supernatural inspiration, he sets down this conclusion: The truth of divine things, which can be accessible to the inquiry of reason, is fittingly proposed by God for man to believe. It is proved from the inconveniences that would follow if this were not so. The first is that knowledge of God would belong to only a few men. For most are deterred from the inquiry into truth for three reasons. Namely, either on account of the constitution of the body, from which many are naturally indisposed toward science and cannot attain the highest degree of human cognition, which consists in knowing God; or on account of the necessities of domestic affairs, because of which many cannot devote themselves to the leisure of contemplative inquiry; or on account of sloth, from which most flee the labor of acquiring learning: for in order to have the knowledge of God that can be had naturally, one must know many things beforehand, since nearly all of philosophy is ordered to it, for which reason metaphysics remains to be studied last; wherefore, although God has implanted in the minds of men a natural desire for knowing, there are nevertheless many who refuse to undergo the labor of learning.

II. It must first be noted here, from the doctrine of Saint Thomas in the Third Book, d. xxv, q. II, a. 2 ³, that the quantity of knowledge can be considered in two ways: namely, according to its objects, and according to the efficacy of the act with respect to the object. Therefore what he says—that the highest degree of human knowledge is to know God—must be understood as regards the object, not as regards the efficacy of the act.

It must be noted, secondly ⁴, as St. Thomas has it on Boethius, De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 1, ad 9 ⁵, that metaphysics is indeed prior to the other sciences by nature, that is, according to perfection; yet with respect to us it is posterior to the other sciences. For this reason Avicenna, in the first book of his Metaphysics ⁶, says that the order of this science is such that it is learned after the other sciences, which St. Thomas also says in this place. But although this is so concerning the science itself, insofar as the properties of being and of separate substances are investigated in it by demonstration, nevertheless certain metaphysical terms must be known with respect to us before the terms of the other sciences, according to their concepts, since the terms of the other sciences are resolved into them. For this reason, although those terms are called metaphysical, insofar as the properties of the things they signify are investigated in metaphysics, they are nevertheless, as regards their concepts, common to all the sciences. — If it is said: Why, then, in Metaphysics V ⁷ are their rationes determined? — it is answered that this is because, if a treatise is to be set forth concerning all of them together, it pertains more to the metaphysician than to any other craftsman, since he also inquires into their properties. Yet it is not thereby denied that they are terms common to all the sciences. But the difference lies in this: metaphysics determines them as subjects, or as parts or passions of subjects; the other sciences, however, use them as antecedents to their subjects, and as known through the way of sense.

It must be noted, thirdly, that Saint Thomas did not say absolutely that the whole of philosophy is ordered to metaphysics, but added almost: because, as he himself says in Trin. q. v, a. 1, ad 9 ⁸, there are certain sciences that are not necessary absolutely for metaphysics, but only for its well-being, such as music and the moral sciences and the like.

Note fourth, that natural appetite, as treated in Iª, q. LX, a. 1, can be taken in two ways: in one way, as distinguished from appetite that follows cognition; in another way, as distinguished from free appetite. In the first way it names only the order of nature toward something, and it imports nothing other than the form of a thing with its natural habitude toward something, just as the appetite of a heavy body for the place below is nothing other than the form of gravity with its habitude toward the place below: and it stands as a first act. In this way every power naturally appetites what is fitting to it, as is said in Iª, q. LXXVIII, a. 1, ad 3. In the second way it names an elicited act following cognition, yet so determined to one of two opposites that it cannot be bent toward the other: just as all naturally appetite beatitude by an act elicited by the will following the apprehension of beatitude. — Therefore the appetite for knowing, which Saint Thomas says, and Aristotle as well, is natural, ⁹, although it can be taken in the first way, because the intellect by its nature has a habitude and order toward cognition as toward what is fitting to it; yet because this does not belong to the intellect alone, but to every power, as we have said, in being borne toward what is fitting to it; and Saint Thomas and the Philosopher seem to wish to posit something particular about the appetite for cognition that is not found in the appetite for the operations of other powers: therefore this appetite must be said to be a certain natural act of the will by which the will is borne toward the cognition proposed to it in such a way that it cannot be borne toward the opposite. This also seems to be what Saint Thomas wishes in Iª IIªe, q. x, a. 1; and IIª IIªe, q. CLXVI, a. 2, when he posits the virtue of studiousness as the moderator of this natural desire.

III. It is absurd, because men would scarcely arrive at that knowledge except after a long span of time. First, on account of the depth of the knowledge, for which the human intellect is found suitable only after long practice. Second, on account of the many things that are presupposed. Third, on account of the movements of the passions, which abound in youth and by which the soul is rendered unfit for the knowledge of so great a truth.

It must first be noted that, since abstract things, considered apart from matter, cannot be known by us except from sensible things, in order that our intellect—to which sensible things are natural—may be raised so far as to draw out from the forms of sensibles a knowledge of such substances, it is necessary beforehand that it be exercised in the operations of the intellect, abstracting universals from particulars and common features from proper ones, so that through such exercise of abstraction it may become more apt for the knowledge of immaterial things. For the intellect cannot attain its noblest operations unless, through assiduity and exercise in lesser ones, it becomes more vigorous and more prompt for investigating hidden things. Much less, therefore, can it be raised to that substance which is most immaterial and most remote from the senses, unless it has been strengthened after long exercise. Hence Saint Thomas says that our intellect cannot pluck that depth of knowledge except after long exercise. For there is caused in the intellect, by study and exercise, a certain aptitude for investigating difficult matters, which would not be present without such exercise. Similarly, the interior sensitive powers, which the intellect employs, are rendered more apt by such exercise, each in its own order, for inquiring into the truth of subtle things.

It must be noted, secondly, that since intellectual cognition comes about through abstraction from sensible things, while on account of the vehemence of the passions the intention of the soul is drawn away from intelligibles toward sensibles: by reason of the vehemence of the passions the act of contemplation is hindered to the greatest degree. Therefore the moral virtues, especially chastity, as Saint Thomas says (II-II, q. 15, a. 3), dispose a man most of all toward perfection in intellectual operation. Where, then, a multitude of passions arises, as happens for the most part in the young, there the soul is not apt for subtle speculations; but in resting and sitting still from the tumults of the passions, as the Philosopher says, one becomes prudent.

IV. The third inconvenience is that knowledge of God would be had with doubt and admixture of error. For the weakness of reason, together with the mingling of phantasms, makes it happen that even those things most truly demonstrated remain doubtful in the eyes of many, since they do not grasp the force of the demonstration—especially when they see that those who are called wise teach different things. It also happens that among the many truths that are demonstrated, many falsehoods are mixed in, which are asserted by some sophistical or merely probable argument that is taken for a demonstration. Therefore it was necessary that what is to be held concerning God be determined for us through faith.

It is concluded, therefore, that divine mercy wisely provided that it should command those things also which reason can investigate to be held by faith, so that all might become partakers of divine knowledge easily, and consequently quickly, and without doubt or error.

It should be noted first that this weakness of the intellect does not signify an illness or something adventitious beyond nature in our intellect, but rather its natural order among intelligible things. For since it holds the lowest place in such a genus, and is a most imperfect thing—just as prime matter is in the genus of material things—it therefore has by its own nature that it be feeble in grasping truth and easily deceived.

It should be noted, second, that although phantasms serve our intellect for understanding, the admixture of phantasms nevertheless impedes the knowledge of truth concerning immaterial things in many. For since they are likenesses only of material things determined to here and now, some who understand through such phantasms cannot understand that anything exists in the nature of things which is not material and determined to some definite place; on account of which they fall into many errors about immaterial things. Therefore, the very admixture of phantasms in our intellection, although necessary for us in order to understand, is yet a weak and disproportionate instrument with respect to immaterial things, and for this reason it is frequently the cause of error in investigating the truth of such immaterial realities.

The first conclusion is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle, Ephesians 4: "You must no longer walk" etc. It is confirmed secondly by the authority of Isaiah 54: "I will make all your children taught by the Lord", etc.

V. But concerning what was said in the first difficulty, a twofold doubt arises. The first¹⁰ concerns the claim that metaphysics is to be learned last of all. Against this it is argued as follows. First: Metaphysics proves the principles of the other sciences, as Saint Thomas says, Trin. q. v, a. 1, ad 9¹¹. Therefore it ought to precede the other sciences. – The consequence is evident, because every science depends upon knowledge of its principles.

Second. Metaphysics supplies principles to all the sciences: as is the mind of St. Thomas in many places, especially Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad 3¹². Therefore etc. – The consequence is proved. Because those things that pertain to metaphysics cannot be known except through metaphysics. If, then, the other sciences use principles that are proper to metaphysics, therefore metaphysics must be included in all the sciences as prior to them. And consequently it must be learned first.

Third. We must always proceed from what is better known to us, as the Philosopher shows in I Posterior Analytics¹³. But the principles that are proper to metaphysics are better known to us than all those handed down in the sciences. Therefore our knowledge must begin from them. Therefore metaphysics is to be learned first.

VI. The second doubt¹⁴ concerns the point that most people are deterred from the inquiry into truth by toil and sadness. For it is argued against this. The inclination of nature is no less than a habit. But a habit produces ease and delight in its proper acts, as is said in II Ethic.¹⁵ Therefore so does nature. If, then, men are inclined by nature toward science and knowledge, the acquisition of science will be easy and delightful. Therefore no one is deterred from it by sloth or toil.

VII. To make the first doubt evident¹⁶, it must first be considered that the first principles and universals of all the sciences can be considered in two ways: in one way, with respect to their truth absolutely; in another way, with respect to the judgment made about them and their defense against those who attack them. In the first way they belong to a single habit per se, which is called intellectus, which Aristotle, in Book VI of the Ethics¹⁷, divides against science and wisdom. In the second way, however, they belong to the metaphysician, as Saint Thomas says, Iª IIae, q. LXVI, a. 5, ad 4: for the metaphysician disputes against those who deny such common principles, because they are constituted from common terms, which fall under the consideration of the metaphysician¹⁸.

It must be considered, second, that although these principles belong to the intellect which is the habit of the principles, according to their truth considered absolutely, and to metaphysics with respect to their examination and defense, they are nevertheless common to all the sciences, insofar as their terms are extended to the terms of the other sciences, and insofar as science has a dependence upon the intellect which is the habit of these principles, as is the mind of Saint Thomas, Iª IIae, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2. Hence it may be said that these principles, as absolutely true, all sciences take from the intellect which is their habit; but as already examined and defended against those who attack them, they take them from metaphysics. Therefore XI Metaph., lect. 1, Saint Thomas says that one science—and he means metaphysics—considers these principles, to which belongs the consideration of the common terms, and from it the other sciences take principles of this kind.

It must be considered, third, as can be gathered from the doctrine of Saint Thomas super Boet. Trin., q. VI, a. 1¹⁹, that we can speak of the sciences in two ways: in one way, with respect to their ordered acquisition; in another way, insofar as they have already been acquired and discovered.

VIII. It is said, therefore, first, that with respect to their acquisition through the discovery of human reason, metaphysics is last: because all the other speculative sciences are ordered to it, and their discovery presupposes the discovery of metaphysics. And according to this reasoning, nothing belonging to metaphysics, as metaphysical, needs to be understood beforehand; but well indeed is the knowledge of the first principles known by the habit which is intellect, and this precedes the discovery of any science whatever, since no science has perfectly the character of a science except insofar as it depends upon such a habit.

It is said second, that if we speak of the sciences as they have already been discovered, then it is not unfitting that other sciences use metaphysical principles as already examined and defended against their attackers by metaphysics.

It is said third, that metaphysics need not on this account be learned before the other sciences. First, because the metaphysical habit is concerned first and principally with being and the passions of being, and also with separate substances; but not with principles of this kind, since they are not conclusions demonstrated in metaphysics. – Second, because the other sciences receive those principles on loan from metaphysics; and therefore it is not necessary that this habit be possessed beforehand, but it suffices that it be discovered and acquired at some time, even after the other sciences. Hence the other sciences believe these principles of metaphysics, namely, that they have been examined and defended by it, although they see them as having their dependence from the intellect of those very principles.

IX. To the first argument, however, the opposite is said: that metaphysics is not said to prove the principles of the other sciences in such a way that they are known demonstratively through the habit of metaphysics, just as a subalternating science is said to prove the principles of a subalternated science; but because through these common principles, according to some consideration pertaining to metaphysics, the principles of the other sciences are made manifest, while all sciences depend on the habit of those principles, which is called intellectus; and while they are resolved into those principles, naturally known but borrowed by the metaphysician according to some consideration, namely insofar as they are principles proper to no single science but common to all, although they are considered more principally by the metaphysician.

To the second it is said that metaphysics does not furnish its principles to the other sciences while it is considered in them according to the order of discovery and acquisition, as was said²⁰; but it furnishes them insofar as all the sciences, once discovered, are understood, inasmuch as all the sciences now receive from metaphysics those principles mutually, as confirmed and defended by it, although they are naturally known in themselves. Hence it does not follow that metaphysics must be learned before the other sciences.

To the third it is said first, that the first principles according to their absolute truth are known to us prior to all the sciences. But with respect to their examination and defense against those who attack them, they are known later. – It is said second, that because according to their truth they belong to the intellect which is their habit, but according to their examination and defense they belong to metaphysics, it does not follow that metaphysics precedes the other sciences, but only the intellect which is their habit, implanted in us by the natural light of the agent intellect.

X. To the second doubt²¹ it is said first that not every inclination of nature is like the inclination of a habit. For, as St. Thomas holds, Truth q. XXIV, a. 10, ad 1, natural inclination toward something is twofold: in one way, when it has within itself a sufficient principle from which that thing follows of necessity; in another way, when it does not have within itself a sufficient principle from which that thing would follow necessarily—as it is natural for a woman to conceive a child, and for free choice to tend toward the good. The first kind of natural inclination therefore produces ease and delight in operation in those who possess cognition, and it resembles the inclination of a habit. But with the second there remains difficulty and labor in acquiring that toward which the inclination is natural, and on account of the labor someone can be deterred from its acquisition. And thus it happens in appetite as in science.

It is said second, that although a habit of itself produces facility in operation, nevertheless, on account of some impediment arriving from without, as is said in I-II, q. 65, a. 3, ad 2, one who has a habit suffers difficulty in operating, and consequently feels no delight. So likewise a man can be withheld from the acquisition of knowledge, even though he has a natural inclination to it, by the labor of learning and other causes, as Saint Thomas says, Metaphysics I ²² For, as he himself also says in Metaphysics V, the chapter on the Necessary ²³, the impulse of natural inclination can be impeded in the pursuit of what has already been begun, and prevented from beginning its motion.

On the contrary, natural desire is not altogether in vain: because nature does nothing in vain, as is said in II On the Heavens ²⁴ Therefore, given that a man may for a time be hindered from the acquisition of knowledge, nevertheless at some point his desire will be fulfilled and the hindrances will cease.

It is answered that, although the natural desire consequent upon the whole of nature cannot be entirely frustrated without being fulfilled in some individual, it is nevertheless not unfitting for it to be frustrated in certain individuals: especially when such a desire is an elicited act of the will; and most of all if there is not in reality a completed principle from which that to which the natural inclination is directed must necessarily follow; just as it is not unfitting for a woman to remain perpetually without offspring, although she is naturally inclined to it.

It could also be said that this natural desire will be fulfilled in the soul separated from the body: as Porphyry said, it will then be blessed, even though, while joined to the body, it does not attain beatitude ²⁵.

As to the second point ¹, the following conclusion is set forth: It is necessary that divinely believed truths, which exceed human reason, be proposed to man. But before it is proved, an argument for the opposite is introduced, which some could bring forward ². For divine wisdom provides for each thing according to the mode of its nature. Therefore it does not seem necessary that something be given to man above the capacity of his nature.

Then he proves the conclusion with four arguments. But it must be noted, with respect to the conclusion, that since the necessary for an end is said in two ways, according to Aristotle, V Metaphysics ³—namely, simply, and with respect to well-being—the conclusion must be understood of both. Hence the first argument proves it of what is necessary simply; the others, however, of what is necessary with respect to well-being.

I. The first argument, then, is this. By divine providence human beings are ordered toward a higher good than the frailty of our present human life can experience. Therefore we had to be called to something higher than what our reason can reach in this present life. — The antecedent will be proved below, in the third book. — The consequence is proved as follows. For no one tends by desire and striving toward anything unless it is previously known to him. Since, then, man strives by desire and effort toward that to which he is ordered by divine providence, it is necessary that he have prior knowledge of it.

This argument is first confirmed by a comparison of the Old and New Law. For since in the Christian religion spiritual and eternal goods are promised, many things are set forth in it that exceed human understanding; but in the Old Law, because temporal goods were promised, few things were proposed that would exceed human reason.

It is confirmed secondly from the laws of the philosophers. For the philosophers, wishing to lead men from the delights of sensible things to honorableness, showed that there are other goods preferable to sensible ones, in whose enjoyment those who devote themselves to the active or contemplative virtues are delighted with far greater sweetness.

2. On this point, it must be noted that "desire" is sometimes taken for the act of the sensitive or rational appetite tending toward something not yet possessed, and sometimes for any appetite and inclination whatsoever toward something, even if it follows upon a natural form. Therefore what is said in no one is moved by desire except toward something previously known is to be understood of desire as an elicited act of the appetite, not of an inclination following upon a natural form; because although such desire also follows upon some cognition, since the work of nature is the work of intelligence, as is said in Book II of the Physics ⁴, it does not nevertheless follow upon the cognition of the thing desiring naturally.

But this argument of St. Thomas seems not to conclude, for the opposite of the consequent seems to stand together with the antecedent. For something can be known by us naturally, and yet we shall not be able to attain it by our own power: just as, although someone may naturally know the nature of ruling, he will nevertheless not be able to be a ruler by his own powers.

It is answered that the point of the argument does not stand in this, that supernatural knowledge is necessary for us because we are ordered to an end which we cannot attain by our own power; but because we are ordered to an end which we can neither attain nor know by natural faculty, according to that of Isaiah 64 ⁵: "Eye has not seen, O God, apart from you, what you have prepared for those who wait for you." Thus the consequent does not stand opposed to the antecedent. For it is not the case together that the intellect is not raised to what is above its nature, and yet that man is ordered to what cannot be known naturally. For if these stood together, then something would be moved by desire and striving toward the unknown: for it would know the end neither naturally nor supernaturally.

3. For the first confirmation, it must first be noted, as is taught in Iª IIᵃᵉ, q. 107, a. 1, that the Old Law and the New are not distinguished as though they were ordered to different ends, the Old to temporal goods and the New to spiritual ones; but rather because, though they have the same end, namely that men be subjected to God, the New orders them more closely to this end, while the Old does so more remotely, and they are compared to one another as the imperfect to the perfect. For the Old Law, because it was given to the imperfect, who had not yet received grace, led men to the observance of the divine precepts by fear of punishments and the promise of temporal goods; whereas the New Law, which is given to the perfect, who have already received grace and faith through baptism, leads men to virtue from the very goodness of virtue itself, and especially of charity. Now, when it is said that the Christian religion promises spiritual goods, while the Old Law promises temporal ones, this is not to be understood as though the men of the Old Law held temporal goods as their end, while the men of the New Law hold spiritual ones; but because through temporal goods those men, being imperfect, were led to the love of God and to spiritual things; whereas we, possessing the perfection of grace, are moved to virtue, and especially to charity, from the very consideration of spiritual things in themselves.

It must be noted, second, that although the faith of the moderns and of the ancients is one, as Saint Thomas holds in Verit. q. xiv, a. 12, nevertheless men in the time of grace are held to believe explicitly more things than in the time of the written Law, as he says there in art. 11. Therefore what is said here, because many things are proposed to us above human sense, but few to the men of the Old Law, is to be understood explicitly: for implicitly the ancients believed all that we believe, as Saint Thomas wills in the place cited above ⁶.

4. For the second confirmation, it must first be noted, as is taught in II-II, q. 179 and 180, that some virtues belong to the contemplative life, such as the virtues that perfect the speculative intellect, of which wisdom is one: for the contemplative life has as its end the contemplation of truth. Others, however, belong to the active life, such as the moral virtues, which are ordered to action: for the end of the active life is exterior operation.

It must be noted, second, that although sensible delights are, with respect to us, more intense than spiritual ones—because sensible things are better known to us, and because such delights occur together with a bodily alteration, and because they are sought against bodily discomforts—spiritual delights are nevertheless greater in themselves, as is said in I-II, q. 31, a. 5, and in IV Sent., d. 49, q. 3, a. 5, because spiritual perfection is nobler than bodily perfection and better suited to the rational nature, and for other reasons which Saint Thomas adduces in those places. Therefore he says here that those who devote themselves to the active or the contemplative life are delighted by the taste of spiritual things, because the delights which those experience who serve the contemplative life—which consists in the contemplation of truth—or indeed the active life, which is assigned to the exercise of the moral virtues, are far better simply and according to their own nature than any bodily and sensible pleasures whatsoever.

II. The second argument. We have a truer knowledge of God from the fact that we possess this truth through faith. Therefore this is useful to us. — The antecedent is proved. Then we truly have knowledge of God when we believe that esse itself is above everything we can think concerning it, since the divine nature exceeds man's natural faculty. But through the fact that certain things divine are proposed to man that exceed human reason, there is confirmed in us the conviction that God is something above all that we can think. Therefore, and so on.

It must be noted that, since we cannot see the divine essence as it is in itself, nor do we know God quidditatively; whatever predicates we attribute to him fall maximally short of the divine perfection, inasmuch as God is something more excellent. Hence one who supposed that there is in God only that perfection which can be investigated of him naturally would be deceived, wishing to equate the divine nature with a created intellect. But if he judged that God is more excellent than all that we know of him by natural investigation, he has a truer knowledge, approaching more nearly to his nature with his knowledge. For knowing this, the revelation of certain divine things helps us, which no one could ever have investigated by his own ingenuity.

III. The third reason. Human presumption, the mother of error, is thereby checked. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved. For there are some who presume so much upon their own ingenuity that they think only what seems true to them is true of God, and that whatever does not seem so to them is false. This rashness is checked, however, when certain things are proposed by infallible truth which exceed their understanding.

Fourth argument. Much perfection is acquired by human reason from knowledge and faith, however slight, concerning such things. Therefore etc. — The antecedent is proved from the authority of Aristotle in Book X of the Ethics, where against Simonides he says that a man ought to draw himself toward the immortal and divine as far as he can; and in Book XI On Animals, that even a small perception of the higher substances is more loved and desired than all the cognition we possess of lower substances; and in Book II On the Heavens, that when questions about celestial bodies can be resolved by a small and topical solution, it happens that the hearer's joy is intense. For from these it is held that however imperfect the cognition of the noblest things may be, it confers the greatest perfection upon the soul.

IV. It must be noted that St. Thomas does not resolve the argument made to the contrary at the beginning of the chapter, but leaves it as resolved from what has been said. For the consequence is denied. Since human nature is ordered by divine providence to a supernatural end, therefore divine providence provided for it supernatural cognition, just as for the attainment of its natural end it provided natural principles.

V. Scotus, in question I of the Prologue of the Sentences, agrees with us on two points: first, that it is necessary for some knowledge to be handed down to us supernaturally; second, that the end to which human nature is ordered, namely God seen in His essence, is not naturally knowable by us in this present state. He disagrees, however, on this point: he holds that end to be natural, though to be attained supernaturally. Saint Thomas, on the other hand, in the first argument of this chapter and elsewhere ⁷, holds that man's ultimate end, which is God, is supernatural and to be acquired supernaturally.

Scotus proves his claim first by the authority of Augustine, Book I, On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 5, where he says: Therefore, to be able to have faith, just as to be able to have charity, belongs to the nature of men; but to have faith, just as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful. Therefore, to be able to have faith and charity belongs naturally to man. Hence also to be able to have the end to which faith and charity dispose him.

Second. Man naturally desires that end which you call supernatural. Therefore he is naturally ordered to it. And consequently it is a natural end.

2. But against this position of Scotus, insofar as it differs from Saint Thomas, the argument runs thus. If God were a natural end, that is, one toward which nature inclines, but to be acquired supernaturally, it would follow that nature inclines its subject toward something to which it would be impossible for it to be brought. This, however, seems false in all natures. And it also conflicts with reason: for then the natural appetite would be in vain in nature, since by no means could it be fulfilled through nature. Therefore, and so on.

3. But a doubt arises concerning this. For it seems that St. Thomas holds the same view as Scotus, in Boet. Trin., q. ult., a. ult., ad ult. ⁸ For there he says that, although man is inclined by nature toward his ultimate end, he cannot nevertheless attain it naturally, but only through grace.

It is answered that Scotus understands natural inclination and the natural end in one way, and Saint Thomas in another. For Scotus himself takes natural inclination for a merely natural inclination consequent upon nature and excluding cognition, which is not an elicited act, as is clear from him in Book IV, d. 49, q. 10. Likewise he speaks of the ultimate end materially, that is, of that in which the character of the ultimate end is found. Saint Thomas, however, by natural inclination understands not an inclination of nature opposed to the inclination that follows cognition, but an act elicited by the will which is natural and determinate with respect to the specification of the act, but not with respect to its exercise. Likewise he speaks of the ultimate end in general and under the common character of ultimate end and beatitude, as will be declared below. And the sense of his words is that if the ultimate end and beatitude are proposed to the will in common, the will indeed can elicit or not elicit an act concerning that object; but if it elicits an act concerning it, that act will be one of pursuit, and the will cannot flee such an object, although man cannot arrive at that good by his own power. Now it is not unfitting that man be inclined to something by an act of the will natural in the manner described, and yet be unable to attain it by his own power: because although natural power does not suffice for reaching it, it is nevertheless proposed to the will under the character of something appetible in every respect and having no defect of good, whence the will has it that it cannot reject it. But it is indeed unfitting that something be desired by an appetite which is only the inclination of nature, and yet man be unable to reach it by any natural power: because nature of itself has no inclination except within the limits of nature.

4. But Scotus's arguments do not compel. For when Augustine says that it is possible for faith to be of the nature of man, this is not said because there is in man a natural potency for faith and charity and the supernatural end, but because in the nature and substance of man there is an obediential potency for these things, and also a logical potency, which is non-repugnance. For it is not repugnant to the nature of man to have faith and charity, as it is to the nature of a stone. Indeed, to the nature of man there has been given a capacity for those things by which man may arrive at the supernatural end: as can be gathered from what is said in Verit. q. XIV, a. 10, ad 1. Hence Augustine's meaning is that in the nature of men there is a capacity and aptitude for faith and charity, which is not found in other material natures.

To the second, the antecedent is denied, if man is taken simply with respect to his natural endowments. For man, considered in his nature, does not naturally desire the vision of the divine essence as it is the highest good and ultimate end to which intellectual nature is ordered by divine providence — for this is how we are now speaking of the vision of the divine essence. But if man is taken as informed by divine revelation and by faith, such that his ultimate end and highest good is the clear and perfect vision of the divine essence, then he does desire it naturally, just as he desires the highest good in general. But then the consequence is denied, namely, Therefore it is natural, in the manner in which we are speaking here of the natural, that is, of that end which is proportioned to nature, and of which nature has a natural capacity, and which can be reached by nature's own powers; for this is how something is called natural among the philosophers, unless we wish to misuse words.

After St. Thomas had determined the mode of knowing divine truth insofar as it concerns the teacher, he now determines the same matter insofar as it concerns the learner¹. And he sets down this conclusion: Those who offer faith to a truth to which human reason provides no experience do not believe lightly. First it is proved simply; second, comparatively with respect to the law of Mohammed².

I. The first argument, then, is this. To believe the divine Wisdom revealing is not a matter of levity; rather, it is a matter of prudence. But these things of which we speak have been revealed by the divine Wisdom. Therefore it is not levity to believe them. — The major premise is manifest, in that the divine Wisdom can neither err nor deceive us. — The minor premise, however, is proved as follows. Revelation and manifestation of certain things through visible works that surpass the capacity of nature comes only from him who is above created nature. But the things that belong to faith are confirmed in just such a way, namely by things that surpass every capacity of nature. Therefore, and so on.

The minor is proved by running through the miracles. First, for the confirmation of the faith there were made miraculous cures of diseases, raisings of the dead, miraculous transformations of heavenly bodies, and many other things concerning bodily matters, of which knowledge has been handed down to us both in the Old and in the New Testament. — Second, there was an inspiration of human minds above nature, when the unlearned and simple, filled with the gift of the Holy Spirit, attained in an instant the highest wisdom and eloquence. — Third, there was a conversion of the world, miraculous and above nature. For not by the power of arms or by the promise of pleasures, but from the contemplation of divine works, even amid the tyranny of persecutors, an innumerable throng, not only of the simple but also of the wisest men, flew to faith in Christ; in which are preached things exceeding human understanding, the pleasures of the flesh are restrained, and all things that are in the world are taught to be held in contempt. For this is the greatest of miracles, and a work of divine inspiration, that the souls of mortals have assented to these things. But if anyone were to say that this happened by chance and suddenly: Saint Thomas presses the point that God foretold through many oracles of the prophets beforehand that he would do this, which is a sign of divine disposition, not of chance. The Apostle touched upon this mode of confirming the faith, Hebrews 2, saying: Which salvation, namely man's, having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by those who heard him, God bearing witness by signs and wonders and various distributions of the Holy Spirit.

From this the following corollary is deduced: namely, that it is not necessary for past signs to be repeated any further — although even now God does not cease to work miracles through his saints. It is proved: because this conversion of the world, so marvelous, to the Christian faith is the effect of past signs; and thus in its effect those signs are seen. But if it were said that the conversion of the world was not brought about by preceding signs, this would be more marvelous than all signs and miracles, if the world, without miracles, was led by simple and lowly men to believe things so arduous, to hope for things so lofty, to do things so difficult. And on that account miracles will no longer be necessary.

II. Second, he proves it by comparison with the law of Mohammed³. For it is no wonder that many adhered to that law, since it promised pleasures and gave precepts conformable to them, loosening the reins toward which the human mind inclines. — Likewise, Mohammed did not confirm his sayings by miracles, but claimed he was sent in the power of arms. This is characteristic of tyrants. — Moreover, those who believed him from the beginning were not wise and learned men, but brutish men dwelling in deserts, utterly ignorant of all knowledge. — Finally, no oracles of prophets preceded it that would bear witness to that law as being established by God. — From this it follows that to believe it is a mark of levity and folly, whereas to adhere to our faith is a mark of the greatest wisdom.

III. Concerning the proof of this conclusion, a doubt arises. For no works, however marvelous, seem to prove with necessity and sufficiently that our Law is from God. For there are no works so great that someone could not, by quibbling, twist them: either asserting that they were done by demons; or that they appeared by illusions, yet were not truly done; or that they were produced by some natural cause. For the magicians of Pharaoh performed almost all the works that Moses did⁴. Similarly among the gentiles many astonishing things occurred resembling the miracles of our faith. Among the Muslims too, many things are said to happen as miracles.

IV. To make evident this difficulty, in which most Christians stumble, we must consider above all that only those things are truly miracles, as is declared below in the third book⁵, which can be done by God alone—whether with respect to the substance of the thing done, or with respect to that in which they are done, or with respect to the manner of doing them, specially beyond the common mode of the governance of the universe. Therefore, when we wish to investigate whether something is truly a miracle, we must examine whether there is anything in it that could not be done by any creature by its own power. And if such a thing is found in it, and it has been done in the truth of reality and not merely according to appearance, we shall assert with certainty that it is a true miracle. We must take care, however, not to attribute to creatures, and especially to immaterial substances, more power than befits them, nor to subtract from their power more than is fitting: lest we judge that things which can be done by God alone can be done by some created power, or believe that things which created power can effect can be done only by divine power; for error concerning true miracles can arise from either.

It must also be considered that, although in things done bodily it is difficult to have truth beyond doubt—because demons, by means of a local transmutation of the air or of some other body, or even by an alteration of the senses, can make many things appear which are not so in truth—nevertheless even in matters of this kind, when all the circumstances are weighed together, what is true can be discerned. For instance, in the raising of the dead: although a demon might enter the body of the deceased and perform in it certain works resembling the works of life, or even alter men's senses in such a way that one who has not revived appears to have revived; nevertheless, if we were to see all the works of life taking place in that body, and in the same manner as before, such that they would appear to all indifferently, and over a long period of time, we would say that the dead man had truly revived, and not merely according to appearance. And similarly concerning other cases.

It must be noted further that, although in some works of the demon there [can] be illusion, there are nevertheless certain miracles in which illusion has no place, as is the change of intellect and will, which are not perceived by the bodily senses. For illusions are produced with respect to bodily things, which are perceived by some sense.

V. It is said, therefore, first, that there are some miracles that are truly and simply such, which admit no calumny, and by which the truth of the teacher is confirmed in the best and most efficacious way. For there are certain things which, if they are granted to have been done in truth—as that at the time of Joshua the sun stood still⁶, or that the sun underwent an eclipse of its light at the Passion of Christ while the moon was in opposition⁷—cannot be denied to have been done by God alone. Similarly with the raising of the dead and the like. Now of such things there are some that no one can deny were done in truth: as with that standing still of the sun, and with the many signs wrought by Christ.

It is said second, that that sudden illumination of the Apostles' minds, brought about by the mission of the Holy Spirit⁸ admits no calumny. For all who heard the apostles speaking in tongues and disputing knew that this was done not merely in appearance but in truth. Nor could it have been done by demons, since this is repugnant to their perverse will, by which they wish to drag men into evil, not to lead them to good. And if anyone should say that this illumination could have been wrought by angels, even granting that, we shall say that, just as other miracles are performed by God through the ministry of angels, so too are the illuminations of men. This will indeed be a confirmation of certain truths preached by unlearned men: for good angels do not deceive, but instruct men concerning divine things. — In like manner, the conversion of men, both unlearned and wise, to the faith of Christ, and their rejection of pleasures to which human inclination is naturally drawn, can be referred to God alone as their author, who alone can change human wills.

It is said third, that unusual signs and true miracles are and are wrought by divine power; this is an argument when he who works miracles in confirmation of his doctrine preaches good morals and lives according to them, and strives to lead men back to God, but does not seek his own advantage, nor makes use of superstitions, and performs wonders concerning things useful, not concerning vanities. For then one can be certain that it is a divine spirit, not a deceptive one, that is at work. On this basis Saint Thomas, II Sent., d. VII, q. III, a. 1, ad 2, distinguishes true signs from false ones.

After St. Thomas had determined the mode of knowing divine truth absolutely, he now determines it comparatively with respect to human reason ¹. In regard to this he does two things: first, he compares the truth that is believed to the truth known naturally; second, in the following chapter, he compares the first truth to natural reason itself.

I. First, therefore, he compares truth to truth. And he sets down this conclusion: The truth of faith is not contrary to the truth naturally implanted in us. Regarding which it must be noted that the first indemonstrable principles, known to us naturally, virtually contain the knowledge of all other things that can be known by natural investigation; and things are true insofar as they accord with the aforesaid principles. Therefore, from the fact that it is shown that the truth of faith is not contrary to the knowledge of the first principles, it is also evident that it is contrary to no other truth naturally known. Now this conclusion is proved in several ways.

First. That which is contrary to the true must be false: since the true is not contrary to the true, but only to the false, as appears from their definitions. But the first principles cannot be false, nor can they even be thought to be false. Likewise, that which is held by faith, so evidently confirmed by God, it is not lawful to believe to be false. Therefore etc.

For the clarification of the greater point, it must be noted that, just as the account of the true consists in the adequation of intellect and thing ², so the account of the false consists in inadequation: for which reason it is said in Metaphysics IV ³ that the false arises from this, that something is said or appears to be which is not, or not to be which is. True knowledge, therefore, will be that by which it is known that a thing is as it is; but false knowledge, that by which it is known that a thing is as it is not. And because to apprehend being and non-being are contraries, as is said in Peri Hermeneias II ⁴, therefore true knowledge and false knowledge are contraries. It is well said, then, that the false is contrary to the true, whereas the true is not, as is evident from their accounts: because an adequate cognition of a thing is not contrary to an adequate cognition of the thing; but rather an inadequate cognition of a thing—by which, namely, it is judged that what is, is not, wherein the account of the false consists—is contrary to the adequate cognition of the thing, by which it is judged that the thing is as it is, wherein the account of the true consists.

It must also be noted, for the clarification of the minor premise, that Saint Thomas speaks in different ways about first principles and about the things that are of faith, in order to show that we have knowledge of these in different manners. For principles must be most true and appear most true, in such a way that they cannot even be thought to be false: as the Philosopher says of this first principle, It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong to the same thing at the same time, IV Metaph.⁵ For although someone might say in words that this is false, he cannot nevertheless think it in his mind: because then contraries would belong to the same thing at once, as the Philosopher argues. But those things which are of faith, although they are in themselves most true, do not yet have their truth apparent to us from the proper notions of their terms; rather, they are judged to be true only in a general way because they have been divinely revealed, as has been confirmed by miracles, as we said in the preceding chapter ⁶ Therefore, to intimate this different manner in which we stand with respect to knowing these things, Saint Thomas said of principles that it is evident that they are most true: but of what is held by faith he said that it is not lawful to believe it to be false.

2. From this reasoning of St. Thomas, the reasoning of Robert Holcot is excluded, in Book I of the Sentences⁷, where he argues that the things which are of faith are against natural reason, because natural reason dictates that the opposite is true. For it is clear from what has been said that this assumption is false.

It is also clear from what has been said that what he assumes in another respect is false, namely, that the articles of faith are contrary to reason not only for rustics but also for the wise: for instance, that a woman should conceive without the seed of a man. For it is said that they are not contrary to the reason of those truly wise. For if such men say that it is impossible for a virgin to conceive, they say this considering the order of secondary causes, but not considering the order of the divine power. And if anyone said this to be impossible for God, they were not truly wise nor truly philosophers. Hence Saint Thomas, on Boethius' De Trinitate, q. II, a. 3 ⁸, says that if anything is found in the sayings of the philosophers contrary to the faith, this is not philosophy, but rather an abuse of philosophy arising from a defect of reason.

II. Second. What is contrary to divine wisdom cannot be from God. But what is contrary to first principles is contrary to divine wisdom. Therefore it cannot be from God. Therefore those things that are held by divine revelation cannot be contrary to natural knowledge.

The minor is proved. What the teacher induces in the soul of the student contains the knowledge of the doctor, unless he teaches fictitiously. But the knowledge of principles naturally known has been implanted in us by God, since God is the author of our nature. Therefore divine wisdom contains these principles. Therefore what is contrary to them is contrary to divine wisdom.

Concerning this argument, it must be noted that the containment by which it is here said that the teacher's science contains the disciple's science is not the virtual containment of an active principle: since, as Saint Thomas says, Iª, q. CXVII ⁹, science is not an active quality, but stands only in the manner of a directive principle in operating. Now the teacher's science is said to contain the disciple's science insofar as it extends to the same knowables and to the same truths to which the disciple's science extends: for it is the same truth that the disciple knows and the master, because the master moves the disciple to know the same things that he himself knows. Hence that containment could be called perfectional and similitudinary: in the way in which a square contains a triangle, and one white thing another white thing.

2. But a doubt arises concerning the last inference. For it does not seem to follow: Divine wisdom contains the principles, Therefore what is contrary to the principles of divine wisdom is contrary to it. For this does not hold: Divine power contains whiteness because it can produce whiteness, Therefore what is contrary to whiteness is contrary to divine power. It will be said that, just as divine power can be the cause of contraries, inasmuch as it contains each of them virtually, so divine wisdom will be able to be the cause of opposed cognitions, as containing both virtually and supereminently. Nor must it follow that, if one cognition be contrary to another, it is therefore also contrary to divine wisdom.

To make this difficulty evident, it must be considered that the containment of which we are speaking here is not, as we have already said, the containment of an active principle, but that of a certain likeness and agreement, insofar as two cognitions agree in the same truth known. And because one cognition is not contrary to another except because they terminate in opposite enunciables—just as the cognition by which a man is judged to be risible is contrary to that by which he is judged not to be risible—therefore, if one cognition is contrary to another, it will also be contrary to that which is like it, since it agrees with it in the object known. For that which is contrary to this human cognition, Man is risible, is contrary to every other cognition, whether angelic or human, by which man is known to be risible. This consequence therefore holds well: Divine wisdom contains the knowledge of first principles; therefore the cognition contrary to the knowledge of those principles is also contrary to divine wisdom; because by this containment nothing else is understood than agreement in that truth known through divine wisdom and the knowledge of first principles.

To the objection, however, it is said that it is not similar: because there the argument concerns only the virtual containment of the active principle, according to which the same thing can contain contraries eminently; but here we speak of a containment proper also to science, which is perfectional and involves a certain likeness, unity, and fittingness in the same object, according to which one knowledge cannot contain opposite knowledges; although divine wisdom is indeed the cause of our natural cognition. — But when it is said that the science of opposites is the same ¹⁰, this is understood, as regards incomplex terms, to mean that the consideration of both opposites pertains to the same science, just as the science of the healthy and the sick is the same; but as regards complex propositions, to mean that by the same science it is known that one part of a contradiction is true and the other false.

III. Third. If such a contrariety existed, our intellect would be impeded from the knowledge of truth. But this cannot be from God. Therefore, etc. — The consequence is proved. By contrary reasons the intellect is impeded from the cognition of truth. Therefore, if contrary cognitions were sent to us by God, our intellect would be impeded from the cognition of truth.

For the proof of the consequence, it must be considered that the contrariety of argumentations is taken from the opposition of the conclusions to which they terminate: because an argumentation is a certain movement of reason, and movements of contraries terminate in contrary terms. It is therefore the same thing for reasons to be contrary as for them to cause contrary cognitions. And it is the same thing for the intellect to be impeded and confounded by contrary reasons as for it to be impeded by contrary cognitions caused by one or the other of them. Now divine wisdom is proportioned to demonstration with respect to this, that it causes cognition in us. On account of this, just as contrary reasons impede the intellect because they cause contrary cognitions, so, if divine wisdom were to cause contrary cognitions in us, it would impede the intellect from the cognition of truth. This cannot be from God by acting (except perhaps on account of a mystery or a utility), but well by not acting, that is, by not infusing the light by which something may be understood: just as neither is sin of fault from God except by not infusing grace.

IV. Fourth. Either these cognitions will be together in the intellect, or, when one arrives, the other departs. Not the first: because contraries cannot be in the same thing at once. Nor the second: because natural cognition always remains; for things that are natural, while the nature remains, cannot be changed. Therefore they are not contraries. — It is confirmed by the authority of the Apostle and of Augustine.

2. But a doubt arises. For it is natural for water to be cold, and yet coldness is removed from it while the water remains, namely when it is heated. Therefore it is false that things which are natural cannot be changed while their nature remains.

It is confirmed. For St. Thomas himself, in II-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 1, says that natural things are always present in immobile things, but not in mobile things, of which kind is human nature. Therefore, although some knowledge is natural to man, it can nevertheless be separated from man while he remains.

3. In answer to these doubts at once, it is said first that "natural," as St. Thomas holds (Book IV, d. 26, q. 1, a. 1), is said in two ways: namely, either of what is caused by the principles of nature with necessity, or of what nature inclines toward. This proposition, therefore—that natural things cannot be changed while their nature remains—is to be understood of natural things in the first way; and it is true both in mobile and in immobile things. But of the natural in the second way it is true only in immobile things, not however in mobile ones: because according to a change of nature even such natural things can be changed and impeded, while the substance remains in its essential perfection. Hence St. Thomas does not contradict himself: for here he speaks of the natural in the first way, but in the cited passage of the natural in the second way.

It is said secondly that it is natural for water to have coldness, yet within a certain latitude: that is, from the essential principles of water there follows some degree of coldness within that latitude, nor can water fail to have some degree of that coldness; indeed, if the coldness were remitted to a degree below that whole latitude, say below the latitude which is from two to six, the nature of water would cease. Therefore, although water, left to itself and unimpeded, is led by nature, so inclining, to the highest degree of that latitude of coldness, it can nevertheless be prevented by violence from the contrary, so as not to have that highest degree of coldness; yet by no heating whatsoever can every degree of coldness be removed from it entirely, its nature remaining. Hence we may say that some degree of coldness is natural to water as caused absolutely by the principles of its nature, and this cannot be removed from water; but other degrees of coldness are natural to water as those to which the nature of water, impediments being removed, leads it; and these can be removed from water by violence and for a time.

Second, Saint Thomas compares the first truth to natural reason¹. On this point he does two things: first, he shows what human reason can do with respect to the things that belong to faith; second, what is useful².

I. First, then, he says that in order to know the truth of faith, which can be most fully known only to those who see the divine substance, human reason can gather probable arguments, but not demonstrative ones. — This is proved. Sensible things, from which human reason takes the principle of its knowledge, bear within themselves some trace of the imitation of God, but not so perfect a one as to make manifest God's substance. Therefore, in order to know those things we believe about God, and which are most fully known only to those who see the divine substance, reason can indeed have probabilities, but not demonstrations.

The antecedent is clear for the first part: because they are effects of God; and an effect has some likeness to its cause. — The second part is also evident from what was said above³: namely, that they are weak and inadequate effects. — Likewise the consequence is known: because an effect, according to its condition, leads to knowledge of its cause.

II. It must be noted, for the explanation of the conclusion, that although faith has certainty in itself, that certainty is accompanied by inevidence: because the things that belong to faith neither appear to be true from the reasons of the terms, nor are they manifest from their resolution to the first principles naturally known, since they are above human reason; but we believe those things to be true only because they have been revealed by God, who is infallible truth. On account of this Saint Thomas says that only for those seeing the divine essence can they be most evidently known. For those who see the divine substance see that the things believed by us concerning the divinity are necessary, because from the reasons of the terms they know that the predicate inheres necessarily in the subject; which relation we cannot now see.

I think that what is said—that human reason can have plausible arguments—must be understood after the faith has been revealed, not before, since the human mind cannot raise itself of its own power to the things that are of faith. Hence Saint Thomas says in Iª, qu. XXXII, a. 1, ad 2, that reason can be brought in to make manifest the Trinity in a way that accords with a Trinity already posited, but not so as to prove sufficiently the trinity of Persons.

It must also be noted that Saint Thomas posits a twofold mode of evidence in these words: which, however, do not suffice for the aforementioned truth to be grasped as it were demonstratively or understood per se. For something becomes evident to the intellect in two ways: namely, either through necessary deduction from principles known per se, and this seems to occur through demonstration; or from the rationes of the terms, and this is said to be known per se to the intellect. Yet both draw their origin from sensible things: because the universal propositions from which demonstration is constituted are known only through experience, as is stated in Book I of the Metaphysics ⁴; likewise the rationes of the terms are deduced from sensible things, as the Philosopher teaches in Book II of the Posterior Analytics ⁵.

III. Secondly, in ⁶, he shows that, however weak such reasonings may be, it is nevertheless useful for the human mind to exercise itself in them: provided only that there be no presumption of demonstrating or comprehending. — This is proved by the authority of Aristotle adduced above: namely, because it is most delightful to be able to gaze upon the highest things even by a small and weak reasoning. — It is proved also by the authority of Hilary in his book On the Trinity, where he says: Begin to run through these things by believing.

Finally, Saint Thomas, bringing his prologue to a close, declares from what has been said his intention with respect to the manner of proceeding ¹. He first observes that, since there is a twofold truth concerning divine things, this duality of truth is not to be taken from the side of God himself, but from the side of our knowledge.

For the understanding of this, it must be considered that, since truth resides in the intellect's being adequate to the thing through its act of understanding—that is, while it apprehends the thing as it is—two elements are included in this: one that is real, namely the act of understanding; and another that belongs to reason, especially in God, namely the relation of adequation to the thing understood. If we speak of truth with respect to the very act of understanding, then in God there is one simple truth; indeed, He Himself is truth most simple, because one most simple intelligence understands the esse of all things. But if we speak of truth with respect to the relation of reason itself, then it is not unfitting that there be many truths in God, according as He is adequate to the many things understood by Him. Yet because He understands these many things in one, namely in His own essence, therefore He is said absolutely to be one simple truth. Our intellect, however, knows different complexes by different acts of understanding. Therefore, according to the multitude of its acts of understanding—not only with respect to the relation, but also with respect to the foundation and the act of understanding—there are many truths in it. When, then, we say that a twofold truth of divine things has been handed down to us, this is not to be understood as though God Himself possesses a twofold knowledge and has handed it on to us; but rather because of those things which God, knowing them in Himself with one cognition, has revealed to us, we possess a twofold cognition and a twofold truth.

Second, we may expound it thus. For truth can be taken in two ways: either, I say, as it is in the thing known, or as it is in the intellect. Here Saint Thomas speaks of truth as it is in the thing known, not however as it is in the intellect. For enuntiabilia about the same thing can be multiplied in two ways: namely, either because there are diverse things in the thing itself from which diverse enuntiabilia are constituted, just as of a musical and white man is understood that he himself is musical and that he himself is white; or because the thing indeed is in itself most simple, lacking all diversity, but nevertheless, because the intellect cannot comprehend it, it forms diverse concepts of it, imperfect and unequal, from which it constitutes diverse true enuntiabilia. The sense of Saint Thomas, therefore, is that this twofold truth, or diversity of true enuntiabilia, is not to be taken on the part of God himself, as if, namely, there were in him diverse things from which the diversity of enuntiabilia might be taken; rather he himself is one and simple truth on the part of the thing, because all the predicates attributed to the divine essence are identical with one another and also with the subject; but it is on the part of our intellect, which understands God in diverse ways and with diverse concepts, knowing some things about him naturally, others indeed through revelation.

II. This having been premised, Saint Thomas goes on to say that, in order to make manifest a truth naturally known, we must proceed both by demonstrative arguments and by probable ones, gathered from the books of the philosophers as well as of the Saints. — From this it is clear that not all the arguments set down by the holy Doctor in this book are to be defended as demonstrative: since he himself says that he wishes to introduce some that are merely probable.

For the manifestation of truth known supernaturally, the aim ought not to be that the adversary be convinced by arguments, but rather that the arguments of the adversaries be resolved, and that the truth be shown forth from the authority of Scripture, confirmed by miracles. It will not, however, be useless to bring forward probable arguments for the exercise and consolation of the faithful, but not for convincing adversaries.

Having set forth the prologue, Saint Thomas proceeds to the manifestation of divine things, which he intends to treat in this work ¹. This book, moreover, is divided into two principal parts, inasmuch as there are two things that are known about God: first, he treats of those things that can be investigated by human reason; second, of those things that have been revealed and exceed human understanding, and this in the fourth book.

As to the first, he makes three points, as he himself shows in the preceding chapter. For in the first book he determines those things that befit God in himself; in the second, the procession of creatures from him; in the third, the order of creatures toward him as toward their end.

Concerning the first, he does three things. For since, in order to consider those things that befit God in himself, it is necessary to know that he is, as it were a necessary foundation, he therefore first sets before that consideration the one by which it is demonstrated that God is. Second, he treats of the divine simplicity, by which we can in some way know what God is, chapter XIV. Third, he shows what sort of being God is, chapter XXVIII.

Concerning the first point: because some judge, for two reasons, that the inquiry into whether God exists is vain, he does two things: first, he removes the said reasons; second, he demonstrates his intended point, in chapter XIII. — Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he inquires into the first cause; second, into the second, in chapter XII. — Concerning the first, he does two things: first, he sets out the arguments of the opponents; second, he resolves them, in the following chapter.

II. As to the first point, then: there were some, says Saint Thomas, who judged the aforesaid consideration superfluous, on the ground that that God exists is self-evident, such that its contrary cannot be thought; and for this reason they said no demonstration is needed for this matter. And this seems to have been the opinion of Anselm, as Saint Thomas reports in Verit. q. X, a. 12. Some confirm this position with several arguments.

The first of these is as follows. That God exists is known as soon as the terms are understood. Therefore it is known per se. — The antecedent is proved: because by the name "God" we understand that than which a greater cannot be thought. But this cannot exist in the intellect alone: for what exists both in the intellect and in reality is greater than that which exists in the intellect alone.

The second is that something greater than God could then be thought, if he himself could be thought not to exist: namely, that which cannot be thought not to exist.

The third is because in God esse and essence are the same. Now those propositions in which a thing is predicated of itself must be most evident.

The fourth is this: that God's existence is naturally known, since man's desire naturally tends toward Him. But those things that are naturally known are known through themselves.

The fifth is, because God is that by which all other things are known, since the divine light is the principle of all intelligible cognition.

The most learned Saint Thomas resolves the arguments set forth above. But in this matter he does two things: first he shows whence the deception of this opinion arises; second, he replies to the arguments ¹.

I. As to the first, he says there are two things that could have led men into this opinion. The first is indeed custom. For since from the beginning men have been accustomed to hear the name of God and to invoke it, and custom—especially that which is from the beginning ²—has the force of nature, therefore it is firmly held that God is, as if this were naturally and per se known. For those things with which the mind is imbued from childhood are held so firmly as if they were naturally and per se known.

The second is that they did not distinguish between what is known in itself simply, and what is known in itself to us. For that God exists is indeed known in itself simply, because God is his own esse. But as far as we are concerned, it is not known in itself, since we cannot conceive in our mind that very thing which is God. Just as that every whole is greater than its part is known in itself simply, yet to one who could not conceive in his mind the notion of the whole it would not be known in itself, but would indeed be unknown. And for this reason it comes about that our intellect stands toward the most evident things of reality as the eye of an owl toward the sun: namely, because we cannot conceive them as they are.

II. For the declaration of this distinction, it must be noted that a proposition is said to be self-evident because it does not need some other prior and better-known proposition for its manifestation, nor can it be demonstrated by another. On account of which St. Thomas says, I P., q. XVII, a. 3, ad 2, and this is the mind of Aristotle, I Posterior Analytics, ³ and of Boethius, in the book De Hebdomadibus, ⁴ that self-evident principles are those which are known as soon as the terms are known. But because a thing has esse in two ways, namely in one way in itself outside the intellect, and in another way insofar as it is conceived and understood by our intellect, therefore we can speak of a thing in two ways: in one way, according to what belongs to it according to its own nature; in another way, of what belongs to it insofar as it is conceived and understood by us. It is not unfitting, however, that something belong to a thing in some way according to its own nature which does not belong to it according to the manner in which it is conceived by us, and conversely. It can therefore happen that the nature of some subject and predicate be such that one is the same as the other, or that one has an immediate order to the other: and therefore, if each of them were conceived as it is in itself, it would at once appear that the predicate is in the subject. But because the nature of the subject and predicate is not comprehended as it is in itself, but rather is conceived weakly and imperfectly, therefore from that knowledge of the subject and predicate it is not at once known that the predicate is in the subject, but something better known to us and prior is needed for its evidence. Such a proposition is then said to be self-evident simply and according to nature, because it is in the nature of the subject and predicate that, if they were known as they are, the predicate would at once appear to be in the subject, nor would anything better known be needed for obtaining its knowledge: yet it is not self-evident to us, because their nature is not perfectly known, and according to those concepts which we form of the subject and predicate, the connection of the predicate with the subject does not at once appear. On account of which such a proposition is not known once the terms are known, as they are conceived by us. But if some proposition be such that both from the nature of the subject and of the predicate, as they are in themselves, once known, the necessary connection of each appears; and their natures are known to us by their proper and perfect concepts: then such a proposition will be self-evident both according to nature, insofar as their natures are such that, once perfectly inspected, the predicate appears to belong to the subject; and with respect to us, insofar as its evidence appears from the concepts of the terms formed of them by our intellect, but not from some previously known proposition.

Since, therefore, if the divine essence were seen as it is in itself, it would at once appear that existence belongs to it, inasmuch as it is one and the same with that essence itself, we rightly say that God's esse is self-evident simply and by nature. But since that existence necessarily belongs to God, as conceived by us, is not evident except as shown from His effects, because we cannot conceive God as He is in Himself, therefore that proposition is not self-evident with respect to us.

III. But a doubt arises in the doctrine of Saint Thomas as to which propositions are known as soon as their terms are known, which are said to be self-evident to the intellect: for it is of these that we speak, not of those that are known to sense, such as that snow is white. For it seems to some Thomists that only those are of this kind in which the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject; and they think this to be true of Saint Thomas on the basis of certain words of his. — But it seems to others that not only those in which the predicate is contained in the account of the subject are self-evident, but also many others, as appears from those which are adduced by Saint Thomas himself as self-evident ⁵, such as, Every whole is greater than its part, and, If equals are subtracted from equals, what remains is equal, and, Incorporeal things are not in a place, and the like. And they say, in particular, that that proposition is also simply self-evident in which a first passion is predicated of its subject.

We may say, however, that being of the reason and definition of a subject can be taken in two ways: in one way, formally, namely as entering into the subject's essence, as animal is of the reason of man; in another way, virtually and consequently, namely as included virtually in the quiddity of the thing and immediately consequent upon the thing's essence, as if we were to say that it is of the reason of fire to be hot, because heat so follows the essence of fire that fire cannot be without being at once hot. If we take "of the reason of the subject" in the first way, then it does not follow that only that proposition is per se known in which the predicate is of the reason of the subject. Nor does Saint Thomas understand it thus. For although with him every such proposition in which the predicate is of the reason of the subject is per se known, yet conversely not every per se known proposition is of this sort, such that its predicate is of the reason of the subject. For he himself, in I Poster., lect. 36, expounding text 38, places among indemonstrable principles the proposition in which it is signified that a passion belongs to its own and immediate subject, and likewise the one in which the passion is denied of such a subject. This also seems to have been the mind of the Philosopher, in the same place.

But if it is taken in the first or second way under the disjunction, then it is true in his view that every proposition is known of itself and simply such that the predicate is included in the account of the subject. For just as between a subject and its definition nothing intermediate falls in between—on account of which the proposition in which the definition is predicated of the defined is immediate and indemonstrable—so too between a subject and its first passion, as far as the side of the thing is concerned, nothing falls as an intermediary, and the subject has from itself, and not through something else, that such a passion befits it. And on this account the proposition in which such a passion is predicated of the subject is indemonstrable and known of itself, and at once, once the nature of the thing and the definition are known, it appears to him that such a passion belongs to it: just as at once, once the nature and definition of a whole are grasped, it appears that the whole is greater than any of its parts; and, once the nature of fire is known, it is at once seen that heat belongs to it.

2. But here the words of St. Thomas in q. 1 of De Veritate, a. 12, create a difficulty. For there he proves that it cannot be said that the esse of any creature is self-evident and evident in itself, because esse is not perfectly included in the concept of any creature, since the esse of every creature is other than its quiddity. From this the argument runs as follows: No less than esse is the first passion, according to his doctrine, other than quiddity. Therefore, if the esse of a creature is not known in itself because it is other than its quiddity, by the same reasoning neither will that proposition be self-evident in which the passion is predicated of its subject.

I would say, as far as occurs to me for now, that in one way esse is other than quiddity, and in another way a passion is other than its subject. For esse is altogether other than quiddity, and is in no way included in the ratio of a creature—neither, that is, as existing identically with the quiddity essentially, nor as necessarily and immediately accompanying the quiddity: since every creature has esse entirely from without, and consequently the subject does not have from itself that esse befits it, but through another. The first passion, however, although it does not enter into the essence of the thing, nevertheless necessarily and immediately follows upon that essence itself, and is produced from it by a certain natural resultantia. On account of this it belongs to the ratio of subject in the second way spoken of. Therefore that it inheres in its subject is known per se; but not that esse inheres in a creature.

IV. But against two statements made in this determination—namely, that a proposition is self-evident in which the predicate is of the essence of the subject in the manner explained; and that it is one thing for a proposition to be simply self-evident, and another for a proposition to be self-evident to us—Scotus argues. For he holds, I Sentences, d. 2, q. 2, that a proposition is self-evident which has evident truth from its proper terms, which are something of it as they are its terms: and that if a proposition in which a defined term is posited as such—that is, importing a confused concept—is evident from itself, then it is self-evident; but if it is not evident from the terms so taken, although it be evident from the definitive concept, such a proposition is not self-evident.

Against the first statement made by us, therefore, it is argued first from the sayings of Scotus as follows. And it is supposed, from I Posterior Analytics, that what a thing is is the middle of a demonstration. Then thus: In the demonstration set out above, the principle is per se known, but the conclusion is not per se known, but demonstrated. Yet in the premise is placed the definition of the terms, while in the conclusion the defined. Therefore, given that the predicate is in the manner expounded above of the definition of the subject, the proposition will not be per se known, but rather that one in which the predicate is attributed to the definition of the subject. — It is confirmed. Because if such a proposition were per se known, then in a demonstration, in which a proposition is demonstrated through the definition of the subject, beyond the impossibility—namely, that what is indemonstrable would be demonstrated—there would be a begging of the question: because the same would be demonstrated by the same, and the equally known by the equally known.

Second. A proposition is self-evident when it has evident truth from its own terms. But the terms are distinct: the distinct concept of a quiddity, as signified by the definition, and the confused concept of the quiddity, as signified by the name. Therefore a proposition is not self-evident with respect to the quiddity taken confusedly—that is, as it is signified by the name—unless the definition of the name is known.

Third. Then every proposition would be self-evident in the special sciences which the metaphysician could have as self-evident from the definitions of the extremes. But this is not so: because the geometer uses as self-evident propositions only those that possess evident truth from terms known confusedly. Therefore, and so on.

2. Against the second it is argued, because a proposition is said to be self-evident since, as far as the nature of the terms is concerned, it is apt to have evident truth contained in the terms, even if no intellect conceives the terms: for, as far as the terms are concerned, it is self-evident to any intellect, if the terms are conceived. Therefore a proposition self-evident in itself and simply does not differ from one self-evident with respect to us.

It can also be argued against this second point from what Aureol says⁶. The intellect conceiving a proposition that is self-evident either directs its intuition upon the concepts from which knowledge of the proposition arises, or upon others. If upon the same ones, then the proposition will be self-evident to it. If upon others, it is no longer the same proposition: since words alone do not make a proposition, but rather concepts. And thus it is wrongly said that the same proposition is self-evident simply, but not with respect to us.

V. For the solution of these questions, it must be known that when we say a proposition is per se known, meaning one that is known from its own terms and not through another proposition, we call that proposition known from its own terms which is recognized as true from the definitions of its terms. But the definition of a term can be taken in two ways. In one way, for the definition considered on the side of the thing according as it is in itself: and that is the definition by which the very quiddity and essence signified by the name is defined and explicated perfectly and according as it is in itself. In another way, for the definition considered on the side of the thing according as it is in our intellect: and that is the definition which our intellect forms of a thing known by it, as it is known by it, distinguishing it from any other thing, even if at times it represents the nature and essence of the thing imperfectly; as happens in the definitions which our intellect forms of God, and which are signified to us by this name "God."

A proposition is therefore said to be simply self-evident when the predicate belongs to the essence of the subject considered on the side of the thing as it is in itself; and such a proposition, if its terms are known according to that definition, is naturally apt to be evident of itself to the intellect. It is said to be known also with respect to us, however, when that concept, which holds on the side of the thing as it is in itself, is likewise formed by our intellect, and the thing is perfectly known by our intellect as it is in itself.

It must also be noted that the concept and definition, on the side of the thing as it is in itself, considered in itself, can be regarded in two ways: in one way, materially, namely with respect to the thing signified and represented absolutely and in itself; in another way, formally, namely with respect to the thing as it underlies such a definition. In the first way, the definition and the defined are the same: for the definition signifies the same thing as the name of the defined. In the second way, they are distinguished: because the definition represents the thing distinctly, while the name represents it confusedly, as is stated in I Physics, text. 5⁷.

From which it follows that between the defined and the first passion no definition intervenes, if both definition and defined are taken materially: for between the essence of a thing and its immediate passion there is no intermediate thing. But if they are taken formally, between subject and predicate there stands as middle the definition of the subject: first is the thing as confusedly conceived; second, the thing as distinctly conceived; third, the passion following.

It follows, second, that the first and immediate passion cannot be demonstrated through the definition of the subject as through a middle cause, if the definition is taken materially; for the definition taken materially is not a middle between the defined and the passion, but is the same thing as the defined. And this is the sense of the words of St. Thomas when he places among indemonstrable principles the proposition in which a passion is predicated of its proper and immediate subject ⁸. But if the definition is taken formally, then such a passion can be demonstrated through it a priori, as through a cause of cognition; and through a cause in some way in being, in the manner in which the prior reason of a thing is the reason why what is second to it inheres in it.

VI. To the first argument of Scotus against the first statement ⁹ it is answered that the conclusion of such a demonstration is demonstrated, and is not self-evident, if all things are taken formally, and that the quiddity serves as the middle term, as we have shown. But if they are taken materially, then the conclusion is indemonstrable, and the quiddity is not the middle term. Therefore the same proposition is not self-evident in the respect in which it is demonstrated, namely when all things are taken formally; and it is self-evident and indemonstrable when all are taken materially. — To the confirmation it is said that, if all things are taken formally, there is no begging of the question there: because the same thing, distinctly conceived, is formally distinguished from itself as confusedly conceived. But if they are taken materially, then there is a begging of the question, and there are only two terms there: because the middle term and the subject of the conclusion are materially the same. Hence St. Thomas, in the treatise on Fallacies ¹⁰, holds that a begging of the question is committed when it is proved that something belongs to a subject because it belongs to the definition: for, knowing the same thing through the definition and that the defined is signified, if he denies that something belongs to the defined, he will also deny that it belongs to the definition.

To the second it is said that definition and the defined are not other terms if they are taken materially. Hence Saint Thomas, in the Questions on Truth ¹¹ and in other places, proves by this that it belongs to the definition of God to be posited, insofar as it is on the side of God, because the predicate is the same as the subject, since essence and esse are one in God.

To the third, the consequence is denied. For it may stand that in metaphysics there are concepts proper to it which hold on the side of the thing, from which a proposition is rendered self-evident, and yet these are not known in the particular sciences. — Likewise it is false that the geometer uses as self-evident only those propositions which have evident truth from terms known confusedly.

VII. To the argument against the second statement ¹², the consequence is denied. For from the fact that some proposition is said to be self-evident because, as far as the nature of its terms is concerned, it is apt to possess evident truth, and that, of itself, it would be known if its terms were conceived, it does not follow that it is known to us. Rather it follows that, because there is such a proposition which is self-evident by its own nature, whose mutually related concepts on the side of the thing are not had by us, therefore it is known in itself but not to us. And some propositions, as Boethius says in the book De Hebdomadibus ¹³, are self-evident to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms, but are not self-evident to the common people—for example, that incorporeal things are not in a place.

To Aureol we say that, when we say that the same proposition is known per se simpliciter but is not known per se to us—if we refer this to those who in no way understand the significata of the terms, as when a Greek speaks to a Latin—then the same proposition is taken both materially and formally: because it is in itself known, but by those people the terms are not understood. If, however, it is referred to those who understand the terms in some way, the proposition is said to be the same materially, namely with respect to the utterance and the thing ultimately signified; but not formally with respect to the concept conveyed. Therefore, when an intellect conceives and somehow understands a proposition that is known per se simpliciter but not to itself, it forms other concepts than those by which it is known per se in itself. And so formally it is another proposition from the one that is simply per se known: but materially it is the same, both on the side of the thing signified and on the side of the utterance.

VIII. With these things premised ¹⁴, Saint Thomas answers the first argument made in the preceding chapter in two ways. First, that not all know, even those granting that God is, that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. Nor can this be understood from the expositions of Damascene.

Second, because, even given that, it is not necessary that something than which a greater cannot be thought exist in the nature of things. For in the same way it is necessary to posit both the thing and the rationale of the name. Nor does it follow except that God is in the understanding.

But against this objection it is said that it is not absurd that, given anything whatever in reality or in the intellect, something greater can be thought, unless for one who grants that there is something than which a greater cannot be thought in the nature of things.

2. Concerning the second reply, in which it is admitted that by the name "God" is signified that than which a greater cannot be thought, yet denied that such a thing must exist in the nature of things, note that regarding that proposition—"In the same way it is necessary to posit both the thing and the meaning of the name"—there is a twofold meaning of a name: namely, formal and objective. The formal meaning is the concept which the intellect forms in itself; the objective meaning is that which, on the side of the thing, corresponds to the concept of the intellect. Now the formal meaning is said to be posited in the thing when there corresponds to it in the thing some objective meaning, which is the thing signified by the name. This proposition, therefore, is to be understood of the formal meaning. For since, as was said ¹⁵, the definition and the defined are materially the same on the side of the thing, if the thing signified by the name is posited in reality, it is necessary that the meaning of the name also be posited in reality—that is, that something existing in reality correspond to the meaning of the name—since the same thing is signified on the side of the thing by the name and by the definition of the name, although what is signified by the name is signified confusedly, while what is signified by the definitive meaning of the name is signified distinctly. For in the same way it is necessary to posit man and rational animal: for if man exists in the nature of things, then rational animal will exist in the nature of things; but if man were only in the intellect, then rational animal would be in the intellect too. Yet from the fact that it is conceived in the mind that this name "God" is uttered, it does not follow that God exists except in the intellect: just as from the fact that it is conceived that this name "void" is uttered, it does not follow that the void exists except in the intellect. Hence, on account of such a conception, it is not necessary that that than which a greater cannot be thought exist except in the intellect.

But when it is urged: "That which exists both in the intellect and in reality is greater than that which exists in the intellect alone. But nothing is greater than God, as is evident from the meaning of the name. Therefore, from the very meaning of the name, it follows that God exists in reality as well, and not only in the intellect" — the reply is given that the minor premise is not true unless it is supposed that God, or something than which a greater cannot be thought, exists in reality. For one who denied that God exists, or that there is anything in reality than which a greater cannot be thought, would say that something can be greater than God, namely that which exists in reality. And when it is proved from the meaning of the name, the reply is given that although by the name "God" is signified that than which a greater cannot be thought, nevertheless that being does not exist in reality.

But it must be noted — since St. Thomas says that it is not inconsistent that something greater can be thought than any given thing, whether in reality or in the intellect, except for one who grants that there is something in the nature of things than which nothing greater can be thought — that if it is not granted that what is signified by this name "God" exists in the nature of things, that which is signified is nothing entitatively and really, although it is something in thought esse: just as is the case with what is signified by the name "void." Therefore it is not inconsistent that something greater be thought than it: because whatever real being, having esse in nature, is thought, that will be worthier and greater: just as a being is nobler than a non-being. Hence that real being, say a man, is nobler as thinkable than God, supposing that what is signified by this name God is nothing in nature but only in thought. — But this is to be understood simply, and with respect to the esse of nature, not however with respect to thought esse. For, although God were not in nature, nevertheless what is signified by this name God is greater than what is signified by this name man, if each is taken only in thought esse: although what is signified by this name man is greater simply and in the esse of nature, just as a being than a non-being, as we said.

IX. To the second, Saint Thomas denies this consequence: God can be thought not to exist, Therefore something greater than God can be thought. For it would be sound if the possibility of thinking him not to exist arose from the imperfection of his esse or from uncertainty, since he would then be an imperfect being; but not if it arises from the weakness of our intellect, which cannot behold him.

It must be noted, however, that the case is not the same for these two propositions: It can be thought that there is something that cannot be thought not to be, and, There can be something in the nature of things that cannot be thought not to be. The first, which the argument assumes, is indeed true: for in thinkable esse it is not unfitting that there be something that cannot be thought not to be. But the second is false: because nothing can be in the nature of things that cannot be thought not to be; since even that God does not exist can fall within human thought, in accordance with that verse of the Psalm ¹⁶: The fool said in his heart: There is no God.

It must be noted further that the following consequence, something greater than God can be thought, is false if we suppose that God exists and that by the name "God" is signified that than which a greater cannot be thought. And because the argument seems to proceed on that supposition, therefore Saint Thomas denies the consequence; but not the falsity of the consequent, as he seems to deny in replying to the first argument, in which it is not supposed—indeed it is denied, given the position of those who hold that God does not exist—that there is anything in reality than which a greater cannot be thought. Hence there is no contradiction when, in his reply to the first argument, he grants that something greater than God can be thought, while here he seems to admit that this is false: for there he answers that, such a thing not being admitted to exist, there is nothing in nature than which a greater cannot be thought; but here he answers on the supposition made by the arguer that something of that kind exists in nature.

X. To the third he responds that to those who see the divine essence it is indeed known that God is per se; yet it is not per se known to us, who arrive at knowledge of him through his effects.

To make this evident, it must first be known that, although a proposition in which the same thing is predicated of itself is simply self-evident, since the predicate not only belongs to the account of the subject but is also wholly identical with the subject, nevertheless with respect to us it may fail to be self-evident, either because we are ignorant of the meanings of the terms, as happens to a Latin speaker with the proposition Anthropos est anthropos, or because we do not know evidently that the predicate is identical with the subject, and this is the case with the proposition Deus est. For since we do not see the divine essence as it is in itself, neither can we comprehend its esse per se, so as to see from the terms, as they are conceived by us, that esse is not distinct from its essence; rather, we arrive at that knowledge through its effects. But for the blessed this is most evident, because they behold the divine essence itself.

2. To the fourth he says that man desires God naturally insofar as he desires beatitude, which is a certain likeness of the divine goodness. Therefore it is not necessary that God himself, considered in himself, be naturally known to man, but only his likeness.

To make this evident, it must be known that man is said to desire beatitude naturally, which is a certain likeness of God, and thus to know God in His likeness—not because he desires beatitude under this particular aspect, namely the vision of the divine essence, for neither is it known naturally nor desired naturally, speaking absolutely; but because he desires beatitude in common, since each person wills to be blessed. And in whatever the account of beatitude is placed, that is a certain likeness of divine goodness.

3. To the fifth he says that all things are indeed known to God, not as first known, but because through His influence all knowledge is caused in us.

Having excluded the first cause for which some thought it vain to inquire whether God is, Saint Thomas now excludes the second ¹, which seems to stand opposed to the first.

I. For there were some, as Rabbi Moses relates ², who said that God's existence is neither known in itself nor can be demonstrated, but is held only by faith; they were moved to this by the weakness of the arguments which some brought forward to prove that God exists.

There are, however, three (1). The first. In God, esse is the same as essence. But by the way of reason one cannot arrive at knowledge of what God is. Therefore neither can one arrive at knowledge of whether He is.

Second. The principle for demonstrating whether a thing is, is the account of the name. This, however, is the definition, according to Aristotle, Metaphysics IV. And this cannot be had of God. Therefore, and so on.

The third is this. Those things which exceed sense and sensible things are indemonstrable, because the principles of demonstration take their origin from sense. Now that God exists is of this kind. Therefore, etc.

II. But Saint Thomas refutes this opinion in four ways. First, from the art of demonstration, by which we are taught to conclude causes from effects. For from the fact that we see something to have been effected in things, we can demonstrate and conclude, as Aristotle argues, that there must be a first cause, which we call God ³.

2. Second, from the order of the sciences. For if there were no knowable substance above sensible substance, there would be no science above natural science. But it is evident that divine science is above natural science. Therefore there must be some knowable substance above sensible substance.

But this argument seems to fail, for two reasons. First, because, even given that there were a knowable substance above sensible things, it does not nevertheless follow that its esse could be demonstrated. For it could be supposed that it exists, and other predicates about it be known through demonstration.

Second, because for some science to be above the natural, it suffices that there be some immaterial substance about which there can be science; it is not necessary that God exist and that what is of God be known through demonstration.

To the first of these it is said that, since the existence of the subject of any naturally discovered science is presupposed, that existence must either be known through the senses, or be self-evident from the terms, or be demonstrated in that science itself or in another. Since therefore the existence of God, of whom metaphysics treats, is not known through the senses, nor from the terms, as the aforementioned opinion ⁴ holds, it must necessarily be demonstrated. The metaphysician therefore cannot demonstrate anything about God from the supposition that He exists, unless it be demonstrated either through Him or through another.

To the second, one may reply in two ways. First, that if there were no other knowable substance besides those immaterial ones which the philosophers investigated by natural reason to be the movers of the heavenly bodies, there would be no divine science: because the consideration of those would belong to natural philosophy, to which it pertains to consider both things that move themselves and their parts.

Second, that which St. Thomas intends, in order to preserve the claim that an intelligible substance must be posited above sensible substances—that is, that there be a genus of separate substances, under which God is also contained, using the term "genus" in a broad signification. Since this is demonstrated to exist, it follows that God's existence is demonstrated, at least under the common aspect of immaterial substance.

3. Third, the aforementioned opinion is refuted by the zeal of the philosophers, who have attempted to demonstrate that God exists.

Fourth, by the authority of the Apostle, in Romans 1, who says: The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood through the things that have been made.

III. But to the first argument on the opposite side ⁵ Saint Thomas replies that esse can be taken in two ways: in one way, as signifying the actual existence by which a thing exists; in the other way, as signifying the composition of the intellect. If it is taken in the first way, then it is true that God is His own esse; but what this is like is unknown to us, just as His essence is. If, however, it is taken in the second way, then God's being falls under demonstration. — But supply: In this way esse is not understood when it is said, In God essence and esse are the same.

To make this answer evident, it must be noted that, since in every proposition "est" signifies the composition of the proposition, inasmuch as it is a kind of copula and conjunction of the predicate with the subject, sometimes in a proposition, beyond the composition of the proposition, it also signifies actual existence, as when it is said, "Socrates is"; but sometimes it signifies only the truth of the proposition, that is, the composition which the intellect forms concerning the thing, that is, that the intellect, in forming such a composition, is adequate to the thing, and on this account is true; as, when we say that man is an animal, it is signified that the intellect, understanding animal of man, apprehends it as it is in the thing. Similarly, when we say "blindness is," because blindness is not a being in the nature of things but only a negation, it is signified that the intellect, apprehending something as lacking the power of sight, is adequate to the thing: for "est" does not signify actual existence, even in a proposition of second apposition, unless it is attributed to a real being; but it signifies only the composition of the proposition.

(1) There are, however, three. — Has something fallen out of the text of the Ferrariensis? Cf. below n. III, To the first argument on the opposite side. Certainly the arguments that follow are not among those "which some used to bring forward to prove that God exists": rather they pertain to the support of the error of those who say that God's existence cannot be demonstrated.

It must also be known that we are in one state when we know that God is, and in another when we know that Socrates is. For since esse in Socrates is really distinct from his essence, it is nothing other than the actuality by which Socrates exists. Therefore the esse of Socrates is then known completely when it is known that through it Socrates exists in reality. And this indeed must be known when it is known that Socrates is, since Socrates is a true real being. — But the divine esse does not differ really from the divine essence, but only by reason, on the part of our intellect, when we apprehend the divine essence under the aspect of an actuality of being proportioned to created esse. Therefore the divine esse is not apprehended perfectly and completely when it is known to be that actuality of being by which God exists in reality, but only when it is known that it is the divine essence, which is ipsum esse subsistens. Rightly therefore Saint Thomas says that through the demonstration by which we know that God is, we do not know the esse by which God subsists in himself, that is, with perfect and complete quidditative knowledge, just as we do not know the divine essence as it is in itself; but we know the esse that signifies the composition of the intellect — that is, we know that esse belongs to God as an actuality of being, but because we know only the composition which the intellect makes of a thing with its adequate esse, and that the intellect thus composing is true, and thus that it is so in reality as the intellect understands it. This, however, presupposes knowledge of the divine esse as it is an actuality of being, and grounds the truth of the proposition, but not as regards its very quiddity as it is in itself.

By this the objection of Scotus is removed, I Sent., d. III, q. 1, who says that "si est" need not be distinguished as it is a question about the truth of a proposition, or as it is a question about the esse of God: because, as he says, if there can be a question about the truth of a proposition in which esse is sought of a subject as a predicate, then in order to conceive the truth of that question one must first conceive its terms. — For it is said that indeed in such a question the esse of God is first conceived: yet not by a perfect and quidditative concept, but only as it is the actuality of essendi.

IV. To the second argument ⁶ Saint Thomas replies by denying that in the arguments by which it is demonstrated that God exists, the divine essence and quiddity must be assumed, that is, the very definition, of which it is said in Metaphysics IV that the ratio signified by a name is its definition. But in place of the quiddity an effect is taken, from which the ratio of this name "God" is drawn: as happens in demonstrations quia.

For the understanding of this response, note that the reason assumed to demonstrate whether it is of something is the definition of what the name means, quid nominis, and not the quidditative definition, which is called the definition of what the thing is, as Saint Thomas says in Prima, q. II, a. 2 ⁷; and it is stated in II Poster. ⁸: for the question of what the thing is follows the question of whether it is, as is clear from II Poster. Now this sort of "what" of the name God is taken from the divine effects. Hence the demonstrations by which that God exists is shown are a posteriori on the part of the thing, but a priori on our part: because the effects of God are more known to us than God himself. Therefore Saint Thomas says that one need not use the quiddity of God as the middle term for proving that God exists, but only his effect: this is to say that one need not use as the middle term what the thing God is, but what the name means, taken from the effect.

V. To the third argument ⁹ Saint Thomas replies that the origin of this knowledge is indeed in the senses: because the effects of God, from which the demonstration is taken to prove His esse, are sensible; although God exceeds all sensible things and sense itself.

It must be noted that from this response Saint Thomas gives us to understand that the cognition of a thing can be understood as originating from sense in two ways. In one way, because the thing itself must first be known in itself through sense before anything about it is known through the intellect. And in this sense the proposition is false: for we know many things about God and the intelligences, and yet neither God nor the intelligences fall under sense in themselves. — In another way, because either the thing itself must fall under sense, or the intellect must be led by the hand to its cognition through something that falls under sense. And then the proposition is true, as experience also teaches: for we find that concerning immaterial substances we have no cognition except insofar as we arrive at knowledge of them from sensible things.