Apologeticae sive Theologiae Fundamentalis, Tomus II (Pars Altera): Demonstratio Catholica

1. To the infallible definitions of the Church a firm faith must be given, as is evident of itself. Yet this faith is diverse, according as the definitions pertain to the revealed truths themselves (the direct object of infallibility) or to truths connected with revelation (the indirect object of infallibility). If a definition pertains to the revealed truths themselves, the assent due to it is called divine faith; but if a definition pertains to truths connected with revelation, the assent due to it is called ecclesiastical faith. The former rests immediately on the authority of God, only mediately on the authority of the Church; the latter rests immediately on the authority of the Church, only mediately on the authority of God, who preserves the Church from error.¹ Both kinds of faith, namely divine and ecclesiastical, must have the same firmness of assent above all things, since both rest on infallible authority. He who denies a truth pertaining to divine faith is a heretic; he, however, who denies a truth pertaining to ecclesiastical faith is not indeed a heretic, but is nevertheless erroneous in faith.

2. To the authentic decrees of the Church that are not infallible, a religious assent must be given, although not one firm above all things. These decrees do not merit an assent firm above all things, since their truth is not absolutely certain; they nevertheless demand a religious assent, because they proceed from the magisterium instituted by Christ and marked with Christ's authority.² The assent to be given to these decrees comprises two things: obsequious silence or external submission, which requires that one abstain from speech, writing, and other external actions against the decrees issued; and also the obedience of the mind or internal submission, by which the doctrines proposed in such decrees are held as practically safe and to be followed.

This assent ought to be the firmer, the higher is the authentic tribunal issuing the respective declaration, and the more intimate is the connection existing between the decree and the common and constant doctrine of Catholics. Hence Pius IX³ declares: "Since it is a question of that submission by which all Catholics are bound in conscience, . . . it is not enough for learned Catholics to receive and venerate the dogmas of the Church, but it is also necessary that they submit themselves both to the decisions which, pertaining to doctrine, are put forth by the pontifical congregations, and to those chapters of doctrine which are retained by the common and constant consent of Catholics as theological truths and conclusions so certain, that opinions contrary to these same chapters of doctrine, although they cannot be called heretical, nevertheless merit another theological censure."⁴

But if, at length, grave and solid reasons should at some time seem to oppose an authentic decree, it will be lawful to fear, to assent conditionally, to doubt, nay even wholly to suspend the internal assent, and reverently to appeal to a higher tribunal, namely, from the bishop to the Roman congregation, from the congregations to the supreme pontiff or to a council. If, however, notwithstanding the appeal, the Church should uphold the decree issued, one will have to acquiesce entirely. For although in decrees of this kind the doctrine is not objectively safe, there is nevertheless in them a subjective security, because it is always safe and meritorious not to violate the due submission toward the divinely instituted magisterium.