Apologeticae sive Theologiae Fundamentalis, Tomus II (Pars Altera): Demonstratio Catholica

1. Explanation. a) A dogmatic fact in the wider sense is understood to be a fact which indeed is not revealed, but is indissolubly connected with revelation, e. g. that the Vatican Council was ecumenical, or that Pius IX was the legitimate successor of Peter. Indeed neither of these facts can be called revealed, yet both are connected with revelation by an indissoluble bond. For if either fact were denied, the dogmatic constitutions of the same council or pope would at once collapse (as far as we are concerned). Hence a dogmatic fact is more than a merely historical, albeit ecclesiastical, fact, which does not affect dogma; yet it is less than a revealed fact to be believed with divine faith, e. g. the fall of the first parents, the conversion of Paul. Thus a dogmatic fact is a mean between a revealed fact and a purely historical fact, just as a theological conclusion is a mean between revealed doctrine and merely natural doctrine.

b) In the stricter sense, however, from the time of Jansenism a dogmatic fact is understood to be the fact that a certain orthodox or heterodox doctrine is contained in a certain book. For the Jansenists professed the infallibility of the Church in the question of right, namely whether such a doctrine, considered in itself, agrees with dogma or not; but they denied the infallibility of the Church in the question of fact, namely whether such a heterodox doctrine is really contained in such a book, i. e. whether the words of some book bear such an objectively heretical sense.¹ This indeed is not directly the object of an ecclesiastical definition: for it concerns a merely human fact, and one to be established by wholly human means, namely by critical and grammatical rules. But still we assert that such dogmatic facts or dogmatic texts indirectly fall under the infallible judgment of the Church, insofar as they are intimately connected with the direct object of ecclesiastical infallibility.

2. Proof. That the Church is infallible in judging dogmatic facts is proved from the end of infallibility and from the practice of the Church.

a) From the end of infallibility. The Church cannot effectively discharge her office of infallibly teaching and defending the faith, if any author can with impunity spread contrary doctrines on the ground that the ecclesiastical authority did not rightly understand the sense of his book.

But this would happen, if the Church were not infallible in judging dogmatic facts or texts. For as often as the Church condemned a book or some writing, the author could plead that the Church did not understand the sense of the condemned book. Therefore infallibility in the question of right would be useless, unless the Church were also infallible in the question of fact, namely whether these or those words used by the author express Catholic doctrine or not. If infallibility in the abstract question of right be admitted, but infallibility in the concrete question of fact be denied, license lies open to all heresies.

b) From the practice of the Church, by which in the course of time many books and their texts have in general been either approved or condemned in a definitive manner. Thus the First Council of Nicaea condemned the book of Arius entitled "Thalia";² the Council of Ephesus approved the writings of Cyril and condemned those of Nestorius;³ the Second Council of Constantinople condemned the Three Chapters, i. e. the writings of Theodorus, Theodoretus, and Ibas;⁴ the Council of Constance prescribed that the books and documents of John Wyclif, John Hus, and Jerome of Prague be held as condemned by every Catholic;⁵ Leo X condemned the errors culled from the works of Luther;⁶ Pius V reprobated the propositions of Baius,⁷ Pius VI the decrees of the Synod of Pistoia.⁸ And so from almost every age definitive sentences are at hand, by which the Church has judged concerning the objective sense of certain books.

In particular, however, in the cause of Jansenism the Church asserted her infallibility with regard to dogmatic texts. For Innocent X (1653) condemned the five propositions from the book of Jansenius, which is entitled "Augustinus".⁹ In order to escape this condemnation, the Jansenists contended that the Church is indeed infallible in the question of right, but not in the question of fact, and for that reason they said that those five propositions, taken abstractly, were deservedly condemned, but were not contained in the work of Jansenius in the concrete, or at least that the condemned sense was not the sense intended by Jansenius.¹⁰ But Alexander VII (1656 and 1664) established: "We declare and define that those five propositions . . . excerpted from the book of the aforementioned Cornelius Jansenius . . . were condemned in the sense intended by the same Cornelius".¹¹

And since the Jansenists pretended that by virtue of these apostolic constitutions they were indeed bound to a "respectful silence", but not to internal assent, Clement XI (1705) declared that "the obedience, which is owed to the aforementioned apostolic constitutions, is by no means satisfied by that respectful silence; but the sense of the book of Jansenius condemned in the five aforesaid propositions, which the words of those propositions bear, as is said above, must be rejected and condemned by all the faithful of Christ as heretical, not only by word, but also in heart."¹² From which it is clear that the Church in the Jansenist cause delivered a definitive sentence. Therefore she extended her infallibility to dogmatic facts.

Scholion. Not every prohibition of books established by the Church is to be regarded as an infallible judgment concerning their heterodoxy. For the most part, indeed, the Church intends only to prohibit the use of a book, lest the faithful suffer any harm from it. Thus in general one must judge concerning the books prohibited in the Index. Sometimes, however, an ecclesiastical judgment of this kind delivered concerning some book is to be regarded as an infallible sentence, namely when the conditions otherwise required for an infallible decree of the Church are present, as e. g. in the condemnation of Wyclif, John Hus, Jansenius, Baius, and others.