Prooemium

§ I: De ecclesia ut societate christifidelium

Subarticulus I: Solum depositum fidei apostolicum

That the Christian revelation will never yield its place to another revealed economy is evident from what we have said concerning the perpetuity of the messianic revelation and the indefectibility of the Church.¹ But just as the revelation begun in the Old Testament and perfected in the New cannot be abrogated, so neither can it be objectively increased, but it remains wholly closed from the death of the last apostle. This indeed Sacred Scripture and patristic Tradition clearly declare.

Sacred Scripture. The Gospel, which Christ commands to be preached to all times and to all creatures, is confined to those things which He Himself revealed to the apostles, teaching visibly and sending the Holy Spirit invisibly: "Going... teach all nations... teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you ... I have yet many things to say to you: but you cannot bear them now. But when He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will teach you all truth."² Only the truth, therefore, which the apostles received from Christ and the Holy Spirit is the Christian truth to be preached to all nations and times. Besides this truth "there is no other gospel", as St. Paul writes.³ Whence also all the faithful are said to be "built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ Himself being the chief corner stone",⁴ i. e. the doctrinal foundation of the Church is the revelation of the Old Testament through the prophets and the revelation of the New Testament completed through the apostles, whose beginning and end is Christ Jesus. Wherefore the successors of the apostles are everywhere shown forth as witnesses and teachers only of those things which they had received from the apostles. They are admonished to keep the apostolic deposit of faith inviolably: "Hold the form of sound words, which thou hast heard of me in faith ... Keep the good deposit through the Holy Spirit."⁵⁶ They are forbidden to receive any new doctrine whatsoever, even if it comes under the name of supernatural revelation: "But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach a gospel to you besides that which we have preached to you, let him be anathema."⁷ Beyond the apostolic deposit, therefore, the Church has no other revelation to hand on to the faithful.
Patristic Tradition. Already Tertullian says excellently: "For us there is no need of curiosity after Christ Jesus, nor of inquiry after the gospel. When we believe, we desire nothing further to believe. For this we believe first, that there is nothing which we ought to believe beyond ... This trench [boundary] He Himself [Christ] marked out for you, who does not will you to believe anything other than what He instituted, and therefore not even to seek."⁸ Augustine: "That [Cyprian] admonishes us to have recourse to the fountain, that is, to the apostolic tradition, and from there to direct the channel into our times, is best and without hesitation to be done."⁹ Jerome: "Except the apostles, whatever else shall be said afterwards, let it be cut off, let it have no authority."¹⁰ Vincent of Lérins: "To receive and follow new [post-apostolic] expressions was never [the mark] of Catholics, but always of heretics ... It is shown to all with sufficient evidence and clarity that among almost all heresies this is, as it were, a solemn and legitimate practice: that they always delight in profane novelties, disdain the ordinances of antiquity, and through the oppositions of knowledge falsely so called make shipwreck of the faith. But on the contrary, this is truly proper to Catholics: to keep the deposits and trusts of the holy fathers, to condemn profane novelties, and, as the apostle said, 'if anyone shall announce besides what has been received, let him be anathema'."¹¹

Whence it is clear that the revelations which were made after the apostles, are made, or will be made do not belong to the deposit of faith, which has been committed to the Church to be guarded, explained, and proposed. Never, therefore, can the Church pronounce, or does it intend to pronounce, an infallible judgment concerning such private revelations.¹² The deposit of the public revelation (i. e. destined for all men) was sealed by the death of the last apostle in such a way that from then on it suffers no increase in itself. Wherefore this sentence of the modernists was justly condemned: "Revelation constituting the object of the Catholic faith was not completed with the apostles."¹³

But just as ecclesiastical infallibility comprises only the apostolic deposit, so it comprises:

Subarticulus II: Totum depositum fidei apostolicum

For brighter than light are the words by which Christ promises to the teaching office of the Church His perennial assistance, that it may teach the whole world all days everything whatsoever He Himself commanded,¹ and likewise the Holy Spirit, who leads the Church into all truth,² namely revealed truth. Whatever therefore has been formally revealed is the object of infallibility, whether those things are contained in the deposit explicitly or implicitly.

Explicitly revealed are those things which are set forth in the deposit not only as to concept, but as to their proper term, e.g.: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth;"³ "And the Word was made flesh."⁴ These, since they were revealed with such clarity, could never be unknown in the Church, and hence from the very first centuries they had to be proposed to the faithful by an explicit, constant and universal preaching. Concerning these indeed that well-known canon of Vincent of Lérins holds most of all: "In the catholic Church itself great care must be taken that we hold that which has been believed everywhere, always, and by all."⁵
Implicitly revealed are those things which are set forth in the deposit not indeed under their proper term, but nevertheless as to concept or sense, e.g., that in Christ there are two wills; that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. These, since they conduce to a fuller and deeper understanding of revelation, were not immediately understood and preached in the primitive Church, but were believed only by implicit faith. In the course of the centuries, however, as theological science advanced, controversies arose, and the Holy Spirit guided the Church, the implicitly revealed and believed truths could and can be gradually unfolded by the infallible magisterium and at length definitively proposed.⁶

Hence it is clear that the deposit of faith, although it admits of no increase in itself, nevertheless admits of progress with respect to us. On this matter Vincent of Lérins discourses excellently: "But perhaps someone will say: Shall there then be no progress of religion in the Church? Let there certainly be, and the greatest. For who is that man so envious of men, so hateful to God, as to try to forbid it? But yet in such a way that it be a true progress of faith, not a change. For it pertains to progress that each thing be amplified in itself; but to change, that something be turned from one thing into another. Let the understanding, knowledge and wisdom both of individuals and of all, both of one man and of the whole Church, grow therefore and advance much and vehemently through the stages of ages and centuries, but only in its own kind, namely in the same dogma ... Let the religion of souls imitate the manner of bodies, which, although in the process of years they unfold and develop their numbers, yet remain the same as they were."⁷ Therefore the revealed truths entrusted to the infallible magisterium of the Church are not like stones, but like seeds, whose innate powers and virtues must day by day be unfolded and whose fruits set forth. However they are unfolded and set forth, the same apostolic deposit remains, to be faithfully guarded and infallibly declared by the Church.

Corollary. From what has been said it follows that in the Christian economy there is no place for a history of revelation. The history of revelation obtained until the end of the apostolic age, since throughout the whole Old Testament, from the first beginning of revelation up to Christ and the apostles, new revelations continually accrued to the old; from then on, however, it no longer obtains, since the deposit of revelation remains objectively closed by the death of the last apostle. Since nevertheless the apostolic deposit can and must be more and more unfolded and proposed in the course of time, in the Christian economy there is also a history of dogmas, i.e., a history of the unfolding and proposing of the revealed truths. The dogmas themselves, however, i.e., the truths once definitively proposed by the Church, exclude historical progress or the so-called "evolution" just as revelation itself does. Hence the Vatican Council: "For the doctrine of the faith which God revealed has not been proposed, like a philosophical invention, to human minds to be perfected, but has been handed to the spouse of Christ as a divine deposit, to be faithfully guarded and infallibly declared. Hence, too, that sense of the sacred dogmas is perpetually to be retained which holy Mother Church once declared, nor is it ever to be departed from that sense under the appearance and name of a higher understanding ... If anyone shall say that it is possible that, according to the progress of science, a sense is sometimes to be attributed to the dogmas proposed by the Church other than that which the Church has understood and understands: let him be anathema."⁸ Likewise Pius X rejected the modernists' "fiction of the evolution of dogmas, passing from one sense into another sense, different from that which the Church formerly had".⁹

Subarticulus I: Conclusiones theologicae

Explanation. Theological conclusions in the widest sense are propositions which are inferred by a process of reasoning from revealed premises. They are, however, of three kinds: a) Conclusions which are inferred by reasoning of any sort whatsoever from two revealed premises, e.g. Christ is to be adored; but Christ is really present in the Eucharist; therefore the Eucharist is to be adored. Such propositions are properly or formally revealed, as is evident.

b) Conclusions which are inferred by a merely explicative reasoning from two premises, of which one is revealed and the other naturally certain, e.g. Christ is a man; but every man has a rational soul; therefore Christ has a rational soul. It is clear that this conclusion is contained in the revealed premise alone, as a part in the whole, and therefore the process of reasoning affords no new motive of assent. Whence even such propositions are properly or formally revealed.

c) Conclusions which are inferred by a deductive or rigorous process of reasoning from one revealed premise and another naturally certain one, e.g. the Son is the Word of God; but the Word of God proceeds from the intellect of God; therefore the Son proceeds from the intellect of God. This conclusion is contained in both premises; and because the conclusion follows the weaker part, it cannot be held as a truth properly or formally revealed, but at most can be called virtually revealed on account of its intimate connection with revelation. These propositions are strictly called theological conclusions, of which we are speaking.

Proof. That the Church is infallible in establishing and adjudicating theological conclusions is proved from the end of infallibility and from the practice of the Church.

a) From the end of infallibility. The Church cannot preserve the revealed deposit inviolably unless it is infallible in establishing and adjudicating theological conclusions. For between the revealed principles and the theological conclusions deduced from them there exists such a logical connection that from the falsity of the conclusions the falsity of the principles would necessarily follow. Therefore the Church is infallible with regard to theological conclusions.

b) From the practice of the Church. The Church has frequently established or adjudicated theological conclusions peremptorily. Thus the Council of Constance against Wycliffe and Hus; Pius V against Baius; Pius VI against the Pistorians and the Jansenists; Pius IX against modern errors; Pius X against the modernists condemned propositions, among which not a few theological conclusions are found. But by this manner of acting the Church vindicated for herself infallibility in actual exercise. Therefore she is to be held infallible in these matters. The argument is confirmed by the manner of acting of the faithful, who never failed to give obedience and absolute assent to these judgments of the Church.

Related to theological conclusions are:

Subarticulus II: Quaestiones quaedam naturales

Explanation. Questions of the profane sciences are not in themselves subject to the magisterium of the Church, since they pertain to the natural order. Per accidens, however, certain natural questions constitute the object of the infallible magisterium, whether direct or indirect.

a) In most of the profane sciences, and especially in philosophy, there are found certain natural doctrines which are at the same time supernaturally revealed truths, e.g., the existence of God, the attributes of God, the immortality of the soul, the creation of the world, the freedom of man. Such doctrines are the direct object of infallibility, as is evident. Whence the Vatican council: "If anyone says that the human disciplines are to be treated with such freedom that their assertions, even if they are opposed to revealed doctrine, may be retained as true and cannot be proscribed by the Church: let him be anathema."¹ Of these truths, therefore, resp. errors, we are not speaking.

b) But there are, moreover, natural doctrines which, although they are not at the same time revealed, are nevertheless intimately connected with revealed truths, and indeed either as necessary presuppositions or as necessary consequences of revealed principles. These doctrines we say belong to the indirect object of infallibility.

Proof. a) From the end of infallibility. The deposit of faith could be destroyed if the Church were not infallible in judging doctrines of the natural order which affect the revealed realities themselves. For if, e.g., a philosopher affirmed that man is fit to investigate every truth, the dogma concerning the mysteries in the strict sense is consequently denied. Or if you imagine false notions of substance after the manner of Spinoza, or false notions of essence, person, supposit, you can no longer defend the right concept of God, of the Most Holy Trinity, of the hypostatic union of the Word. Therefore, unless the Church could judge infallibly concerning the truth or falsity of such natural doctrines, it would be all over with the deposit of faith as regards its custody and its integral transmission.

b) From the practice of the Church. The Church has often condemned philosophical theses which, although they are not directly opposed to revealed truths, nevertheless cannot be reconciled with them even indirectly. Examples are provided by the errors of Eckhart, Nicholas of Autrecourt, Georg Hermes, Anton Günther, Jakob Frohschammer, of indifferentism, of traditionalism, of ontologism² and many others, of earlier as well as of our own times, condemned by the Church. By her decrees, moreover, issued against these errors, the Church demanded absolute intellectual obedience. In general the Vatican council decreed: "The Church, which together with the apostolic office of teaching received the mandate of guarding the deposit of faith, has also from God the right and the duty of proscribing science falsely so called ... Wherefore all the Christian faithful are forbidden not only to defend such opinions, which are known to be contrary to the doctrine of faith, especially if they have been reprobated by the Church, as legitimate conclusions of science, but they are altogether bound to hold them rather as errors which present a fallacious appearance of truth."³ Finally Pius X proscribed this error of the Modernists: "Since the deposit of faith contains only revealed truths, under no respect does it pertain to the Church to pass judgment on the assertions of the human disciplines."⁴

Almost equivalent to theological conclusions are also:

Subarticulus III: Facta dogmatica

Explanation. a) A dogmatic fact in the wider sense is understood to be a fact which indeed is not revealed, but is indissolubly connected with revelation, e. g. that the Vatican Council was ecumenical, or that Pius IX was the legitimate successor of Peter. Indeed neither of these facts can be called revealed, yet both are connected with revelation by an indissoluble bond. For if either fact were denied, the dogmatic constitutions of the same council or pope would at once collapse (as far as we are concerned). Hence a dogmatic fact is more than a merely historical, albeit ecclesiastical, fact, which does not affect dogma; yet it is less than a revealed fact to be believed with divine faith, e. g. the fall of the first parents, the conversion of Paul. Thus a dogmatic fact is a mean between a revealed fact and a purely historical fact, just as a theological conclusion is a mean between revealed doctrine and merely natural doctrine.

b) In the stricter sense, however, from the time of Jansenism a dogmatic fact is understood to be the fact that a certain orthodox or heterodox doctrine is contained in a certain book. For the Jansenists professed the infallibility of the Church in the question of right, namely whether such a doctrine, considered in itself, agrees with dogma or not; but they denied the infallibility of the Church in the question of fact, namely whether such a heterodox doctrine is really contained in such a book, i. e. whether the words of some book bear such an objectively heretical sense.¹ This indeed is not directly the object of an ecclesiastical definition: for it concerns a merely human fact, and one to be established by wholly human means, namely by critical and grammatical rules. But still we assert that such dogmatic facts or dogmatic texts indirectly fall under the infallible judgment of the Church, insofar as they are intimately connected with the direct object of ecclesiastical infallibility.

Proof. That the Church is infallible in judging dogmatic facts is proved from the end of infallibility and from the practice of the Church.

a) From the end of infallibility. The Church cannot effectively discharge her office of infallibly teaching and defending the faith, if any author can with impunity spread contrary doctrines on the ground that the ecclesiastical authority did not rightly understand the sense of his book.

But this would happen, if the Church were not infallible in judging dogmatic facts or texts. For as often as the Church condemned a book or some writing, the author could plead that the Church did not understand the sense of the condemned book. Therefore infallibility in the question of right would be useless, unless the Church were also infallible in the question of fact, namely whether these or those words used by the author express Catholic doctrine or not. If infallibility in the abstract question of right be admitted, but infallibility in the concrete question of fact be denied, license lies open to all heresies.

b) From the practice of the Church, by which in the course of time many books and their texts have in general been either approved or condemned in a definitive manner. Thus the First Council of Nicaea condemned the book of Arius entitled "Thalia";² the Council of Ephesus approved the writings of Cyril and condemned those of Nestorius;³ the Second Council of Constantinople condemned the Three Chapters, i. e. the writings of Theodorus, Theodoretus, and Ibas;⁴ the Council of Constance prescribed that the books and documents of John Wyclif, John Hus, and Jerome of Prague be held as condemned by every Catholic;⁵ Leo X condemned the errors culled from the works of Luther;⁶ Pius V reprobated the propositions of Baius,⁷ Pius VI the decrees of the Synod of Pistoia.⁸ And so from almost every age definitive sentences are at hand, by which the Church has judged concerning the objective sense of certain books.

In particular, however, in the cause of Jansenism the Church asserted her infallibility with regard to dogmatic texts. For Innocent X (1653) condemned the five propositions from the book of Jansenius, which is entitled "Augustinus".⁹ In order to escape this condemnation, the Jansenists contended that the Church is indeed infallible in the question of right, but not in the question of fact, and for that reason they said that those five propositions, taken abstractly, were deservedly condemned, but were not contained in the work of Jansenius in the concrete, or at least that the condemned sense was not the sense intended by Jansenius.¹⁰ But Alexander VII (1656 and 1664) established: "We declare and define that those five propositions . . . excerpted from the book of the aforementioned Cornelius Jansenius . . . were condemned in the sense intended by the same Cornelius".¹¹

And since the Jansenists pretended that by virtue of these apostolic constitutions they were indeed bound to a "respectful silence", but not to internal assent, Clement XI (1705) declared that "the obedience, which is owed to the aforementioned apostolic constitutions, is by no means satisfied by that respectful silence; but the sense of the book of Jansenius condemned in the five aforesaid propositions, which the words of those propositions bear, as is said above, must be rejected and condemned by all the faithful of Christ as heretical, not only by word, but also in heart."¹² From which it is clear that the Church in the Jansenist cause delivered a definitive sentence. Therefore she extended her infallibility to dogmatic facts.

Scholion. Not every prohibition of books established by the Church is to be regarded as an infallible judgment concerning their heterodoxy. For the most part, indeed, the Church intends only to prohibit the use of a book, lest the faithful suffer any harm from it. Thus in general one must judge concerning the books prohibited in the Index. Sometimes, however, an ecclesiastical judgment of this kind delivered concerning some book is to be regarded as an infallible sentence, namely when the conditions otherwise required for an infallible decree of the Church are present, as e. g. in the condemnation of Wyclif, John Hus, Jansenius, Baius, and others.

Subarticulus IV: Disciplina generalis

Explanation. a) By the name of general discipline come the ecclesiastical laws properly so called, i. e. those established by the Church herself and for the universal Church. By the Church herself. Hence we are dealing with human laws, not with divine laws. For the divinely revealed laws pertain to the direct object of infallibility. For the universal Church, not for some particular region only. For we know that the magisterium of the Church is not infallible unless it teaches the whole Church of Christ.

b) Ecclesiastical laws, however, are not infallible in themselves, but because they are connected with faith and morals. They are not infallible in themselves, because they are not revealed. Hence we do not maintain that these laws are always the most prudent of all ordinances or the most suitable for all times, since supreme prudence has nowhere been promised to ecclesiastical superiors, and since popes and councils give, abrogate and change laws "with consideration for the ages or times or grave necessities".¹ They are, however, infallible because of their connection with faith and morals in this sense, that they never contain or prescribe anything that is contrary to faith and good morals.

Proof. a) From the end of infallibility. If the Church were to establish a disciplinary law opposed to faith or to good morals, it would by that very fact lead all the faithful into error in practice. But practical error either presupposes or includes or induces theoretical error. Therefore a Church erring in laying down disciplinary laws would by that very fact err in matters of faith and morals, which is plainly opposed to the end of infallibility.

b) From the practice of the Church. Already the apostles themselves, in laying down the first ecclesiastical law, appeal to the assisting Holy Spirit: "For it has seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us to lay upon you no further burden than these necessary things."² The Council of Constance, concerning the custom of receiving the Eucharist under one species only, says against the Hussites: "To say that to observe this custom or law is sacrilegious or illicit must be judged erroneous, and those who pertinaciously assert the opposite of the foregoing are to be kept away as heretics and severely punished."³ The Council of Trent defines concerning the rites of the sacraments and the ceremonies of the Mass: "If anyone says that the received and approved rites of the Catholic Church, wont to be employed in the solemn administration of the sacraments, can be contemned or omitted without sin by the ministers at their pleasure, or can be changed by any pastor of the churches whatsoever into new and other ones: let him be anathema."

If anyone says that the ceremonies, vestments and outward signs, which the Catholic Church uses in the celebration of the Mass, are incentives to impiety rather than offices of piety: let him be anathema."⁴ Finally, Pius VI in general proscribed the opinion of the Pistoians, "as if the Church, which is ruled by the Spirit of God, could establish a discipline not only useless and more burdensome than Christian liberty tolerates, but also dangerous, harmful, leading into superstition and materialism: — false, rash, scandalous, pernicious, offensive to pious ears, injurious to the Church and to the Spirit of God, by whom it is ruled, at least erroneous".⁵

Scholion. That saying brings out the infallibility of the Church in disciplinary matters which pertain to divine worship: "The law of praying is the law of believing." Its force is: that the prayer formulas employed in the public liturgy of the universal Church contain no error against faith and good morals. But one would wrongly conclude from this that all the lessons of the Breviary agree with historical truth, and all the homilies with sound exegesis. For the Church cannot judge infallibly concerning the merely human facts of the second nocturn, and it does not will to judge infallibly concerning the passages of sacred Scripture of the third nocturn. Hence emendations of the Breviary raise no dogmatic difficulty. Indeed, many bishops of the Vatican Council demanded an opportune revision of the Breviary in those things "which seem not altogether to agree with certain history and sound exegesis of sacred Scripture".⁶ Until this revision, already begun, has reached a happy outcome, it would be wrong to treat lightly the erroneous lessons and homilies.⁷

To general discipline are referred:

Subarticulus V: Approbatio ordinum religiosorum

Explanation. a) A religious order is a society approved by the Church, "in which the members, according to the proper laws of the society itself, profess (solemn) vows, and thus tend to evangelical perfection".¹ The essence of the religious state, which is common to all orders, consists in the three solemn vows of poverty, chastity and obedience; the diverse laws (rules, constitutions, statutes) are, as it were, the specific difference by which one order differs from another.

b) The approval does not concern the goodness of the three vows, since these are commended by the Lord Himself (evangelical counsels); but it concerns the goodness of the rule, according to which the individual orders observe the vows and apply themselves to perfection. In every approval, moreover, two judgments are to be distinguished: the doctrinal and the prudential. The former touches the conformity of the particular rule with the doctrine of faith and morals; the latter pertains to the suitability of the proposed rule and of the respective order. We affirm that the Church is infallible not in rendering a prudential judgment, but in rendering a doctrinal judgment. Moreover:

c) A twofold form of approval is to be distinguished, namely: simple and solemn approval. Through the former the Church only declares that such an institute is praiseworthy and that the faithful can safely enter it; the latter, however, is the definitive sentence of the Supreme Pontiff, by which a given institute becomes formally and definitively an order in the proper sense. In this sole solemn approval we say that the Church is infallible.

Proof. a) From the end of infallibility. The Supreme Pontiff solemnly approving a religious order peremptorily declares to the whole Church that this manner of life is conformable to good morals and to evangelical perfection itself. But if the Supreme Pontiff were to err in rendering this judgment, he would surely err in matters of morals. Therefore he is infallible in approving religious orders.

b) From the practice of the Church. The Supreme Pontiffs, in approving religious orders, use words so weighty that they clearly indicate that they are rendering a definitive and therefore infallible sentence. The common formula of the approvals is this: "Therefore let no man be allowed to infringe this page of our approval or to contravene it with rash daring; but if anyone shall presume to attempt this, let him know that he will incur the indignation of almighty God and of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul." Sometimes, moreover, the penalty of excommunication is inflicted upon those who impugn the approval, e.g., in the bull of Gregory XIII "Ascendente Domino", by which the institute of the Society of Jesus is confirmed. These formulas and penalties openly suppose that the Supreme Pontiffs approving religious orders are immune from error.

Subarticulus VI: Canonizatio sanctorum

Explanation. a) Canonization¹ is the definitive sentence of the supreme pontiff by which some Blessed is prescribed to the whole Church as to be believed and venerated as a heavenly inhabitant. It is called: a definitive sentence, i. e. final and peremptory, which can be neither abrogated nor revised; of the supreme pontiff, because "the causes of the beatification of the servants of God and of the canonization of the Blessed are reserved to the judgment of the Holy See alone";² by which some Blessed is prescribed, because "no one can seek the canonization of anyone . . . unless it has first been established that the Servant of God in question has been enrolled among the Blessed either formally or equivalently",³ to be believed and venerated as a heavenly inhabitant, because canonization includes both the speculative judgment that the Blessed enjoys the glory of the heavenly inhabitants and the practical precept that the Blessed is to be venerated on earth; and it is prescribed to the whole Church in the sense that all the faithful are obliged to hold the canonized person indubitably as a heavenly inhabitant and worthy of public veneration. Therefore canonization differs from beatification, which is a prior sentence of the supreme pontiff by which the veneration of some Servant of God is only permitted, or at least not universally prescribed.⁴

b) We do not extend infallibility to beatification. Beatification indeed is carried out with such great diligence that it wins for itself the greatest possible moral certainty. Nevertheless, since the sentence of beatification is not definitive or irrevocable, neither is it infallible.⁵ Nor does the insertion of the saints in the Roman Breviary produce infallibility. Before the Roman pontiffs reserved to themselves the right of canonization, many Servants of God were first venerated in individual churches, afterwards they were gradually taken up by the universal Church as to be venerated, the supreme pontiffs not contradicting or even approving. Nevertheless such approbation is only a permissive judgment, not truly a definitive and peremptory one of the supreme pontiff. Whence it can happen that some deceased person who is not a saint is found in the body of the Roman Breviary.⁶ Much less does the inscription of the saints in the Martyrology prepare infallibility. This inscription is indeed an effect which always follows canonization; nevertheless it neither necessarily presupposes nor demonstrates canonization, since many names are read in the Martyrology of those who were never canonized or beatified, and since the Martyrology has in the course of time undergone various corrections.⁷ Therefore we say that the Church is infallible in canonization properly so called alone.

Proof. a) From the end of infallibility. By canonization the deceased is strictly prescribed to all the faithful as to be venerated and imitated, and thereby a rule of morals is established for the whole Church. But if the Church erred in canonization, it could prescribe a member of the devil to be venerated and imitated, and thereby prescribe a false rule of morals to the whole Church. Therefore, lest so great an error be in the Church, God must be believed to provide individually that the Church not err in the canonization of the saints.

They object wrongly: 1° that the evil action, such as is the veneration and imitation of a member of the devil, to which the Church erring in canonization would lead, would be not formal but only material. I concede the premise, but I deny the conclusion, namely, that the Church can prescribe to all the faithful that such a material error be held. For material error is an error evil in itself; but if the Church by its definitive judgment sanctioned an error evil in itself, it would be all over with its infallibility in moral matters. This indeed is evident a fortiori from the fact that the Church in canonizing judges not only practically that the canonized one is to be venerated and imitated, but "professes as speculatively true that the Saint himself is in eternal glory".⁸

2° that the Church in the canonization of the saints relies on merely human testimonies, by which it learns and proves the heroic virtue and the miracles of the one to be canonized; but human testimonies do not afford infallible certainty. This indeed is true, but it does not prove that the Church can err in canonization. For the reason of infallibility is not heroic virtue and miracles established by human testimonies, but the assistance of the Holy Spirit prohibiting that the Church err in the very definitive judgment concerning the sanctity of the Blessed.

b) From the persuasion of the Church. The supreme pontiffs enunciate their infallibility in canonizing the saints both implicitly and explicitly.

Implicitly indeed, inasmuch as in the act of canonization and in the bulls of canonization they use such formulas as infallible decrees are wont to shine with. The common formula is this: "By the authority of Our Lord Jesus Christ, of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul and Our own, after mature deliberation had beforehand and divine help repeatedly implored ... We decree and define the Blessed N. to be a saint and ascribe him to the catalogue of the saints, ordaining that his memory be recalled by the universal Church every year on the day of his birth into heaven ... with pious devotion ... Let no one therefore be allowed to infringe this page of Our definition ... But if anyone shall presume with rash daring to contravene, let him know that he will incur the indignation of almighty God and of the holy apostles Peter and Paul."⁹ With these words the supreme pontiffs, by their supreme authority, oblige the whole Church to assent. Therefore they supply all things which pertain to infallible decrees. Nay more:

Explicitly too they assert that they enjoy infallibility in the canonization of the saints. E. g. Sixtus IV in the bull by which he canonized the blessed Bonaventure: "Trusting, therefore, that in this canonization God will not permit us to err ... We decree that the blessed Bonaventure is a saint ... and must be held faithfully and firmly." Likewise Sixtus V in the canonization of the blessed Didacus appeals to the "infallible assistance" of the Holy Spirit, and declares in general: "the Roman pontiff ... cannot err and be deceived in the canonization of the saints. And this is to be believed not only piously, but necessarily and with the most certain faith", he affirms.¹⁰ These words, although they do not constitute a definition ex cathedra, nevertheless manifest that the pontiffs are most firmly persuaded of the infallibility of the Church in the canonization of the saints.¹¹

Whence Benedict XIV thus demolishes the contrary opinion: "If not a heretic, yet rash, bringing scandal upon the whole Church, injurious to the saints, favoring the heretics who deny the authority of the Church in the canonization of the saints, savoring of heresy, as paving the way for infidels to deride the faithful, the assertor of an erroneous proposition and liable to the gravest penalties, we shall call him who would dare to assert that the pontiff erred in this or that canonization, and that this or that Saint canonized by him is not to be venerated with the cult of dulia."¹²

Therefore the direct object of infallibility is constituted by all revealed truths, or the apostolic deposit; the indirect object, however, by all doctrines necessarily connected with the revealed deposit. Nevertheless infallibility embraces these two objects in different ways. For:

Revealed truths fall under infallibility by reason of themselves; connected doctrines, however, which are not revealed but serve for the safeguarding of the revealed deposit, are subject to ecclesiastical infallibility not by reason of themselves, but by reason of the revealed deposit with which they cohere.
Revealed truths which are defined by the Church are to be believed with catholic faith, by which "all those things are to be believed which are contained in the word of God written or handed down, and are proposed by the Church ... as divinely revealed to be believed".¹³ Truths connected with revelation, however, if they are defined by the Church, are to be believed with ecclesiastical faith, by which we hold all those things which are proposed by the infallible authority of the Church to be held, although they are not contained in the revealed word of God.
That revealed truths constitute the object of the infallible magisterium is a dogma of faith proposed by the Church more than enough, which therefore cannot be denied without heresy. On the contrary, the infallibility of the Church with regard to the doctrines connected with revelation, although it is a most certain thing, nevertheless is not yet a definitively proposed dogma, the negation of which would constitute heresy properly so called.¹⁴

Prooemium

§ I: De ecclesia ut societate christifidelium

Dissertatio I: De institutione ecclesiae

Caput I: De facto ecclesiae a Christo institutae

Articulus I: Realitas ecclesiae a Christo institutae

Subarticulus I: Testimonium Christi ipsius

Subarticulus II: Testimonium apostolorum Christi

Subarticulus III: Testimonium antiquitatis christianae

Articulus II: Unicitas ecclesiae a Christo institutae

Subarticulus I: Testimonium Christi ipsius

Subarticulus II: Testimonium apostolorum Christi

Subarticulus III: Testimonium antiquitatis christianae

Caput II: De fine ecclesiae a Christo institutae

Articulus I: Finis proximus ecclesiae

Subarticulus I: Testimonium Christi

Subarticulus II: Testimonium apostolorum

Subarticulus III: Testimonium antiquitatis christianae

Articulus II: Finis remotus ecclesiae

Subarticulus I: Sententia explicatur

Subarticulus II: Sententia probatur

Caput III: De indole ecclesiae a Christo institutae

Articulus I: De indole indefectibili ecclesiae

Subarticulus I: De exsistentia indefectibili ecclesiae

Subarticulus II: De essentia indefectibili ecclesiae

Articulus II: De indole visibili ecclesiae

Subarticulus I: Argumentatio directa

Subarticulus II: Argumentatio indirecta

Articulus III: De indole supernaturali ecclesiae

Subarticulus I: Thesis principalis

Subarticulus II: Consectaria specialia

Corollaria apologetico-dogmatica

Subarticulus I: De corpore et anima ecclesiae

Subarticulus II: De membris ecclesiae

Dissertatio II: De constitutione ecclesiae

Caput I: De constitutione ecclesiae hierarchica

Articulus I: De hierarchia ecclesiae generatim

Subarticulus I: Testimonia evangelica

Subarticulus II: Testimonia apostolica

Subarticulus III: Testimonia patristica

Articulus II: De episcopatu singillatim

Subarticulus I: Documenta saeculi primi

Subarticulus II: Documenta saeculi secundi

Caput II: De constitutione ecclesiae monarchica

Articulus I: De primatu Petri apostoli

Subarticulus I: Primatus petrinus in s. Scriptura praeclare promittitur

Subarticulus II: Primatus petrinus in s. Scriptura sollemniter confertur

Subarticulus III: Primatus petrinus in s. Scriptura luculenter illustratur

Subarticulus IV: Primatus petrinus in s. Scriptura perenniter stabilitur

Articulus II: De primatu romani pontificis

Subarticulus I: Petrus romano pontifici primatum reliquit

Subarticulus II: Romani pontifices primatum sibi semper attribuerunt

Subarticulus III: Patres primatum romani pontificis semper docuerunt

Subarticulus IV: Ecclesia tota primatum romani pontificis semper agnovit

Subarticulus V: Scholia de vi et ortu primatus romani

Dissertatio III: De inventione ecclesiae

Caput I: De explicatione notarum

Articulus I: Unitas ecclesiae

Subarticulus I: Unitas confessionis symbolicae

Subarticulus II: Unitas communionis socialis

Articulus II: Sanctitas ecclesiae

Subarticulus I: Sanctitas simpliciter accepta

Subarticulus II: Sanctitas emphatice accepta

Articulus III: Catholicitas ecclesiae

Subarticulus I: Catholicitas ecclesiae determinatur

Subarticulus II: Catholicitas ecclesiae demonstratur

Articulus IV: Apostolicitas ecclesiae

Subarticulus I: Apostolicitas originis

Subarticulus II: Apostolicitas successionis

Caput II: De applicatione notarum

Articulus I: Ecclesia una

Subarticulus I: Ecclesia romana una est

Subarticulus II: Coetus antiromani non sunt uni

Articulus II: Ecclesia sancta

Subarticulus I: Ecclesia romana sancta est

Subarticulus II: Coetus antiromani non sunt sancti

Articulus III: Ecclesia catholica

Subarticulus I: Ecclesia romana catholica est

Subarticulus II: Coetus antiromani non sunt catholici

Articulus IV: Ecclesia apostolica

Subarticulus I: Ecclesia romana apostolica est