Apologeticae sive Theologiae Fundamentalis, Tomus II (Pars Altera): Demonstratio Catholica

1. The force of the Roman primacy was defined clearly enough by the decree of the Council of Florence, which we have quoted above. But since in the meantime manifold errors against the primacy thus defined had arisen, which are commonly comprised under the name of the "episcopal system," and of which the champions were chiefly the Richerians, the Jansenists, the Gallicans, the Febronians, and the Regalists, the Vatican Council renewed the Florentine definition and developed it more fully in these words: "We therefore teach and declare that the Roman Church, by the disposition of the Lord, holds the primacy of ordinary power over all others, and that this power of jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, which is truly episcopal, is immediate: to which the pastors and the faithful of every rite and dignity, whether taken singly or all together, are bound by the duty of hierarchical subordination and true obedience, not only in matters which pertain to faith and morals, but also in those which pertain to the discipline and government of the Church spread throughout the whole world; so that, with the unity both of communion and of the profession of the same faith preserved with the Roman Pontiff, the Church of Christ may be one flock under one supreme shepherd. This is the doctrine of catholic truth, from which no one can deviate without loss of faith and salvation... If anyone, therefore, shall say that the Roman Pontiff has only the office of inspection or direction, but not the full and supreme power of jurisdiction over the universal Church, not only in matters which pertain to faith and morals, but also in those which pertain to the discipline and government of the Church spread throughout the whole world; or that he has only the greater share, but not the fullness of this supreme power; or that this power of his is not ordinary and immediate, whether over all and each of the churches or over all and each of the pastors and faithful: let him be anathema."¹

This conciliar definition is the necessary conclusion of those things which we have thus far argued in the whole chapter on the primacy. Hence it needs no new proof, but demands only a succinct explanation. The force or nature of the primacy is, therefore, this: that it is a power of jurisdiction that is universal, episcopal, supreme, full, ordinary, and immediate.

a) A power of jurisdiction universal in respect of subject and object. In respect of subject, that is, of persons, so that it extends to absolutely all Christians without any limitation, whether they are bishops or simple faithful, whether taken individually or collectively. In respect of object, that is, of matters, so that it extends not only to matters of faith and morals (the ecclesiastical magisterium), but also to matters of discipline and government (ecclesiastical power of governance). That this universality of pontifical jurisdiction is the principal mark of the whole primacy, the words of the Vatican Council again declare. And rightly so; for with this universality granted or denied, almost the whole doctrine of the primacy is granted or denied.

b) A power of jurisdiction that is episcopal. For the supreme pontiff, the special bishop of the Roman Church, is at the same time a bishop, not indeed special, but general, of all churches, of all bishops, of all the faithful. With the same power, therefore, by which individual bishops feed individual dioceses, with the same the supreme pontiff feeds all dioceses and their prelates and sheep. Hence he is rightly called bishop of bishops and bishop of the catholic Church.

Hence is excluded the error of Febronius and of the others, who, distinguishing a twofold dignity in the pope, namely the episcopal and the primatial, said: The Roman Pontiff as bishop can exercise episcopal or properly so-called jurisdiction only in his own Roman diocese; as primate, however, he is related to the universal Church as an archbishop or metropolitan or patriarch is related to his province, resp. provinces. Just as, therefore, an archbishop can indeed exercise a certain influence over his suffragans by admonishing and watching over them, but cannot exercise episcopal rights except in his own diocese, so too the supreme pontiff, although he has a power of inspection or of a certain direction over the universal Church, nevertheless does not enjoy episcopal power except in his own special Roman diocese.²

c) A power of jurisdiction that is supreme, so that no other hierarchical power is either greater or equal. This explanation is that of the Vatican Council itself, defining as follows: "Since by divine right of the apostolic primacy the Roman Pontiff presides over the universal Church, we also teach and declare that he is the supreme judge of the faithful, and that in all cases pertaining to ecclesiastical examination recourse may be had to his judgment; but that the judgment of the Apostolic See, than whose authority there is none greater, is to be retracted by no one, nor is it lawful for anyone to judge concerning its judgment. Wherefore they wander from the right path of truth who affirm that it is lawful to appeal from the judgments of the Roman Pontiffs to an ecumenical council as to an authority superior to the Roman Pontiff."

Hence is struck down the error of the Gallicans, the Febronians, and the Pistorians, according to whom the pope's power proceeds from the Church and therefore also flows back into the Church and is subject to the Church.

From which error it would especially follow that a council (without the pope) is superior to the pope and can judge concerning the person and acts of the pope.³

d) A power of jurisdiction that is full, so that according to the Vatican definition the pope has not only the "greater share," but "the fullness of this supreme power." For the papal power could be supreme, although it were not full. That would happen if the hierarchical power were so divided between the supreme pontiff and the other bishops that he held the greater share of the power, yet to be completed through their lesser shares.

Such a division of the Church's power between the pope and the bishops is supposed by Article IV of the "Declaration of the Gallican clergy" (a. 1682): "In questions of faith also the greater share belongs to the supreme pontiff, and his decrees pertain to all and each of the churches, and yet his judgment is not irreformable, unless the consent of the Church has intervened."

Nevertheless, by the words quoted, with which the Vatican Council repudiates this Gallican assertion, the power of the bishops is not denied, but it is affirmed only that every power, whatever is found in the Church, is found also in the supreme power of the pope. The words of the Council are therefore to be understood positively, not exclusively.

e) A power of jurisdiction that is ordinary, so that it inheres in the office of the primacy itself and can consequently be exercised not only in extraordinary cases, but always. For the Gallicans and the Febronians had contended that the supreme pontiff could do nothing in a foreign diocese besides the Roman one, except in extraordinary circumstances, for example when particular bishops failed in their office through negligence or malice.⁴

f) A power of jurisdiction that is immediate, so that it can be exercised with no other authority intervening. The pope, therefore, can exercise all episcopal rights in all dioceses and over all Christians, without being bound to use a particular bishop as intermediary, or to ask his permission. Everywhere he can immediately teach, correct, judge, and punish, even against the will of the bishops.

Hence is excluded the error of the Febronians, who had judged that "the immediate care and direction of the individual sheep" of the universal Church does not belong to the pope, but that he can devote his solicitude in other dioceses only through the mediation of the bishops.⁵

2. The origin of the Roman primacy. From the whole chapter on the primacy it is evident that Christ instituted in the blessed apostle Peter a perennial primacy, whose heir, God so providing, Peter so disposing, and the Church of all ages so teaching, is the Roman bishop. In this sense the Roman bishop holds by divine right the power of jurisdiction described above, and accordingly the primacy has a divine origin. Hence by this very fact the hypotheses of the adversaries fall to the ground, by which they imagine the primacy to have arisen from merely human causes.

Nevertheless, although not necessarily, yet opportunely we shall still briefly review these causes. Some trace the Roman primacy to forged documents, others to political conditions, others to papal ambition, and others finally to historical necessity. But it is easily evident that the Roman primacy did not arise:

a) From forged documents. Döllinger, Friedrich, Langen and the other haters of the Vatican Council contended that the Roman primacy was introduced only in the Middle Ages, and indeed resting on false decrees of popes and synods and especially on the pseudo-Clementine writings. But this opinion is today repudiated by the adversaries themselves.⁶

Indeed, so far is it from being the case that the primacy was introduced only in the Middle Ages through forged or apocryphal writings, that it is established by sure and innumerable documents of the very first centuries that it was present. Recall the arguments from antiquity by which we have established the Roman primacy.

b) From political conditions. It is almost a dogma of the rationalists and modernists: "The city of Rome shone with such dignity and civil influence that it easily won for the Roman bishops even the religious primacy. Hence, just as the emperors were the supreme pontiffs of the pagans, so the Roman prelates, with this same political influence favoring them, became the supreme pontiffs of the Christians." But certainly the political power of the Caesarean city did not introduce the Christian primacy in the first three centuries, when that harlot Babylon⁷ burned with immense hatred against the Christians and especially against the rulers of the Church.

After the third century, however, if the primacy had finally been introduced by political force, certainly not the Roman primacy, but the Constantinopolitan, would have been introduced, since Constantine the Great and his successors had placed the seat of the civil empire in the "new Rome." Moreover, the Christians, as we have seen, never attributed the primacy to the Roman bishop for this reason, because the emperor sat in Rome holding civil power, but because in the city of Rome Peter, the prince of the Church, had fixed his seat. Hence Pius X rightly condemned that modernist proposition: "The Roman Church has become the head of all the churches not by the ordinance of divine providence, but from merely political conditions."⁸

c) From papal ambition. The adversaries infer that the Roman pontiffs arrogated the primacy to themselves out of an ambitious desire to dominate, from the fact that the popes conducted themselves as primates of the Church. Yet the exercise of the primacy is no argument for ambition, unless it is established that the Roman pontiffs attributed the primacy to themselves undeservedly. But that the contrary is established, we have proved on every count. Moreover, if the Roman pontiffs had ambitiously seized the primatial prerogative for themselves, the whole Church and especially the Eastern bishops would have protested and resisted. But so far are they from having protested and resisted, that the universal Church, including the Eastern bishops and patriarchs themselves, acknowledged and proclaimed that the Roman pontiffs hold by divine right and perpetuate the primacy instituted by Christ in blessed Peter.

d) From historical necessity. The adversaries indeed affirm that for the Christian religion spread throughout the whole world it was highly useful, indeed morally necessary, that there be some center and head by which all the churches and all the faithful might be united; and that the faithful, conscious of this necessity, gradually granted the primacy to the Roman bishop, and attributed to divine institution what had been introduced by human means.⁹

By their own mouth, therefore, the adversaries confess the necessity of the primacy. But that the faithful perceived this necessity only in the course of time and therefore invented the primacy is plainly false. For the universal Church of the very first centuries simply acknowledged the primacy as already existing, indeed as instituted by Christ himself in the prince of the apostles and continued in the Roman pontiffs. This fact cannot be explained unless we say that Christ already foresaw the necessity of the primacy and therefore constituted the Church in such a way that there would continually be a monarchical center and head, which in the name and place of Christ would exercise jurisdiction over the whole Church. Hence even the last refuge of the adversaries truly proves that the Roman primacy is not a human and natural contrivance, but a divine and supernatural institution.