Apologeticae sive Theologiae Fundamentalis, Tomus I: Demonstratio Christiana

The possibility of prophecy is impugned by the Epicureans, the Stoics, and all who deny divine foreknowledge. Against these, however, there is no need to contend in this place, since it is established from philosophy that God is omniscient and therefore foreknows all future things of whatsoever kind; nay, for Him there are no future things, "because His intuition is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presence"¹ Hence the only question is whether God can reveal through the prophets the future things He has foreseen. That He possesses the absolute power of revealing future things is evident from what we have said concerning the possibility of revelation. That He, however, lacks the ordained power of revealing future things is contended by most rationalists. For they plead that by the prediction of future things human liberty is taken away, since the events predicted by God must of necessity be fulfilled.² Nevertheless:

1. The difficulty objected does not touch the prediction of those things which by no means depend on human liberty, namely, the free decrees of God and the necessary events of physical nature.

2. Nor does the difficulty objected hold with regard to the free acts of men. Harm would indeed be done to free will if the future acts of men were to come to pass because they had been predicted; but on the contrary they are predicted because they will come to pass in the future. Therefore the necessity of the free act foretold is consequent, not antecedent, and for that reason it can in no way take away or diminish the liberty of the act itself. Moreover, the author of the foretold action for the most part either does not know the prophecy or does not remember the prophecy while he acts, or if he does remember the prophecy, he does not act because of the prophecy, but for other reasons.

Nothing, therefore, stands in the way of the possibility of prophecy.