Apologeticae sive Theologiae Fundamentalis, Tomus I: Demonstratio Christiana

Etymologically prophecy is so called from the Greek word: προφητεία = to speak in someone's stead.¹ Hence by force of the word prophecy signifies "interpretation," and prophet "interpreter." In the sacred books only those are called prophets who speak in God's stead.

And indeed in the very widest sense those are called prophets who, under divine instinct, either interpret the sacred Scripture, or exhort the people, or praise God.²

In the stricter sense prophecy is the manifestation of things hidden from men. But a thing can be hidden from men in a threefold way: psychologically, i.e., with respect to the soul; topologically, i.e., with respect to place; chronologically, i.e., with respect to time. Hence to prophecy pertain: the manifestation of the thoughts of other men, or the reading of hearts (καρδιογνωσία); the manifestation of things so distant in place that they cannot be perceived by the senses (κρυπτογνωσία); the manifestation of events absent in time, i.e., simply future events (vaticinium, μαντεία).

It is evident, however, that the notion of prophecy most of all befits the manifestation of events that are simply future. For events hidden psychologically are known to at least one man, events hidden topologically are for the most part known to several men; but things simply future are altogether hidden from all men. Therefore prophecy in the strictest sense is about future things. For that reason it is defined: the certain and determinate foretelling of a future event which cannot become known from natural causes.

It is called: a certain foretelling, i.e., one expressed in undoubted words. Hence mere suspicions (Ahnungen, pressentiments) and assertions more or less probable are excluded.

A determinate foretelling, one expressed in words that are in no way ambiguous. Hence are excluded ambiguities and equivocations, which can be bent in every direction. To this class belong the Sibylline poems of the pagans and the Delphic oracles of Apollo.³ It is not necessary, however, that future events be announced with the greatest and most complete clarity, after the manner of history. For although the foretelling be determinate, it can nonetheless be obscure on account of the metaphors and types employed, on account of the circumstances concealed, on account of the prophetic light being more or less clear. Since prophecies are adumbrations of future things, they ought to say only as much as suffices, so that when what was foretold has come to pass, it may appear that it had been foretold.

[Of] a future event, not of a present or past one. Hence are excluded prophecies made after the event or even at the very time of the event, such as are the prophecies related in the Aeneid of Vergil, as well as many Sibylline and Delphic oracles.

Which cannot naturally become known, i.e., which can in no way be inferred from natural causes. Of these events there are three kinds: the free works and decrees of God ad extra, e.g., the Incarnation; the free actions and decisions of men, e.g., the betrayal of Judas, the denial of Peter; and finally the events of the physical world, which exist only in a cause unknown to all men, e.g., an earthquake which will occur after a hundred years with these or those attendant circumstances. Yet the foretelling of events of this threefold kind pertains to prophecy in a different manner. The free decrees of God and of men, since they pre-exist in no natural cause, are the object of absolute prophecy, or of the first order. Future events of physical nature, since they pre-exist in a natural cause, although a hidden one, are the object of relative prophecy, or of the second order. It is evident of itself that future things which can be foreseen by natural instinct, by the acuteness of the senses or of the mind, or by the divination of the learned and of skilled practitioners, are in no way the object of prophecy.