Apologeticae sive Theologiae Fundamentalis, Tomus I: Demonstratio Christiana

Prophecy belongs to the genus of miracles, inasmuch as it is an intellectual miracle. Hence what we have set forth concerning miracles holds equally for prophecies. Yet a few things must be added touching the nature, possibility, and knowability of prophecies.¹

Etymologically prophecy is so called from the Greek word: προφητεία = to speak in someone's stead.¹ Hence by force of the word prophecy signifies "interpretation," and prophet "interpreter." In the sacred books only those are called prophets who speak in God's stead.

And indeed in the very widest sense those are called prophets who, under divine instinct, either interpret the sacred Scripture, or exhort the people, or praise God.²

In the stricter sense prophecy is the manifestation of things hidden from men. But a thing can be hidden from men in a threefold way: psychologically, i.e., with respect to the soul; topologically, i.e., with respect to place; chronologically, i.e., with respect to time. Hence to prophecy pertain: the manifestation of the thoughts of other men, or the reading of hearts (καρδιογνωσία); the manifestation of things so distant in place that they cannot be perceived by the senses (κρυπτογνωσία); the manifestation of events absent in time, i.e., simply future events (vaticinium, μαντεία).

It is evident, however, that the notion of prophecy most of all befits the manifestation of events that are simply future. For events hidden psychologically are known to at least one man, events hidden topologically are for the most part known to several men; but things simply future are altogether hidden from all men. Therefore prophecy in the strictest sense is about future things. For that reason it is defined: the certain and determinate foretelling of a future event which cannot become known from natural causes.

It is called: a certain foretelling, i.e., one expressed in undoubted words. Hence mere suspicions (Ahnungen, pressentiments) and assertions more or less probable are excluded.

A determinate foretelling, one expressed in words that are in no way ambiguous. Hence are excluded ambiguities and equivocations, which can be bent in every direction. To this class belong the Sibylline poems of the pagans and the Delphic oracles of Apollo.³ It is not necessary, however, that future events be announced with the greatest and most complete clarity, after the manner of history. For although the foretelling be determinate, it can nonetheless be obscure on account of the metaphors and types employed, on account of the circumstances concealed, on account of the prophetic light being more or less clear. Since prophecies are adumbrations of future things, they ought to say only as much as suffices, so that when what was foretold has come to pass, it may appear that it had been foretold.

[Of] a future event, not of a present or past one. Hence are excluded prophecies made after the event or even at the very time of the event, such as are the prophecies related in the Aeneid of Vergil, as well as many Sibylline and Delphic oracles.

Which cannot naturally become known, i.e., which can in no way be inferred from natural causes. Of these events there are three kinds: the free works and decrees of God ad extra, e.g., the Incarnation; the free actions and decisions of men, e.g., the betrayal of Judas, the denial of Peter; and finally the events of the physical world, which exist only in a cause unknown to all men, e.g., an earthquake which will occur after a hundred years with these or those attendant circumstances. Yet the foretelling of events of this threefold kind pertains to prophecy in a different manner. The free decrees of God and of men, since they pre-exist in no natural cause, are the object of absolute prophecy, or of the first order. Future events of physical nature, since they pre-exist in a natural cause, although a hidden one, are the object of relative prophecy, or of the second order. It is evident of itself that future things which can be foreseen by natural instinct, by the acuteness of the senses or of the mind, or by the divination of the learned and of skilled practitioners, are in no way the object of prophecy.

The possibility of prophecy is impugned by the Epicureans, the Stoics, and all who deny divine foreknowledge. Against these, however, there is no need to contend in this place, since it is established from philosophy that God is omniscient and therefore foreknows all future things of whatsoever kind; nay, for Him there are no future things, "because His intuition is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presence"¹ Hence the only question is whether God can reveal through the prophets the future things He has foreseen. That He possesses the absolute power of revealing future things is evident from what we have said concerning the possibility of revelation. That He, however, lacks the ordained power of revealing future things is contended by most rationalists. For they plead that by the prediction of future things human liberty is taken away, since the events predicted by God must of necessity be fulfilled.² Nevertheless:

1. The difficulty objected does not touch the prediction of those things which by no means depend on human liberty, namely, the free decrees of God and the necessary events of physical nature.

2. Nor does the difficulty objected hold with regard to the free acts of men. Harm would indeed be done to free will if the future acts of men were to come to pass because they had been predicted; but on the contrary they are predicted because they will come to pass in the future. Therefore the necessity of the free act foretold is consequent, not antecedent, and for that reason it can in no way take away or diminish the liberty of the act itself. Moreover, the author of the foretold action for the most part either does not know the prophecy or does not remember the prophecy while he acts, or if he does remember the prophecy, he does not act because of the prophecy, but for other reasons.

Nothing, therefore, stands in the way of the possibility of prophecy.

Both the historical truth and the philosophical truth of prophecy are knowable. As regards the historical truth, it is evident. A prophecy is historically true if it is established that a certain and determinate prediction of a future event was made and fulfilled. But this can be established in the same way in which the truth of any historical testimony and fact is established.

We know the philosophical truth of prophecy if it is established that the prediction, to which the event corresponded, is to be attributed neither to blind chance, nor to human conjecture, nor to diabolical knowledge. For if these three things are established, the cause of the prophecy is either God alone or at least a good angel. But for the most part it is established that the fulfilled prediction is not to be attributed:

Blind chance (Zufall, hasard). It can indeed happen that someone quite rashly predicts an event to which the outcome corresponds by chance, as when someone declares at his own pleasure: In ten years a great war will come, and this actually comes to pass. Nevertheless, a rash prediction is certainly excluded from being fulfilled by chance, if the predicted thing cannot be brought about by natural means (e. g. the prediction of a virginal birth or of the resurrection of a dead man), or if many things are predicted, or one thing indeed, but with diverse and minute circumstances (e. g. the messianic prophecies of the Old Testament). And the loftier the things, and the more numerous and more determinate the things that are predicted, the less can they be affirmed rashly and be fulfilled by chance, since chance is not constant.¹

Human conjecture. By conjectural knowledge (Vermutung, conjecture) man can indeed predict the effects of the physical world which follow necessarily from known causes, but by no means those events whose causes are wholly and entirely hidden. Likewise, by psychological experience we can conjecture by probable judgment certain future actions of men; but in a certain and determinate way we cannot predict what a man or men will freely do after a long time. Finally, the free decrees of God wholly escape human conjecture.

Diabolical knowledge. Demons indeed excel in reason and hence also in the most penetrating conjectural knowledge. Therefore they can foretell many physical effects that are inaccessible to us, and can presume many human actions with some probability. Nevertheless, not only the free decrees of God, but also the altogether free actions of men are inaccessible to them. For those objects are present neither in themselves nor in their causes, and therefore they cannot affect and determine any created intellect. But even in predicting the events of physical nature the demons are limited by divine providence, which does not permit men who use right reason to be led into error by evil spirits. For the rest, diabolical prophecies are distinguished from divine prophecies by the same criteria as diabolical miracles.²