Apologeticae sive Theologiae Fundamentalis, Tomus I: Demonstratio Christiana

Hilarin Felder

Apologeticae sive Theologiae Fundamentalis, Tomus I: Demonstratio Christiana

Hilarin Felder (1867–1951)

Apologeticae sive Theologiae Fundamentalis

First published 1923

Hilarin Felder, O.M.Cap.'s Apologeticae sive Theologiae Fundamentalis, Tomus I—Demonstratio Christiana—is the Christian-demonstration half of a two-volume Latin manual of fundamental theology. First published at Paderborn in 1920 and revised in the second edition of 1923, it presents a neo-scholastic case for the historical revelation of Christ and the credibility of Christianity, using Scripture, history, and theological argument for classroom formation. Felder's work belongs to the mature manual tradition that shaped Catholic apologetics before the mid-century renewal. Schola presents the 1923 Latin edition with an English translation.


Praefatio

Epistola I: SS. D. Benedictus PP. XV (s. m.) opus collaudat

Introductio

§ I: Introductio theologica

Caput I: Theologiae notio

Caput II: Theologiae divisio

Caput III: Theologiae praestantia

§ II: Introductio apologetica

Caput I: Apologeticae definitio

Caput II: Apologeticae obiectum

Caput III: Apologeticae momentum

Caput IV: Apologeticae historia

Pars I: Demonstratio Christiana

§ I: Revelationis theoria

Caput I: De revelatione ontologice spectata

Articulus I: De natura revelationis

Subarticulus I: Notio revelationis

Subarticulus II: Divisio revelationis

Articulus II: De possibilitate revelationis

Subarticulus I: Possibilitas revelationis generatim

Subarticulus II: Possibilitas revelationis mysteriorum

Articulus III: De necessitate revelationis

Subarticulus I: Explicatur necessitas revelationis

Subarticulus II: Probatur necessitas revelationis

Caput II: De revelatione logice spectata

Articulus I: De criteriis revelationis in genere

Subarticulus I: Natura criteriorum

Subarticulus II: Expositio et aestimatio criteriorum

Subarticulus III: Criteria inepta

Articulus II: De miraculis

Subarticulus I: Natura miraculi

Subarticulus II: Possibilitas miraculi

The rationalists contend that a miracle is repugnant both on the part of nature, in which it would be wrought, and on the part of God, by whom it would be wrought. Against this, however:

  1. A miracle is not repugnant to nature. If a miraculous effect were repugnant to nature, the repugnance would regard either the laws, or the forces, or the sciences of nature. But a miraculous effect is repugnant neither to the natural laws, nor to the natural forces, nor to the natural sciences. Therefore it is not repugnant to nature.

a) It is not repugnant to the natural laws. Unbelievers argue that miracles change physical laws that are utterly immutable. But in truth the laws of nature are neither immutable, nor are they changed by a miracle.

1°. The laws of nature are not immutable. By the name of natural laws we understand the constant and uniform manner of operation of physical things. Now this manner of operation for the most part does not follow necessarily from the essence of physical things, but depends on various conditions, which in no way flow from the essence of the things. E. g. motion, whether translational or molecular, communicated in this or that direction, with this or that velocity, does not depend on the essential properties of matter. Hence this motion can be changed by a miracle, the corporeal things remaining essentially unchanged.

But even those laws which follow necessarily from the essence of things are nevertheless mutable in themselves. For physical things themselves are not necessary beings, but contingent ones, i. e. they can be or not be, be so or otherwise, and be changed, the laws being changed. Therefore the creator and lord of nature could suspend, vary, and abolish the laws of nature at his pleasure, not only in a single case, but in the whole world.

Yet: 2°. The laws of nature are not changed, but are only actually impeded, while a miraculous effect takes place. E. g. while Peter walks upon the waters, the law of gravity is restrained from acting here and now, the law itself, i. e. the inclination of the waves to engulf Peter, nevertheless remaining.

For the laws of nature do not attain their effects categorically, but only hypothetically, i. e. if they are not restrained by some higher force. Whence even the natural forces themselves curtail the efficacy of the laws in many ways. Thus, e. g., the law of gravity very often does not obtain its effect, when some natural cause resists. Already the inorganic forces of magnetism and electricity withdraw many bodies from gravity for a time. In vegetal and animal nature, a higher direction being impressed upon the molecules, we observe the force of gravity suspended. Much more does rational man by his industry and sagacity know how to curb the innate activity of gravity, e. g. while he holds back a stone, lest it fall.

But if creatures are able to act thus, the law remaining unimpaired, a fortiori the creator can frustrate the natural laws of their effects, the law, i. e. the natural inclination of things to their own manner of acting, nevertheless remaining. Therefore a miracle is not repugnant to the laws of nature.

b) It is not repugnant to the natural forces. The adversaries contend that both the connection and the constancy of the natural forces stand in the way of a miracle. Against this, however:

1°. The connection of the natural forces does not stand in the way of a miracle. From the principle of the "connection of the forces or natural causes" (Prinzip der geschlossenen Naturkausalität, principe du connexe des causes naturelles) it indeed follows that nature left to itself produces effects only by natural causes, and that all natural causes together with their effects form at length one single cosmic cycle. But the unbelievers falsely maintain that not even God, the author and lord of nature, can break this cycle, by positing some effect immediately, without employing natural causes. For this opinion excludes not only the supernatural or miraculous influx of God, but also the natural one, and is thereby confounded with deistic naturalism itself. Whoever confesses God to be independent of the world and provident over mundane things will not deny that he can posit any effects whatsoever in the world, without making use of the causes or forces of nature.

2°. The constancy of the natural forces does not stand in the way of a miracle. According to the principle of the "constancy of natural energies" (Kraftprinzip, Gesetz der Erhaltung der Kraft, principe de la conservation de l'énergie naturelle) the sum of the physical forces remains constantly the same. But by a miracle the physical forces would be increased, e. g. the vital force by the resuscitation of the dead, the healing force by the miraculous cure of the sick. Therefore a miracle would do away with the constancy of the energies. Thus the adversaries.

But this is without foundation. For the principle of the energies merely declares that the physical forces of the world left to itself are neither diminished nor increased. But whether they can be diminished or increased, God being the efficient cause, the principle of the energies does not know.

Philosophy, however, affirms that God, who created the sum of the forces at the beginning of the world, can add other forces besides, the world being already created. Nay, it is certain that he has actually added new forces in the course of time. For cosmology and geology testify that life arose only at a late stage. God therefore created the vital forces later, the inorganic forces having already been created. Hence, with the dictum of the energies unimpaired, God, who was once able to add new forces, will be able even now to do so by working miracles.

Therefore a miracle is not repugnant to the forces of nature.

c) It is not repugnant to the natural sciences. The haters of miracles object at last that by miraculous works all science of natural things is undermined. If a miracle is admitted, they say, then both the theoretical certainty and the practical use of natural knowledge are imperilled, since we never know whether in a single case a natural effect will follow or be eluded by divine intervention.

1°. A miracle does not take away the theoretical certainty of natural knowledge. The certainty of the natural sciences consists in this, that, the conditions being posited, the forces of nature constantly produce their proper effect. A miracle does not weaken this certainty, but presupposes and strengthens it. For as often as we perceive an effect which we cannot here and now explain from the laws and forces of nature, we do not conclude that the constancy of the natural order has failed, but rather affirm without hesitation: Nature always does what is its own; but when a preternatural effect is present, surely not nature, but God, has posited it. E. g. we know with certainty that men cannot walk upon the waters, but are overwhelmed by the waves. This certainty does not perish, although we see Peter walking upon the sea; nay, without any doubt it stands that not nature, but God, is the author of this wholly unusual thing.

2°. A miracle does not take away the practical use of natural knowledge. From the fact that God sometimes works an effect neither expected nor foreseen, men's affairs are not disturbed. For not only supernatural effects, but much more often also natural ones, come to pass unexpected and unforeseen. Think of ships sunk, of crops devastated by the storm, of houses set on fire, and six hundred other things. Notwithstanding these, men pursue their duties and affairs. Therefore a pari they will not neglect them because of miracles that may perhaps happen. Nay, a fortiori! For miracles are wrought by God, who is supremely provident. Hence they always redound to our advantage, whether temporal or most certainly spiritual and eternal. Far be it that the use of natural knowledge should suffer detriment from a miracle!

Therefore miracles are repugnant neither to the laws, nor to the forces, nor to the sciences of nature. Hence they include no repugnance at all with nature.

  1. A miracle is not repugnant to God. Those who think a miracle impossible on the part of God argue from the supposed contradiction of the miracle with nature. But since on this side there is no contradiction, as we have seen, it is very easily proved that a miraculous operation is in no way repugnant to God. For, as the adversaries themselves confess, that repugnance would regard either the power, or the wisdom, or the immutability of God. But a miraculous operation is repugnant neither to the divine power, nor to the divine immutability, nor to the divine wisdom. Therefore it is not repugnant to God.

a) It is not repugnant to the divine power. They object that God can no more act against a physical law than against a moral and a logical law, since this threefold law follows from the very nature of God.

Yet the falsity of this sophism escapes no one. Logical-mathematical and ethical truths exist by virtue of an internal or metaphysical necessity; therefore they flow from the necessity and perfection of the divine nature. That iron is not wooden; that twice two are not five; that good is to be done and evil avoided — these are truths absolutely necessary. The contrary of these logical, mathematical, and ethical truths includes an absolute contradiction. Therefore not even the divine omnipotence can make it possible. But the truths of the physical order, as has already been said, depend in all their numbers and parts on the free will of God. God could institute this or that or no physical order at all. A fortiori he can produce a singular effect which is beyond, above, or against that effect which nature here and now could produce. Therefore a miracle is not repugnant to the divine power.

b) It is not repugnant to the divine immutability. They urge that God, although he instituted the order freely, nevertheless instituted it by an eternal decree, and therefore cannot change it in time, without himself being changed. In truth, by his eternal decree God established not only the customary order of nature, but also these or those preternatural or miraculous effects. "God from eternity foresaw and willed that he would do what he does in time; thus he instituted the course of nature in such a way that nevertheless it was preordained in his eternal will that he would at some time do something beyond that course."

But since a miracle comes to pass by force of that eternal decree at the appointed time, God is not changed; otherwise by the same reasoning he would have to be said to be changed by the very creation of nature. Both effects, viz. the ordinary effects and the extraordinary effects, are one eternal decree put into execution at the appointed time. Both coalesce into one order of the world, whose lowest part is the order of nature, but whose highest part is the preternatural order.

c) It is not repugnant to the divine wisdom. They say at last that God, although by absolute power he is able to work a miracle, is nevertheless not able to do so by ordered power or wisdom. For it is unworthy of the divine wisdom to emend and correct by miracles, continually, the order of nature once established.

This would indeed be true, if by miracles the physical laws and forces were declared imperfect and insufficient for obtaining their proximate, i. e. physical, end. But in fact miracles by no means declare the laws and forces of nature inept for producing the physical effects assigned to them. Surely miracles are not wrought that the physical course of nature may be better off, but that a moral and religious end may be attained, viz. that God may hear prayers, bestow goods, avert evils, and above all, that he may signify and confirm the divine revelation. For just as natural works demonstrate the natural revelation of God, so supernatural or miraculous works manifest the supernatural revelation of God. But because miracles tend to that supernatural end, they by no means injure or correct the natural course; just as the natural order is by no means injured or corrected by the supernatural revelation.

It is therefore evident that miracles are altogether possible, since they are repugnant neither on the part of nature, nor on the part of God.

Nay, unless we confuse nature with divinity or divinity with nature, but profess God as supermundane and personal, the possibility of miracles stands of itself. For nothing is more customary for God than to command nature with the utmost freedom, and nothing is more customary for nature than to obey God most humbly in all things. Whence also the persuasion of almost all peoples ascribes miracles to the supreme deity.

Subarticulus III: Cognoscibilitas miraculi

Subarticulus IV: Simulacra miraculorum

Articulus III: De prophetiis

Subarticulus I: Natura prophetiae

Subarticulus II: Possibilitas prophetiae

Subarticulus III: Cognoscibilitas prophetiae

§ II: Revelationis exsistentia

Dissertatio I: Testimonium Iesu de messianitate et divinitate sua

Caput I: Testimonium Iesu de messianitate sua

Articulus I: Factum testimonii messiani Iesu

Subarticulus I: Factum professionis messianae Iesu generatim

Subarticulus II: Initium professionis messianae Iesu

Subarticulus III: Incrementum professionis messianae Iesu

Subarticulus IV: Complementum professionis messianae Iesu

Articulus II: Sensus testimonii messiani Iesu

§ I: Conceptus messianicus ante Iesum

Subarticulus I: Conceptus messianus Veteris Testamenti

Subarticulus II: Conceptus messianus recentioris iudaismi

§ II: Conceptus messianicus ipsius Iesu

Subarticulus I: Iesus reiecit messianismum rabbinicum et eschatologicum recentioris iudaismi

Subarticulus II: Iesus accepit et perfecit messianismum propheticum Veteris Testamenti

Caput II: Testimonium Iesu de divinitate sua

Articulus I: De divinitate Iesu manifestata ante ipsius mortem

Subarticulus I: Iesus se ipse confitetur esse Deum simpliciter

Subarticulus II: Iesus se ipse confitetur esse Filium Dei naturalem

Articulus II: De divinitate Iesu manifestata post ipsius mortem

Subarticulus I: Divinitas Iesu a resurrectione usque ad ascensionem

Subarticulus II: Divinitas Iesu in ecclesia primigenia

Subarticulus III: Divinitas Iesu apud S. Paulum

Subarticulus IV: Divinitas Iesu apud S. Ioannem

Dissertatio II: Argumenta Iesu pro messianitate et divinitate sua

Caput I: Character Iesu

Articulus I: Character intellectualis Iesu

Subarticulus I: Iesus nulla insaniae signa dedit

Subarticulus II: Iesus summa sapientiae signa praesetulit

Articulus II: Character moralis Iesu

Subarticulus I: Iesus immunis fuit ab omni peccato

Subarticulus II: Iesus insignis fuit summa virtute

Caput II: Vaticinia Iesu

Articulus I: Vaticinia Veteris Testamenti de Iesu Christo edita

Subarticulus I: Vaticinia de genealogia Christi

Subarticulus II: Vaticinia de chronologia Christi

Subarticulus III: Vaticinia de biographia Christi

Articulus II: Vaticinia Novi Testamenti a Iesu Christo edita

Subarticulus I: Vaticinia Christi quoad res simpliciter occultas

Subarticulus II: Vaticinia Christi quoad res simpliciter futuras

Caput III: Miracula Iesu

Articulus I: Veritas historica miraculorum Iesu

Subarticulus I: Documenta historica miraculorum Iesu

Subarticulus II: Critica historica miraculorum Iesu

Articulus II: Veritas philosophica miraculorum Iesu

Subarticulus I: Sanationes infirmorum

Subarticulus II: Eiectiones daemonum

Subarticulus III: Dominatio virium naturalium

Subarticulus IV: Resuscitationes mortuorum

Caput IV: Resurrectio Iesu

Articulus I: Demonstratio factorum

Subarticulus I: Fides discipulorum Iesu

Subarticulus II: Monumentum Iesu vacuum

Subarticulus III: Apparitiones Iesu redivivi

Articulus II: Explicatio factorum

Subarticulus I: Explicatio fidei discipulorum

Subarticulus II: Explicatio monumenti Iesu vacui

Subarticulus III: Explicatio apparitionum Iesu redivivi

Conclusio I: Conclusio demonstrationis christianae

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