Apologeticae sive Theologiae Fundamentalis, Tomus I: Demonstratio Christiana

1. Negative criteria. A religious doctrine cannot have been revealed which — intrinsically — contains an error against sound reason and upright morals, or involves a contradiction with truths naturally known or perhaps already supernaturally revealed; or which — extrinsically — is proposed and propagated by means and in a manner that are illicit and unworthy, or produces disastrous effects and evil fruits. For God, the supreme truth and holiness, cannot reveal anything but what is true and holy; cannot employ anything but lawful and honest means; cannot produce anything but good fruits, and the best.

Hence, that religion cannot be divine which affirms several gods, a world eternal or subject to fate, men deprived of freedom, the soul to be mortal; which would be propagated by fraud or by force, etc.

Nay, even a religion, however commendable, whose first herald and founder was a vicious man would be suspect. For although God can absolutely speak through unworthy men, nevertheless for promulgating a religion He will hardly choose a messenger who is infamous, hostile to God, and abominable to men.¹

Hence the negative criteria are of the greatest importance for recognizing and refuting spurious revelations, but of the least for acknowledging the true revelation. For doctrines to which the negative criteria are wanting are at once, and without further examination, proven to be spurious revelations; but of a doctrine that is marked with the negative criteria it is not yet established that it is divine. Hence one must proceed from the negative to the positive criteria, both internal and external.

2. Positive internal or philosophical criteria. A doctrine which affords an adequate, nay a perfect, knowledge of the natural religion is probably, though not certainly, supernaturally revealed. Probably, because moral impotence stands in the way of men acquiring by their own effort not only an adequate but even a perfect knowledge of the natural religion; not certainly, because it is absolutely possible that a man of outstanding genius and industry should attain that knowledge.

If such a doctrine moreover adds to the natural religion certain excellent theoretical dogmas and moral precepts (which illumine and perfect the rational truths, are consonant with the legitimate aspirations and demands of mind and heart, and supremely promote the piety and edification of individual men as well as the common good of society), its divine origin is established as most probable, but not yet peremptorily. Most probable, since, given human weakness, it can hardly come about that natural reason should have found so excellent a doctrine; not peremptorily, since such an impossibility cannot be strictly demonstrated.

Moreover, a judgment on the excellence, sublimity, and utility of a doctrine is difficult. For it presupposes a diligent examination of the individual truths, which can be undertaken by few and is not infrequently disturbed by the subjective feelings of those who inquire.

Consequently, the positive internal criteria prove the divine origin of revelation neither with absolute certainty, so that every doubt is excluded, nor with such clarity that they are understood by all, especially by the uneducated. They are nevertheless of great importance not only in themselves, but in view of the concrete disposition of many men. For many are moved more by internal than by external criteria; nay, unless they are first prepared by the internal ones, they refuse, held back by prejudices, to approach the external, especially miracles and prophecies.

3. Positive external or historical criteria. Beyond all doubt divine is that religion whose propagation, preservation, and efficacy are so wonderful that they cannot be explained from human effort, or whose founder excels in such personal sanctity that the moral powers of men do not suffice to attain it. For if the moral powers of men do not suffice to produce those historical facts, they must have been produced with the special help of God.

Facts, moreover, which proceed from a human cause under the special concursus of God are not so much human facts as rather divine facts. God, therefore, Himself bears witness to the supernatural origin of the religion for which such external or historical criteria militate.

Nevertheless, the historical criteria thus set forth do not fully satisfy, nor satisfy everyone. For it is difficult to define with certainty and clarity how far the created moral power extends and where the special concursus of God begins.

But this last difficulty vanishes where historical facts occur which are brought about immediately by God alone, without the intervention of a secondary cause: namely, miracles and prophecies.

These works indeed, since they are seals of God, prove most certainly and most clearly the divine origin of the religion in whose favor they are wrought.

1°. We say: "they prove the divine origin of the religion most certainly and most clearly": most certainly, because God cannot confirm a false religion with His seal; most clearly, because everyone easily recognizes the sensible seal of God. "The force of a seal and of a miracle is the same. For the royal seal is always better known and more firm than the king's letters. For all know how to distinguish the seal; not all distinguish the letters; and the seal without letters has authority, while the letters without the seal have none. So too a miracle is better known and more efficacious than preaching; for all who see a blind man given sight or a dead man raised up understand that it is a supernatural and divine work, and are accordingly moved to believe that which is confirmed by such a testimony."² Hence: 2°. We say: "they prove the divine origin of the religion in whose favor they are wrought." For just as the royal seal confirms only those letters to which it is impressed or attached, so miracles and prophecies prove only that religion divine in whose favor they are wrought. Consequently, the relation of miracles and prophecies to the proposed religion must certainly be established, if they are to have demonstrative force. That relation, however, is for the most part most easily recognized from the fact that the wonder-worker or prophet asserts that he performs divine works, so that men may know that he speaks in the name of God and discharges an embassy of God. Thus, e. g., Jesus Christ appeals to His miracles and prophecies as to signs of His divine mission, as we shall see in the treatise on His prophecies, miracles, and resurrection.

Against this demonstrative force of miracles and prophecies unbelievers wrongly object:

1°. That almost all religions, even the falsest, boast of miracles and prophecies. They indeed boast of vain miracles and prophecies, but they do not show true miracles and prophecies. But the probative force of divine works is not impaired by the fact that many fabricate false miracles and prophecies, just as neither is the force of the royal seal or of genuine coin destroyed by the fact that some fashion forged seals or false coins. This one thing follows from the difficulty objected: that miracles have no demonstrative force unless their truth is established beyond doubt.

2°. That proving the supernatural revelation of God from the supernatural works of God is a vicious circle (Schelling, Strauß). For we prove the intelligible and invisible revelation from the sensible and visible works of God. Which is wholly consonant with reason. For "it is natural to man to apprehend intelligible truth through sensible effects. Hence, just as by the guidance of natural reason man can arrive at some knowledge of God through natural effects, so through certain supernatural effects, which are called miracles, man is led into a certain supernatural knowledge of the things to be believed."³

3°. That a historical and contingent event cannot prove a metaphysical and necessary truth (Lessing). But we do not contend that the internal truth of the individual doctrines of the proposed religion is proved immediately by miracles and prophecies; rather we contend that the divine origin of the religion, that is, the fact of revelation, is proved by miracles and prophecies. But if this divine origin of the religion, that is, the fact of revelation, is established, from that very fact the internal truth of the doctrines which constitute that revealed religion is logically deduced. For God revealing can neither be deceived nor deceive.

Hence the Vatican Council, passing over the other criteria in silence, rightly extols miracles and prophecies in this way: "That nonetheless the homage of our faith might be in accord with reason, God willed that external arguments of His revelation be joined to the internal helps of the Holy Spirit, namely divine facts and above all miracles and prophecies, which, since they clearly show forth the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are the most certain signs of divine revelation and accommodated to the understanding of all... If anyone says that divine revelation cannot be made credible by external signs, and therefore that men ought to be moved to faith solely by the internal experience of each one or by private inspiration: let him be anathema."⁴

The same Pius X prescribed to be confessed under oath against the errors of Modernism: "I admit and acknowledge the external arguments of revelation, that is, divine facts and above all miracles and prophecies, as the most certain signs of the divinely originated Christian religion, and I hold that they are most accommodated to the intelligence of all ages and of all men, even of this time."⁵