Apologeticae sive Theologiae Fundamentalis, Tomus I: Demonstratio Christiana

Driven into straits by this line of argument, the rationalists sometimes concede that revelation, considered in itself — objectively, or ontologically — is not contrary to reason. They urge, however, that revelation cannot be known by reason and is therefore, considered subjectively, that is, as regards us or logically, of no account. Hence it must be shown that revelation can be rendered knowable by criteria in general, and in particular by miracles and prophecies.

We cannot give credence to a revelation unless it is certainly established that it is divine. Hence, if God bestows a revelation upon the human race, He must mark it with such arguments as would enable it to be recognized as truly of divine origin, to be accepted with rational assent, and to be carried out with humble obedience. For otherwise man would be defrauded of the fruit of revelation, and God, in revealing, would be doing useless things.

1. Notion. The arguments by which the fact — that is, the existence or the divine origin — of revelation is to be proved are called motives of credibility or criteria of revelation. They are called motives of credibility¹ with reference to the ultimate end, because by them the fact of revelation is rendered rationally certain, and from this certainty the individual revealed truths become evidently credible. They are called criteria of revelation with reference to the proximate end, because from them true revelation is recognized and distinguished from spurious revelation.

2. Qualities. In order, however, that the criteria may answer to their end, they must be certain and clear.

Certain, i. e. such as to convince every sound reason, excluding any prudent doubt concerning the divine origin of the proposed revelation. In the concrete, indeed, it is not required that each and every one of them be absolutely certain, because in view of the diversity of men a diverse, that is, a relative, certainty suffices. A child rationally assents to the simple authority of parents or teachers; the unlearned, to the testimony of trustworthy men; but the learned, and above all sceptics, are scarcely convinced even by the greatest reasons. Since, however, the criteria must be suited to all, it is necessary that at least all of them taken together possess not merely relative, but absolute certainty.²

Clear, i. e. such as can be grasped by every sound reason. Not, indeed, must all of them be of such great clarity that they are easily known by all men one and all, since the faculty of judgment varies with the variety of talent and learning. Nevertheless, let at least some criteria be of such a kind that any lover of truth can learn from them the existence of divine revelation.

The certainty of the criteria taken together must therefore be so great that it befits even the most learned absolutely; the clarity, on the other hand, so great that it lies open even to the most unlearned relatively. And the greater the certainty and clarity of the individual criteria, the more they have the nature and force of criteria.

3. Division. The criteria of revelation are divided according to the source from which they proceed and according to the end which they attain.

According to their source, the criteria are either internal (intrinsic) or external (extrinsic). The former are drawn from the philosophical character of the doctrine itself which is declared to be revealed; the latter consist in the historical facts which accompany the manifestation of the doctrine.

According to their end, each of the two is again either negative or positive. Negative are those which prove negatively, i. e. that nothing stands in the way of such a doctrine being revealed; positive, on the other hand, are those which prove positively, i. e. that such a doctrine has truly been revealed.

1. Negative criteria. A religious doctrine cannot have been revealed which — intrinsically — contains an error against sound reason and upright morals, or involves a contradiction with truths naturally known or perhaps already supernaturally revealed; or which — extrinsically — is proposed and propagated by means and in a manner that are illicit and unworthy, or produces disastrous effects and evil fruits. For God, the supreme truth and holiness, cannot reveal anything but what is true and holy; cannot employ anything but lawful and honest means; cannot produce anything but good fruits, and the best.

Hence, that religion cannot be divine which affirms several gods, a world eternal or subject to fate, men deprived of freedom, the soul to be mortal; which would be propagated by fraud or by force, etc.

Nay, even a religion, however commendable, whose first herald and founder was a vicious man would be suspect. For although God can absolutely speak through unworthy men, nevertheless for promulgating a religion He will hardly choose a messenger who is infamous, hostile to God, and abominable to men.¹

Hence the negative criteria are of the greatest importance for recognizing and refuting spurious revelations, but of the least for acknowledging the true revelation. For doctrines to which the negative criteria are wanting are at once, and without further examination, proven to be spurious revelations; but of a doctrine that is marked with the negative criteria it is not yet established that it is divine. Hence one must proceed from the negative to the positive criteria, both internal and external.

2. Positive internal or philosophical criteria. A doctrine which affords an adequate, nay a perfect, knowledge of the natural religion is probably, though not certainly, supernaturally revealed. Probably, because moral impotence stands in the way of men acquiring by their own effort not only an adequate but even a perfect knowledge of the natural religion; not certainly, because it is absolutely possible that a man of outstanding genius and industry should attain that knowledge.

If such a doctrine moreover adds to the natural religion certain excellent theoretical dogmas and moral precepts (which illumine and perfect the rational truths, are consonant with the legitimate aspirations and demands of mind and heart, and supremely promote the piety and edification of individual men as well as the common good of society), its divine origin is established as most probable, but not yet peremptorily. Most probable, since, given human weakness, it can hardly come about that natural reason should have found so excellent a doctrine; not peremptorily, since such an impossibility cannot be strictly demonstrated.

Moreover, a judgment on the excellence, sublimity, and utility of a doctrine is difficult. For it presupposes a diligent examination of the individual truths, which can be undertaken by few and is not infrequently disturbed by the subjective feelings of those who inquire.

Consequently, the positive internal criteria prove the divine origin of revelation neither with absolute certainty, so that every doubt is excluded, nor with such clarity that they are understood by all, especially by the uneducated. They are nevertheless of great importance not only in themselves, but in view of the concrete disposition of many men. For many are moved more by internal than by external criteria; nay, unless they are first prepared by the internal ones, they refuse, held back by prejudices, to approach the external, especially miracles and prophecies.

3. Positive external or historical criteria. Beyond all doubt divine is that religion whose propagation, preservation, and efficacy are so wonderful that they cannot be explained from human effort, or whose founder excels in such personal sanctity that the moral powers of men do not suffice to attain it. For if the moral powers of men do not suffice to produce those historical facts, they must have been produced with the special help of God.

Facts, moreover, which proceed from a human cause under the special concursus of God are not so much human facts as rather divine facts. God, therefore, Himself bears witness to the supernatural origin of the religion for which such external or historical criteria militate.

Nevertheless, the historical criteria thus set forth do not fully satisfy, nor satisfy everyone. For it is difficult to define with certainty and clarity how far the created moral power extends and where the special concursus of God begins.

But this last difficulty vanishes where historical facts occur which are brought about immediately by God alone, without the intervention of a secondary cause: namely, miracles and prophecies.

These works indeed, since they are seals of God, prove most certainly and most clearly the divine origin of the religion in whose favor they are wrought.

1°. We say: "they prove the divine origin of the religion most certainly and most clearly": most certainly, because God cannot confirm a false religion with His seal; most clearly, because everyone easily recognizes the sensible seal of God. "The force of a seal and of a miracle is the same. For the royal seal is always better known and more firm than the king's letters. For all know how to distinguish the seal; not all distinguish the letters; and the seal without letters has authority, while the letters without the seal have none. So too a miracle is better known and more efficacious than preaching; for all who see a blind man given sight or a dead man raised up understand that it is a supernatural and divine work, and are accordingly moved to believe that which is confirmed by such a testimony."² Hence: 2°. We say: "they prove the divine origin of the religion in whose favor they are wrought." For just as the royal seal confirms only those letters to which it is impressed or attached, so miracles and prophecies prove only that religion divine in whose favor they are wrought. Consequently, the relation of miracles and prophecies to the proposed religion must certainly be established, if they are to have demonstrative force. That relation, however, is for the most part most easily recognized from the fact that the wonder-worker or prophet asserts that he performs divine works, so that men may know that he speaks in the name of God and discharges an embassy of God. Thus, e. g., Jesus Christ appeals to His miracles and prophecies as to signs of His divine mission, as we shall see in the treatise on His prophecies, miracles, and resurrection.

Against this demonstrative force of miracles and prophecies unbelievers wrongly object:

1°. That almost all religions, even the falsest, boast of miracles and prophecies. They indeed boast of vain miracles and prophecies, but they do not show true miracles and prophecies. But the probative force of divine works is not impaired by the fact that many fabricate false miracles and prophecies, just as neither is the force of the royal seal or of genuine coin destroyed by the fact that some fashion forged seals or false coins. This one thing follows from the difficulty objected: that miracles have no demonstrative force unless their truth is established beyond doubt.

2°. That proving the supernatural revelation of God from the supernatural works of God is a vicious circle (Schelling, Strauß). For we prove the intelligible and invisible revelation from the sensible and visible works of God. Which is wholly consonant with reason. For "it is natural to man to apprehend intelligible truth through sensible effects. Hence, just as by the guidance of natural reason man can arrive at some knowledge of God through natural effects, so through certain supernatural effects, which are called miracles, man is led into a certain supernatural knowledge of the things to be believed."³

3°. That a historical and contingent event cannot prove a metaphysical and necessary truth (Lessing). But we do not contend that the internal truth of the individual doctrines of the proposed religion is proved immediately by miracles and prophecies; rather we contend that the divine origin of the religion, that is, the fact of revelation, is proved by miracles and prophecies. But if this divine origin of the religion, that is, the fact of revelation, is established, from that very fact the internal truth of the doctrines which constitute that revealed religion is logically deduced. For God revealing can neither be deceived nor deceive.

Hence the Vatican Council, passing over the other criteria in silence, rightly extols miracles and prophecies in this way: "That nonetheless the homage of our faith might be in accord with reason, God willed that external arguments of His revelation be joined to the internal helps of the Holy Spirit, namely divine facts and above all miracles and prophecies, which, since they clearly show forth the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are the most certain signs of divine revelation and accommodated to the understanding of all... If anyone says that divine revelation cannot be made credible by external signs, and therefore that men ought to be moved to faith solely by the internal experience of each one or by private inspiration: let him be anathema."⁴

The same Pius X prescribed to be confessed under oath against the errors of Modernism: "I admit and acknowledge the external arguments of revelation, that is, divine facts and above all miracles and prophecies, as the most certain signs of the divinely originated Christian religion, and I hold that they are most accommodated to the intelligence of all ages and of all men, even of this time."⁵

By the decrees just praised the Church wishes not only to defend the suitable criteria of revelation, but also to rout the unsuitable ones. For the Vatican Council rejects sentimentalism, while Pius X rejects apologetic immanentism. Both agree in this: having rejected the philosophical (intrinsic) and historical (extrinsic) criteria, above all miracles and prophecies, they have recourse to purely psychological arguments — that is, arguments drawn neither from religion itself nor from the divine facts that accompany religion, but from the man who practices religion. They differ, however, as follows:

1. The apologetic sentimentalism of the Protestants¹ appeals exclusively to the subjective movements which the human soul undergoes while it undergoes revelation.

The older Protestants (the Pietists), indeed, maintained that every believer is moved or inspired interiorly by the Holy Spirit in such a way that he discerns the genuine word of God by its "savor" and "taste," with that same evidence by which he distinguishes white colors from black and pleasant foods from bitter ones.²

But an inspiration of this kind, a private inspiration of the Holy Spirit, is affirmed gratuitously. Indeed, it is proved not to exist, since individual Protestants believe contradictory and plainly false things, all the while appealing to the "testimony of the Holy Spirit." What they call private inspiration is in reality a private motion or subjective feeling.

Hence the more recent Protestants, under the leadership of Kant and Schleiermacher, substitute for the imaginary testimony of the Holy Spirit the natural religious sense or internal experience (religiöses Gefühl, inneres Erlebnis). For almost the whole of Protestant theology and philosophy, following Kant, teaches that pure or theoretical reason is incapable of religious knowledge (agnosticism); religion is grasped by practical reason alone, i. e. by conscience or internal experience.

But a criterion of this sort: 1°. takes away all objective certainty of religion and of revelation. For if those things, and those alone, are said to be revealed which please each person's internal experience, every religious truth dissolves into each person's subjective opinion. One and the same proposition one man could call revealed, another not revealed. Indeed, the said criterion 2°. destroys even all subjective certainty of revelation. For the "religious sense" and "internal experience" do not proceed from the cognitive faculty of reason, but from the will or rather from blind feeling. Hence they produce no certain knowledge, and they vary continually at the whim of feeling, so that one and the same man calls now these things, now those, revealed.

It is clear, therefore, that this Protestant criterion is altogether unsuitable for attesting true revelation.

2. Apologetic immanentism does not indeed judge revelation from the subjective movements of the soul alone, but holds it to be divine for this reason: that it answers to the aspirations and exigencies of the whole of human nature and life.

In the nineteenth century, indeed, Kantianism and positivism struck such deep roots that not only most non-Catholics but many Catholics too grew weary of "traditional" apologetics, which proves revelation by philosophical and historical reasons. To win over these "modern" minds, certain Catholic men, among them Ollé-Laprune, Fonsegrive, and Brunetière,³ invented what they call the "new" apologetics. Its novelty consists in this: that it exalts psychological arguments more than is fitting and regards them as primary criteria.⁴ It strives with all its might to show that man by his nature desires and demands revelation; that revelation not only agrees with the noblest desires and strivings of mind and heart, but is altogether necessary for rightly ordering intellectual and moral life. The other criteria, especially miracles and prophecies, it does not indeed despise, but employs in second place, once modern minds have already been won over by psychological motives.

Soon, however, the Modernist authors, above all Loisy, Blondel, Laberthonnière, and Tyrrell,⁵ rejected outright every philosophical and historical criterion, and above all miracles and prophecies. They do not tolerate a truth brought in from without ("extrinsicism") and known and proved by reason alone ("intellectualism"). They hold that alone to be true which gushes forth from one's own "ego" and is demanded by one's own "ego," i. e. by the whole soul and human life ("immanentism"). Every transcendent truth must, by its origin, prove itself immanent.

Hence the Modernist apologists work solely and exclusively "to persuade man that in himself and in the innermost recesses of his nature and life there lies hidden a desire for and an exigency of some religion — and not of any religion whatever, but of one altogether such as the Catholic religion is; for this, they say, is demanded outright by a perfect explanation of life."⁶

This apologetic immanentism Pius X condemned both in the encyclical "Pascendi"⁷ and in the "Oath against the errors of Modernism,"⁸ teaching that miracles and prophecies are "the most certain signs of the divinely originated Christian religion, and the same are most well suited to the understanding of all ages and of all men, even of the present time." He disapproves, moreover, of those Catholics "who, although they reject the doctrine of immanence as a doctrine, nevertheless use it for apologetics; and they do this so incautiously that in human nature they seem to admit not only a capacity for and suitability to the supernatural order — which Catholic apologists have always demonstrated with appropriate qualifications — but a genuine exigency in the true sense of the word."⁹

In truth, we have already proved¹⁰ that revelation is morally necessary for the human race in its present state, but is not of itself demanded by human nature. If it were demanded by nature, it would no longer be a supernatural and gratuitous revelation, but a natural one owed to nature. Consequently, the Modernists understand revelation not as an objective locution of God, but as subjective religious experience in the neo-Kantian sense.¹¹ Hence the apologetic method of immanence does not build up revelation, but destroys it.¹²

From everything we have so far said about criteria in general, it is clear that the Catholic Church defends miracles and prophecies as the principal criteria, whereas the adversaries of the Catholic cause either make light of those divine facts or reject them outright. Hence we must now treat of miracles and of prophecies one by one.

We must treat of the nature, possibility, and knowability of miracles, as well as of counterfeit miracles.¹

1. Notion. Miracles are designated by various names in the sacred Scriptures, according as they are considered under different aspects, namely the ontological, teleological and psychological. They are called: powers, deeds (δυνάμεις, ἔργα) under the ontological aspect, because they proceed from the omnipotent God; signs (σημεῖα) under the teleological aspect, because they manifest the divine will and religion; prodigies, portents, wonders (τέρατα, θαυμάσια) under the psychological aspect, because they excite admiration.

It is in this last respect that the word miracle itself is taken. For miracle (miraculum) is so called from wondering (mirari). Now we wonder when we see an effect whose cause we do not know. And in this broadest sense St. Augustine¹ calls a miracle "whatever hard or unusual thing appears beyond the hope or power of the one wondering".

Very many effects of this kind, however, excite the admiration of some men only, whereas to others they appear in no way wonderful. Thus the unlearned marvel at an eclipse of the sun or at electrical phenomena, whereas all learned men would marvel if things happened otherwise. Hence such effects are not wonderful in themselves and consequently are not strictly miraculous.

In the strict sense a miracle is a sensible work effected by God beyond the natural order.

2. Explanation. a) A sensible work. In itself, that is, ontologically, a miracle can exist, although it is not perceived by the senses. Psychologically and teleologically, however, it must be a sensible work. Psychologically, namely, it belongs to a miracle to excite admiration. But it cannot excite admiration unless it is in some way apprehended by the senses. Moreover, teleologically a miracle must be a sign of the divine will and especially a seal of revelation. But it is not a seal unless it is sensible.

Hence the miracles of faith are called miracles only improperly, e. g. the Incarnation, Transubstantiation, the working of the sacraments. For these effects are not perceived by the senses and therefore do not become known immediately to reason either, but are known by faith alone.²

Psychic miracles already have more of the sensible character of miracles. For extraordinary effects which affect a man's intellect (intellectual miracles, e. g. infused knowledge; the gift of tongues; prophetic knowledge) or his will (moral miracles, e. g. the sudden conversion of a sinner; the heroic virtues of the Saints) are manifested at least to the internal senses of that man who is the subject of the miracle. Indeed, sometimes they are even sensibly manifested to other men in a mediate way, e. g. prophetic knowledge by the fulfilment of the prophecy; the conversion of Paul by the light sent forth from heaven, the voice of Christ perceived, Saul's body prostrate on the ground, his eyes blinded, his conduct changed. Wherefore these works are commonly numbered among miracles.³

Immediately, however, only the phenomena of the physical world are subject to sense experience. Hence physical miracles (the healing of the sick; the raising of the dead; the calming of the storm, etc.) most fully deserve the name of miracles.

b) A work is called extraordinary, not insofar as it happens rarely⁴ nor insofar as it exceeds the forces of nature, but insofar as it is done beyond the order of things created and established by God. For God has established a mode according to which phenomena happen constantly and uniformly. But if some effect does not follow this order, it is called miraculous; if, on the other hand, it comes to pass according to this order of things, it is not miraculous, even if it is produced directly by God Himself.

For this reason neither the creation of things out of nothing at the beginning of time, nor the continual creation and infusion of the soul into the disposed body, nor the sustaining and feeding of all animals, nor the governance of the whole world, nor the special providence besought by the prayers of men are numbered among miracles. But it is a miracle if God creates even now a grain of sand, or if with five loaves He feeds five thousand men, or if He heals the sick man with a word alone, or raises the dead.

This is the principal and most essential property of miracle, namely, that it be an effect beyond the order of nature. For its two other properties, sensibility namely and divine causality, miracle has in common with many other events; but it belongs to miracle alone that it be beyond the course of nature. Moreover, the sensibility of the miraculous effect is not required for its own sake, but only for our sake, namely, that miracle may become for us a sign or criterion; divine causality, however, as will presently appear, necessarily underlies the praeternatural effect. Wherefore miracle is sometimes defined simply as: a praeternatural effect.

c) A divine work, or one effected by God. For from the fact that the miraculous effect is beyond the natural order it follows: 1°. That visible creatures can work no miracles. For the creatures of the visible world are possessed of merely natural forces. But natural forces are able to produce only natural effects. Therefore neither irrational beings nor rational men can perform miracles.

2°. That pure spirits can work only relative miracles. In the opinion of almost all who concede that these spirits exist, angels, both good and bad, far surpass by their power the whole visible world. They are endowed with an extraordinary keenness of intellect and strength of will in regard to things both supernatural and natural. And although they are pure spirits, yet by a special motive power they are able to move bodies from place to place. This is established by reason and by history. By reason: for the highest of the lowest reaches the lowest of the highest; in bodies, however, local motion is the highest, and therefore angels, who are above bodies, can at least produce this motion in them. Moreover, for the harmonious unity and governance of the world it is necessary that spirits be able to have some connexion and fellowship with corporeal things; but with local motion excluded, spirits can do nothing at all in corporeal things.⁵ By history: the Angel carried Habacuc to Babylon, Philip to Azotus; he rolled back the stone from Christ's sepulchre, loosed Peter's chains; angels, taking on and moving bodies, accompanied Tobias, appeared to Abraham, Lot, Daniel, Mary, Joseph, and performed many similar things.⁶

This motive power of the angels is increased by their supreme perspicacity, invisibility, swiftness and compenetrability. Hence spirits are able to transfer bodies of immense bulk, both heavenly and earthly, in the briefest time and over the longest stretch of places; to divert the forces of gravity, cohesion and others; to excite the phenomena of light, heat, electricity; to penetrate and pass through, to besiege and possess bodies; to cause infirmities, and again to heal diseases that are naturally curable, by seeking out and applying suitable remedies; to produce apparitions by presenting objects to the external senses, or by exciting phantasms in the internal senses; to apply active things to passive, and whatever else is contained in or obtained by motion.

Therefore angels can work wonderful things, which wholly surpass the order of nature known and accessible to us, and which are consequently miracles with respect to us, that is, relative miracles. In themselves, however, or absolutely, these works are not praeternatural. For whatever and however angels act, they always act in a manner that befits the natural order. For the natural order is nothing else than the constant action or will of God to produce the same effects under the same circumstances; but it is repugnant that any creature should intercept this will or action of God.⁷

3°. That God alone can work absolute miracles. This is evident a priori. For absolute miracles are done beyond the order of the whole of created nature. But only the creator, lord and governor of the world surpasses the natural order.⁸

In fact it is established a posteriori that no miracles of this kind have been performed except by the direct intervention of God. Nowhere do we read of the dead recalled to life, of weak organs healed by the mere nod of the will, of the elements subdued by the command of a voice, except in the name of God.

Scripture attributes the power of working miracles to God alone: "The Lord alone does great wonders".⁹

In a twofold way, however, can God bring about miracles: immediately and mediately. Immediately, if He uses no created cause to produce the effect; mediately, if He uses some creature as an instrument.

The instrumental cause, likewise, is either ministerial, or moral, or physical. Ministerial (simply instrumental), which acts in the name and by the command of God, its own intervention being excluded (e. g. Balaam's ass); moral (impetratory, meritorious), which moves God to act (e. g. miracles obtained through the intercession of the Saints); physical, which really influences the effect (e. g. the deaf and dumb man healed by the touch of Jesus). All creatures can be ministerial causes of miracles;¹⁰ the moral causes are the good angels and holy men; the physical cause is the humanity of Christ, since it is the instrument of the Word united to Himself.¹¹ In whatever way, however, the instrumental causes cooperate, God alone is the principal or efficient cause of miracles.

3. Refutation. The doctrine thus far set forth concerning the nature of miracles is in harmony with the whole of sacred Scripture,¹² with Christian tradition and with Catholic theology.¹³ A contrary notion of miracle is proposed only by those authors who, keeping the name, deny miracle in reality. And indeed:

a) Monists and deists think a miracle is a merely natural effect, which appears praeternatural and supernatural to credulous ignorance. Thus Spinoza defines a miracle as "a work of nature, whose natural cause we cannot explain by the example of another familiar thing".¹⁴ According to Locke a miracle is "a sensible operation, which, exceeding the comprehension of the spectator and believed to be contrary to the course of nature, is judged by him to be divine".¹⁵ Monists and deists cannot concede a miracle in the true sense of the word. For the former deny the existence of God, the latter God's power over the world. Hence a fortiori they deny praeternatural works performed by God. With these adversaries, however, we have no concern. Every dispute about miracle presupposes the existence of a personal God and the natural influence of God upon the world.

b) Rationalists call miracles effects of divine providence. Wegscheider, the father of theological rationalism, calls miracles "wonderful events, which, under God's direction, were so disposed that they stirred the spectators to recognize a certain efficiency of divine providence, and moved them to give faith to the teacher of a new religion".¹⁶ Unjustly, however. For the works of providence are miraculous only insofar as they are done by God intervening in a praeternatural manner, e. g. if God, moved by the prayers of men, heals the sick man instantly, no natural means being employed.

c) Neorationalists, i. e. radical and liberal Protestants as well as Modernists, call miracles all events in which we experience God, or which by subjective faith we attribute to God. According to Mart. Rade, the birth of offspring to pious parents, the flight of the machine to the aeronaut are miracles, if through these events they intimately feel God and refer them to God.¹⁷ "Miracles," says Ziller, "spring from religious feeling and experience ... The miracle is produced by faith".¹⁸ It is evident that by such a definition all objective truth of miracle, and consequently miracle itself, is taken away.

d) Positive Protestants, namely the "mediating theologians" (Vermittlungstheologen) and the "orthodox", judge miracles to be effects of a higher natural order, not, however, of the praeter- and supernatural order. Strauss himself already derides the "mediating" theologians, because they strive to explain the Gospel miracles by the merely imaginary powers of a higher nature.¹⁹ Most of the orthodox define a miracle as "a natural event, whose laws are not yet known".²⁰ Therefore almost all non-Catholics agree in this, that they do not understand miracle as an effect beyond the order of nature. Whether, then, they attack miracles or defend them, they reject the miracle in the true sense of the word; nay, they declare it impossible.²¹

The rationalists contend that a miracle is repugnant both on the part of nature, in which it would be wrought, and on the part of God, by whom it would be wrought.¹ Against this, however:

1. A miracle is not repugnant to nature. If a miraculous effect were repugnant to nature, the repugnance would regard either the laws, or the forces, or the sciences of nature. But a miraculous effect is repugnant neither to the natural laws, nor to the natural forces, nor to the natural sciences. Therefore it is not repugnant to nature.

a) It is not repugnant to the natural laws. Unbelievers argue that miracles change physical laws that are utterly immutable.² But in truth the laws of nature are neither immutable, nor are they changed by a miracle.

1°. The laws of nature are not immutable. By the name of natural laws we understand the constant and uniform manner of operation of physical things. Now this manner of operation for the most part does not follow necessarily from the essence of physical things, but depends on various conditions, which in no way flow from the essence of the things. E. g. motion, whether translational or molecular, communicated in this or that direction, with this or that velocity, does not depend on the essential properties of matter. Hence this motion can be changed by a miracle, the corporeal things remaining essentially unchanged.

But even those laws which follow necessarily from the essence of things are nevertheless mutable in themselves. For physical things themselves are not necessary beings, but contingent ones, i. e. they can be or not be, be so or otherwise, and be changed, the laws being changed. Therefore the creator and lord of nature could suspend, vary, and abolish the laws of nature at his pleasure, not only in a single case, but in the whole world.³

Yet: 2°. The laws of nature are not changed, but are only actually impeded, while a miraculous effect takes place. E. g. while Peter walks upon the waters, the law of gravity is restrained from acting here and now, the law itself, i. e. the inclination of the waves to engulf Peter, nevertheless remaining.

For the laws of nature do not attain their effects categorically, but only hypothetically, i. e. if they are not restrained by some higher force. Whence even the natural forces themselves curtail the efficacy of the laws in many ways. Thus, e. g., the law of gravity very often does not obtain its effect, when some natural cause resists. Already the inorganic forces of magnetism and electricity withdraw many bodies from gravity for a time. In vegetal and animal nature, a higher direction being impressed upon the molecules, we observe the force of gravity suspended. Much more does rational man by his industry and sagacity know how to curb the innate activity of gravity, e. g. while he holds back a stone, lest it fall.

But if creatures are able to act thus, the law remaining unimpaired, a fortiori the creator can frustrate the natural laws of their effects, the law, i. e. the natural inclination of things to their own manner of acting, nevertheless remaining. Therefore a miracle is not repugnant to the laws of nature.

b) It is not repugnant to the natural forces. The adversaries contend that both the connection and the constancy of the natural forces stand in the way of a miracle. Against this, however:

1°. The connection of the natural forces does not stand in the way of a miracle. From the principle of the "connection of the forces or natural causes" (Prinzip der geschlossenen Naturkausalität, principe du connexe des causes naturelles)⁴ it indeed follows that nature left to itself produces effects only by natural causes, and that all natural causes together with their effects form at length one single cosmic cycle. But the unbelievers falsely maintain that not even God, the author and lord of nature, can break this cycle, by positing some effect immediately, without employing natural causes.⁵ For this opinion excludes not only the supernatural or miraculous influx of God, but also the natural one, and is thereby confounded with deistic naturalism itself. Whoever confesses God to be independent of the world and provident over mundane things will not deny that he can posit any effects whatsoever in the world, without making use of the causes or forces of nature.

2°. The constancy of the natural forces does not stand in the way of a miracle. According to the principle of the "constancy of natural energies" (Kraftprinzip, Gesetz der Erhaltung der Kraft, principe de la conservation de l'énergie naturelle) the sum of the physical forces remains constantly the same. But by a miracle the physical forces would be increased, e. g. the vital force by the resuscitation of the dead, the healing force by the miraculous cure of the sick. Therefore a miracle would do away with the constancy of the energies. Thus the adversaries.⁶

But this is without foundation. For the principle of the energies merely declares that the physical forces of the world left to itself are neither diminished nor increased. But whether they can be diminished or increased, God being the efficient cause, the principle of the energies does not know.

Philosophy, however, affirms that God, who created the sum of the forces at the beginning of the world, can add other forces besides, the world being already created. Nay, it is certain that he has actually added new forces in the course of time. For cosmology and geology testify that life arose only at a late stage. God therefore created the vital forces later, the inorganic forces having already been created. Hence, with the dictum of the energies unimpaired, God, who was once able to add new forces, will be able even now to do so by working miracles.⁷

Therefore a miracle is not repugnant to the forces of nature.

c) It is not repugnant to the natural sciences. The haters of miracles object at last that by miraculous works all science of natural things is undermined. If a miracle is admitted, they say, then both the theoretical certainty and the practical use of natural knowledge are imperilled, since we never know whether in a single case a natural effect will follow or be eluded by divine intervention.⁸

1°. A miracle does not take away the theoretical certainty of natural knowledge. The certainty of the natural sciences consists in this, that, the conditions being posited, the forces of nature constantly produce their proper effect. A miracle does not weaken this certainty, but presupposes and strengthens it. For as often as we perceive an effect which we cannot here and now explain from the laws and forces of nature, we do not conclude that the constancy of the natural order has failed, but rather affirm without hesitation: Nature always does what is its own; but when a preternatural effect is present, surely not nature, but God, has posited it. E. g. we know with certainty that men cannot walk upon the waters, but are overwhelmed by the waves. This certainty does not perish, although we see Peter walking upon the sea; nay, without any doubt it stands that not nature, but God, is the author of this wholly unusual thing.⁹

2°. A miracle does not take away the practical use of natural knowledge. From the fact that God sometimes works an effect neither expected nor foreseen, men's affairs are not disturbed. For not only supernatural effects, but much more often also natural ones, come to pass unexpected and unforeseen. Think of ships sunk, of crops devastated by the storm, of houses set on fire, and six hundred other things. Notwithstanding these, men pursue their duties and affairs. Therefore a pari they will not neglect them because of miracles that may perhaps happen. Nay, a fortiori! For miracles are wrought by God, who is supremely provident. Hence they always redound to our advantage, whether temporal or most certainly spiritual and eternal. Far be it that the use of natural knowledge should suffer detriment from a miracle!¹⁰

Therefore miracles are repugnant neither to the laws, nor to the forces, nor to the sciences of nature. Hence they include no repugnance at all with nature.

2. A miracle is not repugnant to God. Those who think a miracle impossible on the part of God argue from the supposed contradiction of the miracle with nature. But since on this side there is no contradiction, as we have seen, it is very easily proved that a miraculous operation is in no way repugnant to God. For, as the adversaries themselves confess, that repugnance would regard either the power, or the wisdom, or the immutability of God. But a miraculous operation is repugnant neither to the divine power, nor to the divine immutability, nor to the divine wisdom. Therefore it is not repugnant to God.

a) It is not repugnant to the divine power. They object that God can no more act against a physical law than against a moral and a logical law, since this threefold law follows from the very nature of God.¹¹

Yet the falsity of this sophism escapes no one. Logical-mathematical and ethical truths exist by virtue of an internal or metaphysical necessity; therefore they flow from the necessity and perfection of the divine nature. That iron is not wooden; that twice two are not five; that good is to be done and evil avoided — these are truths absolutely necessary. The contrary of these logical, mathematical, and ethical truths includes an absolute contradiction. Therefore not even the divine omnipotence can make it possible. But the truths of the physical order, as has already been said,¹² depend in all their numbers and parts on the free will of God. God could institute this or that or no physical order at all. A fortiori he can produce a singular effect which is beyond, above, or against that effect which nature here and now could produce. Therefore a miracle is not repugnant to the divine power.¹³

b) It is not repugnant to the divine immutability. They urge that God, although he instituted the order freely, nevertheless instituted it by an eternal decree, and therefore cannot change it in time, without himself being changed.¹⁴ In truth, by his eternal decree God established not only the customary order of nature, but also these or those preternatural or miraculous effects. "God from eternity foresaw and willed that he would do what he does in time; thus he instituted the course of nature in such a way that nevertheless it was preordained in his eternal will that he would at some time do something beyond that course."¹⁵

But since a miracle comes to pass by force of that eternal decree at the appointed time, God is not changed; otherwise by the same reasoning he would have to be said to be changed by the very creation of nature. Both effects, viz. the ordinary effects and the extraordinary effects, are one eternal decree put into execution at the appointed time. Both coalesce into one order of the world, whose lowest part is the order of nature, but whose highest part is the preternatural order.

c) It is not repugnant to the divine wisdom. They say at last that God, although by absolute power he is able to work a miracle, is nevertheless not able to do so by ordered power or wisdom. For it is unworthy of the divine wisdom to emend and correct by miracles, continually, the order of nature once established.¹⁶

This would indeed be true, if by miracles the physical laws and forces were declared imperfect and insufficient for obtaining their proximate, i. e. physical, end. But in fact miracles by no means declare the laws and forces of nature inept for producing the physical effects assigned to them. Surely miracles are not wrought that the physical course of nature may be better off, but that a moral and religious end may be attained, viz. that God may hear prayers, bestow goods, avert evils, and above all, that he may signify and confirm the divine revelation. For just as natural works demonstrate the natural revelation of God, so supernatural or miraculous works manifest the supernatural revelation of God. But because miracles tend to that supernatural end, they by no means injure or correct the natural course; just as the natural order is by no means injured or corrected by the supernatural revelation.

It is therefore evident that miracles are altogether possible, since they are repugnant neither on the part of nature, nor on the part of God.

Nay, unless we confuse nature with divinity or divinity with nature, but profess God as supermundane and personal, the possibility of miracles stands of itself. For nothing is more customary for God than to command nature with the utmost freedom, and nothing is more customary for nature than to obey God most humbly in all things.¹⁷ Whence also the persuasion of almost all peoples ascribes miracles to the supreme deity.

Once the possibility of miracle has been established, the adversaries seek another refuge, boasting that miracle as such can never be known by us. And some indeed contend that the sensible fact of miracle can never be established; others, that the supernatural cause of miracle can never be established. The former deny the historical knowability, the latter the philosophical knowability, of miracles.

Now we do not say that we always know with unhesitating certainty the historical and philosophical truth of miracle; but we maintain that miracle in itself does not escape our knowledge, and can therefore very often be known by us.

1. Historical knowability of miracle. It is manifest that we have nothing in common with the "historico-critical" rationalists (neo-Kantians), who understand miracle not as an objective fact, but as a fiction of subjective experience. Philosophico-sceptical rationalism, on the contrary, does indeed suppose miracle to be an objective event, yet one wholly foreign to knowledge. For either it asserts that the miraculous fact remains doubtful a priori, simply speaking, or at least that it must be subjected to so immoderate a critical examination that a posteriori it will always elude us. Against this, however, we set down:

a) The miraculous fact can be established with the same certainty with which other historical facts are established.

Hume, with Strauß, Zeller, and others assenting, notes that in individual cases only the moral testimony of those who say that a praeternatural effect has occurred stands for the truth of a miracle; against the truth of a miracle, however, there stands in all cases physical experience asserting that no praeternatural effects occur. Manifestly, that moral testimony is always overcome by this physical experience. Hence the truth of the miraculous fact can never be proved.¹

In truth, however, the miraculous fact can be firmly proved after the manner of natural events, either by one's own physical testimony or by the physical-moral testimony of others.

1°. By one's own physical testimony. If we are present at a miracle, we perceive it by our own experience of the senses. E. g. if a dead man is recalled to life while we look on, we declare him raised to life again and know it, taught by the experience of our eyes. But it is in exactly the same way and by the same means that we apprehend natural effects, E. g. that the dead are for the most part not recalled to life. We should speak falsely were we to say that in our case the miraculous fact is supported only by moral testimony, but the natural fact by physical testimony. It is manifest that both rest upon physical experience. Hence both are also established with the same certainty. For if I could not trust my own senses when they testify that a dead man has been raised, neither could I trust them when they testify that the dead have not been raised. Whence, unless one foolishly wishes to deny the experience and testimony of the senses, he must concede that the truth of a marvellous fact can be established with certainty, if we were present.

2°. By the physical-moral testimony of others. If we were absent from a miracle, we ought and can trust the moral testimony of others, who themselves affirm that they perceived the miraculous fact by physical experience of the senses. E. g. St. John the Evangelist narrates several miracles of Christ, testifying that he saw with his own eyes the signs related.²

But in a similar manner we also apprehend the natural facts of past time. All history and jurisprudence, nay, for the most part even the experimental and mathematical sciences, rest upon the physical-moral testimony of others. All sciences consist in this, that they trust the critical testimony of others as much as their own. If this testimony holds where it is a question of affirming ordinary facts, it must also hold where it is a question of extraordinary, that is, miraculous, facts; but if it did not hold for these, neither would it hold for those, and accordingly almost all scientific certainty would be utterly overthrown.

Therefore there is an absolute parity of certainty as regards natural and praeternatural, that is, miraculous, facts. By the same testimony, whether our own or that of others, we are convinced that natural events for the most part occur, but that sometimes praeternatural ones also happen. It is absurd to say that miracles are supported by moral testimony alone, or that they are refuted by physical-experimental testimony. The contrary is established, provided only that miraculous events be measured against critical rules. Whence:

b) The miraculous fact must be examined with the same critical method with which other historical facts are examined.

Renan, treading in the footsteps of Voltaire and Rousseau, does not indeed wholly deny that the historical truth of miracle can be established; but he subjects miracle to such hypercritical rules that the miraculous fact in reality always remains doubtful. For when it is a question of examining it, he rejects the testimony of rude and simple men, requiring an examination by men expert in the art; nay, demanding that these men be able to repeat the miracle as often, in whatever manner, and wherever it may please them, E. g. by bidding the thaumaturge to raise the dead man repeatedly, under other circumstances, while other witnesses look on, before judgment be rendered concerning the historical truth of the miracle.³

But miracles are unjustly subjected to such critical rules. For a miracle is a sensible effect like all historical events. From this head no distinction whatsoever intervenes between a natural and a praeternatural fact. In exactly the same way in which we know that a man is blind or dead, we also know that he sees or lives again. Wherefore miracles are unjustly weighed by critical rules other than those by which the remaining historical facts are weighed.

And since any men whatever suffice to testify to these things, why do they not also suffice to testify to those? Nay, a fortiori they suffice to testify to miracles, since the strangeness of the fact the more stirs men to examine accurately. It is therefore hypercritical to demand that miracles be examined only by men expert in the medical, physical, chemical, and historical arts. It is foolishly and impiously demanded that God repeat miracles at the will and mockery of men, since not even the ordinary facts of history may be repeated in this manner. It belongs to historical criticism only to investigate miraculous facts according to the accustomed rules, and to admit no miracle unless it be proved by the testimony of men of sound senses and undoubted veracity.

These things being so, the historical truth of miracle is knowable.

2. Philosophical knowability of miracle. That a marvellous effect has been produced by a supernatural cause is established, if it is established that it surpasses natural causes.

For from the enunciation of the "principle of sufficient reason" we may conclude from the effect to the adequate cause. Wherefore, if that cause is not found in the created world, it must be sought in God. But the rationalists absolutely deny that we can ever affirm any effect to surpass natural causes. Such an affirmation, they say, always remains doubtful, unless we know all the natural forces and laws. Since, however, we know scarcely the smallest part of them, judgment concerning the natural or supernatural causality of a marvellous effect must be suspended. Thus, together with Spinoza, today almost all liberal and conservative Protestants argue.⁴

This argumentation is indeed scientific in appearance, but in reality futile. For:

a) That a marvellous effect has been produced by a supernatural cause is established, even though we know only those forces and laws of nature which pertain to the concrete case of the miracle.

Not all of nature, but only one or another force and law of nature pertains to an individual marvellous effect. E. g. if it is a question of a dead man recalled to life, it suffices to know the axiom: "Omne vivum ex ovo", i. e. that nature never produces life out of death. Armed with this one axiom, we may pronounce with absolute certainty that the dead man was raised by supernatural, not natural, force.

b) Nay, of the very natural forces which pertain to the concrete marvellous effect, for the most part not positive but only negative knowledge is required.

Of course it is not necessary to know how far the respective natural power extends; it suffices to have known that it is not sufficient to produce the proposed effect. E. g. for the most part we cannot positively determine what the natural medical art can accomplish; but negatively we know that this power is unequal to suddenly healing a putrid or cancerous wound. For those expert in the medical art know that many biological and successive processes are required for the natural restoration of the cells which they call vital. Those ignorant of medical science know this at least from experience, that nature does not suddenly heal a putrid or cancerous wound. All therefore rightly pronounce such a healing to be not natural, but supernatural.

c) Finally, often no knowledge of natural things is required, neither positive nor negative, in order that it may be perfectly clear that nature has not produced the concrete marvellous effect.

This is evidently clear if the thaumaturge uses no natural force at all, nor can use any, E. g. if by the mere command of his voice or will he cleanses a leper, recalls a dead man to life, stills the aroused waves of the sea. In these cases nature contributes or can contribute nothing at all to the production of that marvellous effect. Therefore either the effect was produced by a supernatural cause, or it was produced without a cause, which is wholly absurd.

Hence two conclusions follow:

First: Often miraculous works can be safely distinguished from natural works. The limits, indeed, by which natural and supernatural things are divided are for the most part difficult or impossible to designate; but it is easy to discern very many things which lie far from the limits. Nay, we can very often distinguish supernatural from natural things with the same certainty with which we distinguish day from night, the green, blue, and red colors of the rainbow, although we can neither accurately determine at what moment of twilight day ends and night begins, nor where in the rainbow are the outermost extremes of the individual colors.

Second: No unusual effect is to be numbered among miracles, unless it is certainly supernatural. For on the part of science it would be rash and insane to claim a miracle, unless either by evidence or at least by the most careful examination it be established that nature was unequal to producing the concrete marvellous effect. On the part of faith, moreover, it would be dangerous and impious to peddle false miracles as true. For by false miracles true ones are ridiculed, and accordingly the most luculent criteria of revelation are obscured. For this reason the Catholic Church conducts herself so cautiously and severely in judging miracles, that she excites even the admiration of unbelieving scholars.⁵

Some moderns admit that marvelous works exist which cannot be explained by the physical forces of nature. They maintain, however, that these are not to be attributed to a divine cause, but either to the psychical efficacy of human beings, or to the psychical efficacy of human beings aided, as they say, by the spirits of the higher world, or finally, simply, to the efficacy of diabolical spirits.

The first are called hypnotic wonders, the second spiritistic wonders, the third diabolical wonders. The question therefore arises whether true miracles can be explained away by these counterfeits of miracles.

1. Hypnotic wonders.¹ Hypnosis is so called from the Greek word ὕπνος = sleep, because it is a morbid state similar to natural sleep.

Already known among the ancient Medes, Chaldaeans, Indians, Egyptians, and Greeks, and in recent times recognized by the physicians Mesmer († 1815) and Braid († 1860), hypnosis was scientifically investigated on all sides in the last decades of the nineteenth century.

In practice physicians use hypnosis to cure various diseases; artists, to obtain models (Modelle, modèles) which will long preserve the same posture; judges, to extort confessions from the accused or from witnesses; parents and teachers, to root out bad habits in children; conjurers, to prey upon curious and superstitious people; corruptors, to attain base ends. The scientific theory of hypnosis, as well as the practical art of inducing it, is called hypnotism, sometimes also mesmerism or braidism.

It is the part of physicians to expound hypnosis from the medical point of view, of moralists to judge it from ethics, of apologists, however, only to prove that hypnosis has nothing to do with miracles. For this reason the hypnotic phenomena are first to be enumerated, then to be explained.

a) The hypnotic phenomena are enumerated. Hypnosis is of twofold origin: spontaneous and artificial. Spontaneous hypnosis occurs without being intended either by the hypnotized person or by the hypnotizer. It suddenly overcomes persons disposed to it by nature or by chance (hysterics, the severely wounded, etc.). Artificial hypnosis is produced voluntarily by the person either to be hypnotized or hypnotizing. The means of provoking and intensifying artificial hypnosis are either sensorial (by exciting or soothing the senses, e. g. the eyes with a bright object, the ears with an unfamiliar noise), or mechanical (by percussion or pressure on the body, the head, the eyes), or physical (by the force of the magnet, of electricity), or narcotic (by ether, chloroform, morphine, alcohol), but chiefly psychical, namely by suggestion, whether one's own (autosuggestion) or another's (heterosuggestion).

The hypnotic state, however arising and however induced, shines forth in four phenomena: lethargy, catalepsy, somnambulism, and suggestibility.²

It must nevertheless be noted that not all these phenomena are present in every single case of hypnosis. Sometimes only lethargy, or catalepsy, or hypnotic somnambulism is present; sometimes lethargy occurs first, then catalepsy, finally somnambulism. Suggestibility, however, never fails, whether the other phenomena are present or absent.

1°. Hypnosis usually begins with lethargy. It manifests itself in the extreme irritability and contraction of the muscles, as well as in a more or less perfect anaesthesia (insensibility) of the senses and of the whole surface of the body. Whence it comes about that the lethargic person communicates with the outer world scarcely or not at all, and even the power of the suggester himself is with difficulty brought to bear upon him.

2°. Catalepsy usually follows lethargy, although it can occur or be provoked without it. In catalepsy the anaesthesia of the senses is absolutely perfect, so much so that the hypnotized person can be pricked, cut, and burned without pain. There is added the properly cataleptic mark, namely the rigor of the muscles, whereby it comes about that the patient, like a corpse, lacks all "spontaneous" movement. Since the muscles do not react at all to irritations, the limbs have an entirely waxen flexibility, so that they can be moved and fixed in any position whatever and invariably retain the movement or posture once received. Through impressed movements catalepsy also receives suitable phantasms and, accordingly, suggestions.

3°. Somnambulism is distinguished from lethargy and catalepsy by this, that it not only relaxes the sensitive faculties but wonderfully increases them. And first of all the external senses. Sight is sharpened in a wonderful way, so that the somnambulist can read with ease the smallest letter-forms with almost closed eyes, nay, can clearly see things whose tiniest image is reflected from the eyes of another person. Hearing reacts to the lightest sounds and even perceives noises at a great distance. In like manner taste, touch, and smell are sharpened. But also the internal senses. The phantasy is so far exalted that it receives images of things as vivid as if the objects themselves were present. The memory is so firm and tenacious that the somnambulist recognizes most perfectly whatever he once learned or perceived, e. g. languages which he had known cursorily in youth or had heard by chance. The instinct emerges with such force that the ailing somnambulist often indicates his own illness and its remedies, led by natural sense after the manner of animals. The spiritual faculties, on the contrary, lie dormant. The intellect is elevated only accidentally, because the sensitive life is more faithfully assisted, e. g. a somnambulist pupil will sometimes do a difficult assignment more easily, because the somnambulic memory holds the teacher's lesson more firmly. Of the exercise and force of the will there is almost nothing. Self-consciousness the somnambulist has wholly lost.

4°. Suggestibility, taken in general, is the propensity to undergo suggestions.³ By hypnotic suggestibility is understood that by which various representations, affections, motions, and actions can be commanded to the hypnotized person ("medium") at the nod of the suggester. Suggestibility is minimal in lethargy, greater in catalepsy, greatest in somnambulism. The somnambulist suffers and performs everything whatever is suggested to him. Is it suggested to him that he is a little schoolboy? Suddenly he will put on the manners and ignorance of a beginner, although he be an old man and a teacher. Is it suggested to him that he is another person, or several persons, or even a beast? He is inwardly convinced that the matter is so. Is it suggested to him that the water held out is generous wine? He believes he is drinking generous wine, and becomes drunk. Is blindness or deafness suggested to him? He immediately becomes blind or deaf. Is it suggested, on the contrary, that he is freed from the hysterical blindness or deafness with which he was afflicted before the hypnosis? He is suddenly cured, and will remain cured even after the hypnosis. Is it suggested to him that in the posthypnotic state he will commit a crime or lay aside a bad habit? Infallibly, at the appointed time that had been suggested to him, he will carry it out, although perhaps the suggester no longer remembers the "medium". This posthypnotic propensity fades away only gradually, sooner or later, according to the degree of suggestibility or of the suggestion.

b) The hypnotic phenomena are explained. The hypnotic phenomena, and hence hypnosis itself, have sometimes been attributed to preternatural causes. Unjustly, however. For although it is sometimes difficult to know what natural cause produced some particular hypnotic effect, nevertheless it is certain that all hypnotic phenomena are produced by natural causes. For these phenomena occur also outside hypnosis in those conditions in which preternatural causality is evidently excluded. And indeed:

1°. Imperfect lethargy is present in natural sleep, the most perfect in apparent death ("stupor"), the perfect one in that state of the chronic disease with which hypnotic lethargy wholly shares both name and nature.

2°. Phenomena of catalepsy are observed in all hospitals and insane asylums, especially among melancholics, paralytics, and hysterics. From this prehypnotic catalepsy the hypnotic catalepsy differs scarcely or not at all.

3°. Imperfect somnambulism afflicts those men who walk in their sleep (whence it is also called somnambulism) and perform many unusual things; perfect somnambulism frequently invades singular persons and even whole infirmaries, whole families or schools, after the manner of an epidemic. To these infirm persons hypnotic somnambulists are wholly equal, not only physiologically but also psychically.

Unjustly are preternatural psychical powers and actions attributed to hypnotic somnambulists. Their so-called "clear vision" (Hellsehen, clairvoyance) rests upon the incredible acuteness of the senses, the phantasy, the memory, and the instinct. The stories that are told of the speaking of wholly unknown languages, of the prediction of future contingent events, of action at a distance, or of other wonders of this kind in somnambulists, are either mere fables or at least are not established.

4°. Psychical suggestibility, or "impressionability", is in all men. Even in the state of waking and in daily life we are frequently subjected to suggestion, e. g. the sight of troublesome little animals excites itching; the representation of foul things provokes vomiting, etc. The weaker the will and self-consciousness, the greater the suggestibility. Whence in natural sleep, and especially in natural somnambulism, certain men are capable of stupendous suggestion, because, while the will and consciousness sleep, their external and internal senses are sometimes wonderfully exalted.

Since this is so, we no longer wonder that in artificial or hypnotic sleep, and above all in hypnotic somnambulism, suggestibility is at its maximum. For on the one hand the "medium" suffers hyperaesthesia (extreme sensibility) of the senses and nerves, on the other hand he is without the exercise of will and self-consciousness, and accordingly depends almost wholly on the nod and influence of the suggester.

On this suggestive influence hypnotic therapy also rests and terminates, i. e. the cure of diseases effected through hypnotism. By hypnotic — nay, even prehypnotic — suggestion are removed those diseases whose sole cause is suggestion (namely, certain "functional" disturbances of the senses, of respiration, of digestion, of palpitation,⁴ of the whole nervous system), and which are called hysterical or nervous.

For just as those hysterico-nervous diseases arise from suggestion, so too they can naturally be cured through suggestion. Beyond this, however, psychotherapy does not extend. True or "organic" diseases wholly elude the efficacy of hypnotic psychotherapy no less than of prehypnotic. Psychical suggestion gives only a transient illusion of the cure, or rather of the mitigation, of true diseases. It therefore acts wholly according to the laws, not beyond the laws, of nature. Consequently it contains nothing miraculous.

2. Spiritistic wonders.⁵ Spiritism or spiritualism is so called because it boasts of commerce with the spirits of the other world, namely with angels and the souls of deceased men. It is also called mediumism, because that commerce usually takes place through persons singularly fitted for it; hypno-spiritism, because spiritistic mediums frequently act in the hypnotic state; occultism, because it shuns the light of day; theosophy, because spiritism has constructed a religious system sui generis out of superstitious supernaturalism and unbelieving naturalism.

Already the Old Testament abhors those who, after the manner of the heathen, "consult soothsayers" or "seek the truth from the dead".⁶ In fact almost all ancient peoples — above all the Hebrews, Chaldaeans, Egyptians, Indians, Chinese, Greeks, Romans, Celts — favored spiritistic magic, oracles, and divinations. In the Middle Ages Jewish cabbalists as well as certain Christian magicians cultivated spiritistic arts (the conjuring of demons, necromancy, etc.), against the resistance of the ecclesiastical magisterium. When at length hypnotism was revived in the nineteenth century, spiritism first gained ground in America, afterwards in the various regions of Europe, so that around the year 1880 almost 20 million adherents of the "religion" of spiritism were numbered. When at last the frauds of many mediums were detected and the absurdities of spiritistic doctrine laid bare, this deadly plague declined day by day, although even today many hundreds of thousands adhere to it.⁷

It is the part of moral theology to show that theoretical and practical spiritism is illicit; of apologetics, however, that spiritistic phenomena are not to be equated with miracles. To this end we shall first enumerate those phenomena, afterwards judge them.

a) The spiritistic phenomena are enumerated. In spiritistic séances phenomena of three kinds occur:

1°. Local motions with no mechanical force applied. The most frequently reported is the turning of tables. It is brought about in this way: several persons — one alone very rarely suffices — touch with their fingertips a table at which they sit around. After a short interval the table begins to move and to be shaken by its feet. Sometimes tables, chairs, and other furniture, nay, even the spiritistic "mediums" themselves, are lifted into the air, bells are set ringing, musical sounds are heard, and the room resounds with noises and unusual blows.

2°. Intellectual revelations. When questions are put, answers are obtained bearing both upon earthly and upon heavenly matters, e. g. scientific or religious questions are elucidated; the state of the departed in the other life is set forth. Now the things that are revealed are not in themselves miraculous; for those revelations mostly contain puerile, facetious, and fabricated matter, and never exceed the knowledge which either the "mediums" or the other persons present at the séance possess.⁸ Yet the manner in which the intellectual cognitions are made known seems miraculous. For they are not always manifested through the speech of the "medium", but very often are indicated by blows and lines of the turning tables, or by painting and writing which are set down on paper by a magical hand, whether the paper be open or even closed in an envelope.

3°. Material apparitions. Deceased relatives, friends, acquaintances, and other spirits make their appearance clothed in sensible form, offering little flowers, leaving traces of bodily limbs, or permitting their photograph to be taken, finally bringing about all those things which are called "materialisations" of spirits. Nevertheless doubt remains whether the "materialisations" really occurred or not. The mutual suggestion of those present and hallucinations of the senses are easily mingled with these things, but above all fraud. For very often it has been proved that the "materialised spirit" was in reality the body of the "medium"; that the "medium" had disguised the little flowers offered by the "spirits" or the photographs of the departed in clothes, hair, etc. Wherefore all phenomena of this kind become suspect.

b) The spiritistic phenomena are judged. Although spiritistic phenomena are explained in one way by some and in another by others, it is nevertheless certain that they have nothing to do with miracles. For:

1°. Almost all spiritistic phenomena appear to be natural. The key to this natural explanation is furnished by the turning tables themselves. For the turning of the tables can be effected not only by those who affect conversation with the spirits of the other world, but also by those who abhor all commerce with spirits. Therefore the cause of this phenomenon is not preternatural, but natural. As innumerable experiments testify, it consists in a certain nervous force. For just as mineral magnetism inheres in certain minerals and metals, so in the nerves of men there inheres an animal magnetism, similar to the electric fluid.⁹

Animal magnetism not only cures certain diseases after the manner of hypnotism,¹⁰ but also moves from their place the bodies to which it is applied. It is applied, moreover, and passes into bodies, especially during a certain state of psychical exaltation. Whence "hypnospiritistic mediums" and fantastic séances are especially fitted to produce the turning of tables and kindred phenomena. To the experiment of the turning tables, moreover, are related all the local motions proper to spiritism. For if tables can be moved and shaken by the nervous fluid, why could not they themselves and other bodies be lifted on high? Why could not musical sounds be produced by the motion of instruments, or blows and unusual noises by the motion of other bodies?

To the same magnetico-electric fluid can be attributed, at least in part, the intellectual revelations, i. e. the wonderful manner in which the cognitions of the "mediums" or of the other persons present at the séance are made known. For since the turning of the tables can be effected by the nervous fluid at the nod of the "mediums" or of the other agents, nothing forbids that the same fluid, at the pleasure of the agents, trace blows or lines on the tables. How, however, the same magnetic force can write on open paper, or on paper closed in envelopes of copper and stone, with or without a pen, is indeed not clear to me. The same is to be said a fortiori of the "materialisations" of the spirits. In no way is it proved that by the magnetic fluid the bodies of the departed can be shown, nay, photographs taken and traces of limbs impressed. If, therefore, the truth of the phenomena be supposed, those "materialisations" seem to be referred to a preternatural cause.

2°. If some spiritistic phenomena are preternatural, they are not divine.

Neither God himself nor the spirits familiar to God, namely the good angels and the blessed souls of the departed, can mingle in spiritism.

For the system of spiritism is a sink of error and impiety. It denies the existence of a personal God, preaching a certain hypersupernaturalistic pantheism no less than a materialistic one. It thinks Christ a mere man, or even a "materialised" spirit, whose miracles it attributes to occultistic machinations. Finally it denies all religious truths, except the immortality of the human soul. But even this immortality it understands falsely. For it opines that the spiritual soul is surrounded by a corporeal ethereal substance, which it therefore calls the "perispirit" (perisprit) or astral body (Astralleib). This astral body it holds to be the medium by which men on earth and the departed in heaven are physically united and spiritistic commerce is instituted. The heavenly life of the departed and the earthly life of the living it depraves with a gross sensualism. It is evident, therefore, that both God and the spirits friendly to God are far removed from this system.

Individual occultistic séances dishonor God and the spirits friendly to God no less than the whole system of occultism. For those sessions are convened for the sake of vanity, cupidity, and superstition; they are carried on by "hysterical" and for the most part suspect "mediums", with a ridiculous apparatus, with a concourse of "spirits" knocking, making noises, and trifling; they are finished with wholly futile, false, and pernicious things and revelations. In such sessions God and the good spirits certainly cannot take part. Nay, God cannot permit that at the pleasure of the "mediums" the good spirits be able to be summoned and to appear in occultistic sessions. Therefore if spiritism contains preternatural phenomena, they are produced by the evil spirits and are referred to the diabolical wonders.

3. Diabolical wonders. Pure spirits can by their natural force effect works which are miracles with respect to us, or relative [miracles].¹¹ And indeed this natural power belongs not only to the good angels, but also to the demons. For "all the power and might of operating ad extra which is natural to the angels remained intact in the demons after sin, since by sin the natural [endowments] in the angels were not diminished, much less lost.¹²

If these relative miracles are effected by the good angels, they have the same value and probative force as miracles wrought by God himself. For the good spirits, intimately united to God in all things, work only good things, and those for a good end. They can in no way favor falsehood and iniquity. Wherefore miracles made either by God or by the good angels are simply divine signs.

The question, however, arises whether it is lawful to discern these divine signs from diabolical works.¹³ We grant that sometimes it is difficult to discern the two from each other; for the most part, however, diabolical wonders are easily distinguished from miracles by reason of the work that is done, the circumstances under which it is done, and the end to which it is done.

a) The work that is done. Spirits are able to act on the world by locomotive force alone.¹⁴

Hence the following are not diabolical:

1°. Works which are above locomotive force. By locomotive force only translations and the alterations dependent on them can be produced. Therefore the demons are incapable of the production of bodies, by which substances are either created or generated or multiplied. Likewise they cannot cause the animations by which dead bodies are given life, e. g. restore the skin destroyed by leprosy; give sight to a blind man deprived of the visual organ; raise to life a man who has died. Finally they cannot effect the transformations by which bodies are constituted intrinsically different from what they were before, as when water was changed by Christ into wine.¹⁵ These effects therefore are absolute miracles, possible of performance to God alone.

2°. Works which are beside locomotive force, i. e. which are done with no locomotive force applied. This happens as often as the effect is produced not by touch or physical impact, but by nod or moral command. For it must not be thought that "this matter of visible things serves those transgressor angels at their nod, but God"¹⁶

Hence even the local translations and alterations of bodies themselves, if they are effected by a mere nod, cannot be ascribed to the demons. The demons can indeed cure a disease by bringing and applying remedies, or satisfy a multitude by bringing loaves from elsewhere, or calm a storm by locally constraining the elements; they cannot, however, do so by commanding. Whence, e. g., all the evangelical miracles are by that very fact divine, because they were effected by a mere command of voice and will.

If, however, some work is such that it can in itself be done by a demon, it is to be learned from the circumstances whether it was really done by diabolical force or not.

b) The circumstances under which the work is done pertain both to the medium and to the manner of the wonderful work.

1°. The medium of the wonderful operation. If the thaumaturge is a man of sound mind and peaceful spirit, if he is pious and holy, modest and humble, endowed with all the qualities of a legate of God, and fleeing the help of the devil, there is no doubt that he does not operate with the power of the evil spirit. If not, he is highly suspect. For although God can use even an unworthy medium for working miracles, for the most part nevertheless he uses a worthy one.

2°. The manner of the wonderful operation. If in the deed wrought nothing is found but what is honest, grave, wise, worthy of God, and salutary to men, it is to be attributed to God or to the good angel. To the devil, however, it is to be ascribed if superstitious, obscene, ridiculous, and cruel things occur. For the superstitious is opposed to divine truth, the obscene to divine sanctity, the ridiculous to divine majesty, the cruel to divine goodness.

If finally, even with the circumstances weighed, the origin of the wonderful work remains doubtful, recourse is to be had to its end itself.

3°. The end to which the work tends. The end of a divine miracle is twofold: ultimate and proximate.

α) The ultimate end of a miracle is the glory of God, to the promotion of which all divine works tend. The demons, however, can never work for the glory of God, so far as in them lies, because they are necessarily hostile to God and to his worshippers. Even if they sometimes boast of the glory of God and the eternal salvation of men, in their works there will always be something by which diabolical perversity is betrayed. Otherwise, as Christ testifies, "Satan would be divided against himself".¹⁷

Wherefore a work cannot be diabolical which consists wholly in this: that it inculcates the knowledge and love of God, commends the divine virtues, leads men to God, strengthens the kingdom of God. On the contrary, certainly diabolical is a wonderful deed which has an evil end, namely human glory, the corruption of morals, the neglect of religion, or at least an end unworthy of God, such as gain and curiosity.

β) The proximate end of a miracle is chiefly this, that it manifest to men the will and truth of God. For just as from the natural works of God we know the natural truths of religion, so from the supernatural works of God, namely miracles, we learn the supernatural truths. Whence God has implanted in men the invincible persuasion that works wholly exceeding the forces of corporeal nature certainly prove the divine origin of the doctrine in favor of which they are done, and to which the negative criteria already lend their support.

Wherefore men would be led into invincible error if God suffered works miraculous with respect to us to be done in favor of a doctrine which is falsely said to be revealed. Such invincible error, moreover, God is wholly bound to prevent by the same right by which a king must prevent forgers from using his seal for sealing forged decrees. As therefore divine providence restrains the power of the devil, lest he disturb natural things to the irreparable ruin of the world, so too it will wholly prohibit the demons from working miracles by which the supernatural order of revelation would necessarily be subverted. Therefore a relative miracle wrought to prove the divine origin of a doctrine for which the negative criteria militate cannot be from the devil.

Nothing, however, forbids God to suffer the demons to do relative wonders in favor of a doctrine destitute of the negative criteria. For it is evident of itself that a doctrine destitute of these criteria is not divinely revealed, and hence the wonders accompanying it cannot be divine miracles. Wherefore sacred Scripture expressly says that God suffers the demons to defend their errors by prodigies. For Christ says: "False prophets will arise and will give great signs and wonders, so as to lead into error, if possible, even the elect."¹⁸ Likewise St. Paul writes of the antichrist: "And then that iniquitous one will be revealed ... whose coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power and signs and lying wonders, and in all the seduction of iniquity."¹⁹ Nay, even pagan and ecclesiastical writers relate certain prodigies, whether feigned or real, in confirmation of idolatrous worship.²⁰

Prophecy belongs to the genus of miracles, inasmuch as it is an intellectual miracle. Hence what we have set forth concerning miracles holds equally for prophecies. Yet a few things must be added touching the nature, possibility, and knowability of prophecies.¹

Etymologically prophecy is so called from the Greek word: προφητεία = to speak in someone's stead.¹ Hence by force of the word prophecy signifies "interpretation," and prophet "interpreter." In the sacred books only those are called prophets who speak in God's stead.

And indeed in the very widest sense those are called prophets who, under divine instinct, either interpret the sacred Scripture, or exhort the people, or praise God.²

In the stricter sense prophecy is the manifestation of things hidden from men. But a thing can be hidden from men in a threefold way: psychologically, i.e., with respect to the soul; topologically, i.e., with respect to place; chronologically, i.e., with respect to time. Hence to prophecy pertain: the manifestation of the thoughts of other men, or the reading of hearts (καρδιογνωσία); the manifestation of things so distant in place that they cannot be perceived by the senses (κρυπτογνωσία); the manifestation of events absent in time, i.e., simply future events (vaticinium, μαντεία).

It is evident, however, that the notion of prophecy most of all befits the manifestation of events that are simply future. For events hidden psychologically are known to at least one man, events hidden topologically are for the most part known to several men; but things simply future are altogether hidden from all men. Therefore prophecy in the strictest sense is about future things. For that reason it is defined: the certain and determinate foretelling of a future event which cannot become known from natural causes.

It is called: a certain foretelling, i.e., one expressed in undoubted words. Hence mere suspicions (Ahnungen, pressentiments) and assertions more or less probable are excluded.

A determinate foretelling, one expressed in words that are in no way ambiguous. Hence are excluded ambiguities and equivocations, which can be bent in every direction. To this class belong the Sibylline poems of the pagans and the Delphic oracles of Apollo.³ It is not necessary, however, that future events be announced with the greatest and most complete clarity, after the manner of history. For although the foretelling be determinate, it can nonetheless be obscure on account of the metaphors and types employed, on account of the circumstances concealed, on account of the prophetic light being more or less clear. Since prophecies are adumbrations of future things, they ought to say only as much as suffices, so that when what was foretold has come to pass, it may appear that it had been foretold.

[Of] a future event, not of a present or past one. Hence are excluded prophecies made after the event or even at the very time of the event, such as are the prophecies related in the Aeneid of Vergil, as well as many Sibylline and Delphic oracles.

Which cannot naturally become known, i.e., which can in no way be inferred from natural causes. Of these events there are three kinds: the free works and decrees of God ad extra, e.g., the Incarnation; the free actions and decisions of men, e.g., the betrayal of Judas, the denial of Peter; and finally the events of the physical world, which exist only in a cause unknown to all men, e.g., an earthquake which will occur after a hundred years with these or those attendant circumstances. Yet the foretelling of events of this threefold kind pertains to prophecy in a different manner. The free decrees of God and of men, since they pre-exist in no natural cause, are the object of absolute prophecy, or of the first order. Future events of physical nature, since they pre-exist in a natural cause, although a hidden one, are the object of relative prophecy, or of the second order. It is evident of itself that future things which can be foreseen by natural instinct, by the acuteness of the senses or of the mind, or by the divination of the learned and of skilled practitioners, are in no way the object of prophecy.