Apologeticae sive Theologiae Fundamentalis, Tomus I: Demonstratio Christiana

The Semi-Rationalists indeed concede that rational truths — even suprarational ones — can be revealed. But they assert it can in no way come about that mysteries in the strict sense, which contain truths that are simply suprarational, should be revealed.

In truth, the revelation of these truths could not come about if it were contradictory either for them to exist, or for them to be communicated by God, or for them to be believed by men. But it is not contradictory either for mysteries to exist, or for God to communicate mysteries, or for man to believe mysteries. Therefore the revelation of mysteries is not impossible.

1. It is not contradictory that mysteries should exist.

We do not intend positively to prove that mysteries exist. For reason can neither establish the existence of mysteries, nor ought it to. It cannot. For:

a) A mystery is a truth that simply, or absolutely, surpasses the intellect. But those things that absolutely surpass the intellect do not have for it more of the character of being than of non-being.

b) Moreover, the existence of a mystery, since it is not established elsewhere, would have to be demonstrated from its own internal evidence. But this we are in no way able to do, since the internal nature of a mystery is evident neither before nor after revelation. Therefore reason, left to itself, can positively assert nothing about a mystery.

Nor ought it to. For the adversaries maintain that the existence of a mystery is contradictory. It suffices, therefore, to show that this contradiction is not established. But it is shown:

a) From the nature of a mystery. A mystery is a truth that simply exceeds reason. But of a thing that simply exceeds reason, reason cannot prove the contradiction.

b) From the infinity of God and our own finitude. The infinite is fully measured only by an infinite intellect, by no means by a finite one. But if our finite intellect does not fully measure the infinite God, neither can it affirm whether mysteries exist in Him or not.

c) From the human manner of knowing divine things. In this life we do not know God and divine things intuitively, but only discursively from created things. But created things do not represent God in an adequate manner, but only analogically and imperfectly. Therefore we can be ignorant of many things that are in God, for example mysteries. A man born blind, who judges the nature of light and colors analogically from the sensation of hearing, has only an obscure idea of the matter. So a fortiori man, who knows God solely from creatures, perhaps simply does not know a great many of God's (attributes).¹ Hence he would wrongly affirm that the existence of mysteries is contradictory.

2. It is not contradictory that God should communicate mysteries.

For it is evident that God does not lack the power by which to reveal, nor the manner by which to reveal, nor the end for which to reveal mysteries, if there truly are any.

a) Divine omnipotence does not lack the power by which to reveal mysteries. For men are able to hand on to other men truths whose internal nature the latter do not understand; a fortiori, therefore, God is able to do so.

Moreover, from the omnipotent only those things cannot be done which include a contradiction and are therefore internally not possible. But mysteries, if they exist, do not include a contradiction. Therefore the omnipotent God has the faculty by which He can reveal them.

b) Divine omniscience does not lack the manner by which to reveal mysteries. For by the very same ways and means by which He manifests natural and preternatural truths He can manifest mysteries as well. For he will achieve this either by devising and explaining signs not yet known, or by employing and combining signs already known — for example, if it is revealed that in the one nature of God there are three divine persons, the subject (the one essence of God) and the predicate (the three divine persons) are already known to us, although we do not comprehend that this predicate belongs to that subject.

It is by this double means that both the inventors of new things and, above all, the refiners of languages make use. Indeed, it is in these ways that all men communicate to other men truths whose internal nature the latter do not grasp. A fortiori, therefore, God can reveal mysteries to men in these ways.

c) Divine wisdom does not lack the end for which He reveals mysteries.

It is absurd to deny that God's wisdom has reasons for revealing mysteries, since His ways are unsearchable — indeed, since even we, fools that we are, can set down several reasons of this sort. His end can be, through the mysteries revealed:

α) That our knowledge be increased. For with the mysteries revealed we know subordinate truths, i.e. rational and preternatural ones, more easily and more deeply; for example, we know the nature of God better and more correctly through the revealed mystery of the Trinity. Indeed, all the arts and disciplines have progressed wonderfully through the benefit of the Christian mysteries. Mysteries are like the sun, which, although it cannot be looked at with the naked eye, nevertheless illuminates all things; or like the telescope, by whose aid many things are perceived which, on account of their distance, would not at all be reached by the simple eye. Moreover, mysteries add to the rational and preternatural object already known an object that is simply suprarational, higher and nobler than the rest. Whence it comes about that also:

β) Our mind is perfected. "Of the noblest things, however imperfect a knowledge may be, it confers the greatest perfection upon the soul. And therefore, although the things that are above reason human reason cannot fully grasp, yet it acquires for itself much perfection if at least it holds them in some way by faith."²

γ) The goodness of God is manifested. For by revealing His intimate and most profound mysteries God discloses to man His charity, benignity, mercy, liberality, and paternal affection. Thence He also excites and stimulates our love and gratitude toward Himself. Therefore the revelation of mysteries, if there truly are any, is not repugnant on God's part, but rather most fitting.

3. It is not contradictory that man should believe mysteries.

For if the assent to be given to mysteries were repugnant, this would come about either because mysteries objectively contradicted reason, or because subjectively they could not be known by reason.³

But neither of these can be said.

a) Mysteries do not objectively contradict reason.

The Rationalists falsely suppose that mysteries are against reason for the reason that they are above reason. For these two things are as far apart as the poles. Above reason, namely, is that proposition between whose terms reason, left to its own powers, does not suffice to detect either agreement or disagreement, e.g. that in the one essence of God there are three persons. Against reason is that proposition which in the terms of which it consists includes a contradiction, e.g. to say that a circle is a square, that twice two make five, that there is one God and three Gods. The difference between these two is manifest: not being able to be known, and including a contradiction.⁴

Indeed, since they are simply above reason, they cannot be proved to be against reason. For concerning those things that simply surpass reason, such as mysteries, reason can simply positively affirm nothing, neither agreement nor repugnance. Rather, the repugnance of a thing can be pretended only then, when the internal nature of the thing is clearly perceived. But we do not clearly perceive the internal nature of a mystery by reason. Therefore it will never be permissible to say that a mystery objectively contradicts reason.

b) Mysteries are known subjectively by reason.

Although mysteries are incomprehensible, reason nonetheless, with the help of revelation:

α) clearly and certainly knows the fact, or existence, of the mystery, i.e. that it is a mystery. Now a proposition is sufficiently set before reason if we understand the fact of the proposition, namely the subject and predicate, and know without doubt that the latter is connected with the former, although we are ignorant of the internal manner of this connection. For although this knowledge does not furnish the evidence of the thing, it gives at least the invincible certainty of the thing, in which reason reposes. This certainty of the fact alone suffices for us to assert scientifically innumerable profane things, although their internal manner, or internal nature, lies hidden — e.g. electricity, attraction, light, etc. Therefore the certainty of the fact, or existence, suffices, even when the matter concerns a mystery.

β) knows to some extent also the manner, or nature, of the mystery, i.e. what, how, and why it is a mystery. For a proposition containing a mystery can and ought to be clearly enunciated in such a way that we understand what is signified by it, i.e. that we acquire at least an analogous, even if not adequate, notion of the mystery. Moreover, by arguments that are not indeed necessary, but nevertheless fitting, we are able to confirm why it is a mystery. Finally, how it is, we are able to explain by selected similitudes.

All of which the Vatican Council comprehends admirably: "Besides those things to which natural reason can attain, there are proposed for our belief mysteries hidden in God, which, unless they are divinely revealed, cannot become known ... And indeed reason, illuminated by faith, when it seeks diligently, piously and soberly, attains with God's gift some and that a most fruitful understanding of the mysteries, both from the analogy of those things which it naturally knows, and from the connection of the mysteries themselves with one another and with the ultimate end of man; never, however, is it rendered capable of perceiving them in the manner of the truths which constitute its own object. For the divine mysteries by their very nature so exceed the created intellect that even when delivered by revelation and received by faith they remain covered by the veil of faith itself and enveloped in a certain, as it were, obscurity, as long as we are pilgrims from the Lord in this mortal life: for we walk by faith and not by sight."⁵