De inspiratione sacrae Scripturae: theologica disquisitio

But now, when I come to the refutation, those well-known words of Melchior Cano occur even against my will, l. 3 de locis, c. 2: « They assert paradoxes fighting against common sense, which if you wish to refute by arguing, you make matters least doubtful doubtful by arguing. For since the things that precede in a syllogism, in order to produce some belief, must be more certain and better known than those which follow from the premises, it is surely to be feared that, when we refute the opinions of such men, refuting most absurd things with less evidence, we may commit this sin of vicious and inept reasoning ». For in truth we easily grasp the position of the rationalists, for whom the errors and fables of the Bible are an argument of their human and plainly natural origin, but now that halting division into two parts surpasses all belief, by which these men wish either inspiration together with error, or especially truthfulness together with fallacies of every kind, to be reconcilable. Here therefore it is especially to be feared lest the greatest absurdity be refuted with less evidence. Yet perhaps certain observations, both general and particular, will not be inappropriate: general ones indeed concerning the principles which govern the whole process, but particular ones concerning the individual conclusions in order, about myths, about implicit citations, and about artificial adaptations of history.

I. — As to general observations, the first of all could be that everywhere they counter-distinguish in the Scriptures religious truths from facts either historical or related in the manner of history, just as if those facts, generally speaking at least, were nothing more than a mere literary medium which is not sought for its own sake, but only for the sake of the abstract idea it is to clothe, and therefore pertained only to what might be called the style of Scripture, but by no means to the things themselves toward which the intention of the inspiring God was directly borne. For this conception of theirs they give no other reason except that Scripture is not a manual of history, but a code of religion. O profound reason! O truly worthy of admiration! As if, namely, history and religion had nothing in common. As if in revealed religion the principal place and the more important parts were not to be assigned to history. As if this same religion were not founded wholly upon historical facts, did not commend itself entirely through historical facts, nay, did not consist, whole and entire as it is, in one great historical fact!

But that most grave error, which you would scarcely believe could be seriously admitted by men of sound mind and good faith, has already been sufficiently refuted in ch. 2, when the matter of faith and morals in Sacred Scripture was under discussion. Hence, insisting now solely on what the recently devised theory about literary forms brings in anew, I note three general principles, which, since they carry the whole fabric of the system, require a particular judgment concerning their truth or falsity. And I do not think that this business really pertains to abstruse and deeply recondite questions.

First principle: That the biblical writers are authors neither more nor less than any other profane writers whatsoever. It is false, and it will be false as long as the instrumental cause is not placed on the same level of causality as the principal cause. For profane writers are the principal authors of their works, arranging all things by their own industry, their own power, and their own thought. But the biblical writers are only instrumental authors, thinking out and writing down all things to be written under the bending, determination, and inspiration of the Holy Spirit. How then are they authors like others, neither more nor less?

Second principle: That it pertained to the biblical writers to determine the literary genre of their books. It is false, and it will be false as long as it belongs to the principal author to assign the species of truth which is to be proposed and sought in the book. For the question now concerns that literary genre of which our critics speak, on which the whole sense of the book depends, and from which the directive principle of the entire interpretation is taken. Therefore it concerns the literary genre by which the book is specified. But if that by which the book is specified is not from God, but from man, how is God still the principal author?

Third principle: That there is no literary form received among men which the inspiration of the Holy Spirit rejects. It is false, if it is understood of the literary forms which they themselves invent, but especially of that ineffable literary form of Oriental history, which is proportionally related as the form of the art of medicine in Molière. It is false, I say, and it will be false as long as it is true that divine inspiration does not take up our defects, our ignorances, our vices, our temerities and vanities. For what they call genres of literature you would more truly call genres of vanity, in which there is either no excuse, or if there is one, ignorance excuses the error, and temerity excuses the ignorance¹. But God is the corrector of our defects, not their assumer. And if it is now permitted to appeal also to that comparison which the new biblical scholars are accustomed to bring forward², the Word made flesh did not assume any of those defects which, arising from sin, take away something from the fullness of knowledge and grace, but dwelt among us full of grace and truth. How much less, therefore, will He become a partaker of these defects according to that operation which is proper not to the assumed nature, but to His divine nature, by inspiring and dictating books of the primitive-mythical or historico-Oriental genre!

These things surely would seem sufficient for the destruction of the monstrous system. If however you desire fuller treatment, let us now come to particular observations concerning its individual parts, and first indeed concerning the introduction of myths into Sacred Scripture.

II. — A myth is a fabulous tradition which is held by the common people as true history, fantastically expressing either some religious dogma, or some law of nature, or some primitive fact ³. From this description you will already perceive the reason for the sentence of Cyril of Alexandria against Julian the Apostate: For there is nothing fabulous in the holy and divinely inspired Scripture; all things are full of truth ⁴. For granted that in a myth the narrative is nothing other than a vestment of reality, yet it is always a deceptive vestment, because it does not present itself as a vestment, but as reality itself. Indeed, it is circulated under the form of historical tradition, and is either a certain production of popular credulity, or, if perhaps you wish it to have been invented by the wise, you must say that it was invented with a view to popular credulity. Hence Aristotle, l. 12 Metaphysicorum: « Certain things have been handed down « from our ancestors and very ancient men, and left to posterity in the figure of fable, that these are gods, and that all nature contains the divine. But the rest were brought in fabulously for the persuasion of the multitude, and for the convenience of laws and of what is expedient. For they say that they are man-shaped, and similar to some of the other animals, and other consequences, and things similar to those said. Of which if anyone, separating, takes only the first thing itself, that they thought the gods to be the first substances (that is, separate or immaterial), he will surely think it divinely spoken, and... that these opinions of theirs have been preserved even to now as certain relics. Let the ancestral and primitive opinion therefore be manifest to us only to this extent »⁵. Where you see that myths were invented for the persuasion of the multitude, because since the multitude could not be persuaded of intelligible things, it had to be deceived by certain officious lies, according as it was best for the making of laws and for the utility of human intercourse. In which indeed the whole marrow of paganism is found entire. Now therefore, unless we wish to make God Himself a cooperator in imposture of this kind, nay rather its promoter and master, or seriously to contend, heaping paradox upon paradox, that the reason is the same for myths as for parables or allegories, it will immediately appear in what place the opinion of the biblical scholars is to be put, who dream that primitive history was inspired, composed, and dictated by God, and yet was of the same condition as the semi-legendary and semi-mythical primitive histories of gentile literature.

But the argument grows, not diminishes, from that purification to which they commonly appeal in order to persuade that myths are possible in Scripture. For a myth is the more deceptive the more it dissembles its condition. Wherefore biblical myths, precisely because they are purified from all the absurdities of gentile fables, would be worse lies than all. And indeed the myths of the pagans had at least this in them, that they would deceive no one except a plainly foolish person, and Aristotle knew in them, and whoever were learned even in secular wisdom alone knew, to take only the first thing itself by separating. But biblical myths would have deceived all the wise, all the Fathers, all the doctors of the Church down to the present day, until, namely, after the long nights of the preceding centuries had been completed, the dispeller of universal error, the new sun of the critical school, had at last shone forth.

Add that, as has already been shown, the things which they wish to be myths in ancient Scripture are set forth in the New Testament as real facts from which either dogmatic conclusions are drawn, or examples provoking to virtue are exhibited. Add that those same facts are adduced in the Psalms as illustrious signs of the power and wisdom and mercy of God; as great wonders for which the Lord God of truth must be praised, praised forever, praised from generation to generation, praised from age to age. Read Psalms 77, 104, 105, 113, 135, where are individually commemorated both the Egyptian plagues, and the division of the Red Sea, and the manna from heaven, and the water from the rock, etc. For all these things one must confess to the Lord, for His mercy endures forever. Confess, I say, to the Lord of lords, who broke the sea and led them through; who led them in a cloud by day, and all the night in the illumination of fire; who rained manna upon them to eat, and gave them the bread of heaven; who brought the South wind from heaven, and rained flesh upon them like dust; who placed His signs in Egypt, and His prodigies in the field of Tanis. But now these things, according to you, are semi-mythical and semi-legendary. Therefore for the praise of God the confession of Him above heaven and earth no longer suffices, nor is the simple truth of His works enough. Therefore this should have been the peroration of the whole Psalter, this the conclusion, this the epilogue: « Praise the Lord in His holy ones, praise Him in the firmament of His power. Praise Him in His virtues, praise Him according to the multitude of His greatness. Praise Him with the sound of the trumpet... Praise Him with sounding cymbals, praise Him with cymbals of jubilation, praise Him in myths and fables! Let every spirit praise the Lord. Alleluia! »

III. — But enough about myths thus far. Let us now come to implicit citations, which are a great part of the new invention. In which matter, this could be observed before all else, that those things which they call implicit citations should rather have been called transcriptions or insertions of documents, and are quite ineptly called citations. For to cite, from the propriety of the word, is nothing other than to summon someone to testify, to allege someone's testimony. But where there is no appearance of a witness, where is the citation? Whatever it be, however, we shall not care so much about the word, because it is enough that the matter itself which is intended by the word be established. Now under the name of implicit citation there now comes the tacit bringing in of a document which the author has at hand, and which he inserts into his narrative under the guarantee of the document itself, by no means making himself the sponsor of its truth. And therefore they affect the name of citation everywhere, namely that they may insinuate a certain other witness, with whom alone lies the lapse or fallacy.

But the following consideration will show you that it is a most vain escape for reconciling the inerrancy of Scripture with the material falsity of its narratives.

For whatever literary form you suppose, whatever usages or conventions prevailing according to the diversity of times or places you bring forward, one must at last believe with the heart and confess with the mouth that the sacred books were written with the Holy Spirit dictating, and indeed as regards all and each of their parts, and therefore also as regards all and each of the so-called implicit citations. For if a citation even properly so called, that is, formal and explicit, is a most true part of the book, which must be from the author, no less than the rest, as has been shown above by an evident argument⁶, how much more an implicit citation, which, with no allegation made, is now supposed to be inserted into the body of the narrative! It is necessary therefore that those very citations which you call implicit were placed by the hagiographers not by their own motion and their own industry, but under the dictation of God. Once this principle has been unshakably laid down, see now how unstable is the construction of your system. And indeed the human writer finds a document whose value he does not know; nevertheless he transcribes it nonetheless, and inserts it into his narrative at a kind of risk of chance, thinking that he can in every case be held excused, partly because of the presumed probability of the document's truthfulness, partly because of the considerations which our critics have ingeniously devised: let it pass! But what, I ask, would you say of him to whom the falsity of the document was most certainly known, and who, notwithstanding this his most certain conscience, would either insert the document itself simply and without addition into the narrative, or dictate it to be inserted? Or will you perhaps distinguish historical probity into Western and Oriental, ancient and modern? It would surely be wonderful if in that case even Oriental probity would still remain safe and entire. But whatever be the case, since God Himself is neither Western nor Oriental, neither ancient nor modern; since moreover He does not apprehend the things that are false as probably or possibly true, but knows them most certainly and determinately as false; since finally with Him those usages and conventions have no value which only the vanity or ignorance of men introduced: you will understand, I think, how from His dictation there can altogether not descend an implicit citation of a false and erroneous document. And therefore from first to last, the doctrine of implicit citations, understood in that sense, and for that purpose which the new exegetes intend, is most evidently to be rejected.

Finally here too there can be proportionally applied the rule of Augustine in the passage cited above: Once there has been admitted, in so great a height of authority, some implicit citation, no particle of those books will remain which, as it shall seem to each one incredible for faith, may not by that same most pernicious rule be referred to the design and office of the citing author. This indeed they equivalently confess, as we have seen, those whom you would aptly call radical critics. But in vain also do the others who are called moderate attempt to restrict and circumscribe the application of the system to certain limits. For if, for example, in order to free yourself from a sufficiently light difficulty which occurs in the genealogy of Christ (Luc. III-36) concerning Cainan, inasmuch as it is said there that Cainan was the son of Arphaxad, and Sale the son of Cainan, whereas from Genes. XI-12 it is established that Sale was not the grandson of Arphaxad, but his son, and that no middle generation intervened between them: if, I say, you say that Luke implicitly cited the faulty version of the seventy interpreters, in such a way, namely, that he wished the faith and authority in this part to rest with them alone, why, I ask, in the case of any evangelical discourse of Christ difficult to explain, would someone not with equal right claim an implicit citation of one of those documents of doubtful faith which, at the time of the redaction of the Gospels, as Luke himself testifies in I-1, were spread abroad about the life and deeds of Christ? And thus, running through individual cases, once a most pernicious principle has been introduced, the authority of the Gospel is found wavering, uncertain, and in all things slippery. Let there be, therefore, as you wish, certain tacit transcriptions in the Scriptures of pre-existing documents; yet this most certainly only from the dictation of God, who, when He inserted those documents into the inspired narrative, by that very fact made Himself the guarantor of their fidelity and of their truthfulness in every respect.

Furthermore, for the difficulty mentioned above, and others like it, so many possible and even obvious explanations occur that the excuse, as they say, sought from the necessity of the case can by no means have a place there. On which matter see, if you please, approved authors⁷. In the meantime, however, let it be allowed to confirm the present doctrine from the recent decision of the Pontifical Commission on biblical matters.

It had been asked: Whether, in order to unravel the difficulties which occur in certain texts of Sacred Scripture which appear to report historical facts, it is lawful for a Catholic exegete to assert that these concern a tacit or implicit citation of a document written by an uninspired author, all of whose assertions the inspired author by no means intends to approve or make his own, and which therefore cannot be held immune from error. — And the answer was: Negative, except in the case in which, the sense and judgment of the Church being safe, it is proved by solid arguments: 1) that the hagiographer really cites the words or documents of another, and 2) that he neither approves them nor makes them his own, so that he is rightly judged not to speak in his own name.

Therefore the answer is negative. But because of the exception added, it has seemed to some that the opinion of the exaggerated critics was indeed rejected, who wish almost entire historical books of Sacred Scripture to consist neither more nor less of implicit citations; but that the sentence of the others who are called moderate, and who, as they say, confine the system within just limits, was approved and almost canonized. Do you think that the matter really stands so?

But against such an interpretation, even that simple observation which occurs at first sight would already be more than enough: namely, that no one could ever have been so foolish as to say that, once the double hypothesis of the excepted case has been verified (if it is proved by solid arguments that the hagiographer really cites another's words or documents, and neither approves them nor makes them his own), it is not lawful for a Catholic exegete thence to unravel the difficulties occurring in certain texts of Scripture. For this matter is too evident and open for it to bear contradiction from sensible men. Therefore the point of controversy concerning the so-called system of implicit citations is not, nor could it have been, there.

It must therefore be known that the authors of this system mean this: that the hagiographer is rightly judged not to speak in his own name from this very fact, from this alone, that he tacitly cites the documents of another author. And the only difference between the exaggerated and the moderate is that the exaggerated think that implicit citations are to be held as the rule in sacred history, while the cases in which the hagiographer speaks in his own name are to be held as exceptions to the rule, to be positively proved as often as they occur. The moderate, however, think on the contrary that it is regular for the sacred historian to speak in his own name, and that implicit citations, as being extra-regular, ought to be specially demonstrated for each individual case. Furthermore, it is the opinion of all indiscriminately that the mere fact (presumed according to the exaggerated, or demonstrated according to the moderate) of the tacit citation of a non-inspired document suffices for the legitimate conclusion: that the hagiographer reported its assertions under the sole guarantee of the said document, and that therefore those assertions are not necessarily to be held immune from historical error.

But now the Biblical Commission rejects this opinion entirely, and the case which it excepts is really outside the scope of the system of implicit citations, in whatever way it be finally taken. For according to the exaggerated, in order to unravel the difficulties occurring in the texts of Scripture which appear to report historical facts, it would be lawful for a Catholic exegete to assert that these concern an implicit citation, even with no special demonstration made. According to the moderate, however, it would be lawful for a Catholic exegete, with only one demonstration made, namely that the hagiographer really cites another's words or documents. But the Biblical Commission asserts that not one demonstration only is necessary, but two: insofar as, besides the fact of tacit citation, it wills that this other thing also be proved by solid arguments, namely that the hagiographer neither approves nor makes his own the documents tacitly cited. In which case it is evidently clear that the admissible error does not arise precisely from the fact that the citation was implicit, but from that other head whose proof is sought, and on which the whole legitimacy of the solution depends. For the same reasoning would hold outside the case of citation. As when Ecclesiastes says: One is the destruction of men and of beasts, etc., there is no implicit citation of a document either. Yet it is not true. Indeed, it is demonstrated by solid arguments that these things are placed in the mouth of materialists or sceptics, and that the hagiographer neither approves them nor makes them his own.

You will therefore rightly conclude that the Biblical Commission has simply and absolutely struck down the system which they call that of implicit citations. Enough about these things thus far.

IV. — Finally there remains the last and worst invention of all, by which, namely, there is introduced into the utterances of truth a formal, express, and deliberately sought corruption of history by the sacred author himself, an amplification, an arbitrary accommodation, for the more efficacious inculcation of the truths of faith and morals. In which indeed all the observations brought forward above return again, whether about the end which does not legitimize the means; or about that unheard-of and truly incredible manner of forming morals by the very example of falsification given in the act; or about divine dictation or suggestion, which if it be supposed not to extend itself to such falsification, the faith of the integral inspiration of Scripture will perish, but if on the contrary it be supposed to extend, then the principle will be at stake from which it is impious to depart without blasphemy, namely that God cannot be the author of any lie. Indeed all the things they bring forward to palliate the crime of lying will be able to impose only on those to whom, for the defense of their preconceived opinions, every reason finally seems good. There is therefore no reason why we should occupy ourselves with these things anew.

But since they now think they have a special argument from the manner in which future things are foretold in Scripture, it will be worthwhile to observe a few things also about this new sophism.

It really moves admiration that men who distinguish so many literary genres according to the usages and conventions of men should not know how to add the distinction where the nature of things itself indicates it. They ask, therefore, what is the difference between the historical narration of the past and the prophetic announcement of the future, and I say that the answer is not to be sought from afar, but is naturally taken from the very different condition of past and future. Namely, there is this difference, which is the difference between the knowledge of things in themselves and the knowledge of things in the mirror of divine eternity. There is this difference, which would be the difference between the vision of a man who, himself walking on the way, would behold the others walking on the same way one after another, and the vision of a man who, placed in a high and eminent place outside the order of those passing by, would see all the passersby at once. In one word, this is the difference, that the historical narration of the past has the mode of the things themselves which are swept away by the motion of time, but the prophetic announcement of the future retains impressed the mode of the divine intuition, to which by a certain incomprehensible reason all the volumes of the ages, though passing, remain, and though running, stand, as Gregory says, l. 20 Moral. c. 32. For in the illumination of the prophet's mind there results the likeness of the truth of divine foreknowledge, and on this account such illumination is called the mirror of eternity, as it were representing the foreknowledge of God, who in His eternity sees all things as present. Hence therefore you will take the reason from the nature of the thing why in prophetic diction events separated by a long interval are joined together, or why there is often a sudden transition from the type to the antitype, nay, the antitype is sometimes designated by the same name as the type itself, as a certain continuation of it. For the prophet is placed on that watchtower in which the perspective is changed, and things swept away by the motion of time are touched under another angle, as it were ⁸. Hence too you will understand why it happens that things which are still future as regards us are enunciated in the form of the present, and more frequently in the form of the past: « Attend, says Augustine, why the prophets say many things as if they were past, when they foretell future things, not things done... Because to God even future things are as certain as if they were past. For to us the things that have passed are certain; the things that are future are uncertain. For we know that something has happened, and it cannot happen that what has happened has not happened. Give me a prophet to whom the future is as certain as the past is to you; and as what you remember to have been done cannot happen that it was not done, so what he knows to be future cannot happen that it shall not be done. Therefore they speak of the future as if it were past, for the sake of certainty »⁹. Add that the future is the secret of God; the past, however, is the natural object of human knowledge. And do you think it necessary that the secret of God should be disclosed to us as distinctly as the common things exposed in the open offer themselves distinctly to our knowledge? Nay rather, in the revelation of the future there is always mingled, by express design, an obscurity which only the fulfillment of the event removes ¹⁰.

Let the final conclusion therefore be that, since the question now concerns literary forms, they would perhaps give an argument of sounder criticism if, instead of asking to which common genre or category the divine books are to be assigned, they recognized rather that singular, transcendent genre, bearing no comparison with others, which is Sacred Scripture itself. For then they would not be left to their arbitrary considerations, nor would reason a priori fail them, nor reason a posteriori. Not reason a priori, because it is surely fitting that those books whose principal author is God should bear in their very manner of speaking something proper which is not found in others. Nor indeed reason a posteriori, because the Bible exists in fact, with which no other literature can be compared even from afar, and much less that Babylonian literature which they bring forward. Which, if it is said to be like our Bible, perhaps as an ugly ape can be said to be like a man.