De immutabilitate traditionis contra modernam haeresim evolutionismi

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Proem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

CHAPTER ONE. — On the Catholic Concept of Sacred Tradition . . . . 9

1. That the authentic organ of tradition was instituted by Jesus Christ in His Church, namely the apostolic hierarchy with which He promised to be present unto the end of the ages. And that tradition itself is the preaching continued from age to age through the successors of the apostles, under the charism of the assistance of the Holy Spirit, of the revelation first received orally from the same Jesus Christ and His apostles. . . . . . . . . . . 11

2. That tradition, taken in its true and catholic sense, is the rule of faith. And that the concept of tradition under the aspect of a bare human fact, or of a preaching running its course from Christ and the apostles with historical authority alone, is a false concept, Protestant, and bearing the mark of heresy . . . . . . 19

3. That tradition is the rule of faith, prior to Scripture in order both of time and of knowledge and of comprehension, and differing from it most of all in this, that it is not a remote rule only, but also a proximate and immediate one, according to the twofold consideration under which it can be taken. . . . . . . . . . . 25

4. That from what has been said thus far it follows that tradition has indeed, in the course of time, a certain evolution, but one conjoined with entire immutability and agreement in the same dogma always and in the same sentence: so, namely, that as regards the investigation of the traditional sense, special rules, and those far different from the rules that govern historical science, have rightly and deservedly been laid down by the Fathers . 30

CHAPTER TWO. — On the Cause of Apparent Oppositions in the Testimonies of Tradition.

That the doctrine of tradition, although it is always the same, is not for that reason always set out, polished and refined in the same way, but receives in the course of time, especially on the occasion of the heresies that rise up, more evidence, more light, more precision. And that, generally speaking, three states are to be distinguished in regard to individual dogmas: the state of simple faith, the state of perfect explication, and the intermediate state, when the transition from simple faith to theological speculation was beginning and, because of the manifold difficulty of the beginnings, the expositions were still less exact and the modes of speaking sometimes ambiguous. Which nevertheless not only admit of reduction to the orthodox sense, but even require it, if account be had of the proper principles by which patristic exegesis must be governed. . . . . . . . 41

CHAPTER THREE. — On the Vice of the Historical Method in the Crisis of the Monuments of Tradition . . . . . . . . 71

1 That the historical method, by opposition to the method of immanence, is the only legitimate method in the preambles of faith, when it comes to proving the fact of revelation, namely: whether the Christian preaching is from God revealing, and as such is credible and to be believed . . . . . . . . . 72

2. That the historical method, by opposition to the theological method, is not only altogether insufficient and disproportionate, but even inductive to positive errors of every kind, when, after the preambles of faith, the question concerning Christian revelation is no longer whether it is, but what is its sense, or what the interpretation of the things contained in its sources. And that the same method, if it be carried so far that, under the deceitful appearance of abstraction from the higher rules, it uses the same independence in constructing its wonted hypotheses or conjectures as if those higher rules did not exist, has at its base a heresy the more pernicious the more artfully it is dissembled, and the graver the more freely it opens the way to every denial of the revealed dogmas . . . . . 81

CHAPTER FOUR. — On the Error of Relative Truth in the Dogmas of Tradition . . . . . . . 88

1. That the concept of relative truth is absurd in itself, and that, besides the definition consecrated by ancient philosophy, the adequation of intellect and thing, no other notion of truth is admissible . . . . . . . . . 91

2. That the dogmas of our religion are truly and properly from heaven, and that on this account, by a special title, they would still conflict with the notion of relative truth, even if they were not otherwise marked by contradictory and mutually opposed notes. And that the same absurd fiction, when applied to the evolution of sacred tradition, destroys the formal motive of faith, destroys its material object, destroys the manner of the highest certainty that faith ought to have in the believer . . . . . . . . . . . 99

3. That in defence of their error they appeal in vain to notions or doctrines which they say have been imported from profane schools into sacred doctrine, or to past adaptations of theology to philosophy, especially Aristotelian, which they invent . 105

CHAPTER FIVE. — On the Consummation of Ruin through Moral Dogmatism . . . . . . . . . . . 116

1. That moral dogmatism seeks in vain a means of restoration on the side of the will, to which it ineptly attributes the primacy in the business of acquiring and knowing religious truth. And that it appeals altogether undeservedly to the Catholic doctrine concerning the assent of faith, in order to conciliate for itself a certain semblance and appearance of orthodoxy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

2. That moral dogmatism not only does not restore the collapsed edifice of truth, by erecting the will for the good as principle and foundation, but rather heaps ruin upon ruin, namely the ruin of the moral order upon the ruin of intellectual knowledge, by making the notion of morality independent of the notion of God and of His law, and by constructing the rule of the honourable upon the immanent powers or aspirations of the soul alone . 124

3. That moral dogmatism consummates the irreparable destruction of the truth of faith, by proclaiming the purely practical value of the dogmas of religion, that is, by asserting that no objective value can be in them, as being wholly unknowable to us, but that they are only norms or incitements to action, inasmuch as we must so conduct ourselves in acting as if those things were true which are presented to our intellect by faith . . 131

CHAPTER SIX. — On the Heap of Errors in the System of the Living Faith

That the system of living faith gathers into itself all the errors of rationalism that have arisen thus far, and contains the radical negation of all the dogmas of the Christian faith, not one excepted . . . . . . . . . . . 138

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167