Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

16 Since we have shown that by middle knowledge there is taken away from God both the reason of the first act that is free, and the reason of His predetermination, and that He is not the first cause and the first author of grace, and finally that He does not have the most omnipotent power to fulfil what He promises: we must now show whether the aforesaid knowledge postulates in God ignorance and blindness, and consequently a manner of operating that is blind, ignorant, and without intention of the end in particular.

§ I. Decision of the difficulty, and its first reason.

It must therefore be said that from middle knowledge there follows ignorance and blindness in God, or a manner of operating that is blind and ignorant, and that He Himself concurs with respect to our free acts without intention of the end in particular; and consequently that under this heading also middle knowledge is repugnant. Thus the Doctors cited in disp. 10, dub. ultim. This assertion is clear from the premise as regards its second part.

The first part, however, is urged by the reasoning which D. Thom. hints at in the places cited above and to be referred to in the treatise On the Will of God, art. 8. For once middle knowledge is admitted, God, as its authors concede, influxes through a certain indifferent will, by which He is ready to influx into that which Peter, for example, willed, such that the will which is presupposed in that prior, before it is understood that middle knowledge is in it, is not for concurring determinately to consent, for example, to the act of faith: otherwise He would effectively predetermine that act before the aforesaid knowledge; but for granting an indifferent concurrence, or for concurring to that which Peter willed, namely either to assent if Peter should be pleased, or to dissent if he should prefer it: therefore He influxes while ignoring what precisely that is which is to follow from His influx: whether namely that will be assent to the faith, or rather dissent, and consequently without intention of it in particular, which is to follow: and consequently in a manner blind, ignorant, and without any counsel, and providence, with respect to that effect taken determinately and in particular.

17 Whence it will be of no avail for you to object that by middle knowledge God knows determinately and in particular what that is which is to be chosen by Peter; and thus, this knowledge being presupposed, God has the aforesaid decree not blindly and ignorantly, but knowingly and wisely.

This will therefore be of no avail. For let us inquire about the decree of the first cause, which is presupposed by middle knowledge itself for this, that it may attain with certainty a future effect: since, just as this presupposes its future effect under a condition, so also all future causalities required in that conditioned state for such an effect are supposed, whether they be on the part of the second cause, or even on the part of the first: but the future decree, prerequisite in that sign, on the part of the first cause with respect to such an effect, and foreseen as future, is to will to be ready to concur to that which the created will has chosen, without any judgment of the intellect directing toward such an effect in particular: therefore God in that sign will know that He is to will, in some sign, ignorantly, that is, not knowing in that sign what precisely that will be which is to follow from His influx, or from that will of His, since it is prior that God have the aforesaid decree than that the created will will it. The major, with its consequence, seems to be clear enough. The minor, however, in which the difficulty lies, seems to be certain. Since that decree is known most precisely as future which afterwards will be so in fact: therefore, since God afterwards has only the will of granting concurrence indifferently, ¹ as the adversaries, in accordance with their own opinion, confess, and as we have shown they must confess, it follows that the decree which, on God's part, seems to be future in that prior, is only this: to will to be ready to concur to that which the created will has chosen, without any judgment of the intellect directing toward such an effect in particular.

18 It is confirmed first. For since this knowledge is not practical, or productive of things, but purely speculative, and consequently presupposes its object, as they themselves say, it must be that it presupposes all future essential dependencies required for the existence of the action: therefore, if this action depends on God once for all so as to have the aforesaid future decree, and indifferent with respect to that act and its opposite, and not so as to have a future decree with respect to that act in particular in preference to its opposite, it presupposes it rather as destined to have this precise decree, indifferent, and not some other determined decree (so to speak): therefore it also presupposes it as operating without providence, wisdom, and counsel: because from the force of such a decree, indifferent and future, as presupposed for this knowledge, it cannot know whether the created will will be going to give its concurrence; since that decree of God is not more directed toward one act than toward its opposite.

19 It is confirmed second. Because in the opinion of those admitting this knowledge, that which it presupposes is not necessarily required for the existence of the actions of secondary causes: since this knowledge, as we were saying, presupposes its object, and all the essential dependencies required for its existence: therefore, since according to them that manner of willing of the first cause, through counsel, and prudence, and from the intention of a particular effect, presupposes middle knowledge, this manner of concurring will not be necessary for the existence of such actions: and consequently they must distinguish a twofold manner of concurring in the first cause: one fortuitously, without counsel and deliberation, and in a blind manner, and this one essentially required for the existence of the effect; the other indeed with counsel and deliberation, and this one not essentially desired for such an existence: than which what is more absurd?

§ II. The same assertion is proved by another reason.

20 Second, the same assertion is proved, and at the same time the preceding reason is confirmed. Because if middle knowledge is granted once for all, it follows that God learns from the event that of which He previously had no certain knowledge: and consequently that there is in Him some ignorance and experimental knowledge: this, however, is shown by the following reasoning. Because in that prior, in which in the state of the conditioned God is understood to give aids, to impose precepts, to inspire, and to enlighten the intellect of secondary causes, He does not know with certainty and infallibility, from the force of these, according to the opposed opinion, what will happen from them through created freedom; but then it is certainly known to Him precisely, from the force of the vision of the effect in itself, which the created will, by reason of its innate freedom and aided by such aids, has chosen: therefore He will learn from the event, and by experience.

The antecedent is proved. Because according to the opposed opinion God does not know with certainty the event itself in the very aid, or will, by which it is given, in as far as these two, by way of the first act, precede the consent of created freedom: for, according to the aforesaid opinion, that consent is not inferred with certainty and infallibility from such an aid and will of God: and so it attains it with certainty only in the very fact that, as a second act, it proceeds from the created will and from an aid indifferent in itself. The consequence, however, is proved by the following example. For if one persuades another to be seated, and from the force of the persuasion considered in the first act does not know with certainty that the sitting will be, but knows it only when he sees it in himself, then it is truly said that he knows that effect from the event: therefore the same must be said of God, that He attains the cognition of future contingents, if this is true, not by His free decrees, but by middle knowledge.

Nor will it be necessary to employ any solution which can be drawn from the doctrine of the adversaries, because it remains refuted by what we said at length in disp. 7.

21 Nor does it avail to object that absolute knowledge, which God has of absolute futures, has a dependence on a future event, and yet God is not therefore said to learn them from the event, nor is this knowledge, with respect to those, experimental for Him: therefore the same must be said as was said above, even if conditional knowledge is admitted in Him.

It is answered, then, that for someone to be said to learn from the event, it is not enough that his cognition have some dependence on that same event, as on the object toward which the cognition itself tends; but for this it is required that the learner be ignorant, or not know, the truth in its causes, and afterwards know it from the force of the vision of the event: but God at once sees the future effect absolutely in Himself, and as existing in eternity, and at once in its determined cause through the efficacious divine decree, on account of which from eternity He draws it out of Himself into the now of eternity; and so He never learns from the event. But since, according to the opposed opinion, God never knows future contingents, whether absolute or conditional, in His decree, but knows them only after He has seen the event, He cannot fail to learn from that same event, and to have experimental knowledge of it; and these things are true both of this difficulty, and of this whole disputation and article.

The conclusion affirms.

Concerning which we said many things in the preceding article.

The conclusion denies.

Concerning which many things could be said, were it not that in the treatise On the Will of God many things pertaining to this point, concerning the immutability of the divine will, concerning the free acts of God, would have to be said.

Conclusion. God has with respect to Himself only speculative knowledge, but with respect to others both practical and speculative knowledge at once.

But on the subject matter of this article we said more in art. 8, showing that the knowledge of God is the cause of things: and therefore nothing remains to be said at present.