Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

2 Once the impossibility of middle knowledge has been proved a priori, or quasi a priori, from the impossibility of its object, before the efficacious decree of the divine will, there remains that we should demonstrate it further from some of the inconsistencies that follow from it; and since among all other things the most important is that which we recounted in the title of this Difficulty, we therefore begin with that in the first place.

§ I. Explanation of the Difficulty, and its first proof.

It must therefore be said that from the position of middle knowledge it is correctly inferred that the reason of the first cause, and of the first author of grace, is taken away from God; and consequently that by this head it is sufficiently proved that it is not to be admitted. Thus do the authors adduced for our opinion in disp. 10. dub. ult. This assertion, insofar as its last part follows from the preceding one, is sufficiently clear. As for the first part, however, it is proved by a fundamental reason drawn from D. Thom. in the places cited above; our own Cornelius, however, adduces it in due form, and expounds it in this article, disp. 3. num. 107. and 108. For from the position of middle knowledge it follows that the first root of the conditional futurition of our free act, even of a good one, for example the conversion of the Tyrians, if Christ were to preach to them, is not primarily to be referred back to God, but to their created will; and consequently their conversion in the state of the conditioned would not be due to God as first author, but to their own will; and this indeed removes from God the reason of the first cause with respect to free acts, and the reason of the first author of grace. The minor is sufficiently clear. The consequence, however, is proved. Because that conversion would be due to him as first author, from whom its futurition first arose in its execution; but if it be future antecedently with respect to the divine will, its futurition did not first arise from God, but from their own will: ergo, etc.

3 It makes no difference if, with the authors of the opposite opinion, one says that God is the first root and the author of such a futurition, not indeed by reason of any conditioned decree efficacious in the present act, by which such a conversion is willed under a condition, but by reason of the divine decree which precedes objectively, of giving to those men sufficient aid, by which they may be able to convert, and of concurring with their will, if they themselves are willing to convert.

It makes no difference, then, for this reason. Because by reason of that decree the conversion of the Tyrians is not more willed than their non-conversion; and therefore, precisely by reason of that decree, it cannot be attributed to God that he be the first root and the first author of that their conversion is to be determined. The consequence seems certain, and the antecedent is proved. Because by that decree God wills to concur only with the will of those men toward conversion, or toward an act which is not conversion, according as they themselves shall wish to act from their own native freedom; and therefore, so far as it lies on the part of that decree, the conversion is not more future than its omission; and therefore that it is in fact future, the condition and the aid being posited, cannot be referred back to the divine will, as to the first root and the first author of such a conversion.

4 It is confirmed. Because that will of God which is posited as objectively present, and which as thus present has being prior in the order of reason than that God, in our way of understanding, should know that the will of those men would be, with such a will of God towards them, consenting, in no way determines their will to conversion, but leaves it altogether indifferent, without any infallible determination, to either part of the contradiction, as the authors of the opposite opinion confess; and therefore that the will of the Tyrians antecedently to the divine cognition determinately elects to convert is not to be attributed to that divine will, as the first root of such election and conversion; but it is to be attributed to the human will of the Tyrians itself, which, with such a will or volition of God, will determine itself of itself indifferently to the one part or the other of the contradiction.

5 It is confirmed a second time. Because that will, or that divine volition with respect to the state of the conditioned, only gives the possibility of being converted, and does not of itself, nor infers from itself, that conversion determinately, since it is not efficacious of itself according to the doctrine of the solution which we impugne; and therefore, by reason of it, the conversion itself cannot be attributed to God as first author. The consequence is proved by almost the same reason as that used by D. August. in lib. 2. de peccatorum meritis cap. 18. contra Pelagianos, who said that a good will was to be attributed to God precisely for this, that he had given man a good will, with which he could will the good.

The reason, however, is this. If, for this precise reason, the good will of the Tyrians, or their actual conversion, is to be attributed to God, because he gave them something, or (which comes to the same thing for the present) because he had towards them that gratuitous will, already described, and not efficacious, and with which they could will the good and be converted; and therefore, for the same reason, our bad will would be attributed to him, because namely he gives us free choice, with which we can will something badly; therefore God has not only the aforesaid will with regard to the good acts of the created choice, but he also has a will efficacious of itself towards them, by which he grants to the aforesaid choice that it not only can act, but acts infallibly.

6 Nor does it make any difference if one says that that will, which God had towards the Tyrians on such an occasion, was congruent; and thus that the conversion is to be attributed to God, who confers it, and is its first author.

It makes no difference, then, for this reason. Because that will with respect to the sign, on which it is presupposed, both itself and the free choice of the Tyrians, towards that knowledge of their conversion which is known by God as determinately future, cannot be said to be congruent of itself, and in so far as it lies in its own force, but is said to be congruent only accidentally and from the effect; and therefore, precisely by reason of it thus taken, such a conversion cannot be attributed to God as first author. The consequence cannot be denied. And the antecedent is proved. Because with respect to that prior sense in which we understand God to have that will towards the Tyrians in the state of the conditioned, he does not yet know, but rather ignores (if it is so permissible to speak) what their will will be, when it operates with him, until in the later sense of reason he sees their operations, since otherwise he would know that will altogether indifferently in the cause; and therefore with respect to the prior sense by which he has such a will or volition antecedently to that knowledge, he does not yet know whether it will be congruent or incongruent, or not congruent, but he knows this only in the posterior sign, when he sees that it has had its effect; and therefore he has not the reason of a congruent will, neither in itself, nor as it is known by God, insofar as it precedes the conversion itself in the manner of the first act.

§ II. Proof of the second assertion.

7 And all these things can be clarified and confirmed by another reason, which the same Master adduces on the part of Cornelius and expounds in this way. For from the position of middle knowledge it follows that God is at least the first cause of this, that the created will be established by him in this or that order of things, in which these or those acts are future of themselves, yet not that they, with respect to the substance of the acts and their other circumstances, would have proceeded from the created will, if they were posited by God in such an order of things; and so the reason of the first cause is taken away from God with respect to the substance of free acts and of the aforesaid circumstances of those same acts. This second consequence is evident from the preceding one. The prior, however, as regards its first part, follows from itself: since that the created will be established in this order of things rather than in that one cannot, as is clear from itself, have its origin from anywhere else than from the good pleasure of the divine will. As for the second part, it is also clear from those things which we said by way of the preceding reason.

8 It makes no difference if one says first that it is sufficient that God, from his free will, with no regard had to anything outside himself, should have chosen and established this order of things, which now is one among others out of the countless ones which he might have produced, to the end that he be called the first cause of those effects, to which he is also presupposed to have concurred.

It makes no difference, then, for this reason. Because he is said to be the first cause of this order for this, that he established it independently of anything extrinsic, from his will alone, with no regard had to, and no inspection of, any reason or condition outside himself; but in this way he is not the cause of those effects; and therefore he is not the first cause with respect to them. The consequence is evident, because opposite reasons, or causes, have opposite effects. The minor, however, is proved. Because with precisely the same act of being objectively present, by which, in the state of the conditioned, an act and an effect of the created will are presupposed to be willed by God, for example the conversion of D. Peter, he must also have willed it, when that divine volition is posited as existing on the part of the thing, since the thing existing ad extra is that same one which was formerly future; but in the state of the conditioned the act by which God is said to have willed effects that are free and contingent, and conditional, for example the conversion of D. Peter on such an occasion (and the same is true of all the others (was not independent of the extrinsic, but depended on the will of Peter himself and on his consent; as from a condition sine qua non, previously antecedent, or concomitant (as was shown above) because it was not an act efficacious of itself, the condition being still posited, but was a simple affect, and indifferent of itself towards either, according as the human will should determine itself; and therefore it is not in the same way the cause of this order of things that God is the cause of the free acts of this order; and consequently he is not the first cause of either, but only of the order of things.

9 It is confirmed. Because in the state of the conditioned God, according to the opposite opinion, did not see these or those acts as future by the created will, because he foreknew them by his own decree and moved it efficaciously toward them; but because the created will itself, associated nevertheless with grace, or with the gratuitous will of God, would by its own innate freedom elicit them, as is clear from the things said in disp. 10. dub. 1; and therefore precisely from the fact that God established this order of things it does not follow that he was the first and independent cause of the free acts of his own creatures, which in fact he produced.

It is confirmed a second time. Because although God could, by his freedom, have established not this order of things, which in fact he created, but another, yet in that one he could do nothing else than that which he had previously, through this knowledge, found to exist objectively in themselves by the created will; since the knowledge of these future things precedes the free act of the divine will, so that, that hypothesis being posited, it was not in God's power to know otherwise than he knew; and therefore with respect to these effects he cannot have the reason of the first cause, operating from his own motive, and from his own freedom alone independently of any other secondary cause, as of a prerequisite condition. Especially since that act of the divine will, whether actually exhibited or objectively present, is according to the opinion of the Adversaries indifferent to serving (so to speak) for consent, for example, rather than for dissent of the created will; and so he could not with the aforesaid independence be the first reason of consent rather than of dissent.

10 Nor in turn will it be sufficient if one says a second time that there is a disparity between the effects which depend on the will of God alone, such as the fact that this or that order of things, this or that universe, is produced, and the effects which depend at the same time on the will of God and on the created will, such as are all the free acts and effects of the creature. Because of effects of the first kind God is the first cause, with no regard had to any reason outside himself which might move him, or which is required as a necessary condition; of effects, however, of the second kind, namely of free acts, he cannot be the first cause otherwise than dependently upon the concurrence and the consent of the created will itself.

It is not enough, then, for this reason. Because, as we shall say below, it is one thing to be the cause of a free act of the creature dependently upon the consent of the created will, as upon an effect infallibly following afterward by causality, or (as we should speak more accurately) it is one thing for God to be the cause of a free act of the creature, infallibly inferring it as an effect of his own, and as something posterior to it by his own causality; and it is another thing, however, to be the cause of that act, dependently upon the created consent itself, as upon a prerequisite condition. And although the first is not against the reason of the first cause, the second, however, is well against it; since such a condition is presupposed with respect to the divine will itself, namely the consent itself of the will.

11 Nor finally does it make any difference if, both by those things which we brought forward in this present Difficulty on the second of these reasons and by the others which we did so on the first, one says with Suarez, in lib. 1. de concursu, cap. 15. that that will of God is not indifferent, but that he truly has a will by which he determinately wills, for example, consent rather than dissent of the created will; although this divine volition is not such that he absolutely wills that it should consent rather than dissent, but by including an implicit condition, if the created will should be willing; and therefore God does not offer one determinate concurrence, but several, toward diverse objects and diverse acts.

It makes no difference, then, for this reason. For either this mode of speaking does not in fact differ from the opinion of Molina, or, according to that, the efficacious will of God infallibly inferring the consent of the created will, antecedently to middle knowledge, and independently in the said sense from the created will, must be admitted; to this Suarez objects with all his strength: and therefore he must concede the former, at least not in words but in fact; and consequently all the inconsistencies follow which we said follow in this Difficulty from the position of middle knowledge. The antecedent is proved. For from the force of that will to concur, including nevertheless an implicit condition, namely if the created will should be willing, God will concur to an act of love, for example, if it should be willing to love on such an occasion; on the contrary, however, he will concur by the force of that same will to an act of hatred, if on the same occasion it should be willing to pursue with hatred and not to love. Because if it did not proceed from the force of that will except a determinate concurrence toward loving, so that not toward the opposite, that will would already be a predefinition of the act of loving preceding it in the order of causality; and therefore either this kind of predefinition must be conceded, which Suarez rejects, or he posits only a general will to concur, and indifferent of itself, as Molina posits.

12 It is confirmed. Because otherwise God would not influence through the manner of freedom, but through the manner of nature. For that will declared in the aforesaid manner is so necessary in God that he cannot will the opposite, or will not to will it: since he cannot not will to concur with the created will, or with any other secondary cause, if that cause should concur: because in such an object, whether in possible creatures, or in future ones, there would be a manifest involvement. Nor will it be necessary, both in this and in the following Difficulties of this disputation, to adduce the foundations of the Adversaries in their own favour, since by those things which we said in the preceding disputations they remain answered. Let those things, however, be considered which we brought forward in disp. praecedenti dub. 1.