Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

14 So that it may be more evident how middle knowledge not only fails to benefit, but even works against the end for which it is introduced, namely divine predestination: accordingly it has seemed proper to us to raise this difficulty in particular.

§ I. Resolution of the difficulty.

It must therefore be said that, on another ground, middle knowledge cannot stand together with the predestination of adults, and conversely, insofar as the predestination of these, at least speaking in the natural order, must occur independently, or as from a cause, or reason a priori, or at least as from a prior condition, of their good works foreseen as future. But if middle knowledge is granted, the opposite must obtain. Thus many Doctors, cited in disp. 10. dub. ult.

The reason for this assertion, as regards the first part, namely the predestination of adults, speaking at least in the natural order, that it is not given together with the aforesaid dependence upon good works foreseen as future, will be clear from what is to be said in the treatise On Predestination. For the present, however, it suffices to add that of Paul to the Romans 9. For when they had not yet done anything good or evil (so that according to the election the purpose of God might remain) it was said of him not from works, but from him who calls: because the elder shall serve the younger, as it is written, Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated. These words D. August. explains in lib. 2. contra duas Epist. Pelagianor. cap. 7. as follows: Wherefore are you foolish, when, the truth being told, it was said not from works, but from him who calls, while you say that Jacob was loved on account of future works which God foreknew he would do; and so you contradict the Apostle when he says, Not from works: as though he could not have said, Not from present, but from future works: but he says, Not from works, in order to commend grace.

There is also another testimony of D. August. in lib. de Praedest. Sanct. cap. 17. where he says thus: This is the unchangeable truth of predestination and grace. For what is it that the Apostle says, As he chose us in himself before the founda- tion of the world? which undoubtedly was said because God foreknew that we would believe, not because he himself was going to make us believers; against this foreknowledge the Son speaks, saying: Not you have chosen me, but I have chosen you; since God foreknew rather this, that they themselves were going to choose him, so that they might deserve to be chosen by him. They were therefore chosen before the foundation of the world by that predestination in which God foreknew his future deeds; but they were chosen from the world by that calling by which God fulfilled that which he had predestined.

15 The reason, however, for that same assertion, as regards the second part, namely that if middle knowledge is granted, or the antecedent free decrees of the divine will, it follows that of necessity there must be given a cause, or reason a priori, or at least a prerequisite condition for the predestination of adults, namely their good works foreseen — this is insinuated by D. Thom. in the places cited above, and is to be referred to in the treatise On Predestination, and it can be proposed in the following form. For if God had foreseen Peter through this middle knowledge, for example, that if he were placed in this or that order, or in any other order whatsoever, he would return to grace and would not persevere in it, he could not predestine him: since according to the opposite opinion it is indispensably required for this, that God be able to predestine some adult who by his middle good works attains eternal life, that through this middle knowledge he first see that if he is placed in this or that order of things and is called by God, then, being established in one of those, he will not resist grace, but will rather consent to it and will persevere in the friendship of God; hence that he predestine him depends on the good consent previously seen through this middle knowledge, either as from a cause, or reason a priori, or at least as from a condition, not of any kind whatsoever, but one necessarily prerequisite. The consequence is evident. For as often as the negation is the cause of the negation, so the affirmation also must be the cause, or reason a priori, or at least the prerequisite condition of the affirmation: as when Peter cannot run unless he lives, the affirmation of his life must by one of the aforesaid modes be required for the affirmation of the running of the same Peter.

§ II. The first two evasions of the younger writers, and their being closed off in advance.

16 First the Adversaries present the objection that the case is impossible; because since there are infinite orders of things in which Peter can be placed, it follows that at least in some of them it is not foreseen that he would, if called by God in such and such a way, consent to grace and persevere. But this solution does not empty out the force of the reasoning just made. Then, because according to the opposite opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned for which it would be infallible that Peter, placed in one of those orders of things, would consent to grace and persevere in it; and hence there is no reason why in all of those the actual dissent of Peter should not be conjoined with the calling of God: since the will of God calling, and preceding Peter's consent, is not, according to the opposite opinion, efficacious of itself and infallibly producing the effect; and so nothing stands in the way of its being conjoined with Peter's dissent in whatever order of things. Then again: because even if it be admitted that the case is impossible, the argument remains in its force. Since the consequence, or conditional, made in it is formal, it is therefore always and universally true that if Peter is foreseen in that order of things through middle knowledge as not going to consent (whether this condition be possible or impossible), then Peter will be unable to be predestined by middle good works, or insofar as he is an adult: hence it is a sign that intrinsically predestination depends on Peter's good works foreseen, either as from a cause, or reason a priori, or at least as from a condition necessarily prerequisite; otherwise there would be no reason why the aforesaid conditional should be indispensably true. Just as if, for the distinction of the Divine Word from the Holy Spirit, the procession of the latter from the former were not necessarily and indispensably required, there would be no reason why this conditional should also be indispensably true: namely, If the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son through what is possible, or what is impossible, then he would not be really distinguished from him.

17 Secondly Suarez and others present the objection that, since good works foreseen as future under a condition cannot have the reason of merit or demerit before God more than works considered precisely as possible, as Augustine asserts in lib. 2. de Dono persever. cap. 9. and 10. and lib. 10. de Genesi ad litteram cap. 16. as also in lib. 1. de Anima, et eius origine cap. 12. and elsewhere often against the Pelagians, it follows that the good works of adults foreseen through middle knowledge cannot concur to their predestination as the cause or the motive of the divine will. And so it is always true that adults are not predestined on account of their good works: although with this it stands that middle knowledge is indispensably required, and that God, through it, before he predestines or has the efficacious decree of Peter's eternal salvation, foresees his good consent and his perseverance in the conditioned state, so that the divine decree and predestination may be altogether certain and may infallibly attain their effect; otherwise the aforesaid certainty could not be had by them.

But neither does this solution satisfy. For in the first place it does not sufficiently rescue the position that predestination does not depend on the aforesaid works, at least as upon a condition, not of any kind whatsoever, but one wholly prerequisite to that same predestination; and hence it does not rescue why, in this sense, predestination should not be from foreseen works, the contrary of which is taught by Aug. and D. Thom., as we shall show in the treatise On Predestination: ergo, etc. The antecedent is evident: since according to it the axiom adduced by us is not sufficiently met, namely that when the negation is the cause of the negation, then the affirmation is the cause, or at least the prerequisite condition of the affirmation.

18 Next, because according to the principles of middle knowledge and of its authors, there is no reason why the good works which D. Peter, for example, performed, even if they are considered for that state of the conditioned, or (which comes to the same thing for the present) for a previous sign of the reason with respect to the free decrees and the efficacy of God, should not be able and obliged to have the reason of merit, or of the motive of the divine will, with respect to the predestination of the same D. Peter. And the reason is this. For according to the aforesaid opinion, for the works to have the reason of the absolute future in that former [state], it is enough that in the latter sign there be the absolute future decree of God concerning their future existence, as we saw in disp. 7. n. 34: hence, if the good works of D. Peter, absolutely future, have the reason of merit, there is no reason why they should not have it in that former [state], and consequently there will be no reason why a meritorious cause of the predestination, or a cause moving the divine will with respect to it, should not be given on this side: since in that sign which is antecedent to the predestination and the efficacy of God, they are, according to the Adversaries, absolutely future.

19 Finally. Because if it is once admitted that it is indispensably required for this, that God predestine some adult, that he should first foresee through middle knowledge the good consent of that man's will and his perseverance in grace, there is no reason why predestination should not be made from good works, as from the motive of the divine will with respect to the predestination of the same adult: because, middle knowledge having been once admitted, the absolute decree of God to concur with Peter's will, for example, with regard to the act of faith, is in God in no other way than according to the exigency of Peter's will, namely because it is foreseen by God on that occasion, with such helps prepared, that he will be as much of himself believing: hence, since such a decree of God to concur is then choice with respect to the end, it follows manifestly that Peter is chosen for faith, supposing such an exigency of his will. Because if he were not chosen, then, those circumstances being supposed, and it being supposed that God would wish to place Peter in that order of things, violence would be done to him by God, or (which comes to the same thing for the present) God would not concur naturally with it; and consequently Peter's consent, foreseen by God as future under the condition that God would wish to concur, is the motivating reason of the divine will, that he may choose him for the end, and so motivating that God would do violence to Peter's will, or would not concur naturally with it, according to what that will, insofar as it is a special will, demands, if he did not then choose him. This objection will be confirmed still more from what is to be said immediately.

§ III. Another solution of the Adversaries, and its refutation.

20 Lastingly the Adversaries answer our fundamental argument by denying the consequence. Because, just as God foresaw Peter's future merits, if he were placed in that order of things in which he was going to have merits, so also he foresaw his future demerits, if he were placed in another order of things: and then no reason, cause, can be discerned which on the side of the object moved God, whereby he placed Peter rather in that order of things in which he was going to have merits than in that in which he was going to have demerits; but this must be referred back to the divine will alone.

But neither is this solution pleasing. Then, because neither according to it is the axiom adduced by us from Aristotle sufficiently met for proving that consequence, namely that when the negation is the cause of the negation, then the affirmation is the cause, or at least the condition, not of any kind whatsoever, but one prerequisite to the affirmation. Then again: because although from this solution it follows that there is not given a cause, nor a reason, on account of which God, from the infinite orders and occasions of things in which he could have placed Peter, chose this one rather, in which he foreknew that he would make good use of the helps, than another, in which he foreknew that he would make bad use of them; nevertheless, once this order has been chosen, in which the aforesaid good use is foreseen, in which he predestines him to grace and glory and by his efficacious decree predetermines his good works, it has an indispensable dependence upon such a foreknowledge, or upon such a good use foreknown, either as upon a reason, or at least as upon a condition without which such a predestination neither would be nor could be.

21 It makes no difference if you object that even in any opinion the predestination of the adult depends on the future consent of his own free choice: since unless such a good use were future, he could not be predestined in the manner of an adult, or (which comes to the same thing for the present) by the middle good works performed by him. And in like manner it also depends on merits considered as possible: since God cannot efficaciously elect any adult to glory, as to a crown, unless he foresees that he is able to have merits, and nevertheless predestination is not on that account made from merits; hence, although the good use of the adult foreseen under a condition through middle knowledge is indispensably required for the predestination of the adult, the adult will not on that account be predestined from merits, nor will his predestination have a dependence upon them, either as upon a cause, or a reason a priori, or at least as upon a condition wholly prerequisite.

You will confirm. Because in our opinion it must be admitted that God knows such future things in the efficacious and conditioned decree of his will, and nevertheless the aforesaid merits, known in that way, are not the reason, or the condition without which of the predestination, which is afterwards made through the absolute decree; hence one will be able to argue in the same proportional manner, even if middle knowledge is granted, and through it the good use of free choice is foreseen as future before the efficacious and absolute decree of predestination itself.

22 An answer is given, then, to the objection that if we speak of the good use and the supernatural consent of the predestinate, absolutely future, then according to our opinion, although predestination has an infallible connection with it, as with an effect infallibly brought about by it, it nevertheless does not have a dependence upon it, but rather such a consent depends on predestination itself; and so it is posterior to it; and consequently it can be neither the cause, nor the reason a priori of it, nor even the prior condition required for it: whereas according to the opposite opinion, predestination is not connected with that free consent of which we are speaking, as with an effect of its own predestination, but rather it is presupposed to be future, and foreknown as future, before it, as is clear from what has been said: and consequently, since otherwise it is indispensably required for it, it cannot fail to be either the reason, or at least the prior condition required for it. But if we speak of the good use, or of merits considered precisely as possible, then we confess that these, as foreknown through the knowledge of simple intelligence, must precede in the category of possibles.

But from this it does not follow that predestination is made in some way from foreseen works. Because what is required for this is that in some way, namely at least through the mode of a condition that is meritorious and required in advance, they should allure the divine will with respect to predestining. But it is certain that merits, considered precisely as possible, have no power of moving the divine will in any way, even through the mode of a meritorious condition for something to be bestowed on someone. Because for this, at the very least, it is required that they have the reason of future things. But according to the opposite opinion, the merits and the good use of the predestinate are presupposed to be future, both under a condition and absolutely, in that former [state] before the predestination and the efficacious decree of it: since, as we were saying, according to the aforesaid opinion it is enough that in the subsequent sign there be the aforesaid decree and predestination.

There is added the consideration that Scripture and the Fathers do not at all remove good works, considered as possible, and as known in that way, preceding the predestination at least through the mode of a condition, whereas otherwise these very same works, still in that same mode, precede it as future, as will be clear from the testimonies cited in this difficulty and from what we shall say in the treatise On Predestination.

23 In confirmation of this, both premises having been granted, the consequence must be denied. And the reason of the disparity is this. Because although that efficacious and conditioned will precedes the decree of predestination, it is nevertheless not required, in our opinion, for this, that God should predestine whom he pleases with the utmost certainty and infallibility, from the fact that the divine will has of itself the infallible efficacy already described, but it is required on account of the highest actuality of divine liberty, as we shall explain in the treatise On the Will of God disp. 5. num. 73. and as we have touched upon in disp. 9. num. 66. of that treatise. And therefore, even if by an impossibility God did not have the aforesaid conditioned decrees and efficacies, he would nevertheless predestine in the same manner as he now predestines: and consequently predestination cannot depend on the aforesaid will. But according to the opposite opinion, God cannot (as all, or almost all, of its followers confess) predestine any adult, his freedom being preserved, unless he foresees through middle knowledge that, placed in these or those circumstances, he will truly consent, will persevere, and will at length attain eternal life: and therefore the good use of free choice, foreseen through that knowledge, cannot fail to be at least a prerequisite condition with respect to the predestination.

24 From all of which it must be inferred, and said secondly, that on yet another ground middle knowledge is not compatible with divine predestination, namely because, that having been granted, God could never have predestined any of those who in fact died, or will die, in mortal sin, nor very many of those who will never be created. Which certainly, as is clear, contains enough falsity. So do the disciples of D. Thom.

The reason for the assertion is this. Because these two contradictory propositions can be formed, for example, about Judas, and about any other of those already mentioned: If Judas is created, he will die in sin: Not if Judas is created, he will die in sin; and then, middle knowledge having been granted, God would know before his efficacious decree which of them was determinately true, or determinately false; and since it is evidently the case that he did not know the affirmative to be false, otherwise he would have been deceived, since from the event it is clear that he died in sin, the consequence will be that he knew that Judas would die in sin; hence, this knowledge having been once admitted, he could not have predestined him.

And this same argument can be formed not only about men actually created, but also about very many of those who are in fact not created, and consequently about conditioned future contingents. Because if, for example, ten thousand men are singled out from those who will never be created, then, middle knowledge having been granted, God would also know either the determinate truth or the determinate falsity of these contradictions, namely: If these ten thousand men are created, all will die in grace: Not if these are created, all will die in grace: and if he knows the affirmative to be false, he will not be able from this collection to predestine those of whom he foreknows that they will not fail in grace. But if he knows it to be true, then, since it cannot be denied that other collections, of other ten thousands, can be given, about which he knows that some of those, if they are created, will not die in grace, and consequently about which, when similar contradictory propositions are formed, this negative is true: Not if these ten thousand are created, all will die in grace, it will follow from this that God, this knowledge having been once presupposed, cannot predestine those from those collections whom he foreknows will not die in grace.

25 It makes no difference that some of the younger writers evade [this] by saying that this conditioned future does not have, by reason of this precise condition, a connection with the future event: since precisely from this, that someone is created, it follows no more that he will die in grace than that he will not die: and hence it is not known through middle knowledge.

For the contrary of this is the fact that this solution utterly destroys the most solid foundation of middle knowledge, namely that out of two contradictory propositions, precisely because they are contradictory, one of them must be determinately true and the other determinately false: and consequently all of this must be known by God; hence, since the propositions already mentioned are contradictory under that precise condition, it will be necessary for God to know which of them is true and which is false.

There is added the consideration that if once a connection between the condition and the future event is required, in order that God may know the conditioned future, the consequence will be that in proportion to the degree of the connection there must be a knowledge of it, in such a way indeed that if the connection is fallible, then the knowledge is not infallible on the side of the object: and consequently middle knowledge is destroyed precisely by that very thing. Because in order to know infallibly on the side of the subject, and fallibly on the side of the object, those conditionates which have a probable connection with the future event, that is, in order to know scientifically that what is probable, posited such a condition, will be future, that effect, since the connection between that condition and the event is probable, or likely, middle knowledge is not necessary; but this can be known through the knowledge of simple intelligence, as is clear from itself.