Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Since two of the most powerful arguments by which many authors are moved to the contrary position are the ones by which they believe middle knowledge to be altogether necessary for the two offices recounted in the title, this head of science, among others, will also be found here impugned; let us therefore inquire into it in the first place in this disputation.

§ I. Opinion of the moderns.

Suarez, and all, or almost all, the authors of middle knowledge, hold that middle knowledge is altogether necessary for those two things recounted in the title. The foundation, however, on which the necessity of this knowledge with respect to the certitude of divine predestination rests, is none other than this: that God cannot predestinate anyone already grown up by a predestination that is altogether certain unless he knows the middle terms by which he is to attain eternal beatitude; otherwise indeed he would predestinate rashly, and not by a predestination altogether certain, as is clear from itself; but these middle terms must be known by middle knowledge, that is, by conditional knowledge; and so on. The minor is proved. Since these middle terms, whose knowledge must precede predestination, on the part of those already grown up, can be none other than these: namely, that if he be called on such or such an occasion, he will consent; and that if he be pressed by such or such temptations, he will not succumb; but finally he will so stand that at least he will fall away in grace; yet all these things, since they are future contingents that are conditional, seem to belong to middle knowledge as its proper object, and therefore ought to be known through it.

The foundation, however, of the same position, so far as it concerns the second part, can also be none other than that which the Adversaries so often bring forward, namely: that if God should predefine anything dependent on the created will, before the foreseen consent of that will by means of middle knowledge, and so accordingly such knowledge would not precede that predefinition, then the free choice of the creature would be removed; from the fact that the infallibility of such a consent, resulting therefrom, would come from something extrinsic, and would not be in the power of the created will, but would precede its consent, that is, from the efficacy of the divine will; and thus there would be an infallibility and a preceding necessity; which, according to the common opinion of the theologians, is opposed to freedom.

§ II. First assertion.

2 It must nevertheless be said first that middle knowledge is not necessary for this, that God should efficaciously predefine the free consent of the created will, its freedom being preserved; nay rather, such knowledge being given, it is impossible to predefine such a consent, the aforesaid freedom being preserved, whether of the created will or of the divine will. Thus do the Thomists commonly, and almost all the authors, deny middle knowledge. This assertion, that the first part is clear from those things which we said above in disp. 7, dub. 2, and disp. 8, dub. 1, and from those things which we shall say in the treatise On the Will of God, disp. 10, num. 78, and onwards, showing that from the fact that the divine will is efficacious of itself, and can efficaciously will whatever pleases it, and in the way that pleases it, namely that it be done by the creature freely or necessarily, it follows that the creature itself is free in the second act; and accordingly that God, without dependence on the prevision of the consent through middle knowledge, efficaciously predefines something to be done freely by the creature, does not destroy its freedom in the second act, but rather establishes it.

With respect to the second part, however, the same assertion is argued from those things which we asserted in this treatise, disp. 7, num. 64 and the following, namely: that middle knowledge being given, both the freedom of the divine will and that of the created will are destroyed; and consequently, if such knowledge is necessary for the divine predefinition, God will not be able to predefine anything, the freedom being preserved, either of his own will or of the created will.

§ III. Second assertion.

3 It must be said secondly that middle knowledge is not necessary for the certitude of divine predestination; but that without it God can very well predestinate whomsoever pleases him. Thus all the Doctors whom we brought forward in the preceding disputation, last difficulty, for our position. This assertion follows openly from the preceding. For from the very fact that the divine will is so efficacious of itself that whatever it wills to be done by a creature in a free way will be done freely by that same creature, this truth cannot fail to be known by the knowledge of simple understanding: since this efficacy belongs to the intrinsic perfection of the divine will; therefore, by that very fact, he will be able most certainly to predestinate whomsoever pleases him, without any lack of some other middle knowledge presupposed for the predestination. The consequence is evident. For whoever knows with certainty that he has the all-powerful ability to incline the created will freely as he pleases, and consequently to incline it to persevere in good, will by that very fact, without any further middle knowledge, conditional as well, presupposed for this, be able to order any intellectual and free creature to the eternal beatitude that it is to attain with certainty and freely.

§ IV. Later assertion.

4 It must be said thirdly that middle knowledge is not only not necessary for predestination, or for its certitude; but that predestination itself, and consequently its certitude, cannot be joined with this knowledge. This assertion is commonly taught by the disciples of St. Thomas: and several Doctors cited for us in the preceding disputation, last difficulty, are bound to defend it.

The fundamental reason for that is indicated by St. Thomas in the passages soon to be cited, and can be proposed in this form. Since it cannot be joined with the essence of predestination that it should not be the cause of the middle terms which efficaciously, or together with the effect, lead on to the attainment of eternal life, nor of the attainment of that same eternal life, and consequently it cannot be joined with the certitude of the aforesaid predestination either, since predestination demands from its intrinsic part that it be certain; therefore it cannot be joined with it either, because the aforesaid middle terms and the attainment of eternal life do not have their dependence on it: therefore neither can it be bound together with it, in the sense that middle knowledge is given preceding that same predestination.

The antecedent, from which both consequences depend, is argued both from St. Thomas and also from a reason drawn from the same source. Indeed from St. Thomas. For he himself, 1st part, q. 22, art. 2 and 3, and On Truth, q. 5, art. 1 and 2, says that the providence of God is the cause of things: and in the same q. 5, art. 1, resp. to 7, he asserts that the providence of God is the cause of all things: and in the following article he proves that God governs all things through his providence; and 1st part, q. 103, art. 4, he says that if the effects of this governance of divine providence, which are caused in us by it, are considered in particular, they are thus numberingless for us. Whence, since predestination is a most perfect and special providence of God, it follows that it must be the cause of those things to which it extends. And so the same holy Doctor, speaking of that in q. 23 below, art. 6, and q. 6 On Truth, art. 3, means that it is certain, not only with the certitude of foreknowledge, but also with the certitude of causality, in these words: The foreknowledge of God, therefore, because it does not universally import the relation of cause with respect to those things of which it is the foreknowledge, is not considered in it except as the certitude of knowledge alone: but predestination, because it includes foreknowledge and adds the relation of cause to those things of which it is the predestination, insofar as it is a certain direction, or preparation, can be considered in it above the certitude of knowledge, the certitude of order.

5 By a reason, however, drawn from the same Angelic Doctor, the same antecedent is argued. First, because providence, both general and special, is the right reason of things to be done, not indeed speculative, but practical. Now it is clear that the right and practical reason of things to be done is the cause of things. Then also, because, as St. Thomas explains from the Philosopher, 1st part, q. 23, art. 4, providence presupposes the will of the end, and formally consists in the ordering and preparation of the means for the attainment of that end; and thus it will be the cause, at least directive, of the attainment of the aforesaid end; since, namely, the aforesaid will of the end and the ordering of the means cannot fail to have some influx and causality with respect to the attainment of that end through such means.

From this also the first consequence is sufficiently clear. Since it cannot be joined with this, that something should be the cause of some thing, when the attainment of such a thing and the means through which it is to be attained do not have their dependence on it, as is clear from itself; therefore, if predestination must be the cause of the attainment of eternal life and of the means leading on to it together with the effect, it cannot be joined with it in the sense that the aforesaid means and the attainment of eternal life do not have their dependence on it.

From this also the second consequence is sufficiently evident. First, because from the very fact that middle knowledge is given, through which God knows antecedently to predestination and independently of it, that if Peter is called on these and those occasions and is established, he will consent, and finally will persevere and attain eternal life, these means and the attainment of eternal life would then not depend on predestination as on their cause; otherwise God could not foreknow, antecedently to that same predestination and independently of it, the aforesaid contingent and conditional effects through middle knowledge; therefore, just as it cannot be joined with the essence of predestination, and consequently not with its certitude either, in the sense that that consent, perseverance and attainment of eternal life do not have their dependence on predestination as on their cause; so neither can it be joined with it, and consequently not with its certitude either, in the sense that middle knowledge is given, preceding that same predestination, or independent of it; since, as we were saying a moment ago, from the very fact that it is given antecedently to predestination and independently of it, the aforesaid future conditionals cannot depend on predestination as on their true cause.

6 Then also, because when it is said that God knows that if Peter is called on these and those occasions he will consent and will finally attain eternal life: either predestination itself is implicitly involved in this object, so that the sense is that if Peter is predestined and called on the aforesaid occasions, he will consent and attain eternal life? or it is not involved? If the first, then that object will not be known by middle knowledge, but by the knowledge of simple understanding: since that conditional consequence, if Peter is predestined by God, he will be saved, is a formal consequence, and one known to everyone: and consequently neither will it be joined with the essence and the certitude of predestination, in the sense that the knowledge necessarily preceding it be middle knowledge. If, however, the second is said, then that knowledge, by which the aforesaid object is known independently of predestination and without predestination itself being involved in it, will not be able to be joined with the essence of predestination either, and consequently not with its certitude either: since by that very fact it is removed from predestination that the aforesaid object should depend on it: and consequently that it should be the cause of that consent and of the attainment of eternal life; which is indeed required, per se and intrinsically, for the essence of predestination and for its certitude.

7 It is confirmed, and it is explained. For if we speak of Peter as ordained to eternal salvation, not indeed in the conditional sense, but in the absolute sense, it is certain that he will not attain eternal life except dependently on predestination, as on the cause of that attainment; therefore neither under any hypothesis or condition will it be future that Peter should attain eternal life unless God predestinate him, preparing for him through this his special providence more special means of the order of grace; therefore neither can God know, antecedently to predestination, that under any hypothesis whatsoever Peter will be saved, unless predestination be involved there as well, at least under the condition, by which those more special aids are prepared, nor can such knowledge be middle knowledge in any sense.

The antecedent of this confirmation seems to be clear from itself; and this, too, is taught both by St. Augustine, in the book on heresies, num. 88, where, recounting the heresy of Pelagius and Caelestius, he says thus: This grace of God, by which we are predestined to the adoption of sons through Jesus Christ into himself, and by which we are rescued from the power of darkness, so that we believe in him and are transferred into the kingdom of himself, wherefore he says, No one comes to me unless it be given him by my Father, and by which charity is poured forth in our hearts, so that faith may work through love, to such a degree are they enemies that without this they cannot believe that man is able to do all the divine commandments. Then also, Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 22, where it is defined that a man justified cannot persevere in the accepted righteousness without special aid from God, and consequently cannot attain eternal life without the special providence of God, which cannot be other than predestination, from which the gift of perseverance proceeds.

8 The first consequence, however, follows clearly from the antecedent. For that which is required on the part of the cause, namely, that the absolute future be commanded to execution, is desired under a hypothesis, namely, that the conditional future be commanded to execution, and nothing else is required for it; otherwise it would not be true: since for it to be commanded to execution, something else would be required than the whole of that which is enclosed within its hypothesis. And thus, though that condition were posited in the thing itself, it would not be future, that effect which indeed is, namely, to have that conditional one false.

From this also the second consequence, that is, the first part, is sufficiently clear. For if the future salvation of Peter, still under a condition, is not to be given unless predestination be involved there under the hypothesis, it follows that it cannot be known with certainty by God even under a condition, unless the predestination of the same Peter be involved there as well, at least under the hypothesis.

From this, finally, the second part of that same consequence is sufficiently clear: since, as we have often said, knowledge of some future conditional that involves predestination, or the efficacious decree of God, at least under a hypothesis, does not belong to middle knowledge. But concerning these, let them be seen in what we said above in disp. 7, from num. 48 as far as 75, and from num. 102 as far as num. 150, as well as what we brought forward in disp. 9, from num. 5 as far as num. 88. Through all of these the evasions of the Adversaries collapse: and therefore, so that we do not repeat the same things again, we purposely refrain from them, especially because by the following reason they will collapse more completely.

9 Secondly, therefore, the assertion is principally proved, and at the same time a certain tacit evasion is excluded, and the preceding reason is more strongly confirmed, supposing however three things. The first is that the gift of perseverance, according to the Tridentine passage cited, is a special gift even with respect to those already justified: yet this special character is not attributed to several other aids of the order of grace, such as that which is granted to a justified man for the eliciting of some particular act, for example of supernatural faith. The second is that this special character cannot consist in this, that after God has had a conditional will of saving all, that is, a will of saving those unless it should depend on themselves, and consequently of granting the common aids to persevere, and after he has seen (according to the opposing position) that such common aids in some things placed in this order, for example the order of things, attain their effect, while in another they do not, he should then have chosen with respect to those who are to persevere to establish them in an order in which he foresaw that they would persevere with the common aids, but not in that order in which he foresaw that they would not persevere, so that in this will the special character of the gift of perseverance should consist: since this is also found in other aids of the order of grace, which are not called special, when God has also foresaw Peter to be placed in such an order of things in which with the common aids he would be believed to believe; and in another order in which with the aforesaid aids he would not be believed to believe: and has likewise chosen to grant him the aforesaid aid in that order and series of things in which he foreknew that he would be believed to believe. The third is that, from the very fact that the special character of the gift of perseverance does not consist in what we have just said, it must bring an infallible connection with perseverance itself: otherwise the act of persevering itself would be commanded to execution only by the common aids, offered both to those who are to persevere and to those who are not to persevere, about whom, according to the opposing position, it was foreknown that they would at some time have the effect and at another time would not.

10 Hence the following reason is deduced. Since that knowledge must precede, as necessary for the certitude of predestination, through which the aforesaid special character of the gift of perseverance and its infallible connection with perseverance itself are foreknown; and since that knowledge is repugnant as preceding that other one, namely, what is necessary for its certitude, through which the aforesaid special character and connection cannot be known: but this cannot be known by middle knowledge; therefore it is repugnant that this should precede predestination as necessary for its certitude. The major seems certain. Since for the certitude of predestination it is required that there precede the knowledge and the certitude of the means, among which the gift of perseverance is most powerful, having the aforesaid special character and connection.

The minor, however, is proved. Because that special character and the infallible connection of the gift of perseverance brings with it the goodness of the consequence, so that this is a legitimate consequence: If, for example, the gift of perseverance, or a special aid to persevere, is granted to Peter or to anyone else, he will never stand firm, neither in this nor in any other thing, in which he does not persevere: therefore this object is repugnant to belonging to middle knowledge: which, even if it be admitted, does not terminate in infallible truths, which rest on the goodness of the consequence; but in conditional truths, in which no goodness of the consequence is found, and the imposition of the consequence consisting in this, that the antecedent should not stand as true while the consequent is false.

11 It is confirmed, and it is explained. Because otherwise predestination would add nothing to the general providence of God beyond the certitude of foreknowledge, insofar as God orders the predestined to salvation, like anyone else, with this single difference, however, that of the predestined he knows through middle knowledge that he will not fall short of the attainment of eternal salvation; but this seems to be the greatest inconvenience; and so on. The sequence seems clear. Because according to the opposing position (whose truth we are not discussing for the moment) God knows that if, for example, the common aids of grace are granted to Peter on this or that occasion, he will be converted and will persevere; but on the other hand, as is afterwards clear from the following indication, God does not provide for other aids with respect to this, so that the same Peter may attain eternal life; but only for those with which he foresaw that he would consent and would persevere; although with the same aids, and perhaps greater ones, Paul was foreknown as not to consent, or as not to persevere in grace; therefore predestination adds nothing to the certitude of providence beyond the certitude of foreknowledge, insofar as God orders the predestined to salvation, like anyone else, with this single difference, however, that of the predestined he knows that he will not fall short of the attainment of eternal life.

The falsity of the consequent is likewise established. Because otherwise the predestined would not differ from the non-predestined on the part of the order or direction of God, and of its peculiar efficacy, but only on the part of the foreknowledge of the event; and thus foreknowledge would be the cause of predestination, and predestination would not be predestination by an altogether gratuitous election.

Which reasoning we took from St. Thomas, q. 6 On Truth, art. 3, where, refuting this mode of speaking of the Adversaries, he says thus: For it cannot be said that predestination adds nothing to the certitude of providence beyond the certitude of foreknowledge, as though it were said that God orders the predestined to salvation, like anyone else, but with this single difference, however, that of the predestined he knows that he will not fall short of salvation. For thus speaking, it would not be said that the predestined differs from the non-predestined on the part of the order, but only on the part of the foreknowledge of the event, and thus foreknowledge would be the cause of predestination, and predestination would not be by the election of predestination: which is against sacred Scripture and the sayings of the Saints. Whence, apart from the certitude of foreknowledge, the very order of predestination has an infallible certitude.

12 Nor will it be necessary to bring forward the solution of the Adversaries, namely, that from the very fact that predestination adds to the certitude of providence the certitude of foreknowledge, it must also add a peculiar gratuitous will to constitute the predestined in these or those occasions in which God foreknows through middle knowledge that he will consent, and finally persevere in grace.

It will therefore not be necessary to bring forward this solution. Since from what was said in this confirmation, as well as in dub. 4 of the preceding disputation, it sufficiently collapses. For the fact that this will is efficacious and will certainly have its effect does not arise from its own merits; from the fact that it has, independently of the consent of the created free will foreknown through middle knowledge, an infallible efficacy, in order to cause the created will to consent freely and to persevere; nor again does such a will of God have this infallible and certain efficacy from the force of another divine will, as the Adversaries confess; therefore, speaking of those things which on God's side hold, predestination adds no other certitude to providence beyond only the certitude of foreknowledge: since this certitude, on God's side, can arise only from the certitude and infallibility of his knowledge, or from the infallible and most certain efficacy of his will. Wherefore, if there be any distinction between the predestined and the non-predestined, and if any infallibility of attaining eternal life be found in the predestined, this will arise, as from its first root, from the free will of the predestined one, yet associated with the gratuitous will of God, as we showed in many passages of the preceding disputation, num. 12, and onwards; and on God's side there will be added only the certitude of divine foreknowledge, insofar as from the very fact that the predestined one in fact is discerned from the non-predestined by his consent and perseverance, taken in the way just described, he cannot fail to be foreknown by God with this certainty. From this it will also come about that St. Thomas most correctly infers that predestination is not by the election of the one predestining: since the first root of this distinction and of predestination will not arise from the gratuitous will of God, but from the free choice associated with it.

§ V. Solution of the foundation of the first position.

12 With respect to the foundation of the first position, as to its first part, from what was said in this very difficulty the major is to be granted and the minor denied. And by way of proof it must be said that the means by which those already grown up attain eternal life are their good works: and for this, namely, that God may know with certainty that his predestination is not to be frustrated through their defect, it is enough that he foreknow through the knowledge of simple understanding the efficacy of his will to be so great that whatever it wills, and in the way that it wills it, will be done by creatures. For by that very fact he will be able certainly to intend whichever end pleases him: since all the means to be employed even by the creatures themselves are in the power of the divine will. But concerning these, let them be seen in what we said above, disp. 9, num. 5, explaining how this proposition, If the divine will wills something to be done efficaciously by a creature in a free way, it will be done infallibly, and other similar propositions, if they are taken in the force of a formal consequence, are only in name propositions about the future; and thus through the knowledge of simple understanding must their object be attained by God. Whether, however, God knows from some other source, before the decree of predestination, some future conditionals in conditional and efficacious decrees of his, is another question, which does not bear on the present matter.

With respect to the foundation of the same position, as to its second part, it is clear from those things which we said above in disp. 7, dub. 2, and disput. 8, dub. 1, and which we shall say in the treatise On the Will of God, disp. 10, num. 78, and onwards.