Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

1 Because nothing can be in God which is not necessary with respect to something, or which has an incompatibility with the other things that are in him, as is clear of itself; therefore the possibility or the impossibility of middle knowledge's being reconciled with God is very well deduced from the fact that it either is or is not necessary to him with respect to something, or from the fact that it either has or does not have an incompatibility with the other divine perfections; and so it was well chosen to raise this disputation, treating it point by point, for the more thorough examination of the impossibility of middle knowledge.

Since two of the most powerful arguments by which many authors are moved to the contrary position are the ones by which they believe middle knowledge to be altogether necessary for the two offices recounted in the title, this head of science, among others, will also be found here impugned; let us therefore inquire into it in the first place in this disputation.

§ I. Opinion of the moderns.

Suarez, and all, or almost all, the authors of middle knowledge, hold that middle knowledge is altogether necessary for those two things recounted in the title. The foundation, however, on which the necessity of this knowledge with respect to the certitude of divine predestination rests, is none other than this: that God cannot predestinate anyone already grown up by a predestination that is altogether certain unless he knows the middle terms by which he is to attain eternal beatitude; otherwise indeed he would predestinate rashly, and not by a predestination altogether certain, as is clear from itself; but these middle terms must be known by middle knowledge, that is, by conditional knowledge; and so on. The minor is proved. Since these middle terms, whose knowledge must precede predestination, on the part of those already grown up, can be none other than these: namely, that if he be called on such or such an occasion, he will consent; and that if he be pressed by such or such temptations, he will not succumb; but finally he will so stand that at least he will fall away in grace; yet all these things, since they are future contingents that are conditional, seem to belong to middle knowledge as its proper object, and therefore ought to be known through it.

The foundation, however, of the same position, so far as it concerns the second part, can also be none other than that which the Adversaries so often bring forward, namely: that if God should predefine anything dependent on the created will, before the foreseen consent of that will by means of middle knowledge, and so accordingly such knowledge would not precede that predefinition, then the free choice of the creature would be removed; from the fact that the infallibility of such a consent, resulting therefrom, would come from something extrinsic, and would not be in the power of the created will, but would precede its consent, that is, from the efficacy of the divine will; and thus there would be an infallibility and a preceding necessity; which, according to the common opinion of the theologians, is opposed to freedom.

§ II. First assertion.

2 It must nevertheless be said first that middle knowledge is not necessary for this, that God should efficaciously predefine the free consent of the created will, its freedom being preserved; nay rather, such knowledge being given, it is impossible to predefine such a consent, the aforesaid freedom being preserved, whether of the created will or of the divine will. Thus do the Thomists commonly, and almost all the authors, deny middle knowledge. This assertion, that the first part is clear from those things which we said above in disp. 7, dub. 2, and disp. 8, dub. 1, and from those things which we shall say in the treatise On the Will of God, disp. 10, num. 78, and onwards, showing that from the fact that the divine will is efficacious of itself, and can efficaciously will whatever pleases it, and in the way that pleases it, namely that it be done by the creature freely or necessarily, it follows that the creature itself is free in the second act; and accordingly that God, without dependence on the prevision of the consent through middle knowledge, efficaciously predefines something to be done freely by the creature, does not destroy its freedom in the second act, but rather establishes it.

With respect to the second part, however, the same assertion is argued from those things which we asserted in this treatise, disp. 7, num. 64 and the following, namely: that middle knowledge being given, both the freedom of the divine will and that of the created will are destroyed; and consequently, if such knowledge is necessary for the divine predefinition, God will not be able to predefine anything, the freedom being preserved, either of his own will or of the created will.

§ III. Second assertion.

3 It must be said secondly that middle knowledge is not necessary for the certitude of divine predestination; but that without it God can very well predestinate whomsoever pleases him. Thus all the Doctors whom we brought forward in the preceding disputation, last difficulty, for our position. This assertion follows openly from the preceding. For from the very fact that the divine will is so efficacious of itself that whatever it wills to be done by a creature in a free way will be done freely by that same creature, this truth cannot fail to be known by the knowledge of simple understanding: since this efficacy belongs to the intrinsic perfection of the divine will; therefore, by that very fact, he will be able most certainly to predestinate whomsoever pleases him, without any lack of some other middle knowledge presupposed for the predestination. The consequence is evident. For whoever knows with certainty that he has the all-powerful ability to incline the created will freely as he pleases, and consequently to incline it to persevere in good, will by that very fact, without any further middle knowledge, conditional as well, presupposed for this, be able to order any intellectual and free creature to the eternal beatitude that it is to attain with certainty and freely.

§ IV. Later assertion.

4 It must be said thirdly that middle knowledge is not only not necessary for predestination, or for its certitude; but that predestination itself, and consequently its certitude, cannot be joined with this knowledge. This assertion is commonly taught by the disciples of St. Thomas: and several Doctors cited for us in the preceding disputation, last difficulty, are bound to defend it.

The fundamental reason for that is indicated by St. Thomas in the passages soon to be cited, and can be proposed in this form. Since it cannot be joined with the essence of predestination that it should not be the cause of the middle terms which efficaciously, or together with the effect, lead on to the attainment of eternal life, nor of the attainment of that same eternal life, and consequently it cannot be joined with the certitude of the aforesaid predestination either, since predestination demands from its intrinsic part that it be certain; therefore it cannot be joined with it either, because the aforesaid middle terms and the attainment of eternal life do not have their dependence on it: therefore neither can it be bound together with it, in the sense that middle knowledge is given preceding that same predestination.

The antecedent, from which both consequences depend, is argued both from St. Thomas and also from a reason drawn from the same source. Indeed from St. Thomas. For he himself, 1st part, q. 22, art. 2 and 3, and On Truth, q. 5, art. 1 and 2, says that the providence of God is the cause of things: and in the same q. 5, art. 1, resp. to 7, he asserts that the providence of God is the cause of all things: and in the following article he proves that God governs all things through his providence; and 1st part, q. 103, art. 4, he says that if the effects of this governance of divine providence, which are caused in us by it, are considered in particular, they are thus numberingless for us. Whence, since predestination is a most perfect and special providence of God, it follows that it must be the cause of those things to which it extends. And so the same holy Doctor, speaking of that in q. 23 below, art. 6, and q. 6 On Truth, art. 3, means that it is certain, not only with the certitude of foreknowledge, but also with the certitude of causality, in these words: The foreknowledge of God, therefore, because it does not universally import the relation of cause with respect to those things of which it is the foreknowledge, is not considered in it except as the certitude of knowledge alone: but predestination, because it includes foreknowledge and adds the relation of cause to those things of which it is the predestination, insofar as it is a certain direction, or preparation, can be considered in it above the certitude of knowledge, the certitude of order.

5 By a reason, however, drawn from the same Angelic Doctor, the same antecedent is argued. First, because providence, both general and special, is the right reason of things to be done, not indeed speculative, but practical. Now it is clear that the right and practical reason of things to be done is the cause of things. Then also, because, as St. Thomas explains from the Philosopher, 1st part, q. 23, art. 4, providence presupposes the will of the end, and formally consists in the ordering and preparation of the means for the attainment of that end; and thus it will be the cause, at least directive, of the attainment of the aforesaid end; since, namely, the aforesaid will of the end and the ordering of the means cannot fail to have some influx and causality with respect to the attainment of that end through such means.

From this also the first consequence is sufficiently clear. Since it cannot be joined with this, that something should be the cause of some thing, when the attainment of such a thing and the means through which it is to be attained do not have their dependence on it, as is clear from itself; therefore, if predestination must be the cause of the attainment of eternal life and of the means leading on to it together with the effect, it cannot be joined with it in the sense that the aforesaid means and the attainment of eternal life do not have their dependence on it.

From this also the second consequence is sufficiently evident. First, because from the very fact that middle knowledge is given, through which God knows antecedently to predestination and independently of it, that if Peter is called on these and those occasions and is established, he will consent, and finally will persevere and attain eternal life, these means and the attainment of eternal life would then not depend on predestination as on their cause; otherwise God could not foreknow, antecedently to that same predestination and independently of it, the aforesaid contingent and conditional effects through middle knowledge; therefore, just as it cannot be joined with the essence of predestination, and consequently not with its certitude either, in the sense that that consent, perseverance and attainment of eternal life do not have their dependence on predestination as on their cause; so neither can it be joined with it, and consequently not with its certitude either, in the sense that middle knowledge is given, preceding that same predestination, or independent of it; since, as we were saying a moment ago, from the very fact that it is given antecedently to predestination and independently of it, the aforesaid future conditionals cannot depend on predestination as on their true cause.

6 Then also, because when it is said that God knows that if Peter is called on these and those occasions he will consent and will finally attain eternal life: either predestination itself is implicitly involved in this object, so that the sense is that if Peter is predestined and called on the aforesaid occasions, he will consent and attain eternal life? or it is not involved? If the first, then that object will not be known by middle knowledge, but by the knowledge of simple understanding: since that conditional consequence, if Peter is predestined by God, he will be saved, is a formal consequence, and one known to everyone: and consequently neither will it be joined with the essence and the certitude of predestination, in the sense that the knowledge necessarily preceding it be middle knowledge. If, however, the second is said, then that knowledge, by which the aforesaid object is known independently of predestination and without predestination itself being involved in it, will not be able to be joined with the essence of predestination either, and consequently not with its certitude either: since by that very fact it is removed from predestination that the aforesaid object should depend on it: and consequently that it should be the cause of that consent and of the attainment of eternal life; which is indeed required, per se and intrinsically, for the essence of predestination and for its certitude.

7 It is confirmed, and it is explained. For if we speak of Peter as ordained to eternal salvation, not indeed in the conditional sense, but in the absolute sense, it is certain that he will not attain eternal life except dependently on predestination, as on the cause of that attainment; therefore neither under any hypothesis or condition will it be future that Peter should attain eternal life unless God predestinate him, preparing for him through this his special providence more special means of the order of grace; therefore neither can God know, antecedently to predestination, that under any hypothesis whatsoever Peter will be saved, unless predestination be involved there as well, at least under the condition, by which those more special aids are prepared, nor can such knowledge be middle knowledge in any sense.

The antecedent of this confirmation seems to be clear from itself; and this, too, is taught both by St. Augustine, in the book on heresies, num. 88, where, recounting the heresy of Pelagius and Caelestius, he says thus: This grace of God, by which we are predestined to the adoption of sons through Jesus Christ into himself, and by which we are rescued from the power of darkness, so that we believe in him and are transferred into the kingdom of himself, wherefore he says, No one comes to me unless it be given him by my Father, and by which charity is poured forth in our hearts, so that faith may work through love, to such a degree are they enemies that without this they cannot believe that man is able to do all the divine commandments. Then also, Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 22, where it is defined that a man justified cannot persevere in the accepted righteousness without special aid from God, and consequently cannot attain eternal life without the special providence of God, which cannot be other than predestination, from which the gift of perseverance proceeds.

8 The first consequence, however, follows clearly from the antecedent. For that which is required on the part of the cause, namely, that the absolute future be commanded to execution, is desired under a hypothesis, namely, that the conditional future be commanded to execution, and nothing else is required for it; otherwise it would not be true: since for it to be commanded to execution, something else would be required than the whole of that which is enclosed within its hypothesis. And thus, though that condition were posited in the thing itself, it would not be future, that effect which indeed is, namely, to have that conditional one false.

From this also the second consequence, that is, the first part, is sufficiently clear. For if the future salvation of Peter, still under a condition, is not to be given unless predestination be involved there under the hypothesis, it follows that it cannot be known with certainty by God even under a condition, unless the predestination of the same Peter be involved there as well, at least under the hypothesis.

From this, finally, the second part of that same consequence is sufficiently clear: since, as we have often said, knowledge of some future conditional that involves predestination, or the efficacious decree of God, at least under a hypothesis, does not belong to middle knowledge. But concerning these, let them be seen in what we said above in disp. 7, from num. 48 as far as 75, and from num. 102 as far as num. 150, as well as what we brought forward in disp. 9, from num. 5 as far as num. 88. Through all of these the evasions of the Adversaries collapse: and therefore, so that we do not repeat the same things again, we purposely refrain from them, especially because by the following reason they will collapse more completely.

9 Secondly, therefore, the assertion is principally proved, and at the same time a certain tacit evasion is excluded, and the preceding reason is more strongly confirmed, supposing however three things. The first is that the gift of perseverance, according to the Tridentine passage cited, is a special gift even with respect to those already justified: yet this special character is not attributed to several other aids of the order of grace, such as that which is granted to a justified man for the eliciting of some particular act, for example of supernatural faith. The second is that this special character cannot consist in this, that after God has had a conditional will of saving all, that is, a will of saving those unless it should depend on themselves, and consequently of granting the common aids to persevere, and after he has seen (according to the opposing position) that such common aids in some things placed in this order, for example the order of things, attain their effect, while in another they do not, he should then have chosen with respect to those who are to persevere to establish them in an order in which he foresaw that they would persevere with the common aids, but not in that order in which he foresaw that they would not persevere, so that in this will the special character of the gift of perseverance should consist: since this is also found in other aids of the order of grace, which are not called special, when God has also foresaw Peter to be placed in such an order of things in which with the common aids he would be believed to believe; and in another order in which with the aforesaid aids he would not be believed to believe: and has likewise chosen to grant him the aforesaid aid in that order and series of things in which he foreknew that he would be believed to believe. The third is that, from the very fact that the special character of the gift of perseverance does not consist in what we have just said, it must bring an infallible connection with perseverance itself: otherwise the act of persevering itself would be commanded to execution only by the common aids, offered both to those who are to persevere and to those who are not to persevere, about whom, according to the opposing position, it was foreknown that they would at some time have the effect and at another time would not.

10 Hence the following reason is deduced. Since that knowledge must precede, as necessary for the certitude of predestination, through which the aforesaid special character of the gift of perseverance and its infallible connection with perseverance itself are foreknown; and since that knowledge is repugnant as preceding that other one, namely, what is necessary for its certitude, through which the aforesaid special character and connection cannot be known: but this cannot be known by middle knowledge; therefore it is repugnant that this should precede predestination as necessary for its certitude. The major seems certain. Since for the certitude of predestination it is required that there precede the knowledge and the certitude of the means, among which the gift of perseverance is most powerful, having the aforesaid special character and connection.

The minor, however, is proved. Because that special character and the infallible connection of the gift of perseverance brings with it the goodness of the consequence, so that this is a legitimate consequence: If, for example, the gift of perseverance, or a special aid to persevere, is granted to Peter or to anyone else, he will never stand firm, neither in this nor in any other thing, in which he does not persevere: therefore this object is repugnant to belonging to middle knowledge: which, even if it be admitted, does not terminate in infallible truths, which rest on the goodness of the consequence; but in conditional truths, in which no goodness of the consequence is found, and the imposition of the consequence consisting in this, that the antecedent should not stand as true while the consequent is false.

11 It is confirmed, and it is explained. Because otherwise predestination would add nothing to the general providence of God beyond the certitude of foreknowledge, insofar as God orders the predestined to salvation, like anyone else, with this single difference, however, that of the predestined he knows through middle knowledge that he will not fall short of the attainment of eternal salvation; but this seems to be the greatest inconvenience; and so on. The sequence seems clear. Because according to the opposing position (whose truth we are not discussing for the moment) God knows that if, for example, the common aids of grace are granted to Peter on this or that occasion, he will be converted and will persevere; but on the other hand, as is afterwards clear from the following indication, God does not provide for other aids with respect to this, so that the same Peter may attain eternal life; but only for those with which he foresaw that he would consent and would persevere; although with the same aids, and perhaps greater ones, Paul was foreknown as not to consent, or as not to persevere in grace; therefore predestination adds nothing to the certitude of providence beyond the certitude of foreknowledge, insofar as God orders the predestined to salvation, like anyone else, with this single difference, however, that of the predestined he knows that he will not fall short of the attainment of eternal life.

The falsity of the consequent is likewise established. Because otherwise the predestined would not differ from the non-predestined on the part of the order or direction of God, and of its peculiar efficacy, but only on the part of the foreknowledge of the event; and thus foreknowledge would be the cause of predestination, and predestination would not be predestination by an altogether gratuitous election.

Which reasoning we took from St. Thomas, q. 6 On Truth, art. 3, where, refuting this mode of speaking of the Adversaries, he says thus: For it cannot be said that predestination adds nothing to the certitude of providence beyond the certitude of foreknowledge, as though it were said that God orders the predestined to salvation, like anyone else, but with this single difference, however, that of the predestined he knows that he will not fall short of salvation. For thus speaking, it would not be said that the predestined differs from the non-predestined on the part of the order, but only on the part of the foreknowledge of the event, and thus foreknowledge would be the cause of predestination, and predestination would not be by the election of predestination: which is against sacred Scripture and the sayings of the Saints. Whence, apart from the certitude of foreknowledge, the very order of predestination has an infallible certitude.

12 Nor will it be necessary to bring forward the solution of the Adversaries, namely, that from the very fact that predestination adds to the certitude of providence the certitude of foreknowledge, it must also add a peculiar gratuitous will to constitute the predestined in these or those occasions in which God foreknows through middle knowledge that he will consent, and finally persevere in grace.

It will therefore not be necessary to bring forward this solution. Since from what was said in this confirmation, as well as in dub. 4 of the preceding disputation, it sufficiently collapses. For the fact that this will is efficacious and will certainly have its effect does not arise from its own merits; from the fact that it has, independently of the consent of the created free will foreknown through middle knowledge, an infallible efficacy, in order to cause the created will to consent freely and to persevere; nor again does such a will of God have this infallible and certain efficacy from the force of another divine will, as the Adversaries confess; therefore, speaking of those things which on God's side hold, predestination adds no other certitude to providence beyond only the certitude of foreknowledge: since this certitude, on God's side, can arise only from the certitude and infallibility of his knowledge, or from the infallible and most certain efficacy of his will. Wherefore, if there be any distinction between the predestined and the non-predestined, and if any infallibility of attaining eternal life be found in the predestined, this will arise, as from its first root, from the free will of the predestined one, yet associated with the gratuitous will of God, as we showed in many passages of the preceding disputation, num. 12, and onwards; and on God's side there will be added only the certitude of divine foreknowledge, insofar as from the very fact that the predestined one in fact is discerned from the non-predestined by his consent and perseverance, taken in the way just described, he cannot fail to be foreknown by God with this certainty. From this it will also come about that St. Thomas most correctly infers that predestination is not by the election of the one predestining: since the first root of this distinction and of predestination will not arise from the gratuitous will of God, but from the free choice associated with it.

§ V. Solution of the foundation of the first position.

12 With respect to the foundation of the first position, as to its first part, from what was said in this very difficulty the major is to be granted and the minor denied. And by way of proof it must be said that the means by which those already grown up attain eternal life are their good works: and for this, namely, that God may know with certainty that his predestination is not to be frustrated through their defect, it is enough that he foreknow through the knowledge of simple understanding the efficacy of his will to be so great that whatever it wills, and in the way that it wills it, will be done by creatures. For by that very fact he will be able certainly to intend whichever end pleases him: since all the means to be employed even by the creatures themselves are in the power of the divine will. But concerning these, let them be seen in what we said above, disp. 9, num. 5, explaining how this proposition, If the divine will wills something to be done efficaciously by a creature in a free way, it will be done infallibly, and other similar propositions, if they are taken in the force of a formal consequence, are only in name propositions about the future; and thus through the knowledge of simple understanding must their object be attained by God. Whether, however, God knows from some other source, before the decree of predestination, some future conditionals in conditional and efficacious decrees of his, is another question, which does not bear on the present matter.

With respect to the foundation of the same position, as to its second part, it is clear from those things which we said above in disp. 7, dub. 2, and disput. 8, dub. 1, and which we shall say in the treatise On the Will of God, disp. 10, num. 78, and onwards.

14 So that it may be more evident how middle knowledge not only fails to benefit, but even works against the end for which it is introduced, namely divine predestination: accordingly it has seemed proper to us to raise this difficulty in particular.

§ I. Resolution of the difficulty.

It must therefore be said that, on another ground, middle knowledge cannot stand together with the predestination of adults, and conversely, insofar as the predestination of these, at least speaking in the natural order, must occur independently, or as from a cause, or reason a priori, or at least as from a prior condition, of their good works foreseen as future. But if middle knowledge is granted, the opposite must obtain. Thus many Doctors, cited in disp. 10. dub. ult.

The reason for this assertion, as regards the first part, namely the predestination of adults, speaking at least in the natural order, that it is not given together with the aforesaid dependence upon good works foreseen as future, will be clear from what is to be said in the treatise On Predestination. For the present, however, it suffices to add that of Paul to the Romans 9. For when they had not yet done anything good or evil (so that according to the election the purpose of God might remain) it was said of him not from works, but from him who calls: because the elder shall serve the younger, as it is written, Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated. These words D. August. explains in lib. 2. contra duas Epist. Pelagianor. cap. 7. as follows: Wherefore are you foolish, when, the truth being told, it was said not from works, but from him who calls, while you say that Jacob was loved on account of future works which God foreknew he would do; and so you contradict the Apostle when he says, Not from works: as though he could not have said, Not from present, but from future works: but he says, Not from works, in order to commend grace.

There is also another testimony of D. August. in lib. de Praedest. Sanct. cap. 17. where he says thus: This is the unchangeable truth of predestination and grace. For what is it that the Apostle says, As he chose us in himself before the founda- tion of the world? which undoubtedly was said because God foreknew that we would believe, not because he himself was going to make us believers; against this foreknowledge the Son speaks, saying: Not you have chosen me, but I have chosen you; since God foreknew rather this, that they themselves were going to choose him, so that they might deserve to be chosen by him. They were therefore chosen before the foundation of the world by that predestination in which God foreknew his future deeds; but they were chosen from the world by that calling by which God fulfilled that which he had predestined.

15 The reason, however, for that same assertion, as regards the second part, namely that if middle knowledge is granted, or the antecedent free decrees of the divine will, it follows that of necessity there must be given a cause, or reason a priori, or at least a prerequisite condition for the predestination of adults, namely their good works foreseen — this is insinuated by D. Thom. in the places cited above, and is to be referred to in the treatise On Predestination, and it can be proposed in the following form. For if God had foreseen Peter through this middle knowledge, for example, that if he were placed in this or that order, or in any other order whatsoever, he would return to grace and would not persevere in it, he could not predestine him: since according to the opposite opinion it is indispensably required for this, that God be able to predestine some adult who by his middle good works attains eternal life, that through this middle knowledge he first see that if he is placed in this or that order of things and is called by God, then, being established in one of those, he will not resist grace, but will rather consent to it and will persevere in the friendship of God; hence that he predestine him depends on the good consent previously seen through this middle knowledge, either as from a cause, or reason a priori, or at least as from a condition, not of any kind whatsoever, but one necessarily prerequisite. The consequence is evident. For as often as the negation is the cause of the negation, so the affirmation also must be the cause, or reason a priori, or at least the prerequisite condition of the affirmation: as when Peter cannot run unless he lives, the affirmation of his life must by one of the aforesaid modes be required for the affirmation of the running of the same Peter.

§ II. The first two evasions of the younger writers, and their being closed off in advance.

16 First the Adversaries present the objection that the case is impossible; because since there are infinite orders of things in which Peter can be placed, it follows that at least in some of them it is not foreseen that he would, if called by God in such and such a way, consent to grace and persevere. But this solution does not empty out the force of the reasoning just made. Then, because according to the opposite opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned for which it would be infallible that Peter, placed in one of those orders of things, would consent to grace and persevere in it; and hence there is no reason why in all of those the actual dissent of Peter should not be conjoined with the calling of God: since the will of God calling, and preceding Peter's consent, is not, according to the opposite opinion, efficacious of itself and infallibly producing the effect; and so nothing stands in the way of its being conjoined with Peter's dissent in whatever order of things. Then again: because even if it be admitted that the case is impossible, the argument remains in its force. Since the consequence, or conditional, made in it is formal, it is therefore always and universally true that if Peter is foreseen in that order of things through middle knowledge as not going to consent (whether this condition be possible or impossible), then Peter will be unable to be predestined by middle good works, or insofar as he is an adult: hence it is a sign that intrinsically predestination depends on Peter's good works foreseen, either as from a cause, or reason a priori, or at least as from a condition necessarily prerequisite; otherwise there would be no reason why the aforesaid conditional should be indispensably true. Just as if, for the distinction of the Divine Word from the Holy Spirit, the procession of the latter from the former were not necessarily and indispensably required, there would be no reason why this conditional should also be indispensably true: namely, If the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son through what is possible, or what is impossible, then he would not be really distinguished from him.

17 Secondly Suarez and others present the objection that, since good works foreseen as future under a condition cannot have the reason of merit or demerit before God more than works considered precisely as possible, as Augustine asserts in lib. 2. de Dono persever. cap. 9. and 10. and lib. 10. de Genesi ad litteram cap. 16. as also in lib. 1. de Anima, et eius origine cap. 12. and elsewhere often against the Pelagians, it follows that the good works of adults foreseen through middle knowledge cannot concur to their predestination as the cause or the motive of the divine will. And so it is always true that adults are not predestined on account of their good works: although with this it stands that middle knowledge is indispensably required, and that God, through it, before he predestines or has the efficacious decree of Peter's eternal salvation, foresees his good consent and his perseverance in the conditioned state, so that the divine decree and predestination may be altogether certain and may infallibly attain their effect; otherwise the aforesaid certainty could not be had by them.

But neither does this solution satisfy. For in the first place it does not sufficiently rescue the position that predestination does not depend on the aforesaid works, at least as upon a condition, not of any kind whatsoever, but one wholly prerequisite to that same predestination; and hence it does not rescue why, in this sense, predestination should not be from foreseen works, the contrary of which is taught by Aug. and D. Thom., as we shall show in the treatise On Predestination: ergo, etc. The antecedent is evident: since according to it the axiom adduced by us is not sufficiently met, namely that when the negation is the cause of the negation, then the affirmation is the cause, or at least the prerequisite condition of the affirmation.

18 Next, because according to the principles of middle knowledge and of its authors, there is no reason why the good works which D. Peter, for example, performed, even if they are considered for that state of the conditioned, or (which comes to the same thing for the present) for a previous sign of the reason with respect to the free decrees and the efficacy of God, should not be able and obliged to have the reason of merit, or of the motive of the divine will, with respect to the predestination of the same D. Peter. And the reason is this. For according to the aforesaid opinion, for the works to have the reason of the absolute future in that former [state], it is enough that in the latter sign there be the absolute future decree of God concerning their future existence, as we saw in disp. 7. n. 34: hence, if the good works of D. Peter, absolutely future, have the reason of merit, there is no reason why they should not have it in that former [state], and consequently there will be no reason why a meritorious cause of the predestination, or a cause moving the divine will with respect to it, should not be given on this side: since in that sign which is antecedent to the predestination and the efficacy of God, they are, according to the Adversaries, absolutely future.

19 Finally. Because if it is once admitted that it is indispensably required for this, that God predestine some adult, that he should first foresee through middle knowledge the good consent of that man's will and his perseverance in grace, there is no reason why predestination should not be made from good works, as from the motive of the divine will with respect to the predestination of the same adult: because, middle knowledge having been once admitted, the absolute decree of God to concur with Peter's will, for example, with regard to the act of faith, is in God in no other way than according to the exigency of Peter's will, namely because it is foreseen by God on that occasion, with such helps prepared, that he will be as much of himself believing: hence, since such a decree of God to concur is then choice with respect to the end, it follows manifestly that Peter is chosen for faith, supposing such an exigency of his will. Because if he were not chosen, then, those circumstances being supposed, and it being supposed that God would wish to place Peter in that order of things, violence would be done to him by God, or (which comes to the same thing for the present) God would not concur naturally with it; and consequently Peter's consent, foreseen by God as future under the condition that God would wish to concur, is the motivating reason of the divine will, that he may choose him for the end, and so motivating that God would do violence to Peter's will, or would not concur naturally with it, according to what that will, insofar as it is a special will, demands, if he did not then choose him. This objection will be confirmed still more from what is to be said immediately.

§ III. Another solution of the Adversaries, and its refutation.

20 Lastingly the Adversaries answer our fundamental argument by denying the consequence. Because, just as God foresaw Peter's future merits, if he were placed in that order of things in which he was going to have merits, so also he foresaw his future demerits, if he were placed in another order of things: and then no reason, cause, can be discerned which on the side of the object moved God, whereby he placed Peter rather in that order of things in which he was going to have merits than in that in which he was going to have demerits; but this must be referred back to the divine will alone.

But neither is this solution pleasing. Then, because neither according to it is the axiom adduced by us from Aristotle sufficiently met for proving that consequence, namely that when the negation is the cause of the negation, then the affirmation is the cause, or at least the condition, not of any kind whatsoever, but one prerequisite to the affirmation. Then again: because although from this solution it follows that there is not given a cause, nor a reason, on account of which God, from the infinite orders and occasions of things in which he could have placed Peter, chose this one rather, in which he foreknew that he would make good use of the helps, than another, in which he foreknew that he would make bad use of them; nevertheless, once this order has been chosen, in which the aforesaid good use is foreseen, in which he predestines him to grace and glory and by his efficacious decree predetermines his good works, it has an indispensable dependence upon such a foreknowledge, or upon such a good use foreknown, either as upon a reason, or at least as upon a condition without which such a predestination neither would be nor could be.

21 It makes no difference if you object that even in any opinion the predestination of the adult depends on the future consent of his own free choice: since unless such a good use were future, he could not be predestined in the manner of an adult, or (which comes to the same thing for the present) by the middle good works performed by him. And in like manner it also depends on merits considered as possible: since God cannot efficaciously elect any adult to glory, as to a crown, unless he foresees that he is able to have merits, and nevertheless predestination is not on that account made from merits; hence, although the good use of the adult foreseen under a condition through middle knowledge is indispensably required for the predestination of the adult, the adult will not on that account be predestined from merits, nor will his predestination have a dependence upon them, either as upon a cause, or a reason a priori, or at least as upon a condition wholly prerequisite.

You will confirm. Because in our opinion it must be admitted that God knows such future things in the efficacious and conditioned decree of his will, and nevertheless the aforesaid merits, known in that way, are not the reason, or the condition without which of the predestination, which is afterwards made through the absolute decree; hence one will be able to argue in the same proportional manner, even if middle knowledge is granted, and through it the good use of free choice is foreseen as future before the efficacious and absolute decree of predestination itself.

22 An answer is given, then, to the objection that if we speak of the good use and the supernatural consent of the predestinate, absolutely future, then according to our opinion, although predestination has an infallible connection with it, as with an effect infallibly brought about by it, it nevertheless does not have a dependence upon it, but rather such a consent depends on predestination itself; and so it is posterior to it; and consequently it can be neither the cause, nor the reason a priori of it, nor even the prior condition required for it: whereas according to the opposite opinion, predestination is not connected with that free consent of which we are speaking, as with an effect of its own predestination, but rather it is presupposed to be future, and foreknown as future, before it, as is clear from what has been said: and consequently, since otherwise it is indispensably required for it, it cannot fail to be either the reason, or at least the prior condition required for it. But if we speak of the good use, or of merits considered precisely as possible, then we confess that these, as foreknown through the knowledge of simple intelligence, must precede in the category of possibles.

But from this it does not follow that predestination is made in some way from foreseen works. Because what is required for this is that in some way, namely at least through the mode of a condition that is meritorious and required in advance, they should allure the divine will with respect to predestining. But it is certain that merits, considered precisely as possible, have no power of moving the divine will in any way, even through the mode of a meritorious condition for something to be bestowed on someone. Because for this, at the very least, it is required that they have the reason of future things. But according to the opposite opinion, the merits and the good use of the predestinate are presupposed to be future, both under a condition and absolutely, in that former [state] before the predestination and the efficacious decree of it: since, as we were saying, according to the aforesaid opinion it is enough that in the subsequent sign there be the aforesaid decree and predestination.

There is added the consideration that Scripture and the Fathers do not at all remove good works, considered as possible, and as known in that way, preceding the predestination at least through the mode of a condition, whereas otherwise these very same works, still in that same mode, precede it as future, as will be clear from the testimonies cited in this difficulty and from what we shall say in the treatise On Predestination.

23 In confirmation of this, both premises having been granted, the consequence must be denied. And the reason of the disparity is this. Because although that efficacious and conditioned will precedes the decree of predestination, it is nevertheless not required, in our opinion, for this, that God should predestine whom he pleases with the utmost certainty and infallibility, from the fact that the divine will has of itself the infallible efficacy already described, but it is required on account of the highest actuality of divine liberty, as we shall explain in the treatise On the Will of God disp. 5. num. 73. and as we have touched upon in disp. 9. num. 66. of that treatise. And therefore, even if by an impossibility God did not have the aforesaid conditioned decrees and efficacies, he would nevertheless predestine in the same manner as he now predestines: and consequently predestination cannot depend on the aforesaid will. But according to the opposite opinion, God cannot (as all, or almost all, of its followers confess) predestine any adult, his freedom being preserved, unless he foresees through middle knowledge that, placed in these or those circumstances, he will truly consent, will persevere, and will at length attain eternal life: and therefore the good use of free choice, foreseen through that knowledge, cannot fail to be at least a prerequisite condition with respect to the predestination.

24 From all of which it must be inferred, and said secondly, that on yet another ground middle knowledge is not compatible with divine predestination, namely because, that having been granted, God could never have predestined any of those who in fact died, or will die, in mortal sin, nor very many of those who will never be created. Which certainly, as is clear, contains enough falsity. So do the disciples of D. Thom.

The reason for the assertion is this. Because these two contradictory propositions can be formed, for example, about Judas, and about any other of those already mentioned: If Judas is created, he will die in sin: Not if Judas is created, he will die in sin; and then, middle knowledge having been granted, God would know before his efficacious decree which of them was determinately true, or determinately false; and since it is evidently the case that he did not know the affirmative to be false, otherwise he would have been deceived, since from the event it is clear that he died in sin, the consequence will be that he knew that Judas would die in sin; hence, this knowledge having been once admitted, he could not have predestined him.

And this same argument can be formed not only about men actually created, but also about very many of those who are in fact not created, and consequently about conditioned future contingents. Because if, for example, ten thousand men are singled out from those who will never be created, then, middle knowledge having been granted, God would also know either the determinate truth or the determinate falsity of these contradictions, namely: If these ten thousand men are created, all will die in grace: Not if these are created, all will die in grace: and if he knows the affirmative to be false, he will not be able from this collection to predestine those of whom he foreknows that they will not fail in grace. But if he knows it to be true, then, since it cannot be denied that other collections, of other ten thousands, can be given, about which he knows that some of those, if they are created, will not die in grace, and consequently about which, when similar contradictory propositions are formed, this negative is true: Not if these ten thousand are created, all will die in grace, it will follow from this that God, this knowledge having been once presupposed, cannot predestine those from those collections whom he foreknows will not die in grace.

25 It makes no difference that some of the younger writers evade [this] by saying that this conditioned future does not have, by reason of this precise condition, a connection with the future event: since precisely from this, that someone is created, it follows no more that he will die in grace than that he will not die: and hence it is not known through middle knowledge.

For the contrary of this is the fact that this solution utterly destroys the most solid foundation of middle knowledge, namely that out of two contradictory propositions, precisely because they are contradictory, one of them must be determinately true and the other determinately false: and consequently all of this must be known by God; hence, since the propositions already mentioned are contradictory under that precise condition, it will be necessary for God to know which of them is true and which is false.

There is added the consideration that if once a connection between the condition and the future event is required, in order that God may know the conditioned future, the consequence will be that in proportion to the degree of the connection there must be a knowledge of it, in such a way indeed that if the connection is fallible, then the knowledge is not infallible on the side of the object: and consequently middle knowledge is destroyed precisely by that very thing. Because in order to know infallibly on the side of the subject, and fallibly on the side of the object, those conditionates which have a probable connection with the future event, that is, in order to know scientifically that what is probable, posited such a condition, will be future, that effect, since the connection between that condition and the event is probable, or likely, middle knowledge is not necessary; but this can be known through the knowledge of simple intelligence, as is clear from itself.