Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem
Collegii Salmanticensis Cursus Theologicus, tomus I
First published 1870
The Cursus Theologicus of the Discalced Carmelites of Salamanca (the 'Salmanticenses'), tomus I, in the 1870 Paris reprint. Contains the Prooemium and the three great treatises of this volume: De principio individuationis (a digression on the principle of individuation), De Visione Dei (in quaest. 12), and De Scientia Dei (in quaest. 14, including the extended rejection of middle knowledge). The edition prints St Thomas's Prima Pars text alongside; that text is not republished here.
Prooemium, and the Division of the whole Work
Quaestio I: On the Simplicity of God
Tractatus I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance and of Its Accidents
Disputatio I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance
Dubium I: Whether the substantial form is itself individuated, and the first principle of the individuation and of the purely individual distinction of the whole composite?
Dubium II: Whether matter, taken by itself and precisely, or matter marked by quantity, is the first and radical principle of the individuation of the whole substantial composite
Dubium III: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to constitute a composite of matter and quantity as an inhering and constituting form, is the first root of the individuation of the composite
Dubium IV: Whether matter determined by quantity, insofar as it denotes a certain substantial mode, is by the very nature of the thing distinct from matter and determines it toward having this quantity rather than that, is the first root of the individuation of material substance and of its substantial form?
Dubium V: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to possess by a radical mode this quantity rather than that, is the first root of the completed material substance and therefore of its substantial form
Disputatio II: On the Principle of the Individuation of Accidents
Dubium I: Whether the subject is the first root and principle of the individuation of accidents and of their purely individual distinction
Dubium II: Whether quantity claims for itself a peculiar principle, so that it is individuated from itself as though it were the first root
Dubium III: Whether essential repugnance exists between purely numerical distinction of accidents, as such that two of them differ only numerically in the same subject
Tractatus II: In quaest. 12 of the First Part of St. Thomas: On the Vision of God
Quaestio I: How God is known by us
Disputatio I: On the Possibility and Appetitability of the Vision of God by Essence
Dubium I: Whether the clear vision of God by essence is possible to the created intellect?
Dubium II: Whether the Holy Fathers knew that vision of God by essence is possible to a created intellect
Dubium III: Whether the possibility of vision of God by essence can be clearly known to a created intellect by the light of nature
Dubium IV: Whether the intellectual nature considered by itself has an innate appetite for the vision of God by essence
Dubium V: Whether an elicited and natural appetite is given in the intellectual creature considered by itself with regard to the clear vision of God
Disputatio II: On the Likeness, or Form, Required for a Clear Vision of God
Dubium I: Whether, according to the mind of St Thomas, some created likeness is admitted in order to elicit the clear vision of God
Dubium II: Whether the divine essence is in fact united to the intellect of the blessed man by way of an intelligible species, with a view to the clear vision of God?
Dubium III: Whether the divine essence, as it has the character of an intelligible form, actively concurs to the clear vision of God
Dubium IV: Whether by divine power a created impressed species is possible, through which God may be seen in a quidditative way, such as He is in Himself?
Dubium V: Whether the first reason which D. Thom. adduces in this article sufficiently proves the impossibility of an impressed species representing God quidditatively and clearly?
Dubium VI: Whether from the second reason of St. Thomas the impossibility is sufficiently inferred of an impressed form representing God quidditatively, and clearly, as He is in Himself
Dubium VII: What specially stands against the second reason of St. Thomas, and how it is to be solved
Dubium VIII: Whether the last reason of the article proves the impossibility of a created intelligible species representing God quidditatively: where the arguments also are dissolved which we brought from the opponents in dub. 4 of this disputation?
Dubium IX: Whether in the blessed there is necessarily and indispensably given a word, or expressed form, representing God quidditatively, as He is in Himself
Dubium X: Whether the impossibility of a created word representing God clearly and quidditatively is rightly proved from the fact that God is essentially itself the being quidditatively understood, and thus cannot be quidditatively understood through a created word?
Disputatio III: On the Impossibility of the Vision of God, As He Is in Himself, by Created Powers of the Natural Order, or Such as Are Connatural to Some Created Intellect
Dubium I: Whether by the absolute power of God there is possible some intellect which by the powers proper to it of the natural order could see God as He is in Himself
Dubium II: Whether by divine power there can be possible some substances and some intellects for which the light of glory is connatural, and which can see God by essence by their own powers?
Disputatio IV: On the Necessity of the Light of Glory for Seeing the Divine Essence As It Is in Itself
Dubium I: Whether the light of glory concurs to the vision of God, as He is in Himself, after the manner of an impressed form
Dubium II: Whether the light of glory is a necessary disposition, in order that the divine essence, in the ratio of form or of intelligible species, be united to the intellects of the blessed?
Dubium III: Whether the light of glory is necessarily desired for the receiving of the vision of God?
Dubium IV: Whether by the absolute power of God the created intellect can, without the light of glory, by its own obediential power alone, though with a concomitant influx superadded in the vision, but not by any other previous [influx], elicit that vision in the same intellect
Dubium V: Whether by divine power the divine essence can be united, in the ratio of light, to the created intellect, and thus constitute it, without a created light, in the first act for seeing God as He is in Himself?
Disputatio V: On the Quality and Inequality of the Visions in the Blessed
Dubium I: Whether an inequality is found among the beatific visions
Dubium II: Whether the inequality found among the beatific visions is not only intensive and extensive, but also essential and specific
Dubium III: Whether an intellectual power that is better, with equal light of glory, sees the divine essence more clearly
Disputatio VI: On the Incomprehensibility of God to the Created Intellect
Dubium I: Whether by divine power the created intellect can comprehend God?
Disputatio VII: On Those Things Which, God Having Been Seen, Are Seen in Him, or Can Be Seen
Dubium I: Whether those who see God see everything absolutely which is formally and of necessity contained in Him
Dubium II: Whether the divine essence can be seen without the persons, or one person without another?
Dubium III: Whether the blessed can, by the force of the vision of the divine essence, see, and in fact see, the free decrees of God?
Dubium IV: Whether from the force of the vision of the divine essence the effects existing under some difference of time can, or ought to, be seen
Dubium V: Whether by the force of the vision of the divine essence possible creatures can be seen?
Tractatus III: In quaest. 14 of the First Part of the Angelic Doctor: On the Knowledge of God
Quaestio I: De Scientia Dei
Dubium I: Whether those things which St. Thomas teaches in the Prooemium of this question are true
Disputatio I: De scientia Dei, quoad an est?
Dubium I: Whether intellectual knowledge is formally in God?
Dubium II: Whether from the fact that God is most immaterial the Angelic Doctor rightly proves that He is most intelligent?
Dubium III: Whether there is in God knowledge strictly so called and formally, and with respect to things
Dubium IV: Whether the knowledge of God is an attribute of Him?
Disputatio II: On the Twofold Distinction Which D. Thom. Constitutes in This Article Between Things Known and Things Not Known
Dubium I: Whether the first distinction which St. Thomas assigns between things that know and things that do not know is true, namely that these have only their own form, whereas those have also the forms of other things
Dubium II: Whether knowing things have not only the form of another thing, but also become by identity other things in being knowable, that is, representatively?
Disputatio III: On the Intellection and Knowledge of God with Respect to Its Primary Object
Dubium I: Whether God understands Himself primarily
Dubium II: Whether the object per se, first and specificative of the essential intellection of God is the divine essence, as distinguished from the attributes and the relations: or whether all these are formally and expressly meant?
Disputatio IV: On Understanding by God with Respect to the Power It Has to Constitute the Divine Essence and Nature
Dubium I: Whether the constitutive [element] of the divine essence, or nature, is the sole reason of a spiritual substance in itself, or of such by essence, as distinct virtually from the reason of a subsisting intellectual substance, whether radically and in the first act, or in the second act
Dubium II: Whether what constitutes the divine essence, or nature, is the ratio of substance alone, essentially and per essentiam intellectual, as virtually distinct from intellection by essence, or whether without any virtual distinction it is intellection itself?
Disputatio V: On the Knowledge of God with Respect to Its Causality toward Creatures
Dubium I: Whether divine knowledge is in some way the cause of things
Dubium II: What the knowledge of God is as cause of things
Dubium III: Whether just as the knowledge of God, taken formally, is the cause directing toward the production of creatures, so too it is the immediate effective principle and the executor of their production?
Disputatio VI: On Divine Knowledge Collated with Evils
Dubium I: Whether God knows evils?
Dubium II: Whether God necessarily knows evils through created goods?
Disputatio VII: On Whether There Is Knowledge of God with Respect to Absolute Future Contingents, and on Those Things Which Cannot Be Certainly Known by Him
Dubium I: What, and how manifold, the future contingent is
Dubium II: Whether God certainly knows absolutely future contingents?
Dubium III: Whether God certainly knows absolute free future things, by His essence and divine ideas, as they represent the truth of those things antecedently to the decree of His will
Dubium IV: Whether God certainly knows absolutely future contingents in the free decree of His will, not indeed as present, but as future?
Dubium V: Whether God certainly knows absolutely future contingents which in some way depend on created freedom, in the comprehension of secondary causes, antecedently to the free determination of the divine will?
Dubium VI: Whether God certainly knows absolute future contingents in their objective truth, antecedently to the divine decree
Disputatio VIII: On the knowledge of God with respect to absolutely future contingents, as regards those of which He is certainly known to be aware
Dubium I: Whether God certainly knows all absolutely future contingents in the decree put into execution of His will, antecedently to any infallible futurehood of them, or whether they are determined in their essence by such a decree?
Dubium II: Whether according to Scripture and the Fathers, but especially St. Thomas, absolute future contingents are from eternity really and physically present to God in the measure of eternity, and by reason of this presence are certainly known by Him
Dubium III: Whether with a sufficient reason it is proved that absolutely future contingents were from eternity, and are now really and physically present to God in the measure of eternity, and by reason of this presence are certainly known by Him?
Dubium IV: Whether eternity, and the presentiality of the future already explained in it, is altogether necessary for this, so that God may certainly and infallibly know absolutely future contingents before they are present in their own and adequate measure, or so far as we are concerned?
Disputatio IX: On the Knowledge of Conditioned Future Things, Which God Has in His Efficacious Yet Conditioned Decree
Dubium I: On the multiple division of the future contingent, and which of them belong to the present disputation
Dubium II: Whether according to holy Scripture God certainly knows conditioned future contingents, whether they be disparate, yet depending both as to the condition and as to the event on free causes, or be not disparate, but having only a probable, or conjectural, connection with the condition?
Dubium III: Whether according to the mind of the holy Fathers God knows with perfect certainty and infallibly conditioned future contingents, whether they be disparate in the manner just described, or have a probable connection with the future event
Dubium IV: Whether with a sufficient reason it is shown that God certainly, and altogether infallibly, knows both future contingents that are conditioned and disparate, and those which have only a probable and conjectural connection on the part of the object with the condition?
Dubium V: Whether in God conditioned, positive, and efficacious decrees about all conditioned future contingents are to be posited, and whether, these being set aside, the aforesaid futures can in any case be certainly and infallibly known by God?
Disputatio X: On the Impossibility of Middle, or Conditional, Knowledge Drawn from Authority
Dubium I: Whether according to holy Scripture middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, is to be admitted?
Dubium II: Whether from St. Augustine's mind, as gathered from His testimonies, it is concluded that middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, is to be given?
Dubium III: Whether either according to the principles of the opponents, or absolutely and simply speaking, it is inferred from the effects of Augustine's doctrine, or from other signs, that according to his mind middle, or conditional, knowledge is to be rejected
Dubium IV: Whether, according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor as drawn from His testimonies, middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, is to be given in God?
Dubium V: Whether from certain other signs it is concluded that, according to the mind of St. Thomas, middle knowledge is not to be given?
Dubium VI: Whether middle knowledge has flowed down continually from the time of Augustine to the present, and has been approved by theologians both more recent and more ancient, and especially by those who were present at the Council of Trent
Dubium VII: Whether middle knowledge remained hidden from St. Augustine and the ancient Fathers up to the year 1560 and the older Scholastics, and was drawn forth by the later theologians from the doctrine of those same Fathers, or whether it was known and reprobated by the aforesaid ancient theologians and Scholastics?
101 Now that we have explained the preceding doubts, whether from the time of Augustine up to the present day the doctrine which establishes middle knowledge, approved continually and sufficiently commonly both by the ancients and by the later theologians, has come down to us, and we have established the part that denies it, it remains for us to explain in professed terms whether, even if it be granted that it did not have this, nevertheless from the time of Augustine up to the year 1560, in which year Fonseca says that he first discovered it, to wit, the knowledge handed down by the ancient Fathers and lying in darkness, and publicly taught in his College of Coimbra or York (although, as Herice attests in the place just referred to, he did not venture to commit it to the press), such knowledge was not, from the time of Augustine up to the aforesaid times, repudiated by the ancient scholastics, but lay hidden from them throughout that whole period, and was afterwards known to the later theologians and drawn out from the hiding-places and the entrails of Augustine and the Fathers; or whether on the contrary it was both known and repudiated by those same ancient scholastics.
And although the decision of this doubt is sufficiently clear from what was said in doubts 3, 4 and 5, where we proved that the aforesaid middle knowledge is contained in the Fathers as approved by them themselves, and consequently could not be drawn out from their bosom or their hiding-places as their own proper mind, and likewise from what was asserted in the immediately preceding doubt, it is not a little indicated that this same doctrine was repudiated by the ancient theologians; nevertheless, so that this matter may be explained more fully and appear more clearly how these three things cannot be consistent with one another, which certain of the Adversaries pile up in favour of middle knowledge, namely that it was handed down by Augustine and the Fathers, that afterwards it lay entirely hidden from the scholastics, and that at length it was dug out of the bosom of the Fathers by the later theologians; on that account we raise this doubt in detail. We shall treat of it, not, so to speak, a priori, and by examining the testimonies of the scholastics (for we shall discuss this, briefly and as far as will suffice, in the following doubt), but rather a posteriori, and from the sign.
Herice therefore, 1. part. disp. 7. cap. 10., defends the part that affirms this, and thus says, as we reported above: Who does not know that this knowledge lay hidden from the scholastics, and was dug out by ours (namely by the Fathers of the Society) from the darkness in which it lay, by diligent reading and constant perusal of the Fathers? This too Fonseca defends, as we saw recently. Now the foundation of their view can be nothing else than some of the testimonies which we adduced above from Augustine and the Fathers in favour of middle knowledge, together with the solution; and the further fact that in the ancient scholastics, and in the later ones who are not of the Fathers of the Society, no mention of this knowledge is found. For from these two principles it seems right that it follows, that this knowledge was dug out by the Fathers of the Society from the hiding-places of the Fathers, in which it was concealed.
§ I. The first assertion, and its first foundation.
102 It must be said first, however, that if it were once true that this middle knowledge is found in Augustine and the other Fathers as their own proper mind (the opposite of which we have shown in doubts 2, 3, 4 and 5), then it could not be said that the aforesaid knowledge was unknown to the scholastics who came before them and to the others who existed from the time of that same Augustine up to the year 1560; and consequently it cannot be said on any grounds that it was the later theologians of the Society who first dug it out of the entrails and hiding-places of the Fathers. This assertion is against Fonseca, Herice, and the other followers of theirs. They maintain it also the disciples of St Thomas and Suárez in the place cited, and many others referred to below.
But in order that the first and principal foundation of this assertion may be grasped, it is to be observed first that which no one can deny, namely that that treasure of middle knowledge, if it truly were the proper mind of Augustine and the other Fathers, was bound to be found in them by the Angelic Doctor: who indeed was an assiduous reader of the works of the Augustinians, a profound meditator, and one who was inseparable from the same Augustine as his disciple and a penetrator of his doctrine. For if it is once said that the Angelic Doctor did not find the aforesaid knowledge in Augustine as his own proper mind, this very fact will be morally evident proof that it is not to be found in him. And so not only Suárez, but also Herice and very many others of the Fathers of the Society, the later Molinists, strenuously contend, gathering testimonies from all sides, that the Angelic Doctor, with the intervention of this middle knowledge, harmonized created freedom with the efficacy and certainty of the acts of the divine intellect and will.
103 Secondly, it is to be noted that, once it is admitted, as it ought truly to be admitted, that this middle knowledge was discovered by St Thomas in the entrails of Augustine, if indeed it truly were in them, as the adversaries unduly claim, it is necessary also to confess that, at least in the time of St Thomas, the doctrine of Augustine concerning this controversy was known, both from the same Angelic Doctor and from others with whom the aforesaid Angelic Doctor discussed this matter, and in whose presence he publicly disputed, and that it came to light through him and through others of his contemporaries at the universities, and was committed to the press or to writing.
104 Thirdly, it is to be noted that from the time of St Thomas up to the present century, that is, from the year of our Lord 1240 up to the year 1600 roughly, or up to the year 1560 in which Fonseca attests that he found it, an unbroken succession of the most eminent theological writers flourished most abundantly, as is clear from what Bellarmine teaches in his book on the ecclesiastical writers. For up to the year 1300 flourished Alex. de Ales, Albertus Magn., ipse D. Thom. Doct. Angel., S. Bonavent., Petrus de Tarantasia, Udalricus Argentinensis, Rupertus de Ruffia, Aegidius Roman., Ricardus de Mediavilla, et Johannes Parisiensis. Ab anno Domini 1300 usque ad 1400, Johannes Scotus, Petrus Aureolus, Anton. Andreas, Durandus, Franciscus, Maironis, Hervaeus, Guillelmus, Okamus, Monaldus, Nicolaus de Lyra, Alvarus Pelagius, natione Lusitanus, Episcopus Silvensis, Petrus Palud., noster Guido, Adam Godam, noster Johannes Baccon, Rober. Olcoth, Thomas Argentinensis, Gregorius Ariminensis, Nicolaus Gorranus, Alfonsus de Bargas, Henricus de Usia. From the year of our Lord 1400 up to the year 1584, Johannes Capreolus S. Thom. fidelissimus interpres, discipulus, ac defensor, noster Thom. Uvaldens., Augustinus de Roma, Alfonsus Tostatus, S. Antoninus Florentinus, Joannes Basolis, Dionysius Carthusianus, Gabriel Biel, Marsilius, Thomas Caietanus, Franciscus Ferrariensis, Jacobus Almainus, Adrianus Sextus Summus Pontifex, Franciscus Liquetus, Sylvester, Joannes Echius, Conradus, Joannes Roffensis, Thomas Morus, qui insignem epistolam, et responsionem ad epistolam Lutheri scripsit, et pro Christo Domino occisus fuit: Joannes Gocleus, Franciscus a Victoria, Dominicus de Soto, Ambrosius Catharinus, Joannes Vincentius, Dominicus Bannez. Qui omnes de concordia creatae libertatis cum actibus intellectus, et voluntatis divinae scripserunt, scriptaque sua praelo mandarunt, vel ad primum librum Sententiarum, ubi distinctione 35. de Scientia Dei, et distinctione 45. de Voluntate Dei tractat Magister, vel ad secundum Sententiarum, vel tandem speciales tractatus de illa ediderant toto illo temporis spatio, scilicet ab anno 1240. usque ad annum 1560. vel usque ad annum fere 1600; quibus etiam annumerandi sunt alii multo plures, iique gravissimi, ac doctissimi Theologi, qui se ad scribendum non applicuerunt, quosque eodem tempore fuisse nullus negare poterit, siquidem experientia compertum est, adhuc nostro tempore, ubi commoditas imprimendi, et libido (si sic licet loqui) scribendi invaluit, multo plures ex gravissimis Theologis variis de causis ab scribendo, et sua opera praelo tradendo abstinere.
105 Lastly, it is to be noted both that among these Doctors there arose, in the time of St Thomas or thereabouts, Alens., Albert., Bonau., Angelicus ipse Aquinas, et Scotus, from whom Alensis flourished in the year 1245, Albert. Magn., S. Thom. et D. Bonav. in the year 1265, and Scotus in the year 1300; and that from these, as from fountains, there emerged the three classes of theologians which afterwards flourished and flourish, namely the Thomistae, Scotistae, et Nominales, who produced many weighty volumes in which they worked out every question, down to the most minute one pertaining to theology, and left them transmitted to posterity; and that the doctrine taught always by these preceptors and common Masters was preserved both in writing and by tradition, the Thomistic indeed among the Preachers and others, the Scotistic among the Friars Minor, and that of the Nominalists among various other Doctors.
Furthermore, what must be weighed among the Doctors referred to, over and above their already abundant number, is how great their diversity was: for some were Italians, others French, others Spaniards, others Germans, others English, others Flemings, others Swabians, of whom some were Carmelites, more Augustinians, more Franciscans, and very many Dominicans. Lastly, some of the Doctors named lived at Paris, others at Bologna, others at Salamanca, others at Louvain, others at Tübingen, others at Dillingen, others at Oxford, others at Cambridge, and then others again at other Christian academies, so that they imbued and illustrated their doctrine by their voice and their writings that the whole of their learning came, by some right of succession and inheritance, to almost the entire Church, in accordance with that saying: How much he charged our fathers to make known to their children, that another generation may know the children who shall be born and rise up; and they shall tell their own children.
106 These things having been supposed, the following conclusion is deduced from them in support of the assertion. For if the Angelic Doctor found this middle knowledge, with a view to reconciling the efficacy of the acts of the divine intellect and will with created freedom, as his own proper mind of the same Augustine, and it was likewise known to those Doctors and Masters with whom he himself publicly disputed and lived, such as Bonaventure and others (in accordance with what we said in the first observation above); then it was necessary that in that common and most famous university, where all these Doctors lived, this knowledge should be present as the mind of Augustine and the Fathers, most well known, and that public mention and knowledge of it should be had by them; hence it was also necessary that either this same mind of Augustine and the Fathers should be passed on by the succeeding Doctors and Masters as something approved by those same Masters and derived to their own disciples too, or at least that they should make public mention of it: since it is incredible that they should have so neglected the mind of Augustine as expounded by St Thomas that they not only did not embrace it, but did not even make mention of it.
The same is said, in proportion, of the disciples of these other Doctors, and so of the rest in the course of time already described, as succeeding one another there: for the mind of Augustine, taught publicly by St Thomas, would have been proclaimed by his disciples, especially by the Dominicans, who had received it from him there both by living voice and in writing, and would have been diffused by all the Doctors of that university, because of the enduring memory of the Angelic Doctor, which prevailed there with the stronger right; and consequently, if this middle knowledge was once of the mind of Augustine and the Fathers, and was taught by St Thomas, and was received, or at least known, by his contemporaries, it could not have been unknown to all these theologians of that university; hence it was also necessary, according to the Adversaries, that the aforesaid mind of Augustine and of St Thomas should be middle knowledge, known to nearly all the other Doctors of the other universities throughout that whole period.
107 This final conclusion follows clearly from the two last observations adduced in support of this argument. For from the very fact that this was the mind of Augustine and of St Thomas, publicly taught by the same Angelic Doctor and by Bonaventure and the other contemporary Masters, or at least known to them, it was necessary that, for no brief time, throughout the whole Dominican family dispersed over almost all the universities and over so many parts of the Church, the voice should be the same, and the consensus the same in this respect: since all Dominicans regarded the Angelic Doctor as an oracle, and the Holy Spirit as, so to speak, his instrument; and consequently because this same mind was diffused by them in the universities and in other places. The same is said of the Franciscan Fathers, though in proportion, as also of all the disciples of St Thomas and of the other Doctors of that university, who had come thither from diverse and very many places and were afterwards dispersed again through the same places, and betook themselves to various universities in order to teach theology publicly there (as commonly happens). Yet while that whole time elapsed from St Thomas up to the year 1560, there passed away (as we said in the third observation) so many, and such eminent theologians, scattered through so many provinces and so many universities, whom we said to have written on this matter, and who could have had knowledge of this, of the Parisians, and especially of St Thomas, in accordance with the doctrine of Augustine; and that they received the aforesaid knowledge is more than credible, on account of the extreme gravity of this difficulty, or of this reconciliation of human freedom with divine knowledge and will, which always weighed on the minds of all and is always on the lips of all theologians: as is sufficiently clear from what we see has happened in our own time about this same difficulty; hence it is incredible that this knowledge of middle knowledge, taught by St Thomas out of the mind of Augustine according to the Adversaries, and either wholly acceptable to the whole university of Paris or at least known to it, by which, according to the same Adversaries, this reconciliation of created freedom with the acts of the divine intellect and will is so clearly established, should not have reached the aforesaid Doctors scattered through almost all the universities: hence it will also be incredible that the knowledge of the aforesaid middle knowledge, which the mind of Augustine and St Thomas, so celebrated, and so well fitted to resolve so celebrated a difficulty, would have been transmitted in an unbroken succession through all the aforesaid theologians, succeeding one another in turn, who sent their writings to the press about this controversy. Indeed, it is even incredible that they themselves, being so learned and so practised, should not have drawn it out from the writings of Augustine, of St Thomas and of the other Doctors of Paris. Especially since what is taught publicly in the scholastic manner about some controversy is always so distinctly and clearly set forth that anyone who is not slow-witted can easily follow the meaning of the Master.
108 This is confirmed first by what we said in the last observation. For since out of St Thomas and out of those Doctors and Masters enumerated in the aforesaid observation there emerged those three so celebrated schools, namely those of the Thomists, the Scotists and the Nominalists, which preserved even the most minute particulars of what they received from their own fountains, and which were scattered through all the universities, it follows that, if St Thomas, the prince of his Thomistic school, once handed down this middle knowledge from Augustine, and Scotus taught it, or at least had knowledge of it, namely he who was St Thomas's contemporary, or very nearly so (which we say in like manner of Alexander of Hales), this same mind and opinion must have been known to the aforesaid schools and preserved in them. Especially since this does not pertain to the most minute questions, but to a most celebrated controversy, which has always pressed, presses, and will press upon the wits of all ages.
109 This is confirmed secondly. Because if this middle knowledge is once found in St Thomas as his own and as the mind of Augustine, it will follow that all those most grave theologians whom we have mentioned, who existed from the time of St Thomas up to the time of Fonseca, in whose hands the works of St Thomas were handled frequently, especially the Dominicans, who assiduously occupy themselves with the reading of St Thomas by the bond of their profession and by many other titles, and strive to defend his doctrine with the most ardent affection of heart and with all their strength, and to teach it continually throughout all the universities of the Christian world and to transfuse it into the minds of all, either did not understand their own holy Doctor, or so neglected his opinion about this controversy, which so presses upon the minds of all, that they did not even wish to make any mention of it; since this is utterly incredible, it follows likewise that there can be no doubt that this doctrine about middle knowledge (if it truly were of the mind of Augustine and St Thomas) was transmitted continually, in word and in writing, through the aforesaid theologians and Doctors down to the time of Fonseca; and consequently it is evident from all of these things that those things which the adversaries assert cannot be consistent with one another, namely that this middle knowledge is of the mind of Augustine and of St Thomas and of the other Fathers, and nevertheless that from the time of Augustine up to the year 1560 it lay hidden from the ancient scholastics, and was dug out by the later ones, that is by the Fathers of the Society, from the entrails of the Fathers, in which it was hidden.
§ II. The second foundation is proposed in support of the same first assertion.
110 In order, however, that the second and fundamental argument in favour of this same first assertion be set out, it must be presupposed that, although the harmony and the reconciliation of human freedom with divine knowledge and with the predeterminations, applied to supernatural predestination and to the acts ordered towards its end, namely supernatural beatitude, is proper to the Christian Religion and to the Church, and before the Incarnation regarded the Synagogue, which according to the sacred scriptures acknowledged supernatural beatitude to be obtained by supernatural works; nevertheless, because the weight of this difficulty does not arise from the supernaturality of divine providence or of our works, but from the indispensable dependence of the aforesaid works in being, in being made, and in being preserved upon divine providence, and from the great certainty and infallibility of the latter with respect to the freedom of our acts, even if they are considered within the natural order (both of which the natural light shows), it follows that the divine providence, involving the infallible knowledge of God and the unimpeded decrees of his will, has afflicted and weighed upon the whole span of every man's life.
111 Hence, weighed down by the weight of the aforesaid difficulty, the pagan Philosophers of old denied divine providence with respect to these lower things, and thus (as Augustine said of Cicero) that they might make men free, they made them sacrilegious.
Others, however, on the contrary, so as to profess God to be all-knowing, all-determining and all-providing, left men almost without experience of brute liberty. Of their number were Simon Magus, the Manichaeans, and other ancients, whom the Lutherans and Calvinists follow, with new errors added. And in the same way our Uvaldensis speaks, tom. 1. doctrinal fidei antiquae lib. 1. art. 1. cap. 26.: From the beginning of the rising Church men have gathered together most wise questions about this highest foreknowledge of God, wonderful as they are, and indeed many have failed while searching, searching out their investigations. And in the same book and article, cap. 22., treating of the heresy of Wycliff and exposing its antiquity, he says: In the time of Saint James there broke out, through certain — pseudo — men among the people of the Jewish dispersion, who was then faithful; for they said that God necessitated men to sin through certain private inspirations, which they called the hidden temptations of God; against whom James wrote, saying: No one when he is tempted, etc. And finally the ancient Fathers and Doctors, especially St Augustine, did not sweat a little in the explaining of this controversy; nor did they fight manfully against the heretics in its defence; nor did they achieve so signal a victory over the same in it.
112 These things having been supposed, the following argument is formed in support of the assertion. Because it cannot rightly be consistent with itself that this middle knowledge should have lain hidden from the scholastic Doctors who lived from the time of Augustine and of the Fathers older than he, up to the year already named, that is, 1560; and that nevertheless the aforesaid knowledge be contained in the bosom and the hiding-places of the Fathers; hence such knowledge did not lie hidden from the aforesaid scholastics, and was dug out of the ends and hiding-places of the holy Fathers by the later Scholastics and theologians. The conclusion seems clear. The antecedent, however, is argued from the following discourse. For it is incredible that a great multitude of grave and wise men should fall into so great a laziness and inertness, and lie there in it for so long a time, as to let slip and perish, so to speak out of their hands, that thing which they long sought after and investigated with great labour and anxiety in order to resolve a most grave difficulty and a most pressing controversy, which weighed so heavily on all the ages of men, and which, once found and frequently needed, they let slip, so to speak, and suffer to perish, so that no memory or knowledge of it is preserved for several centuries, at least by use itself and by tradition, as daily experience sufficiently attests in the case of other things necessary or very useful for human life; whereas the more grave wits of all the ages labored strenuously to reconcile the efficacy and the certainty of the divine acts with human freedom, as for a very difficult thing, and one most necessary for the shaping of human manners, as is clear from the observation recently proposed; hence it will be incredible that that way of reconciliation, which the ancient Fathers attained, and which was committed to posterity by the press or by their writings, and which was frequently necessary and very useful both for meeting heretics who denied divine providence and human freedom, and for quieting the temptations by which, on this point, even very Catholic and pious men are often afflicted, as also for understanding better many other difficulties, should have lain given up to oblivion through so many centuries, down to our own times, or down to the period already assigned, that is, up to the year 1560; hence, according to the Adversaries against whom we fight, if this way and this method of reconciliation which the Fathers used, and which they left to posterity, were to be brought about through the intervention of middle knowledge, it is incredible that it lay hidden through all the aforesaid centuries from all the theologians and scholastics; and consequently these two things cannot be consistent with one another, namely that the aforesaid knowledge was unknown to the ancient scholastics from those times onwards, and that it is truly contained in those same Fathers.
113 This argument is confirmed. Because if what the aforesaid authors intend is true, then both that very long oblivion of this ancient doctrine, and that the volumes of Augustine and of the other Fathers, in which this doctrine is said to be found frequently, were read by no diligent, learned and careful man through so many centuries, or understood by no one, are necessary; which is utterly incredible in itself, and very injurious to the venerable antiquity of the scholastics, as also to the many Fathers who lived after the time of Augustine and of the other Fathers, among whom were Anselm and Bernard, who published special books on foreknowledge, predestination, the grace of God, and the free choice of man, to be reconciled with them. Who, therefore, even if he strives studiously to persuade himself of it, will be able to believe that these (to pass over the other Fathers) and the other scholastics never found this treasure, discovered by Augustine and the other ancient Fathers and recorded in their writings (as the Adversaries say), and so necessary for establishing and defending the doctrine of the faith and for the shaping of men's manners, either by the reading of the ancient Fathers, or by any tradition, or by any special illumination of God?
114 It is confirmed, then. For did the Fathers of the Council of Trent find this treasure of middle knowledge in Augustine and the Fathers, or not? That they did not find it cannot be said, if (as the Adversaries, though unduly, will have it) this treasure was hidden in the hiding-places and the entrails of the Fathers, and if according to the opinion of those same Adversaries it is altogether necessary for reconciling the freedom of created choice with the acts of the divine intellect and will. Since when those Fathers were gathered together in the Holy Spirit to set forth this agreement, and intended and ought to explain it from the mind of the holy Fathers, and when so grave and so great a necessity was pressing upon them, and finally when the whole Church of God urgently poured forth prayers to God for this light, it is incredible that the Holy Spirit should have denied them a true knowledge, in this respect, of Augustine and the other Fathers; and consequently that they should not have found that treasure of middle knowledge, which is held to be uniquely necessary for the aforesaid agreement, if it truly were found in the holy Fathers.
If, however, the first alternative is said, we ask again whether those Fathers learned it in the special council by some revelation, so that they were previously entirely ignorant of this middle knowledge, or whether they had knowledge of it beforehand. The first cannot be said: for, as is clear from what was said in doubt 6, the aforesaid Fathers of the council did not use this middle knowledge in order to reconcile created freedom with the acts of the divine intellect and will. But if they had recognized it there by some special revelation, there could be no doubt that they would have used it for the aforesaid1 purpose; hence necessarily the second must be said; and consequently, by the same reasoning, this knowledge would be as well known to the other theologians of that age from the year 1545, in which the council began, onwards, as to the others older than they, existing from the time of Augustine. This final conclusion, as to its first part, that is, as regards the theologians contemporary with the Fathers of the council, is sufficiently established. For those Fathers were gathered from almost the whole Church; and so that which was known to them as theologians of that age, namely that this treasure of middle knowledge is to be found in Augustine and in the holy Fathers older than he, could not have been unknown to other contemporary theologians, with whom they lived in the same universities and in other places, and conversed frequently.
115 As to the second part, however, that is, as regards the other theologians from the time of Augustine onwards, this too is established. First, because, if this middle knowledge was known both to the Fathers of the council and to their contemporaries as being the mind of Augustine and of the Fathers older than he, it would be so for this reason, that they received it from their own masters; since, according to the common course of things, what is contained in Augustine and commonly known is commonly received from the masters, as is clear from the other truths contained in Augustine and commonly known. And since the same reasoning holds of these masters of those Fathers and theologians, their contemporaries, and so of the others ascending up to St Thomas, and indeed even up to Augustine, it follows that the aforesaid knowledge, if it was once the mind of Augustine, was not a little known to the ancient theologians. Especially because the nearer this ascent approaches the time of Augustine, the greater force it has in this respect, namely that the mind of Augustine was better known to the theologians of that age.
Furthermore: because what the Fathers of the Council of Trent and the other theologians contemporary with them found in Augustine, to wit, middle knowledge, could not have arisen from elsewhere, unless they themselves were learned men, who consequently were able to apprehend the mind of St Augustine; hence, since so many most learned men preceded them, as is evident from itself and is further established from what was said for the first foundation of this assertion, it follows that this middle knowledge, if it was once of Augustine, was known to the older theologians; and consequently it cannot be consistent that middle knowledge should be of the mind of Augustine and of the Fathers, and that the later theologians of the Society were the first to deduce it, lying in darkness, from that same Augustine and from the Fathers.
116 All of these things can be elucidated, if we compare the time in which Fonseca attests that he first found it in the Fathers with the time in which the Council of Trent, where this controversy had already been discussed, was held. For, as Fonseca likewise attests, this knowledge was discovered by him in the aforesaid Fathers in the year of our Lord 1560, in which year the Fathers of the Council of Trent were still assembled at the same council. For that council began under Paul III in the year 1545, and was not dissolved at all until the year 1563, up to which year it continued under different popes, namely Paul III, Julius III and Pius IV. Indeed it is most difficult to believe that, at the time when the Fathers were gathered in the Council of Trent by the Holy Spirit, chiefly among other things to reconcile against Luther created freedom with the divine acts, the true understanding of Augustine and of the Fathers should have been denied them (from whom, as from the organs by which the Holy Spirit speaks, this knowledge, if it truly were in them as the same Adversaries will have it, had to be learned, being altogether necessary for such a reconciliation); that, the same Fathers of the council being left behind where so great a necessity was pressing, where heavenly light was so earnestly begged for, where the cause of the whole Church was being pursued in common, where the Holy Spirit had promised to set himself, then that same divine Spirit should have flown to the college of Coimbra or York of the Fathers of the Society (so to speak), and there should have disclosed to some peculiar theologian among them (although otherwise most learned) a true understanding, so recondite as they themselves say, of Augustine and of the Fathers, in this respect, and should have revealed that treasure hidden in them and discovered by no one after the aforesaid time: truly this is most difficult to believe, and is outside the common course and manner of divine providence, as is evident from itself.
§ III. A corollary worthy of note.
117 From which, as we say this incidentally, it follows that Molina did not speak well in his original harmony when he said that this middle knowledge is very necessary for reconciling created freedom with the acts of the divine intellect and will, and that it was first discovered by him, and was unknown to the Fathers. We do not rise against the necessity and the novelty of this middle knowledge (if it truly is new, as Molina, Granado and other Jesuits frankly confess) on the ground that any new doctrine merely on the title of novelty deserves so little, since we know that, for new things, a new doctrine deduced from common principles must be newly devised and applied; but on the ground that in this controversy this novelty cannot be admitted. For since in this doubt have been set out the antiquity and the difficulty of this controversy, and of this reconciliation, and since the Philosophers of old, and afterwards in the earlier centuries of the primitive Church the more grave Fathers and Doctors, namely Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, Hilary and Prosper, contended to overcome it against the heretics, who favoured human liberty too much, whom the Fathers, convicted in fact of falsity and of heresy, condemned in the councils of Orange and of Milan, approved by the Holy Apostolic See; it would follow that all those Fathers, among whom Augustine excelled, and the whole Church of God, ignorant of the middle knowledge newly introduced by these later men according to their own mind, and consequently also ignorant of the harmony of human freedom with the acts of the divine intellect and will (since this harmony, that is, the aforesaid knowledge, is judged impossible by the aforesaid later men), had in fact not satisfied the heretics who alleged the aforesaid incompatibility of freedom with the divine acts, and consequently that the heretics, considered with respect to the force of argument in this controversy, would have been superior and victorious, but with respect to authority and power only inferior, and would have remained vanquished: but this seems injurious both to those Fathers and Doctors, and to the whole Church of God, and to antiquity, as also to divine providence, which always seasonably assists the Church militant and struggling with the heretics. Hence it was rightly, and piously, said by Master Luna, in the manuscript additions to 3. part. art. 3., that he would rather be ignorant of middle knowledge with Augustine than to hold it with Molina.
118 We do indeed confess that divine providence distributes its gifts in such a way that it always reserves what is to be conferred for as long as the Church struggles on earth. For it is for this reason that the Moon is compared to one receiving increments of light day by day until it reaches its fullness, according to that saying, Beautiful as the moon. Nor do we deny that the sacred Society of Jesus is most apt for this through its own members. But it does not seem compatible with divine providence, which touches from end to end and strongly and sweetly disposes all things, that it should have denied to its own Church, and to the aforesaid Fathers in the councils already mentioned, fighting against the heretics in so pressing a necessity, for the sake of its own divine glory and the defence of the Catholic faith, the one unique way of reconciling; otherwise those same Fathers, and the whole Church, would have remained humbled and genuinely confounded before the heretics, and derided by them, and God would have left his own doctrine and the Catholic faith destitute of the necessary defence in so grave a matter. Yet Christ the Lord promised to that same Church: For it will be given to you in that hour what you shall say. But what hour can that be, unless the one in which the adversaries press, and the Church anxiously asks of the Father of lights, who gives to all abundantly, and who gives food in due season, for the bread of sacred doctrine and the way of escaping the deceitful snares and traps of the heretics? What, beyond doubt, was that hour in which heresies were pressing and the Fathers of the Church were gathered in the councils by papal authority, to meet the heretics and to dissolve their fallacious arguments.
Hence it does not seem how that word which was said of the Church by Christ the Lord, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it, would have been fulfilled, if the heretics had prevailed, considered with respect to the force of argument, over the whole Church gathered in the councils; and finally, by what means could it be consistent with the sweetness and the right ordering of divine providence, that this method of reconciliation, uniquely necessary, which the whole Church had hidden in the time of such great necessity and danger, should afterwards have been opened to the later Jesuits?
§ IV. The two later assertions.
119 It must be said secondly that, if we speak absolutely and simply, without any supposition having been made, then it must necessarily be admitted that the ancient scholastics knew middle knowledge, that is, conditional knowledge. Thus the disciples of St Thomas.
This assertion is to be understood with the precision which the word knew conveys. For we do not mean by it that the aforesaid theologians recognized and approved the aforesaid knowledge, but only that they recognized it. Whether, however, they approved it or reprobated it, we shall state in the following assertion. And from what we asserted above in the preceding disputations it is not a little clear.
And although the proof of this assertion is sufficiently clear from what was said for the preceding one, and from what we brought forward in the second doubt of this disputation; nevertheless, for the sake of greater clarity, we shall deduce the following argument in its support from those things. Because it is certain and clear that, whoever unfolds the works of St Augustine and of St Prosper, his contemporary, with ordinary care and ordinary ability — especially the passages which we referred to in the cited doubt, in which the Pelagians and the Semi-Pelagians admitted middle knowledge, that is, conditional knowledge, although they afterwards differed from the Catholic authors, who recently began to admit it again, in its use; — hence, since it is incredible that those most grave theologians, whom we have numbered at 104, who published so many treatises on the reconciliation of created freedom with the efficacy of the acts of the divine intellect and will, did not consult St Augustine in the more common and more perspicuous passages, nor St Prosper; it follows that the aforesaid scholastics knew this middle knowledge. The conclusion seems sufficiently clear.
The antecedent, however, is clear from what was said in the place cited. Because, in order that the Pelagians and the Semi-Pelagians might save predestination, and likewise that grace be given on merits, even to little children who died before the use of reason and with Baptism, they said two things. The first, in which they expressly confessed middle knowledge, was that, before the decree of the efficacious will of God, he foreknew that those children dying with Baptism, if they should reach adult age, would work well. The second (which is not relevant at present) was that, on account of works thus foreknown, they were predestined by God, and the grace of Baptism was given to them. These two things, however, are so clear and so obvious to everyone in Augustine and in Prosper that it conflicts with reason that anyone should unfold the aforesaid passages with ordinary care and ability and not grasp them, as will be clear to one who looks into the matter.
120 It must be said thirdly that the aforesaid ancient scholastics not only recognized middle knowledge, but also, with everything weighed, reprobated it: and consequently they knew it as a knowledge to be reprobated. Thus all Thomists in common. This assertion is sufficiently clear from what was said for the preceding one, and from what we said in the preceding doubts of this disputation. Because, as we recently asserted, this middle knowledge was known to the aforesaid ancient theologians: and all, or nearly all, of them reconciled created freedom with the efficacy of the acts of the divine intellect and will without the intervention of the aforesaid knowledge; hence, weighing everything, they reprobated it. The minor is clear. Because in none, or nearly none, of the aforesaid scholastics will the aforesaid reconciliation be found with the intervention of middle knowledge, as will be clear to one who looks into the matter, and as will be made still clearer from what we shall show in the following doubt.
The conclusion, however, is proved. Because since this controversy about reconciling created freedom with the acts of the intellect and of the will of God is so very difficult, and has so pressed upon the wits of all the ages, it seems incredible that the ancient scholastics, conscious of middle knowledge, did not use it for this reconciliation, if they truly felt that such knowledge was to be given; since all who admit it believe that it very perspicuously and expeditiously saves created freedom and harmonizes it with the aforesaid acts of God, and therefore it is incredible that they did not use it to save this most grave difficulty. Just as it would be incredible that the Fathers of the Society, when granting it, should pass it over in silence when they treat of this reconciliation, so as in no way to assert that it is necessary or useful for this harmony; and consequently all those men, with the single exception of Vásquez, use it for the aforesaid reconciliation. Hence this omission and this silence, which in other matters would be only negative proof, has here, all things weighed, and proceeding morally and in a human manner, the force of positive argument, and also of positive reprobation of this middle knowledge.
121 The same assertion is proved secondly from what we said above. For when this middle knowledge was first published by Molina and publicly approved by him, it at once moved the minds of nearly all, and so displeased the Dominican theologians that they referred it to the judges of the faith: hence it is a sign that the aforesaid middle knowledge (otherwise known) was commonly reprobated by those same theologians. The conclusion is clear. Because since it had already been known to them, as is clear from the preceding assertion, it would not have so moved men's minds unless it had been reprobated at the same time, and, as a doctrine commonly rejected, already abandoned. For it is clear that whenever something is said about some very grave difficulty, which has pressed on all minds, this common reprobation of the theologians, which existed at that time, sufficiently indicates that there was the same consensus among the ancient theologians from whom they had successively received theological doctrine, as may be seen by an induction made in other similar difficulties.
122 And this second argument can be confirmed and elucidated not a little, if we compare what happened when Master Báñez, of the Dominican family (whom some of the Adversaries, though unduly, now call the discoverer of the absolute divine predeterminations, efficacious from themselves, and prior to the foreseen consent), sent his commentaries on the first part of St Thomas to the press: where he rejects middle knowledge; and what happened when Molina committed his middle knowledge to the press. Because the aforesaid doctrine of Master Báñez preceded Molina's harmony by the space of five years: as is clear from the commentaries of both authors first committed to the press. For Báñez's commentaries on the first part, where Knowledge, Will, Providence and Predestination are treated, were printed at Salamanca in the year of our Lord 1584, and came out. Molina's harmony, on the other hand, first came out at Lisbon in the year 1589 at the earliest: but experience itself has established that throughout that whole five-year period the aforesaid commentaries of Báñez contained, as anyone could see, no new, let alone dangerous, doctrine, and were much less referred to the judges of the faith, as Molina's harmony was, in respect of his middle knowledge, which we shall say at number 124; on the contrary, they were in very frequent use and held in great approval among theologians; hence there can be no doubt that this five-year silence, joined to the very frequent use and approval of those commentaries, is the greatest sign of a doctrine that is not new, but one that ran on continually among the ancient theologians and was received in all the Christian universities; and that therefore it did not excite admiration on account of its novelty (since no passion arises from what is customary); just as, for the opposite reason, from Molina's doctrine about middle knowledge a not small affect of admiration at once arose (not because the knowledge of such a knowledge was new; but because favouring it, admitting it, and introducing it into the schools as something to be received was quite new).
123 This same point is explained further. Because the whole order of Preachers, abounding in so many most grave and most learned theologians, not only did not repudiate but even embraced the aforesaid commentaries of their own Báñez, which admit absolute and efficacious divine predeterminations, prior to the foreseen consent of created will, while preserving its freedom, and deny middle knowledge; and they admitted them not just any how, but as a doctrine thoroughly Thomistic, revealing the mind of St Thomas, finding them confirmed by the common judgment of all; hence it is morally an evident sign that the doctrine of those commentaries was by no means newly introduced into the Dominican family, but had been accepted and used continually by their forefathers down to those times; unless someone wishes to say that all those Masters of the Dominican family, so many in number and so great in wisdom, gravity and holiness, and moreover so diverse, namely as being dispersed throughout the whole Christian world, denied themselves and abandoned their own knowledge, which they had received from their forefathers and which they had taught up to that time, in order to subscribe with unanimous consent to the doctrine of Báñez as it came forth anew, and to commend it under the false title of Thomistic doctrine. Who does not see how incredibly this is said?
124 It is added, firstly, that, if the doctrine of the absolute divine predeterminations, efficacious from themselves and held prior to the foreseen consent of created freedom, and denying middle knowledge, was new, and newly introduced by Báñez; what other doctrine, we ask, was used about this controversy by the theologians, both Dominicans and others, before that year 1584 in which Báñez's commentaries appeared (a controversy which was always agitated, as was shown above)? But they will not dare to say that it was the doctrine about middle knowledge; for when the knowledge predicted by Molina was first published, all theologians were moved, as about something new, in the sense stated at number 122, especially the Dominicans, contemporaries of Báñez, and several of them older than Báñez himself, so thought of it that they judged it to contain, in some measure, suspect doctrine (in their own opinion, of which nevertheless we made nothing, as we did at number 92) to be referred to the supreme judge of the Church. Indeed the Fathers of the Society themselves, with whom we are now disputing, expressly assert and glory in the Lord that they discovered this middle knowledge of that kind, or dug it out from the ancient hiding-places of the Fathers; but that they did not receive it from other theologians, especially from the Dominicans who immediately preceded them; hence the aforesaid theologians, both Dominicans and others, used another doctrine distinct from middle knowledge before that year 1584 in this most grave controversy; but such a doctrine was not different from, or adverse to, that which Báñez taught on this matter. Then, because no trace remains in the Dominican family of the doctrine opposed to the aforesaid doctrine preceding that year 1584 and used among so many and so great theologians and Dominicans and handed on to their disciples, neither in the manuscripts, nor in the writings committed to the press, nor in the voices of the disciples who followed those ancient Masters; on the contrary, the doctrine of predeterminations, absolute in themselves, prior to the foreseen consent of created will, and denying middle knowledge, is received, commended and proclaimed as ancient and uniquely Thomistic by all the Dominicans unanimously and by many other theologians. Then too, because otherwise this doctrine of Báñez would not have been so readily, and with such unanimous consent, admitted by the aforesaid Dominicans; since experience shows that they never admit with unanimous consent a doctrine contrary to their own school; nay, they guard the sound doctrine so zealously that, if anyone among them ever deviated from it, they would refer him to the judges of the faith.
125 All of these things, as well as those which in the preceding doubts we deduced from moral conjectures, although they do not demonstrate by metaphysical demonstration that which we intend, so that the opposite involves a contradiction, yet they do prove that, if this matter is to be treated morally and in a human manner, and according to moral conjectures, and according to that which commonly, and for the most part, occurs, then it must be said that this doctrine about middle knowledge is neither held nor approved among the Fathers, nor among the aforesaid ancient scholastics, nor among the Thomists, whether ancient or later; but rather is reprobated by all of them. But with these things standing, we do not on that account, or on account of the other things which we have said, visit any censure upon the opposite opinion. Because, so that it may not be unworthy of it, it is enough that so many of the later Adversaries of the Society of Jesus, and some other theologians of this age, who nevertheless are outside the school of St Thomas, defend it.