Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

94 This difficulty can be resolved in two ways. Firstly indeed, by bringing forward the testimonies of the Fathers and theologians who came forth in the course of time under the title just set out. Secondly, however, by producing signs and probable conjectures, by which a posteriori (as they say) it is shown that middle knowledge did not have that perpetual flux and approval from the older scholastics down to these our own times. Of these two ways, we shall use the latter one for the knot of this difficulty, because it is better adapted to treat that matter more clearly and more agreeably: whereas of the former we shall have to make use below in the last difficulty, briefly indeed, and in summary.

§ I. The first assertion.

It must be said, firstly, that middle knowledge did not flow on perpetually from the time of Augustine down to these our own times; so that it was not approved with sufficient common consent by theologians, both ancient and later, existing in the course of this period of time. This assertion is set up among others against Suarez, vol. 1, de Gratia, proleg. 2, and his other followers, inasmuch as he contends that middle knowledge flowed on perpetually from the time of Augustine down to his own times, and was approved by both earlier and later theologians. And so in the same place, cap. 1, num. 12, he says thus: This opinion, then, namely that which establishes middle knowledge, far surpasses in the authority of theologians, not only the later but even the ancient scholastics, the opposite view: wherefore no one can call it new, unless he has either not read the ancients, or has preferred to dispute about the names rather than about the things. Moreover, our assertion is supported by Vasquez, 1, part, q. 14, disp. 67, cap. 4, at the end, in these words: That the ancient scholastics who have written up to now have had in mind only simple knowledge, of understanding and of vision, matters little: for they did not debate at all, or take account of, this knowledge under a condition, and so forth. What then if we posit another, of which they themselves made no mention, nor did they deny? Herice, 1, part, disp. 7, cap. 10, in these words: Who does not know that this middle knowledge lay hidden from the scholastics, and was drawn out from the darkness in which it lay hidden by ours, that is, by the Fathers of the Society, by their diligent use of the Fathers and their constant reading? Fonseca, 6, Metaphys., cap. 2, q. 8; Molina in his concordia, given to the press in the year 1588, where he very openly confesses with some fear, however, that this knowledge was entirely new, and was known neither to the theologians nor to the Fathers, and least of all to Augustine.

And most recently Granado of the same Society, 1, part, q. 14, art. 13, tract. 5, disp. 3, sect. 2, where, after he has said that this middle knowledge is to be given, he adds: Nor is it a wonder if, with the passing of time, something new has been thought out by the later theologians. And lastly the same assertion is supported by several very weighty theologians, whom we shall mention in the last difficulty: although both we and those Doctors, by a different route than the Fathers of the Society recently mentioned, proceed in denying that perpetual flux and that common approval of the scholastics with respect to middle knowledge, as will be clear from what is to be said.

95 The assertion is proved. For it is incredible that the Dominican theologians, most pious and most wise, should have fallen into that delusion and folly, so that when the doctrine about middle knowledge was first published by Molina, they should have accused it before the judges of the faith, if this doctrine had been derived perpetually from the ancient theologians from the time of Augustine down to the times of Molina, and had consequently been known to all the academies, and sufficiently commonly received by the same, and handed down to their hearers (among whom are also to be counted the Dominican Fathers preceding Master Bannez, whom some of the Fathers of the Society call the first discoverer of the divine predefinitions efficacious in themselves). Indeed, if things had been so arranged, they would have deservedly brought that doctrine before all the theologians of the whole world, to be derided by all, and held as fools, or rash and most shameless accusers; and all would at once have cried out against them, and imposed a great silence upon so great and such folly and shamelessness, with great confusion and disgrace to themselves. Whence either all those, together with the same Fonseca, Molina, Vazquez, Granado, Herice, and the other Fathers of the Society who hold for our assertion, were ignorant of the antiquity and of the doctrine most celebrated in the academies before them, and handed down perpetually, and flourishing at that time, and besides all the rest, theologians of every profession who did not at once rise up against the Dominicans, as against malicious dissemblers in a matter so grave, or as ignorant and fools, would have had to be accused and condemned; or it must be granted that the antiquity and perpetuity of the doctrine about middle knowledge, intended by Suarez, is incredible.

But since that first alternative is very injurious to the whole family of Preachers, and likewise in great part to the Society of Jesus, and even to the theologians of the whole world, and is incredible of itself, it will follow that this second one is to be chosen; and consequently that the doctrine about middle knowledge did not flow on perpetually from antiquity down to these times, so that it was sufficiently commonly approved both by the later and by the ancient theologians.

96 It is confirmed, on the supposition of what we said in dub. 3, that is, that when the doctrine of Molina, with respect to this knowledge, was brought before Clement VIII, the aforesaid Pontiff then appointed thirty very weighty men for the discussion of this cause, who together with himself were to assist him. On that supposition the following confirmation is framed. For if the doctrine about middle knowledge had been sufficiently commonly approved by the ancient theologians, and had flowed down perpetually in the Church from the aforesaid antiquity down to our own times, it would follow that the Roman Pontiff (as is his custom), on the advice of the Cardinals, and also of the theologians, would have admitted, and would have decreed to be treated at length and earnestly with his own person assisting, the denunciation or accusation made against this doctrine about middle knowledge, which was set forth so clearly and so frequently (as Suarez wishes) by the holy Fathers in so grave a matter, and was received sufficiently commonly and perpetually in the Church of God by its Doctors and theologians: in no way could he have rebuked such accusers as manifest calumniators, and as men thinking ill, in so grave a matter, of the antiquity and the quite perpetual doctrine of the Fathers and theologians, and still flourishing strongly at that time, ¹ which indeed, as is clear of itself, cannot be said.

And also those thirty very weighty men (of whom we spoke in dub. 3) who, by order of Clement VIII, came together at Rome, with the intervention of the Pontiff himself, over several sessions, to examine this controversy: and all of them, with one or two exceptions, after a mature discussion came to that opinion, that they judged the aforesaid doctrine about middle knowledge to be opposed to the doctrine of the Holy Fathers, Augustine and St. Thomas, and that they had proceeded with folly, and with great ignorance of an antiquity and a doctrine then flourishing exceedingly, in a matter so grave: indeed, they were ignorant of that which is contained so frequently and so clearly (as Suarez wishes) in the books of the aforesaid Fathers and of all those theologians, and (which is still worse) they understood their doctrine so un favourably, that they thought this middle knowledge to be opposed to them; but this cannot be admitted, as is clear of itself; therefore it will necessarily have to be confessed that this doctrine about middle knowledge did not flow on perpetually and continuously from the aforesaid time down to these our own times, so that it was sufficiently commonly approved both by the later and by the ancient theologians.

§ II. The second assertion.

97 It must be said, secondly, that this doctrine about middle knowledge was not approved by the Fathers of the Council of Trent, but rather, as we have already explained, was at least virtually reprobated. The assertion is proved on the supposition that the Council of Trent was, among other things, principally summoned in the year of the Lord 1545, at the instance of Charles V, Roman Emperor, and of the other Catholic princes, by Paul III, Supreme Pontiff, for the sake of putting an end to the heresy of Luther, who was destroying the freedom of created choice. And Luther was moved to destroy it by this enthymeme: God from eternity foresaw absolutely and efficaciously decreed those things which come to pass in time: therefore all things happen from absolute necessity: and consequently without any contingency and without freedom. On these suppositions, then, the following argument is framed. For the Fathers of the Council of Trent, summoned above all to compose against Luther the freedom of created choice concordantly with the divine knowledge and the predefinitions of the divine will, did not use this middle knowledge: therefore it is a very urgent sign that they did not admit the aforesaid knowledge, and therefore that they at least virtually reprobated it. The first consequence is clear from the antecedent. For if they had admitted it, they would certainly have used it for the aforesaid task. Then, because as many as admit it use it for the aforesaid concordance: and consequently the same thing would have happened to the aforesaid Fathers, if they had admitted it. And also because all who establish it believe that created freedom, or divine freedom, is not thereby removed; but rather that without any ambiguity, and very clearly, by it is explained how neither the knowledge nor the decrees of God remove the freedom of created choice, as we explained from their opinion in the preceding difficulties. And so, if the Fathers of the Council had admitted this knowledge, and had felt that created freedom was so clearly reconciled by it with the divine acts, it seems very credible that they would have used it for this task, which was at hand, and for which above all they were summoned. Whence the argument in this part is a negative argument, considering all that has already been said, and at least a virtually positive argument, for believing that the aforesaid Fathers of the Council did not admit such a knowledge, but rather rejected it as false.

98 The antecedent, however, is proved. First, because Molina himself confesses in his first concordia that, inasmuch as he asserts that his mode of reconciliation by means of the aforesaid knowledge was not handed down by anyone, as is clear from what he teaches at the end of 1, part, q. 23, art. 4 and 5, disp. 1, num. ult. Then also because, out of those Fathers and theologians who were present at the Council of Trent, fifty of them, and some others besides, committed their opinion in this most grave controversy to writing, and handed it down to the press and to posterity, as will be clear to those learned and versed in the reading of the Doctors; but in none of these authors is any use of middle knowledge found for this concordance, as will be evident to those who look into it; therefore it is a very urgent sign that in that Council human freedom was constituted and reconciled, without any use of this knowledge, with the doctrine of the divine decrees efficacious in themselves: otherwise, how could all those aforesaid writers, who were present at the Council and who undertook so grave and difficult a controversy, have been able to pass over the use of that thing which they saw had been employed by the Fathers of the Council, as the best, for its resolution, and that especially, when they themselves exercised the task, as it were, of explaining and making manifest to all the mind and doctrine of the Council.

99 Furthermore, because, the Council of Trent having been successfully concluded, as out of the Trojan horse there emerged many most eminent Doctors and Masters, who returned to their own seats, academies, and chairs, and who could not have restrained themselves from carrying with them middle knowledge and its use for that sodesired and difficult concordance, which they had seen employed in that Council for composing so very difficult an affair, and from proposing it to their hearers, and from commending it to them as it were a second sword, with which the heads of Goliath and Holofernes, to wit, Luther and Calvin, had been cut off and gloriously amputated; and so they would have imbued all the Catholic academies with the same doctrine, so that it would have been most well known and constant, not only to the advanced but even to the beginners in theology. But when it is certain and established that the doctrine of that knowledge, and its use, as something new, or (better to say) as something not received, had moved the theologians, and had displeased many, and very weighty ones, so that they brought the book of Molina, in this respect, before the supreme judge and head of the Church, as containing (in their judgement at least, about which however we say nothing at the present moment, in order fully to obey the decree of our most holy Lord) a suspect doctrine: it follows thence that no such knowledge was used in the Council of Trent for the resolution of this controversy.

100 It makes no difference if you say that Father Salmeron was present at that Council, and yet is cited for this knowledge by Father Herice, tract. 1, disp. 7, cap. 10: for it is probable that that knowledge made its appearance in that Council. For this probability utterly vanishes once the argument has been made. Clearly, if this knowledge had been employed by the Fathers of the Council for the resolution of so grave and difficult a controversy, how could it come about that none among so many and such great theologians as came out of that Council should have made an honourable mention of it, whether in their writings or in word, except for the single man Salmeron? Indeed, it seems incredible that, if this knowledge had been admitted by those Fathers for the solution of the aforesaid difficulty, so very celebrated, that outcome should have happened which afterwards did happen, namely, that all of them should have reckoned that it, as being new, was approved by theologians so far as it is what it is, and that all should have been moved to its outcome, as it is well established that they really were moved.

Whence it is incredible that Salmeron should have learned this knowledge in the Council of Trent: but if he did know it, it must be said that he received it from his associates, the Fathers of the Society, afterwards for many years, to wit from the year 1563, in which the Council was finished, down to the year 1585, in which Salmeron himself died at Naples, and that he was introduced to it by them; and that at length, much later, in his posthumous writings, published with the care and at the expense of the same Society, in the year 1602, it was found.