Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Salmanticenses

Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Salmanticenses

Collegii Salmanticensis Cursus Theologicus, tomus I

First published 1870

The Cursus Theologicus of the Discalced Carmelites of Salamanca (the 'Salmanticenses'), tomus I, in the 1870 Paris reprint. Contains the Prooemium and the three great treatises of this volume: De principio individuationis (a digression on the principle of individuation), De Visione Dei (in quaest. 12), and De Scientia Dei (in quaest. 14, including the extended rejection of middle knowledge). The edition prints St Thomas's Prima Pars text alongside; that text is not republished here.


Prooemium, and the Division of the whole Work

Quaestio I: On the Simplicity of God

Tractatus I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance and of Its Accidents

Disputatio I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance

Dubium I: Whether the substantial form is itself individuated, and the first principle of the individuation and of the purely individual distinction of the whole composite?

Dubium II: Whether matter, taken by itself and precisely, or matter marked by quantity, is the first and radical principle of the individuation of the whole substantial composite

Dubium III: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to constitute a composite of matter and quantity as an inhering and constituting form, is the first root of the individuation of the composite

Dubium IV: Whether matter determined by quantity, insofar as it denotes a certain substantial mode, is by the very nature of the thing distinct from matter and determines it toward having this quantity rather than that, is the first root of the individuation of material substance and of its substantial form?

Dubium V: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to possess by a radical mode this quantity rather than that, is the first root of the completed material substance and therefore of its substantial form

Disputatio II: On the Principle of the Individuation of Accidents

Dubium I: Whether the subject is the first root and principle of the individuation of accidents and of their purely individual distinction

Dubium II: Whether quantity claims for itself a peculiar principle, so that it is individuated from itself as though it were the first root

Dubium III: Whether essential repugnance exists between purely numerical distinction of accidents, as such that two of them differ only numerically in the same subject

Tractatus II: In quaest. 12 of the First Part of St. Thomas: On the Vision of God

Quaestio I: How God is known by us

Disputatio I: On the Possibility and Appetitability of the Vision of God by Essence

Dubium I: Whether the clear vision of God by essence is possible to the created intellect?

Dubium II: Whether the Holy Fathers knew that vision of God by essence is possible to a created intellect

Dubium III: Whether the possibility of vision of God by essence can be clearly known to a created intellect by the light of nature

Dubium IV: Whether the intellectual nature considered by itself has an innate appetite for the vision of God by essence

Dubium V: Whether an elicited and natural appetite is given in the intellectual creature considered by itself with regard to the clear vision of God

Disputatio II: On the Likeness, or Form, Required for a Clear Vision of God

Dubium I: Whether, according to the mind of St Thomas, some created likeness is admitted in order to elicit the clear vision of God

Dubium II: Whether the divine essence is in fact united to the intellect of the blessed man by way of an intelligible species, with a view to the clear vision of God?

Dubium III: Whether the divine essence, as it has the character of an intelligible form, actively concurs to the clear vision of God

Dubium IV: Whether by divine power a created impressed species is possible, through which God may be seen in a quidditative way, such as He is in Himself?

Dubium V: Whether the first reason which D. Thom. adduces in this article sufficiently proves the impossibility of an impressed species representing God quidditatively and clearly?

Dubium VI: Whether from the second reason of St. Thomas the impossibility is sufficiently inferred of an impressed form representing God quidditatively, and clearly, as He is in Himself

Dubium VII: What specially stands against the second reason of St. Thomas, and how it is to be solved

Dubium VIII: Whether the last reason of the article proves the impossibility of a created intelligible species representing God quidditatively: where the arguments also are dissolved which we brought from the opponents in dub. 4 of this disputation?

Dubium IX: Whether in the blessed there is necessarily and indispensably given a word, or expressed form, representing God quidditatively, as He is in Himself

Dubium X: Whether the impossibility of a created word representing God clearly and quidditatively is rightly proved from the fact that God is essentially itself the being quidditatively understood, and thus cannot be quidditatively understood through a created word?

Disputatio III: On the Impossibility of the Vision of God, As He Is in Himself, by Created Powers of the Natural Order, or Such as Are Connatural to Some Created Intellect

Dubium I: Whether by the absolute power of God there is possible some intellect which by the powers proper to it of the natural order could see God as He is in Himself

Dubium II: Whether by divine power there can be possible some substances and some intellects for which the light of glory is connatural, and which can see God by essence by their own powers?

Disputatio IV: On the Necessity of the Light of Glory for Seeing the Divine Essence As It Is in Itself

Dubium I: Whether the light of glory concurs to the vision of God, as He is in Himself, after the manner of an impressed form

Dubium II: Whether the light of glory is a necessary disposition, in order that the divine essence, in the ratio of form or of intelligible species, be united to the intellects of the blessed?

Dubium III: Whether the light of glory is necessarily desired for the receiving of the vision of God?

Dubium IV: Whether by the absolute power of God the created intellect can, without the light of glory, by its own obediential power alone, though with a concomitant influx superadded in the vision, but not by any other previous [influx], elicit that vision in the same intellect

Dubium V: Whether by divine power the divine essence can be united, in the ratio of light, to the created intellect, and thus constitute it, without a created light, in the first act for seeing God as He is in Himself?

Disputatio V: On the Quality and Inequality of the Visions in the Blessed

Dubium I: Whether an inequality is found among the beatific visions

Dubium II: Whether the inequality found among the beatific visions is not only intensive and extensive, but also essential and specific

Dubium III: Whether an intellectual power that is better, with equal light of glory, sees the divine essence more clearly

Disputatio VI: On the Incomprehensibility of God to the Created Intellect

Dubium I: Whether by divine power the created intellect can comprehend God?

Disputatio VII: On Those Things Which, God Having Been Seen, Are Seen in Him, or Can Be Seen

Dubium I: Whether those who see God see everything absolutely which is formally and of necessity contained in Him

Dubium II: Whether the divine essence can be seen without the persons, or one person without another?

Dubium III: Whether the blessed can, by the force of the vision of the divine essence, see, and in fact see, the free decrees of God?

Dubium IV: Whether from the force of the vision of the divine essence the effects existing under some difference of time can, or ought to, be seen

Dubium V: Whether by the force of the vision of the divine essence possible creatures can be seen?

Tractatus III: In quaest. 14 of the First Part of the Angelic Doctor: On the Knowledge of God

Quaestio I: De Scientia Dei

Dubium I: Whether those things which St. Thomas teaches in the Prooemium of this question are true

Disputatio I: De scientia Dei, quoad an est?

Dubium I: Whether intellectual knowledge is formally in God?

Dubium II: Whether from the fact that God is most immaterial the Angelic Doctor rightly proves that He is most intelligent?

Dubium III: Whether there is in God knowledge strictly so called and formally, and with respect to things

Dubium IV: Whether the knowledge of God is an attribute of Him?

Disputatio II: On the Twofold Distinction Which D. Thom. Constitutes in This Article Between Things Known and Things Not Known

Dubium I: Whether the first distinction which St. Thomas assigns between things that know and things that do not know is true, namely that these have only their own form, whereas those have also the forms of other things

Dubium II: Whether knowing things have not only the form of another thing, but also become by identity other things in being knowable, that is, representatively?

Disputatio III: On the Intellection and Knowledge of God with Respect to Its Primary Object

Dubium I: Whether God understands Himself primarily

Dubium II: Whether the object per se, first and specificative of the essential intellection of God is the divine essence, as distinguished from the attributes and the relations: or whether all these are formally and expressly meant?

Disputatio IV: On Understanding by God with Respect to the Power It Has to Constitute the Divine Essence and Nature

Dubium I: Whether the constitutive [element] of the divine essence, or nature, is the sole reason of a spiritual substance in itself, or of such by essence, as distinct virtually from the reason of a subsisting intellectual substance, whether radically and in the first act, or in the second act

Dubium II: Whether what constitutes the divine essence, or nature, is the ratio of substance alone, essentially and per essentiam intellectual, as virtually distinct from intellection by essence, or whether without any virtual distinction it is intellection itself?

Disputatio V: On the Knowledge of God with Respect to Its Causality toward Creatures

Dubium I: Whether divine knowledge is in some way the cause of things

Dubium II: What the knowledge of God is as cause of things

Dubium III: Whether just as the knowledge of God, taken formally, is the cause directing toward the production of creatures, so too it is the immediate effective principle and the executor of their production?

Disputatio VI: On Divine Knowledge Collated with Evils

Dubium I: Whether God knows evils?

Dubium II: Whether God necessarily knows evils through created goods?

Disputatio VII: On Whether There Is Knowledge of God with Respect to Absolute Future Contingents, and on Those Things Which Cannot Be Certainly Known by Him

Dubium I: What, and how manifold, the future contingent is

Dubium II: Whether God certainly knows absolutely future contingents?

Dubium III: Whether God certainly knows absolute free future things, by His essence and divine ideas, as they represent the truth of those things antecedently to the decree of His will

Dubium IV: Whether God certainly knows absolutely future contingents in the free decree of His will, not indeed as present, but as future?

Dubium V: Whether God certainly knows absolutely future contingents which in some way depend on created freedom, in the comprehension of secondary causes, antecedently to the free determination of the divine will?

Dubium VI: Whether God certainly knows absolute future contingents in their objective truth, antecedently to the divine decree

Disputatio VIII: On the knowledge of God with respect to absolutely future contingents, as regards those of which He is certainly known to be aware

Dubium I: Whether God certainly knows all absolutely future contingents in the decree put into execution of His will, antecedently to any infallible futurehood of them, or whether they are determined in their essence by such a decree?

Dubium II: Whether according to Scripture and the Fathers, but especially St. Thomas, absolute future contingents are from eternity really and physically present to God in the measure of eternity, and by reason of this presence are certainly known by Him

Dubium III: Whether with a sufficient reason it is proved that absolutely future contingents were from eternity, and are now really and physically present to God in the measure of eternity, and by reason of this presence are certainly known by Him?

Dubium IV: Whether eternity, and the presentiality of the future already explained in it, is altogether necessary for this, so that God may certainly and infallibly know absolutely future contingents before they are present in their own and adequate measure, or so far as we are concerned?

Disputatio IX: On the Knowledge of Conditioned Future Things, Which God Has in His Efficacious Yet Conditioned Decree

Dubium I: On the multiple division of the future contingent, and which of them belong to the present disputation

Dubium II: Whether according to holy Scripture God certainly knows conditioned future contingents, whether they be disparate, yet depending both as to the condition and as to the event on free causes, or be not disparate, but having only a probable, or conjectural, connection with the condition?

Dubium III: Whether according to the mind of the holy Fathers God knows with perfect certainty and infallibly conditioned future contingents, whether they be disparate in the manner just described, or have a probable connection with the future event

Dubium IV: Whether with a sufficient reason it is shown that God certainly, and altogether infallibly, knows both future contingents that are conditioned and disparate, and those which have only a probable and conjectural connection on the part of the object with the condition?

Dubium V: Whether in God conditioned, positive, and efficacious decrees about all conditioned future contingents are to be posited, and whether, these being set aside, the aforesaid futures can in any case be certainly and infallibly known by God?

Disputatio X: On the Impossibility of Middle, or Conditional, Knowledge Drawn from Authority

Dubium I: Whether according to holy Scripture middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, is to be admitted?

Dubium II: Whether from St. Augustine's mind, as gathered from His testimonies, it is concluded that middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, is to be given?

Dubium III: Whether either according to the principles of the opponents, or absolutely and simply speaking, it is inferred from the effects of Augustine's doctrine, or from other signs, that according to his mind middle, or conditional, knowledge is to be rejected

Dubium IV: Whether, according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor as drawn from His testimonies, middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, is to be given in God?

Dubium V: Whether from certain other signs it is concluded that, according to the mind of St. Thomas, middle knowledge is not to be given?

87 Because the mind of St. Augustine and of St. Thomas, with regard to this part, coincides with the mind of those other Holy Fathers who followed upon St. Augustine, and consequently it is of great importance to examine the mind of each of them; therefore, since we have already examined both what Augustine thought (so to speak, on the a priori side and then on the a posteriori side) and what the Angelic Doctor teaches, we must also approach the mind of that same Angelic Doctor a posteriori, so that thus from every quarter his mind may remain more transparent and clear.

§ I. Resolution of the difficulty, and its first foundation.

It must be said, therefore, that according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor, middle knowledge cannot be given, this conclusion being taken from certain signs and a posteriori. The prior and fundamental reason of this assertion is drawn from what was said in dub. 3, assertion 2, num. 67, and thereafter. For the reason then given for showing Augustine's mind on this point proves the present assertion, as will be clear to the one who looks into it.

88 It is proved, secondly. Because the Fathers of the Council of Trent did not approve, but rather rejected middle knowledge, in the way we shall say below: therefore it is a sign that it does not exist according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor. The antecedent will be clear from what we shall say in the following difficulty. The consequence, however, is proved. Because whatever was done in that Council, about which St. Thomas treated in his works, was all of it derived from the doctrine of the Holy Doctor. And so the doctrine of St. Thomas was like the Lydian stone, in which true gold was distinguished from false: so that that was reckoned to be true doctrine which cohered with the mind of the Angelic Doctor and was approved by him; but that was false which was out of tune with him, or which was at some time reprobated by him. And this indeed is clear from that oration which was delivered by the orator of that same Council before the Fathers on the day of the Holy Doctor, where these words occur: St. Thomas could not be present at the Church's Councils, being prevented by death; but behold, surviving and destined to live forever, he is with you: the good things, the treasures of his spiritual doctrine, he has handed down to you by hereditary right. Accordingly, no councils have been held without the sacred Doctor since his happy passage. For to pass over the other things, that which we hear, that which we see, that which we handle with our hands: why should we not with open voice testify to his praise? weigh your assemblies, which are very numerous; and to that honorable college of Doctors, every counsellor who approaches adds his weight, who does not adorn his opinion with the authority of St. Thomas as with a shining gem? But in that most distinguished recess of the Fathers, this Doctor, when asked for his opinion, gives it most frequently, and if any doubt or controversy has arisen, you think he is to be referred to with common votes as to the Lydian stone; and whoever shall have obtained him as the patron of his own judgment will not be subject to the uncertain chance of judgments, but that the decision ought to be given according to him.

§ II. The last foundation of the true opinion.

89 The assertion is proved, thirdly. For the most faithful and most well-known disciples of St. Thomas, both the older and the younger, that is to say the Dominicans, never found this middle knowledge in their Holy Doctor; as regards the older, this will be clear from what is to be said in the last difficulty of this disputation, and as regards the younger it is clear from all the Dominicans who in our own age have committed their writings to the press, such as Bannez, Navarrete, Nunno, Nazario, Gonzalez, Ripa, Zannardo, Ledesma, Alvarez, and Martinez, and from all those who publicly teach sacred Theology throughout the whole world: therefore it is a sign that this knowledge does not exist according to the mind of the Holy Doctor. The consequence is evident. Because it is incredible that all the approved and most renowned disciples and interpreters of St. Thomas, who are said to swear to his words, who daily turn over his writings with the utmost affection of soul, compare them, ponder them, chew the cud of them, and devote themselves with assiduous study to attaining his meaning, and join prayers to their reading, and who still within the walls of their own household strive after the true doctrine of St. Thomas with the greatest zeal, so that not one of them would have dared to defend in any way the opposing doctrine, to their greatest disgrace, anywhere found, nor received from their elders, this doctrine about middle knowledge, if it were truly in the Holy Doctor; especially since St. Thomas so very often hinted at it, or brought it into the open, if it were in his mind: indeed, very very often, or (better to say) on countless occasions, the opportunity of treating of it presented itself; as in the matter of the knowledge of God, of the will, of predestination, of the Incarnation, of grace, of the angels, and very many other things: as the Adversaries, admitting it in all these places and in many others, use it, to unravel many and grave difficulties.

90 It is confirmed, firstly. Because the aforesaid disciples of St. Thomas not only assert that they did not find, nor received from their elders, this doctrine about middle knowledge, but rather affirm that the opposing doctrine has always reigned in his school. And so, when Molina first brought it to light, they not only did not favour it, but even accused it in juridical form before the Supreme Pontiff: yet it is incredible that the aforesaid disciples of St. Thomas, distinguished by number, by antiquity, by wisdom, by religion, and by many other titles, most devotedly and most piously by the bond of the Angelic Doctor's profession, and very well versed in his writings, should not only have failed to find his opinion on this so celebrated and so often repeated difficulty, but that even all of them should have been deceived and so blinded as to accuse the true doctrine of St. Thomas before the Pontiff: therefore, and so on.

It is confirmed and explained, secondly. For as regards the mind of St. Thomas about middle knowledge, faith is rather to be given to the Dominican Fathers than to his adversaries: therefore, since those of them stand openly against it, it will be a sign that the Holy Doctor also stands against it. The consequence seems transparent. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because the Dominican Fathers, whenever in other matters they deliver their opinion in common about the mind of the Holy Doctor, have never been found openly to have departed from his true understanding, and consequently they are not to be believed to have departed from it in this matter either; whereas the adversaries are wont many times over in other matters to produce St. Thomas on their own side, although it is very certain that he himself stands for the opposite view, as is evident in the matters about the existence of created things and its distinction from essence, about the principle of individuation, about intension and remission, and elsewhere often.

91 It is confirmed and explained, lastly. Because the Dominican Fathers, being led by no passion against their adversaries, nor compelled by any necessity imposed from without (as they say), bring forward St. Thomas on their own side and against middle knowledge. But the adversaries, although they are not led by any passion against the Dominicans, are yet as it were compelled by a necessity, and they prop up the doctrine about middle knowledge by the authority of St. Thomas: therefore, as regards this question, that is, whether the aforesaid knowledge is or is not according to the mind of the Holy Doctor, faith is rather to be given to the former than to the latter. The consequence needs no proof.

The antecedent, however, as regards the first part, that is, as regards the Dominican Fathers, is shown by the following dilemma. For when Molina first published his middle knowledge, either this knowledge was commonly received in the school of those same Dominicans, that is, of the Thomists, as the doctrine of St. Thomas, or it was commonly rejected as something contrary to that same doctrine? The first cannot be said: because, had the aforesaid Fathers greatly (as it were) rejoiced in the increase and spread of the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, they would not have assailed it so boldly, nor accused this knowledge before the Supreme Pontiff, if by their common reckoning it was then held to be Thomistic; otherwise they would indeed have brought not the Adversaries, but rather themselves and their own doctrine before the Pontiff, and so would have been rejected by him as madmen; since they were accusing that very doctrine which they themselves acknowledged was the doctrine of St. Thomas.

If, however, it be said that it was the second, then, being led by no passion against the Adversaries, they made answer against St.

Thomas against this middle knowledge. For what passion could render the Dominicans less worthy of credit in this, when they reject this middle knowledge published by the Adversaries in the public press, as something at variance with St. Thomas, when those same Dominicans had previously held it as certain among themselves? especially since the Fathers of the Society up to those times had followed the way and the doctrine of the Dominicans, and hence it is incredible that they were not on that account loyally (as was right) disposed towards them. For the same reason too, no necessity imposed from outside appears, by which they were compelled to affirm the doctrine about middle knowledge to be against St. Thomas: indeed, if they once felt it that way before, they could have been moved to this by no other necessity, except that which (so to speak) arises from within, that is, from the fact that they previously felt that very thing in the truth of their hearts.

92 As regards the second part, however, that is, that the Adversaries, being led by no passion against the Dominicans, prop up middle knowledge by the authority of St. Thomas, the same antecedent is clear enough. Because, as will be evident to the one who looks into it, that is, more clearly than the light of noonday, to think the opposite would be to squint in the same light: indeed, such a passion cannot be believed, let alone even faintly suspected, of men so learned, so grave, and so religious.

As regards the last part of that same antecedent, that is, that the Adversaries, being as it were compelled by some necessity imposed from outside (as they say), prop up the doctrine about middle knowledge by the authority of St. Thomas, this can be taken from the fact that many external things could and ought to have moved them to this very thing. For they saw that it was being brought by the disciples of St. Thomas before the judges of the faith, as being in some way suspect; they experienced how much prejudice the aforesaid knowledge would suffer, as it ran counter to them, from the authority of St. Augustine and of St. Thomas; they beheld Clement VIII refer the whole weight of this cause to the authority of each of the two Doctors; they heard badly of Molina, who asserted in his first Concordia that this knowledge was new and had been unknown to the ancient Fathers; they saw that under the title of novelty this knowledge was held in contempt by all the more serious theologians, and had to be assailed with keenness, and that it would stir up many adversaries against itself: by no other road could they have freed their middle knowledge from all these known dangers and storms, nay, from total ruin, than by fortifying it with the authority of each of the two Doctors and corroborating it; and so they were as it were compelled (against that which the very authors of this knowledge used to confess before this storm arose) to proclaim on every hand that it is frequently and clearly found in each of the two Doctors, Augustine and St. Thomas, and to bring forward the testimonies of each of them to prove that point. Who then does not see how, although the testimony of the Adversaries is always weighty, nevertheless with respect to this particular point it is not so firm for the purpose of establishing the mind of St. Thomas, as is the testimony of the Dominicans, which, for none of the aforesaid objections, could rationally be rejected?

93 All of which can be made clear by the elegant testimony of Master Alfonso Curiel, who, although in his own controversies he favours this middle knowledge sufficiently and is strongly inclined to it (although afterwards he retracted it, as we shall say in the last difficulty), nevertheless in the aforesaid place confesses that such a doctrine is at variance with the mind of St. Thomas, and even with that of his disciples. Which testimony cannot fail, as things stand, to have force. First, because of the outstanding wisdom and authority of this Doctor, known to the whole world. Secondly also, because the religious profession, whether that of the Dominicans or that of the Fathers of the Society, cannot in the least make him suspect, on account of a pious affection which he had towards his own men: indeed, he was bound to neither of them. Lastly, because in that place he leans rather towards the opinion of the adversaries; and consequently, if he truly could fortify it with the authority of St. Thomas, he would in fact do so, and yet would have to confess, against himself and against the opinion which he there chose in preference, that it is at variance with the doctrine of St. Thomas.

Dubium VI: Whether middle knowledge has flowed down continually from the time of Augustine to the present, and has been approved by theologians both more recent and more ancient, and especially by those who were present at the Council of Trent

Dubium VII: Whether middle knowledge remained hidden from St. Augustine and the ancient Fathers up to the year 1560 and the older Scholastics, and was drawn forth by the later theologians from the doctrine of those same Fathers, or whether it was known and reprobated by the aforesaid ancient theologians and Scholastics?

Dubium VIII: How from what has been said it may be deduced that the doctrine denying middle knowledge is to be preferred to that asserting it: where in particular the Doctors denying the aforesaid middle knowledge are recounted

Disputatio XI: On the Impossibility of Middle Knowledge from the Defect of Its Necessity, and from Its Incompossibility with the Other Things Presupposed in God

Dubium I: Whether middle knowledge is necessary to God, in order that He may certainly predestinate, or efficaciously predefine the consent of created will without injury to its freedom, or whether it removes both of these?

Dubium II: Whether from yet another head middle knowledge is incompatible with divine predestination with regard to adults?

Disputatio XII: On the Impossibility of Middle Knowledge, Both a Priori, or Quasi a Priori, and Drawn from Various Inconveniences

Dubium I: Whether the impossibility of middle knowledge is sufficiently shown by a priori, or quasi a priori reasoning?

Dubium II: Whether middle knowledge is impossible, from the fact that through it the reason of the first cause and of the first author of grace is removed from God?

Dubium III: Whether middle knowledge is impossible on the ground that it follows from it that God cannot fulfil what He promises concerning the faith, or the conversion, of the rational creature by the power of His omnipotence, but only from the foreknowledge of our future consent

Dubium IV: Whether middle knowledge is repugnant, from the fact that from it is gathered that God concurs to our free acts in a blind and ignorant way, and without intention of them in particular?

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