Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

58 Because the authority of St. Augustine (as we touched upon in the preceding difficulty) is indeed great everywhere, it is nowhere greater than when he discusses divine grace and the other things belonging to it, such as the admission or the rejection of middle knowledge, of which we are speaking here; and accordingly the Fathers of the Councils of Palestine, Africa, Arles and Milan sought out and embraced the opinion of that same St. Augustine, and St. Hilary and Prosper adhered to it inseparably, as is clear from the Epistles of both; and finally all the Fathers who followed after Augustine revered his mind, and all the theologians alike yield the palm to him in this matter, as is doctrinally and widely proved by Alvarez, lib. 1. de auxiliis disput. 5, and Suarez, lib. 1. de Grat. prol. 6. cap. 6. Wherefore, although in the preceding difficulty we set forth Augustine's mind as drawn immediately from his own testimonies, it seemed good to us to investigate that same mind here point by point from elsewhere, from certain signs and indications, or effects, so that this matter may be treated better and more at its roots.

The reason, however, for which we are especially roused to this, is this. Because Augustine very frequently treats of this matter in his works, since, both when he was recent and when he was an old man, he fought with the Pelagians and Semipelagians and with the remnants of the Pelagians, and daily, having become in his later and last writings a teacher in his own person, he explained some things which he had not said clearly enough in his earlier ones. And therefore it can hardly be said how great a multitude of testimonies is brought forward on either side of this controversy, and much less how many ways the testimonies adduced on both sides are carefully set aside: so that unless they are inspected on purpose in their own source and together with the context of the same, the mind of St. Augustine cannot be discerned amid so dense a forest of interpretations, expositions, evasions and solutions: for on this side and that Augustine sounds and resounds, on both sides Augustine meets us: and when Augustine goes to meet Augustine, his features cannot be distinguished unless they are carefully inspected.

59 Whence, although in the preceding difficulty we contemplated the features and the words of Augustine by inspecting them attentively in themselves; nevertheless, so that Augustine may not perhaps seem to have been otherwise known, and to have appeared in himself and in his own writings to sound the opposite, we therefore add here another way, by which we may find once more, both by arguing to the contrary against the Adversaries and absolutely and simply speaking, the mind of Augustine which has already been found. But this way is none other than that which is commonly said to be from the effects, or as it were the effects, that is, a posteriori.

Wherefore the effects, or as it were the effects, of the Augustinian doctrine concerning the efficacy of the divine will and of its decrees, as well as concerning the certainty of divine predestination and reprobation, are to be carefully investigated and weighed by us, and brought forth from the treasure of antiquity into the open, so that from them we may dig out the wished-for mind and opinion of Augustine in this celebrated controversy about middle knowledge, and indeed his true resolution of it.

§ I. Decision of the difficulty as to its first part.

60 It must be said, therefore, first, that from the effects of the Augustinian doctrine (if once for all those things are true which the Adversaries teach concerning middle knowledge from the principles of their own opinion) it is very credibly and with great certainty inferred that, according to his own mind, middle knowledge, that is, conditional knowledge, or that knowledge which is in God before the decree, efficacious from itself and conditioned by his will, is to be rejected altogether.

This assertion is not better urged than from those things which Hilary, Prosper and Fulgentius wrote about Augustine's doctrine, whether to him or to others: these are contained in the seventh volume of the works of that same Augustine. For from them it is clear what the effects were which followed from Augustine's doctrine, not indeed by reason of a defect in it, but accidentally and on the occasion drawn from it. For, as is most clearly manifest from the Epistles cited, the doctrine of Augustine was such that from it several grave and learned men, whom Prosper there calls clear and excellent, were disturbed (though unjustly), and placed themselves in great danger of denying human freedom. And therefore Prosper in his Epistle to that same Augustine asserts that the remnants of the Pelagians took occasion from that doctrine to say that under the name of predestination a fatal necessity was introduced. And Hilary, writing to Augustine, says thus: The words of your Holiness are so framed that they say that a certain despair is exhibited to men.

61 Hence the following reason is deduced in support of the assertion. Because it is incredible that they should take occasion for that danger and despair from a doctrine which extols human free choice very clearly and manifestly and most brilliantly; nay rather it is evidently credible that they took it from a doctrine which proceeds by a way entirely opposite, and which commends in such a way the efficacy of the divine will, and the infallibility and certainty of absolute predestination and of its decrees, in advance of the foreknown consent of the created will, that the aforesaid free choice seemed to be overthrown and an all-round necessity to be introduced; whereas the doctrine by which middle knowledge is taught is prior to the free decrees of the divine will, and to the certainty of predestination, and is of such a condition that unless God provides through it what human will will be going to do on this or that occasion, it cannot, without harm to its freedom, decree anything absolutely, or predestine anyone, or reprobate anyone: this greatly favours — or, as we should say better, as far as can be conceived, favours in the highest degree — (according to the opinion of the Adversaries, and to what they teach about middle knowledge) created freedom, and renders it altogether clearly, and with the greatest perspicuity, unharmed; on the contrary, the doctrine which denies this middle knowledge, and which posits decrees that are efficacious from themselves, by which before the foreknowledge of any created consent God decrees efficaciously and foredefines the aforesaid consent, and reprobates or predestines whom He pleases, highly commends the certainty of divine predestination, and the efficacy which the divine will has from itself and intrinsically, with at least some apparent prejudice to human freedom, as the Adversaries confess: therefore, if those things are true which those same Adversaries teach concerning middle knowledge, then it is a very urgent sign that the doctrine from which those men, of whom Hilary and Prosper speak, were so disturbed and fell into the aforesaid danger, is not that which establishes middle knowledge; but rather that which denies it, and which admits decrees efficacious from themselves in advance of the foreknown consent of created freedom; and hence it will also be a very efficacious sign that the doctrine of Augustine, from which, on the testimony of Hilary and Prosper, they took occasion, just spoken of, is not that which admits middle knowledge and denies decrees of God efficacious from themselves in advance of the foreknown consent of created freedom, but rather its opposite.

62 It is confirmed, firstly, that the opposing doctrine which teaches middle knowledge is such that its authors boast of and proclaim that through it free choice has vindicated its freedom, and can most conveniently be left off altogether; since, according to it, as very nearly all the Adversaries confess, God cannot decree anything efficaciously concerning the free consent, as it were such a consent of the created will, unless (so to speak) He waits to see what the aforesaid will, if it be placed in this or that condition, will be going to do from its own freedom; and that this should be foreknown through middle knowledge; so that nothing other than this, and in no other way than this, can be foredefined by God around the aforesaid consent, except what has been foreknown through this knowledge, and in the manner in which it was foreknown by the created will according to its own freedom, will be brought forth. Which, according to the opinion of the Adversaries, very clearly, and with the greatest perspicuity, favours created freedom, so that it is obvious to everyone. On the contrary, the doctrine denying the aforesaid middle knowledge is such that its authors have very often asserted, as long as it was allowed them, that through it free choice is bound, and altogether overthrown, and that a necessity arising from the absolute and altogether efficacious will of God is imposed upon it; therefore it cannot be said that the Augustinian doctrine favours the opposing doctrine; nay rather it will be very certain that it is altogether opposed to it, and coincides with the Thomistic doctrine which we defend.

The consequence is evident. Both because Augustine did not undergo a slight danger to his life, and a great danger to his fame and honour, on account of that doctrine which he then taught. For who can persuade himself, upon well-considered reflection, that Augustine could have suffered (if those things are true which the Adversaries teach about middle knowledge) hatred of life and of honour as the destroyer of human freedom, if his doctrine were the same as, or similar to, that which the authors of that same middle knowledge teach as favouring human freedom? by which, as they themselves proclaim, the freedom of human free choice plainly remains, and with most manifest perspicuity, unencumbered and unfettered. Both also on account of those things which we have just indicated. Because if the doctrine of Augustine were similar to that which the opposing opinion teaches, then those aforesaid men (who, on the testimony of Hilary and Prosper, were clear and excellent, and of such authority that these two Fathers thought themselves unequal to contradict them: and for that reason had recourse to Augustine) would not only be suspect in the faith, but would manifestly have to be pronounced mad and foolish: since, from a doctrine which commends the freedom of human free choice so clearly and openly, according to what the Adversaries say, that it was obvious to everyone, they took occasion to feel that the aforesaid freedom was perverted and that the danger of despair was introduced.

63 All of which the first patron of middle knowledge, as he himself believes, Molina, foresaw and openly confessed in his first concordia printed at Lisbon: although afterwards, seeing by experience how much prejudice to his own opinion followed from it, he glossed this over in the Lyon edition. And although very many others among the Adversaries, as it were joining their forces, contend that this doctrine about middle knowledge taught by them is Augustinian; yet out of the many whom we have seen, and whom we daily see coming to light, we have found no one who flatly asserts that Augustine, who treated with the Pelaginians and their remnants concerning the grace of God, and who strove to reconcile it with created freedom, made use of middle knowledge: for they fear, and rightly so (as we believe), that they would constitute those famous men of whom Prosper makes mention, who were disturbed by St. Augustine's doctrine as being destructive of freedom and had already fallen into the danger aforesaid, not as reckless but as mad and foolish accusers and calumniators of St. Augustine.

64 The aforesaid reasoning is confirmed and explained, secondly, by comparing the effects which followed from the Augustinian doctrine with those of the doctrine which removes middle knowledge and admits absolute predeterminations of all future effects; so that God cannot know anything as future, whether absolutely or conditionally, except after the decree which is efficacious from itself, whether absolute or conditional, of His will. Because the effect which followed from the Augustinian doctrine in this respect was twofold. The first is that which we have just touched upon, namely that those clear and excellent men (to use the words of Prosper quoted above) were scandalized by the Augustinian doctrine and incurred the danger of despair, and rising up against it as the destroyer of human freedom, they began to complain of Augustine: and had they not been deterred by the authority of the Roman pontiffs from Augustine's doctrine, they would have risen up against it even more seriously.

The second, however, is that the men of Marseille, shuddering at an absolute and antecedent election which would not depend on the created consent foreknown through this middle knowledge, were disturbed when they heard that this was the doctrine of Augustine: and anxiously they strove, while Augustine himself was still alive, to establish, by heaping up certain testimonies of his and of others, that he and others stood with the Catholics for the opposing opinion: as Prosper attests, who, writing to Augustine in the place cited, says: And this is attested not only by the testimonies of other Catholics, but also by the more ancient disputation of your Holiness: whereas the aforesaid effects of the doctrine which denies middle knowledge and admits absolute, and efficacious from themselves, predeterminations, and therefore admits in God only the knowledge of future things after the efficacious decree of His will, followed from it; therefore it is a sign that this doctrine, which denies middle knowledge, is conformed to the doctrine of St. Augustine, and that the opposing doctrine is adverse to it. The consequence seems to follow with great credibility and certainty from the two premises laid down. The major, however, is established by those things which we have brought forward from St. Prosper.

65 The minor, however, as to the first part, that is, as to the first effect, is proved. For Molina, who in our own time first sent middle knowledge to press, and other distinguished theologians who followed him, were scandalized by the doctrine which denies the aforesaid knowledge and posits in God only the knowledge of future things after the determination which is efficacious from itself of His will, and therefore commends the absolute certainty of divine predestination, and rose up against it and ceaselessly rise up: and as long as they were not prohibited from it by the decrees of the pontiffs, they condemned it as the destroyer of human freedom: and had they not afterwards been prohibited by a pontifical decree, they would have risen up against it still more seriously, as far as it could lawfully be done.

As to the second part, however, that is, as to the second effect, the same minor is explained and urged. For certain of the Adversaries, bitterly and harshly opposing that doctrine which constitutes an absolute and antecedent election, and absolute and antecedent decrees, and removes middle knowledge from the midst, strove with great anxiety to bolster it with the authority of the ancient theologians, especially of the Thomistic family, and to draw over to the contrary opinion some of the opponents themselves, as we shall say in the last difficulty. All of them, however (as we say in passing), being greatly pained by what was objected to them, namely that Augustine stood for the doctrine which denies middle knowledge, assert that they prove the opposing opinion by heaping up many of his testimonies (though these do not indeed persuade of the intention, as we saw in the preceding difficulty); therefore, etc.

§ II. Resolution of the difficulty as to its second part.

66 It must be said, secondly, that from the effects of Augustine's doctrine and from other signs it is sufficiently inferred that he absolutely and simply speaking stood against middle knowledge. This assertion is proved by the reason given for the preceding one, and expounded in this way. For Prosper, relating the disturbance with which those famous men were disturbed by Augustine's doctrine, says that they proclaimed that all effort is removed and all virtues taken away, if God's ordinance anticipates human wills, and that this under the name of predestination, that is, anticipating our wills, introduces a certain fatal necessity; therefore that doctrine of Augustine from which they took occasion for this disturbance was a doctrine admitting decrees efficacious from themselves in advance of the consent of the human will, and not a doctrine teaching middle knowledge in order to reconcile the efficacy of grace with the aforesaid freedom.

The consequence as to the first part is evident. Because if that ordinance of God were not efficacious from itself, but were made efficacious by reason of the human consent, it would not be an ordinance of God anticipating human wills, which, as it stands from itself, would seem to introduce a certain fatal necessity. As to the second, however, it is also clear. Because middle knowledge does not anticipate human wills, but rather follows upon them, since this knowledge is purely speculative: and it is not because it is thus foreknown through this knowledge that the consent of the human will is going to be future; but rather, because it is going to be future, it is foreknown through that knowledge.

67 The same assertion is proved, secondly, with three things noted beforehand. The first is, that when Molina first published his book on the agreement of grace with free choice, in which he gave to press a new name for middle knowledge and a peculiar method of reconciling the efficacy of the divine predeterminations with created freedom, he was immediately accused in law before the Supreme Pontiff, and although he was accused on other matters, we shall say nothing whatever about those here (as we obey the decree of our most holy Lord Paul V in every respect); but only about what happened with regard to the middle knowledge which that same Molina sent to press.

Now, the cause having been referred to Clement VIII, there were appointed by him at least thirty very grave men, among whom were some Cardinals, some Bishops and some Regulars, so that all of these might assist with the Supreme Pontiff sitting in judgement, as counsellors and as witnesses; and when the affair had been protracted and treated through a certain number of sessions, so that arguments from reason and similar replies were brought forward, and it had been found out that nothing could be concluded by this road, because with dialectical and metaphysical terms and distinctions everything was made obscure and uncertain, Clement the Supreme Pontiff decreed (with the Holy Spirit suggesting it, as it is right to believe) that henceforth this Catholic cause should not be treated by Catholic reasons supplied by the natural light through the natural sciences; but only by the testimonies of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, inasmuch as these are drawn from nothing else than from the clearest sources of Sacred Scripture, traditions, Councils and the Holy Fathers, or rightly deduced from them. For he judged it alien to Christian gravity that Christian dogmas should be deduced at the outset from foreign principles, such as Dialectic, Philosophy and Metaphysics; but only from their own and divine principles, such as Sacred Scripture, traditions, Councils and the testimonies of the Fathers. And so in the subsequent sessions, of which there were many and which were famous, this was constantly observed.

68 Secondly, it is to be noted that when they saw that by virtue of this decree the Fathers of the Society were left destitute of natural reasons and restricted to the testimonies alone of St. Augustine and of his most faithful disciple St. Thomas Aquinas, they were compelled to turn themselves to this, so that they might strive to show that middle knowledge was according to the mind of each of the two holy Doctors, although Molina in his book (for the defence of whose doctrine they had come together) openly confesses the opposite, namely that the aforesaid middle knowledge is not according to the mind of St. Augustine, but was unknown to him. And so from then on they anxiously took care that the aforesaid middle knowledge, and the efficacy of the divine predeterminations to be regulated by it, should be very well known to St. Augustine and to the Angelic Doctor; very often asserted and most clearly taught, or at least not contrary or dissonant with the doctrine of these Fathers.

Whence, with the utmost care (as was right), they brought forward very many and diverse testimonies of St. Augustine and of St. Thomas during that whole, not unimportant period, as we shall say, before the Supreme Pontiff and the thirty very grave men already mentioned, in favour of middle knowledge. And it is very credible that the most select testimonies, and those which can be found in all the works of each of the two holy Doctors, were produced by them, and were brought out, expounded and weighed with an outstanding acuteness of intellect for the purpose of proving their intention. Because the men appointed for this from the Fathers of the Society were the most grave and most learned theologians, endowed with the greatest acuteness of intellect, among whom was eminent Fr. Gregory of Valencia, a most erudite man and very well versed in the reading of the Holy Fathers, as his outstanding works throughout the whole summa of St. Thomas sufficiently attest. And with him were associated other excellent theologians of the same Society, as Fr. Peter Azor, Fr. Vasquez, Fr. Salas and others, and men were daily sent to him, as was lawful, whether manuscript or also printed books on this matter, accurately composed by the eminent theologians by whom the sacred Society was then flourishing, and has always flourished and will flourish.

Just as on the opposing side too, many outstanding testimonies of Augustine and of the Angelic Doctor were brought forward: because for this purpose eminent and very grave theologians of the Dominican family were appointed, among whom stood Fr. Thomas de Lemos, a man endowed with the greatest wisdom and distinguished in the doctrine of St. Augustine and of St. Thomas, whom were accompanied by the distinguished Masters Fr. Francis de Avila and Fr. John González, insigne theologians, whom others no inferior supported, of whom the Dominican family always abounds, both by word of mouth and by writings: and from the whole order, especially from Spain, where this controversy first arose, many most learned manuscripts were sent by other very expert Masters.

69 Thirdly, it is to be noted that while each side on both sides alleged what served it, and produced diverse testimonies of St. Augustine and of the Angelic Doctor in its favour, a long and lasting time was spent in the discussion, the probation and (so to speak) the contestation of this cause. For on this account very many sessions were held under each of the Supreme Pontiffs Clement VIII and Paul V, with those thirty very grave men present, and out of all of them, with one or two exceptions, all the others advanced that opinion: namely, that neither Augustine nor the Angelic Doctor taught in any way that middle knowledge, that is, conditional knowledge, by which God foreknows a consent, for example, of the human will, as infallibly future, before He actually has an efficacious decree about its being future; but rather that each of the two holy Doctors opposed the aforesaid knowledge, and taught absolute predeterminations of God independent of the aforesaid knowledge, and preserving created freedom.

All of which we have not invented from our own resources, but have received from men far more grave, beyond all exception: whose truth no sane person can suspect. Since, however, a contrary report was spread by some, we have therefore taken care that, so as to flee, as far as is possible in this matter, every moral danger of deception, a peculiar diligence and care be applied in the Roman curia to examining this: and by this diligence applied we have found that the matter stands as we received it from those very grave men, which was also most recently attested at Rome by a certain distinguished theologian, who was most attentively present at all the congregations which we have enumerated, carefully noted everything done in them, and, so that it might not be lost by forgetfulness, faithfully committed it to writing, since he was adorned not only with the greatest wisdom but with such outstanding virtues that after his death he worked many miracles; and so that his testimony may remain yet more firm and beyond all exception great, we testify that that most grave man, eight days before his death and before he had fallen into the illness by which he ended his life, and consequently while he was flourishing most in sacred theology and holiness, frankly declared that what we have said is false.

And therefore we must stand by those things which we have said, because in these matters, in which the question is not so much one of right as of fact itself, and in which, with sufficient diligence applied to the evidence of the fact, metaphysical certainty cannot obtain (as has happened here after the very great diligence we have applied), a prudent human judgement cannot be derived from anywhere else (whatever be the case before God about the thing itself, which is not plainly known to men) except from moral conjectures, such as from the testimonies of men far more grave than all exception, or from ocular witnesses.

70 From all of which the following reason is deduced. Because it is very difficult to believe that those thirty very grave men, together with the Supreme Pontiff, so intently, and for so long a time, and through so many sessions, with all passion (as it is right to believe concerning those aforesaid men) set aside; and that on both sides, after examining the more select testimonies of Augustine for either side, not only with that thoroughness which was applied to the same testimonies by the outstanding theologians who took the part of each opinion, but also by adding to them often new force from a greater thoroughness which could occur to each of these thirty men according to the acuteness of his own intellect and learning: it is therefore very difficult to believe that these thirty very grave men together with the Supreme Pontiff should have investigated Augustine's mind in this way as to the middle knowledge in question, and yet have none the less not attained it; so that all of them, with one or two exceptions, should have agreed together with the Supreme Pontiff that the aforesaid middle knowledge is not to be granted; therefore it is a very urgent sign that Augustine did not approve, but rather reproved, the aforesaid knowledge.

71 It is confirmed and explained. Because if those men, who assisted together with the Supreme Pontiff as counsellors and as witnesses, were few in number, some suspicion might perhaps arise as to whether they had perhaps grasped Augustine's mind; and even if they had not been few in number, if nevertheless there had been disagreement among them, so that a large part of them stood for middle knowledge according to Augustine's mind, while another, somewhat larger part opposed the aforesaid knowledge, asserting that it was against Augustine's mind, then someone might justly and sanely doubt whether it was those or those others who had touched on Augustine's mind in this matter.

Then, although the aforesaid counsellors agreed against middle knowledge, with one or two exceptions: yet if they had been of the Dominican family, or of the Society of Jesus, it would perhaps seem to someone (though unjustly) that so much credit should not be given them in this matter: on the ground that each man many times judges for that side for which he is partial. And likewise if these Doctors had not most carefully sifted Augustine, whether by themselves or by others, namely by those outstanding theologians mentioned above, both of the Society and of the Dominican family, who were assigned to this purpose, and who with all care, so far as morally possible, as was right, proposed to bring forward once again and once again the more select testimonies of Augustine in their favour, expounding and weighing them; then it might perhaps seem to someone that so firm a stand could not be made by the opinion of such great men, on the ground that the cause had not been examined altogether, but that something else of greater weight than what had been adduced was left for each of the contending parties to allege, and that something was left to be examined: but those men who assisted together with the Supreme Pontiff were not few in number, but were of quite a considerable number, namely up to at least thirty; and a large part of them did not stand for middle knowledge according to Augustine's mind, and another and still larger part stood against it, and according to the mind of that same holy Doctor; but all of them, with one or two exceptions, felt that Augustine opposed it, and afterwards, with one or two excepted, they were not of the Dominican or Jesuit family, and finally, having examined all, or the more select, testimonies which could be adduced for either side, they judged as is clear from what has been said: therefore there is no ground from which the opinion advanced by them can be invalidated; and consequently it will be very difficult to believe that they did not touch on Augustine's mind as to this; and accordingly it must be said beyond doubt that that middle knowledge aforesaid is opposed to Augustine, as they themselves felt.

72 All the aforesaid things are confirmed by the fact that certain learned and religious men (whom we have known and consulted as Lectors of Theology at Salamanca and at Alcalá in their colleges) disclosed to us that they had at some time been addicted to middle knowledge, and (so to speak) imbued with its odour and affected by its colour, and had devoted themselves to the reading of Augustine on purpose; so that from him, as from a source, they drew his mind, and confirmed that middle knowledge by his own testimonies; yet from the aforesaid reading they plainly learned that Augustine is very much opposed to the aforesaid knowledge and stands for the opposing opinion. And therefore they laid down that old opinion about middle knowledge which they had imbibed, and embraced another opposed to it which they had previously rejected; because they plainly saw that it is this, and not that, which Augustine professes everywhere.