Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

28 We raise this doubt especially concerning the mind of Saint Augustine, because, as regards the present disputation and others that concern this same point, the greatest weight must be given to his authority. For although his authority is always to be held in high esteem, in the present matter especially care must be taken about it, as is clear from the definitions of the African Council, and from the Decretal Epistles of Innocent, and Boniface, as well as Celestine, and Saint Leo, and Gelasius, in which his opinion on this matter, against those impugning it, was approved: and so no one is permitted to depart from it, as Alvarez shows more at length in the first book on aids, disputation five, and Suarez in the book on grace, prologom. 6.

Hence what Molina says is not to be admitted, namely, that many of the faithful were disturbed by the disputations of Augustine and lapsed even into Pelagianism. By this he seems to insinuate that the opinion of Saint Augustine, and his doctrine against the Pelagians, is not to be held so important: in which, as we shall prove at once, he knew this middle knowledge and refuted it, although Molina persuades himself that it lay hidden from Augustine.

For the following openly tell against this. Then too what we said a moment ago. Then also the words of Saint Prosper at the beginning of the letter to Augustine, which stands before the books On the Predestination of the Saints, where he thus says: When this book of your beatitude has been set forth (that is, the book On Correction and Grace), just as those who formerly followed the holy and apostolic doctrine of your authority have become much more intelligent and better instructed, so those who were hindered by the obscurity of their own persuasion have drawn back, more averse than they were. From which words it is clear that the faithful were not disturbed but enlightened by the disputations of Augustine; but that those became more averse who formerly followed their own sense and measured the understanding of the truth by their own persuasion.

Deliberately, therefore, in the title we have inquired into the mind of Augustine, not anyhow, but as drawn from his testimonies, on account of the things which we shall say at the beginning of the following doubt.

§ I. The opinion affirming.

29 The affirming side is held by all the authors of middle knowledge, whom we shall bring forward at the last doubt of this disputation. And although many testimonies of Augustine, as well as of others, are adduced for it: yet since most of those prove only the knowledge of future conditionals, of which we treated in the preceding disputation, and consequently the knowledge of those in the divine decree, efficacious and infallible, they have nothing peculiar by which, even in outward appearance, they would recommend this middle knowledge; others, however, rest on this, that for the calling — lofty, secret, and congruous, which is rejected by no hard heart, and which Augustine often admits — there is required the knowledge of God with respect to that calling, which is prior to the free and efficacious decree of the same, lest created freedom be wounded: and we have said enough about this above, showing how the aforesaid decree in no way wounds the freedom of created free choice: we shall moreover show it again in the treatise On the Will of God, disput. 10. num. 78. and thenceforward: on this account we deliberately omit those testimonies and choose one or another, which seems to entail some difficulty.

The first of these is found in the first book To Simplicianus, question 2, where he says that when the calling is congruous, that is efficacious, it depends on the manner in which each one is disposed, so as to consent to the calling; and then he adds: Although many are called in one and the same manner, yet because they are not all disposed in one and the same manner, those alone follow the calling who are found apt for receiving it, and this is none the less true: it is therefore not of the one willing, nor of the one running, but of the merciful God who called in this manner, as was fitting for those who followed the calling. Here, as you see, Augustine does not have recourse, in order that the calling be efficacious, to the divine decree, but to this, that a person who is called be matched to the manner in which he is disposed: and so it necessarily presupposes, in order that that calling be efficacious, that God should will efficaciously to be efficacious — which he foreknows will be each man's future disposition, so as to adapt the calling to him: and for this reason the same Augustine adds: If God should will to have mercy on them, he could call them in such a way as would be fitting for them, so that they should be moved.

30 The second, however, is found in the same Augustine, second book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 14, where he says: To have, in a certain way in the very genius of the soul, a natural divine gift of understanding, by which they should be moved to faith, if, in accordance with their minds, they either hear words or behold signs. Here too the holy Doctor has recourse to the disposition of the one called, insofar as he is called as accords with his own mind. From which it seems to follow that the truth of this future contingent and conditional event — namely that Peter, for example, would be moved to faith from the natural gift of understanding excited by grace, if it were preached to him in accordance with himself — is known by God before his efficacious decree. For if that truth followed from the divine decree, it would then agree not only with some, but with all, concerning whom the aforesaid decree was made. Wherefore, since Augustine says that it is true only of some that they consent when thus called — those, namely, who in their very genius have naturally a divine gift of understanding, by which they may be moved to faith, if, in accordance with their minds, they either hear words or behold signs — the sign is that it is felt, that the event foretold is known by God not from the force of the efficacious decree and consequently to it, but antecedently to it, and by reason of the objective truth which it has: which, as is clear from what was said in num. 1. of this disputation, is to admit middle knowledge.

§ II. The mind of Augustine is revealed by one illustrious testimony of his own.

31 It must nevertheless be said, according to the mind of Augustine as drawn from his testimonies, that the aforesaid middle and conditional knowledge, or (which amounts to the same) infallible knowledge, is not to be granted, both on the part of the subject and on the part of the object, with respect to future conditional contingents which are prior to the efficacious decree of the divine will. So think several, and most weighty, Doctors, whom we shall bring forward at the last doubt of this same disputation.

This is proved first by that testimony of Saint Augustine in the first book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter fourteen, which we touched upon above: where, disputing against the heretics who assert that before the efficacious decree of his will God foreknows what each one would have done, good or evil, if he should live long, and that on account of these good works thus foreseen he predestines or reprobates each one of those whom he has decided to create, and at the same time those whom he has snatched away by a premature death before they reached the age of adults, he thus says, explaining that of Wisdom 4: He was snatched away, lest wickedness should alter his understanding: for it was said according to the dangers of this life, not according to the foreknowledge of God, who foreknew that which was going to be, not that which was not going to be: that is, that he was going to give him an untimely death, so that he might be taken out of the uncertainty of temptations, not that he was going to sin, who would not have remained in temptation. Here, as you see, a twofold future is involved in this testimony, though at once saying so, namely that he was going to be snatched away by an untimely death, so that he might be taken out of the dangers of temptations; and another, namely that if this same one who was snatched away should remain in this life, he would then fall into sin. And of the first, which truly is future, because God truly decreed that man should be snatched away by an untimely death, so that he might be rescued from the dangers of temptations, he says that God certainly has an absolute foreknowledge: since, the aforesaid decree being posited, such an effect was absolutely going to be. But of the second future, which before the efficacious decree of the divine will has only the outward appearance of a future — in which sign the heretics asserted that it was going to be — Augustine teaches that it is not foreknown by God, from the fact that he foreknows as future only that which is future; whereas that future, in the manner in which the heretics constituted it (that is, before the aforesaid decree), is not going to be. And so the holy Doctor concludes: Because this he foreknew that which was going to be, not that which was not going to be.

32 The objection occurs twofold in Suarez, first book on grace, prologom., second chapter, fourth, num. 2. and 3., and in the second book On Conditional Knowledge, chapter second, num. 8. Here in the first tractate On the Knowledge of God, disput. 7. cap. 5. and 10., and others. ¹ First indeed Augustine impugns only the present evil use of middle knowledge, with which these heretics abused it, inasmuch as they asserted that from good or evil works, foreseen through it under a condition, God was moved, as on account of merits or demerits, to punish, or to bestow grace and eternal salvation; but not the aforesaid knowledge absolutely in this testimony, and taken in itself.

But this solution is not according to the mind of Saint Augustine. And this, so that it may be grasped more clearly. It must be assumed that the heretics, who admitted this middle knowledge, were among others Pelagians, who, in order that they might be saved — that is, how grace was not given gratis but from merits, and on account of good works foreseen before the decree conferring it — asserted that God foreknows what each one would have done on this or that occasion, and that on account of these good works foreseen grace and eternal salvation are bestowed on them by God, as something falling under the merit of the aforesaid works. And when the Catholics pressed these heretics with that argument, namely that to some little children dying before the use of reason baptism and eternal life are conferred, when yet no good or evil works would be future in them, they then had recourse to middle knowledge, asserting that God, through this knowledge, and consequently prior to his efficacious decree, knew what each one of those little children would have done, good or evil, if he should have remained longer in life and had reached the age of adults: and that to some of them he bestowed baptism and eternal salvation, because he foresaw that they would work well at the aforesaid age; but to others he denied the grace of baptism and eternal salvation, because he foreknew that they would work badly if they should reach the age of adults.

Wherefore Saint Augustine, disputing against these heretics, impugns this middle knowledge from a twofold basis. First indeed, and principally, because on account of good works future under a condition, yet never actually performed, God bestows no reward; just as on account of evil works foreseen in the same manner, yet never actually put into execution, he does not punish. Second, however, and less principally, because the aforesaid middle knowledge is impossible, and corresponds to no object which has as yet conditionally the being future: since before the efficacious decree of the divine will, in which sign this middle knowledge is placed by its authors, nothing is as yet future under a condition.

33 That this is the mind of Saint Augustine is clear from letter 105. to Sixtus, and 107. against Vitalis the Pelagian, and the second book Against Two Epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 7, and the first book Against Vincentius Victor, chapter 12, and the twelfth book On Genesis, on the letter, chapter 6.

From which testimonies the following refutation of the solution of the opponents, reduced however to this form, is derived. For Augustine refutes this error of the Pelagians from both of the bases just mentioned: he therefore not only refutes the evil use of middle knowledge (as the opponents speak), namely that from good or evil works future under a condition, and foreseen through this knowledge, yet never actually performed, God punishes or rewards; but he also removed the same middle knowledge from the midst. What is antecedent as to the first part, namely that Augustine refuted this error of the Pelagians on account of that evil use of middle knowledge, or on the ground that on account of good or evil works future under a condition, yet never actually to be performed, God neither punishes nor bestows goods, is clear. Then, from the second book already cited, Against Two Epistles of the Pelagians, chapter seven, where he thus says: And so you certainly despise the one of whom, when the truth is told, it was said not on account of the works but on account of the caller, while you say that Jacob was beloved on account of future works which God foreknew he would do; and so you contradict the Apostle who says: Not on account of the works, as though he could not say: Not on account of present, but of future works; but he says: Not on account of the works, in order that he might commend grace. Then also from the first book recently cited, On the Soul and its Origin, chapter 12, in these words: For if the sins which a man would have committed if he should live are condemned even though not committed, no benefit has been conferred on him who was snatched away lest wickedness should alter his understanding: since he will be judged according to that malice which was going to be future in him, not according to that innocence which was found in him, and of no dead man who has been baptized (even a little child) can there be security, because even after baptism men are able not only to sin in any way, but even to apostatize. What if therefore he who has been baptized is snatched away hence was going to be an apostate if he should live? shall we not judge that no benefit has been conferred on him, because he was snatched away lest wickedness should alter his understanding, and that, on account of God's foreknowledge, he is to be judged not as a faithful member of Christ, but as an apostate? For how much better would it be, if the sins not yet committed, not yet known, but foreknown and future, were punished, that those two should be cast out of Paradise before sinning, so that they should not sin in a place so holy and blessed?

34 As to the second part, namely that Saint Augustine also refuted the opinion of these heretics from another basis, namely from this, that its object, namely the future conditional prior to the efficacious and conditional decree of God, does not have the being future even under a condition, the same antecedent is urged from the same places. Then from this testimony of Saint Augustine from the book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 14, about whose exposition we are engaged. For, as we have seen, there he concludes that the conditional is not known by God, namely that he who had been overtaken by an untimely death would sin gravely if he should live longer: on the ground that in that sign, in which the heretics were speaking about him, and which is assigned as middle knowledge, namely before the efficacious decree of the divine will, it does not have the being future: and so it cannot be in that manner not foreseen by God. To this refutation the opponents do not sufficiently respond, as will be clear to the reader. Then also: because in the same second book, Against Two Epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 7. cited a moment ago, after he had brought forward those words related in num. 33. by which he refuted the opinion of the heretics from that first basis, he immediately overturns it from this second one: and so, adding the example of two little children, who died before the adult age, one with Baptism and the other without it, he thus says: For in what manner did he foreknow those things which were going to be future for them while still in infancy? And he gives the reason: Because his foreknowledge cannot be deceived, he foreknew rather that they were not going to be future. Where, as is clear, he does not refute this middle knowledge, or the knowledge prior to the efficacious decree of the divine will, on the ground that on account of good or evil works foreseen through it under a condition God punishes or bestows a reward; but on the ground that divine knowledge cannot be deceived. And so, since in that former case those good or evil works are not future with an infallible futurition (of which we are speaking, and for the knowledge of which middle knowledge is introduced in that former case, but not for the attaining of a fallible and conjectural futurition) but rather are not future in that former case in a negative sense: therefore divine knowledge, which cannot be deceived, cannot foreknow that those things were then going to be future, but rather he foreknew that they were not going to be future. And therefore he concludes: Because his foreknowledge cannot be deceived, he foreknew rather that they were not going to be future, so as to signify plainly that those objects are not knowable as future in any way, on the ground that they have entirely no such being, but that God would have to be deceived if he knew them as future in some way: otherwise he would not have come: he foreknew rather that they were not going to be future. Then also from the same first book, On the Soul, chapter 12. cited above: where, once this knowledge has been refuted from that first basis already mentioned, he does not stop there; but he goes on further to overturn it from this second one. For the aforesaid knowledge, as it was asserted by the Semipelagians and Pelagians, namely as prior to the decree of the divine will, and consequently in the sense of middle knowledge, which consists in this, is not to be admitted. And so he adds: What of the fact that foreknowledge itself is thereby utterly emptied out, if that which is foreknown is not going to be? For in what manner is it rightly said to be foreknown as future that which is not going to be future? Where, from the defect of the knowable object in that former case, because, namely, it has then no being future at all, Augustine concludes that foreknowledge is utterly emptied out, or reduced to nothing.

35 This is confirmed first from the same Saint Augustine, book 26. Against Faustus, chapter 4. Where he posits as future only that which God in fact made future; but not that which would have been future of itself, but which God made so as not to occur. And thus he says: If I should hear that something was going to be future, but God made it so as not to occur, I would answer most confidently that what God made was rather going to be future, not that which, if it had been going to be future, he would have made this: for God certainly knew what he was going to do, and therefore at the same time he knew that that was not going to be future which he was going to make so as not to occur. Where Saint Augustine plainly affirms that the futurition of things depends on God's making, but does not precede his will, and consequently in the aforesaid words he also impugns this middle knowledge from the defect of its object: on the ground that before the efficacious decree, whether absolute or conditional, of the divine will, and consequently before God makes something future, whether absolutely or conditionally, nothing has the being future, as yet under a condition.

36 This is confirmed secondly from the same Saint Augustine, book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 17. Where, speaking of the beginning of our faith, and of other good works leading to eternal salvation, he says: If there is no predestination, which we defend, things are not foreknown by God: and consequently he holds that they are not foreknowable by God before his decree, nor do they have the being future antecedently to it: because it does not hold that those things are foreknowable in that former case, and foreknown by God. And for this reason Augustine often says that if he has predestined, he certainly has foreknown; but the good things which he has not predestined, he has not foreknown. Where he plainly rejects the knowledge prior to the decree of the divine will, or (which is the same) middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, brought forward by the opponents, and not only its abuse (as they themselves speak): for in the aforesaid words he does not overturn it on the ground that from good works foreseen under a condition, yet never actually performed, God is moved to reward; but because if the aforesaid decree of the divine will does not exist, and consequently prior to it, God cannot have an infallible foreknowledge of such works.

Add that, as we shall say in disputation 11. num. 14. and the following, from the very fact that God foreknows, before the efficacious decree of his will, conditional good or evil works in the manner in which it is spoken by the authors of middle knowledge, he cannot in any way be moved to predestiny or to reprobate on account of the aforesaid works.

37 From this also the second solution of the opponents remains refuted, namely that in this testimony of the first book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 14. which we have examined and elucidated in this first proof, Augustine denies only the absolute foreknowledge, or that of vision, and not the conditional, or middle knowledge. Because by no means does he deny that God foreknows those future conditionals; but that he foreknows them as absolutely, and in every respect, future. And finally he denies only that it should be called foreknowledge; but not that God truly has knowledge of them. Because foreknowledge signifies the relation to that which will at some time absolutely have the being future; knowledge, however, otherwise: and consequently, as was said in the first solution, to reject only that knowledge with regard to its abuse, namely with regard to this, that God punishes or rewards on account of good works conditional, as foreseen through this knowledge.

The opponents confirm this solution on the ground that, if Saint Augustine had excluded those conditionals from the divine knowledge, so as to deny absolutely the middle and conditional knowledge, he would also contradict the disciples of D. Thomas, who admit that God knows those future conditionals after his decree.

From what has been said, therefore, this solution remains refuted: since, as we have seen, on that ground Augustine teaches that these future things are not foreknown by God before the efficacious decree of his will, and consequently not through middle knowledge, because his knowledge cannot be deceived; and it would be deceived if he foreknew as future that which truly is then not future. This reasoning, however (as is clear), and that which we brought forward in its confirmation, prove not only that foreknowledge is denied by Saint Augustine, but also the knowledge of such future things; which in his opinion have true being future only in name, and not in fact, infallible.

38 Add first that neither the Pelagians nor the Semipelagians, against whom Augustine disputes there, asserted that God has an absolute foreknowledge of good or evil works which those who were snatched away by a premature death before that same age were going to perform in the adult age; nay, it could not occur to anyone to think so, since it is evident that such future things are not absolutely such things, but only conditional: wherefore, since Augustine refutes that knowledge of future things admitted by these heretics, on the ground that that which is not thus future cannot be known with certainty and infallibility, then either he spoke altogether beside the point, or he refuted expressly that conditional and middle knowledge which these heretics themselves were establishing (though not heretically in this particular).

Add secondly, and this same point will be explained more clearly. For it does not seem worthy of Augustine that, disputing against these heretics and denying absolutely this foreknowledge, he should have intended by this denial only that that knowledge should not be called foreknowledge, as the opponents teach. What concern would the Pelagian have, that it should not be called foreknowledge? if there were in God a true knowledge of those good or evil works, as of futures infallibly under a condition? and so it was unimpaired for God to use the aforesaid knowledge for bestowing or denying grace, just as if it were, or were called, foreknowledge: therefore, if the mind of Saint Augustine was to conclude against these heretics that there is not in God foreknowledge of such future things, he ought also to have denied the very relation of knowledge, and not only the name of foreknowledge.

Add thirdly that, if once the relation of knowledge is granted to God with respect to these future conditionals, and antecedently to the efficacious decree of the divine will, there is no reason why the name of foreknowledge should be denied to it. And so the same Augustine calls that knowledge, which God had of the future conversion of the Tyrians and Sidonians, conditional under a condition, and after the efficacious and conditional decree of his divine will, as we saw from the same Augustine in num. 26, foreknowledge and prevision: On the Gift of Perseverance, cap. 9. and 11. as the opponents themselves also admit.

39 It makes no difference if, together with Arrubal, who follows this second solution in disputation 44. and impugns the former, you say that Augustine calls that knowledge a foreknowledge improperly so called, inasmuch as it precedes the act of the divine will, and not inasmuch as it precedes in duration the thing known: which, indeed, is required for the relation of foreknowledge properly so called, and which is not found in the aforesaid future conditionals: on the ground that they will never have true duration; just as they will never have true being.

It does not, therefore, turn on this. For against this it is that, if it was permissible for Saint Augustine to call that knowledge a foreknowledge improperly so called, why was it not also permissible for the Pelagians to use the name of foreknowledge in this acceptation? or whence is it clear that they usurped the name of foreknowledge, according to which foreknowledge signifies knowledge which in duration precedes a thing which will at some time truly endure? since Augustine does not say this: nor could it have occurred to them, that those future things which they themselves admitted only under a condition as future, but never absolutely, should at some time truly have duration: and consequently neither could they have used the name of foreknowledge with respect to these future things, according to which foreknowledge signifies knowledge which in duration precedes some thing which will at some time truly endure.

40 Nor does what Francisco Suarez brings forward in support of this solution favour him, namely that, if Augustine excluded those conditionals absolutely from the middle knowledge of God, that is, from what precedes the divine efficacious decree, he would also contradict the Thomists, who admit that God knows those things after his decree.

It does not, therefore, favour him, as it seems to stand of itself. For the mind of Augustine was only this, that God does not know those conditionals before his decree: on the ground that the Pelagians did not admit knowledge of those future things which would follow after the decree of God, and would not be prior to it. For if they had admitted this, their opinion would have been emptied out, in which they asserted that grace is given on account of merits: since that decree was prior to all merits, and to all our will, even to that which is conditionally future: and consequently the knowledge which would follow this decree would know that which God had defined beforehand, and not something which on our part would be prior to grace. Wherefore, this decree being granted together with Augustine and the Thomists, the error of Pelagius is emptied out, and the reasoning of Augustine does not hold. For foreknowledge is not exhausted if God knows, infallibly and under a condition, as future that which he himself has first defined to be in this manner: but this decree being denied, divine foreknowledge is exhausted, and Augustine's reasoning holds: for that is foreknown as future on our part which will not be future, as yet under a condition, before the aforesaid decree, as we said from the same Augustine.

§ III. The mind of Augustine is further explained by another outstanding testimony of his own.

41 The second testimony is found in Augustine, in the same first book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 9. But so that its force may be grasped more clearly, it is to be noted that on this same question about which we are engaged, Augustine was consulted by Saint Prosper in his letter to the same Augustine, which stands before the books On the Predestination of the Saints. For when the Semipelagians asserted that God has a decree by which he establishes that no one is saved except through the sacrament of Baptism, and that to this sacrament he has called all men, so that those who wish may become sons of God; but those who do not wish may be without excuse, and thus, indiscriminately, as far as is on God's part, he wills that all be saved — admitting a certain inefficacious will for the salvation of all, yet not efficacious before the prevision of works in a conditional state, which anyone was going to perform on this or that occasion, if he were called in this way or that: because by such a decree, as Saint Prosper testifies in the letter cited, they held that the freedom of free choice was removed.

Wherefore, although they admitted an efficacious decree, or an efficacious proposal of God founded on foreknowledge, or depending on and following foreknowledge, they did not admit foreknowledge founded on an efficacious proposal, or foreknowledge supposing the aforesaid proposal, as in some way the relation of knowing. And for this reason they asserted that, of little children not reaching the age of adults, some die without Baptism and are not saved; but others with Baptism and are saved; because God foresaw before every decree what good or evil they were going to do, if they should reach the age of adults: and of those of whom he foreknew that they would lead a good life, he decreed to bestow the grace of Baptism and eternal salvation; but otherwise as to others: so that they might be saved in this way, because the efficacious decree is founded on foreknowledge, and not the other way round.

42 Since therefore the Semipelagians asserted this constantly, Saint Prosper, among the other questions which he proposed to Saint Augustine for explanation, put this one, which we have just been discussing, and expressed it in these words: Whether the foreknowledge of God remains so according to the proposal, that those things themselves which are proposed are to be taken as foreknown? or does this vary according to the kinds of causes and the classes of persons? so that, since the callings are different in those who are to do nothing and are saved, the proposal of God alone seems to exist; but in those who are to do something good, the proposal can hold by foreknowledge. Or indeed uniformly — since foreknowledge cannot be divided from the temporal proposal by a distinction — yet foreknowledge is in some order founded upon the proposal: and just as there is no business of any kind which divine knowledge does not anticipate, so there is no good which has not flowed into our participation with God as its author.

Where, as you see, Saint Prosper expressly proposes this very question, which we have just been discussing, to Saint Augustine for explanation: namely whether the proposal, or the divine and efficacious decree, precedes, and is in some way the relation of infallibly knowing those future conditionals; so that the infallibility of foreknowledge is founded on the aforesaid proposal, or decree? Or conversely whether the infallibility of the divine decree is to be founded on some foreknowledge which precedes it? as is clear from those words: Whether the proposal can hold by foreknowledge (that is, can have infallibility), or whether uniformly (that is, in all cases) foreknowledge is founded upon the proposal (that is, follows upon the decree and proposal of God)? And since by the name of middle and conditional knowledge (of whose possibility we are inquiring in this doubt) is understood the knowledge which attains futures under a conditional state, and which is prior to the divine efficacious decree, and consequently does not found itself upon it, nor follow upon it, but rather the efficacy of the decree is founded upon this foreknowledge, inasmuch as no future contingent which is to be elicited by created free choice can be defined beforehand efficaciously by God, unless he first foresees what that free choice, if it were called in this or that disposition, would do or would not do: it follows that Prosper has put to Augustine for explanation this very question which we have just been handling; and consequently he has in fact inquired whether middle and conditional knowledge is to be admitted according to his own mind.

43 Not only D. Prosper, but Saint Hilary of Arles also, in the letter sent to Augustine which stands before his book On the Predestination of the Saints, proposed this very difficulty to Augustine for explanation: where he narrates how the Massilians established that the conditional foreknowledge of our future works cannot be otherwise than precede the efficacious decree of God concerning those same works, lest the freedom of created free choice be wounded otherwise; and he adds that the Massilians corroborate this their manner of speaking from the words of the same Saint Augustine in his previously written books, such as that in the book On Six Questions against Porphyry, that Christ the Lord willed then to appear and to preach his doctrine among those of whom, and where, he knew that those would be who would believe in him, if the Gospel were preached to them. The words of Hilary, with which he addresses Augustine, are these: But when it is said to them why the Gospel is preached to others, or somewhere, or is not preached, etc. they say that this is of divine foreknowledge, so that at that time, and in that place, and to those persons, the truth might be announced, or declared, when and where it was foreknown to be believed. And this they declare to be proved not only by the testimonies of other Catholics, but also by the testimonies of your holiness in the earlier disputation, as is that which your holiness said in the question against Porphyry, On the time of the Christian religion, the religion, that Christ willed then to appear to men, and his doctrine to be preached among those of whom, and where, he knew that those would be who would believe in him.

44 These things being supposed, the mind of Augustine is revealed by an elegant testimony drawn from the place cited, On the Predestination of the Saints, with which he thus answers this question and the objection drawn from his little book against Porphyry: But that which you recall that I said in my little book against Porphyry, under the title, On the time of the Christian religion, I said in such a way that I might pass over this more diligent and laborious disputation about grace, etc. And after he had repeated word for word what he had asserted in that little book, he added: Do you see that I willed to say this about the foreknowledge of Christ, without prejudice to the hidden counsel of God and of other causes, since it seems enough for the refutation of the infidelity of the Pelagians, who had put this question? For what is truer than that Christ foreknew who, and when, and in what places were going to believe in him? But whether they were going to have faith in him on their own account, once he had been preached to them, or were going to receive it as a gift from God — that is, whether God foreknew them only, or also predestined them — I did not then think necessary to inquire and to discuss. And so what I said, that he willed then to appear to men, and his doctrine to be preached among those of whom, and where, he knew that those would be who were going to believe in him, can also be said in this way: that he willed then to appear to men, and his doctrine to be preached among those of whom, and where, he knew that those would be who had been chosen in him before the constitution of the world. But since, if it were said in this way, it would make the reader attentive to those things which, from the admonition of the Pelagian error, must now be discussed more fully and more laboriously, it seemed to me that it was then enough to speak briefly, excepting (as I said) the depth of the wisdom and knowledge of God, and without prejudice to other causes, about which I thought it was not then, but at some other time, more opportune to dispute.

In this testimony three things are to be examined in particular. The first is that Augustine, explaining what he had said in the Questions against Porphyry, namely, that he willed then to appear to men, and his doctrine to be preached among those of whom, and where, he knew that those would be who were going to believe in him, says: that I willed to say this without prejudice to the hidden counsel of God, and excepting the depth of his wisdom and knowledge, that is, without prejudice to the divine counsel which involves, or presupposes, the efficacious decree, at least by way of the intention of the divine will, by which he defined beforehand efficaciously that future thing under a condition.

45 And the reason is this. For it was the customary phrase with Augustine and his disciples, against the Pelagians and Semipelagians, to explain by the name of the hidden counsel of God, and of the depth of his wisdom and knowledge, divine foreknowledge, and the decrees which presuppose the efficacious decree of the will of God, prior to the prevision of any future contingents, and following upon the aforesaid decree: on the ground that if God, after the prevision of the consent which is future under a condition, that this one or that one were called to faith on this or that occasion, should decree that this one should believe and that other should not believe; then there would be no place for this hidden counsel of God, nor would there be any depth of his wisdom and knowledge, if out of several who are called this one should believe and that other should not believe, and so of the others. For then the reason of the divine counsel, wisdom and knowledge could be assigned most easily, if it were said that he draws these to faith and not those, because these wished to believe, but not THOSE. And so there would be no place for this hidden counsel of God, nor any depth searchable by human genius in his knowledge and wisdom, against that of the Apostle: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, how incomprehensible are his judgments, and his ways unsearchable!

Wherefore Augustine and his disciples, in order to set themselves against these heretics and to denote that God does not elect to faith, nor decree the consent of created will, after the prevision of that same consent, under a condition of being future; but before the aforesaid prevision, even as conditionally future, and on account of the highest and most hidden ends, and on account of his unsearchable judgments, decrees efficaciously that this one should be converted to faith, whereas that other should not, whether absolutely or under a condition; for this reason they called the divine decrees, and the divine knowledge, concerning the aforesaid future things by the name of the hidden counsel of God, and of the depth of divine wisdom and knowledge; and they said that the same decrees are the unsearchable ways of the Lord, and the judgments of truth, thinking that it is not of sound minds to reproach this hidden counsel of God, and that contrariwise the judgments of God are haughtily asserted to be penetrable; and finally, that according to the opinion of the Pelagians, there will be no hidden counsel of God, nor will the reason of the divine will remain hidden.

46 And so Saint Prosper, in the Excerpta of the Genoese, in the answer to dub. 4. refuting the opinion of the Pelagians who reprobated this manner of thinking highly of God and his knowledge, and consequently asserting that it was going to be future that these should believe, but not those, without a presupposed divine decree (which also to be the opinion of those same Pelagians Augustine taught, On the Predestination, cap. 18.) thus says: It is therefore not of sound minds to reproach this: and to reckon the unsearchable ways of the Lord, that is, the gifts of mercy and the judgments of truth, as penetrable to the haughtiness of the Pelagians. For according to themselves the counsel of God is not hidden, nor is the reason of the divine will in concealment.

Which Saint Prosper also confirmed in the first book On the Calling of the Gentiles, chapter 25, in these words: Against all the haughtiness which glories in free choice, to resist with the most unconquerable opposition that opinion of the Apostle who says: For who discerns thee? or what hast thou that thou didst not receive? From which he concludes: The depth, therefore, of that question which we confess to be impenetrable in the admiration of the Apostle, is not solved by the willing and the not-willing of free choice: for although a man may have a good will and a bad will, yet unless it is given he does not have a good will.

Wherefore it comes back to the same point, in Augustine's phraseology, namely that he said that he had spoken about the foreknowledge of God with respect to that future faith of those men, in such a place and at such a time, if the Gospel were announced to them, without prejudice to the hidden counsel of God, and excepting the depth of the wisdom and knowledge of God; and that he asserted that he had spoken about the foreknowledge of God which presupposes the divine efficacious decree of their conversion to faith, if they were called to faith in such a place and at such a time. For if he had said that God has foreknowledge of that future faith, if the Gospel were announced to them, in such a way that this foreknowledge preceded the efficacious decree, he would then have done an injury to the hidden counsel of God, and to the depth of his wisdom and knowledge: for then it would not be unsearchable by us, why out of several called to faith he should draw these and not those?

47 The second, however, which is to be examined in this testimony, is that with the Semipelagians, nay even with Augustine himself, it was the same to say that we have faith from ourselves and not from God giving it; as to assert that God foreknew our faith only, and did not predestine it, that is, did not define it beforehand by his decree, and not by any decree whatever, but by one which efficaciously anticipates our will. For these heretics did not deny the concomitant concurrence, even in that foreknowledge of God, as Prosper says in the letter so often cited: That grace is an attendant, not a forerunner, of human merits. Nay even Pelagius and Caelestius, who asserted that grace is given on account of the merits of our works, did not exclude in such works of ours the concomitant gratuitous concurrence of God, as is clear from Augustine, first book Against Two Epistles of the Pelagians, chapter 19, where he thus says: You have said that in a good work one is always assisted by the grace of God, as by his own will, whereas a man beginning a good work with no grace of God is divinely assisted in the very act itself. Wherefore, since with Augustine and all the Fathers it is certain that we do not have faith from ourselves but from God giving it, it will also be certain with the same Augustine and the other Fathers that God does not foreknow our faith only, that is, that he does not foreknow it before his efficacious decree; but that he also predestines it, or defines it beforehand by his efficacious decree before its prevision: since, as we said a moment ago, with Augustine it is the same to say that we have faith from ourselves and not from God giving it, as to assert that God foreknows it only, and does not define it by his efficacious decree. And for this reason the same holy Doctor said in this testimony which we are examining: But whether they were going to have faith in him on their own account, once he had been preached to them, or were going to receive it as a gift from God, that is, whether he foreknew them only, or God also predestined them? etc.

48 Wherefore the same Augustine, in the book On Correction and Grace, chapter 12, in order to explain how that promise, by which God promised Abraham spiritual children through grace and faith, did not rest on the foreknowledge of future consent, but on the efficacy of the divine power and decree, used this manner of speaking: namely that he did not promise them because he foreknew that they would of themselves be good, otherwise he would have promised not his own, but what belonged to them; but, conversely, that that promise rests on the efficacy of the divine decree, and that Abraham thus believed it, of which manner of speaking there is no other reason than this, namely that, as we saw a moment ago, with Augustine it is the same to say that God foreknows only and does not predestine beforehand, or does not define beforehand, the faith of anyone; and that he who believes has that foretold faith from himself.

The words of Augustine which explain this same point clearly are these: For on that account he did not promise them to Abraham, because he foreknew that they would of themselves be good. For if it is so, that which he promised is not his own but theirs. But Abraham did not thus believe, but he was not weakened in faith, giving glory to God, and believing most fully, because what God has promised he is able also to do. He does not say that he is able to promise what he has foreknown. Which he also taught in the first book On the Predestination of the Saints, chapter 10, where, explaining this same promise, he says: He promised not on the power of our will, but on his own predestination: for if he had foreseen beforehand what he was going to predestine, he would certainly have promised it on the power of our will, as is also clear from what we said in the preceding doubt from num. 13. up to num. 23.

Wherefore, on account of this reason, Augustine, explaining in this testimony what he himself had taught against Porphyry, says: And so what I said, that he willed then to appear to men, and his doctrine to be preached among those of whom he knew that those would be who were going to believe in him, can also be said in this way: that he willed then to appear to men, and his doctrine to be preached among those of whom, and where, he knew that those would be who had been chosen in him before the constitution of the world. For when it is said absolutely that God foreknows some future contingent, it is always understood, according to the same holy Doctor, without prejudice to the hidden counsel and the depth of his wisdom and knowledge; that is, without prejudice to the divine, antecedent and efficacious definition, as we said from the same Augustine: and so it comes back to the same point to say that God foreknew who those were who were then going to believe in him, if the Gospel were preached to them; as to assert that God foreknew who those were who had been defined beforehand as going to believe, if the preaching of the Gospel were made to them.

49 Thirdly, finally, which is to be examined in this testimony from the first book On the Predestination of the Saints, is that with Augustine it is the same to say that God foreknows some free future, when and where he knew it was to be done; as to say that he foreknows that which he himself had chosen before the constitution of the world. And for this reason he subjoins in the same chapter in which this same testimony which we are examining is found: By predestination God foreknew those things which he himself was going to do. Whence it is said, He has done those things which are future, that is, he has made future those things which are future, in the manner in which they are future.

50 From this also it follows that of no account is the solution of a certain junior author who asserts that Augustine here is not speaking of future conditionals, but of absolute futures, which are seen through the knowledge of vision, and who supposes the efficacious decree of God, founded however on the conditional divine foreknowledge.

From what has been said, therefore, this evasion is excluded. Then because, as is clear from the letter of D. Prosper and Hilary, he was asked by them about the knowledge of future conditionals, and more particularly and more expressly by Prosper, whether foreknowledge is founded on the proposal, or conversely the proposal on foreknowledge. But if Augustine had not spoken of future conditionals, the interrogation of these Fathers which they were then intending would not have arisen.

Then also: because the Semipelagians, to whom this argument belongs, against whom Augustine meets the objection, did not say that the cause of the election of these was in them, from the foreknowledge of absolutely future good works, which are seen through the knowledge of vision; but only from the foreknowledge of the same works as future under a condition, as Augustine teaches in the same book, cap. 12, and in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, cap. 9. and the following, and as D. Prosper teaches in his Letter to Augustine, where, referring to the foreknowledge which the Massilians posited, he says: Let them fabricate futures which are not future, and let them be foreknown as a new kind of absurdity with them, and not to be done, and foreknown but not done. In which words he speaks plainly of the foreknowledge of certain futures fabricated by those same Massilians, that is, independent of the proposal and the election of God, which is of such a condition that it exists in God before the aforesaid foreknowledge; and for this reason they said that the divine proposal concerning the aforesaid futures is founded on this foreknowledge, namely the conditional one. For in the absolute foreknowledge, which is at the same time the knowledge of vision, and supposes the decree of God actually existing in it, it is evident that the opposite occurs. And so, because they themselves admitted the aforesaid conditional knowledge to be that on which the divine efficacious proposal was founded, the same Prosper took occasion to consult Augustine in the words cited above: Whether, namely, the proposal can hold by foreknowledge, or conversely whether that foreknowledge is in some way founded upon the proposal of God?

51 Then finally. Because Augustine speaks expressly in this testimony which we are examining of this conditional future, namely that those men would believe, if the Gospel were preached to them: which, although afterwards the posteriority of the reason passes over into the absolute, yet as it is under a conditional state, according to which reason it is considered, as it is expressed in those words, namely, if the Gospel were preached to all of them at the time of the coming of Christ, they would believe, has the being of a conditional future, and is subject to the divine efficacious and conditional decree, as will be clear from what we shall say in the treatise On the Will of God, disp. 5. num. 73; and it pertains, according to the opponents, to the conditional knowledge, by way of a conditional future: not indeed insofar as a conditional future expresses a future of such a kind that its condition is never purified; but according as each and every conditional, whether it afterwards passes over into the absolute or not; and so they say that every absolute future, in that under a conditional state it precedes itself under the absolute state, pertains to this middle knowledge.

52 Nor let it stand in the way at last, if you say that those words of Augustine, namely: It can also be said that he willed then to appear to men, and his doctrine to be preached among those of whom, and where, he knew that those would be who had been chosen by him before the constitution of the world, must necessarily be understood of the absolute election, or of the absolute decree, by which that passage of Paul is usually understood; and hence that Augustine is speaking only of the knowledge of absolute futures.

It does not, therefore, stand in the way. For it is customary with Augustine, as is clear from some passages cited in this doubt, to understand by the name of predestination and election the efficacious decree of God concerning any good thing defined beforehand. And so, although that passage of Paul may also be understood of the absolute election, and not of any election whatever, but of election to eternal beatitude, it is not against this manner of understanding that it should also be understood, by reason of the matter to which it is applied, of conditional election, concerning some good work; because by this middle election God foresaw who those then would be who were going to believe in him, if the Gospel were preached to them at the coming of Christ the Lord; and especially because Augustine says that the words quoted in this objection do not contain a sense different from that which he had given in the question against Porphyry, because there he had spoken without prejudice to the hidden counsel of God, that is, to a decree efficacious of itself and from its own merits, as has been said. Wherefore, since the sense contained in the words against Porphyry concerns this conditional future, that if Christ should come at such a time and should appear to these men, and the Gospel were preached to them, they would believe, and consequently the heretics used this same sense to confirm their own error: it follows that this sense also, quoted in this objection and drawn from the same Augustine, must be understood as concerning future conditionals; although these same futures afterwards pass over, by the posteriority of the reason, into the absolute.

53 Add that, even granting but not conceding that Saint Augustine spoke in this testimony only of absolute future contingents, so that these alone are infallibly known to God after the efficacious and absolute decree of his will, it would follow that, according to the same Augustine, the same thing would have to be said, with the proportion preserved, of the conditionals; so that they could be certainly known by him only after the efficacious and conditional decree of God. And the reason is evident: since the absolute future contingent must have its dependence on the same cause on which the future contingent and conditional must have its dependence; and so if the former depends on the being future absolutely from the will of God, efficacious of itself and from its own merits, prior to it and independent of it, the conditional will also depend on the same decree, efficacious of itself, but conditional on the part of the object: since just as the futures themselves are distinguished only by the being absolute and conditional, so also the cause and the efficacious decree of God can be distinguished in this alone; and hence, just as the knowledge of those rests on the proposal, but not conversely; so also the knowledge and the infallible cognition of these.

§ IV. The testimonies brought for the first opinion are met.

54 To the first it is to be answered that, granting that Augustine admits an efficacious calling (about which we say nothing for the present, so as to obey in every point the decree of our most holy Lord, our Paul V), it is to be said that, since the same Augustine teaches that the calling is congruous when it is fitted to him who is called, this is not to be understood as meaning that this aptitude and congruity is something self-subsistent on our part; but something inspired, or given, by God, and proceeding from the efficacious proposal of God. And for this reason this calling is sometimes called congruous, and sometimes the calling from the proposal: because Augustine, as he himself explains, always speaks without prejudice to the hidden counsel of God, that is, to the divine proposal efficacious of itself, as we said in num. 45.

Wherefore the same holy Doctor, explaining this aptitude at the end of that question, thus says: Who embraces in his mind anything which, when it does not delight, does not delight? or who has the power either that something should occur which is able to delight him, or that it should delight him when it occurs? for therefore, when those things which further us toward God delight us, this is inspired and the grace of God is given, not by our nod, and it is not obtained by industry or the merits of works: for it is He who gives the nod of the will, who gives the industry of the study, who makes the works burn with charity, He bestows, He grants. But about this testimony, and a fuller understanding of it, it will be said elsewhere, God giving.

55 From this also an answer is to be given to the second, namely that, even granting the supposition just mentioned about the mind of Saint Augustine (about which we say nothing for the present), it must consequently be said that those who have that gift of understanding are not foreseen to be moved to faith infallibly, unless they hear congruous words or see signs: but that these are congruous depends on the efficacious proposal of God.

Nor does anything prove against this what is brought forward there for the exposition of the same testimony, namely that, if that truth arose from the efficacious proposal of God, Augustine would not then have said that some have the divine gift of understanding, etc., but this would have to be affirmed of all: for it does not hold that God should decree something efficaciously and that the opposite should at the same time occur.

It does not, therefore, prove anything. For although all those, concerning whom the aforesaid decree is, have that divine gift of understanding, etc., yet because those concerning whom such a decree is do not include all those who are called, but this decree is given concerning some and not concerning others; for this reason, although all those, concerning whom that decree is, have the divine gift of understanding, nevertheless not all of them simply enjoy it, but some; although these some are all those concerning whom the divine decree turns.

56 But since Saint Augustine and the other Fathers sometimes state absolutely that God foreknows the aforesaid conditional future contingents, and sometimes do not make explicit mention of the conditional divine decree, for this reason it is to be held, by way of a universal rule, that they speak without prejudice to the hidden counsel of God, and to the depth of divine knowledge and wisdom: in which manner we saw Augustine to have spoken. This rule the same Saint Augustine employed even more explicitly and more generally in the book On the Gift of Perseverance, chapter 18, in these words: Sometimes the signification of predestination is conveyed by the name of foreknowledge, as the Apostle says: He did not reject his people whom he foreknew. This which he says (he foreknew) is not rightly understood unless he predestined; but to have predestined is to have foreknown that which he himself was going to do. What therefore prevents us, when we read in some place of the foreknowledge of God, and the question is of the calling of the elect, from understanding the same predestination? Thus far Augustine, whose words are to be held as a universal rule, so that whenever the name of foreknowledge is found, and mention is made of the calling of the elect, or of any good effect efficaciously and infallibly future (for the reason is the same in both cases, as will be clear to the reader), predestination is always to be understood through foreknowledge, that is, the predefinition which is present, or the efficacious decree of God, which is such from its own merits, whether that effect is efficaciously future under a condition or without it.

57 We have said: and mention is made of any good effect efficaciously and infallibly future: not indeed because no efficacious decree of God permitting those evil works, as to their wickedness, is given; and moreover the decree by which he wills, and efficaciously defines beforehand, those things as to the substance of the act, in which decrees, conceived either virtually or as to our manner, they are to be distinguished, those evil works are known by God in the manner suggested above; but because D. Augustine in the aforesaid words mentions only good effects; although from them the same conclusion follows with regard to evil works, the proportion being nevertheless preserved.

It makes no difference if you say that it is enough for this purpose that the decree of the objectively future is given, and that this decree is foreseen by God to be in the future, if the will consents.

For against this everything presses which we said in disp. 7. from num. 48. up to num. 75., and also the fact that what D. Augustine understands here under the name of foreknowledge, and the name of predestination, cannot conveniently be understood as a decree which is only objectively present, as is clear from itself.