Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Because from ignorance of terms, and also from a lack of a right understanding of the title of the difficulty, an ambiguity and a lesser apprehension of the matter under discussion are wont to arise; it has therefore been thought fitting, for the explanation of the title of this difficulty, and consequently of the whole disputation, to note briefly a few things.

§ I. Threefold observation for the explanation of the title of this difficulty, and of the whole disputation.

2 First therefore it must be recalled to mind, and noted with particular attention, what we touched upon at the head of the preceding disputation, namely that the knowledge of future conditional events, which we set out from sacred Scripture, from the Fathers, and from sufficient reason in the preceding disputation, is not the same as the middle knowledge, and conditional knowledge, which certain younger men teach, and which the disciples of D. Thom. commonly attack. For that knowledge of future conditional events which we admitted in the cited disputation, supposes a decree efficacious from itself and conditional, and existing in God, in whom future contingents are foreknown by him; and it does not constitute any middle knowledge between the natural and the free, but is simply free, since it presupposes the foreknown free and efficacious decree: and consequently it belongs to one of those two members into which the Angelic Doctor and his school divide divine knowledge adequately, namely into the knowledge of vision and the knowledge of simple intelligence. For, as we explained in disp. 9. num. 50. through 53. of this tract., that knowledge of future conditional events, however free it may be, pertains to the knowledge of simple intelligence.

Now the middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, which those younger men build up, is agreed to accord to God before every efficacious decree of the divine will. Because they hold that God, through it, before every efficacious decree existing in himself, knows future conditional contingents. And although some of them say that there is presupposed for it God's decree objectively present and afterwards future, it is not however the decree actually existing in him, nor even the decree objectively present and, in the following sign, future, which is efficacious of itself: and consequently they constitute it as a certain mean between the knowledge of simple intelligence and of vision, or (as they themselves speak) between the free and the natural knowledge of God: from the fact that it participates in both extremes, inasmuch indeed that it is necessary on the part of the subject, that is of God, since it does not presuppose the free decree of his will actually existing in him; and it is free on the part of the object, because it terminates at free objects.

From which also it follows, first, that this middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, is constituted by its authors as altogether necessary, in order that God may will, efficaciously and absolutely, the future existence of some created free act, without doing injury to its own liberty. Because unless through this knowledge God foreknows what the created free choice would will, if it were placed in this or that state and order of things, God could not, without injury to the liberty of that same free choice, decree absolutely that such an act would be present at some future time: and consequently He could not, without the said injury, predestinate or reprobate anyone, unless this knowledge went before and showed to what end the said free choice is to be inclined in this or that event.

Now the knowledge of future conditional contingents, which the school of D. Thom. admits, is not posited as altogether necessary, in order that God may will anything efficaciously; but rather it follows upon the efficacious decree, existing in God, which is efficacious of its own merits. And so God does not foreknow through it what will come to pass under the condition, because it will so come to pass, the middle knowledge, according to its authors, supposing the future event; but rather conversely the thing comes to pass conditionally because God foreknows it so: whence it is not posited as necessary for predestination or reprobation; but the whole business is resolved into the divine decree and its gentle, yet exceedingly strong, efficacy.

Secondly, it follows that this disputation about middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, as distinct from the said knowledge of future conditional events which D. Thom. and his school admit, is not about the name alone, as Suarez wishes, lib. 2. de scientia conditionatorum, cap. 3. num. 4.; since, as is clear from what has just been said, the differences which we have established between the two kinds of knowledge are not about the name, but about the thing itself, and very much about the thing itself, as will become evident to the reader.

3 Secondly it is to be noted that although the future conditional events, whose condition is sometimes purified, or sometimes fulfilled, did not pertain to the preceding disputation, as we noted in its dub. 1.; yet they do pertain well to this one, so long as they are considered under the status of future conditional events, that is, so long as it is not known that the condition has been purified, nor that the future event has been transferred from the conditional status to the absolute status, by means of the divine decree existing in God. Because the authors of middle knowledge contend that any future absolute event can be considered in a twofold status. First indeed in the conditional: and then through middle knowledge God knows what the will, for example, of a man would will, if it were placed in this state or order of things; or what it would be if placed in the opposite, or what afterwards if it were placed in many other and diverse orders of things. Secondly indeed in the absolute status, not just any, but following upon the divine decree, inasmuch as after God has foreknown through this middle knowledge what the said will would will in each of those states, if it were placed in them, He has decided to place it (for example) in this state, in which He foreknows that it would agree with the divine call. And so this consent, which before was only foreknown in the conditional status through middle knowledge, now appears in the absolute status, and through the knowledge of vision, after God has had that decree of placing it in the said order of things: in such a way, however, that this decree could only have had infallible efficacy if middle knowledge went before, and the said event itself in the condition preceded it, which, just as it could have come to pass in the opposite manner, nevertheless in fact and actually so came to pass, and so indeed was foreknown.

4 We have said, So long as it is not known that that condition is purified, nor that the future event is transferred from the conditional status to the absolute status, by a divine decree existing in God: because a future contingent existing antecedently to the divine decree in God also has, according to the authors of middle knowledge, the relation and the mode of an absolute future, though not altogether immediately such, from the fact that the decree of God actually existing in it is lacking. And so this proposition: Antichrist will be, in which true absolute futurity is predicated of the Antichrist, is most true in that sign: and therefore it pertains, still in this status, and precisely, to middle knowledge, and consequently to this disputation: although, because I have said a good deal about absolute futures in this sense, and precisely, in disp. 7., we shall say almost nothing about them here.

From which also (let us say this in passing) it is clear how middle knowledge signified under this name extends more widely than that denoted by the name conditional knowledge itself. Because according to the former signification it extends to absolute futures before the divine decree, but not according to the latter signification; but only to future conditional events, expressing some condition taken up in the ways described.

5 Thirdly (so that the terms of the title of this disputation and of the difficulty may more clearly appear), it must be explained and noted why this knowledge, about which the present disputation is inscribed, is called Middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge — which indeed is gathered from the two notations adduced. For in the first place it is called middle knowledge because it is midway between the knowledge of simple intelligence and the knowledge of vision. Then because of the reason touched on in the former notation, namely because it participates in both extremes, as a mean universally shares in the extremes: and therefore it is necessary on the part of the subject, just as the knowledge of simple intelligence; and it is free and contingent on the part of the object, because it deals with free and contingent objects, just as the free knowledge terminates at future contingents (taken, however, in a different way).

Then too, because the first knowledge which God has of creatures is the knowledge of simple intelligence, through which He knows them as possible. The second indeed is this knowledge, through which God knows those same creatures; not indeed under the status of pure possibility, nor under the status of absolute futurity; but under the status of conditional futurity: and not in any way whatever, but antecedently to the efficacious decree of God concerning such a futurity. The third indeed is the knowledge of vision, through which, after the said knowledge held in the second place, and after the decree of God which follows upon it in the way just explained, God knows those futures which are absolutely future. And so that knowledge which holds the second place between the former knowledge and this third one is deservedly called middle knowledge, since it stands between the two. Just as also (a point connected with what precedes) this knowledge is called middle knowledge for another reason, namely by reason of the object around which it deals: from the fact that between the thing purely possible, and the same thing under the status of absolute futurity, it is itself the mean under the status of conditional futurity, according to which it pertains to this knowledge.

6 From which also it is understood why the said knowledge is now called conditional: not indeed because it is such on the part of the subject, since if it were conditional in this way it would not be formally in God, but would be in him only if some condition were posited, as we said in the preceding disputation concerning the efficacious and conditional decree of God; but because it is conditional on the part of the object: because its object, as it is signified under this name, is either a future conditional event, of which we treated most especially in the preceding disputation, that is, one whose condition will never be purified, and consequently will never in fact exist; or a future conditional event which, although it will exist at some time, because the condition will be purified, or will be fulfilled, yet as it pertains to this knowledge is considered under the conditional status, and antecedently to the efficacious divine decree, and consequently as not yet transferred from the conditional status to the absolute status, as has been explained.

From which at length it is again understood in what way the present disputation differs, from another standpoint also, from the two preceding ones. For in the first of those, it is about absolutely future contingents alone; in the second indeed most especially about conditional events whose condition will never be purified; in this one indeed it treats of conditional events, be the condition purified or not purified; although, as we have already touched upon, the decision of it is gathered from what was said in each of the two. And because many things pertaining also to the present subject have already been said in the preceding ones, only those things will be brought forward here which have not been explained elsewhere.

Wherefore, gathering all these things into one, the sense of the title is this: whether, in accordance with sacred Scripture, there is to be given in God, antecedently to his efficacious decree, existing as conditional in him, some knowledge through which He certainly and infallibly knows future conditional contingents: whether they be from among the conditional events whose condition will never be purified, and which are never transferred to the absolute status; or from among the conditional events in which the condition is purified, and which pass over to the absolute status.

§ II. The first opinion is proposed.

7 The first opinion holds the affirmative part. Thus do many Doctors, whom we shall cite in this disp. num. 131. And although this opinion may be proved by its adherents from many testimonies of sacred Scripture, because however they only advise that the knowledge of future conditional events is to be given after the efficacious divine decree, we deliberately omit those; and we select only the single testimony which in its outward appearance seems to prove this opinion: namely that which we have often cited in the preceding disputation from Matth. 11. and from Lucae 10., to wit: WOE to you, Chorazin, WOE to you, Bethsaida, because if the mighty works had been done in Tyre and Sidon which were done in you, they would of old have repented in sackcloth and ashes. Where Christ the Lord upbraids the Bethsaida people and the inhabitants of Chorazin for their lack of penance: because the Tyrians and Sidonians would have done that penance, if those miracles had been worked among them. Now this reproach would be empty, if the Tyrians and Sidonians were going to do penance only because God had efficaciously predetermined that they would do it, if they had seen those miracles; and consequently if Christ had foreknown this future conditional event in his efficacious decree, which he had as God. For then the Bethsaida people and the inhabitants of Chorazin could reply that they too would have done penance on seeing those signs, if the said efficacious and conditional will had been present toward them. Just as also the Tyrians and Sidonians would not have been converted, if the said will had not been present toward them: and so there would be no ground on which they were upbraided by comparison with them.

8 The force of this testimony is confirmed and explained. For if Christ were to have suffered external signs far greater among the Gentiles, namely the Tyrians and Sidonians, than among the Jews, of whom this testimony speaks, then the force of the reproach wherewith he upbraided the Jews would be weakened: therefore much more will it remain weakened, there having been established on God's part unequal gratuitous wills toward the Jews and toward the Gentiles: so that toward the former he had only an inefficacious will; but toward the latter an efficacious and conditional will of their conversion. Consequently it is clear. Because if once the said efficacious will is admitted, or required, it cannot fail to lead to the effect predetermined by it far more than all external signs and conceivable miracles: since all these have only a fallible connection with the effect, that is, with the conversion and penance of the sinner; but the efficacious will predetermining the said conversion has an infallible connection with it, precisely because it is efficacious.

9 It makes no difference if you object, saying that the inhabitants of Bethsaida and Chorazin are justly upbraided: because they placed greater obstacles to divine grace than the Tyrians and Sidonians did. Now these greater obstacles they placed by their own natural powers. For although no one can prepare himself by the powers of nature and by positive divine grace, he can nevertheless place obstacles in the way of the same.

Against this, Herice argues, tom. 1. in 1. part. tract. 4. disp. 7. cap. 3. num. 15. For this placing of a greater obstacle, on account of which the inhabitants of Bethsaida and Chorazin are justly upbraided, can neither be merely the denial of a fuller response to the more abundant calls of divine grace, where there was neither a command nor any fault on their part in not responding; nor can it be the commission of greater sins; ergo it is none of these. The consequence seems clear: because this greater placing of obstacles can come from no other source, as will become evident to the reader.

The antecedent, however, as far as the first part is concerned, is evident: both from the context of the same testimony, inasmuch as it threatens that it will be dealt with more harshly with the Bethsaida people and the inhabitants of Chorazin than with Tyre and Sidon. And it is clear that on account of a blameless denial of response to the aids of divine grace no greater punishment is inflicted; and consequently God is not to be dealt with more harshly in his judgment with one who does not respond. Then too, because precisely, if that placing of a greater obstacle consisted in this blameless denial of response to the aids of divine grace, it would follow that the said aids were not efficacious: from the fact that it does not stand with efficacious grace — so as thus to join the denial of the act, on account of which it is given, in such a way that efficacious grace and the denial of the act, in view of which it is efficacious, are composed together in one and the same potency, at once and at the same time; ergo Christ's rebuke of the Jews would be rendered empty if there were not in God an efficacious decree of their penance, just as there was concerning the Gentiles. For they could thus accuse Christ the Lord: that if the Gentiles, when the same miracles had been worked among them, had been roused by God with only sufficient aids, they too would not have responded. For in the opinion of the Thomists, just as an aid and an efficacious decree and the denial of the act cannot be composed together, so neither can a decree and an aid merely sufficient and the act of penance for which it is given.

10 As for the second part, namely that this placing of a greater obstacle is not the commission of greater sins, so that on account of those they would be justly upbraided beyond the Tyrians and Sidonians, the same antecedent argues the same thing. Because if once this efficacious decree is admitted, then just as God predetermines good acts, so He also predetermines bad ones as to the entity of the act, as the Thomists commonly teach; ergo the Jews could not be upbraided by Christ beyond the Gentiles on account of the greater obstacles they placed to grace, on account of the greater sins committed by them: since they could reply to Christ's reproach: that if there had been in God that efficacious predetermining decree of those greater sins of the Gentiles, which there was concerning the Jews themselves, then they would have perpetrated those greater sins no less than the Jews, nor would they have placed lesser obstacles to God's grace.

§ III. The true opinion.

11 Nevertheless it must be said, in accordance with sacred Scripture, that this middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, is not to be admitted, or (which comes to the same thing) that there is not given in God a knowledge through which, before his efficacious decree, He certainly knows the said future conditional contingents. Thus do many and most weighty Doctors, whom we shall bring forward in this disp. num. 126. and thereafter. And although this assertion might be urged from many testimonies of Scripture, nevertheless, suppressing those, we select only the one. The truth of which seems to be unable to be preserved so well, if once this middle knowledge, or conditional knowledge, is admitted: and this is taken from Paul, first to the Corinthians 4., where he says thus: Let no one be puffed up for one against another, beyond what is written. For who makes you to differ? Or what have you that you did not receive? But if you did receive it, why do you glory as though you had not received it?

But in order that the force of the said testimony may be better weighed, it must be assumed that¹ which the adversaries constantly admit, namely that out of two prevented by an equal will of God toward them, and consequently with respect to those of whom God has no decree efficacious from himself touching their conversion, one can in fact be converted and is actually converted and consents to grace; whereas with the other it is otherwise.

12 With this supposition — whose truth or falsity we do not discuss at present — the said testimony can be weighed and pressed. For if God, antecedently to his efficacious and conditional decree, and therefore through middle and conditional knowledge, had foreknown, for example, that Peter was to be converted, but Paul contrariwise, if they were placed in such or such an order of things, and the will of God toward them were equal, then Peter could glory against Paul because he had separated himself from him by himself and by his own will: since, with a common and equal will of God toward each, and without there being a decree of God efficacious from himself concerning either of them, he separated himself from him, using for his own free choice that gratuitous will of God with which each was equally prevented; and consequently this separation would not have to be referred back to a diverse gratuitous will of God: since, once the efficacious will of God is excluded, before the foreknown consent of each, as it is excluded in this mode of speaking, all the gratuitous wills are equal, as is supposed.

13 It makes no difference if, together with the adversaries, you say that this separation of Peter from Paul, or that the latter consents to grace whereas the former does not, does not arise in Peter from the natural powers of his will alone, but at the same time from the gratuitous will of God: and thus it is to be attributed to God, who has the said will, although such a will is not infallibly efficacious; and consequently, although God infallibly foresaw the consent before the efficacious decree of his will, He will not thereby foreknow that Peter separates himself from Paul, but from grace, or from that gratuitous will of God, existing first and accepted first.

It does not depend on this, then. But in order that this — and at the same time what we intend at present — may be better grasped, it must be presupposed that for the present we are not disputing in what the efficacy of grace consists, nor how God influences in the supernatural order, nor what is derived from his efficacious will into the created will; but we set this aside: and we consider God before He efficaciously decrees the consent of the created will in that conditional status of which we made mention in the preceding §; whether afterwards He have such a decree, and whether grace proceed from him intrinsically efficacious or not; and we strive to show that if once in that former knowledge He knows future conditional contingents, and consequently Peter, for example, as corresponds to divine knowledge in that conditional status, is foreknown as consenting, but Paul contrariwise, then God would foreknow Peter's separation from Paul not by reason of the gratuitous will of God, but by reason of the innate liberty.

14 This being supposed, the preceding solution is refuted as follows. Because precisely, in that conditional status which is presupposed for this middle knowledge, God has not, in advance of Paul, an efficacious decree concerning Peter's conversion, by reason of which He would will the former to consent but not the latter, Peter can be seen to be, precisely in the first act presupposed for such a conversion, no more beholden to himself than Paul: because He has not toward him a gratuitous will greater than toward the said Paul; ergo He will foreknow that Peter's separation from Paul is to be referred back to the liberty of free choice, as into the first ground of the separation, and not into grace, or the gratuitous will of God. The antecedent does not need proof in the case of which we speak, and so it is admitted by the authors of the opposite opinion. The consequence, however, is proved. Because those things which coincide in something common to them and at the same time are distinguished and separated do not have their distinction and separation on account of that which is common to each, but on account of that which is peculiar to them; ergo, since Peter and Paul coincide, in the case of which we speak, in the gratuitous will of God toward them, and consequently are in this wholly equal, and are otherwise distinguished in their consent, it is necessary that this diversity and the separation of one from the other not be referred back to the gratuitous will of God, in which they coincide, but to the liberty of free choice itself, inasmuch as one of them, namely Peter, by his innate liberty has made good use of that gratuitous will of God; whereas the other, namely Paul, by his liberty has made bad use of the same.

15 It is confirmed, firstly. Because in the aforesaid event Peter and Paul are separated and are unequal in the second act, namely in the consent itself: ergo they must also be separated and be unequal in the first act; ergo, since this separation and inequality cannot arise in the first act from grace — since in it they are presupposed to be indistinct and equal — it must arise from free choice, or from something other than grace, on the part of that same free choice. This second consequence is clear from the first, and the first from the antecedent: because the separation and inequality in the second act is some effect arising from the first act; ergo whatever inequality and separation is found there must be presupposed, and shine forth, beforehand in the first act itself.

It is confirmed and explained, secondly, from the fact that D. August., lib. de praedest. Sanct. cap. 5., teaches. For explaining there that passage to the Corinthians 3., Let him who glories glory in the Lord, he says: But nothing is so contrary to this sense as that anyone should glory in his own merits, as though the grace which distinguishes the good from the wicked were not that which is common to good and wicked. Wherefore, since in the case of which we speak those things which are of grace are common to each of these two, of whom the one consents and the other does not consent, their separation cannot be referred back to the grace of God, or to the gratuitous will of God; but to that which is peculiar to each of them, namely that one by his innate liberty has made good use of the grace of God, or the gratuitous divine will, whereas the other has made bad use of the same; otherwise the reason brought forward by Augustine would not be legitimate; and consequently, if God before his efficacious decree foreknows this, He will certainly foreknow that one of them is separated from the other by his own powers.

16 It is confirmed and explained, thirdly, and at the same time a certain tacit solution is overturned. Because although that consent by which Peter was converted does not proceed from the liberty of his will alone, and consequently that gratuitous will of God does influence that separation, nevertheless if God before his efficacious decree foreknows such a consent, it is necessary that He also foreknow that the first root of this separation does not arise from the said grace, but from the innate liberty of Peter's free choice: ergo the force of the testimony of Paul brought forward by us is not preserved: since, as will become evident to the reader, it intends that the first root of the separation of one from the other is the divine grace, as has been explained; otherwise that reason of his would not stand; but one might be puffed up against the other and glory, on the ground that he himself was the first ground of his own separation from the other, although divine grace also concurred for this. The antecedent, in which the difficulty lies, is proved. Then, because, according to this mode of speaking, the concurrence of God promised from the force of that gratuitous will must be promised toward either of the two, so that if the created will should will to consent to grace, or to the gratuitous will of God, God would then concur to the consent; but if it should will to dissent, He would also influence together with it toward the dissent; ergo, that the will in act consents, is not to be attributed to grace, as to the first root, but to the created will, which had this peculiarity, that by its innate liberty it made good use of the said grace: ergo, precisely, because God before his efficacious decree, requiring Peter's conversion, foreknows that he will consent before Paul, then this consent of one above the other, and the separation of one from the other, will be foreknown as having its origin in the created will, as from the first root. Then too, because that gratuitous will of God toward him does not incline more to consent than that which is in God toward Paul; nor does it demand consent more in one than in the other; ergo, that which in Peter actually impels him rather than in Paul, and consequently that which is efficacious in the second act, must be referred back to the first root, in the liberty of Peter's free choice, who by his innate liberty has made good use of the said grace, although it also proceeds from the same grace: ergo, etc.

17 Then the same solution can be refuted by another route: presupposing, however, first what the adversaries teach, as is seen in Molina, namely that created free choice, prevented by the gratuitous and sufficient will of God, or holding itself on the part of the first act, has a peculiar proximate and innate power of acting, distinct from the power which is superadded to it by that gratuitous will of God, and which is not formally conferred on it by such a will, although it cannot influence a supernatural act by this power unless associated with grace.

But this being supposed, the said solution can be refuted otherwise, from what at least follows, namely that a man by his free choice, according to what he has of his own, associated yet with grace, is foreknown by God in the posited case as separating himself from another who does not consent; and this too is against Paul, who attributes this separation of one above the other, or that one consents while the other does not, to grace, and not to free choice according to what it has of itself, even if it be associated with grace: ergo, etc.

18 The consequence is proved. Then, because precisely, free choice has of its own some proximate active power, which is not conferred on it by that gratuitous will, although it cannot operate unless associated with it, it is necessary that that partial efficacy of the said free choice, as it precisely corresponds to its proximate and innate power according to what it has of its own, although associated with grace, and inasmuch as it is a part of one entire cause of its consent and separation, be foreknown by God as something which is not formally from that gratuitous will, but from the very nature of free choice; ergo Peter consenting will be foreknown as separating himself partially by what is his own, that is, by what has not been received through that supernatural and gratuitous will of God, but only through creation; although this partial separation of what is his own must necessarily be associated with the partial separation through grace. Then finally (by which the preceding proof is further explained), because that separation and inequality is not foreknown, according to the opposite opinion, as proceeding wholly and totally from grace as from the proximate principle, since grace is equal in both; ergo it is foreknown as proceeding partly from grace and partly from the will, according to what it has of itself, although associated with grace; and so the will of Peter will be able partially to glory against Paul, because he separated himself from him by what is his own, though associated with grace.

The falsity of the consequence, apart from the fact that it seems sufficiently clear from what has been said in it, can nevertheless be shown further in this way. Because if Paul says that a man is separated by grace, because the created will alone does not separate itself, but itself, according to what it has of its own, associated yet with grace, has itself proximately separated; then for the same reason it should be said that a man separates himself in part by what is his own, and that he is foreknown as such by God: because not only grace, but also the created will, according to the proximate power which it has of its own, concurs to this separation — which nevertheless, as is clear, is against the intention of Paul.

19 From which also the other solution of those who, feeling the force of these refutations, say this — namely that when it is commonly said that there stands the case of two prevented by equal gratuitous wills of God, so that the one consents but not the other, and consequently that in one that grace is rendered efficacious in fact in the second act, but not in the other, it is understood as being about equality in physical being, and not about equality in moral being; and so he who is converted, and is foreknown by God through conditional knowledge to be converted in the conditional status, can (let us say so) receive the same grace, wholly equal physically to that of him who is not converted, but not the same, or equal, morally in the first act. And they give the reason for this. Because precisely, since it is foreknown that he will consent with that gratuitous will of God toward him, in that order and series of things, and at that place and time; and at the same time it is foreknown that he will not consent with the same wills in another order and series of things, or at another place and time assigned to them, he has the greater grace morally in this, that God has toward him a gratuitous will equal in physical being at that time, occasion and order of things in which he is foreknown to be consenting, but not in others.

From what has been said, therefore, this solution remains refuted. Then, because Peter and Paul in that event are found to be not only separated by the consent, that is, by the second supernatural act, according to what is moral in it; but also according to what is physical in it; ergo, since every separation in the second act must presuppose a separation in the first act proportionate to it, it is necessary that, just as in the second act separation and inequality are found in actual grace, considered both according to moral being and according to physical being, so this same proportionate separation and inequality be found in the first act; ergo, since this cannot be foreknown by God as proceeding precisely from grace, which is supposed to be physically equal, it must be foreknown as proceeding from free choice by what is its own, although associated with grace, inasmuch as by its innate liberty it has made good use of that grace which Paul did not use, but abused.

20 Then too, because the second act cannot pertain to the first act, as is clear from the terms themselves; ergo, that the second act is foreknown as about to follow, precisely because the will of Peter in such an order, series of things, and occasions is called by the same gratuitous will physically equal to the gratuitous will toward Paul (if it is true that it can be foreknown before the efficacious decree of God, the opposite of which is clear from what has been said in the two preceding disputations), cannot be reduced to this, that that grace be morally unequal in the first act: since this inequality arises only from the consent which by lot befalls to be future, and such a consent is itself the second act: above all, because in order that something pertain morally to the first act, it must morally exist; but that act, foreknown as future, says rather the negation of existence as long as it is future: and so also on this account it cannot pertain to the first act, neither on its own account, nor on account of the middle knowledge by which it is foreknown; since the latter is speculative in the opinion of the adversaries, and does not posit, but rather presupposes, its object. Then finally (which follows from the preceding). For when it is said that in the case described there intervenes a greater moral grace, precisely because it is given in such an order of things and with such or such circumstances, then is the consent of the will, as it corresponds to the power and efficacy of free choice according to what it has of its own, associated yet with grace, counted among these circumstances? or not? but only the consent as it is from grace? If the first, then the partial separation made through free choice according to what it has of its own is counted there as well, and consequently it is involved there that it is foreknown by God that Peter, for example, is separated from Paul in the sense described, according to what he has of his own. But the second cannot be said, because the consent cannot be foreknown as from grace without its also being foreknown as from free choice. Since according to this mode of speaking the consent as from grace is not efficacious of itself to influence causally the consent, as it is when it is from free choice according to what it has of its own, associated yet with grace; but they behave purely concomitantly. Indeed, if there is any order between them, the consent as from free choice must come first. For the concurrence offered on God's part is indifferent as to this, that if the created will should will to consent, God should concur to the consent; but if it should will not to consent, God should also concur to this volition.

21 From all of which the other solution also remains refuted, namely that it is false on another ground to say that he who is converted has not received more, or that there was not in God a greater gratuitous will toward him; since he has received a supernatural consent, and the concurrence of God concomitant with it.

Against this, press what we said above, namely that this inequality of receiving this concurrence cannot but arise as from a partial cause, or as from an indispensable condition, from free choice considered according to its native and proximate power, although associated with grace: since that God should influence in act and give the concurrence of the supernatural order depends indispensably on free choice's also giving its own concurrence, according to what it has of its native power, associated yet with grace; and the concurrence concomitant with God is not a cause, or a reason a priori, according to this mode of speaking, of the concurrence of free choice considered according to the said reason; but they behave purely concomitantly, inasmuch as neither is it without the other, nor conversely; ergo, although God should influence in act through the concurrence concomitant with it, created free choice will be foreknown by him as separating itself in that part of the concurrence which it gives of its own, associated yet with grace, and which operates at the same time with God, co-operating with him.

It is confirmed, firstly. For here too what I was just saying presses, namely that precisely, since there is an inequality on God's part in the second act, there must also be an inequality on the creature's part in the second act; ergo, since every inequality in the second act must be referred back to the first act, and according to the opinion of the adversaries there is no inequality in the first act on God's part, or on the part of his gratuitous will, it is necessary that this be reduced to the created will, which by its innate liberty associated its own concurrence with the concurrence of God.

22 It is confirmed, secondly, from Augustine, lib. de praedest. Sanct. cap. 6., where he says thus: Many hear the word of truth, but some believe, others contradict. These therefore will to believe, those will NOT. Who is ignorant of this? Who would deny it? But when it is prepared for some and not prepared for others, it is the will of the Lord: it must indeed be discerned what will come from his mercy, what from his judgment. Where, according to Augustine, the distinction of the believer from the unbeliever proceeds from the gratuitous will of God, with which the will is prepared, and not from the concurring concomitant. Let us grant, then, that if we speak of the created will in that former stage, before God has decreed efficaciously concerning it, what it will operate in such or such a conditional status, it cannot be known with certainty and infallibility by any intellect, even a divine one, what it will will: not applying these statements to supernatural operations; then, with an equal gratuitous will of God, one created will consenting is foreknown and another not consenting; and so it is foreknown as separating itself, and by what is its own, from the other, and able to glory against the other.

Yet it is to be noted that we have deliberately spoken in this difficulty only about the equality of the gratuitous will of God, and not about the aids of grace, which are received in the created will, so as to utter not the least word, as far as possible, about these, so that we may stand as far as possible apart from the not altogether perfect observance of the decree of our most holy Roman Pontiff, by which it is provided that treatises and disputations on the efficacy of the aids of divine grace are not to be committed to the press:

§ IV. The foundation of the first opinion is resolved.

23 To the foundation, therefore, of the opposite opinion it must be said that it can also be retorted against its own authors; and consequently that it must be resolved both by them and by us, though from a different standpoint. Since in their opinion the Bethsaida people and the inhabitants of Chorazin could also say, in reply to Christ's reproach, that just as the Tyrians and Sidonians would have believed on seeing those signs, because they were ready for them in that series and order of things and occasions in which it was foreknown by God that they would consent and believe, although there were many other occasions on which He foreknows that, those same signs having been worked, they would not be converted; so if the same signs had been worked among the said Jews on many other occasions and circumstances in which it was foreknown by God that they would believe, then they would believe no less than the Tyrians and Sidonians. Whence it seems that it can also be complained of against Christ that, when He had foreknown both in the Jews and in the Gentiles certain occasions and circumstances in which, when called, they would respond; and certain others in which they would not respond, on seeing the same signs and being roused by the same internal and sufficient graces, He nevertheless chose for the Tyrians and Sidonians those in which He foreknew they would believe, leaving aside those in which He foreknew the contrary; whereas in Bethsaida and among the inhabitants of Chorazin He chose those in which He foreknew they would not consent, leaving aside those in which He foreknew that they would consent.

24 To this accusation, and to the apparent complaint of the Jews against Christ the Lord, the authors of the opposite opinion can respond in no other way than by saying that it was enough for the Jews to have all the aids of grace that are sufficient, both for the occasions on which they are foreknown to be consenting and for those on which it was foreknown by God that they would not consent; and thus it is to be laid to their fault that, being so called, they did not believe; nor is God bound always to choose those occasions on which He foreknows the created free choice, excited by divine grace, will be consenting; but as universal provident He can leave that free choice, for many and most upright ends, in those occasions in which He foreknows it will not consent, and permit this defect; otherwise grace would in no way be given to those who do consent and are established in the occasions in which they are foreknown to be consenting, if God were once bound to place them in the said occasions and not in others; nor would those other occasions be among those in which created free choice can be placed, if God could not place it in them without injury to the said free choice.

As therefore the authors of the opposite opinion thus evade the force of this apparent, though not true, response and complaint of the Jews, so we too meet the same objection by the same (though proportionate) way, saying that the Jews could not justly complain against Christ, nor could his rebuke be rendered empty: since he provided them, on seeing the said signs, with aids sufficient for believing, although he made them unequal to the Tyrians and Sidonians in that greater gratuitous will with which he had pursued them, by efficaciously decreeing that, if those powers and signs had been worked among those same Tyrians and Sidonians, they would long ago, or long since, have done penance. For God is not bound, once sufficient aids have been given, to have an efficacious decree touching the conversion, that is, of the consent to be given by created free choice; otherwise He would not concur with it as with a fallible free choice; which, according to the common course, very often fails. Nor finally would any grace be given to those with regard to whom God has the said efficacious decree.

25 All these things will be more clearly revealed, if one considers what we said in disp. 8. num. 16. and thereafter, and what we shall say in the treatise on the Will of God, disp. 10. num. 78. and following, namely that by this efficacious decree liberty is not taken away from those with regard to whom it operates: just as neither by its absence is liberty taken away from those with regard to whom God does not have it; and consequently neither by such a removal is anything lacking from the requirements for sufficiency with regard to the consent to be given to God calling. And so the malice which all wicked men have may be blamed in them, even if they are compared with those who are not wicked but most holy, such as the Apostles were; although toward these the gratuitous will of God was more abundant. And this for no other reason than that the said more abundant will is not counted among the requirements for the sufficiency of the created free choice to be able to consent, but that this having been denied, free choice remains with the requirements that are sufficient with regard to consenting.

26 And this solution is drawn from D. Thom. from the passages adduced in the disputations cited above and to be cited, as also from D. August., lib. de Dono perseverant. cap. 9. Where, speaking of this future conditional event, namely of the penance of the Tyrians and Sidonians, if Christ had worked among them the signs and miracles which he worked among the Jews: and concluding that God foreknows with certainty the said² future conditional event in the way in which we shall say: and that from this it does not follow that there is any inconvenience in this argument, he says thus: What wonder is it, if Christ knew in the earlier centuries the whole world filled with such unbelievers as to be unwilling deservedly to preach to those whom He foreknew would believe neither through His words nor through His miracles? This indeed we cannot say of Tyre and Sidon, and in them we recognize that these divine judgments pertain to those causes of predestination, and yet, without prejudice to which of those hidden causes, I said in answer: I SAID these things. For it is easy indeed for us to accuse the unbelief of the Jews as coming from a free will. Where, as is clear, Augustine means, first, that God foreknew this future thing concerning the Tyrians and Sidonians according to the hidden causes of predestination, that is, of his own decree; but not antecedently to the said decree, and consequently not through middle knowledge. Then also, how, notwithstanding the fact that God had the said decree concerning the Tyrians and Sidonians, he nevertheless says: that it is easy to accuse the unbelief of the Jews, because God had toward them a gratuitous will sufficient with reference to believing: and consequently that it proceeded from their perverse will that they did not believe. And so the holy Doctor added: For it is easy indeed for us to accuse the unbelief of the Jews as coming from a free will.

27 Add that this solution becomes more illustrious, if it is considered that the argument which the adversaries bring forward to recommend middle knowledge from this testimony was in the mind of Augustine in reality the argument of the Pelagians, who for this very reason denied that God converts us efficaciously by reason of his efficacious decree, and makes the unwilling willing, because then He would admonish us in vain, when He himself does not give that grace, or does not have that efficacious gratuitous will, by which we are made willing. And so, on the occasion of this argument, the Divine Augustine composed the book On Correction and Grace; in whose cap. 6., at the beginning of it, he says thus: For the Pelagians were saying: why are we admonished, accused, rebuked, blamed for what we do when we have not received it? We have not received obedience, they say; why then are we admonished, as though we were able to give it to ourselves? And to this argument the Divine Augustine answers in cap. 7.: Perseverance is the gift of God; yet we justly admonish those who, while living well, did not persevere: for by their own will they were changed from a good life to a bad one. Nor will they be excused by saying: we did not receive perseverance, in which we might remain in the good. For if those who have not heard the Gospel are not freed from damnation, much less those who have not received perseverance in the Gospel.

The foundation of which response can be nothing else than this, namely that for anyone to be justly admonished rather than another, it is enough that he had the sufficient means by which he could persevere, obey, or believe; and in fact did not will it: for no one is reasonably admonished unless he was obliged and could do it: and nevertheless he did not do it. Now for these three things to be given, it is not required that God have an efficacious decree touching his conversion, as is clear from itself: since precisely, if God have the said decree, the conversion will infallibly follow; and so the non-conversion will not stand together with the power and the obligation to convert, together with the said decree. By these things also the confirmation of this argument, brought forward at the beginning of the difficulty, is sufficiently established.