Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

55 For understanding the title we must note that a decree can be called conditional in two ways. In one way, both on the part of the subject, or act, and on the part of the object. In another way, on the part of the object; but not on the part of the subject, or act. A decree is then conditional in the first way when it is in fact not given, nor exists: yet it would be given, and would exist, if some condition were posited. This can indeed be explained by the fact that it is said that by it the will does not will, yet would will. On the other hand, a decree is said to be conditional in the second way when the act of willing is in fact given, by which the will wills that object; and so on the part of the subject it has the character of an absolute decree, or (which amounts to the same thing for the present) is absolutely and simply in the will: although, because by it nothing is decreed that is to be future in the absolute sense, but only under a condition, it is therefore said to be conditional on the part of the object, the object willed.

Secondly, it must be noted that this decree can be twofold, namely either efficacious or inefficacious. By the former, the thing decreed through it will infallibly be, provided that the condition is posited on the part of the object. By the latter, however, it will not be, or will not in fact have existence, if the condition were posited.

56 Thirdly, it must be noted that, according to the opinion of many, conditional decrees are under a twofold difference. Either so as to be positive, that is, positing a positive act of the divine will, by which the will positively wills a conditioned object. Or so as to be negative, not indeed in any sense whatever, for by this precisely is signified that God does not will any object determinately and in particular; but in the sense that by it is denoted that as yet, in that sign which in our manner of conceiving is deputed to this, so that after the necessary willing of those things which are formally in him, he immediately wills, or does not will, objects which are freely willable; when the aforesaid sign deputed to this free willing being present, if it pleases God, divine will is had negatively with regard to certain objects in particular, for example with regard to future conditionates, of which we are treating in the present.

The title of the doubt, therefore, as regards the first part, is not understood as concerning a decree conditional both on the part of the subject, or act, and on the part of the object; but as concerning a positive absolute decree, in the sense explained on the part of the subject, and conditional on the part of the object: and, as appears from the same title, it is understood as concerning a decree that is conditional and efficacious. Now when in the second part of it the question is asked whether, with these being set aside, the aforesaid futures can be known by God with certainty, and altogether infallibly? It must be understood in the formal and precise sense, that is, precisely with those positive decrees being excluded, yet those negative decrees being granted, and presupposed, does God know with certainty and infallibility the future contingent conditionates, of which the discourse is had in the present disputation? Having consulted, then, we restrict the difficulty of the present doubt as regards this second part in the following way: whether the aforesaid futures can be known by God with certainty and infallibility before every decree of his will, whether negative or positive, will be treated more broadly in the following disputation, by refuting middle knowledge.

§ I. Negative position.

57 The position denying the first part of the title, and affirming the second, in the sense however of num. 56 explained, and declaring it further at num. 67, is held by several of the Thomists, both the older and the later ones, whom we brought forward at dub. 2 of this disputation; and also by several others outside the school of the Angelic Doctor, though by a different route. For those deny such decrees on the ground that they think conditionals have truth in as far as they have the goodness of an illation: and since in future conditionates, of which we are speaking in the present, the illation is neither necessary and certain, but only conjectural or null, as in disparate cases, hence it is that God knows the aforesaid future conditionates only conjecturally on the part of the object, in which a conjectural illation is involved. Or if the connection is disparate, or null, then in no way does he know them: and consequently the aforesaid conditional and efficacious decrees will in no way be given in God, infallibly inferring a conditioned effect. Those, however, who are not of the school of St. Thomas deny the aforesaid conditional decrees for this reason, that they hold that God knows with certainty and infallibility such futures before any free decree: and consequently that these decrees are superfluous, or impossible, or have both of these defects. Thus Vazquez 1. part. disp. 67. cap. 4. num. 21. et 22.; Herice in tract. de scientia Dei disp. 7. cap. 7.; and very many others.

58 This position, as regards the second part, will be established from what will be said at num. 67 and thereafter; the first part, however, is proved first. For there cannot be given in God a free and efficacious act with regard to creatures unless some real change be posited in them: but in these future conditionates the divine will would posit nothing through the aforesaid conditional decree: hence it cannot have such a decree with regard to them. The consequence seems clear. The minor, however, is also established. For by the force of this decree creatures would never exist, nor have being in themselves; and consequently would never pass from non-being to being: hence by its force real change would never be posited in them. The major, however, is also evident. For the will of God does not presuppose, but makes, the object which it wills; and consequently it must produce in it some change, through which it passes from non-being to being.

It is confirmed, and explained. For in God there cannot be a free and efficacious act through a change in God himself: hence through some change to be undergone in the creature itself: hence precisely because this does not follow from the force of that conditional decree, neither will such a decree be given in God, as we were just saying. The antecedent requires no proof. The first consequence, however, upon which the second depends, is also established. For precisely because God has a free decree with regard to something, there must intervene between it and the thing willed some relation of reason: hence it is necessary that it be founded on a change in one of the two extremes: for with things remaining unchangeably, there is no reason why a new relation should arise: hence precisely because the aforesaid relation is not given, mediated by a change in God, it must be given mediated by a change in the creature.

59 Secondly, it is proved. For from the positing of these decrees an imperfection is posited in God: hence, etc. The antecedent is proved. Then, because they are idle and superfluous in him: for what use could it serve that God should decree that under a condition that thing be future which he otherwise decrees will not be future? and, moreover, that such a condition is never to be posited? since this cannot be necessary for a right and prudent governance. Hence in human affairs a governor would be superfluously and vainly wearied out in decreeing under a condition that which he himself otherwise decrees he will not do, nor that such a condition be posited. Then too: because a conditional willing with regard to some object is not the final resolution, but as it were dependent and suspended; and therefore it is proper only to those who proceed from the imperfect to the perfect in their deliberation: but God wills not with suspension, but always with the final resolution, from the fact that he deliberates most perfectly: hence, etc.

60 Thirdly. Because God would have conditional decrees concerning infinite combinations of infinite conditionates, which can occur under infinite conditions, states, and orders of things: but this seems ridiculous and absurd: hence, etc. The consequence seems clear. Because there is no greater reason why God should have a conditional decree concerning certain combinations from these, than why he should not have, or at least should not be able to have, such a decree concerning all of them: otherwise he would not know with certainty, and altogether infallibility, those future conditionates concerning which he had no efficacious and conditional decree, as appears from what has been said.

The minor, however, as regards the first part, namely that this is ridiculous, is also evident: since many ridiculous combinations can occur with regard to these futures. That it proves the second part, namely the absurdity, is proved thus. For from it St. Thomas proves, 1. part. quaest. 7. art. 4., that God cannot, even by absolute power, produce an infinite in the act according to multitude, because every created multitude must be comprehended under a certain intention of the creator; and so it is necessary that it be closed under a certain number, from the fact that an infinite multitude cannot fall under a certain intention of the creator: this reason, however, if it proves anything, will certainly prove that no multitude can be provided for by God through his decrees and providence, unless it fall under a certain intention of the provident one, otherwise such a provident one would provide in vain and uncertainly, and consequently unless those things which are provided for fall under a certain and determinate number.

61 Fourthly. Because otherwise those conditional propositions would be true in no other way than if they were derived from the force of a formal illation drawn from a decree existing in God: hence their knowledge would pertain solely to the knowledge of pure natural simple intelligence: and consequently they would enunciate no future under a condition. This last consequence follows from the previous one. The previous one, however, follows from the antecedent. For a conditional proposition, which is true in the force of the illation, has this by reason of the goodness of the consequent, as the Dialecticians commonly teach: but a consequence which is once good always has being good, as the same Dialecticians admit, nay it will necessarily be good, otherwise there would be no reason why it should always have goodness: hence since the knowledge of pure natural simple intelligence terminates in truths altogether necessary, the aforesaid futures will pertain to this same knowledge. The antecedent, however, also seems to be established. For, a decree being posited, there is an infallible and necessary connection between the antecedent and the consequent, and otherwise not without it: hence if the aforesaid decree is given with regard to all these future contingents, then the conditional propositions concerning them will be true in no other way than from the force of a formal illation, drawn from such a decree existing in God.

62 Lastly Herice argues. Because to admit these decrees to be efficacious in themselves is to teach that which Calvin and his disciples taught, by positing them: from which there arose another heresy of his doctrine, namely that which admits freedom in our acts: hence such a doctrine is not to be admitted.

§ II. The true position of St. Thomas and of the Fathers is explained by three assertions.

63 It must be said, however, first, that there are given in God the aforesaid conditional and efficacious decrees with regard to all future contingents and conditionates, by which God decrees either that they determinately be for the future time, or that they determinately be not for the same time, if that condition is posited. This assertion is gathered sufficiently efficaciously from those things which we shall adduce from Augustine, from St. Thomas, and from the Fathers in the following disputation. Where those who confess that God knows with certainty and infallibility these futures, adduce, as the reason and the means of such knowledge, divine predestination, or election, or the efficacious decree of the divine will concerning them, from the fact that these futures do not occur at our hands unless dependently upon predestination and election, or the decree of God: and so, just as absolute futures are not so unless by divine predestination, or a preceding absolute decree; so likewise future conditionates would not be so unless by a preceding predestination, or divine decree, by which he decreed that they would be so if some condition were posited.

The same reason proves the same thing with regard to future conditionates containing wicked acts, which, although they are not predestinated by God to wickedness, are nevertheless permitted: and so, just as under the absolute status they would never occur unless a preceding absolute permissive decree, so likewise under the conditional status they would not occur unless a similar conditional decree preceded. Whence the same Augustine says in the Enchiridion, chap. 95: Let nothing be, unless the almighty wills it to become so, either by permitting that they be made, or by himself making them. And so this position is followed, not uncommonly, by the later disciples of St. Thomas, and particularly by all those whom we brought forward at dub. 2 and 3 in support of our position.

64 The most powerful and fundamental reason, however, has been touched upon above in the preceding disputation, and the Fathers sufficiently indicate it in the places recently cited. It can also be reduced to this brief form. Because these future conditionates have a certain futurition, namely a conditioned one; but they cannot of themselves pass from the status of pure possibility to the status of this conditioned futurition, as appears from what was said in the place cited, and from the terms themselves: hence it is necessary that they be drawn out from that status into this one by the first cause: otherwise something would occur, and would be drawn out from the status of pure possibility to some status of futurition, independently of the first being and of its causality; which, as is clear, involves an impossibility: hence since God operates in no other way, nor draws things out to the status of any futurition, except by means of his efficacious decree, proportioned to such an extraction, as appears from what we have said in disp. 7. num. 108. and disp. praeced. num. 16. and following, and what we shall say in tract. 4. disp. 10. dub. 1. 2. et 3.; the consequence is that he have an efficacious decree, proportioned, or conditional, by reason of which he wills the aforesaid futures either determinately to be, or determinately not to be for the future time, if that condition were posited.

It is confirmed, and explained, by a reason drawn from the same Fathers, and one which we adduced in disp. 7. n. 115. with regard to absolute futures. Because these future conditionates do not have being determinately future in themselves, as is clear, since as long as they are future, especially conditioned, they are nothing in themselves: but in nothing true and real determination can be founded: hence it is necessary that they have this determination in their determined causes, especially in the first: hence it will also be necessary that the first cause have an efficacious and proportioned decree, by which he decrees either that, the condition being determinately posited, they are for the future time, or that they determinately are not.

65 Nor would it be necessary to adduce the solution which the authors of middle knowledge offer to this reason and its confirmation, saying that for a future under a condition, which in fact on the part of the thing is not going to have being, but will have it, some certain condition being posited, it is not necessary to presuppose the free determination of the will of God already existing in it; but it suffices that it be presupposed objectively, in the sense of a future under a condition, to the end that such an effect be conditionally future.

This solution, therefore, need not be brought into the open. For from those things which we adduced in disp. 7. num. 48. and thereafter with regard to absolute futures, in order to refute this objective futurition of the divine decree altogether absolute, they remain, however proportionally applied to the present case, sufficiently refuted, so that this will be clear to one who examines them. On which point Gonzalez can also be seen in the commentary on this article, disp. 44. sect. 3. from num. 30. as far as num. 37.

66 Nor does it matter either if, with some of the disciples of St. Thomas who deny to God infallible knowledge of these futures, one were to say that those are not in fact future; but have only either the character of pure possibilities, as happens in future conditionates which are disparate; or at most the character of futures conjecturally, and only probably such; and thus that an efficacious conditional decree of the divine will is not required with regard to them, otherwise they would be infallibly future.

This, therefore, makes no difference. For, as we proved more broadly in tract. de Volunt. Dei disp. 5. num. 73., the divine will, by reason of its highest actuality and excellence, cannot remain suspended with regard to anything willable; but it is determinate to will, or to be unwilling, that it be, or that it not be; although it is free to will determinately that it be, or determinately that it not be. From the fact that, as there belongs to the highest actuality, universality and perfection of the divine intellect that it should extend itself in the way proper to itself to everything intelligible, knowing and comprehending it actually, nor can it stand that something should be actually knowable and comprehensible which is not actually known and comprehended by it; so likewise there belongs to the highest actuality, universality and perfection of the divine will that it should actually extend itself, its freedom being preserved, to every object which is actually freely willable: and since this freedom is preserved sufficiently and more than sufficiently in this, that although it be determinate to have a vague volition or nolition, it is nevertheless altogether free to have a determinate volition, or a determinate nolition, the consequence is that it belongs to its highest actuality that with regard to everything willable, and consequently with regard to all things possible, whether absolute or conditional, it have a perfect, and consequently efficacious, decree, by which, determinately and in proportion to their nature, it wills either that they determinately be, or that they determinately not be: so that with regard to those which it pleases him to be determinately, it has by that very token the decree by which he wills that they be: with regard, however, to those which it pleases him not to be, it has also a positive decree, by which he does not will their existence, and consequently by which their non-being is determinately future. But on these matters let them see what we shall say in the place cited: where this proof is developed more broadly, and the arguments which seem to stand against it are solved at length.

67 It must be said, secondly. That although God in these efficacious, positive and conditional decrees knows with certainty and infallibility the aforesaid futures, nevertheless, still with certainty and infallibility, holding fast to that certitude both on the part of the subject and on the part of the object, he would know them as not going to have existence, or, after the manner of a thing having (so to speak), as having a contrary futurition, or, after the manner of a thing drawn out beyond the status of pure and bare possibility to the aforesaid non-futurition, even if he did not have such positive decrees concerning them, but had himself merely negatively: yet in such a way that it would be prior, in our manner of understanding, that God has himself merely negatively in that sign in which he was going to decree concerning them, and that he sees this manner of having himself negatively with regard to them, than that he should attain them with certainty and infallibility. All the disciples of St. Thomas must hold this assertion, as it will become more clear from what is said immediately below.

And indeed, as regards the first part, it clearly appears from what was said in the preceding doubt, num. 47., and in disp. 8. num. 16. and following.

68 Its fundamental reason as regards the second part (which is at the same time explained and proved) is drawn from those things which the Angelic Doctor teaches, quaest. 19. huius 1. part. art. 7., and in 1. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 1. in corpore, and to 3. and 4.; likewise in 1. contra Gent. cap. 83., and lib. 2. cap. 25., and lib. 3. cap. 78. and 91. It can be proposed in the following form. Because although in that sign in which the divine will is understood in our manner of understanding, it precedes the free determination, or the absence of it, with regard to some object that is future either absolutely or under a condition, it may be indifferent for it to will that it be, or that it not be, or to be unwilling either of these extremes, and so in that sign it may have determinately no character of a future, or of a non-future by a contrary (so to speak) non-futurition; nevertheless, when there arrives that sign in which God is going to decree, or according to this manner of speaking, is going to have himself, negatively, then precisely because he wills the futurition of some thing, he cannot, in the composite sense, with this supposition having been made, be unwilling that it be, nor, with the supposition of unwillingness having been made, will it: nor lastly, if the supposition is made of the suspension of the divine will in that sign which was destined for positive willing, should it have pleased him, can he, in the composite sense, have a volition or a positive nolition with regard to the futurition of such a thing: hence precisely because in that sign he would have himself negatively, or would remain suspended with regard to all future conditionates, he will know with certainty and infallibility, both on the part of the subject and on the part of the object, that even with that condition posited they will not be: not indeed because they remain in the status of pure and bare possibility; but because they have (so to speak) contrariwise, that they are not future under a condition, that is, that they are in such wise not future that futurition is repugnant to them; which is to be beyond the status of pure and bare possibility.

69 The antecedent, as regards the first part, requires no proof, as is clear to one who examines it. As regards the second part, however, it is sufficiently clear. Because on account of the immutability of the divine will it is repugnant, in the composite sense, that it should not always persist, and for the whole eternity, in that disposition, whether positive or negative, which it had in that sign: namely, that if in that sign it willed positively the futurition, or the non-futurition, it must persist in willing or in being unwilling; but if it had itself negatively, or had suspended the act, it must remain throughout eternity in that suspension. Then too, because otherwise the divine will would be mutable. Then also, because otherwise there could be given in God, that suspension having elapsed, some free act which would not be eternal, or which would not be measured by eternity as its own and adequate measure. Which, indeed, as is clear, is impossible.

The consequence, however, as regards both parts, plainly appears to follow from the antecedent. As regards the first part, indeed. For precisely because, in order that, that condition having been posited, some thing be going to have positive existence, there is required that in that sign which in our manner of understanding is deputed to the divine decrees, God have the positive will by which he wills that it, it is necessary, precisely because he does not have such a will, that he have himself negatively in that sign, that such a thing, even with that condition posited, is not going to have positive existence.

70 As regards the second part, too, it is clear. For precisely because, God having himself once negatively in that sign, being unable on account of his immutability and in the composite sense to have afterwards an act by which he should will positively that that thing be, such a thing, inasmuch as it once stood under that divine suspension, or inasmuch as it did not stand in that sign under the positive act of the divine will, under which it could then stand, has something, or some denomination, or as it were a denomination, by reason of which existence for the future time, which is to be (so to speak) to be a non-future contrariwise, is repugnant to it, and to not remain in the status of pure and bare possibility, but to have the character of a non-future contrariwise, in that proportional mode in which it would have an absolute future, if the divine will had itself negatively in that sign with regard to it.

71 From which it is to be inferred, and said, thirdly. That if God, in that sign deputed to this end, so that after the necessary willing of those things which are formally in him, he immediately wills, or does not will, objects which are freely willable, did not have the positive decrees already explained, concerning future conditionates, by which he would will that some be, and that some of them not be, their conditions having been posited (which is the same as what we say with the due proportion about absolute futures in a similar sign, considered precisely), he could not know with certainty and infallibility, or discern, which of them would be going to have positive existence, and which would not have it under the aforesaid conditions; but he would know all of them by the manner of conditioned non-futures (so to speak) contrariwise to such as these; whereas the contrary if he have such positive and efficacious decrees, as we have said that he in fact has.

This assertion is clearly gathered from what precedes, and from the reason of St. Thomas which we adduced for it. For in the former case, namely if he had himself negatively in that sign, then all the negative propositions of all conditioned futures would be true: since the aforesaid conditionates would have something by reason of which positive existence is repugnant to them, and all the affirmative ones, and those involving the positive existence of some thing, would be false: since God, the supposition of that suspension having been made, cannot have a positive act by which he should will that they be: and yet this act is desired for their positive existence. In the latter case, however, that is, if he had a positive act with regard to them, then with regard to those which he willed to be, the condition having been posited, he would certainly know them to be going to have positive existence, if the condition were posited: and he would discern those from those concerning which he willed that, the condition having been posited, they not be; judging the former to be non-futures contrariwise; and the latter to be futures also contrariwise. But about this assertion, namely about what is involved in it, that is, that with the efficacious and positive decree set aside, God could not know concerning any conditioned future that it was going to have existence, we shall say more in the following disputations, throughout those in which we shall show at length the impossibility of middle, or conditional, knowledge.

§ III. Unravelling of the arguments of the first position with regard to its negative part.

72 To the first, the major must be granted if it is understood (as it must be understood) of a real change proportioned to that free and efficacious act which God has with regard to creatures, and the minor must be denied, understood in the same way. And in answer to the proof it must be said that, although by the force of this conditional decree creatures would never exist absolutely, and consequently nor in this way would they pass from non-being to being; nevertheless they would exist conditionally, or if that condition were posited; and thus they would be changed by a change that is conditional and proportioned to the efficacious decree which we posit in God with regard to them, namely to the conditional decree. For as from an efficacious decree, so to speak, with regard to creatures, a change, so to speak, in them follows, so from an efficacious and absolute decree an absolute change follows; and from an efficacious and conditional decree, a conditional change follows.

73 Secondly, it is answered that it suffices for this efficacious and conditional will to have some effect in the creature, namely to order it towards some doing and receiving which would in fact occur if certain conditions were posited. And this ordering can be explained by the example adduced by St. Thomas in 1. distinct. 46. quaest. 1. art. 1. in corpore, of that will which is conditional and on the part of efficacious, by which God wills that all men be saved. For speaking of this will there, the Holy Doctor says thus: Since every good is willed by God, God also wills this, namely that all men be saved. And this is called the antecedent will, and the effect of this will is the very order of nature towards the end of salvation, and the means promoting that end, proposed to all in common, both natural and gratuitous. Where, as you see, from the antecedent and conditional will there arises some effect, namely some order, or disposition towards some effect, either to be done by inferior causes, if they are ordered to do that, or to be received by God alone if it is granted by him alone, as happens in this will of saving all men, by which he willed to give to all grace and glory, which is the effect of God alone, and towards which all men are ordered and elevated in the manner of a material cause, although not all of them in fact receive it.

74 Add (and this itself will be explained further) that it suffices at some point, in order that a free and efficacious act be posited in God followed by some change in the creature, not indeed a real and physical change, but a real objective one, namely a real extrinsic denomination arising from the divine volition or nolition. For by that very token the creature remains extrinsically deputed and ordered towards that which God decreed concerning it, although afterwards in time it may never be actually and physically changed, as is clear in the case of a free, efficacious and absolute act, by which God willed that there be no other universe. For by this act all the other things, universally, apart from that which now is, remained extrinsically deputed and ordered towards not being, and passed from the status of pure and bare possibility, in which is involved the status of negative or privative non-futurition (that is, the status of a thing which, although it be not future, can nevertheless be future) to the status of futurition (so to speak) taken contrariwise: that is, to such a status that in it it has something, or some denomination, by reason of which that it be future positively is repugnant to it.

75 In confirmation, what has been said above makes it clear. Whence, just as (as Aristotle noted so well in the chapter on relation) it is not the same terminus for all relations, for the relation of the heating agent to the thing heated seeks a terminus actually hot, whereas the relation of that which can be heated to the thing that can be heated does not seek a terminus actually heated, but only one in the receptive potency of heat; so likewise the same kind of change is not required for every relation: but for a relation founded on a conditional act it suffices (granted that the aforesaid relation necessarily involves that act, of which we have spoken elsewhere) a conditioned physical change, or the real objective change already mentioned: as likewise for a free, efficacious and absolute act, for example, concerning the existence of Peter, and consequently for the relation founded on it, an absolute physical change to be given for the future time will be required.

76 To the second, the antecedent must be denied. And to the first proof the antecedent is denied too, as is clear in the antecedent and conditional will adduced just above, which is not an idle and superfluous will, although it does not look to an absolute future, namely to glory to be conferred absolutely on all. Whence these conditional and efficacious decrees lead both to the governance and providence of God, since it is the part of a prudent governor to be ready to perform many things which in fact do not occur; and to the manifestation of divine goodness, which is disposed to perform many things which yet are urged on, either by our sins or in order to show the freedom of the choice; and to this, that God may have certain knowledge of every conditional truth; and above all to the preservation of the highest actuality and universality of the divine will, which is so great that it cannot remain suspended with regard to no willable thing whatsoever: but must have, with regard to it, in the manner already indicated, a free determination; and finally to other ends of divine wisdom known to us, but nevertheless hidden from us: since God can order a thing, however disparate from it as it may be, towards several and diverse ends most congruent to it, which are hidden from us.

77 To the second proof, however, of that same antecedent, it is answered that that conditional and efficacious will is the final resolution in its own genus, as is clear: and likewise that it is the final resolution absolutely: from the fact that it is not distinguished, on the part of the conceived thing, from the absolute and efficacious will by which God decreed absolutely that that thing be done in fact, or not done, as we shall say in the treatise on the Will of God, disp. 2.: and therefore that will is not dependent and suspended, nor proper to those who proceed from the imperfect to the perfect in their deliberation. Whence by the force of this proof it follows at the highest that by the force of the conditional will, as distinguished on the part of our manner of conceiving from the absolute will, not everything is determined: which, however, is no inconvenience. Just as neither does it stand in the way that, by the force of the intention of an end taken with precision, and as it is distinguished on the part of our manner of conceiving from election, the means determinate in particular with regard to it should not be conceived.

78 To the third, the consequence must be granted, and the minor denied. And in answer to the proof of the first part of it, it must be said that, although many combinations, sufficiently disparate and perhaps ridiculous to the human gaze, can occur with regard to disparate future contingents, it is nevertheless not ridiculous, but worthy of the highest admiration and veneration, that the force of the divine intellect, and the actuality of the divine will, are so great that these cannot remain suspended with regard to them; but must have a perfect act, and consequently an efficacious act, with regard to their futurition or non-futurition: that, however, namely the divine intellect, cannot fail to know with certainty and infallibility each and every future. Whence, just as it is not inconvenient that all these things should be known by God as possible, from the fact that although several of them are ridiculous, this whole, however, holds on the part of the object, not on the part of the knower; so for the same reason it is not inconvenient that God have a free determination with regard to them, in the sense explained: namely such that with regard to some he decree that they be, certain conditions having been posited; with regard, however, to others, that they not be, even with those conditions posited.

79 In answer, however, to the proof of the second part of that same minor, it must be said that that illation of St. Thomas must be understood most formally, of the intention of the creator, in so far as he is creating, that is, of actually executing real and positive effects. And thus it is to be understood of a certain intention on the part of the proximate end, which is the positive end of the effect produced by the agent quatenus such, as Ferrara noted so well, 3. Physicorum quaest. 7. It involves, however, an infinite multitude of things categorematically, and to be such in the act, certain and determinate. Because it is comprehended by no limits, nor is it measurable by one; and thus it cannot be comprehended in the manner just described under a certain intention, namely on the part of the end effected, as already stated. Now when God has providence over these infinite conditioned combinations, he does not provide for them as being in the act and to be executed simultaneously, nor does he decree concerning all of them that they have positive existence; but concerning several he wills that they not have it even with the condition posited: nor conversely does he have providence over them as being infinite categorematically on the part of the object, but as being an infinite number producible syncategorematically: although with this standing, namely that on his part he provides for all of them actually and simultaneously.

Whence, just as it is not inconvenient that God should know an infinite number categorematically on the part of the knower, and not on the part of the thing known, as is clear with regard to the knowledge which he has of all possible things: and likewise, just as it is not inconvenient that infinite future thoughts should be contained simultaneously in it, not indeed holding itself simultaneously on the part of the things in their own and adequate measure, but simultaneously in the manner explained above, so likewise nothing stands in the way of there being actually and categorematically provided for, on the part of the mind of the infinite and most perfect provident one, an infinite number: although those on the part of the object are not actually and categorematically infinite: and consequently neither can they be actually and simultaneously produced: and consequently neither can they fall under a certain intention of the creator in the sense explained, as the reason of St. Thomas proves.

80 To the fourth, the first consequence must be distinguished: From a decree existing in God, which is posited as the express condition of those conditioned futures of which we are speaking, is to be denied: From a decree existing in God, which is not posited as the express condition of the aforesaid futures, by which God wills concerning some of them that they be, and concerning others however that they not be, is to be granted. And then each of the two consequences immediately subsumed will have to be denied. And in answer to the proof of the former from these two, from which the proof of the latter depends, the major must be granted with regard to the matter at hand, namely concerning the goodness, and the force of the illation and of the consequence: not indeed from merits of the antecedent taken in themselves, or from an express condition posited to the end that something be a conditioned future, taken in themselves; but in so far as it is subject to the efficacious and conditional divine decree.

And then the minor must be granted, as regards the first part, and indeed also as regards the second, if it is understood of the necessity of the goodness of the consequence, taken formally, that is, of the necessity of the consequence precisely, and not of the consequent. Because in order that something be necessary by the necessity of the consequence, as distinguished from the necessity of the consequent, it suffices that although the consequent be absolutely and simply free, it be nevertheless necessary by the necessity of the secundum quid, from the supposition, and in the composite sense, or that it be infallible, in so far as by this is denoted that although in fact and of fact it will be, at least under some condition; so that it is never verified that the condition is not posited; nevertheless it can be that it is not so, even if the aforesaid condition is posited. And lastly the consequence must be denied. Because to the knowledge of pure natural simple intelligence there pertain only those things which are necessary by necessity simply of that kind, and with respect to consequences, and not those which are necessary only by supposition, or by the necessity of the consequence, of mere infallibility already explained. Let what we have said in disp. 7. dub. 2. be consulted.

81 Lastly, it must be said that, although we granted that Calvin and his disciples confess these conditional decrees in every sense in which we ourselves grant them, that is, before the certain and infallible prevision of the future event, and hence inferred the heretical doctrine, namely that there is no freedom in our acts; nevertheless it does not follow well that the aforesaid conditional and efficacious decrees are to be rejected. Because it is the practice among heretics to mingle some truth with their heresies, and to infer from one true antecedent their own errors on account of their own wickedness. Whence the Arians, and the other ancient heretics, denying the three divine persons, deduced this error from the unity of the divine nature, as Tertullian noted elegantly in his book against Praxeas, where he says thus: In manifold ways the devil emulated the truth. He aimed, by defending it, to trample it down. He claims the one Lord, vindicate the almighty creator of the world, in order to make a heresy out of the one.