Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Whether, according to the mind of the Holy Fathers, God knows with perfect certainty, and infallibly, future contingent events that are conditional, whether they be, in the manner already set forth, disparate, or have a probable connection with the future event? 28 After we have explained what had to be said concerning knowledge that is infallible in the strict sense, that is, infallible both on the part of the subject and on the part of the object, with regard to future contingents that are conditional, in accordance with Sacred Scripture, it is necessary that we set out what is to be held concerning the mind of the Fathers, or (better said) that this very question virtually remains open in what was asserted in the preceding difficulty. But so that we may proceed more clearly and more distinctly, this difficulty is raised here in its own right.

§ I. The negative position.

The negative part is maintained by the Doctors cited in the preceding difficulty. And it is proved first by Corneius as follows. For St Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, cap. 14, expounding that passage of Wisdom 4, He was snatched away, lest wickedness should alter his mind, says thus: For it was said according to the perils of this life*, not according to God's foreknowledge: foreknowing that which was to be, not that which was not to be.* Behold, where St Augustine expressly affirms that God does not know those future things whose condition will never be fulfilled. The same is taught in the first book On the Soul, and Its Origin, cap. 12, in these words: It would be killed outright by foreknowledge if what is foreknown were not to be: for how is it said that something is foreknown to be future, when it is not future?

29 Secondly, it is proved from the authority of Prosper of Regensburg, who in his Epistle to St Augustine, which is found in the eighth volume of Augustine's works before the book On Predestination, refuting the position of the Massilians — who asserted that men are chosen for grace and glory on account of the merits which they would have performed had they lived longer — says thus: To such an extent do they subject God's election to any and every fabricated merit, that, since past ones do not exist, they concoct future ones which are not future, and that things foreknown not to be done, and things foreknown to be done, are a new kind of absurdity with them. Behold how most absurd he judges it to be that things not to be done should be foreknown, even if otherwise they would have been purified by the condition.

30 Thirdly, it is proved from Damascene, in the dialogue Against the Manichaeans, where, refuting the error of those who said that God ought by no means to have created those men or angels whom He foreknew to be evil in the future and to be punished with eternal damnation, he says thus: In what way indeed can He foreknow that which is not to be? For if He had foreknown anyone to be a sinner and had not created him, this foreknowledge would not be foreknowledge; but deceit. Just as knowledge is of things that are, so foreknowledge is of things that are certainly to be. With which words nothing clearer can be said for this position, since he calls the knowledge of these future things deceit, that is, fraud and deception.

31 It makes no difference if, in answer to these testimonies, you reply first with Vázquez, in the present disputation, 67, cap. 4, at the beginning, and Curry, Controversia 7, art. 2, num. 63, ¹ that these Fathers deny only the absolute foreknowledge of things which at some time will not be; so that the sense of St Augustine is that God did not snatch away that child by an untimely death for the reason that He foreknew absolutely that his mind would be changed, had he lived long; because, since this was not in fact going to be, since he was forestalled by death, it could not be foreknown absolutely as such. For to be foreknown as absolutely future, when it is truly not future, is to annul foreknowledge itself (as Augustine teaches) and to introduce a new kind of absurdity; indeed, deceit, as Damascene and Prosper teach.

This is therefore irrelevant. Because if the Fathers in these testimonies were denying only the absolute foreknowledge of these future things, they would have attacked insufficiently the error of the Massilians, which they intended to attack. For the latter did not assert that God knows such future things with absolute foreknowledge, but with another knowledge abstracted from the condition, namely, conditional.

32 Nor does it stand in the way either, if secondly, with the same authors and Suárez, lib. 2, De scientia futurorum sub conditione, cap. 3, num. 8, you encounter the aforesaid testimonies by saying that these Fathers do not, in those passages, deny the foreknowledge of future things under a condition, but only that which the Massilians posited, namely, a foreknowledge leading to merit and demerit, to reward and punishment. Because they were attacking their error, whereby they asserted that God punishes and rewards, removes grace or confers it, on account of those good or bad works which He foreknew that boys, or even adults, would perform if they should come to the use of reason, or should persevere long in life, or if this or that should happen, even if in fact such works would never be.

This, therefore, is no obstacle. First, because it seems to have been said gratuitously: for from the testimonies cited it is clear enough that the Fathers denied, absolutely and simply, the foreknowledge of these future things. And certainly by no other means so easy as by denying it could they have refuted the error they were attacking. For otherwise they would more easily have attacked it from Paul's statement (2 Corinthians) that each one is to be judged according to what he in fact did in his own body, and not according to what he did not do, supposing this or that condition to have been fulfilled.

Then, second: because, such a knowledge being admitted, it does not follow that God could not have rewarded and punished the child in view of those works which He should see as to be done under the condition, as St Augustine and Prosper contend must be inferred: for it was not up to the child that, being forestalled by death, they should in fact not be performed. Then, third: because at least from the testimony of Damascene this solution cannot be fitted, as is clear from his words.

33 Nor will it at last suffice, if otherwise, with Suárez at the place cited and Lessius, De praescientia conditionata, cap. 20, num. 5, you encounter the aforesaid Fathers to the effect that they do not deny the knowledge and simple cognition of these future things, but deny only their foreknowledge. For foreknowledge signifies cognition anticipated. But where nothing is future absolutely, there is no anticipation: because before and after are said relationally, and thus there is no foreknowledge, because to foreknow is to know as future; but what is truly not future, but would be, is not foreknown, but would be foreknown; and therefore a future thing under a condition is not said to be foreknown, but to be known like a possible thing.

Against this, however, is the following. Just as absolute foreknowledge is called such because it terminates in a thing absolutely future, so conditional foreknowledge can be called such because it terminates in a thing future under a condition: hence, since the Fathers in these passages deny not only the absolute foreknowledge of future things under a condition, which the Massilians did not posit, it must be said that they deny conditional foreknowledge.

§ II. The true position.

34 Nevertheless, it must be said that, according to the mind of the Holy Fathers, God knows with certainty and infallibility the aforesaid future contingent and conditional things. Thus do the Doctors cited in the preceding difficulty in support of our assertion. That this assertion, as regards the discrete conditional futures of which we spoke in the preceding difficulty, pertains to this disputation, will be clear from what we shall teach concerning the conditional futures which have only a probable connection with the condition. For, as will be evident from what we say immediately below, the reasoning is the same about these and about those as far as this, that they are known with cognition altogether certain and infallible, that is, both on the part of the subject and on the part of the object: since neither of the two has an infallible connection with the condition; and thus they can be known infallibly only by reason of the efficacious and infallible decree of the divine will, which can terminate in either.

With regard, therefore, to the futures which have only a probable connection with the condition, so far as this lies on the part of the inclination and disposition of secondary causes. This is proved first by the testimony of Augustine, tom. 10, serm. 7, De verbis Domini, cap. 1, about those words of Matthew 9 and Luke 9, Master, I will follow you wherever you go. And about Christ's answer: The foxes have holes, and the birds of the sky have nests; but the Son of Man has nowhere to lay his head. For there the holy Doctor raises this question: What so ready? What so sluggish? What so prepared, and what so suited to so great a good, to follow the Lord wherever he goes? You are amazed by his saying: What is this, that when the good Master Jesus Christ invited the disciples, to whom he was to give the kingdom of heaven, this man who was so ready was displeased? And to this question he answers in these words: But what kind of Master was that, who was to foresee future things, we understand, brethren, that this man would have sought his own things, and not the things of Jesus Christ, if he had followed Christ. Where, as you see, he openly asserts that Christ rejected this man, who so offered himself ready to follow him, because He foreknew this conditional future, namely, that if he had been admitted he would have sought his own temporal advantage, and not what Christ intended by his preaching, namely, the benefit of souls and the glory of God. And that the same holy Doctor meant to speak of a foreknowledge of this future that is altogether certain and infallible, even on the part of the material object, he made clear by the force of this, that Christ was such a master as to foresee future things. For if he were speaking only of conjectural knowledge, it would not have been necessary to have recourse to the eminent teaching of Christ, since this very thing could be said of other men of mediocre ability and learning.

35 It is confirmed from the same Augustine, lib. De correctione et gratia, cap. 8, where, affirming that God often does not snatch away certain men by an untimely death, lest they commit the sins which He Himself foreknows they would commit, if they persisted long in life, he says thus: Let them answer, if they can, why God, when they would have lived faithfully and piously, did not at that time snatch them out of the perils of this life, lest wickedness should alter their mind? Had He this in His power? Or did He not know their future evils? Certainly nothing of this kind is said but in the most perverse way. In which words it is as indubitable with Augustine that God foreknows evils as future under a condition, as that He is able to remove them from life.

36 Secondly, it is proved principally from St Chrysostom, homil. 65, on chapter 19 of Matthew, where he says thus: But why, he says, did He not lead out all of them at once? Indeed He would have wished to lead out all of them from the beginning, but since not all of them obeyed at the same time, this difference resulted from the will of those who were called: hence some are called at the first hour, some at the third, some at the sixth, some at the ninth, some at the eleventh, because then they were to be shut up. Which also Paul plainly signified, saying: But when it was the pleasure of God, He separated me from my mother's womb. And when was it His pleasure? Certainly when he was to be shut up. For from the very first swaddling-bands He would have wished it, but because He knew that he was to rise again, then He willed it, not ignoring that the call was to penetrate his soul. Thus too, when He afterwards called the robber, He could have called him before, but when called he would not have obeyed.

37 Lastly, it is proved by the testimony of St Thomas, 3, part., q. 1, art. 5, on the second objection, where, having raised against himself the objection that it is said in 1 Timothy 1 that Christ came into this world to save sinners: but more would have been saved if from the beginning of the human race God had become incarnate. For very many, not knowing God, perished in their sin in various kinds of wickedness: it would therefore have been more fitting that from the beginning of the human race God should have become incarnate. He answers by admitting, both from his own opinion and from the opinion of Augustine in the book De perseverantia, cap. 9, this knowledge of conditional futures; and at the same time he rejects from the same Augustine that which Augustine himself had taught and afterwards retracted, namely, that God foreknew determinately that all who had existed before the coming of Our Lord Christ were not to believe in Him. The words of the Angelic Doctor are these: It must be said that Augustine answers this in the sixth book De quaestionibus Paganorum, saying, in question 2, that Christ then willed to appear to men and His doctrine to be preached among them when and where He knew those who were going to believe in Him to be: for at those times and in those places He foreknew that such men as these would be present in His preaching, not indeed all of them, but yet many were present in His bodily presence who, raised by Him from the dead, were unwilling to believe in Him. But rejecting this answer, the same Augustine says in the book De perseverantia: Can we say that the Tyrians and Sidonians were unwilling to believe when such powers were done among them, or that they would not have believed had it been done; since God Himself attests to them that they would have done great penance of humility, if those signs of divine powers had been done among them? Wherefore (as he himself adds in solving) just as the Apostle says: it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy, who came to the help of those whom He foreknew would believe, if His miracles had been done among them, to whom He willed, but did not come to the help of others, about whom in His predestination, indeed secretly, but yet otherwise, He justly declared: so let us believe without doubt that His mercy is in those who are saved, and His truth in those who are punished. Where, as you see, he openly concedes that God knew with certainty this conditional future, namely, that there would have been more men who would have believed in Christ and been converted, if they had seen His works and miracles, or if these had been reported to them.

All of which will remain more confirmed from several other testimonies, which we shall bring from St Augustine and the Angelic Doctor in the following disputation. For now, for the sake of brevity and clarity, we omit those: as also other testimonies of other Fathers which will frequently meet the eye as those following them out unfold, and which younger theologians adduce as bearing on this question, even though not all of the things which they adduce prove the intention, as will be evident to the reader.

§ III. Answer is made to the testimonies of the Fathers adduced for the first position.

38 To the first testimony, the answer is made that Augustine is speaking there against heretics asserting that men are to be punished, or rewarded, on account of good or evil works which they did not do, but would have done, had they remained longer in life. And thus they said that little children are set apart from one another with a view to their eternal election to glory on account of the evil or good works which they would have perpetrated, had they lived, and which God foreknew, on this hypothesis, that they would have perpetrated; and indeed they asserted that before the divine decree and the election of God, He foreknew on His own part what in the aforesaid hypothesis they would have done. Wherefore, arguing against these, Augustine attacks them in two ways. First indeed, by showing that even if God foreknew the aforesaid conditional future works before His decree and election, or eternal reprobation, of little children, nevertheless on that account these good or evil works, future under a condition, could not deserve merit or demerit, or reward or punishment: from the fact that no one deserves or deserves ill on account of works which he would perform, a given hypothesis being posited, but on account of works which in fact he performed.

39 And then by another way he attacks this error, saying that if God before His decree had foreknown those works, whether good or evil, then that of Wisdom 4, He was snatched away, lest wickedness should alter his mind, could be true only of a conjectural knowledge of God on the part of the object, that is, according to the perils of this life and their disposition: not according to the foreknowledge of God, that is, according to a foreknowledge altogether infallible both on the part of the subject and on the part of the material object. And he gives his reason: Because He foreknew that which was to be, not that which was not to be, that is, because by this altogether infallible knowledge, in the strict sense, only that can be foreknown infallibly on the part of the material object which is infallibly going to be. Wherefore, since in the opinion of Augustine, as we shall say in the following disputation, num. 31 and following, and as is clear from what we have said in the preceding disputation, nothing is future infallibly before the efficacious decree of the divine will, it follows that those good or evil works of little children cannot, in the sense in which the heretics spoke of them, have the character of an infallible future, and consequently cannot be foreknown as such by God. Which interpretation is very consonant with the mind of Augustine, as will be evident to the reader considering it: and we shall return to this, and to this testimony, in the following disputation, num. recently cited, in order to refute middle knowledge, that is, conditional knowledge.

Through which, also, the second testimony from St Prosper is sufficiently clear, and speaking in the same sense. Likewise also the third testimony from Damascene. For the holy Doctor is speaking there of the foreknowledge of future things before the divine decree, refuting it in this sense: on the ground that before the aforesaid decree they do not have the character of future things; and so to attribute the aforesaid foreknowledge to God is not to attribute to Him the foreknowledge which He truly has, but to impose upon Him that which He does not have. For just as knowledge is of things which are, so foreknowing is of things which are certainly to be. Whence this testimony also serves us against middle knowledge, that is, conditional knowledge, to be attacked in the place cited. But in what way, and in what sense, God truly has foreknowledge and foreknowing, and in what sense He has it not, has already been treated above by us, disp. praeced., num. 44 and following.