Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

9 In this doubt we shall not treat of the means by which God knows the aforesaid future things; but of whether he knows with altogether complete certainty, both on the part of the subject and on the part of the object, the aforesaid future things which were set forth in the title.

§ I. The first opinion is proposed.

The first opinion asserts that, according to Holy Scripture, God does not know with the aforesaid certainty the future contingent things which are conditional, of which we are speaking. Thus Ledesma, lib. de auxil. disp. 2, affin. de scientia futurorum contingentium fol. 582, and others of the later Thomists. Which they hold to be probable: Curiel, controver. 7, and our Corneio, in the present disp. 3, dub. 2. It is proved, first, because often when there is question about the event of these future things, which have only a probable connexion with the condition, God speaks of them not assertively, as of a certain thing, but as of a doubtful thing. For in Genes. 3 he says: Behold Adam is become as one of us, etc. Now therefore, lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever, etc. And Deut. 4, thus God addresses the people through Moses: You saw not any likeness on the day when the Lord spoke to you, lest being deceived you should make for yourselves a graven likeness, etc. And Matth. ii, Christ said: If the miracles had been done in Sodom which were done in you, they would perhaps have remained until this day. In which words those future things predicated as conditional are known by God under that particle perhaps. Since therefore the same reasoning holds of all future things that are conditional, it must be said that God has not a certain and infallible knowledge and cognition of their coming to be.

10 It is proved, secondly. Because God, Exod. 4, when giving Moses the signs by which he might induce the Egyptians to believe, thus says: If they will not believe you, nor will they hear the voice of the first sign, they will believe the word of the second sign: and if they will not believe even these two signs, nor will they hear your voice, take the water of the river, and pour it upon the dry ground, and whatsoever you shall draw of the river shall be turned into blood. Where it is plainly predicted that this effect will in itself be uncertain and doubtful, namely, that the Egyptians will believe Moses under this condition, if the former signs were done: and it is clear that God provided this token of the doubt in the later signs, in the case in which the former would not have their effect.

§ II. The first assertion.

11 It must nevertheless be said, first, that, according to Holy Scripture, God certainly and infallibly knows altogether the future contingent things which are conditional and disparate, of which we are speaking here. Thus all the Scholastic Doctors, whom we shall cite below. It is proved from that in 4 Reg. 13, where, when the prophet Elisha had commanded the king of Israel to strike the ground with his staff, as a sign that he was to carry off the victory from the king of Syria, and the king of Israel struck the ground three times only, then Elisha said to him: If thou hadst struck five times, or six times, or seven times, thou wouldst have smitten Syria even unto its consummation; but now three times only shalt thou strike it. Where, as you see, this future contingent thing, which is conditional and disparate, is predicted by God: If the king of Israel had struck the ground five times, or six times, etc., he would smite Syria unto its consummation: therefore God certainly and infallibly knows it. Consequently, it is clear. Because from what head it was predicted by God, it could not be unknown to him: and from what head it has not even a conjectural or probable connexion with the condition, but is disparate with respect to it, it cannot be known by God with a conjectural knowledge on the part of the object, by force of the probable connexion which is between the condition and the future; but it must necessarily be known by force of another means, namely either on account of the objective and infallible truth which the predicated future thing has (as the authors of middle knowledge hold, though falsely, as appears from what was said in the preceding disputation), or on account of the efficacious and infallible decree which God had concerning that future thing, and so it is known through a knowledge altogether infallible and certain, or (which is the same) infallible, both on the part of the object and on the part of the subject.

12 From which it also appears that the solution which some of the opponents apply to this testimony does not suffice, namely, that in this future thing conditional there was some proportion and connexion in the sense of sign and of the thing signed, between it and its condition: a connexion which consisted in this, that as often as the king struck the ground with that staff, so many times did he smite Syria. And so those victories, in accordance with the disposition of things, could probably be judged to be sufficient for the total destruction of Syria.

From what has been said, therefore, it is quite clear that this solution is not valid. For this sign would be either natural or conventional. Not the former, since there is no natural connexion on which such a signification could rest. Nor the latter. Because either by human institution or by divine institution? Not by human institution, since no man could know that future event: therefore by divine institution, and consequently by the free decree of God concerning such a future thing. Once this is admitted, it cannot be denied that God certainly knows it.

13 Nor does it matter, if you say that from this testimony it is only collected that God certainly and infallibly knew this disparate future thing, and not the other similar ones: since this is not a sufficient foundation for asserting that God had conditional and efficacious decrees concerning all future things which are conditional and disparate.

It is not so, therefore. For, according to Holy Scripture, the most perfect liberty and the highest actuality must be granted to God: since, as we shall say in dub. 4 of this disputation, the actuality and the highest perfection of divine liberty consist in this, that with respect to no future thing, whether absolute or conditional, does it remain suspended; but concerning each and every one it decrees in efficacious fashion that it shall be, or that it shall not be. Although whether, in particular and determinately, he had a decree about being, or determinately about not being, must be established for us especially from Scripture or from the Fathers: and so, etc.

§ III. The second assertion, and its first proof.

14 It must be said, secondly, that it is more probable and more consonant with Scripture that God certainly and infallibly knows altogether the future contingent things which have only a probable, or conjectural, connexion with the condition. We have said that this is more probable, because we do not deny that the opposite has some probability: and therefore several theologians, and not to be despised, defend it.

This assertion is maintained without qualification by Zumel, lib. 3, de scientia conditionatorum disp. 5; Alvarez, lib. 2, de auxiliis disp. 7; Nazarius, in the present controversy 1, notabile 1, et conclus. 1; Gonzalez, disp. 44, sect. 2; Cabrera, 3 part., q. 1, art. 3, disp. 1; Ripa, in the present dub. 4, last chapter; Corneio, disp. 3, dub. 3, who well adds that this opinion is almost common among the disciples of St. Thomas, setting aside the means by which such things are known, of which we shall speak in dub. 4; and finally by all the authors who hold middle or conditional knowledge, who are to be mentioned in the following disputation: although these and those are led by different foundations. For these think that the future things predicated are certainly known by God before the divine decree; and therefore they admit predicated middle or conditional knowledge. Those, however, namely the disciples of St. Thomas, grant only infallible knowledge of them, after the divine decree, efficacious and conditional, as to their coming to be; and for that reason they deny the same conditional knowledge pro viribus, that is, as far as it goes.

It is proved, first, from that in Matth. 11 and Luc. 10: Woe to thee, Chorazin! Woe to thee, Bethsaida! for if the miracles had been done in Tyre and Sidon which were done in you, they would long ago have done penance in sackcloth and ashes. Where this future thing conditional is assertively predicted by Christ: and therefore it is certainly known by him, both by infused knowledge and also by divine knowledge.

15 Nor does it matter, if in the first place you answer, together with Curiel at the place cited, num. 62, and Jansenius, in concordia cap. 47, that Christ did not say that they would do penance from any foreknowledge which he had of such an event as being conditioned, because in truth he did not foreknow it; but that he asserted it in a human manner, through a certain exaggeration and hyperbole, in order that the hardness of Bethsaida and Chorazin might be reproved more severely. That manner of speaking is shown to be usual in Scripture by Martinez, lib. 9, Hypothesis, and Ribera, in Amos. cap. 2, num. 19 and 34.

It is not so, therefore. For our Corneio refutes this solution very well from Augustine and Prosper. For Augustine, in the Enchirid. cap. 93 and lib. 2, de dono perseverantiae, cap. 9 and 10, thus says: But can we say that the Tyrians and Sidonians, if such miracles had been done among them, would not have believed: when the Lord himself attests that they would have done penance of great humility? Where those words are to be weighed: when the Lord himself attests; which cannot be said of a hyperbolic proposition, nor of a thing which would not be future. And in the same way St. Prosper, explaining this passage of Matthew, thus says: We also, if we cannot penetrate the reason of the deed and the depth of his judgment, nevertheless know manifestly both that what he said is true and that what he did is just. Therefore, according to the doctrine of these Fathers, it was not a mere exaggeration, nor a hyperbole of a thing not foreknown as future; but a true assertion and a prediction of a future event, the condition having been posited.

16 And it is confirmed. Because if these words are only hyperbolic, the Lord Christ could have said the same thing which he said of the Tyrians and Sidonians of all the other Gentiles; but he truly affirmed something of them which he would not affirm of all the Gentiles; therefore he spoke not hyperbolically and by exaggeration, but from certain knowledge of the Tyrians and Sidonians. The major is clear, because a hyperbole does not contain determined truth, since among the Rhetoricians it is a superiectio, that is, an overstatement.

The minor, however (apart from the fact that it appears of itself to stand), is argued from those words: Yet truly it shall be more leniently dealt with for Tyre and Sidon than for you. Which words contain a determinate prophecy of a lighter punishment for Tyre than for Bethsaida: and therefore the Lord Christ, in those words, Woe to thee, Chorazin, etc., truly affirmed something of the Tyrians and Sidonians which he would not affirm of all the other Gentiles.

17 Nor does it matter, if, secondly, you meet the same Curiel with the argument that those words were said by Christ, not as of a thing future infallibly, the condition being posited; but as of a thing certain only morally, the disposition of the Tyrians being taken into account. This interpretation is favoured by what he says below of the Sodomites: where, predicting something similar of them, he added the particle perhaps, asserting: And thou, Capharnaum, shalt thou not be exalted even to heaven? thou shalt descend even to hell: for if the miracles had been done in Sodom which were done in thee, they would perhaps have remained until this day. Hence in the Greek, after the word olim which our text adduces, there is a particle meaning the same as utique; for which our interpreter renders, in the second place, perhaps: and it seems that he suppressed it in the earlier passage, because he thought it sufficient to append it at the end of the whole sentence, when he had predicted something similar of the Sodomites.

It is not so, therefore. For, in the first place, what is brought from the particle perhaps does not prove that any doubt is contained in the aforesaid testimonies on the part of the object, and consequently only a moral certainty on that same part. Because that word perhaps does not signify doubt in Holy Scripture; but rather the confirmation of the thing spoken of, whenever God or Christ speaks; as is clear from that in Act. 8, where St. Peter, speaking to Simon Magus, says: Repent of this thy wickedness, and pray to God, if perhaps the thought of thy heart be forgiven thee. Which passage Ambrose, expounding, says: The particle (if perhaps) indeed apparently introduces a doubt, but in reality none at all. And he confirms this from sacred and profane authors.

And in the same way Joan. 4: If thou knewest the gift of God, and who it is that saith to thee, Give me to drink: thou wouldst perhaps have asked of him, etc.; and 5: If ye would believe Moses, ye would perhaps also believe me; and cap. 8: If ye knew me, ye would perhaps also know my Father. In which places it is certain that the aforesaid particle is taken in no way doubtfully. And therefore our Vulgate not only in the place mentioned, but also often renders from the Greek for the particle perhaps the particle utique, certainly, as in that Psalm. 50: For if thou hadst wanted it, thou wouldst surely have given a sacrifice. Where St. Jerome, expounding that in Jerem. 26, Take not away the word, if perhaps I may hear, Augustine, tract. 37, in Joan., Chrysostom, homil. 78, in Matthew, Gregory, homil. 9, in Ezekiel, and Eusebius, lib. 6, de praeparatione Evangel., cap. 9, expressly affirm that the particle perhaps does not import doubt when God speaks; but is added to denote either the liberty of the will, or the difficulty of the thing which is predicted, and how few there will be who will do it.

18 It seemed good, however, to report the words of Jerome and of Augustine at greater length, since they are worthy of note, the other things being omitted: The word perhaps (says Jerome) ambiguous (perhaps) as it is, cannot befit the majesty of the Lord, but he speaks in our own idiom, so that the free choice of man may be preserved. Augustine, however, thus says: He who knows all things, when he says perhaps, does not doubt, but rebukes: the word of doubt is when it is said by a man, and therefore by one doubting because he does not know; but when it is said by God, when nothing is hidden from God, that doubt argues infidelity, it does not argue that he is God.

And then, what is further contained in the same solution, namely, that the predicted future thing was not revealed as certainly and infallibly future; but only as certain morally, or, the disposition of causes being taken into account, does not seem consonant with this testimony, especially according to the mind of Augustine. For since the Tyrians and Sidonians were Gentiles and entangled in vices, it could indeed, with this disposition of causes being taken into account, probably be judged that they were not to be converted: just as with other causes being taken into account, it could also probably be estimated that their conversion was to follow, if they had seen those signs and prodigies: and consequently, just as it could be affirmed absolutely that they were to be converted, so the opposite can also be said, the disposition of the same causes being taken into account: but this is repugnant to the explanation which we have brought from St. Augustine. For he assertively affirms that this cannot be said on the ground that the Lord attests that they were going to do penance, as appears from the words just related. But this will be made more clear from what, in expounding other testimonies, we shall say immediately.

19 Nor does it matter, if you object against what we have said about this testimony. In the first place, because according to the rule of the same Augustine, lib. 3, de doctrina Christiana, cap. 10, universally received by all theologians, the words of Holy Scripture must always be understood in the proper sense, when from their being understood in that way nothing follows against faith or against reason: therefore, since the particle perhaps indicates some doubt at least on the part of the object, and no absurdity follows from the aforesaid testimony being understood in that way, the consequence will be that it must be so understood; and consequently that by it is denoted that the predicted future thing is doubtful and only conjecturable on the part of the object; although on the part of the subject it is certainly known as future in a moral or conjectural way. In the second place also: because from what Christ had said, namely, that the Sidonians and Tyrians would be converted, if those miracles had been done in them which were done in Bethsaida: it is immediately collected from the sacred Page that it would be dealt with more leniently with the Tyrians and Sidonians on the day of judgment than with the Jews: therefore this is a sign that Christ spoke only of the present disposition of the Tyrians and Sidonians, and of the disposition of the Jews: and consequently that he affirmed only that these exist in a worse disposition than those: because they had smaller sins. The consequence is clear. For on that day no one is dealt with more leniently on account of the good works which he would do, but on account of the smaller sins which he committed.

20 For an answer must be given to the first of these objections. In the first place, because from the opposite there follows no small absurdity, namely, that if God knew the aforesaid things with moral certainty only on the part of the object, he would not have had an efficacious decree concerning them, though conditional. And from this again it follows that there is not in him the most perfect and the most actual liberty, as we shall insinuate again in dub. 4 of this disputation, and as we shall say in the tract. on the Will, disp. 5, dub. 3. In the second place also, it is enough that, according to the common exposition of the same Augustine and of the other Fathers, the aforesaid particle perhaps is taken in the sense already stated, on account of the matter, because nothing absurd follows from its being taken in that way. Nor will the words of Scripture thereby lose their firmness, or be able to be tortured into other senses: because in the others there will cease to be that agreement of so many Fathers which is present here.

To the second objection, however, it must be said that the Lord Christ predicted both, namely, that the blindness and the hardness of heart of the Tyrians and Sidonians was less than that of the Bethsaidans and of the inhabitants of Chorazin; and then that those would be converted, if they had seen the aforesaid signs; but not these, as Augustine notes, lib. 2, de bono perseverantiae, cap. 14, in these words: The eyes of the Tyrians and Sidonians were not so blinded, nor their heart so hardened, because if they had believed, if these men had seen such signs as they saw, they would have seen signs. Wherefore on the day of judgment it will not be dealt with more leniently with the Tyrians than with the Jews on account of the good works which they would do, the condition being posited, but on account of the smaller sins which they committed, on account of which they were not so hardened as THEY.

§ IV. Second proof of the same assertion.

21 Secondly, the same assertion is proved by other testimonies. For in 1 Reg. 23, when David was in Ceila and had heard that Saul was coming there to overturn the city on account of David himself, he consulted the Lord, saying: If the men of Ceila deliver me into his hand, and if Saul indeed comes down as thy servant has heard, make known to thy servant. And the Lord said, he will come down. And David said: If the men of Ceila deliver me into the hand of Saul, and the men who are with me? And the Lord said, they will deliver. Where, as is clear, a twofold future thing conditional is assertively predicted by God, namely, the coming down of Saul and the delivering of the Ceilaans, if David should remain there.

And in the same way it is said to king Zedekiah in Jerem. 38: If you go forth to the princes of the king of Babylon, your life shall live, and this city shall not be burned with fire, and you shall be safe, and your house. Where three things at least are assertively predicted as future. Namely, first, that the king is to be preserved alive; second, that the city is not to be set on fire; third, that his whole house is to be safe. And that these too were conditional is clear from the following verse: in which it is narrated that he himself did not go forth to the princes of the king of Babylon; and so the opposite of those three things which had been revealed came to pass.

And then Luc. 16, when that rich man asked Abraham that one of the dead should come down to preach repentance to his brothers, so that they might the more easily believe and be converted, he answered: If they do not hear Moses and the Prophets, neither will they believe, even if one of the dead should rise up.

22 And it is confirmed from that in Joan. 5: He it is that accuses you, Moses, in whom you hope. For if ye would believe Moses, ye would perhaps also believe me: for he wrote of me. Where the particle perhaps is not that of one doubting, but of one affirming, as we said above. And thus the most ancient authors omit it, as Maldonatus noted, and Albeinus in St. Thomas. Likewise Cyprian, and Aug. lib. 16, contra Faustum. And in the same way that other passage of Joan. 6 argues the same thing: Jesus therefore, when he had known that they were coming to take him, and to make him king, fled again to the mountain, he alone. And the first to the Corinthians: For if they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory. And finally that passage of 3 Reg., cap. 11: You shall not go in to them; nor do they go in to yours: for they will most certainly turn away your hearts, that you may follow their gods. Where, although this future thing was absolute with respect to Solomon, for example, who was united with alien women with most burning love; and thus, as the sacred text says, when he was already old, his heart was corrupted through women, so that he should follow alien gods; yet with respect to very many others, who were not united with the same women, it had the character of a future contingent thing conditional.

23 Nor can we have recourse in these testimonies to moral certainty alone, and consequently to the claim that they were going to happen so only according to the determination of secondary causes.

For against this, in the first place, is the fact that in almost all the testimonies which have been related, the future things contained in them are predicated absolutely and without any particle denoting doubt on the part of the object. And if there is any testimony containing the particle perhaps, which seems to hint at doubt on the part of the object and to exclude metaphysical infallibility, it has been shown above, in num. 17 and 18, not to have the force of doubt, but rather of affirmation: therefore it is much more consonant with the sacred text that these testimonies be understood in such a way that the future things contained in them are believed to be going to happen altogether certainly and infallibly.

24 It is confirmed, first. Because in the predictions of absolute future things, which do not contain a prophecy of threatening or a promise of some reward, we do not have recourse to knowledge which is merely conjectural on the part of the object; but to metaphysical infallibility: since in them they are predicated absolutely and without any word hinting at doubt: otherwise, indeed, of any revelation of any absolute future whatever, which contains no word hinting at doubtful knowledge on the part of the object, we could reasonably doubt whether in fact it will infallibly happen so: therefore, since the sacred text speaks in the same way in the aforesaid testimonies of conditional future things, and in almost all of them there is no prophecy of threatening, nor promise of some reward, they must be understood as the revelation of an event which is infallibly, and not only morally, future. Especially since no imperfection accrues to God from this; but rather this indicates the greatest perfection in him. Whence Stapleton said that as in the predictions of absolute future things it would be a corruption of the word of God to have recourse only to conjectural knowledge, and to the inclination and disposition of secondary causes, so also in similar revelations of conditional future things.

25 It is confirmed, secondly. Because although in the predictions of absolute future things which contain a prophecy, for example one of threatening, the future event is usually revealed only according to the part of the secondary causes; nevertheless it is not so because the effect is hidden from God, whether it will be future in a certain and infallible way: therefore the same must be understood in due proportion, still in the conditional revelations which contain a prophecy of threatening, and consequently with a stronger reason in the others which do not contain it. The consequence is clear from the parity of the reasoning, and especially because (as we were just hinting, and as we shall say in dub. 5 of this disputation) no absurdity follows from God's certainly knowing these conditional future things; but rather this argues the greatest perfection in God.

The antecedent, however, is shown by St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 171, art. 6, ad 2, in these words: Although future contingents, in themselves, are determined to one thing, yet in their causes they are not determined, so that they cannot happen otherwise. And although this twofold knowledge is always joined to the divine intellect, it is not always joined in the revelation of prophecy, because the impression of the agent does not always equal its power. Whence, whenever the revelation of prophecy is impressed, a certain likeness of divine foreknowledge is imprinted, according as it regards the future contingents in themselves: and such things happen as they are prophesied, according to that in Isa. 7, Behold a virgin shall conceive. But sometimes the revelation of prophecy is impressed as a likeness of divine foreknowledge, according as, namely, it knows the order of causes to effects: and then sometimes it happens otherwise than it is prophesied, and yet no falsity underlies the prophecy. For the sense of the prophecy is that the disposition of lower causes, whether of natural things or of human acts, is such that such an effect will happen, and in this sense the word of Isaiah is understood when he says: Thou shalt die, and shalt not live, that is, the disposition of thy body is ordained to death.

Which he also taught, q. 12, de Verit., art. 10, where, after he had distinguished the disposition of causes from the outcome and the event which will be afterwards, and had said that created power touches the future only as far as the order of causes, he added: But God does not only know the future by reason of the order of causes, but also with respect to the outcome itself, or the execution of the order: therefore, although we grant that in the prophecies of threatening God only predicts the disposition and inclination of the causes; it must not therefore be said that he does not certainly and infallibly know the future event under the condition.

26 Secondly, the same solution is opposed by the fact that, if the aforesaid testimonies were understood as being only about conjectural knowledge on the part of the object, and about the inclination of the causes, then what appears to be rather predicted by God would be the opposite of what was revealed by him; or at least the opposite could very well be predicted in those two testimonies which we adduced in the second, principal proof of the assertion. For the Ceilaans were very attached to David: inasmuch as they had received the greatest benefits from him, especially because he had freed that city from the Philistines, by whom it was being attacked; and thus they had shown to David the greatest affection in words and in promises, as a sign of grateful mind: there is no doubt about this.

And in the same way, according to the part of the inclination and the mode of operation of free secondary causes, it is very credible and probable that if one of the dead should rise up and should foretell by experimental knowledge to the sinners (who are meant by the name of brothers in that testimony of Luc. 16), then several of them, terrified by the novelty of the thing, would believe and come to their senses: therefore, if these testimonies had to be understood as being only about moral certainty on the part of the object, and about the inclination of the causes, the opposite would rather have had to be predicted in them, or at least the opposite could have been revealed. Wherefore, since in them the event opposite to the inclination of the causes is predicted, it is to be believed that this revelation does not rest on that conjectural knowledge, but on another knowledge which is infallible metaphysically, arising from some infallible principle, namely from the divine decree, efficacious and conditional, concerning the event of the aforesaid future things.

27 Finally, the same solution is opposed by the fact that this way of understanding the aforesaid testimonies as being about knowledge which is certain and infallible metaphysically, and not about moral certainty and the part of the secondary causes, seems more consonant with that rule which Moses gave, Deuter. 18, num. 22, for discerning when someone was prophesying in the name of God: where, when he thus says: If thou answerest in secret thought, how can I understand the word which the Lord hath not spoken? he answers immediately: This shalt thou have as a sign, that what that prophet hath foretold in the name of the Lord is not fulfilled, this the Lord hath not spoken, but the prophet has invented it through the swelling of his own mind. Where, as theologians commonly teach, he is speaking of prophecies which contain no threatening, nor promise of a reward. Whence in other similar prophecies, or revelations, just as much is revealed by God as is infallible, so that it always happens; whether absolutely, if the future thing be absolute; or conditionally, if it be conditional: and so we must not have recourse to the inclination of the secondary causes alone: because, this inclination standing, it very often does not happen. Especially because free secondary causes are so easily mutable, that from the disposition which they now have, when the time of the fulfilment of the prophecy and of the revelation comes, it cannot be collected by us whether at the time of the revelation they had beforehand this same disposition, or conversely? and so the rule which the Holy Spirit gave through Moses, for separating true prophets from false ones, would be frustrated.

To all of which is added the fact that that testimony from the book of Kings, adduced in the last place, in which that particle most certainly is contained, indicates the greatest certainty in divine knowledge, which cannot easily be explained by moral certainty, since falsity often underlies it: and so that testimony has greater force than that which is given to it in the aforesaid explanation. But if this testimony must be understood as being about infallible knowledge, then all the others must immediately be understood in the same way. For if God has once this means for infallibly knowing this conditional future thing, there is no reason why it should be denied to him with respect to the other future things, and it seems clear of itself, and will become clearer from what is said below.

For the foundation of the first opinion, what has been said in the second assertion makes it clear.