Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

This doubt must be decided by the simple determination of the truth of the proposition, because the matter of which it treats asks nothing further. For its decision, therefore, it must first be noted that the conditional future can be taken in a twofold way. First indeed in such a way that it denotes the future which will in fact be, because the condition on which it has its dependence will itself be: and thus it is called future, not any future whatsoever, but conditional future, because it depends on some condition. Hence in this sense the incarnation of the Word had the character of a conditional future, from the fact that it depended on the sin of Adam, in such a way that if this sin had not been, the incarnation would not have been either, as St. Thomas teaches in 3. part. qu. 1, art. 3. In the second way that which de facto will not have existence, but would have had it if the condition on which it depends were posited, is called a conditioned future contingent, although in truth it is never to be posited, as if one should say: If Judas had not hanged himself, he would have been saved.

2 Second, it must be noted that the conditional future, taken in this second way, is again DIVIDED. For some are in a certain way connected with the condition, from the fact that the condition influences them in a certain way: whether such an influx be after the manner of a cause, or of an occasion, or of a sine qua non condition, as: If Peter had heard the sermon, he would be converted. Others, however, have, so far as they are of themselves, no connexion with the condition; but considered of themselves they have themselves as concomitant with it. These are indeed called disparate conditionals, as: If Paul were singing at Valladolid, Francis would be sleeping in Madrid.

3 Third, it must be noted that each of these members can be further subdivided. For in the first place the conditional future which has some connexion with the condition is one thing which is necessarily connected with it by a simple necessity, as in these propositions: If the sun were shining, it would be day, or: If Peter were walking, he would be in motion. Another, however, which has only an infallible connexion with the condition, or a necessary connexion by a secundum quid necessity, and precisely on the supposition, as: If Judas had been efficaciously called by Christ, he would not have hanged himself, but would have been converted, or: If he had been predestined, he would not have been damned, but would have been saved. Yet another, which has a probable, or conjectural, connection with the condition, as: If a cup of water were offered to Peter when thirsty, he would drink it.

And then the disparate conditional future can also be divided into other members. For one is that in which the positing of the condition has its dependence from a free cause, while the concomitant effect has its dependence from a necessary cause, as: If Peter were going to Valladolid, John would be killed by the lightning. Another, however, in which both the positing of the condition and the effect itself which follows have their dependence from a created free cause, as: If Peter were walking in Valladolid, John would be sleeping in Madrid.

4 From these things, then, it must be noted, fourthly, that the present disputation is not about conditional futures which, both they themselves and the conditions on which they depend, will have existence in fact; or (as others say) about those futures in which the condition is purified, and so pass into absolutes, because such futures, having truly the character of absolute futures, do not belong to this disputation, but to the preceding one, in which we treated at length of absolute futures.

Now speaking of the conditional futures in which the condition will not be purified, and which have some connexion with it, we shall not treat of those futures which have a necessary connexion with their condition, provided that through the proposition which is formed about them only the necessity of the inference is imported; or provided that that proposition is taken precisely in the force of a conditional importing only the goodness of the inference of one from the other. Then because it is certain that the aforesaid proposition, taken in this way, is truly not a proposition about the future on the part of the object, and founded in the thing; but only with respect to the form of the statement: because the same connexion is necessarily signified in the thing itself also in a proposition of the present or of the past. And so it makes no difference whether you say: If the sun shines, it is day, or whether you assert: If the sun will shine, it will be day. But the conditional propositions which we treat of here do truly, and with foundation in the thing on the part of the object, state something about a future which will in fact be if the condition is posited. Then also: because it is indubitable that the aforesaid conditional futures, or the propositions formed about them, are necessary from the terms and from within, in such a way that they involve from within the opposite being done; and consequently they cannot fail to be certainly known by God; nay, they cannot fail to be certainly known by him through knowledge which is altogether necessary, that is, through the knowledge of simple intelligence.

5 From which it also follows that there is likewise no discourse in this disputation about conditional futures in which the condition, expressly posited in the proposition formed about them, has an infallible connexion, though simply free, with the future event, provided that through those alone the inference of one from the other is signified, as if one should say: If Peter were efficaciously called by God, he would consent.

Then because these propositions, taken in this way, insofar as they state only the goodness of the inference, or the necessity of the consequence, are truly not propositions about the future, as we said above about the other propositions just enumerated; but in the thing itself only about the possible, although with respect to the form of the statement they are about the future. And therefore the same truth would be signified if that proposition were formed in the form of a present or a past tense; as if it were said: If Peter is efficaciously called by God, he consents, or: If God had efficaciously called Peter, he would have consented, or if it were asserted: From the efficacious vocation by which Peter is called by God, it follows rightly that he will consent. Not otherwise, the proportion being preserved, than this proposition: A man is capable of laughter, which on the part of the object, and with foundation in the thing, signifies the same truth as these: If a man is, he is capable of laughter. If a man will be, he will be capable of laughter: and so they are truly about the possible; although with respect to the form of the statement they differ.

Then also (that which follows from the preceding), because it is certain that such a proposition about a conditional future importing only the necessity of the inference has, entirely anterior to the free decree existing in God, a determinate truth, and consequently one altogether necessary, and certainly and necessarily known by God, and consequently through the knowledge of simple intelligence.

6 We have said that there is no discourse about the aforesaid futures, and about the propositions about them in which the condition expressly posited has an infallible connexion with the future event. For although the infallibility is perhaps from the force of the divine decree, but not from the merits of the condition alone, expressly posited, namely, that that effect, with such a condition posited, will have being — this makes no difference. Nor is the consideration and the discussion of the knowledge of the aforesaid future thereby excluded; but rather it is included in this disputation, which is not about knowledge of conditional futures in any way whatever, but about the aforesaid knowledge, inscribed in an efficacious and infallible conditioned decree. And so it belongs to the present disputation: whether God certainly knows that, if the virtues which were worked in Bethsaida had been worked in Tyre and Sidon, then the Tyrians and Sidonians would believe in Christ and do penance. Because although, as we shall say in this same disputation, this cannot be known except from the force of an efficacious and conditioned decree having an infallible connexion with the aforesaid effect, nevertheless the condition expressly posited there is not the aforesaid decree, but another, namely, that the signs and prodigies which were worked in Bethsaida and Corozaim would be worked in Tyre and Sidon.

7 We have added, however: provided that through those alone the inference of one from the other is signified. For if they are taken as stating something about the future, even under a condition, they require, for their own truth, an efficacious decree absolute on the part of the subject and conditioned on the part of the object. Hence under this consideration they will not belong to the natural knowledge of God; but rather to the free knowledge, as Gonzalez well noted in the present disputation 44, section 4, from the fact that the truth signified by it is not purely of the possible; but truly of the future, at least under a condition: and no thing can be drawn out of the character of the purely possible into the character of future in some way, except dependently on the free decree of God existing in it. Hence, in order that this proposition: If Peter were efficaciously called by God, he would consent, be true, not only in the force of the inference, but as stating something about the future even under a condition, that is, be of the aforesaid future on the part of the object, it is required that God have a decree by which he determines that Peter will consent tomorrow, if he were efficaciously called by him then. These two things are to be noted accurately, so that the objections of the adversaries may be answered.

8 From which it also follows that there is no discourse here about those disparate conditional futures in which the condition expressly posited depends on a free will, and yet the ensuing effect is concomitant with, and produced by, some necessary cause. Because it is certain that God knows the aforesaid futures: since necessary futures, or those depending precisely on necessary second causes, are altogether known to God; whereas the aforesaid future depends only on necessary second causes: because that condition, said to be disparate, has itself toward it, as was said above.

Therefore this whole disputation will be occupied only with explaining both whether God certainly and infallibly knows conditional future contingents, whether they be disparate, in such a way nevertheless that both the condition and the future event depend on a free cause; or whether they be not disparate, but having some connexion with the future event, provided that this connexion between the expressly posited condition and the event be not infallible, but only conjectural, or probable. Then also how the aforesaid knowledge of them follows from the force of the decree already indicated.