Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

1 After we have explained that God certainly knows absolute future contingents, and how he certainly knows them, it remains for us to explain whether, and how, he has an infallible knowledge of future conditionates. Deliberately, therefore, in the heading of this disputation we did not inquire absolutely about the knowledge of God with respect to future conditionates, but about the aforesaid knowledge which God has of them in his efficacious and conditioned decree, so as to denote that this disputation is not about middle or conditioned knowledge, which many outside the school of D. Thomas admit, and which does not terminate with respect to future conditionates, because they are efficaciously and conditionally predetermined by God; but by reason of the objective truth which (as they themselves think) they have antecedently to the divine decree. We shall treat of that knowledge indeed, and of how it is to be refuted, in the following disputation professedly.

This doubt must be decided by the simple determination of the truth of the proposition, because the matter of which it treats asks nothing further. For its decision, therefore, it must first be noted that the conditional future can be taken in a twofold way. First indeed in such a way that it denotes the future which will in fact be, because the condition on which it has its dependence will itself be: and thus it is called future, not any future whatsoever, but conditional future, because it depends on some condition. Hence in this sense the incarnation of the Word had the character of a conditional future, from the fact that it depended on the sin of Adam, in such a way that if this sin had not been, the incarnation would not have been either, as St. Thomas teaches in 3. part. qu. 1, art. 3. In the second way that which de facto will not have existence, but would have had it if the condition on which it depends were posited, is called a conditioned future contingent, although in truth it is never to be posited, as if one should say: If Judas had not hanged himself, he would have been saved.

2 Second, it must be noted that the conditional future, taken in this second way, is again DIVIDED. For some are in a certain way connected with the condition, from the fact that the condition influences them in a certain way: whether such an influx be after the manner of a cause, or of an occasion, or of a sine qua non condition, as: If Peter had heard the sermon, he would be converted. Others, however, have, so far as they are of themselves, no connexion with the condition; but considered of themselves they have themselves as concomitant with it. These are indeed called disparate conditionals, as: If Paul were singing at Valladolid, Francis would be sleeping in Madrid.

3 Third, it must be noted that each of these members can be further subdivided. For in the first place the conditional future which has some connexion with the condition is one thing which is necessarily connected with it by a simple necessity, as in these propositions: If the sun were shining, it would be day, or: If Peter were walking, he would be in motion. Another, however, which has only an infallible connexion with the condition, or a necessary connexion by a secundum quid necessity, and precisely on the supposition, as: If Judas had been efficaciously called by Christ, he would not have hanged himself, but would have been converted, or: If he had been predestined, he would not have been damned, but would have been saved. Yet another, which has a probable, or conjectural, connection with the condition, as: If a cup of water were offered to Peter when thirsty, he would drink it.

And then the disparate conditional future can also be divided into other members. For one is that in which the positing of the condition has its dependence from a free cause, while the concomitant effect has its dependence from a necessary cause, as: If Peter were going to Valladolid, John would be killed by the lightning. Another, however, in which both the positing of the condition and the effect itself which follows have their dependence from a created free cause, as: If Peter were walking in Valladolid, John would be sleeping in Madrid.

4 From these things, then, it must be noted, fourthly, that the present disputation is not about conditional futures which, both they themselves and the conditions on which they depend, will have existence in fact; or (as others say) about those futures in which the condition is purified, and so pass into absolutes, because such futures, having truly the character of absolute futures, do not belong to this disputation, but to the preceding one, in which we treated at length of absolute futures.

Now speaking of the conditional futures in which the condition will not be purified, and which have some connexion with it, we shall not treat of those futures which have a necessary connexion with their condition, provided that through the proposition which is formed about them only the necessity of the inference is imported; or provided that that proposition is taken precisely in the force of a conditional importing only the goodness of the inference of one from the other. Then because it is certain that the aforesaid proposition, taken in this way, is truly not a proposition about the future on the part of the object, and founded in the thing; but only with respect to the form of the statement: because the same connexion is necessarily signified in the thing itself also in a proposition of the present or of the past. And so it makes no difference whether you say: If the sun shines, it is day, or whether you assert: If the sun will shine, it will be day. But the conditional propositions which we treat of here do truly, and with foundation in the thing on the part of the object, state something about a future which will in fact be if the condition is posited. Then also: because it is indubitable that the aforesaid conditional futures, or the propositions formed about them, are necessary from the terms and from within, in such a way that they involve from within the opposite being done; and consequently they cannot fail to be certainly known by God; nay, they cannot fail to be certainly known by him through knowledge which is altogether necessary, that is, through the knowledge of simple intelligence.

5 From which it also follows that there is likewise no discourse in this disputation about conditional futures in which the condition, expressly posited in the proposition formed about them, has an infallible connexion, though simply free, with the future event, provided that through those alone the inference of one from the other is signified, as if one should say: If Peter were efficaciously called by God, he would consent.

Then because these propositions, taken in this way, insofar as they state only the goodness of the inference, or the necessity of the consequence, are truly not propositions about the future, as we said above about the other propositions just enumerated; but in the thing itself only about the possible, although with respect to the form of the statement they are about the future. And therefore the same truth would be signified if that proposition were formed in the form of a present or a past tense; as if it were said: If Peter is efficaciously called by God, he consents, or: If God had efficaciously called Peter, he would have consented, or if it were asserted: From the efficacious vocation by which Peter is called by God, it follows rightly that he will consent. Not otherwise, the proportion being preserved, than this proposition: A man is capable of laughter, which on the part of the object, and with foundation in the thing, signifies the same truth as these: If a man is, he is capable of laughter. If a man will be, he will be capable of laughter: and so they are truly about the possible; although with respect to the form of the statement they differ.

Then also (that which follows from the preceding), because it is certain that such a proposition about a conditional future importing only the necessity of the inference has, entirely anterior to the free decree existing in God, a determinate truth, and consequently one altogether necessary, and certainly and necessarily known by God, and consequently through the knowledge of simple intelligence.

6 We have said that there is no discourse about the aforesaid futures, and about the propositions about them in which the condition expressly posited has an infallible connexion with the future event. For although the infallibility is perhaps from the force of the divine decree, but not from the merits of the condition alone, expressly posited, namely, that that effect, with such a condition posited, will have being — this makes no difference. Nor is the consideration and the discussion of the knowledge of the aforesaid future thereby excluded; but rather it is included in this disputation, which is not about knowledge of conditional futures in any way whatever, but about the aforesaid knowledge, inscribed in an efficacious and infallible conditioned decree. And so it belongs to the present disputation: whether God certainly knows that, if the virtues which were worked in Bethsaida had been worked in Tyre and Sidon, then the Tyrians and Sidonians would believe in Christ and do penance. Because although, as we shall say in this same disputation, this cannot be known except from the force of an efficacious and conditioned decree having an infallible connexion with the aforesaid effect, nevertheless the condition expressly posited there is not the aforesaid decree, but another, namely, that the signs and prodigies which were worked in Bethsaida and Corozaim would be worked in Tyre and Sidon.

7 We have added, however: provided that through those alone the inference of one from the other is signified. For if they are taken as stating something about the future, even under a condition, they require, for their own truth, an efficacious decree absolute on the part of the subject and conditioned on the part of the object. Hence under this consideration they will not belong to the natural knowledge of God; but rather to the free knowledge, as Gonzalez well noted in the present disputation 44, section 4, from the fact that the truth signified by it is not purely of the possible; but truly of the future, at least under a condition: and no thing can be drawn out of the character of the purely possible into the character of future in some way, except dependently on the free decree of God existing in it. Hence, in order that this proposition: If Peter were efficaciously called by God, he would consent, be true, not only in the force of the inference, but as stating something about the future even under a condition, that is, be of the aforesaid future on the part of the object, it is required that God have a decree by which he determines that Peter will consent tomorrow, if he were efficaciously called by him then. These two things are to be noted accurately, so that the objections of the adversaries may be answered.

8 From which it also follows that there is no discourse here about those disparate conditional futures in which the condition expressly posited depends on a free will, and yet the ensuing effect is concomitant with, and produced by, some necessary cause. Because it is certain that God knows the aforesaid futures: since necessary futures, or those depending precisely on necessary second causes, are altogether known to God; whereas the aforesaid future depends only on necessary second causes: because that condition, said to be disparate, has itself toward it, as was said above.

Therefore this whole disputation will be occupied only with explaining both whether God certainly and infallibly knows conditional future contingents, whether they be disparate, in such a way nevertheless that both the condition and the future event depend on a free cause; or whether they be not disparate, but having some connexion with the future event, provided that this connexion between the expressly posited condition and the event be not infallible, but only conjectural, or probable. Then also how the aforesaid knowledge of them follows from the force of the decree already indicated.

9 In this doubt we shall not treat of the means by which God knows the aforesaid future things; but of whether he knows with altogether complete certainty, both on the part of the subject and on the part of the object, the aforesaid future things which were set forth in the title.

§ I. The first opinion is proposed.

The first opinion asserts that, according to Holy Scripture, God does not know with the aforesaid certainty the future contingent things which are conditional, of which we are speaking. Thus Ledesma, lib. de auxil. disp. 2, affin. de scientia futurorum contingentium fol. 582, and others of the later Thomists. Which they hold to be probable: Curiel, controver. 7, and our Corneio, in the present disp. 3, dub. 2. It is proved, first, because often when there is question about the event of these future things, which have only a probable connexion with the condition, God speaks of them not assertively, as of a certain thing, but as of a doubtful thing. For in Genes. 3 he says: Behold Adam is become as one of us, etc. Now therefore, lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever, etc. And Deut. 4, thus God addresses the people through Moses: You saw not any likeness on the day when the Lord spoke to you, lest being deceived you should make for yourselves a graven likeness, etc. And Matth. ii, Christ said: If the miracles had been done in Sodom which were done in you, they would perhaps have remained until this day. In which words those future things predicated as conditional are known by God under that particle perhaps. Since therefore the same reasoning holds of all future things that are conditional, it must be said that God has not a certain and infallible knowledge and cognition of their coming to be.

10 It is proved, secondly. Because God, Exod. 4, when giving Moses the signs by which he might induce the Egyptians to believe, thus says: If they will not believe you, nor will they hear the voice of the first sign, they will believe the word of the second sign: and if they will not believe even these two signs, nor will they hear your voice, take the water of the river, and pour it upon the dry ground, and whatsoever you shall draw of the river shall be turned into blood. Where it is plainly predicted that this effect will in itself be uncertain and doubtful, namely, that the Egyptians will believe Moses under this condition, if the former signs were done: and it is clear that God provided this token of the doubt in the later signs, in the case in which the former would not have their effect.

§ II. The first assertion.

11 It must nevertheless be said, first, that, according to Holy Scripture, God certainly and infallibly knows altogether the future contingent things which are conditional and disparate, of which we are speaking here. Thus all the Scholastic Doctors, whom we shall cite below. It is proved from that in 4 Reg. 13, where, when the prophet Elisha had commanded the king of Israel to strike the ground with his staff, as a sign that he was to carry off the victory from the king of Syria, and the king of Israel struck the ground three times only, then Elisha said to him: If thou hadst struck five times, or six times, or seven times, thou wouldst have smitten Syria even unto its consummation; but now three times only shalt thou strike it. Where, as you see, this future contingent thing, which is conditional and disparate, is predicted by God: If the king of Israel had struck the ground five times, or six times, etc., he would smite Syria unto its consummation: therefore God certainly and infallibly knows it. Consequently, it is clear. Because from what head it was predicted by God, it could not be unknown to him: and from what head it has not even a conjectural or probable connexion with the condition, but is disparate with respect to it, it cannot be known by God with a conjectural knowledge on the part of the object, by force of the probable connexion which is between the condition and the future; but it must necessarily be known by force of another means, namely either on account of the objective and infallible truth which the predicated future thing has (as the authors of middle knowledge hold, though falsely, as appears from what was said in the preceding disputation), or on account of the efficacious and infallible decree which God had concerning that future thing, and so it is known through a knowledge altogether infallible and certain, or (which is the same) infallible, both on the part of the object and on the part of the subject.

12 From which it also appears that the solution which some of the opponents apply to this testimony does not suffice, namely, that in this future thing conditional there was some proportion and connexion in the sense of sign and of the thing signed, between it and its condition: a connexion which consisted in this, that as often as the king struck the ground with that staff, so many times did he smite Syria. And so those victories, in accordance with the disposition of things, could probably be judged to be sufficient for the total destruction of Syria.

From what has been said, therefore, it is quite clear that this solution is not valid. For this sign would be either natural or conventional. Not the former, since there is no natural connexion on which such a signification could rest. Nor the latter. Because either by human institution or by divine institution? Not by human institution, since no man could know that future event: therefore by divine institution, and consequently by the free decree of God concerning such a future thing. Once this is admitted, it cannot be denied that God certainly knows it.

13 Nor does it matter, if you say that from this testimony it is only collected that God certainly and infallibly knew this disparate future thing, and not the other similar ones: since this is not a sufficient foundation for asserting that God had conditional and efficacious decrees concerning all future things which are conditional and disparate.

It is not so, therefore. For, according to Holy Scripture, the most perfect liberty and the highest actuality must be granted to God: since, as we shall say in dub. 4 of this disputation, the actuality and the highest perfection of divine liberty consist in this, that with respect to no future thing, whether absolute or conditional, does it remain suspended; but concerning each and every one it decrees in efficacious fashion that it shall be, or that it shall not be. Although whether, in particular and determinately, he had a decree about being, or determinately about not being, must be established for us especially from Scripture or from the Fathers: and so, etc.

§ III. The second assertion, and its first proof.

14 It must be said, secondly, that it is more probable and more consonant with Scripture that God certainly and infallibly knows altogether the future contingent things which have only a probable, or conjectural, connexion with the condition. We have said that this is more probable, because we do not deny that the opposite has some probability: and therefore several theologians, and not to be despised, defend it.

This assertion is maintained without qualification by Zumel, lib. 3, de scientia conditionatorum disp. 5; Alvarez, lib. 2, de auxiliis disp. 7; Nazarius, in the present controversy 1, notabile 1, et conclus. 1; Gonzalez, disp. 44, sect. 2; Cabrera, 3 part., q. 1, art. 3, disp. 1; Ripa, in the present dub. 4, last chapter; Corneio, disp. 3, dub. 3, who well adds that this opinion is almost common among the disciples of St. Thomas, setting aside the means by which such things are known, of which we shall speak in dub. 4; and finally by all the authors who hold middle or conditional knowledge, who are to be mentioned in the following disputation: although these and those are led by different foundations. For these think that the future things predicated are certainly known by God before the divine decree; and therefore they admit predicated middle or conditional knowledge. Those, however, namely the disciples of St. Thomas, grant only infallible knowledge of them, after the divine decree, efficacious and conditional, as to their coming to be; and for that reason they deny the same conditional knowledge pro viribus, that is, as far as it goes.

It is proved, first, from that in Matth. 11 and Luc. 10: Woe to thee, Chorazin! Woe to thee, Bethsaida! for if the miracles had been done in Tyre and Sidon which were done in you, they would long ago have done penance in sackcloth and ashes. Where this future thing conditional is assertively predicted by Christ: and therefore it is certainly known by him, both by infused knowledge and also by divine knowledge.

15 Nor does it matter, if in the first place you answer, together with Curiel at the place cited, num. 62, and Jansenius, in concordia cap. 47, that Christ did not say that they would do penance from any foreknowledge which he had of such an event as being conditioned, because in truth he did not foreknow it; but that he asserted it in a human manner, through a certain exaggeration and hyperbole, in order that the hardness of Bethsaida and Chorazin might be reproved more severely. That manner of speaking is shown to be usual in Scripture by Martinez, lib. 9, Hypothesis, and Ribera, in Amos. cap. 2, num. 19 and 34.

It is not so, therefore. For our Corneio refutes this solution very well from Augustine and Prosper. For Augustine, in the Enchirid. cap. 93 and lib. 2, de dono perseverantiae, cap. 9 and 10, thus says: But can we say that the Tyrians and Sidonians, if such miracles had been done among them, would not have believed: when the Lord himself attests that they would have done penance of great humility? Where those words are to be weighed: when the Lord himself attests; which cannot be said of a hyperbolic proposition, nor of a thing which would not be future. And in the same way St. Prosper, explaining this passage of Matthew, thus says: We also, if we cannot penetrate the reason of the deed and the depth of his judgment, nevertheless know manifestly both that what he said is true and that what he did is just. Therefore, according to the doctrine of these Fathers, it was not a mere exaggeration, nor a hyperbole of a thing not foreknown as future; but a true assertion and a prediction of a future event, the condition having been posited.

16 And it is confirmed. Because if these words are only hyperbolic, the Lord Christ could have said the same thing which he said of the Tyrians and Sidonians of all the other Gentiles; but he truly affirmed something of them which he would not affirm of all the Gentiles; therefore he spoke not hyperbolically and by exaggeration, but from certain knowledge of the Tyrians and Sidonians. The major is clear, because a hyperbole does not contain determined truth, since among the Rhetoricians it is a superiectio, that is, an overstatement.

The minor, however (apart from the fact that it appears of itself to stand), is argued from those words: Yet truly it shall be more leniently dealt with for Tyre and Sidon than for you. Which words contain a determinate prophecy of a lighter punishment for Tyre than for Bethsaida: and therefore the Lord Christ, in those words, Woe to thee, Chorazin, etc., truly affirmed something of the Tyrians and Sidonians which he would not affirm of all the other Gentiles.

17 Nor does it matter, if, secondly, you meet the same Curiel with the argument that those words were said by Christ, not as of a thing future infallibly, the condition being posited; but as of a thing certain only morally, the disposition of the Tyrians being taken into account. This interpretation is favoured by what he says below of the Sodomites: where, predicting something similar of them, he added the particle perhaps, asserting: And thou, Capharnaum, shalt thou not be exalted even to heaven? thou shalt descend even to hell: for if the miracles had been done in Sodom which were done in thee, they would perhaps have remained until this day. Hence in the Greek, after the word olim which our text adduces, there is a particle meaning the same as utique; for which our interpreter renders, in the second place, perhaps: and it seems that he suppressed it in the earlier passage, because he thought it sufficient to append it at the end of the whole sentence, when he had predicted something similar of the Sodomites.

It is not so, therefore. For, in the first place, what is brought from the particle perhaps does not prove that any doubt is contained in the aforesaid testimonies on the part of the object, and consequently only a moral certainty on that same part. Because that word perhaps does not signify doubt in Holy Scripture; but rather the confirmation of the thing spoken of, whenever God or Christ speaks; as is clear from that in Act. 8, where St. Peter, speaking to Simon Magus, says: Repent of this thy wickedness, and pray to God, if perhaps the thought of thy heart be forgiven thee. Which passage Ambrose, expounding, says: The particle (if perhaps) indeed apparently introduces a doubt, but in reality none at all. And he confirms this from sacred and profane authors.

And in the same way Joan. 4: If thou knewest the gift of God, and who it is that saith to thee, Give me to drink: thou wouldst perhaps have asked of him, etc.; and 5: If ye would believe Moses, ye would perhaps also believe me; and cap. 8: If ye knew me, ye would perhaps also know my Father. In which places it is certain that the aforesaid particle is taken in no way doubtfully. And therefore our Vulgate not only in the place mentioned, but also often renders from the Greek for the particle perhaps the particle utique, certainly, as in that Psalm. 50: For if thou hadst wanted it, thou wouldst surely have given a sacrifice. Where St. Jerome, expounding that in Jerem. 26, Take not away the word, if perhaps I may hear, Augustine, tract. 37, in Joan., Chrysostom, homil. 78, in Matthew, Gregory, homil. 9, in Ezekiel, and Eusebius, lib. 6, de praeparatione Evangel., cap. 9, expressly affirm that the particle perhaps does not import doubt when God speaks; but is added to denote either the liberty of the will, or the difficulty of the thing which is predicted, and how few there will be who will do it.

18 It seemed good, however, to report the words of Jerome and of Augustine at greater length, since they are worthy of note, the other things being omitted: The word perhaps (says Jerome) ambiguous (perhaps) as it is, cannot befit the majesty of the Lord, but he speaks in our own idiom, so that the free choice of man may be preserved. Augustine, however, thus says: He who knows all things, when he says perhaps, does not doubt, but rebukes: the word of doubt is when it is said by a man, and therefore by one doubting because he does not know; but when it is said by God, when nothing is hidden from God, that doubt argues infidelity, it does not argue that he is God.

And then, what is further contained in the same solution, namely, that the predicted future thing was not revealed as certainly and infallibly future; but only as certain morally, or, the disposition of causes being taken into account, does not seem consonant with this testimony, especially according to the mind of Augustine. For since the Tyrians and Sidonians were Gentiles and entangled in vices, it could indeed, with this disposition of causes being taken into account, probably be judged that they were not to be converted: just as with other causes being taken into account, it could also probably be estimated that their conversion was to follow, if they had seen those signs and prodigies: and consequently, just as it could be affirmed absolutely that they were to be converted, so the opposite can also be said, the disposition of the same causes being taken into account: but this is repugnant to the explanation which we have brought from St. Augustine. For he assertively affirms that this cannot be said on the ground that the Lord attests that they were going to do penance, as appears from the words just related. But this will be made more clear from what, in expounding other testimonies, we shall say immediately.

19 Nor does it matter, if you object against what we have said about this testimony. In the first place, because according to the rule of the same Augustine, lib. 3, de doctrina Christiana, cap. 10, universally received by all theologians, the words of Holy Scripture must always be understood in the proper sense, when from their being understood in that way nothing follows against faith or against reason: therefore, since the particle perhaps indicates some doubt at least on the part of the object, and no absurdity follows from the aforesaid testimony being understood in that way, the consequence will be that it must be so understood; and consequently that by it is denoted that the predicted future thing is doubtful and only conjecturable on the part of the object; although on the part of the subject it is certainly known as future in a moral or conjectural way. In the second place also: because from what Christ had said, namely, that the Sidonians and Tyrians would be converted, if those miracles had been done in them which were done in Bethsaida: it is immediately collected from the sacred Page that it would be dealt with more leniently with the Tyrians and Sidonians on the day of judgment than with the Jews: therefore this is a sign that Christ spoke only of the present disposition of the Tyrians and Sidonians, and of the disposition of the Jews: and consequently that he affirmed only that these exist in a worse disposition than those: because they had smaller sins. The consequence is clear. For on that day no one is dealt with more leniently on account of the good works which he would do, but on account of the smaller sins which he committed.

20 For an answer must be given to the first of these objections. In the first place, because from the opposite there follows no small absurdity, namely, that if God knew the aforesaid things with moral certainty only on the part of the object, he would not have had an efficacious decree concerning them, though conditional. And from this again it follows that there is not in him the most perfect and the most actual liberty, as we shall insinuate again in dub. 4 of this disputation, and as we shall say in the tract. on the Will, disp. 5, dub. 3. In the second place also, it is enough that, according to the common exposition of the same Augustine and of the other Fathers, the aforesaid particle perhaps is taken in the sense already stated, on account of the matter, because nothing absurd follows from its being taken in that way. Nor will the words of Scripture thereby lose their firmness, or be able to be tortured into other senses: because in the others there will cease to be that agreement of so many Fathers which is present here.

To the second objection, however, it must be said that the Lord Christ predicted both, namely, that the blindness and the hardness of heart of the Tyrians and Sidonians was less than that of the Bethsaidans and of the inhabitants of Chorazin; and then that those would be converted, if they had seen the aforesaid signs; but not these, as Augustine notes, lib. 2, de bono perseverantiae, cap. 14, in these words: The eyes of the Tyrians and Sidonians were not so blinded, nor their heart so hardened, because if they had believed, if these men had seen such signs as they saw, they would have seen signs. Wherefore on the day of judgment it will not be dealt with more leniently with the Tyrians than with the Jews on account of the good works which they would do, the condition being posited, but on account of the smaller sins which they committed, on account of which they were not so hardened as THEY.

§ IV. Second proof of the same assertion.

21 Secondly, the same assertion is proved by other testimonies. For in 1 Reg. 23, when David was in Ceila and had heard that Saul was coming there to overturn the city on account of David himself, he consulted the Lord, saying: If the men of Ceila deliver me into his hand, and if Saul indeed comes down as thy servant has heard, make known to thy servant. And the Lord said, he will come down. And David said: If the men of Ceila deliver me into the hand of Saul, and the men who are with me? And the Lord said, they will deliver. Where, as is clear, a twofold future thing conditional is assertively predicted by God, namely, the coming down of Saul and the delivering of the Ceilaans, if David should remain there.

And in the same way it is said to king Zedekiah in Jerem. 38: If you go forth to the princes of the king of Babylon, your life shall live, and this city shall not be burned with fire, and you shall be safe, and your house. Where three things at least are assertively predicted as future. Namely, first, that the king is to be preserved alive; second, that the city is not to be set on fire; third, that his whole house is to be safe. And that these too were conditional is clear from the following verse: in which it is narrated that he himself did not go forth to the princes of the king of Babylon; and so the opposite of those three things which had been revealed came to pass.

And then Luc. 16, when that rich man asked Abraham that one of the dead should come down to preach repentance to his brothers, so that they might the more easily believe and be converted, he answered: If they do not hear Moses and the Prophets, neither will they believe, even if one of the dead should rise up.

22 And it is confirmed from that in Joan. 5: He it is that accuses you, Moses, in whom you hope. For if ye would believe Moses, ye would perhaps also believe me: for he wrote of me. Where the particle perhaps is not that of one doubting, but of one affirming, as we said above. And thus the most ancient authors omit it, as Maldonatus noted, and Albeinus in St. Thomas. Likewise Cyprian, and Aug. lib. 16, contra Faustum. And in the same way that other passage of Joan. 6 argues the same thing: Jesus therefore, when he had known that they were coming to take him, and to make him king, fled again to the mountain, he alone. And the first to the Corinthians: For if they had known, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory. And finally that passage of 3 Reg., cap. 11: You shall not go in to them; nor do they go in to yours: for they will most certainly turn away your hearts, that you may follow their gods. Where, although this future thing was absolute with respect to Solomon, for example, who was united with alien women with most burning love; and thus, as the sacred text says, when he was already old, his heart was corrupted through women, so that he should follow alien gods; yet with respect to very many others, who were not united with the same women, it had the character of a future contingent thing conditional.

23 Nor can we have recourse in these testimonies to moral certainty alone, and consequently to the claim that they were going to happen so only according to the determination of secondary causes.

For against this, in the first place, is the fact that in almost all the testimonies which have been related, the future things contained in them are predicated absolutely and without any particle denoting doubt on the part of the object. And if there is any testimony containing the particle perhaps, which seems to hint at doubt on the part of the object and to exclude metaphysical infallibility, it has been shown above, in num. 17 and 18, not to have the force of doubt, but rather of affirmation: therefore it is much more consonant with the sacred text that these testimonies be understood in such a way that the future things contained in them are believed to be going to happen altogether certainly and infallibly.

24 It is confirmed, first. Because in the predictions of absolute future things, which do not contain a prophecy of threatening or a promise of some reward, we do not have recourse to knowledge which is merely conjectural on the part of the object; but to metaphysical infallibility: since in them they are predicated absolutely and without any word hinting at doubt: otherwise, indeed, of any revelation of any absolute future whatever, which contains no word hinting at doubtful knowledge on the part of the object, we could reasonably doubt whether in fact it will infallibly happen so: therefore, since the sacred text speaks in the same way in the aforesaid testimonies of conditional future things, and in almost all of them there is no prophecy of threatening, nor promise of some reward, they must be understood as the revelation of an event which is infallibly, and not only morally, future. Especially since no imperfection accrues to God from this; but rather this indicates the greatest perfection in him. Whence Stapleton said that as in the predictions of absolute future things it would be a corruption of the word of God to have recourse only to conjectural knowledge, and to the inclination and disposition of secondary causes, so also in similar revelations of conditional future things.

25 It is confirmed, secondly. Because although in the predictions of absolute future things which contain a prophecy, for example one of threatening, the future event is usually revealed only according to the part of the secondary causes; nevertheless it is not so because the effect is hidden from God, whether it will be future in a certain and infallible way: therefore the same must be understood in due proportion, still in the conditional revelations which contain a prophecy of threatening, and consequently with a stronger reason in the others which do not contain it. The consequence is clear from the parity of the reasoning, and especially because (as we were just hinting, and as we shall say in dub. 5 of this disputation) no absurdity follows from God's certainly knowing these conditional future things; but rather this argues the greatest perfection in God.

The antecedent, however, is shown by St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 171, art. 6, ad 2, in these words: Although future contingents, in themselves, are determined to one thing, yet in their causes they are not determined, so that they cannot happen otherwise. And although this twofold knowledge is always joined to the divine intellect, it is not always joined in the revelation of prophecy, because the impression of the agent does not always equal its power. Whence, whenever the revelation of prophecy is impressed, a certain likeness of divine foreknowledge is imprinted, according as it regards the future contingents in themselves: and such things happen as they are prophesied, according to that in Isa. 7, Behold a virgin shall conceive. But sometimes the revelation of prophecy is impressed as a likeness of divine foreknowledge, according as, namely, it knows the order of causes to effects: and then sometimes it happens otherwise than it is prophesied, and yet no falsity underlies the prophecy. For the sense of the prophecy is that the disposition of lower causes, whether of natural things or of human acts, is such that such an effect will happen, and in this sense the word of Isaiah is understood when he says: Thou shalt die, and shalt not live, that is, the disposition of thy body is ordained to death.

Which he also taught, q. 12, de Verit., art. 10, where, after he had distinguished the disposition of causes from the outcome and the event which will be afterwards, and had said that created power touches the future only as far as the order of causes, he added: But God does not only know the future by reason of the order of causes, but also with respect to the outcome itself, or the execution of the order: therefore, although we grant that in the prophecies of threatening God only predicts the disposition and inclination of the causes; it must not therefore be said that he does not certainly and infallibly know the future event under the condition.

26 Secondly, the same solution is opposed by the fact that, if the aforesaid testimonies were understood as being only about conjectural knowledge on the part of the object, and about the inclination of the causes, then what appears to be rather predicted by God would be the opposite of what was revealed by him; or at least the opposite could very well be predicted in those two testimonies which we adduced in the second, principal proof of the assertion. For the Ceilaans were very attached to David: inasmuch as they had received the greatest benefits from him, especially because he had freed that city from the Philistines, by whom it was being attacked; and thus they had shown to David the greatest affection in words and in promises, as a sign of grateful mind: there is no doubt about this.

And in the same way, according to the part of the inclination and the mode of operation of free secondary causes, it is very credible and probable that if one of the dead should rise up and should foretell by experimental knowledge to the sinners (who are meant by the name of brothers in that testimony of Luc. 16), then several of them, terrified by the novelty of the thing, would believe and come to their senses: therefore, if these testimonies had to be understood as being only about moral certainty on the part of the object, and about the inclination of the causes, the opposite would rather have had to be predicted in them, or at least the opposite could have been revealed. Wherefore, since in them the event opposite to the inclination of the causes is predicted, it is to be believed that this revelation does not rest on that conjectural knowledge, but on another knowledge which is infallible metaphysically, arising from some infallible principle, namely from the divine decree, efficacious and conditional, concerning the event of the aforesaid future things.

27 Finally, the same solution is opposed by the fact that this way of understanding the aforesaid testimonies as being about knowledge which is certain and infallible metaphysically, and not about moral certainty and the part of the secondary causes, seems more consonant with that rule which Moses gave, Deuter. 18, num. 22, for discerning when someone was prophesying in the name of God: where, when he thus says: If thou answerest in secret thought, how can I understand the word which the Lord hath not spoken? he answers immediately: This shalt thou have as a sign, that what that prophet hath foretold in the name of the Lord is not fulfilled, this the Lord hath not spoken, but the prophet has invented it through the swelling of his own mind. Where, as theologians commonly teach, he is speaking of prophecies which contain no threatening, nor promise of a reward. Whence in other similar prophecies, or revelations, just as much is revealed by God as is infallible, so that it always happens; whether absolutely, if the future thing be absolute; or conditionally, if it be conditional: and so we must not have recourse to the inclination of the secondary causes alone: because, this inclination standing, it very often does not happen. Especially because free secondary causes are so easily mutable, that from the disposition which they now have, when the time of the fulfilment of the prophecy and of the revelation comes, it cannot be collected by us whether at the time of the revelation they had beforehand this same disposition, or conversely? and so the rule which the Holy Spirit gave through Moses, for separating true prophets from false ones, would be frustrated.

To all of which is added the fact that that testimony from the book of Kings, adduced in the last place, in which that particle most certainly is contained, indicates the greatest certainty in divine knowledge, which cannot easily be explained by moral certainty, since falsity often underlies it: and so that testimony has greater force than that which is given to it in the aforesaid explanation. But if this testimony must be understood as being about infallible knowledge, then all the others must immediately be understood in the same way. For if God has once this means for infallibly knowing this conditional future thing, there is no reason why it should be denied to him with respect to the other future things, and it seems clear of itself, and will become clearer from what is said below.

For the foundation of the first opinion, what has been said in the second assertion makes it clear.

Whether, according to the mind of the Holy Fathers, God knows with perfect certainty, and infallibly, future contingent events that are conditional, whether they be, in the manner already set forth, disparate, or have a probable connection with the future event? 28 After we have explained what had to be said concerning knowledge that is infallible in the strict sense, that is, infallible both on the part of the subject and on the part of the object, with regard to future contingents that are conditional, in accordance with Sacred Scripture, it is necessary that we set out what is to be held concerning the mind of the Fathers, or (better said) that this very question virtually remains open in what was asserted in the preceding difficulty. But so that we may proceed more clearly and more distinctly, this difficulty is raised here in its own right.

§ I. The negative position.

The negative part is maintained by the Doctors cited in the preceding difficulty. And it is proved first by Corneius as follows. For St Augustine, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints, cap. 14, expounding that passage of Wisdom 4, He was snatched away, lest wickedness should alter his mind, says thus: For it was said according to the perils of this life*, not according to God's foreknowledge: foreknowing that which was to be, not that which was not to be.* Behold, where St Augustine expressly affirms that God does not know those future things whose condition will never be fulfilled. The same is taught in the first book On the Soul, and Its Origin, cap. 12, in these words: It would be killed outright by foreknowledge if what is foreknown were not to be: for how is it said that something is foreknown to be future, when it is not future?

29 Secondly, it is proved from the authority of Prosper of Regensburg, who in his Epistle to St Augustine, which is found in the eighth volume of Augustine's works before the book On Predestination, refuting the position of the Massilians — who asserted that men are chosen for grace and glory on account of the merits which they would have performed had they lived longer — says thus: To such an extent do they subject God's election to any and every fabricated merit, that, since past ones do not exist, they concoct future ones which are not future, and that things foreknown not to be done, and things foreknown to be done, are a new kind of absurdity with them. Behold how most absurd he judges it to be that things not to be done should be foreknown, even if otherwise they would have been purified by the condition.

30 Thirdly, it is proved from Damascene, in the dialogue Against the Manichaeans, where, refuting the error of those who said that God ought by no means to have created those men or angels whom He foreknew to be evil in the future and to be punished with eternal damnation, he says thus: In what way indeed can He foreknow that which is not to be? For if He had foreknown anyone to be a sinner and had not created him, this foreknowledge would not be foreknowledge; but deceit. Just as knowledge is of things that are, so foreknowledge is of things that are certainly to be. With which words nothing clearer can be said for this position, since he calls the knowledge of these future things deceit, that is, fraud and deception.

31 It makes no difference if, in answer to these testimonies, you reply first with Vázquez, in the present disputation, 67, cap. 4, at the beginning, and Curry, Controversia 7, art. 2, num. 63, ¹ that these Fathers deny only the absolute foreknowledge of things which at some time will not be; so that the sense of St Augustine is that God did not snatch away that child by an untimely death for the reason that He foreknew absolutely that his mind would be changed, had he lived long; because, since this was not in fact going to be, since he was forestalled by death, it could not be foreknown absolutely as such. For to be foreknown as absolutely future, when it is truly not future, is to annul foreknowledge itself (as Augustine teaches) and to introduce a new kind of absurdity; indeed, deceit, as Damascene and Prosper teach.

This is therefore irrelevant. Because if the Fathers in these testimonies were denying only the absolute foreknowledge of these future things, they would have attacked insufficiently the error of the Massilians, which they intended to attack. For the latter did not assert that God knows such future things with absolute foreknowledge, but with another knowledge abstracted from the condition, namely, conditional.

32 Nor does it stand in the way either, if secondly, with the same authors and Suárez, lib. 2, De scientia futurorum sub conditione, cap. 3, num. 8, you encounter the aforesaid testimonies by saying that these Fathers do not, in those passages, deny the foreknowledge of future things under a condition, but only that which the Massilians posited, namely, a foreknowledge leading to merit and demerit, to reward and punishment. Because they were attacking their error, whereby they asserted that God punishes and rewards, removes grace or confers it, on account of those good or bad works which He foreknew that boys, or even adults, would perform if they should come to the use of reason, or should persevere long in life, or if this or that should happen, even if in fact such works would never be.

This, therefore, is no obstacle. First, because it seems to have been said gratuitously: for from the testimonies cited it is clear enough that the Fathers denied, absolutely and simply, the foreknowledge of these future things. And certainly by no other means so easy as by denying it could they have refuted the error they were attacking. For otherwise they would more easily have attacked it from Paul's statement (2 Corinthians) that each one is to be judged according to what he in fact did in his own body, and not according to what he did not do, supposing this or that condition to have been fulfilled.

Then, second: because, such a knowledge being admitted, it does not follow that God could not have rewarded and punished the child in view of those works which He should see as to be done under the condition, as St Augustine and Prosper contend must be inferred: for it was not up to the child that, being forestalled by death, they should in fact not be performed. Then, third: because at least from the testimony of Damascene this solution cannot be fitted, as is clear from his words.

33 Nor will it at last suffice, if otherwise, with Suárez at the place cited and Lessius, De praescientia conditionata, cap. 20, num. 5, you encounter the aforesaid Fathers to the effect that they do not deny the knowledge and simple cognition of these future things, but deny only their foreknowledge. For foreknowledge signifies cognition anticipated. But where nothing is future absolutely, there is no anticipation: because before and after are said relationally, and thus there is no foreknowledge, because to foreknow is to know as future; but what is truly not future, but would be, is not foreknown, but would be foreknown; and therefore a future thing under a condition is not said to be foreknown, but to be known like a possible thing.

Against this, however, is the following. Just as absolute foreknowledge is called such because it terminates in a thing absolutely future, so conditional foreknowledge can be called such because it terminates in a thing future under a condition: hence, since the Fathers in these passages deny not only the absolute foreknowledge of future things under a condition, which the Massilians did not posit, it must be said that they deny conditional foreknowledge.

§ II. The true position.

34 Nevertheless, it must be said that, according to the mind of the Holy Fathers, God knows with certainty and infallibility the aforesaid future contingent and conditional things. Thus do the Doctors cited in the preceding difficulty in support of our assertion. That this assertion, as regards the discrete conditional futures of which we spoke in the preceding difficulty, pertains to this disputation, will be clear from what we shall teach concerning the conditional futures which have only a probable connection with the condition. For, as will be evident from what we say immediately below, the reasoning is the same about these and about those as far as this, that they are known with cognition altogether certain and infallible, that is, both on the part of the subject and on the part of the object: since neither of the two has an infallible connection with the condition; and thus they can be known infallibly only by reason of the efficacious and infallible decree of the divine will, which can terminate in either.

With regard, therefore, to the futures which have only a probable connection with the condition, so far as this lies on the part of the inclination and disposition of secondary causes. This is proved first by the testimony of Augustine, tom. 10, serm. 7, De verbis Domini, cap. 1, about those words of Matthew 9 and Luke 9, Master, I will follow you wherever you go. And about Christ's answer: The foxes have holes, and the birds of the sky have nests; but the Son of Man has nowhere to lay his head. For there the holy Doctor raises this question: What so ready? What so sluggish? What so prepared, and what so suited to so great a good, to follow the Lord wherever he goes? You are amazed by his saying: What is this, that when the good Master Jesus Christ invited the disciples, to whom he was to give the kingdom of heaven, this man who was so ready was displeased? And to this question he answers in these words: But what kind of Master was that, who was to foresee future things, we understand, brethren, that this man would have sought his own things, and not the things of Jesus Christ, if he had followed Christ. Where, as you see, he openly asserts that Christ rejected this man, who so offered himself ready to follow him, because He foreknew this conditional future, namely, that if he had been admitted he would have sought his own temporal advantage, and not what Christ intended by his preaching, namely, the benefit of souls and the glory of God. And that the same holy Doctor meant to speak of a foreknowledge of this future that is altogether certain and infallible, even on the part of the material object, he made clear by the force of this, that Christ was such a master as to foresee future things. For if he were speaking only of conjectural knowledge, it would not have been necessary to have recourse to the eminent teaching of Christ, since this very thing could be said of other men of mediocre ability and learning.

35 It is confirmed from the same Augustine, lib. De correctione et gratia, cap. 8, where, affirming that God often does not snatch away certain men by an untimely death, lest they commit the sins which He Himself foreknows they would commit, if they persisted long in life, he says thus: Let them answer, if they can, why God, when they would have lived faithfully and piously, did not at that time snatch them out of the perils of this life, lest wickedness should alter their mind? Had He this in His power? Or did He not know their future evils? Certainly nothing of this kind is said but in the most perverse way. In which words it is as indubitable with Augustine that God foreknows evils as future under a condition, as that He is able to remove them from life.

36 Secondly, it is proved principally from St Chrysostom, homil. 65, on chapter 19 of Matthew, where he says thus: But why, he says, did He not lead out all of them at once? Indeed He would have wished to lead out all of them from the beginning, but since not all of them obeyed at the same time, this difference resulted from the will of those who were called: hence some are called at the first hour, some at the third, some at the sixth, some at the ninth, some at the eleventh, because then they were to be shut up. Which also Paul plainly signified, saying: But when it was the pleasure of God, He separated me from my mother's womb. And when was it His pleasure? Certainly when he was to be shut up. For from the very first swaddling-bands He would have wished it, but because He knew that he was to rise again, then He willed it, not ignoring that the call was to penetrate his soul. Thus too, when He afterwards called the robber, He could have called him before, but when called he would not have obeyed.

37 Lastly, it is proved by the testimony of St Thomas, 3, part., q. 1, art. 5, on the second objection, where, having raised against himself the objection that it is said in 1 Timothy 1 that Christ came into this world to save sinners: but more would have been saved if from the beginning of the human race God had become incarnate. For very many, not knowing God, perished in their sin in various kinds of wickedness: it would therefore have been more fitting that from the beginning of the human race God should have become incarnate. He answers by admitting, both from his own opinion and from the opinion of Augustine in the book De perseverantia, cap. 9, this knowledge of conditional futures; and at the same time he rejects from the same Augustine that which Augustine himself had taught and afterwards retracted, namely, that God foreknew determinately that all who had existed before the coming of Our Lord Christ were not to believe in Him. The words of the Angelic Doctor are these: It must be said that Augustine answers this in the sixth book De quaestionibus Paganorum, saying, in question 2, that Christ then willed to appear to men and His doctrine to be preached among them when and where He knew those who were going to believe in Him to be: for at those times and in those places He foreknew that such men as these would be present in His preaching, not indeed all of them, but yet many were present in His bodily presence who, raised by Him from the dead, were unwilling to believe in Him. But rejecting this answer, the same Augustine says in the book De perseverantia: Can we say that the Tyrians and Sidonians were unwilling to believe when such powers were done among them, or that they would not have believed had it been done; since God Himself attests to them that they would have done great penance of humility, if those signs of divine powers had been done among them? Wherefore (as he himself adds in solving) just as the Apostle says: it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy, who came to the help of those whom He foreknew would believe, if His miracles had been done among them, to whom He willed, but did not come to the help of others, about whom in His predestination, indeed secretly, but yet otherwise, He justly declared: so let us believe without doubt that His mercy is in those who are saved, and His truth in those who are punished. Where, as you see, he openly concedes that God knew with certainty this conditional future, namely, that there would have been more men who would have believed in Christ and been converted, if they had seen His works and miracles, or if these had been reported to them.

All of which will remain more confirmed from several other testimonies, which we shall bring from St Augustine and the Angelic Doctor in the following disputation. For now, for the sake of brevity and clarity, we omit those: as also other testimonies of other Fathers which will frequently meet the eye as those following them out unfold, and which younger theologians adduce as bearing on this question, even though not all of the things which they adduce prove the intention, as will be evident to the reader.

§ III. Answer is made to the testimonies of the Fathers adduced for the first position.

38 To the first testimony, the answer is made that Augustine is speaking there against heretics asserting that men are to be punished, or rewarded, on account of good or evil works which they did not do, but would have done, had they remained longer in life. And thus they said that little children are set apart from one another with a view to their eternal election to glory on account of the evil or good works which they would have perpetrated, had they lived, and which God foreknew, on this hypothesis, that they would have perpetrated; and indeed they asserted that before the divine decree and the election of God, He foreknew on His own part what in the aforesaid hypothesis they would have done. Wherefore, arguing against these, Augustine attacks them in two ways. First indeed, by showing that even if God foreknew the aforesaid conditional future works before His decree and election, or eternal reprobation, of little children, nevertheless on that account these good or evil works, future under a condition, could not deserve merit or demerit, or reward or punishment: from the fact that no one deserves or deserves ill on account of works which he would perform, a given hypothesis being posited, but on account of works which in fact he performed.

39 And then by another way he attacks this error, saying that if God before His decree had foreknown those works, whether good or evil, then that of Wisdom 4, He was snatched away, lest wickedness should alter his mind, could be true only of a conjectural knowledge of God on the part of the object, that is, according to the perils of this life and their disposition: not according to the foreknowledge of God, that is, according to a foreknowledge altogether infallible both on the part of the subject and on the part of the material object. And he gives his reason: Because He foreknew that which was to be, not that which was not to be, that is, because by this altogether infallible knowledge, in the strict sense, only that can be foreknown infallibly on the part of the material object which is infallibly going to be. Wherefore, since in the opinion of Augustine, as we shall say in the following disputation, num. 31 and following, and as is clear from what we have said in the preceding disputation, nothing is future infallibly before the efficacious decree of the divine will, it follows that those good or evil works of little children cannot, in the sense in which the heretics spoke of them, have the character of an infallible future, and consequently cannot be foreknown as such by God. Which interpretation is very consonant with the mind of Augustine, as will be evident to the reader considering it: and we shall return to this, and to this testimony, in the following disputation, num. recently cited, in order to refute middle knowledge, that is, conditional knowledge.

Through which, also, the second testimony from St Prosper is sufficiently clear, and speaking in the same sense. Likewise also the third testimony from Damascene. For the holy Doctor is speaking there of the foreknowledge of future things before the divine decree, refuting it in this sense: on the ground that before the aforesaid decree they do not have the character of future things; and so to attribute the aforesaid foreknowledge to God is not to attribute to Him the foreknowledge which He truly has, but to impose upon Him that which He does not have. For just as knowledge is of things which are, so foreknowing is of things which are certainly to be. Whence this testimony also serves us against middle knowledge, that is, conditional knowledge, to be attacked in the place cited. But in what way, and in what sense, God truly has foreknowledge and foreknowing, and in what sense He has it not, has already been treated above by us, disp. praeced., num. 44 and following.

40 By future conditional contingents, and discrete, we understand here in this difficulty only those discrete futures which we said pertain to the present disputation, namely, those which depend on a contingent and free cause both on the part of the condition and on the part of the future event.

§ I. A twofold position is set out.

The first position affirms it with regard to the conditional futures having a conjectural connection with the condition; but it denies it with regard to the discrete ones. Because it judges that God does not know those, on the ground that they are not knowable. Thus, with regard to the first part, the Doctors to be cited below in support of our assertion. And with regard to the second, those whom we mentioned in num. 9. Indeed, with regard to the first part, it will be clear from what is to be said in support of our assertion. With regard to the second, namely, with regard to the conditional and discrete futures, it is proved first by Corneius in this article, disp. 3, dub. 1. Because futures of this kind have no truth which can be known: therefore it cannot be shown by any reasoning that they are knowable with certainty, and, maintaining infallibility in the strict sense, both on the part of the subject and on the part of the material object. The consequence is evident. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because in propositions concerning the conditional future some dependence of the work on the condition is signified; but when the condition does not excite the will, but is wholly irrelevant and discrete, no such dependence is found, as is evident in this proposition: If Peter were sleeping at Rome, Paul would be doing penance at Salamanca: and so on.

And it is confirmed. For just as this proposition, The Antichrist is infallibly going to be, is, in the strict sense and in the proper sense of speech, false before the divine decree, because it denotes that in that respect the causes are infallibly determined to produce him; and yet it cannot be known in that respect whether he will have determinate existence, or will not have determinate existence, for the future time, because there is nothing infallible in that respect from which it could be known, as we said in disp. 7, num. 148 and following; so the aforesaid proposition, and others like it concerning the discrete conditional future, are false. Because it is signified by the force and strictness of speech that there is some connection between the condition and the future event, which yet, as is supposed, is false, and yet it cannot be known what will be in the future time, the condition being posited; because there is nothing from which it could be known.

41 It makes no difference if, with the authors of middle knowledge, you say that it is enough for this that the proposition be true, and that the future event be known, which, the condition being posited for the future time, namely, Peter's sleep, would be posited at the same time as Paul's penance. Because in reality, and in fact, penance and non-penance of the same Paul cannot be posited together in that event; nor can it be the case that either determinate penance of his, or determinate non-penance, is not posited: because these two are immediately opposed. And therefore, if in the same time in which the condition would be posited, determinate penance of Paul is posited, then that conditional proposition about the future will be true; and consequently known by God infallibly. And the reason of all these is. Because the particle if does not signify an illative sense in the aforesaid propositions; but only denotes the sole and pure concomitance of the condition with the future event.

Against this, however, is the following. Once it is admitted that the particle if denoted only the sole and pure concomitance of Paul's penance with this condition, namely, Peter's sleep, then at least it would have to be admitted that God does not know the discrete conditional futures which would not occur at the same time as their conditions, such as: If Judas had not been a traitor, Luther would have retracted his heresy: for future effects of this kind would have no concomitance, nor coexistence in the same duration of time with their conditions. Which yet the authors of middle knowledge will not admit, since according to their opinion such futures have their own objective truth: by reason of which they can sufficiently determine the divine cognition. And so in their opinion, too, that particle if will not signify mere concomitance in existence.

Then too: because according to the rules of Dialectic, as Soto noted, lib. 2, Summularum, cap. 8, lect. 1, this particle if is wont to be used in only three ways. First, illatively, as: If he is a man, he is an animal. Second, promisively, as: If you will serve Peter, I will give you a reward. Third, conditionally, as: He is a rational animal, if he is a man: and hence it will never signify mere concomitance. The consequence is evident. Because in all these three ways it signifies some connection between the consequent and the antecedent.

42 Secondly, and principally, the same position is proved with regard to this part. For propositions about the discrete conditional future either give an illative sense, and thus all of them are false; or they denote only sole and pure concomitance, and thus they too are false, nor have they anything from which the future event can be known with certainty, as we were saying a moment ago: therefore by no reasoning can they be known with certainty by God, nor can this be urged by any argument. The consequence is evident. The antecedent, however, as regards the first and the last part, is clear from what has been said.

With regard to the second, however, namely, that if that conditional proposition said only sole and pure concomitance, then it would be false, is proved. Because the condition of the one part of that proposition is no more a part of the other than conversely: since concomitance is mutual, and yet by the force of that proposition it is denoted that the first part of that proposition is the condition of the second, as when we say: If Peter were sleeping at Rome, Paul would be doing penance at Salamanca: and so on.

43 The second position denies to God a certain and infallible cognition on the part of the material object, that is, an altogether infallible one, both with respect to the conditional futures which have a discrete relation to their conditions, and with respect to those which are connected with them conjecturally and probably, or by some other lesser connection. Thus do the Doctors adduced for the contrary position in dub. 2. And indeed with regard to the discrete futures it is proved by the arguments of the preceding position. With regard to both classes of futures, however, it is proved first from this: For the aforesaid futures can be known with certainty neither by the knowledge of simple intelligence, nor by the knowledge of vision; therefore by none; and consequently it will be contradictory that it be shown by a sufficient reasoning that those are knowable by God through a cognition infallible from every point of view.

This second consequence follows from the first. Because if any reasoning proved the aforesaid futures to be altogether certainly knowable by God, it would surely prove them to be knowable by one of these knowledges: since, as we hinted above and shall prove at length in the following disputations, it is contradictory that there be any middle knowledge by which they may be known. The first consequence, however, follows from the antecedent.

The antecedent, however, is also evident as regards the first part. For the knowledge of simple intelligence terminates only in things purely possible, and altogether necessary, which the aforesaid futures are not. As regards the second part, too, it is evident. Because the knowledge of vision terminates only in things existing in some difference of time, that is, in things which are really and physically present in eternity; whereas the aforesaid futures will not exist in any difference of time: and consequently they are not from eternity physically and really present to eternity.

44 Secondly. Because the aforesaid futures can be known with certainty only either according to the being which they have in themselves, or according to the being which they have in their causes; but in neither of these two ways; therefore in none: and consequently neither can it be proved by any reasoning that God has a certain and infallible cognition of them. This second consequence follows from the first: the first, however, from both premises. The minor, too, is evident. For the aforesaid futures will never have being in themselves: since they will never exist; and thus they can never be known according to the being which they have in themselves. Just as, likewise, they cannot be known with certainty according to the being which they have in their causes: since in those they have only an uncertain and indeterminate being, namely, contingent being. The major, too, is evident. For there is no other kind of being except either in itself or in its cause, as is clear from what we said at greater length in the preceding disputation.

45 It makes no difference if you say that they have being in themselves, not according to real exercised being, but according to real objective being.

Against this, however, is the fact that, for the same reason, it seems that it can be said that absolute contingent futures have determinate objective truth in any given respect: because although in any given respect they do not have determinate being, either in their causes or in themselves according to exercised being; yet they do have it according to objective being: but this seems to have been attacked more than sufficiently from disp. praecedent., num. 96 up to num. 122: and so on.

46 Thirdly, it is proved. Because the knowledge of these conditional things speaks of an imperfection in God; therefore neither can it be posited in Him, nor urged by any reasoning. The consequence is plain: and the antecedent is proved. Because a judgment which is practical by its very nature, and does not attain its effect, is imperfect; but such is this knowledge of conditional things: for through it both the things themselves and the mode by which they are to be done are known infallibly; and yet they will never be posited to the external by it: and so on.

§ II. The true position.

47 Nevertheless, it must be said that it is proved by a sufficient reasoning that God has a certain and infallible cognition of the aforesaid conditional things, so that from every point of view, namely, both on the part of the subject and on the part of the material object, it is infallible. This assertion is maintained by the authors cited in the two preceding difficulties in support of our position. By no means, however, will it be better proved than by adducing the fundamental reasoning by which it is argued that the aforesaid futures are altogether certainly, and infallibly, attained by God. Which is indeed hinted at by St Thomas in the places to be cited in the following difficulty: and it can be reduced to this brief form.

For God has an efficacious decree, conditional on the part of the object, concerning any conditional future whatsoever, however discrete, by which He efficaciously decrees that, the condition being posited, it will determinately be for the future time, or determinately will not be for the same time; no otherwise, proportion being preserved, than He efficaciously decreed concerning any absolute future that it will determinately have existence for the future time, or will determinately not have it; even though it escapes us whether He has determined its being or its non-being, unless it is divinely revealed to us, or we see the effect posited to the external, or we have certain reasons, or probable conjectures, by reason of which we persuade ourselves that something will determinately have being for the aforesaid time; therefore God in this decree will know most certainly, and altogether infallibly, that is, both on the part of the subject and on the part of the material object, all the aforesaid futures.

The consequence is evident. For the aforesaid conditional decree has a certain and infallible connection with the aforesaid future, so that it does not stand in the composite sense, nor can it stand that God should have efficaciously pre-defined that, the condition being posited, it will have being freely for the future time, and that at the aforesaid time it will infallibly not be; just as, once God efficaciously pre-defined the absolute and free conversion of Peter, such a conversion will infallibly be; therefore from this very fact, that God knows with certainty His own efficacious and conditional decree, He cannot but know with certainty and infallibility the future event, the condition being posited. The antecedent, however, will be treated in the following difficulty, and will be argued at greater length in the treatise De Voluntate Dei, disp. 5, num. 74.

48 It is added that, as we shall say in the following difficulty, even if God had no positive efficacious decree concerning all and each, or any, of these conditional futures, He could nevertheless know them with certainty and infallibility: not indeed in their objective truth, and in that respect which, on the part of our mode of understanding, precedes the respect in which God was going to decree positively and efficaciously concerning them, if He willed, and hence not even by middle knowledge, that is, conditional knowledge; but in the following respect, and in the way which will be explained at the place recently cited, num. 67 and following. Let those things be seen which we shall say about the composite and divided sense in the treatise De Voluntate Dei, disp. 10, num. 84.

49 It makes no difference if you object to what adversaries so often hammer home, namely, that the immediate cause of a free effect is the created free choice, which can differ from God moving and exciting it; therefore in such a determination of the divine will about the futurition of such a contingent effect, it will not be certainly knowable, because the divine will remains unimpedible through the concurrence of the created will: whereas in an unimpedible cause there is no knowable effect, unless the determination of the other is known.

For an answer is made from St Thomas, 3, contra Gent., cap. 94, where he raises the same argument, and it is fifth in order, and it stands thus: Divine providence does not exclude intermediate causes: but among causes some are contingent and able to fail; the effect of providence is therefore able to fail, therefore the providence of God is not certain. To this argument, and at the same time to the fourth which the holy Doctor had brought from Cicero, he answers thus: But what Cicero objects on the basis of the premises appears frivolous. For since not only the effects, but also the causes and the modes of being, are subject to divine providence, it does not follow that if all things are done by the providence of God, there is therefore nothing in us. For thus are they provided by God, that they may be done freely by us. Nor can the defectibility of secondary causes, through which the effects of divine providence are produced, take away the certitude of providence, as the fifth reasoning proceeded, since God Himself works in all things, and according to His own arbitrary will, as has been shown above. Whence it pertains to His providence that at times the defectible causes should cease to fail, and at times He should preserve them without defect. Where, as you see, with a single word he emptied the whole difficulty which greatly presses the adversaries. For although the created will can fail from that order which divine providence establishes, and can will the opposite of what God provides for, yet because God (as the Angelic Doctor says) works in all things according to the arbitrary direction of His will, and hence can efficaciously will that the created will will, and will freely, therefore, by reason of the highest efficacy of His decree, He at times preserves the defectible causes without defect; and consequently in this decree He can know most certainly all free effects, whether absolute, if the decree is absolute, or conditional, if the decree is conditional.

§ III. The foundations of both positions are met with.

50 To the foundations of the first position a single word is the answer: they prove that discrete futures are not known with certainty and infallibility by God, by reason of the connection which in themselves they have with the condition; whereas they are known by reason of the connection which they have with it from the divine decree. For from this very fact, that God has decreed that, such a condition being posited, however discrete in itself, some effect should follow for the future time, already from the divine ordinance that antecedent and consequent are joined together between themselves by an infallible connection.

To the first argument on behalf of the second position, an answer is made by denying the antecedent, as regards the first part of it. And to the proof it must be said that, although the knowledge of simple intelligence terminates in things purely possible, and altogether necessary, it is not so as to rest adequately in them; but when it is understood to express its greater perfection, insofar as it has, so to speak, an ordering to creatures, it can and must terminate in all conditional contingent futures, which are never to be placed in actuality under existence. For the knowledge of simple intelligence attains the exercise of existence, not only under the state of pure possibility, but so far as it is under any state of potentiality, and of being contained within causes, however free the cause be, and determined and disposed freely for the production of the effect: although it does not attain the aforesaid exercise, as actually exercised, or so that both, namely, the aforesaid knowledge and the exercise of existing of the created effect, coexist in the same measure of duration, namely, in the now of eternity.

51 Wherefore, because conditional futures have only by the force of the infallible decree that they be infallibly future under a condition, and not absolutely, so that they exist at some time, they do not say that the exercise of existence is altogether exercised, but exercisable, if such a condition were to obtain; and consequently they say that it is under some state of potentiality, and of being contained within causes, though free, and determined in a free manner for the production of the effect; and on this account the aforesaid conditional futures can belong to the knowledge of simple intelligence.

This is explained from the very root. For the knowledge of simple intelligence, as it is divided most formally against the knowledge of vision, as a member of the division adequate with respect to the knowledge of God, does not consist in this, that it be necessary or free: for the knowledge of vision is also necessary with respect to the divine essence, and free with respect to creatures; but, placed first by itself, it consists in this, that the knowledge of simple intelligence, as it is divided against the knowledge of vision, is abstractive; whether it be necessary or free: and the knowledge of vision is visual, or intuitive, whether it be necessary or free. Because therefore conditional futures cannot be known by the intuitive knowledge of God, for the reason that this terminates only in what is physically and really present in eternity, and hence only in what is absolutely going to issue at some difference of time; on this account they are not known by the knowledge of vision, but by the knowledge of simple intelligence, that is, by the abstractive knowledge of God.

52 We have said that the knowledge of simple intelligence terminates in the aforesaid futures insofar as it expresses its greater perfection, which belongs to it insofar as it has, so to speak, an ordering to creatures, because, as St Thomas often notes from Dionysius, the highest touches the lowest of the lowest, and the lowest of the highest; as is clear from the rational soul, which, according to the highest reason of the intellect, touches the purely intellectual nature, which is the Angelic nature: and thus it knows first principles without discourse and ratiocination, just as an Angel does; whereas the knowledge of vision is on the part of our mode of understanding higher, and even more eminent, than the knowledge of simple intelligence: for in creatures intuitive knowledge is more perfect than abstractive knowledge. Wherefore the knowledge of simple intelligence, that is, abstractive knowledge, insofar as it in some way touches the knowledge of vision, for the reason that it in some way terminates in existence, as exercised (that is, not as purely possible, but as approaching closely to the exercise of existence, that is, to an existence which, though it would never be, yet would be if some condition were given); or insofar as it terminates in conditional futures, has being that touches the lowest of the highest, namely, of vision, on the part of our mode of understanding; and thus it will also express the highest of the lowest, namely, of the knowledge of simple intelligence; and consequently, when it is understood to terminate in conditional futures, it expresses that greater perfection of its which belongs to it, insofar as it is understood to look towards creatures.

53 To the second argument the answer is made that conditional futures are known according to the being which they have in the efficacious and conditional divine decree concerning them, and according to the being which, conditionally and in the sense hinted at above, they have in their proximate causes, in so far as they are subject to the aforesaid decree, or in so far as they are also contained in it (in the way touched at another place); and then that they are also known according to the being which they have in themselves, according to real being, not indeed exercised, but which would be exercised if that condition were given, that is, according to real objective being. Whence the solution given there is legitimate, understood in this sense. And to the proof to the contrary the answer is made that there is a disparate relation between the absolute contingent futures, antecedently to the divine decree, and the conditional futures after it. For the former, before the decree of God, have nothing from which they can claim for themselves a sufficient determination, nor any foundation for a determinate real objective being, which indeed always requires to be founded and derived from some real actual and exercised being, which the thing has either in itself or in its cause. But these latter, although before the divine decree they are in the same condition as the absolute futures before it, yet after the aforesaid decree, and by reason of the being which they have in it, can import a sufficient determination, and obtain a true real objective being, foun-

ded in real exercised being, which they have in the same decree.

And this can be explained by the example of possible creatures, which although they have no real exercised being, yet precisely because they have being in the divine omnipotence, a true real objective being befits them: because a sufficient foundation is given, precisely by the fact that they have that exercised being in God, for this, that they may terminate, without any fiction of the intellect, propositions of eternal truth: and nothing else is desired for the aforesaid real objective being. Concerning these matters, however (so that some tacit objection remains solved), let those things be seen which we said in disput. praeced., num. 143.

54 To the third argument the antecedent must be denied. For it pertains rather to the divine perfection, and to this, that He be all-knowing, that He infallibly touches all conditional futures. And to the proof it must be said that, although for the reason of an absolute practical judgment, both on the part of the subject and on the part of the object, it is required that it attain its effect absolutely, otherwise it would be imperfect within the compass of a practical and efficacious judgment; yet for the reason of a practical judgment, however most perfect, which is only absolute on the part of the subject and conditional on the part of the object, that is, which connotes a decree absolute on the part of the subject and conditional on the part of the object (about which the following difficulty treats), it is not necessary that it attain its effect absolutely, but rather it implies it: and it is enough that it attain it, if the condition were truly posited.

55 For understanding the title we must note that a decree can be called conditional in two ways. In one way, both on the part of the subject, or act, and on the part of the object. In another way, on the part of the object; but not on the part of the subject, or act. A decree is then conditional in the first way when it is in fact not given, nor exists: yet it would be given, and would exist, if some condition were posited. This can indeed be explained by the fact that it is said that by it the will does not will, yet would will. On the other hand, a decree is said to be conditional in the second way when the act of willing is in fact given, by which the will wills that object; and so on the part of the subject it has the character of an absolute decree, or (which amounts to the same thing for the present) is absolutely and simply in the will: although, because by it nothing is decreed that is to be future in the absolute sense, but only under a condition, it is therefore said to be conditional on the part of the object, the object willed.

Secondly, it must be noted that this decree can be twofold, namely either efficacious or inefficacious. By the former, the thing decreed through it will infallibly be, provided that the condition is posited on the part of the object. By the latter, however, it will not be, or will not in fact have existence, if the condition were posited.

56 Thirdly, it must be noted that, according to the opinion of many, conditional decrees are under a twofold difference. Either so as to be positive, that is, positing a positive act of the divine will, by which the will positively wills a conditioned object. Or so as to be negative, not indeed in any sense whatever, for by this precisely is signified that God does not will any object determinately and in particular; but in the sense that by it is denoted that as yet, in that sign which in our manner of conceiving is deputed to this, so that after the necessary willing of those things which are formally in him, he immediately wills, or does not will, objects which are freely willable; when the aforesaid sign deputed to this free willing being present, if it pleases God, divine will is had negatively with regard to certain objects in particular, for example with regard to future conditionates, of which we are treating in the present.

The title of the doubt, therefore, as regards the first part, is not understood as concerning a decree conditional both on the part of the subject, or act, and on the part of the object; but as concerning a positive absolute decree, in the sense explained on the part of the subject, and conditional on the part of the object: and, as appears from the same title, it is understood as concerning a decree that is conditional and efficacious. Now when in the second part of it the question is asked whether, with these being set aside, the aforesaid futures can be known by God with certainty, and altogether infallibly? It must be understood in the formal and precise sense, that is, precisely with those positive decrees being excluded, yet those negative decrees being granted, and presupposed, does God know with certainty and infallibility the future contingent conditionates, of which the discourse is had in the present disputation? Having consulted, then, we restrict the difficulty of the present doubt as regards this second part in the following way: whether the aforesaid futures can be known by God with certainty and infallibility before every decree of his will, whether negative or positive, will be treated more broadly in the following disputation, by refuting middle knowledge.

§ I. Negative position.

57 The position denying the first part of the title, and affirming the second, in the sense however of num. 56 explained, and declaring it further at num. 67, is held by several of the Thomists, both the older and the later ones, whom we brought forward at dub. 2 of this disputation; and also by several others outside the school of the Angelic Doctor, though by a different route. For those deny such decrees on the ground that they think conditionals have truth in as far as they have the goodness of an illation: and since in future conditionates, of which we are speaking in the present, the illation is neither necessary and certain, but only conjectural or null, as in disparate cases, hence it is that God knows the aforesaid future conditionates only conjecturally on the part of the object, in which a conjectural illation is involved. Or if the connection is disparate, or null, then in no way does he know them: and consequently the aforesaid conditional and efficacious decrees will in no way be given in God, infallibly inferring a conditioned effect. Those, however, who are not of the school of St. Thomas deny the aforesaid conditional decrees for this reason, that they hold that God knows with certainty and infallibility such futures before any free decree: and consequently that these decrees are superfluous, or impossible, or have both of these defects. Thus Vazquez 1. part. disp. 67. cap. 4. num. 21. et 22.; Herice in tract. de scientia Dei disp. 7. cap. 7.; and very many others.

58 This position, as regards the second part, will be established from what will be said at num. 67 and thereafter; the first part, however, is proved first. For there cannot be given in God a free and efficacious act with regard to creatures unless some real change be posited in them: but in these future conditionates the divine will would posit nothing through the aforesaid conditional decree: hence it cannot have such a decree with regard to them. The consequence seems clear. The minor, however, is also established. For by the force of this decree creatures would never exist, nor have being in themselves; and consequently would never pass from non-being to being: hence by its force real change would never be posited in them. The major, however, is also evident. For the will of God does not presuppose, but makes, the object which it wills; and consequently it must produce in it some change, through which it passes from non-being to being.

It is confirmed, and explained. For in God there cannot be a free and efficacious act through a change in God himself: hence through some change to be undergone in the creature itself: hence precisely because this does not follow from the force of that conditional decree, neither will such a decree be given in God, as we were just saying. The antecedent requires no proof. The first consequence, however, upon which the second depends, is also established. For precisely because God has a free decree with regard to something, there must intervene between it and the thing willed some relation of reason: hence it is necessary that it be founded on a change in one of the two extremes: for with things remaining unchangeably, there is no reason why a new relation should arise: hence precisely because the aforesaid relation is not given, mediated by a change in God, it must be given mediated by a change in the creature.

59 Secondly, it is proved. For from the positing of these decrees an imperfection is posited in God: hence, etc. The antecedent is proved. Then, because they are idle and superfluous in him: for what use could it serve that God should decree that under a condition that thing be future which he otherwise decrees will not be future? and, moreover, that such a condition is never to be posited? since this cannot be necessary for a right and prudent governance. Hence in human affairs a governor would be superfluously and vainly wearied out in decreeing under a condition that which he himself otherwise decrees he will not do, nor that such a condition be posited. Then too: because a conditional willing with regard to some object is not the final resolution, but as it were dependent and suspended; and therefore it is proper only to those who proceed from the imperfect to the perfect in their deliberation: but God wills not with suspension, but always with the final resolution, from the fact that he deliberates most perfectly: hence, etc.

60 Thirdly. Because God would have conditional decrees concerning infinite combinations of infinite conditionates, which can occur under infinite conditions, states, and orders of things: but this seems ridiculous and absurd: hence, etc. The consequence seems clear. Because there is no greater reason why God should have a conditional decree concerning certain combinations from these, than why he should not have, or at least should not be able to have, such a decree concerning all of them: otherwise he would not know with certainty, and altogether infallibility, those future conditionates concerning which he had no efficacious and conditional decree, as appears from what has been said.

The minor, however, as regards the first part, namely that this is ridiculous, is also evident: since many ridiculous combinations can occur with regard to these futures. That it proves the second part, namely the absurdity, is proved thus. For from it St. Thomas proves, 1. part. quaest. 7. art. 4., that God cannot, even by absolute power, produce an infinite in the act according to multitude, because every created multitude must be comprehended under a certain intention of the creator; and so it is necessary that it be closed under a certain number, from the fact that an infinite multitude cannot fall under a certain intention of the creator: this reason, however, if it proves anything, will certainly prove that no multitude can be provided for by God through his decrees and providence, unless it fall under a certain intention of the provident one, otherwise such a provident one would provide in vain and uncertainly, and consequently unless those things which are provided for fall under a certain and determinate number.

61 Fourthly. Because otherwise those conditional propositions would be true in no other way than if they were derived from the force of a formal illation drawn from a decree existing in God: hence their knowledge would pertain solely to the knowledge of pure natural simple intelligence: and consequently they would enunciate no future under a condition. This last consequence follows from the previous one. The previous one, however, follows from the antecedent. For a conditional proposition, which is true in the force of the illation, has this by reason of the goodness of the consequent, as the Dialecticians commonly teach: but a consequence which is once good always has being good, as the same Dialecticians admit, nay it will necessarily be good, otherwise there would be no reason why it should always have goodness: hence since the knowledge of pure natural simple intelligence terminates in truths altogether necessary, the aforesaid futures will pertain to this same knowledge. The antecedent, however, also seems to be established. For, a decree being posited, there is an infallible and necessary connection between the antecedent and the consequent, and otherwise not without it: hence if the aforesaid decree is given with regard to all these future contingents, then the conditional propositions concerning them will be true in no other way than from the force of a formal illation, drawn from such a decree existing in God.

62 Lastly Herice argues. Because to admit these decrees to be efficacious in themselves is to teach that which Calvin and his disciples taught, by positing them: from which there arose another heresy of his doctrine, namely that which admits freedom in our acts: hence such a doctrine is not to be admitted.

§ II. The true position of St. Thomas and of the Fathers is explained by three assertions.

63 It must be said, however, first, that there are given in God the aforesaid conditional and efficacious decrees with regard to all future contingents and conditionates, by which God decrees either that they determinately be for the future time, or that they determinately be not for the same time, if that condition is posited. This assertion is gathered sufficiently efficaciously from those things which we shall adduce from Augustine, from St. Thomas, and from the Fathers in the following disputation. Where those who confess that God knows with certainty and infallibility these futures, adduce, as the reason and the means of such knowledge, divine predestination, or election, or the efficacious decree of the divine will concerning them, from the fact that these futures do not occur at our hands unless dependently upon predestination and election, or the decree of God: and so, just as absolute futures are not so unless by divine predestination, or a preceding absolute decree; so likewise future conditionates would not be so unless by a preceding predestination, or divine decree, by which he decreed that they would be so if some condition were posited.

The same reason proves the same thing with regard to future conditionates containing wicked acts, which, although they are not predestinated by God to wickedness, are nevertheless permitted: and so, just as under the absolute status they would never occur unless a preceding absolute permissive decree, so likewise under the conditional status they would not occur unless a similar conditional decree preceded. Whence the same Augustine says in the Enchiridion, chap. 95: Let nothing be, unless the almighty wills it to become so, either by permitting that they be made, or by himself making them. And so this position is followed, not uncommonly, by the later disciples of St. Thomas, and particularly by all those whom we brought forward at dub. 2 and 3 in support of our position.

64 The most powerful and fundamental reason, however, has been touched upon above in the preceding disputation, and the Fathers sufficiently indicate it in the places recently cited. It can also be reduced to this brief form. Because these future conditionates have a certain futurition, namely a conditioned one; but they cannot of themselves pass from the status of pure possibility to the status of this conditioned futurition, as appears from what was said in the place cited, and from the terms themselves: hence it is necessary that they be drawn out from that status into this one by the first cause: otherwise something would occur, and would be drawn out from the status of pure possibility to some status of futurition, independently of the first being and of its causality; which, as is clear, involves an impossibility: hence since God operates in no other way, nor draws things out to the status of any futurition, except by means of his efficacious decree, proportioned to such an extraction, as appears from what we have said in disp. 7. num. 108. and disp. praeced. num. 16. and following, and what we shall say in tract. 4. disp. 10. dub. 1. 2. et 3.; the consequence is that he have an efficacious decree, proportioned, or conditional, by reason of which he wills the aforesaid futures either determinately to be, or determinately not to be for the future time, if that condition were posited.

It is confirmed, and explained, by a reason drawn from the same Fathers, and one which we adduced in disp. 7. n. 115. with regard to absolute futures. Because these future conditionates do not have being determinately future in themselves, as is clear, since as long as they are future, especially conditioned, they are nothing in themselves: but in nothing true and real determination can be founded: hence it is necessary that they have this determination in their determined causes, especially in the first: hence it will also be necessary that the first cause have an efficacious and proportioned decree, by which he decrees either that, the condition being determinately posited, they are for the future time, or that they determinately are not.

65 Nor would it be necessary to adduce the solution which the authors of middle knowledge offer to this reason and its confirmation, saying that for a future under a condition, which in fact on the part of the thing is not going to have being, but will have it, some certain condition being posited, it is not necessary to presuppose the free determination of the will of God already existing in it; but it suffices that it be presupposed objectively, in the sense of a future under a condition, to the end that such an effect be conditionally future.

This solution, therefore, need not be brought into the open. For from those things which we adduced in disp. 7. num. 48. and thereafter with regard to absolute futures, in order to refute this objective futurition of the divine decree altogether absolute, they remain, however proportionally applied to the present case, sufficiently refuted, so that this will be clear to one who examines them. On which point Gonzalez can also be seen in the commentary on this article, disp. 44. sect. 3. from num. 30. as far as num. 37.

66 Nor does it matter either if, with some of the disciples of St. Thomas who deny to God infallible knowledge of these futures, one were to say that those are not in fact future; but have only either the character of pure possibilities, as happens in future conditionates which are disparate; or at most the character of futures conjecturally, and only probably such; and thus that an efficacious conditional decree of the divine will is not required with regard to them, otherwise they would be infallibly future.

This, therefore, makes no difference. For, as we proved more broadly in tract. de Volunt. Dei disp. 5. num. 73., the divine will, by reason of its highest actuality and excellence, cannot remain suspended with regard to anything willable; but it is determinate to will, or to be unwilling, that it be, or that it not be; although it is free to will determinately that it be, or determinately that it not be. From the fact that, as there belongs to the highest actuality, universality and perfection of the divine intellect that it should extend itself in the way proper to itself to everything intelligible, knowing and comprehending it actually, nor can it stand that something should be actually knowable and comprehensible which is not actually known and comprehended by it; so likewise there belongs to the highest actuality, universality and perfection of the divine will that it should actually extend itself, its freedom being preserved, to every object which is actually freely willable: and since this freedom is preserved sufficiently and more than sufficiently in this, that although it be determinate to have a vague volition or nolition, it is nevertheless altogether free to have a determinate volition, or a determinate nolition, the consequence is that it belongs to its highest actuality that with regard to everything willable, and consequently with regard to all things possible, whether absolute or conditional, it have a perfect, and consequently efficacious, decree, by which, determinately and in proportion to their nature, it wills either that they determinately be, or that they determinately not be: so that with regard to those which it pleases him to be determinately, it has by that very token the decree by which he wills that they be: with regard, however, to those which it pleases him not to be, it has also a positive decree, by which he does not will their existence, and consequently by which their non-being is determinately future. But on these matters let them see what we shall say in the place cited: where this proof is developed more broadly, and the arguments which seem to stand against it are solved at length.

67 It must be said, secondly. That although God in these efficacious, positive and conditional decrees knows with certainty and infallibility the aforesaid futures, nevertheless, still with certainty and infallibility, holding fast to that certitude both on the part of the subject and on the part of the object, he would know them as not going to have existence, or, after the manner of a thing having (so to speak), as having a contrary futurition, or, after the manner of a thing drawn out beyond the status of pure and bare possibility to the aforesaid non-futurition, even if he did not have such positive decrees concerning them, but had himself merely negatively: yet in such a way that it would be prior, in our manner of understanding, that God has himself merely negatively in that sign in which he was going to decree concerning them, and that he sees this manner of having himself negatively with regard to them, than that he should attain them with certainty and infallibility. All the disciples of St. Thomas must hold this assertion, as it will become more clear from what is said immediately below.

And indeed, as regards the first part, it clearly appears from what was said in the preceding doubt, num. 47., and in disp. 8. num. 16. and following.

68 Its fundamental reason as regards the second part (which is at the same time explained and proved) is drawn from those things which the Angelic Doctor teaches, quaest. 19. huius 1. part. art. 7., and in 1. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 1. in corpore, and to 3. and 4.; likewise in 1. contra Gent. cap. 83., and lib. 2. cap. 25., and lib. 3. cap. 78. and 91. It can be proposed in the following form. Because although in that sign in which the divine will is understood in our manner of understanding, it precedes the free determination, or the absence of it, with regard to some object that is future either absolutely or under a condition, it may be indifferent for it to will that it be, or that it not be, or to be unwilling either of these extremes, and so in that sign it may have determinately no character of a future, or of a non-future by a contrary (so to speak) non-futurition; nevertheless, when there arrives that sign in which God is going to decree, or according to this manner of speaking, is going to have himself, negatively, then precisely because he wills the futurition of some thing, he cannot, in the composite sense, with this supposition having been made, be unwilling that it be, nor, with the supposition of unwillingness having been made, will it: nor lastly, if the supposition is made of the suspension of the divine will in that sign which was destined for positive willing, should it have pleased him, can he, in the composite sense, have a volition or a positive nolition with regard to the futurition of such a thing: hence precisely because in that sign he would have himself negatively, or would remain suspended with regard to all future conditionates, he will know with certainty and infallibility, both on the part of the subject and on the part of the object, that even with that condition posited they will not be: not indeed because they remain in the status of pure and bare possibility; but because they have (so to speak) contrariwise, that they are not future under a condition, that is, that they are in such wise not future that futurition is repugnant to them; which is to be beyond the status of pure and bare possibility.

69 The antecedent, as regards the first part, requires no proof, as is clear to one who examines it. As regards the second part, however, it is sufficiently clear. Because on account of the immutability of the divine will it is repugnant, in the composite sense, that it should not always persist, and for the whole eternity, in that disposition, whether positive or negative, which it had in that sign: namely, that if in that sign it willed positively the futurition, or the non-futurition, it must persist in willing or in being unwilling; but if it had itself negatively, or had suspended the act, it must remain throughout eternity in that suspension. Then too, because otherwise the divine will would be mutable. Then also, because otherwise there could be given in God, that suspension having elapsed, some free act which would not be eternal, or which would not be measured by eternity as its own and adequate measure. Which, indeed, as is clear, is impossible.

The consequence, however, as regards both parts, plainly appears to follow from the antecedent. As regards the first part, indeed. For precisely because, in order that, that condition having been posited, some thing be going to have positive existence, there is required that in that sign which in our manner of understanding is deputed to the divine decrees, God have the positive will by which he wills that it, it is necessary, precisely because he does not have such a will, that he have himself negatively in that sign, that such a thing, even with that condition posited, is not going to have positive existence.

70 As regards the second part, too, it is clear. For precisely because, God having himself once negatively in that sign, being unable on account of his immutability and in the composite sense to have afterwards an act by which he should will positively that that thing be, such a thing, inasmuch as it once stood under that divine suspension, or inasmuch as it did not stand in that sign under the positive act of the divine will, under which it could then stand, has something, or some denomination, or as it were a denomination, by reason of which existence for the future time, which is to be (so to speak) to be a non-future contrariwise, is repugnant to it, and to not remain in the status of pure and bare possibility, but to have the character of a non-future contrariwise, in that proportional mode in which it would have an absolute future, if the divine will had itself negatively in that sign with regard to it.

71 From which it is to be inferred, and said, thirdly. That if God, in that sign deputed to this end, so that after the necessary willing of those things which are formally in him, he immediately wills, or does not will, objects which are freely willable, did not have the positive decrees already explained, concerning future conditionates, by which he would will that some be, and that some of them not be, their conditions having been posited (which is the same as what we say with the due proportion about absolute futures in a similar sign, considered precisely), he could not know with certainty and infallibility, or discern, which of them would be going to have positive existence, and which would not have it under the aforesaid conditions; but he would know all of them by the manner of conditioned non-futures (so to speak) contrariwise to such as these; whereas the contrary if he have such positive and efficacious decrees, as we have said that he in fact has.

This assertion is clearly gathered from what precedes, and from the reason of St. Thomas which we adduced for it. For in the former case, namely if he had himself negatively in that sign, then all the negative propositions of all conditioned futures would be true: since the aforesaid conditionates would have something by reason of which positive existence is repugnant to them, and all the affirmative ones, and those involving the positive existence of some thing, would be false: since God, the supposition of that suspension having been made, cannot have a positive act by which he should will that they be: and yet this act is desired for their positive existence. In the latter case, however, that is, if he had a positive act with regard to them, then with regard to those which he willed to be, the condition having been posited, he would certainly know them to be going to have positive existence, if the condition were posited: and he would discern those from those concerning which he willed that, the condition having been posited, they not be; judging the former to be non-futures contrariwise; and the latter to be futures also contrariwise. But about this assertion, namely about what is involved in it, that is, that with the efficacious and positive decree set aside, God could not know concerning any conditioned future that it was going to have existence, we shall say more in the following disputations, throughout those in which we shall show at length the impossibility of middle, or conditional, knowledge.

§ III. Unravelling of the arguments of the first position with regard to its negative part.

72 To the first, the major must be granted if it is understood (as it must be understood) of a real change proportioned to that free and efficacious act which God has with regard to creatures, and the minor must be denied, understood in the same way. And in answer to the proof it must be said that, although by the force of this conditional decree creatures would never exist absolutely, and consequently nor in this way would they pass from non-being to being; nevertheless they would exist conditionally, or if that condition were posited; and thus they would be changed by a change that is conditional and proportioned to the efficacious decree which we posit in God with regard to them, namely to the conditional decree. For as from an efficacious decree, so to speak, with regard to creatures, a change, so to speak, in them follows, so from an efficacious and absolute decree an absolute change follows; and from an efficacious and conditional decree, a conditional change follows.

73 Secondly, it is answered that it suffices for this efficacious and conditional will to have some effect in the creature, namely to order it towards some doing and receiving which would in fact occur if certain conditions were posited. And this ordering can be explained by the example adduced by St. Thomas in 1. distinct. 46. quaest. 1. art. 1. in corpore, of that will which is conditional and on the part of efficacious, by which God wills that all men be saved. For speaking of this will there, the Holy Doctor says thus: Since every good is willed by God, God also wills this, namely that all men be saved. And this is called the antecedent will, and the effect of this will is the very order of nature towards the end of salvation, and the means promoting that end, proposed to all in common, both natural and gratuitous. Where, as you see, from the antecedent and conditional will there arises some effect, namely some order, or disposition towards some effect, either to be done by inferior causes, if they are ordered to do that, or to be received by God alone if it is granted by him alone, as happens in this will of saving all men, by which he willed to give to all grace and glory, which is the effect of God alone, and towards which all men are ordered and elevated in the manner of a material cause, although not all of them in fact receive it.

74 Add (and this itself will be explained further) that it suffices at some point, in order that a free and efficacious act be posited in God followed by some change in the creature, not indeed a real and physical change, but a real objective one, namely a real extrinsic denomination arising from the divine volition or nolition. For by that very token the creature remains extrinsically deputed and ordered towards that which God decreed concerning it, although afterwards in time it may never be actually and physically changed, as is clear in the case of a free, efficacious and absolute act, by which God willed that there be no other universe. For by this act all the other things, universally, apart from that which now is, remained extrinsically deputed and ordered towards not being, and passed from the status of pure and bare possibility, in which is involved the status of negative or privative non-futurition (that is, the status of a thing which, although it be not future, can nevertheless be future) to the status of futurition (so to speak) taken contrariwise: that is, to such a status that in it it has something, or some denomination, by reason of which that it be future positively is repugnant to it.

75 In confirmation, what has been said above makes it clear. Whence, just as (as Aristotle noted so well in the chapter on relation) it is not the same terminus for all relations, for the relation of the heating agent to the thing heated seeks a terminus actually hot, whereas the relation of that which can be heated to the thing that can be heated does not seek a terminus actually heated, but only one in the receptive potency of heat; so likewise the same kind of change is not required for every relation: but for a relation founded on a conditional act it suffices (granted that the aforesaid relation necessarily involves that act, of which we have spoken elsewhere) a conditioned physical change, or the real objective change already mentioned: as likewise for a free, efficacious and absolute act, for example, concerning the existence of Peter, and consequently for the relation founded on it, an absolute physical change to be given for the future time will be required.

76 To the second, the antecedent must be denied. And to the first proof the antecedent is denied too, as is clear in the antecedent and conditional will adduced just above, which is not an idle and superfluous will, although it does not look to an absolute future, namely to glory to be conferred absolutely on all. Whence these conditional and efficacious decrees lead both to the governance and providence of God, since it is the part of a prudent governor to be ready to perform many things which in fact do not occur; and to the manifestation of divine goodness, which is disposed to perform many things which yet are urged on, either by our sins or in order to show the freedom of the choice; and to this, that God may have certain knowledge of every conditional truth; and above all to the preservation of the highest actuality and universality of the divine will, which is so great that it cannot remain suspended with regard to no willable thing whatsoever: but must have, with regard to it, in the manner already indicated, a free determination; and finally to other ends of divine wisdom known to us, but nevertheless hidden from us: since God can order a thing, however disparate from it as it may be, towards several and diverse ends most congruent to it, which are hidden from us.

77 To the second proof, however, of that same antecedent, it is answered that that conditional and efficacious will is the final resolution in its own genus, as is clear: and likewise that it is the final resolution absolutely: from the fact that it is not distinguished, on the part of the conceived thing, from the absolute and efficacious will by which God decreed absolutely that that thing be done in fact, or not done, as we shall say in the treatise on the Will of God, disp. 2.: and therefore that will is not dependent and suspended, nor proper to those who proceed from the imperfect to the perfect in their deliberation. Whence by the force of this proof it follows at the highest that by the force of the conditional will, as distinguished on the part of our manner of conceiving from the absolute will, not everything is determined: which, however, is no inconvenience. Just as neither does it stand in the way that, by the force of the intention of an end taken with precision, and as it is distinguished on the part of our manner of conceiving from election, the means determinate in particular with regard to it should not be conceived.

78 To the third, the consequence must be granted, and the minor denied. And in answer to the proof of the first part of it, it must be said that, although many combinations, sufficiently disparate and perhaps ridiculous to the human gaze, can occur with regard to disparate future contingents, it is nevertheless not ridiculous, but worthy of the highest admiration and veneration, that the force of the divine intellect, and the actuality of the divine will, are so great that these cannot remain suspended with regard to them; but must have a perfect act, and consequently an efficacious act, with regard to their futurition or non-futurition: that, however, namely the divine intellect, cannot fail to know with certainty and infallibility each and every future. Whence, just as it is not inconvenient that all these things should be known by God as possible, from the fact that although several of them are ridiculous, this whole, however, holds on the part of the object, not on the part of the knower; so for the same reason it is not inconvenient that God have a free determination with regard to them, in the sense explained: namely such that with regard to some he decree that they be, certain conditions having been posited; with regard, however, to others, that they not be, even with those conditions posited.

79 In answer, however, to the proof of the second part of that same minor, it must be said that that illation of St. Thomas must be understood most formally, of the intention of the creator, in so far as he is creating, that is, of actually executing real and positive effects. And thus it is to be understood of a certain intention on the part of the proximate end, which is the positive end of the effect produced by the agent quatenus such, as Ferrara noted so well, 3. Physicorum quaest. 7. It involves, however, an infinite multitude of things categorematically, and to be such in the act, certain and determinate. Because it is comprehended by no limits, nor is it measurable by one; and thus it cannot be comprehended in the manner just described under a certain intention, namely on the part of the end effected, as already stated. Now when God has providence over these infinite conditioned combinations, he does not provide for them as being in the act and to be executed simultaneously, nor does he decree concerning all of them that they have positive existence; but concerning several he wills that they not have it even with the condition posited: nor conversely does he have providence over them as being infinite categorematically on the part of the object, but as being an infinite number producible syncategorematically: although with this standing, namely that on his part he provides for all of them actually and simultaneously.

Whence, just as it is not inconvenient that God should know an infinite number categorematically on the part of the knower, and not on the part of the thing known, as is clear with regard to the knowledge which he has of all possible things: and likewise, just as it is not inconvenient that infinite future thoughts should be contained simultaneously in it, not indeed holding itself simultaneously on the part of the things in their own and adequate measure, but simultaneously in the manner explained above, so likewise nothing stands in the way of there being actually and categorematically provided for, on the part of the mind of the infinite and most perfect provident one, an infinite number: although those on the part of the object are not actually and categorematically infinite: and consequently neither can they be actually and simultaneously produced: and consequently neither can they fall under a certain intention of the creator in the sense explained, as the reason of St. Thomas proves.

80 To the fourth, the first consequence must be distinguished: From a decree existing in God, which is posited as the express condition of those conditioned futures of which we are speaking, is to be denied: From a decree existing in God, which is not posited as the express condition of the aforesaid futures, by which God wills concerning some of them that they be, and concerning others however that they not be, is to be granted. And then each of the two consequences immediately subsumed will have to be denied. And in answer to the proof of the former from these two, from which the proof of the latter depends, the major must be granted with regard to the matter at hand, namely concerning the goodness, and the force of the illation and of the consequence: not indeed from merits of the antecedent taken in themselves, or from an express condition posited to the end that something be a conditioned future, taken in themselves; but in so far as it is subject to the efficacious and conditional divine decree.

And then the minor must be granted, as regards the first part, and indeed also as regards the second, if it is understood of the necessity of the goodness of the consequence, taken formally, that is, of the necessity of the consequence precisely, and not of the consequent. Because in order that something be necessary by the necessity of the consequence, as distinguished from the necessity of the consequent, it suffices that although the consequent be absolutely and simply free, it be nevertheless necessary by the necessity of the secundum quid, from the supposition, and in the composite sense, or that it be infallible, in so far as by this is denoted that although in fact and of fact it will be, at least under some condition; so that it is never verified that the condition is not posited; nevertheless it can be that it is not so, even if the aforesaid condition is posited. And lastly the consequence must be denied. Because to the knowledge of pure natural simple intelligence there pertain only those things which are necessary by necessity simply of that kind, and with respect to consequences, and not those which are necessary only by supposition, or by the necessity of the consequence, of mere infallibility already explained. Let what we have said in disp. 7. dub. 2. be consulted.

81 Lastly, it must be said that, although we granted that Calvin and his disciples confess these conditional decrees in every sense in which we ourselves grant them, that is, before the certain and infallible prevision of the future event, and hence inferred the heretical doctrine, namely that there is no freedom in our acts; nevertheless it does not follow well that the aforesaid conditional and efficacious decrees are to be rejected. Because it is the practice among heretics to mingle some truth with their heresies, and to infer from one true antecedent their own errors on account of their own wickedness. Whence the Arians, and the other ancient heretics, denying the three divine persons, deduced this error from the unity of the divine nature, as Tertullian noted elegantly in his book against Praxeas, where he says thus: In manifold ways the devil emulated the truth. He aimed, by defending it, to trample it down. He claims the one Lord, vindicate the almighty creator of the world, in order to make a heresy out of the one.