Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

124 After we have explained how the presence of future things from eternity in the now of eternity leads to the result that God certainly knows them, it remains to explain whether it is not only conducive, but even altogether necessary for God to have the aforesaid infallible knowledge of them? And so, in order to explain this, we raise the present difficulty. And although the decision of this difficulty follows well enough from what precedes, nevertheless, so that the true opinion of D. Thom. and the other Fathers may be better established as to the manner of knowing the aforesaid future things, and so that the objections of adversaries may be met, we have raised it in its own right.

Moreover, in order that the decision may be better grasped, it should be noted that we have consulted the heading and found that that clause is twofold, namely: But eternity, and the presence of future things in it, already explained, etc. so as to denote that this difficulty can be discussed in a twofold sense, or hypothesis. First, whether eternity is so necessary for knowing future contingents before they are, that, if impossibly divine knowledge were measured on the part before by an everlasting aeon, indeed on the part after as well, and consequently by a duration deficient in itself, God could nevertheless know them with perfect certainty and infallibility before they were? And to denote this it was inquired into in the heading whether eternity is altogether necessary for the aforesaid knowledge. Second, however, whether, if the divine being, and those things which are in God, could on the one part be measured by eternity, and on the other part not coexist from eternity with future things — which nevertheless implies that, as we have seen, being measured by eternity as by one's own and adequate measure, and actually coexisting from eternity with all existing things in some difference of time, are altogether the same thing — nevertheless even then God could certainly and infallibly know future contingents from eternity, and before they were as far as we are concerned, or not?

§ I. The prior opinion is adduced.

125 The first opinion asserts that eternity, in each of the two respects explained from the senses, is altogether necessary for the result that God certainly and infallibly knows the aforesaid future things before they are present in their own and adequate measure. Whence it asserts that, although the divine being and knowledge are not, impossibly, measured by eternity, and consequently neither do the future things physically and really coexist with them from eternity, but are only measured by an aeon; nevertheless God could know the aforesaid future things before they were, in their own and adequate duration, in their objective truth, and antecedent to the efficacious divine decree. Thus the Doctors whom in each of the preceding difficulties we cited for the contrary opinions.

And it is proved first. For if, impossibly, God were to cease to be before he produced Antichrist, he would know him with certainty and infallibility: and yet he would not be present to God according to actual existence in eternity; nor would his being or operation be measured by that same eternity, but at most by an aeon: therefore, although eternity, or the aforesaid presence, may lead to the certain and infallible knowledge of him, it will not nevertheless be altogether necessary for it. The major seems certain. For the essence of God is his infinite knowledge: therefore such knowledge would extend itself to Antichrist, even if, impossibly, he were at some time to cease to be: otherwise, throughout that whole duration in which God would persevere in his being, he would not have infinitely perfect knowledge.

The minor, however, is proved as to the first part. For what is present to God in eternity must coexist with him in some difference of time: but in the case of the argument, God and Antichrist would never coexist in any difference of time, as is evident in itself; therefore, etc. As to the second part, however, it also stands; because what is measured by eternity, as by its own measure, must endure without defect.

126 Second. For the certain and infallible knowledge of God precedes, in the order of reason, the presence of things in eternity; therefore it does not receive its certainty from such presence, as from an altogether necessary reason; therefore neither does it receive it from eternity, even though that could be set aside from such presence. This last consequence is evident from the preceding one. Since also, if eternity could be set aside from the fact that it actually surrounds all future things from eternity, and coexists with them, it would be posterior in the order of reason to the certain and infallible knowledge of them: since the duration of any operation is posterior in the order of reason than the operation itself: therefore it could not be the reason of the certain and infallible knowledge of them.

From which the first consequence seems certain. For that from which knowledge receives its certainty, as from an altogether necessary reason for it, must precede it, and not follow it. The antecedent, however, is proved. For the presence of things in eternity supposes the will of God willing those creatures; but the volition of them presupposes a certain and infallible knowledge of them: therefore, etc.

It is confirmed. For God receives no perfection from creatures, as is evident in itself; therefore, since the certainty of his knowledge is the greatest perfection of it, he will not receive this from those same creatures as present in eternity; therefore neither from eternity itself, taken with the precision indicated. This last consequence is evident from what was just said. The first, however, is clear from the antecedent. For this presence of them is something created: and consequently the certainty of divine knowledge will not be received from those same creatures as present.

127 Third. For the efficacious decree of the divine will concerning future contingents has an infallible connection with them, as is evident from what was said in this disputation, num. 9 and the following: and it would have it even if neither God nor his operations were measured by eternity; otherwise such a decree would not be efficacious; therefore God cannot know this decree without also knowing the same future things; therefore neither eternity nor the presence of those same future things in eternity will be necessary in order that God have a certain knowledge of them.

This last consequence is evident from the preceding one. Because, even if there were no eternity in God, and the things were not present in him from eternity, they could nevertheless be known in the aforesaid decree; since it has an infallible connection with their futurity. The first consequence, however, follows from the antecedent. Because it is repugnant for something to be known perfectly and to have an infallible connection with another without that other thing, with which it is connected, being known; and so God, knowing perfectly his own decree, which has an infallible connection with future creatures, will not be able not to know infallibly their futurity.

It is confirmed. Because God knows conditioned future things in the efficacious and conditioned decree which he has concerning them, as we shall say in the following disputation, num. 67; but the aforesaid future things are never present in eternity; since they will never exist: therefore for a certain knowledge of absolute futures it will not be altogether necessary that there be a presence which is from eternity to eternity (about which we are speaking at present), but the efficacious decree concerning their futurity will suffice: and consequently neither will eternity, under the precision already stated, be necessary for that.

128 Fourth. Future contingents can be known in that duration in which they are not present to the created intellect, yet he himself, precisely in so far as he is such, is not measured by eternity as by his own and adequate measure, as is evident in itself; therefore much more can they certainly be known by God, even if they were not present to him from eternity in his eternity, and if there were no eternity in him. The consequence seems clear. The antecedent, however, is proved. Both because we certainly know by faith that Antichrist is future, and other things of this kind, even though these future things are not present to us. And also because the blessed certainly know many future contingents which are not really and physically present to them. And finally because Christ our Lord now knows all future contingents by infused knowledge, as D. Thom. teaches in 3. part. qaest. 11. art. 1. and yet he does not now really and physically coexist with them.

It is confirmed. For either future contingents have a determined futurity in that duration in which they are not present, or they do not? If the second is said, they will not be able to be certainly attained by any intellect in the aforesaid duration, the contrary of which is evident from the instances just adduced. But if the first is asserted, therefore their determined truth in that duration will be able to be attained by the divine intellect, even if they are not present from eternity to his eternity, and even if, impossibly, they were measured by nothing except an everlasting aeon on the part before, or on the part before as well as on the part after: since whatever is knowable must precisely be attained by the aforesaid intellect; otherwise he would not be infinite in the force of knowing.

§ II. The opinion of St Thomas is explained by two assertions.

129 It must nevertheless be said, first, that for the infallible knowledge by which God knows absolute future contingents, before they are actually present to us in their own duration, it is required per se that the divine being and its operations be measured by eternity as by their own and adequate measure; and consequently, if, impossibly, they were measured by an aeon deficient in itself, God could not have the aforesaid knowledge of them before they were as far as we are concerned: thus D. Thom. in the places cited at dub. 2, and as is common among his disciples.

And the reason is drawn from the same holy Doctor. Since absolute future contingents can be known with certainty only in themselves, or in their causes, namely in the divine decree, or in other secondary causes to which they are subject: but if the divine being and its operations, and consequently its willing, were not measured by eternity as by its own measure, they could not be known with certainty in any of these; therefore, etc. The major follows from what was said in this and the preceding disputation. The minor, however, as regards the knowledge of futures in themselves, is evident. Because before they are as far as we are concerned, they cannot be known in themselves, as is evident, unless not only eternity is given, but also the presence of things in eternity: because this, by reason of its own eminence, extends itself so far as to reach from eternity to coexisting with future things.

130 The same minor, however, also stands as to the second part. Because if the divine decree were not measured by eternity, but by an everlasting aeon, then just as that everlasting aeon itself, precisely in so far as it is such, or precisely in so far as it were distinguished from eternity, would be deficient and variable, so too would the aforesaid decree measured by it; therefore, insofar as God knew his decree, he could not before the aforesaid future was in its own and adequate duration, or before it was as we are, have infallible knowledge of that future: because before its existence he could not know whether the decree itself would persevere up to that duration; or whether instead of it he would have the opposite decree; since that decree and its measure are deficient: and just as they might not persevere, so too they might not persevere up to the aforesaid duration.

It is confirmed, and explained. For the efficacious decree of God, on the supposition that it is, has altogether invariable and indefectible being because it is measured by eternity, which admits of no variability and mutability; whereas on the hypothesis made the divine decree would not be measured by eternity, but by an aeon: which, although it can be without a beginning and an end, is not nevertheless of necessity without them; but just as it can lack a beginning and an end, so too it can be terminated by them: and so it has nothing at all infallible, by reason of which it would be infallibly or necessarily determined to this, that it must lack a beginning and an end; therefore the aforesaid decree would not yet, on the supposition of itself, be altogether invariable; and consequently through its force the future contingent about which it turns could not be known altogether certainly and infallibly.

131 It makes no difference if, against this assertion and its reason, you object that the angelic aeon, although deficient in itself, nevertheless, on the supposition that it once is, will never, speaking naturally, fail; therefore by the same reasoning, even if the divine willing were measured by an aeon deficient in itself, it would nevertheless never fail in fact, and consequently through its force, precisely in so far as it is efficacious, the future contingent would be infallibly known before it was. The first consequence seems to stand from the parity of reasoning. The second, however, follows well enough from the first. Because for the infallible knowledge of some thing it is enough that in fact, and as it is, it will never fail, although it might fail. Just as for the infallible connection of two things it is enough that in fact they are always connected with one another, although they might not be connected, as is evident in the decree of God as it now stands; which indeed is infallibly joined to the thing about which it turns, for example to a created free act: because, although once the decree is posited, the aforesaid act might still not be, it nevertheless in fact, and as it is, will not be.

It makes no difference, then, for one could answer first by granting the antecedent and denying both consequences. And to the proof of the former, on which the proof of the latter depends, the parity of reasoning is to be denied; from the fact that the angel's aeon now has something external from which in fact it never fails, although it is deficient in itself, namely the decree of God, invariable and indefectible, and measured by eternity, by which it is established that it always is. But with respect to the aeon by which the divine willing would be measured in that impossible hypothesis, there would be nothing from which it would in fact always be; because, as is supposed in it, no free act of God would be measured by eternity.

Whence, in accordance with this mode of speaking, the angel's aeon, although it has nothing from which to ask that it be annihilated and fail, nevertheless has nothing from which to ask the opposite: so as to be distinguished in this way from the instant of our time, which asks only for a duration and a momentary continuance, and which at once ceases to be; and also from the instant, or the angelic time, each of which asks, so as not to endure without end.

132 Second, and better, it will be answered that just as from the fact that the angelic willing were measured by an aeon, which in fact will never fail, speaking naturally, there would follow only that in the efficacious decree of the same about some object such an effect could be known with an infallibility by the order to the ordinary power, and to the connatural manner of operating of that same angel; but not with an altogether unqualified infallibility, and by the order to the absolute power of God: so too, from the fact that the divine willing were measured by an aeon, there would not follow the altogether unqualified infallibility of which we are speaking, but an infallibility by the order to the connatural manner of operating of God; and consequently an infallibility against which, absolutely and simply, fallibility would not be repugnant, if attention is given to the absolute, extraordinary and supernatural manner of operating of God.

Because, although once, God naturally determining something, he cannot, on the supposition of this decree and in the composite sense, determine something else from which variability of the prior decree would follow: so too the things which are determined by it now will have, on the supposition and in the composite sense, invariable being, even by the order to the supernatural manner of operating of God, because the aforesaid decree is measured by eternity; but that would not be the case then in the hypothesis of which we are speaking: since the decrees of God would not be measured by eternity.

By which also the objection drawn from created free acts, which have an infallible connection and in no way a fallible one with the divine decree, is sufficiently met, in as far as it can be turned against us. Because the aforesaid acts, on the supposition of the decree and in the composite sense, cannot fail to be; although in the divided sense they can fail to be: but in the hypothesis of the assertion, although the decree of God would always be, speaking naturally, it is not repugnant to it that it should nevertheless fail, even in the supposition and composite sense, that it is once made. Whence what we say in our assertion is to be understood in accordance with these things.

133 It is to be said, second, that for the infallible knowledge of God with respect to contingents, before they are in their own duration, or as far as we are concerned, it is necessarily required that the aforesaid future things be actually and physically present to God in eternity; so that, once it is granted that the divine being and its operations are measured by eternity, he could in no way know the future things before they existed in the manner now stated, unless they were physically and really present to him from eternity. Thus D. Thom. in the present question, and qaest. 2. de Veritate art. 12. and in the places adduced in this disputation from num. 20 to 52, and 1. contra Gentes cap. 66. There, as to the certain knowledge of future contingents which he sought ¹, namely the knowledge of all their causes, and consequently of the divine decree, he infers their actual presence in eternity: and also (which follows from the preceding) that that knowledge does not rest precisely in the knowledge of their causes; but that it passes on to the knowledge of those same future things according as they are in themselves in that same eternity. And so, after the sixth reason, he says thus: Now the things which are present, past, or future to us, God knows according as they are in his power, and in their own causes, and in themselves: and the knowledge of these is called knowledge of vision: for God does not see of things which are not yet with us only that which they have in their causes, but also that which they have in themselves, in as far as his eternity is present with its indivisibility to all time. Whence the holy Doctor is commonly followed by his disciples. Gonzal. in praesenti disp. 43. sect. 4. Alvarez lib. 2. de auxiliis disp. 9. Caiet. in praesenti, Nazarius controv. 3. and many others.

134 The reason, however, for this conclusion was adduced above at num. 100 and following, from D. Thom.; and its force consists in this, that once it is granted, impossibly, that the future things are not present to God from eternity in the now of eternity, then, even if divine knowledge were measured by eternity, nevertheless, when afterwards they were present to him, the aforesaid knowledge of them would at least change on this account from an abstractive to an intuitive knowledge. And again, God would have in time some knowledge which he did not have from eternity, namely this: Now Antichrist is present to my infinite knowledge and to my eternity. And likewise there would fail another knowledge which he had from eternity up to the time of Antichrist, namely this: From eternity up to the time of Antichrist, with respect to my infinite knowledge and my eternity, Antichrist is really and physically future, as we showed in the place cited; but this is repugnant with respect to divine knowledge, as is evident from what was said there: indeed it entails that the aforesaid knowledge is measured on the one part by eternity, as is supposed, and on the other part is not measured by it, since it would be variable: therefore, etc.

135 Nor is the evasion which we indicated there from the adversaries enough, namely that all these things could come to pass in time by reason of an external change of the object, and not of God: and so God could have the aforesaid knowledge without mutability and variation.

It is not enough, then. Both because that was sufficiently refuted in the place cited. And also because the refutation then adduced can be explained and pressed even further from what Corneio teaches in the present question, and the Thomists commonly. For although in the case of which we are speaking we should grant that that variation of knowledge would be taken radically from the part of the things known, it would nevertheless redound into knowledge itself.

And the reason is. Because, the impossible case being granted, in which God produced today some creature which he had not decreed from eternity to produce, then not only would the divine will be changed by a new act of volition not held from eternity, as we suppose (whether that change were truly physical and real, or only quasi-moral, which is called a change of intention and entails an inconstancy and imprudency of soul, as is said above in qaest. 9. and below in qaest. 19.) but the divine intellect would also be changed by a new act even of intuitive cognition, not held from eternity; therefore, although a variation of the object from possibility to futurity, when it is made from eternity, does not entail an intrinsic variation in knowledge, just as it does not entail it in the will through the free act of God held from eternity; but it does indeed entail one when such a variation is made in time: therefore by the same reasoning, although the variation of the same object from pure possibility to that which it is to be from eternity present in the now of eternity, and to that which it is to be from eternity the object of God's intuitive knowledge, does not entail a variation in divine knowledge, it does entail one if these two things occur in time.

The consequences seem clear, and the antecedent is proved. Because, just as there would be a change in the will because it was not terminated from eternity toward that creature, as actually future, or existing; but precisely as possible, and in time it began to be terminated toward it as existing: in exactly the same way the divine intellect was not terminated toward it as actually existing, or future, but only as possible; therefore in time it too began to receive it as future, or existing: therefore there is a change in one or the other of the two, or in neither.

136 Nor does it stand in the way if, along with Suar., disp. 30. Metaphys. sect. 9. num. 55. you object that the immutability of the knowledge of vision in God is not founded on the immutability of the divine will: and so even if, impossibly, God were to begin to will something new, or were to cease to will what he willed from eternity, the knowledge of vision would nevertheless be unchanged: because from eternity he would know such a decree as to be new in the future, and the mutation that would be future in it according to its times, in the same way as he will know these same things invariably of the created will.

The answer to this is that, precisely because this new act of the divine will held in time, or this new relation, or quasi-relation of the divine will toward that creature was not from eternity, but new and in time, as is supposed, it must be that the aforesaid creature, about which it turns, did not have from eternity the character of a future; therefore it could not have been known by God from eternity through the knowledge of vision, but precisely through the knowledge of simple intellection under the character of a possible; therefore the knowledge of vision would begin only in time, and consequently the mutability or immutability of divine knowledge will depend on the mutability or immutability of the divine will.

THESE last two consequences plainly seem to follow from the first. The first, however, is proved. Because, as has often been said, the futurity of a thing supposes the prior divine will, just as an effect supposes its cause. Nor is it the same with the mutation of the acts of the human will. Because this supposes a free act of God from eternity, by which such a mutation was willed: and so it is known from eternity through the knowledge of vision, although the mutation itself is exercised in time.

§ III. A corollary worthy of notice.

137 From all of which there follows a corollary worthy of notice concerning the manner of reconciling divine knowledge and its infallibility with regard to absolute future contingents and created freedom. For it must be said that this real presence, in the manner in which we explained it in the preceding difficulties, is the proximate and sufficient reason for reconciling the certainty of divine knowledge with the freedom of our choice. Thus D. Thom. 1. cont. Gent. cap. 67. and de Verit. quaest. 2. art. 12. in these words: Since, therefore, our sight is not deceived in seeing contingents as they are present, and yet it is not thereby removed that they happen contingently, so God infallibly sees all contingents, because they are not future to him, but he beholds them to be then when they are. Whence it is not thereby removed that they happen contingently. Where, from the fact that God's intuition attains them as really present, he infers the agreement of the infallibility of God's knowledge with their contingency: for just as the contingency of Peter's sitting is not removed by the fact that we see him sitting while he sits, so the contingency of things is not removed by God's knowledge, which is terminated toward things as they are really present to him.

138 And this can be further elucidated. Because through that very production and existence by which things are in time, they coexist from eternity with God himself in the measure of his divine knowledge, which is eternity: therefore through this coexistence and presence with divine knowledge the contingency of things is not removed; indeed, it is rather the sufficient reason for reconciling the infallibility of God's knowledge with the contingency of the things themselves. The consequence is evident. Because through their contingent production, by which they come to be in time, they coexist with God himself through the relation to the now of his eternity, and are subject in the manner of presence to his divine knowledge.

We say that the aforesaid real presence in the now of eternity, explained in the manner stated, is the proximate and sufficient reason for reconciling the certainty of divine knowledge with the freedom of our choice, so as to denote by this that, if we speak of a more remote and radical reason, then the aforesaid reason will be the divine essence, determined however by its own efficacious decree, and its highest eminence, and sweetest but strongest efficacy, by which he not only wills that effects or acts be free, but that they be free; and consequently that they be such that they can fail to be. Whence, on the part on which he wills that they be, they will certainly come to be infallibly: and on the part on which he wills that they be free, they will be so; and consequently they will be such that they can fail to be. But these things were explained at greater length in the preceding disputation, dub. 2, and in this one, dub. 1 and 2, and are to be understood in accordance with what was said there.

§ IV. An answer is given to the arguments of the opposing opinion.

139 To the first, the major is denied, and to the proof the consequence is to be denied. Because in that event Antichrist would not be knowable before he was with altogether complete certainty and infallibility; but only with infallible knowledge by the order to the connatural manner of operating of God, which in that event would be his due, and not by the order to the extraordinary and supernatural manner of operating of God: and consequently the aforesaid knowledge would not have to be infallible with such an infallibility that fallibility would be repugnant to it.

140 To the second, it is to be said that knowledge and the will of God are the cause of the things being contained in eternity; but not in such a way that eternity itself does not concur toward that end after the manner of a kind of formal cause, containing and measuring the things contained in it. Whence it does not follow that, by priority in quo, God knows future things prior even in the order of reason than the fact that they are contained in eternity; and much less that eternity contains and measures them. For by knowing them practically he makes them subsist in eternity, eternity nevertheless concurring as the cause of the measurement, intrinsic indeed to God, but extrinsic to the things measured. And so although the knowledge precedes as causing, it is not nevertheless prior by priority in quo, even according to reason. Just as if the sight of a bodily eye were to produce a wall, the wall in terminating the sight would be at once with the production, and simultaneous with the sight in quo: and yet the sight, insofar as it is causing, would precede the wall by priority a quo.

141 To the confirmation it is to be said that the presence of future things in eternity can be taken in a twofold way, namely on the part of eternity toward them, or on the part of the future things toward that same eternity. If it is taken according to the first consideration, it can be in some way the reason of the certainty and infallibility of divine knowledge. But according to the second consideration it holds itself by way of a condition on the part of the object, namely of the future creatures, and necessarily brought about by the force of the infallibility and certainty of divine knowledge with respect to them. Because, as we said in disput. 5, num. 16, art. 9, the knowledge of vision of God is practical and productive of things: and consequently it places them from eternity within the measure of eternity. Whence it never follows that something created gives to God his certainty; but rather the opposite.

142 To the third, it is evident from what was said for the first assertion. Wherefore, although in that event the decree of God, in itself, would have a fallible efficacy; nevertheless it would not have infallible efficacy unless it persevered up to the time for which the future things have being: and because before it persevered up to the duration, for example, of Antichrist, it would not be infallible that it would persevere up to the aforesaid time; therefore it will not be efficacious infallibly with respect to that same Antichrist, but only fallibly; and so from the force of that knowledge precisely, Antichrist could not be known with certainty before he was.

143 To the confirmation we grant the major and the minor, and we deny the consequence. Because for the certain knowledge of conditioned future things the efficacious decree measured by eternity now suffices. Because precisely in so far as it is, it is invariable and immutable; and consequently precisely in so far as it is, it has infallible efficacy, conditioned however in the manner explained below. But in the event of the first assertion the decree would not have variability, nor infallible efficacy: and so from its force the future could not be infallibly known before it was.

And although for the infallible knowledge of a conditioned future it is not necessary that it exist from eternity in eternity, but it suffices that the decree about it be measured by eternity itself, from the fact that the aforesaid future things are not capable of existing in it except according to the being which they have in the decree, since it is only according to this being that they exist; nevertheless it is to be said otherwise of absolute futures. And the reason for the disparity is. Because just as a conditioned future never exists in itself, so it does not at one time exist in itself and at another not exist in itself: and therefore it is not necessary, in order that it exist invariably in some measure, and consequently in order that it be invariably known, that it be present from eternity in it, provided some infinite and invariable measure is given which surrounds it from eternity: and with respect to which the future itself always and invariably has being present in the manner already explained. Moreover, since the opposite occurs in the case of an absolute future, as is evident from what has been said, therefore, in order that it be invariably known before it is, and consequently in order that it be certainly known absolutely and simply by God, in whom all variable knowledge is repugnant, it must have the aforesaid presence in eternity, and it does not suffice that, impossibly, the decree of God about it should have these two things, namely that it be measured by eternity and at the same time not coexist from eternity with future things and with all differences of time.

144 To the fourth, for the present let the antecedent pass, and the consequence is to be denied. Because divine knowledge, precisely in so far as it is such, must have that altogether complete invariability and immutability already explained; and so it requires in the futures their presence invariable with respect to some measure: whereas created knowledge precisely as such does not.

We have said that let the antecedent pass; we have not, however, granted nor denied that, so as to abstract for the present from those questions, namely, whether the infused knowledge of Christ our Lord and the beatific knowledge are measured by participated eternity, and so really and physically coexist with future things before they are in their duration? For this is to be treated expressly in 3. part. tract. de Scientia Christi.

To the confirmation it is to be said that future contingents do not have a determined and infallible truth in that duration in which they are not present, except by means of the divine decree: and not considered in any way whatever, but as measured by eternity. And then we say that this decree measured by eternity does not suffice for them to have a determined truth in the duration in which they are not; but it is required that, although in their own duration, or as far as we are concerned, they do not exist, they nevertheless have presence with respect to eternity, and in the now of eternity. Because, as we have already explained, they are not otherwise knowable by God through invariable knowledge, and consequently neither through divine knowledge: and consequently they will not be able to be known by a creature either: since any created knowledge presupposes divine knowledge about that object, and those things which are required for it.