Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

70 Now that we have explained what, according to the mind of Scripture and of the Fathers, is to be said of that which is present from eternity in the measure of eternity, and at the same time in what way, according to their opinion, eternity is the reason of knowing the aforesaid futures, it remains for us to explain by what sufficient reason that very point is proved. We have divided, therefore, this question from the preceding one, so that we may proceed more clearly and more distinctly § I. The first opinion is introduced.

The first opinion denies both parts of the title. Thus Scotus in 1. distinct. 38. quaest. 1.; Durandus quaest. 3.; Gabriel, Gregorius, Okamus, and Aureolus in the same distinct. 38.; Suarez, lib. 1. de scientia futurorum absolutorum, cap. 7.; Herveus, Hispalensis in 1. distinct. 38.; Sylvester in constat. 1. part. quaest. 14. art. 16.; Aegidius in defensorio D. Thom. on this article; Valentia in praesenti, puncto 5.; Vasquez disput. 64.; Arrubal disp. 41. cap. 4.; Herice disput. 6. cap. 4. Of whom the last eight authors also believe that the opposite opinion is neither of the mind of D. Thom. nor common to the Fathers.

This opinion follows clearly from the former with regard to its second part. With regard to the first part, however, it is proved firstly. Because nothing can really and physically coexist with another in any duration unless it exist in itself in the same way: but future contingents, before they are in their proper measure, or before they exist with respect to us, do not really and physically exist in themselves: therefore neither will they have a coexistence with eternity in the same measure and duration of eternity: and so such a coexistence will not be able to be urged as following from a sufficient reason. This last consequence is clearly evident from the former. The former, however, is evident from both of the premises.

The minor, moreover, is constant. For created things, before they are in their proper measure, are truly and really nothing in themselves: and thus in no manner are they existing in themselves. The major is proved. Because the coexistence of two things in some duration presupposes that each of them has in itself a true, real, and physical existence: otherwise, as is evident from itself, they will not be able to coexist with one another in any duration.

71 It makes no difference if you say that it is enough for that thing to exist in a higher measure, even though it be not in its proper measure, as happens at present.

For against this it must be said that it is repugnant for something to exist physically and really in an alien measure, unless it be a real being in itself in the same way, as seems evident from the terms themselves; therefore it will also be repugnant unless it exist also in its proper measure. The consequence is evident. Because what a thing, as a real being in itself, physically and really, necessarily involves, is that it exist in its proper measure. For just as then it really and physically comes to be when it is produced in its proper and adequate measure, and not before, so in the same way it is a real being in itself when it exists in its proper measure, and not before that.

72 It is confirmed, firstly. Because it is prior for a thing to exist in its own proper measure, or duration, than to exist in an alien and surpassing measure; therefore nothing will be able to exist in an alien measure unless it have existence in its own proper and adequate measure. The consequence needs no proof: for that which is posterior necessarily depends on the prior, and hence cannot be without it. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because a thing is in an alien and superior duration and measure for this reason, that it is in its own proper duration and measure: since an alien and superior measure reaches, by the force of its own line of duration, only the inferior durations, which are the proper durations of things, and which are contained in that same superior measure. And therefore it is prior for a thing to be in its own proper and adequate measure than to be in an alien and surpassing measure.

It is confirmed, secondly. For what is not verified of things with respect to their proper measure cannot be verified of the same things with respect to an alien and surpassing measure, namely the measure of eternity: therefore, from the very fact that it is not verified of them that they exist from eternity with respect to their proper measure, it cannot be verified with respect to the measure of eternity. The consequence is evident. The antecedent, however, is proved. For a common measure does not touch things except according to the condition which is proper to those things themselves: otherwise it would not touch them as they are in themselves; and furthermore it would change their conditions; whereas neither of these two can correspond to the common measure containing the inferior measures. Just as neither can correspond to a common place, namely the concave of the heavens, when compared with the particular places contained in it and measured by it, so, etc.

73 Secondly, and principally. For does the created thing exist from eternity in eternity by its own created existence, or not? This cannot be said according to the second alternative: otherwise it would be only in God's power, and thus in no way could it be verified that it actually and formally exists, and consequently neither that it exists in eternity. If, however, the first is asserted, then that very thing, because it is created, will not be able not to be produced by some action: and consequently all things which exist in some temporal difference will have been from eternity produced and created by a true and real action, the opposite of which faith teaches, as is evident from Genesis 1: In the beginning God created heaven and earth.

74 It makes no difference if you object that from this only it follows that things are produced from eternity in an alien measure, namely in eternity, and with respect to God, but not in their proper measure and with respect to us; and although this latter is inconvenient and against faith, nevertheless the former is not.

For against this it must be said. Then, because the very fact that a thing is created from eternity in an alien measure, namely in eternity, means absolutely and simply that it is created: because God's action from eternity is terminated precisely in that existence of it, which is nothing other than to be created properly, absolutely, and simply. Now it is certain that, according to faith, creatures were properly, absolutely, and simply created only in time; and also because created existence is not produced without its own duration and measure; because this duration has the status of a property with respect to its own existence; therefore, if created existence is from eternity, its own duration and measure will also be from eternity: and consequently, just as they would be from eternity in their own existence, so also in their own duration.

75 Thirdly, the same opinion is proved. For eternity does not have regard to a thing in the same way when it actually exists and when it has being as past or as future: but this diversity consists in this, that actual existences are regarded by eternity as present to it, whereas future and past existences are regarded as not present to it: therefore futures will not be present from eternity to that same eternity. The consequence is sufficiently clear. The minor seems to be constant, because it does not appear in what the aforesaid diversity consists.

The major, however, is urged from this, that the thing itself has regard to eternity in one way when it is present, and in another way when it has the character of a future; for when it is present, it has regard to that same eternity through a real relation of true and real coexistence; whereas when it has the character of a past and a future, it does not have regard to that same eternity through a real, but only a conceptual, relation: therefore conversely eternity itself has regard to the created thing as present in one way, and as future or past in another: since a diversity in one of the relatives requires a diversity in the term, or in the correlate.

76 Fourthly. Because otherwise there would be an actually infinite multitude which really and physically would be actually and simultaneously present in some duration; but this is impossible; therefore, etc. The sequence is proved. For all the thoughts of the blessed are infinite; therefore, if all those thoughts are actually present to God physically and really in the measure of eternity, according to their proper existences, there will be an actually infinite multitude with respect to some duration, namely eternity. The falsity of the consequent, however, follows from this. For as the Complutensian doctors show in lib. Physic. disp. 18. num. 57., the reason on account of which an actually infinite multitude of totally actual entities is repugnant is this, that the aforesaid multitude must be according to some species of number, or according to a proportion and likeness to it; and since every number is a multitude made, or measured, by a unit, it will certainly be against the reason of a number, or of a multitude having a proportion or likeness with it, that it be actually infinite; indeed, since it is repugnant for a thing actually measured by one of those many, of which it consists, to be actually infinite; and consequently it will also be repugnant that it have this in its own duration; and this reasoning seems intended to convict even if such a multitude is posited to be actually infinite in eternity; for there it must preserve the proper character of such a multitude; therefore, etc.

77 Fifthly. For several absurdities follow from the opposite opinion. The first, that the same thing is produced twice. Once, indeed, in eternity and from eternity; but once again in time. Because just as it cannot exist without being produced, so it cannot be from eternity without being produced from eternity; nor can it begin to exist in time unless it also begin to be produced in time.

Second, that of the Antichrist this could be verified in this instant, namely that which he is in this very instant and in every other instant of our time. For just as it follows well: the Antichrist is in eternity: therefore the Antichrist is, so also it is very well inferred: the Antichrist, who in every instant of time is in eternity, is therefore now, and in every other instant of our time.

Third, that things cannot be created, or produced from nothing in time: for they are already presupposed with their real and physical being in eternity. And thus they would not be produced in time simply from nothing; but at most with a limitation, namely from nothing in time.

Fourth, that Adam and the Antichrist coexist with one another, if they coexist with eternity only once. For just as those things which are the same in relation to one and the same third are the same among themselves; so those things which coexist from eternity with one and the same third will certainly coexist among themselves.

Fifth, that several contradictory propositions would be verified of one and the same thing in one and the same duration, namely in the same instant of eternity; such as that the Antichrist is, and the Antichrist is not, that he is corrupted, and is generated, dies, and exists: for all of these would apply to the Antichrist in eternity. And thus, if all of these apply to him from eternity in the measure of eternity, the aforesaid contradictory propositions will be verified at the same time of him in the same duration: but this seems absurd: for predicates which are contradictory in themselves are always incompatible, in whatever duration they be; from the fact that they are always contradictory in themselves.

78 Lastly, because otherwise the freedom of created choice would be removed. Then, because if the acts of created freedom exist from eternity in eternity, they will certainly have been produced from eternity in it according to all the circumstances which they will have in their own time; therefore it will not be in the power of free choice to do anything, or in any other way, than as it was done in eternity; and so no freedom will remain in it; and also because a future contingent and free thing is not in eternity except through that very being which it will have in time: but if in time it were to have being before it were done by free choice, it would be neither contingent nor free: therefore the same must be said if it has being in eternity before it is produced in time by free choice.

§ II. The true opinion is proposed and explained.

79 Nevertheless, it must be said that it is proved by a sufficient reason that absolute future contingents were from eternity, and are now really and physically present to God in the measure of eternity, and that by reason of this presence they are known with certainty by him. Thus Ferrara 1. contra Gent. cap. 66.; Corduba, quaest. 35. disp. 8.; Capreolus in 1. dist. 38. quaest. 1. art. 2., and dist. 36. quaest. 1. art. 2.; Ricardus in 1. dist. 38. quaest. 5.; Caietan.; Bannez, Ripa, Zanzardus, Zumel here; Nazarius controv. 3.; Navarrete controv. 52.; Gonzalez disp. 43. sect. 3.; Corneio disp. 1. dub. 3.; Alvarez disp. 8. de auxiliis; Abulensis super Math. cap. 18. quaest. 36. And from the Fathers of the Society, Fonseca 6. Metaphys. cap. 2. quaest. 4. sect. 2.; Christophorus Gil. tract. 10. de aeternitate cap. 16.; Granado tract. 5. de scientia Dei disp. 3. sect. 2. And Molina holds this as probable in the present disput. 13., although in the following disputation he embraces the opposite. And finally, commonly, the holy Fathers, whom we mentioned in the preceding question. Because all of those, led by the true reason, admit the aforesaid presence of futures in eternity, and say that by reason of that same presence they are known with certainty and infallibly by God.

Moreover, because this assertion requires explanation, therefore, once the explanation adduced in num. 35. and 40. has been presupposed, it will have to be further explained and then proved.

80 For its explanation, then, it must be noted, firstly, that when it is said that future contingents were from eternity, and are now present to God and to eternity, there are involved there both the last term of the coexistence and also the duration in which they coexist, or the measure by which the aforesaid coexistence is measured. Just as when we say that Peter and Paul coexisted yesterday, and coexist now, there are involved there Peter and Paul coexisting with one another, and the duration and measure in which they coexist, by which such coexistence is measured, namely the external day and the present instant, or the external day reaching up to the present instant.

The last terms, then, of this coexistence, of which we are speaking at present, are on the one hand God, as he is eternal; on the other hand, future contingents. Now the duration which measures does not measure only the truth of the proposition by which it is stated that the aforesaid futures coexisted from eternity, and coexist now with God and eternity, but also the coexistence of the last terms; it is not the instant of our time, or the remaining instant of imaginary time which, according to our mode of understanding, and according to what the Complutensian doctors teach in lib. Physic. disp. 29. num. 50., are understood from eternity as having preceded an imaginary, or a real instant, which is now understood to exist really or imaginarily; but it is eternity itself, or that now of eternity which is indivisible and always stands, which is a measure formally indivisible, and wholly unfailing and unchangeable.

For in this instant of our time it is evident that the Antichrist does not exist: as it is also evident that in the preceding instants, whether real or imaginary, which have preceded, he did not yet have existence; but in relation to our time his existence begins to be in that future time, for which he will really exist. Hence we hold as of faith that, speaking of the production of created things, as measured by our time, then all creatures began in time, as is evident from Genesis 1: In the beginning God created heaven and earth, and from the Council of Nicaea cited above. And therefore, in order to denote this very point, and in order that every equivocation on this account be removed, the particle In the measure of eternity has been added both in the title and in the assertion, so that it may be denoted which duration is the one measuring this coexistence and this presence of futures to eternity.

81 From this it follows that eternity undergoes a twofold office in this coexistence. One indeed, insofar as it has the character of the last term coexisting and at the same time lasting with the futures. The other, insofar as it has the character of the measuring duration, of the truth of the proposition by which the aforesaid coexistence is affirmed, and also of the coexistence itself. Just as when it is said that Peter coexists with the duration of the first heaven, then the duration of the first heaven has both the office of the last term lasting together with Peter, and the office of the measure measuring such coexistence.

We have said that the measuring duration, which measures not only the truth of the proposition but also the coexistence of the last terms, is not this instant of our time, or another which preceded that same instant: because if we speak of the measure measuring only the truth of the proposition, then this proposition, the Antichrist is present now in eternity, is true even if that now denotes the present instant of our time: and consequently the aforesaid now can be the measure of that proposition so taken. For it yields this sense, that in this instant of our time it is true to say that future contingents are present to God in eternity, and that they coexist with him in the same measure of eternity measuring the coexistence of the last terms.

82 Secondly, it must be noted that when it is further said that future contingents were, or are from eternity present to eternity in the same measure of eternity, and that they are also now present to it, with the word now designating eternity, as the measure of this coexistence, this can be understood in a twofold way. First, indeed, that the future contingents themselves, existing in their own proper duration, namely for the future time, are understood according to their existence formally or virtually to be extended, and as it were drawn back, so that from the duration in which they will have being they reach up to the eternal duration itself on the part before that same eternity. Secondly, however, not so that the futures themselves should be extended, and (as we may say) drawn back in this way; but because eternity itself, from the fact that it is infinite in its duration, and consequently has virtually every conceivable extension within this line, extends itself virtually as much as is necessary, so that always and from eternity, and without succession on the part of eternity, or on the part of contact, it may reach up to the future itself, and to its duration for that future temporal difference for which it will be verified that they actually have being, and so in the said sense may encompass and contain all of them.

In that proportional way in which, if time were given from eternity, and were to last on this side into eternity, then if we imagined by an impossibility that the aforesaid time stood with all its parts at once, and at the same time had that formal extension, it would be necessary that from eternity, and still at the same time on the part of contact, it should reach up to the Antichrist, and to all past or future things without limit on the part of the future; not indeed because those past or future things should be extended, so as to be drawn back from their own determined duration, in which they are, as much as would be necessary in order that from there it should reach up to that whole infinite duration on the part of the past; but because time itself would formally be extended, so that at once, and once for all, and without succession, even on the part of contact, it should reach from eternity into eternity; and consequently up to all things, and to the intrinsic durations of them, which are found in that whole latitude, or which exist in any difference of time.

83 When, therefore, we say that future contingents coexist from eternity with eternity in the now of that same eternity, we do not mean that the aforesaid coexistence is given from the fact that the future contingents themselves should be extended from their own temporal difference, for which they will exist in the future time, by as much as suffices in order that they may reach up to the eternal duration on the part before eternity, or to this, namely that they may coexist with it always on the part of the past; but because eternity itself, by reason of its infinitude and virtual extension, extends itself from eternity by as much as suffices in order that it may reach up to the aforesaid futures, and encompass them. And therefore, in order to explain this presence and its mode, it is commonly said by the Thomists, together with D. Thom., that all past and future things are actually encompassed, contained, and concluded in the now of eternity.

And the reason for this mode of philosophising with regard to this is that, in order that future contingents should coexist with eternity in the former way, it would have been necessary that they should have in their own and adequate duration an existence lasting from that temporal difference, in which they will exist, up to the infinite duration on the part before that same eternity, or of imaginary time on the part before the infinite, and conversely; and consequently they would be, and would not be, future. Just as, in order that eternity should extend itself in this way from eternity up to the futures themselves, it is required that it have in its own duration an existence by which from eternity it may reach up to such futures. And therefore, because eternity by reason of its infinitude can have this whole duration, hence it is that futures can coexist with it from eternity in the now of that same eternity, and conversely.

84 Thirdly, for the sake of greater light on these matters, it should be recalled to memory, and illustrated more fully, what we touched upon in num. 67. and 68., namely, that when it is said that future contingents are from eternity present to eternity in the now of that same eternity, from the fact that they are virtually extended, or that they virtually have the parts of duration, namely past, present, and future; and that by reason of these they include all of them within themselves, this can still be understood in a twofold way. Either in such a way that eternity, by reason of all its parts, virtually such, reaches immediately and proximately to each future; or in such a way that it is not by reason of all its virtual parts that it has this, but that, insofar as it virtually contains, for example, tomorrow's duration, it coexists from eternity with the future day, and with all the things which will have existence in it itself; although at present, that is, in the now of our time, they do not have it; and insofar as it virtually contains the day immediately following after tomorrow, and those things which are now future with respect to that same day, they too coexist from eternity with it. Just as also, according to the fact that it contains all the times which have preceded up to the present instant, they always coexist with all past things, as will be explained more fully below.

85 When, therefore, it is said that future contingents always coexist, and from eternity, with God and eternity in the now of eternity, from the fact that they are extended virtually as much as suffices in order that from their own eternal duration on the part of the past they may reach up to the duration of the futures, the sense is not that, by reason of all the virtual parts of their duration, it immediately and proximately concludes and contains within itself each future and its created duration; but that, insofar as it contains that duration in which the Antichrist will be, it encompasses and concludes him; and so with respect to the other temporal differences preceding that one, whether real or imaginary.

And the reason is manifest. Because a thing encompassed and concluded by eternity lasts in its own duration for as long as that virtual part has of virtual extension, by reason of which eternity immediately and proximately concludes and encompasses it. Just as the same thing has as much duration in its own intrinsic measure as is required of the extension of duration formal in the time of the first heaven, in order that it may contain within itself, and encompass, by reason of its parts, that same thing immediately. Hence, if the Antichrist, for example, were contained immediately and proximately by eternity by reason of all its virtual parts, it would be necessary that he should last in his own proper duration as long as eternity is: and consequently he would be formally extended in his character of lasting as much as eternity is virtually extended according to all of itself. Wherefore, since the Antichrist lasts in his own proper measure only from the future time, in which he will be, until the end of his life, hence it is that eternity does not encompass him immediately and proximately, nor coexist with him as present and having existence, except insofar as it contains that whole future duration, and not another.

86 We have said immediately, and proximately, because although in order that eternity may reach from its infinite duration on the part of the past up to the future duration of the Antichrist, and to the Antichrist himself, it is required that it should reach also to all the preceding differences of time; nevertheless not in such a way that it should reach to this one immediately and proximately, but that it reaches to those; but because, by reason of its infinitude, formally indivisible in its duration, it was necessary for this, in order that it might reach to that one, that it should encompass all those which precede it; although it immediately and proximately encompasses only the difference of time in which the Antichrist will be, and his existence, because it contains and encompasses the aforesaid difference of time.

Hence the Thomists very well say that there are in eternity several and diverse folds virtually, and that in one fold there is actually, for example, the Antichrist, and in another Adam, and so on with the rest, according to the various differences of time in which they were, or will exist.

87 From which a fuller explanation follows of those things which we introduced in num. 68., namely, that in as far as future contingents coexist with eternity proximately and immediately only insofar as eternity has for each of them that quasi-private fold corresponding to it, or according as it precisely contains that private difference of time for which, with respect to us, they will exist, it is not necessary for this coexistence already mentioned that they should always exist with respect to us, or that they should have and should have had at the same time, always, existence in their own and adequate measure, as is evident from what has been said. But since from its source eternity contains at the same time virtually and actually, without succession and without formal divisibility, both that difference of time and all those preceding and following it, it is necessary that, always and from eternity, and without succession, on the part both of itself and of the actual virtual extension, or of contact with things or durations which are future with respect to us, it should extend itself to the actual encompassing of all of them, and to concluding them within its own quasi-fold corresponding to each of them, and to each thing measured by that duration, contained and concluded within the same fold.

Just as, if a year had from the beginning of its being that whole formal extension which it has in the course of time, and this were to stand, by an impossibility, always throughout that whole year, then from the beginning of its being it would actually encompass all things which would be done in the tenth month of it, by reason of that part of the formal extension which would correspond to it from that same tenth month, the others standing at the same time, by an impossibility; and for this, namely, that the same year should encompass those things from the beginning of its being, it would be enough that those things should have existence in the tenth month, as in a measure adequate to it.

88 From all of which it finally follows that this question, and the difficulty of it, is not about the name alone, as some of the adversaries wish, but about the thing itself. For although all the Doctors agree in this, that the Antichrist, for example, is not present to eternity in the now of our time, as being in a measure measuring the coexistence of these last terms: and likewise that those same futures coexist, speaking absolutely and simply, in the now of eternity, because eternity is a measure equivalent to infinite time, both on the part of the past and on the part of the future, and all at once; and therefore, just as each future ought to exist in some part of infinite time (if there were such), and to coexist with it, so it also ought to be in eternity, and to have coexistence with it; nay, because it is formally indivisible and all at once, it is necessary that they all coexist with that whole eternity. The Fathers, however, and especially D. Thom., hold that this coexistence of eternity with futures has always been, and has been from eternity, without any succession, not only on the part of eternity, but also on the part of contact (as we may say) which is virtual, or of actual coexistence with them, and conversely. The adversaries, however, deny this: and they say only that this coexistence was not, or was not from eternity, but began in time; not indeed on account of a succession of eternity and of its duration, but on account of the succession, and limitation of the things coexisting with it, and consequently on account of the succession of the contact itself, which arises precisely from this limitation and succession of created things. But these diverse manners of speaking, it is evident, are not about the name or the mere word, but altogether about the thing itself.

§ III. The prior and fundamental reason of the true opinion.

89 The assertion, thus explained, follows clearly in its second part from its first part. For from the very fact that a future contingent is really and physically present, it has a certain and determinate knowability with respect to that to which it is present; and by reason of this presence, it can be known with certainty by him: therefore, from the very fact that future contingents are present in the said way to eternity, and to God by reason of eternity, they will be able to be known with certainty by him by reason of this presence. Let, however, those things which we noted in num. 40. be considered.

With regard, however, to the first part, it is proved, firstly, by the fundamental reason which has already been touched upon in the explanation of this same assertion, and which is drawn from D. Thom. and from the other holy Fathers in the places cited in the preceding question; and it can be reduced to this form. Because eternity is a duration all at once and infinite in its duration; such that at once and once for all it is equivalent to infinite time, both on the part of the past and on the part of the future: therefore, at once and once for all, and from eternity, it coexists in its own proper measure of that same eternity with all future differences of time, and it actually encompasses and contains them all, and all the things which have coexisted in them. The antecedent as regards the first part is evident from itself: otherwise there would be in it a past and a future, and consequently a succession and an imperfection of mutability. The second part, however, is also constant. Because whatever is in God must be infinite within its own line; and consequently it must at once and once for all be equivalent to all created things which look to that same line: therefore, since the line of eternity is the line of duration, it will have to be infinite in this respect, and at once and once for all to be equivalent to infinite duration of time, both on the part of the past and on the part of the future, if this were given; that this can be given is very well proved by the Complutensian doctors in lib. Phys. disp. 29. num. 46. and afterwards.

90 The consequent, however, is proved. Because if eternity did not contain at once, and once for all, and from eternity, all the future differences of time, and all the things existing in them, it would not coexist from eternity with them in the same measure of eternity; then it would not be infinite in its duration, and all at once. Because a duration which is all at once and infinite in its duration, both on the part of the past and on the part of the future, must always, and from eternity, extend itself virtually in such a way that it may reach up to all the differences of time, encompassing them, and coexisting with them from eternity, and with the things existing in them.

Just as that which were infinite in its duration, not indeed so as to be all at once, but successively and formally extended, would have to encompass future things not indeed at once, but successively, and by reason of its future parts, and coexist with them; and if it did not have this, it would not be infinite in its duration considered as successive. And likewise, as we were saying a moment ago, if by an impossibility it were given that a year, for example, of the time of the first heaven had its whole formal extension at once, and standing always, then from the beginning of that same being it would encompass all the differences of time existing intrinsically in those lower things which would be given in the aforesaid year, and it would coexist with all the things which would be done in that year. And if it did not have this, then precisely for that reason it would not have from the beginning of its being that whole formal extension of duration standing always.

91 It is confirmed by the reason of D. Thom. in the places cited. For from the very fact that eternity is a perfectly infinite duration, and all at once without any succession, it must be a measure measuring, in an infinite and unchangeable way, all future created durations, and whatever is contained in them: therefore, always and from eternity, and in an unchangeable way, it must measure them all, and all the things which will have been in them, and contain them actually, and coexist with them.

The antecedent is proved. For although not every duration is a measure of another, and so the age of an angel may indeed have a considerable uniformity, nevertheless it does not measure our motions from the fact that they do not depend on it; yet a duration which is more uniform in itself, and from which other inferior durations depend, must be, according to its own mode, a measure of them, and of the things which are contained in them: therefore, since eternity is not only a duration more uniform than others, but infinitely more uniform and infinitely perfect and unchangeable by God; and since all other durations depend on it, it will be necessary that it be a measure of all other things in an infinite and unchangeable way.

The consequent, however, is proved. Because if it did not always, and from eternity, and in an unchangeable way, measure and contain the aforesaid things, but sometimes began to measure some of them, and ceased to measure them; and again measured others, and ceased from this measurement, then there would be in it a succession in its character of measure, and in its character of duration, by reason of which it measures; and thus it would not measure in a perfectly infinite and unchangeable way.

92 The adversaries object, both to the reason given and to its confirmation. As regards the reason, indeed, they say that in order that eternity be an infinite duration and all at once, it is not necessary that it should always, and from eternity, coexist with all differences of time and with the things existing in them; but it is enough that, as far as it is of itself, it be able to coexist with them: and consequently that the defect of this coexistence should not arise from a defect of eternity and of its infinite duration, but from a defect of time and of the things existing in it; which, because they begin to exist in time, and also cease to exist in time, for that very reason cannot coexist from eternity with that same eternity.

This, however, they explain by the example of immensity: which, although it be infinite within its own line, nevertheless does not fill future places, but only existing ones; not indeed from a defect of its own, but from a defect of theirs: from the fact that so long as they are existing, they are not capable of that aforesaid filling.

From this, also, they answer with regard to the confirmation, that eternity, as far as it is of itself, is an unchangeable measure, because although it now measures present things, but not future things, and those having passed and these existing, it may cease to measure the being of those and begin to measure the being of these: yet this is not on account of a defect, a changeability, or a succession of eternity, but of created things, which flow according to their being, and succeed one another in turn; whereas eternity always remains fixed and unmoving, at least in that proportional way in which a tree in a river remains always unmoved, and successively coexists with the flowing waters: and if it were their measure, it would measure them successively; although this would not arise from the flowing of the tree, but of the waters.

93 Moreover, neither of these solutions satisfies. Not, indeed, the former. For from the very example which they bring forward on their own behalf, and from the difference which obtains between immensity and eternity, it is very efficiently proved that eternity must always, and from eternity, coexist with every future duration and with the things existing in it. For immensity is not infinite in its duration, but only in its immensity, and (as we may say) in its power of filling the whole place: and therefore, by reason of this infinitude taken precisely, it must actually and at the same time fill all places; not indeed future ones, but existing ones, and that whether they are distant from one another or not: and from the very fact that it did not fill them and reach them at the same time, it would follow that the aforesaid immensity was not infinite in its power of filling places: therefore, because eternity is infinite in its duration, it will be necessary that it should at once, and once for all, contain and actually encompass all the differences of time, and everything which has been in them; and consequently that it should touch them, as it were, from eternity, and coexist with them, however distant from one another the things themselves may be in their duration: therefore, since the differences of duration, that is, of our time, are past, present, and future, eternity will have actually, and from eternity, to encompass all these differences of time, and whatever is contained in them.

Otherwise, if by reason of its virtual extension it did not extend itself to the aforesaid things, such that at once, and once for all, and consequently from eternity, it did not reach up to them, and actually encompass them, and coexist with them, it could not be infinite in its duration. Just as, likewise, it could not have the aforesaid infinitude, if it did not grant to immensity that, by reason of itself, according to which it is measured by eternity, it should coexist and should fill future places; because this whole matter belongs to immensity, not indeed taken precisely, but as it looks to the line of eternity, insofar as it is measured by it as by its proper measure.

94 Hence the force of the reason of D. Thom. consists in this, that just as before and after, above and below, near and far with respect to place, there are differences contained within the line of a place that can be filled, but not present, past, and future; so all the differences of time, namely present, past, and future, are differences pertaining to the line of duration: therefore, just as because immensity, taken precisely, is infinite in its power of filling places, it cannot fail to actually and at the same time fill and touch all the aforesaid places, however distant from one another, from the very fact that they exist, but not from the very fact that they are future or past, because these differences of durations do not pertain to the line of immensity: so, from the fact that eternity is infinite in its duration, it will not be able to fail to contain at once, and simultaneously, and as it were to touch, every duration of time, from the very fact that it is present, past, or future: since each one of these pertains to the line of duration: just as any existing place looks to the line of immensity taken precisely.

95 It is confirmed and explained from another difference which turns on the distinction between immensity and eternity. For it is proper to a measuring duration to contain and to conclude within itself a thing lasting in it, especially if it be a surpassing and superior duration and measure; whereas the power filling a place does not contain within itself the place which it fills, but rather it is itself in that place: therefore, since eternity is an infinite and surpassing duration, it will contain within itself every created and lasting thing: just as, because immensity is infinite in its power of filling places, it does not contain within itself the places which it fills, but rather God, as immense, will be intimately in the things filled by him: therefore, since each one is received, or contained, according to the mode of the receiver or of the container, it follows that both that the things actually contained in eternity, or coexisting with it, are contained, and are in it according to the mode of eternity, namely wholly immutably, and consequently always and from eternity. And also that, if immensity were not eternal, it would extend itself only towards filling all the places in so far as they precisely exist, and consequently towards filling them temporally: just as the things in which God is intimately infused by reason of immensity have their being only in time, so as to be in their own and adequate measure; although, because that same immensity is measured by eternity, as by its proper measure, it must by reason of that same eternity fill them from eternity, and encompass them, and coexist with them. But this distinction will be treated of again in the treatise on the Angels, and it must be understood according to what is said there.

96 From this, also (let us say so in passing)¹, another solution of that same reason remains refuted, namely, that for the reason of infinite duration it is not necessary that it should always coexist with future things, and with every future duration; but it is enough that, eminently and from eternity, it contain their perfection, setting aside imperfections: just as in general every cause contains the perfection of its effect; yet it does not thereby always coexist with it. The print numbers this passage “97” (p. 557, col. 1), repeating the number of the preceding passage and leaving 96 unassigned; the next paragraph is again numbered 97 and the following one 98, so the series runs 94, 95, 96, 97, 98. It is read here as 96; the prose itself is untouched.]

From what has been said, then, this solution remains refuted. For just as from the very fact that knowledge is infinite within the line of knowledge, and contains eminently the perfection of the creatures to be known, it cannot fail to contain from eternity within itself, in an unintelligible way, those same creatures, knowing whatever is found in them according to their own being; and this for no other reason than because such containment pertains to the line of knowledge: so, from the very fact that eternity is infinite in its duration, and contains eminently in its entity every created duration, setting aside imperfections, it must furthermore, by the mode of an extrinsic and superior measure actually measuring, encompass from eternity, and as it were touch, created duration which is at some time future, and whatever will be in it: and consequently it must also coexist from eternity with those same things: because this whole matter pertains to the line of infinite duration, as has been shown.

97 Nor, likewise, does the solution which we set out from the adversaries for the confirmation of the reason of D. Thom. satisfy. For in the first place, the example of the tree immovably corresponding on its part to the flowing waters, which they bring forward in their own favour, can be turned back against this solution. For just as, if that tree were formally extended as much as the whole river, then it would coexist at once and once for all with those same waters flowing among themselves, by reason of its various parts; and if that tree were formally indivisible, and at once and once for all had as much virtual extension as the whole river has formal, then according to all of itself it would coexist at once and once for all with the whole river and with all its parts, and any part of the water would touch the whole tree, although one part of the water would not touch another: so, because eternity contains at once and once for all, virtually and in an infinite way, the whole extension of time, both present, and past, and future, it will be able, and it will be obliged, at once and once for all, and consequently from eternity, actually to contain, and measure, and coexist with any part of time, provided that the thing itself is destined to have existence at some time.

We have said, provided that the thing itself is destined to have some existence. For just as through the knowledge of vision things are not actually seen unless they are things which are at some time to come to be, because this knowledge presupposes a decree about their futurition; so eternity does not actually contain, measure, or as it were touch created duration, unless it is at some time destined to have existence; because in the same way it presupposes an efficacious decree about the futurition of things.

98 Next, against that same solution it is urged that it cannot cohere internally that eternity should admit some succession in its contact or coexistence with created things lasting in some difference of time, and that this succession should arise from the relation of created things, and not from a defect of eternity. And the reason seems evident from what has been said. For then some duration and measure would have a defect of its own in that it does not always and immutably coexist with created things, and touch them in the aforesaid way, whereas it is not repugnant to those things, that, once their own futurition is supposed, they should always and immutably be touched by some superior measure and duration, and should immutably coexist with it; nevertheless such a duration does not always and immutably touch them in this way, or coexist with them, but rather with created things existing successively in some difference of time, whether present, or past, or future, it is not repugnant that they should always and from eternity be immutably touched by a superior and most eminent duration: therefore, from the very fact that that superior duration, namely eternity, does not always and immutably touch them, or does not coexist with them immutably, this will arise from a defect of the immutability of that same eternity.

The major needs no proof. For from the very fact that it is not repugnant to created things, their own futurition having been supposed, that this contact and immutable coexistence with the aforesaid superior duration should obtain, it is necessary that, if this duration does not touch them, and coexist with them always and immutably, that this should arise from a defect, and from the mutability, of that same eternity. But this is against the adversaries, and against what they were saying in num. 22.: maintaining that this succession in the contact of eternity with created things arises from their relation, and not from a defect of eternity.

The minor, however, also follows from those things which we were just saying. Because from the very fact that a thing should have existence at some time in some difference of time, whether present, or past, or future, it is of itself always and immutably touched by an infinite duration, which always and immutably has a virtually infinite extension in its duration, and consequently has at once and once for all that whole duration which is in every duration of time, whether present, or past, and future: otherwise, indeed, all these differences of time would not be contained within the line of duration, nor would eternity itself be virtually infinitely extended within that same line.

99 It is confirmed. For divine intellection is always, and from eternity, and immutably terminated with respect to things existing in some difference of time precisely from the fact that they exist in one of them, in such a way that there is then, neither on the part of the things nor on the part of the intellection, any succession with regard to the aforesaid termination, because it is an intellection measured by eternity (which indeed we say, in proportion, of the divine will), and therefore, if it were not measured by eternity, it would not be repugnant that it should terminate in time, and mutably, with respect to them: and from the very fact that it should thus terminate with respect to them, there would then be a succession on the part of each of the two extremes, namely of the intellection, for example, and of the things understood: therefore, with so much the greater reason will eternity itself be terminated in its measurement with respect to those same things existing in some difference of time in an unchangeable way, and consequently always and from eternity; and from the very fact that it does not terminate with respect to them in this way, there will be a succession both on the part of created things and on the part of eternity.

The antecedent seems to be certain. For this is the reason why our intellect is terminated with respect to things existing in some difference of time, because it is not measured by eternity as by its own and adequate measure: and so, if it were measured by it in this way, it would not admit any succession or changeability; since eternity presupposes, or necessarily includes, unchangeability in every respect. And likewise, from the very fact that our intellect terminates mutably, a succession and a changeability intervene there on the part of each of the two extremes, namely on the part of our intellect and of the things understood; otherwise, indeed, it would be enough for this, namely in order that the intellect should terminate in time, and mutably, with respect to the things understood, that there should be some succession on their part, even if there were no succession on the part of the intellect and of the intellection: and thus the divine intellect could, without any change of its own, be terminated in time with respect to things existing temporally, the opposite of which we shall show below. The consequent, however, is proved from that common axiom: on account of which each particular thing is so, and that one more so.

§ IV. A second reason is proposed in support of the assertion.

100 The second fundamental reason of our assertion, however, is taken from the same Angelic Doctor in the places cited, and in art. 15. of this question, and it can be reduced to this form. Because divine knowledge is unchangeable: therefore no future has, physically and really, the character of a future with respect to it; such that from eternity it is not present to it, and physically coexisting with it: therefore, since it does not have this presence in the now of our time, it will certainly have it, from the fact that the aforesaid knowledge is measured by eternity, and with respect to eternity no future has the character of a future which does not physically coexist from eternity in relation to it. The antecedent is commonly admitted by theologians; because otherwise there would be in divine knowledge some imperfection of potentiality and of succession.

The first consequence, however, in which the second part rests, follows from the antecedent. For if the Antichrist, for example, were from eternity physically and really a future with respect to divine knowledge, but were not from eternity coexisting with it in the now of eternity, but only temporally, and in the course of time, then the aforesaid knowledge would be changed. For from eternity it would have known the Antichrist as future to it; and when that time arrived at which he would be physically present to it, that knowledge would cease, insofar as it was terminated with respect to him as actually future, and another would begin, which would know him as actually present to it in the measure of eternity; and consequently there would be an intrinsic change in divine knowledge.

101 The Angelic Doctor drew this reason from Augustine, lib. 2. ad Simplician. quaest. 2., in these words: What then is future for God, who surpasses all times? For if he holds things themselves in knowledge, they are not future, but present, and so it can no longer be called foreknowledge, but only knowledge. But if, just as in the order of temporal creatures, so also with respect to him those things which are future are not yet, but he anticipates them by knowing: therefore he feels them twice, indeed in one way according to the foreknowledge of futures, but in another way according to the knowledge of present things. Something, therefore, is added temporally to God's knowledge, which is most absurd and most false.

And indeed this reason is so efficacious that, if it be weighed alone, it easily destroys the evasion of the adversaries, when they inquire whether it follows from this that there is a change in divine knowledge, from the fact that God from eternity knew the Antichrist to be future, present, and past with respect to eternity and to his own knowledge; not indeed in one and the same difference of time, but in different ones, such that from eternity he knows that from eternity up to the time of the Antichrist's birth he is future to him, and from his birth up to his death he is present to that same divine knowledge and to eternity, and from his death onwards to infinity he is also past to him; in that proportional way in which, according to our opinion, there follows no change in that same knowledge from the fact that it knows that same Antichrist as now future to us, and afterwards present to others, and at length as past with respect to others: because it knew all of this always and from eternity.

From what has been said, therefore, and from any mere weighing of the reason of D. Thom., this solution falls to the ground. For in this, namely that God has known from eternity that the Antichrist is present, past, and future to him in distinct differences of time, there is necessarily involved that he should know that he is not physically and really present to him from eternity in the measure of eternity, but that he is future to him from eternity up to the time of his birth, and that when such a time arrives, he cannot know that he is then future to him, since that knowledge would be false, but that he then knows that he is physically and really present to him in the same measure of eternity, and not future, or past: therefore, when the aforesaid birth arrives, that knowledge will cease, by which he was known as future: for in truth he is then no longer future, but present; and another will begin, by which he is known as then present to him; and thus there will be a change in divine knowledge.

102 It is confirmed and explained. For according to this solution God does not have only the knowledge the Antichrist is physically and really present to my infinite knowledge and to eternity, otherwise (as we were just saying) divine knowledge would be deceived: but he does well have this, the Antichrist is future to my infinite knowledge and to eternity. And then, when the birth of that same Antichrist arrives, God cannot have a knowledge by which he judges that he is then future to him, since this is altogether false; but he does well have this, the Antichrist is now present to my infinite knowledge and to eternity, whereas throughout the whole preceding time he could not have had the aforesaid knowledge by which he judges that at that time he has that same Antichrist physically and really coexisting with him; therefore there will have to be some change in divine knowledge: for from the time of the Antichrist's birth he has some knowledge which he could not have had from eternity.

103 It cannot be answered by admitting that in truth, besides that knowledge by which he knew from eternity that the Antichrist was future, past, and present to him in different differences of time, God has, when the birth of that same Antichrist arrives, this knowledge: Antichristus is now physically and really present to my infinite knowledge and to eternity, and is neither future nor past; and that, when his death arrives, he has this: the Antichrist is now neither present, nor future, to my knowledge and to eternity, but only past. Yet this does not arise from the changeability and mutation of divine knowledge, but only from the variation and defect of the object.

For against this it must be said, first, that this solution is expressly against D. Thom. in this question, art. 15., in the answer to the second, where he has it thus: But from the fact that he knows that some things can be which are not, or even that some are not which are, it does not follow that his knowledge is changeable, but that he knows the changeability of things. Yet if there were something which God previously did not know, and afterwards came to know, his knowledge would be changeable: but this cannot be, because whatever is, or can be, at some time, God knows in his eternity. And therefore, from the fact that it is posited that something is at whatever time, it must be posited that it is known by God from eternity. And therefore it must not be admitted that God is able to know more than he knows. Because this proposition involves that he did not know it before, and knows it afterwards.

And also, that the denomination knowledge is not an extrinsic, but an intrinsic denomination, and one according to the mode of the knower himself; and consequently, as we shall explain at once, measured by eternity; therefore it cannot be changed from any heading, but all things connoted and objectified which are required for it must, from the supposition that they in some way concur to it, be immutable, or immutably coexist with eternity, as with a superior and excellent measure.

104 It is confirmed and explained, and at the same time a certain tacit objection is dissolved. For although it can happen that some intrinsic and immanent denomination should begin anew without any intrinsic change of that of which it is the denomination, but only through a change of the object, or of something connoted, from the fact that that connoted thing was required for the aforesaid denomination: as happens, according to the probable opinion, in the angelic species, which before the existence of any individual did not represent it as existing, but only the specific nature under which it will be contained; yet well when the existence of that same individual arrives: and thus they are anew intrinsically denominated as representing it, through the sole change of the object: yet this happens for this reason, that those species, under that express concept and denomination under which they are conceived as representing the aforesaid individual as existing, are not measured with regard to that exercise, according as they hold themselves on their part by that same measure so fixed and immovable as they are measured with regard to their intrinsic entity under the express and most formal concept, under which they are conceived as representing that same nature, and its individuals as possible. For according to this latter consideration they are measured by the age, no less than the angelic substance itself, with which they begin, and which they always and inseparably accompany; whereas according to the former consideration they are measured by angelic time. And thus, if according to either consideration they were measured by the same measure, they would have to have, according to either, the same stability and immovability; therefore, since the denomination of the knower, according as, on the part of God, it is terminated, is measured by eternity, not only in the act of signification but in the act of exercise with respect to creatures, from the very fact that it is in God, it is necessary that it always be fixed and stable; and consequently that it persevere from eternity and unto eternity; otherwise it would not be measured by eternity as by its own and adequate measure; and consequently it must from eternity have all things connoted which are required in order that that denomination should exist from eternity.

105 It is confirmed and explained, secondly. For although it can happen that some intrinsic denomination should apply to God from time to time, not indeed with regard to what it strictly imports, but that what it adequately says, from the fact that such a denomination connotes some created object as it is present in its own and adequate duration, and thus the aforesaid denomination, with regard to what it adequately says, is measured by eternity as by its own and adequate measure, nor yet with regard to what it holds on the part of God and in the act of exercise; yet an intrinsic denomination which applies to God by connoting a created thing, not according to the mode in which it is in itself, but according to the mode in which it is in God, cannot fail to be measured by eternity as by its proper measure, at least with regard to what it holds on the part of God in the act of exercise: for it is proper to knowledge, and to the denomination of the knower, that it should be referred to things according to the mode of the knower himself, and according to the being which they have in him, because knowledge is by the fact that the thing known, in a manner explained elsewhere, is in the knower: therefore the denomination of the knower in God must, with regard to its actual exercise, according as it holds itself on the part of God, be measured by eternity as by its proper measure, and all things connoted and required for it must be fixed and immovable in eternity: and consequently God cannot come to know again in time something which he did not know before, nor be physically and really present again to that which was not previously present to him in this way.

106 The minor, together with each of the consequences, seems sufficiently to be constant. The major, however, with regard to the second part, because it is briefer and easier to urge, is shown thus. Because the exercise which is in a knower about a thing according to the mode of being in which it is in that knower, must be measured as by its proper measure, by the proper measure of the one exercising: and in God there is no other measure proper and adequate to him except eternity alone; and thus all things connoted which are extrinsic to the aforesaid exercise and required must be stable and fixed, and measured by that same eternity as by a common and surpassing measure: otherwise, indeed, the aforesaid exercise, according as it holds itself on the part of God, could not (as we were just saying) be measured by eternity as by its proper measure.

With regard, however, to the first part, the same major is urged. Then, because for the aforesaid denomination, taken adequately, something temporal is required, as it is in itself present in its own duration: and thus so considered it cannot be measured by eternity: just as neither can that which holds itself on the part of God, and in the act of exercise, be measured by it as by its own and adequate measure. Because for this exercise, under the concept of such a denomination, the aforesaid connoted thing is required as it is present in its own difference of time: and therefore at most the aforesaid denomination is measured by eternity as by its own and adequate measure with regard to the divine entity, and consequently also with regard to what holds itself on the part of God in the act of signification.

And also: because in the relations of the Lord and Creator, taken fundamentally, as also in the intrinsic denomination by which the Word is denominated as united to the humanity, this is clearly seen. For just as it is united by the mode of a pure act, so it is itself the last term that can be united, and that union on its part, and consequently such a denomination, is intrinsic to it: although, because such a union connotes the union of the humanity as it is in its own duration, to the Word, the exercise of the aforesaid union, according as it holds itself on the part of the Word, is not measured by eternity as by its own and adequate measure: not indeed from a defect of the Word, and of the entity of that union of that same Word, but from a defect of the humanity, and of the union which holds itself on the part of it, and is terminated at the Word itself.

107 D. Thom. has set all of this out elegantly in art. 15. of this question, in the answer to the first, where, having raised for himself the objection: Knowledge is said to be relative to the knowable: but those things which import a relation to a creature are said of God from time, and are varied according to the variety of creatures: therefore the knowledge of God is changeable according to the change of creatures, he answers in this way: It must be said that the Lord, the Creator, and things of this kind import a relation to creatures according as they are in themselves; but the knowledge of God imports a relation to creatures according as they are in God: because according to this each thing is actually understood which is in the understander: created things, however, are in God unchangeably, but in themselves changeably. Or it must be said otherwise, that the Lord, the Creator, and things of this kind import relations which follow upon acts which are understood to be terminated at those very creatures according as they are in themselves. And therefore relations of this kind are said variously of God according to the variety of creatures. But knowledge, and love, and things of this kind import relations which follow upon acts which are understood to be in God. And therefore they are predicated of God unchangeably. But concerning these things, and in order that what the holy Doctor teaches about love may be understood, let those things be seen which he himself teaches below in quaest. 19. art. 7., and which we shall note there in turn.

108 It makes no difference if you press the point that from this doctrine it would rather seem to follow that that knowledge by which God knows that this whole universe is now really and physically present to his eternity and to his knowledge should be terminated at it as it is in itself, and thus that this intuitive knowledge could begin in time with regard to its actual exercise, even on the part of God, not indeed from a defect of its own, but from a defect of the connoted thing, namely of this universe: which has its being only in time.

This, therefore, makes no difference. For just as when it is said that possible things are known from eternity by God according to the being which they have in him, or that divine knowledge is terminated at them according to the mode of the knower himself, the sense is not that the aforesaid knowledge does not have, as it were, a transition to the knowing of those same creatures with regard to their own proper being; but that the knower touches things by drawing them to itself; and the reason of touching them is the being which they have in the knower: so, conversely, when it is said that existing creatures are known by God intuitively, as they are in themselves, the sense is not that the reason of knowing them is the being which they have in themselves; but that the knowledge has, as it were, a transition to the touching of them with regard to the being of the exercise of existence which they have in themselves, and which really and physically coexists with them: although it is necessary that the knower, namely God, should draw them to himself, and that they should have being in him: and the reason of this transition and of this knowledge is the being which they have in God: and consequently they must be drawn and represented in the divine essence in an unchangeable way: for the thing known must be drawn and be in the knower according to the proper mode of that knower himself; and since the being of the existence of created things cannot be drawn and represented in that same essence unchangeably, unless it be unchangeably and fixedly present, and since this cannot have a created being in its own duration, it is necessary that as a remedy for this there be given eternity, and a fixed and immovable presence of created things in that same eternity, so that thus they may be represented in the divine essence firmly and immovably; and so that that knowledge may be perfected according to the mode of the knower, and the being which it has in him. But concerning these things, let those be seen which the Complutensian doctors teach in lib. de Anima, disp. 21. quaest. 5., and especially in num. 94.

109 From which it finally follows that it is of no avail that the adversaries, in the former solution of this reason, num. 101., brought forward that, just as according to our opinion God knows from eternity the Antichrist as future to us, and as present to those who will coexist with him at the same time in the future time, and nevertheless no change follows in divine knowledge from this, so God may know the Antichrist as at some time future to him, and not present, and conversely, and from this it may be gathered that there is some change in that same knowledge.

This, therefore, is of no avail. Because according to our opinion the futurition of the Antichrist with respect to us, and his presence with respect to others, is always and immutably present with respect to God: and therefore it can always and unchangeably be known by God. According, however, to the mode of speaking of the adversaries, and to the solution which they have adopted, from the very fact that the Antichrist is at some time future with respect to God, but not present, he has presentiality and futurition variably with respect to God himself, and therefore he cannot be unchangeably known by God, as has been shown.

§ V. An answer is given to the foundations of the opposite opinion.

110 As regards the first point, it is constant from what has been said how, in order that something be present in eternity, as in a surpassing and common measure and duration, it is enough that it have existence in itself for the future time. For from the very fact that eternity, by reason of its infinite virtual extension in its duration, extends itself to the actual encompassing of that thing, and to touching it as it were, and because it has that whole duration at once and from eternity, it extends itself at once, and from eternity, to containing it, and to coexisting with it.

Hence, in the form of the argument, the major must be distinguished: unless in itself it exists in the same way, either in the present time or at least in the future, is to be granted with respect to a surpassing duration, such as eternity: unless in itself it exists in the same way, precisely in the present time, is to be denied with respect to that same surpassing measure, or with respect to eternity. And then in the same proportional way the minor must be distinguished: and if the sense is that future contingents, before they are in their proper measure, neither have de praesenti nor de futuro a physical existence in themselves in that same measure, it must be denied; but otherwise, if the sense is that before they are in their proper measure, they do not have de praesenti a physical existence in themselves. And therefore the consequence must be denied. Because, as we were just indicating, in order that something should coexist from eternity with eternity in the now of eternity itself, it is enough that it exist in some difference of time. By which, also, the proof of the major and of the minor adduced there is sufficiently constant.

111 Or it may be met in other words by distinguishing the same major in the form of the same argument: unless in itself it exists in the same way, either in its own and adequate duration, or in another surpassing one, namely eternity, is to be granted: unless in itself it exists in the same way in its proper measure, is to be denied. And in the same proportional way let the minor be distinguished: that they do not really and physically exist in themselves in their own and adequate duration, let it be granted; in an alien and surpassing one, that is, in eternity, let it be denied. And then the consequence must be denied. For futures exist, and coexist with eternity, in the same way. Because just as they do not exist in themselves in their proper measure, but in the measure of eternity, so they do not coexist with it in their own measure, but in the measure of eternity: although, as we were just saying, for this, namely that a thing should always be existing in eternity, it is enough that from eternity it have a future being: because it is not existing from eternity in eternity except by reason of that existence which it will have for the future time: and not by reason of another existence which it had before: for, as we have already said, from the very fact that it will have existence for the future time, eternity extends itself from eternity to the actual encompassing of that thing, and to its coexisting with it from eternity.

112 Wherefore the solution given there is the best. And as regards the proof, it is evident from what has been said how the antecedent must be distinguished: unless in itself it be a real being in the same way, either in the present time or in the future, is to be granted: unless in itself it be a real being in the same way, in the present time, is to be denied; or in other words: unless in the same way it be a real being in itself, in its proper or in an alien measure, can be granted; in the proper measure only, of a thing existing de praesenti, it must be denied.

And in the same proportional way the consequent must be distinguished, according to the former distinction: either the consequence is to be denied according to the latter, if the consequent is understood to be about existence in the proper measure for the present time alone. And as regards the proof, it is constant from what has been just said how, in order that something should be a physical and real being in itself, or in order that it should have an actual and real entity, it is required that it exist, and that it come to be; yet in order that it exist in an alien measure, virtually and infinitely extended, it is enough that it have that aforesaid reality and actuality in some difference of time.

By which, as regards the first confirmation, it is sufficiently constant. Because the antecedent is true if the sense of it is that it is prior for a thing to exist in its own proper measure or duration, either in the present time or in the future, than to exist in an alien and surpassing measure; otherwise, if the sense of it is that it is prior for a thing to exist in its proper measure in the present time only, than to exist in the aforesaid surpassing measure, as is evident from what has been said.

113 To the second confirmation it will be answered, that all the aforesaid predicates which suit a thing in eternity also belong to it in its proper measure, except that aforesaid predicate in which the mode of being of a thing in eternity is explained. For since that mode is different from that which belongs to the thing in its proper measure, it must not belong to it in its own proper measure. And thus it is false that a thing exists from eternity in its proper measure, if the words in its proper measure import the proper duration of the thing measuring its coexistence with eternity, although it can be true if it is only meant by this that the thing is contained from eternity together with its proper measure in eternity: from the fact that eternity, by reason of its infinite duration, extends itself at once, and immutably, so as to reach every difference of time which exists at some time, and whatever thing is contained in it. Nevertheless, because this proposition, a thing exists from eternity in its proper measure, taken absolutely according to the common mode of conceiving, yields the former sense and not the latter, for that reason it is to be denied absolutely.

And this can be explained by the example of the most holy Sacrament of the Eucharist, in which all the aforesaid predicates which suit Christ outside the sacrament also belong to him in the sacrament, and conversely, except for those aforesaid predicates in which the modes of being in him, or outside him, are imported: and thus outside the sacrament he is not under the appearances, nor is he present in the sacrament in a quantitative manner.

114 To the second point, a good answer is given there, provided that that solution is understood according to what has been just said. And to the first proof to the contrary, the antecedent must be denied. Because a thing does not have being absolutely and simply, and according to the common mode of conceiving, except when it exists in its own and adequate measure. Just as, likewise, it does not have being created absolutely and simply, and according to the same mode of conceiving, except when it comes to be in that same proper and adequate measure.

As regards the second proof, however, it is constant from what has been said that the antecedent is to be granted, and the first consequence in the sense already indicated, and that the consequent of the second is to be distinguished. Hence, if the sense of it is that, just as things are from eternity in their own existence, so also in their own duration, as being in the measure measuring that coexistence with eternity, the consequence is to be denied. But if the sense is that, just as a thing is from eternity with its own existence in the measure of eternity, so also with its own duration, because each of the two is contained in it, the consequence will have to be granted.

115 As regards the third point, the major is to be granted, according to what we shall say at once, and the minor is to be denied. Because the diversity according to which eternity has regard to a thing when it actually exists, and when it has being as past or as future, does not consist in this, that these should be regarded by it successively; such that futures should be regarded by it precisely as futures, or precisely as things not coexisting with it but to coexist with it: because, as we have often said, eternity always, and in an unchangeable way, has regard to present, past, and future things, and at once and immutably coexists with all of these, and all of these with it. But the diversity consists in this, that eternity, insofar as it virtually contains the time in which, for example, Abraham was present, coexists from eternity with it as it is present according to its existence; and insofar as it contains the future time in which the Antichrist will be present, it must also coexist with him from eternity. Just as also, according as it precedes that time which is prior to the existence of Abraham, in which it was verified, not indeed that Abraham was, but that he was future, the futurition of that same Abraham must be coexisting from eternity, or the determination of causes, by reason of which he was future: and insofar as it contains the time subsequent to the life of that same Abraham, it cannot fail to coexist with his pastness; so that both the futurition and the pastness, in the same way in which they can have being, must immutably coexist with eternity.

116 Hence, when according to our opinion it is said that nothing is future or past with respect to eternity, but that all things are present to it, the sense is not that the pastness and the futurition of a thing, in the way in which they can have being, are not from eternity in it; otherwise it would not itself contain at once and once for all all the differences of time, namely present, past, and future; but that nothing is present to it from eternity precisely according to the state of futurition, such that it is not at the same time present to it according to the state of existence and of presentiality (which we say the same of pastness, proportion being preserved), and therefore, distinguishing in a future thing, for example, those two times which we said in disp. praeced. num. 116. are included in it, namely the present time, in which it is future and does not have being, and the future time, in which it will be verified that it has being, then it is not to be said that it successively coexists with eternity; such that it first coexists with it precisely according to what it has in the present time, in which it is future, namely according to the negation of existence which it has de praesenti, and the determination to exist which belongs to it in its causes; but that it does not then coexist with that same eternity according to the being of existence which it will have for the future time; and likewise, when the future time and the existence of the future thing arrive, it does not coexist with it in the character of a future, but only in the character of a present; but it must be asserted that in the same measure of eternity it coexists with it at once and once for all, as containing those diverse times, both according to what the aforesaid future says for the present time, in which it is future and does not have being in itself, but only a determination in its causes to exist, and according to what it brings for the future time, in which it will be verified that it is present.

We think the same must be said, in proportion, of the past, which includes two other times, namely the present, in which it is not, and the past, in which it was verified of it that it is. And therefore, according to this mode of speaking, that relation of reason by which the pastness of Abraham, according to what it says de praesenti, has regard to eternity, is always, and from eternity, present to it in its own way in the now of eternity. Just as the real relation which, for the time for which he was present, is encompassed by that same eternity, is always, and from eternity, encompassed by the same.

117 As regards the fourth point, it will be answered by denying the sequence. And to the proof, it will be answered together with our Complutensians, in lib. Physic. disputat. 18. from num. 62. up to num. 65., that there is a difference between things which coexist actually in their own and adequate measure, and between those very same things as they coexist precisely in eternity, as in a surpassing and superior measure. For those things which coexist in their own and adequate duration are simply and actually at the same time: and thus an infinite multitude is involved, which is actually at the same time in its own and adequate duration. Those, however, which coexist in the now of eternity, need not be simply and absolutely at the same time, but with a qualification, namely simultaneity in the now of eternity. Because things, however essentially successive they may be, and so much so that speaking simply they cannot be at the same time, can nevertheless coexist at the same time in eternity: from the fact that, as we have often said, eternity is a superior, indivisible, and all-at-once measure, encompassing by reason of its infinite perfection both past things, and present, and future. And therefore some things may remain simply infinite in potency, and at the same time be present in eternity.

Wherefore, from the fact that that whole multitude of thoughts is at the same time in eternity, it does not follow that it is actually infinite, or that it is actually contained in some species of number, or in some species of multitude having a proportion or likeness with the species of numbers; but only that there is given an infinite multitude in potency, which is in potency in some species of multitude: and this involves no inconvenience whatever, as the aforesaid Complutensian Fathers well explain. For from the fact that when it is said that that whole infinite multitude is infinite in potency, in potency in some species of multitude, already explained, the sense is not that this potency is for this, namely that that multitude according to all of itself should be at the same time, and actually, in some one species of number; but only for this, namely that according to some of those thoughts it should be actually in some one, or in some few, species of number: in such a way, however, that those to which it actually belongs should always be finite, although the rest, which are only in potency species, and which will become actually such, from the very fact that they are multitudes measured by a unit, should be of such a condition that, any one of them being given, another, and another, can be given without limit. From which, as is evident, no inconvenience follows, but only this, that an infinite in potency can be given.

118 As regards the fifth point, namely that it results from the various absurdities brought against our opinion, it is to be denied that those follow from it. And to the first absurdity, the antecedent must be denied. Because just as the future does not have the character of a present, or of an existing thing in itself with respect to eternity, except by reason of that existence which it will have for the future time, and not by reason of another which it had before, so it is not necessary that another action be made, but the very same which will be present for the future time: from the fact that eternity, by reason of its infinite virtual extension, which it has all at once, extends itself as much as suffices so as always to reach, and from eternity, up to that action, and to the difference of time in which it is contained.

119 And to the second absurdity, the antecedent can be granted, if the words in this instant, and in every instant of our time, denote precisely the instant measuring the truth of the proposition. Because then only this is meant: that in every instant of our time it is true that the Antichrist always exists to eternity in the very measure of eternity. And for this it is enough that the Antichrist be future from eternity, or that he exist at some time in some difference of time: for by that very fact eternity will extend itself, by reason of its virtual extension, to the actual encompassing of him. The same antecedent, however, must be denied, if the words in the instant, and in every instant of our time, denote the instant measuring the eternal coexistence of the Antichrist with eternity, as has been shown. And to the proof to the contrary, the antecedent is to be denied. Because it does not follow well: the Antichrist is in eternity: therefore the Antichrist is; from the fact that, in order that he be in eternity, as we have often said, it is enough that he be at some time in himself in some difference of time; and consequently it is enough that he have existence at some time, that is, for the future time; but, as we indicated above, by the very fact that it is said absolutely and simply that the Antichrist is, it is indicated according to the common mode of speaking and conceiving that he is in himself de praesenti in his own and adequate measure. Hence it is argued virtually in the same place from the more extensive to the less extensive affirmatively: as if it were said, the Antichrist is, or will be: therefore the Antichrist is; for in order that the Antichrist be in eternity, it is enough that he be actually existing in himself, or that he will be existing for the future time: and in order that it be said absolutely and simply that he is, it is required that he have de praesenti and actually in himself, and in his own measure, namely in the now of our time, his existence.

120 To the third absurdity, the sequence must be denied. And to the proof it must be said that although things which are future with respect to us are presupposed to be already present in eternity, they are nevertheless not made in time from that being which they have in eternity, as from a term a quo, because that is the very thing which they will have for the future time: from the fact that eternity, by reason of its virtual and infinite extension, which it has from eternity, extends itself as much as suffices so as always to reach any future thing through the whole eternity: but it is evident that nothing can be made from itself, as from a term a quo: but they are made from non-being, which they have both in the preceding time and in eternity; because, as we touched upon in num. 116., just as the being which the Antichrist will have in the future time is present from eternity in eternity, so as to encompass that difference of time, the non-being of that which he now has is also present from eternity to that same eternity, in as far as it contains this difference of time.

121 To the fourth absurdity, the sequence must also be denied, if it is understood to be about the mutual coexistence of the Antichrist and Adam in the own and adequate duration of each. And to the proof to the contrary, it must be said that just as those things which are adequately identified with one and the same third are so identified ² that each of them is adequately identified with it, and then they are identified among themselves according to their proper realities, so those things which coexist adequately with one and the same third in the same way coexist among themselves according to their proper durations. But the Antichrist and Adam do not coexist adequately with eternity, but inadequately, and as with a superior and surpassing measure. For each of them coexists with it as containing its own proper time; but not as containing the time in which another had, or will have, being: and therefore it is not necessary that they coexist among themselves according to their proper durations, but rather the opposite follows from this.

And this can be explained by the example of the evening and the morning lectures, which are on the same day; and yet they do not coexist with one another according to their proper durations: because they do not coexist adequately with that day, but inadequately, and by reason of its various formal parts. Thus likewise Adam and the Antichrist coexist in eternity by reason of the various virtual parts contained in it, and therefore they do not coexist among themselves according to their proper durations.

122 To the fifth absurdity, the sequence must also be denied. For in the first place those two propositions, namely the Antichrist is, and the Antichrist is not, if the word is denotes being in eternity, are not both verified of the Antichrist. For the negative one is false: because it absolutely denies that the Antichrist is in eternity; and thus it denies that he is still in it, according as eternity contains the future time in which it will be verified that the Antichrist is in his own proper duration: because that negation is of the nature of a malignant thing, denying whatever it finds after itself. And then the remaining propositions introduced there, namely that the Antichrist is corrupted, and is generated, dies, and exists, are not contradictory. Because they yield only this sense, namely that the generation and the corruption of the Antichrist are in eternity; and that his existence is in eternity; and likewise his non-existence; and this involves no inconvenience whatever, because neither of these is adequate in it; but only insofar as it contains those diverse times in which each of them exists. Just as it involves no inconvenience that, if the copula unites for the whole year, as it unites for the whole eternity, then these two propositions should be true, Peter is existing, Peter is not existing, Peter dies, Peter is generated. Because neither death, nor generation, nor his being, nor his non-being coexist adequately with that same year.

123 To the last absurdity, the sequence must be denied. And to the first proof, the antecedent having been granted, and the first consequence being understood in the compound sense, as indeed it is understood there, the second is to be denied, if the consequent yields the divided sense, although it can be granted if it yields the compound sense: otherwise, by the same reasoning it would be proved that it is not in the power of free choice to do anything, precisely because God foreknew from eternity that that act was to be freely done by that same freedom. But concerning these things, let those be seen which we said in dub. 2. of the preceding disputation in a similar case, as also those things which we shall say concerning the compound and the divided sense in tract. 4. disp. 10. num. 84. and onwards.

As regards the second proof, however, both premises having been granted, the consequent must be denied. And the reason of the disparity is this. For if a future contingent had being in time before it was produced by free choice, with respect to that choice it would be purely passive, as Luther said: because it would receive only the action produced by another, and not by itself. Hence, with respect to that choice it would not be a free cause: but this does not follow from the fact that future contingents, and free things, have being in eternity before they are produced with respect to us in time. For indeed, just as God beholds in his eternity our free act, which will be in such and such a time, so also he beholds in that same eternity the free cause of that act, freely producing it: although with respect to our time that production is future.