Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

35 In the title under consideration the question is not asked absolutely concerning the eternal presence of future things with respect to eternity, but according to the mind of Scripture and of the Fathers, and especially of the Angelic Doctor. For many contend strongly that this presence is not of the mind of Scripture and of the Fathers, and particularly not of St Thomas. Hence, since the principal proof of this presence — and therefore of the reason on account of which future contingents are certainly known by the divine intellect — depends on this, we therefore raise this difficulty on its own, and for the sake of greater clarity to explain the matter.

Just as, with studied care, that clause has also been added to the same title: really and physically present to God. For presence is twofold: one kind is objective, the other is real and physical. For the former kind, nothing further is required than that the thing which is said to be present in this way be known: for it is proper to the power of the knower to draw things to itself. For the latter kind, however, it is further required that the thing should be truly present according to its true essence and existence in some true duration; so that even if, impossibly, there were no possible knowledge by reason of which it should be objectively present to the cognitive power, it would nevertheless truly be present according to its essence and existence in the aforesaid duration.

The title, therefore, is not to be understood as concerning only that former, objective presence. Because, as is clear from what has been said, God certainly knows absolute future contingents, so that they cannot but be objectively present to him; but it concerns the latter presence, in such a way that from this the former may be inferred: namely, from the fact that the real and physical presence which future things have from eternity in eternity is, at least insofar as it is taken on God's side, in some way the reason for knowing the aforesaid future things. And although others raise this difficulty as to its first part in other words — namely, whether absolute future contingents truly and really are future with respect to eternity, or are rather always really present to it — nevertheless both modes of inquiry coincide in the same point, as will be evident to one who considers.

§ I. The opinion denying it.

36 The part which denies, as regards everything contained in the title, is followed by Suarez, lib. 1, de scientia futurorum absolutorum, cap. 7; Vazquez, in the present work, disp. 64; Arrubal, disput. 41, cap. 4; and many others, to be mentioned in the following difficulty. This opinion, as regards its first part, namely, that the aforesaid presence of future things in eternity is not drawn from Scripture: nay rather, according to it, the opposite must be said.

It is proved first. For it is said in Genesis 1: In the beginning (that is, in time) God created heaven and earth. And in Psalm 89: Before the mountains were made, or the earth and the orb was formed: from eternity, and unto eternity thou art God. From these passages the following argument is derived. For, as you see, both that things are said to have begun to exist in time through creation, and that God precedes them in duration are asserted; but these cannot be verified, if things were physically present from eternity in eternity: therefore they are present to him only objectively, and not physically. The minor, as regards the first part, is proved. Because a thing which begins to be through creation is not supposed to have any being before it; but it is made out of nothing: yet if it physically coexisted with eternity from eternity, it would be supposed to exist before its creation in time with some being: therefore it cannot be verified that such a thing began to have being in time through creation.

The minor is likewise evident as regards the second part. Because when two things physically coexist at the same time, neither precedes the other in duration: therefore, precisely because creatures were physically present from eternity to eternity, and consequently to God himself, it could not be verified what Scripture teaches, namely that God precedes them in duration.

37 Secondly, for the other part, namely for the second part of the same opinion, namely that the aforesaid presence of future things is not to be admitted according to the mind of the Fathers, the argument is as follows. For when the Fathers and the Councils state that God alone was from eternity and that all creatures began in time, they speak absolutely; therefore they hold that future things are not present to God from eternity in eternity: otherwise they would not have had to deny absolutely the presence of future things from eternity, but with this qualification, namely, in the measure of our time.

It is confirmed first from the Council of Nicaea in the Creed of faith, and from Athanasius, oration 2, contra Arianos: where, when they condemn as impious that word of Arius about the Son of God, sounding out: He was when he was not, they wish to denote some measure of duration in which the Son of God always was, but not a creature: therefore, since such a measure is none other than eternity, it follows that, according to the mind of the Council and of Athanasius, future creatures were not present to God in the measure of eternity.

It is confirmed secondly from the twofold testimony of Augustine which Arrubal adduces. The first indeed, in lib. 12, de Civit. Dei, cap. 28, in these words: If God were to withdraw his power from things, they would not be as they were before they came to be, and had not been: "before" I mean in eternity, not in time. The second, however, in serm. 11, de verbis Apostoli, where he says thus: God has the elect within himself, not in their nature, but in his foreknowledge. Now if the elect, before they existed in their own proper duration, had been really and physically present in eternity, then he would have them within himself not only in his foreknowledge, but also in their nature.

It is confirmed thirdly from Isidore, lib. de sum. bono, cap. 8, in these words: If the times were always present to God, they would not be times, but eternity, because they would not change, but would stand.

Thirdly.

38 Thirdly, for the third part of the same opinion, namely that according to the Angelic Doctor the aforesaid real and physical presence of future things in eternity, which is from eternity, is not to be admitted, but only objective presence, the argument is as follows. For the Holy Doctor, after he had said in this article that all things which are in time are present to God from eternity, immediately, in order to explain what kind of presence this was, added that they are present to HIM from eternity. Not only by that reason whereby he has the reasons of things present with himself, as some say; but because his intuition is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality. Where, as you see, the Angelic Doctor teaches that future things are present to God from eternity to this extent, namely that his intuition is borne from eternity over them, or (which comes to the same) because he knows them from eternity. But it is clear from this alone that only objective presence is conceded, on the ground of knowledge; and not physical and real presence, which would be from eternity in eternity.

It is confirmed.

It is confirmed first. For the same Angelic Doctor says below, quaest. 16, art. 7, that truth is not found from eternity except only in the divine intellect. Because the divine intellect alone is eternal, and in it alone does truth have eternity. Now if future things were really present to God from eternity in eternity, then, just as from eternity they would be present to God in eternity outside the divine intellect, so also they would have outside it an eternal truth. And in quaest. 20, art. 2, ad 2, he says: Creatures were not in God from eternity, yet he loved them from eternity, because he knew them from eternity. In which words it is openly taught that they were present to God from eternity only on the ground of objective presence, and not of physical presence.

And likewise in 1, 2, quaest. 91, art. 1, ad 1, speaking of the eternal law, and explaining how it was from eternity, when it was not yet imposed upon anyone, he says thus: It must be said that those things which are not in themselves exist with God, insofar as they are known and preordained by him, according to that of Romans 4: he who calls the things that are not as though they were. Where it clearly appears to hold that things are present to God only insofar as they are known by him, and consequently in objective being, and not physically and really.

39 It is confirmed secondly. For if, for some reason, absolute future contingents were present to God from eternity in the measure of eternity, according to the mind of St Thomas — and all the more because the Holy Doctor himself often says that eternity is an indivisible measure, and all at once, and infinite, as we shall say from the passages in this same following difficulty — then also because this very fact, that eternity is indivisible, and all at once, and infinite, makes it appear that what is future with respect to us would never be future with respect to eternity, but present; otherwise it would be future with respect to the whole eternity, and would be outside that whole, and consequently would never be present: since indeed no presence can be given to a created thing which lies outside the whole eternity encompassing infinite duration, both (so to speak) on the part before and on the part after: just as the same presence cannot exist outside the whole imaginary time, which is in like manner infinite.

The minor is proved. First, because the age of an angel is in duration indivisible, and all at once, and infinite on the part after; and yet absolute future contingents have the character of future things with respect to it, and are not present to him until they are actually in their own measure: otherwise the angel could by his own power know them, as he knows those things which are present in their own measure, the opposite of which the theologians commonly teach in the matter of angels; then also: because although eternity is all at once, and has infinite being in the ratio of duration, future things are nevertheless not contained in it adequately, but inadequately, and as in a surpassing measure: therefore they will not be coexistent with it from eternity and unto eternity: otherwise they would coexist with it adequately, and would not be in it as in a surpassing measure.

The last part of the same opinion, namely that the aforesaid presence in eternity cannot lead to this, that absolute future contingents are certainly known by God, evidently follows from the other parts already proved: since the assertion that future things are certainly known by God on the ground of the presence which they have from eternity in the measure of eternity supposes that this presence is possible.

§ II. It is established that the part affirming it is that of Scripture and of the Fathers.

40 It must nevertheless be said first, according to the mind of Scripture, that absolute future contingents are really and physically present to God from eternity in the measure of eternity, and are certainly known by God on the ground of this presence. Thus all the Doctors who are to be mentioned in the following difficulty in favour of our opinion.

Now, before we prove the assertion, this much must be noted about it, in proportion to what we noted in like manner about the assertion of the preceding difficulty, namely, that we do not wish to determine in its second part whether God certainly knows absolute future contingents in his eternity, or on the ground of eternity itself, as though it were the primary object, and as it were specifying; because, as we said there, this is clear from the passages of disp. 3, num. 43, of this tractate; but only this, that eternity, insofar as it is taken on God's side, leads on God's side to the certain knowledge of absolute future contingents: and hence that it is in some way the reason why God certainly knows them. Just as also (a point which follows from what precedes) this same presence, insofar as it is taken on the part of the aforesaid future things, is the condition for their terminating in some way the aforesaid knowledge on their own side.

And although this assertion still stands in need of a fuller explanation: since, however, it will be explained in the following difficulty, where we shall treat not so much of the mind of Scripture and of the Fathers as of the thing itself in itself, we therefore refer this point to the following difficulty.

41 The second part of this assertion, therefore, clearly follows from the first, as is manifest in itself: and it will be still clearer from what is about to be said. The first part, however, is proved. First, from that of Job 14: The number of his months is with you; that is, with respect to you my months are never future; but always present and standing firm: because your being is measured by eternity. Hence St Gregory, 12, Moral., cap. 1, expounding these words, says: Because with almighty God even things that glide stand, he declares that the number of our months is to be with him. It is clear, however, that things which glide cannot stand, except insofar as those which happen successively are stably present to God from eternity in the measure of his eternity.

The same is also gathered from those words of Ecclesiasticus 39: He beholds all the works of every creature before him from eternity, and unto eternity: and there is nothing wonderful in his sight. Where two things are asserted. The first is, that all our works are present to him from eternity: which is denoted by that clause, before him from eternity. The second is, that he perceives them intuitively from eternity: for this is signified by that clause beholds, and by what is immediately subjoined, namely: There is nothing wonderful in his sight. Where it must also be weighed, first, that the presence of our works in eternity is posited in the first place. Then, that the intuitive knowledge of God with respect to them, so that it might be shown how this presence, at least insofar as it is taken on God's side, is in some way the reason for certainly knowing our works, which are future with respect to us; and that, insofar as it is taken on the part of those same works, it is the condition for their terminating in some way the aforesaid knowledge infallibly on their own side.

Then also, from the very fact that it is said that God knows our works intuitively from eternity, it is hinted in the same place that they are really and physically present to him from eternity: since it is highly probable, in the way of the Holy Doctor, that the aforesaid presence is required altogether for intuitive knowledge, as will appear more fully from what we shall say in this same disputation from num. 59 up to 62.

42 The same is also proved from that of Hebrews 1, where it is said of the Son of God: Through whom he also made the ages. Yet among the ages some are past and some are future: but all things are said to have been made by God: because in eternity all things are present: otherwise it could not be verified that all those things have already been made. Likewise also in Isaiah 45, that which there is signified as future is said to have been created by God: yet future things are said to have been made by God, because in his eternity all things are present, as though made, nor is anything future or past with respect to him; although something is said to be past with respect to one part of our time, and future with respect to another.

Finally, for this opinion the passage of the Apostle to the Romans 4 is to be noted, where it is said of Abraham: I have set thee, father of many nations, before God, who calls the things that are not as though they were. Where, by this which is said, before God, he explains what he had said of the past, I have set thee. For although that were future, yet because it was present to God in eternity, therefore he said, I have set thee. And he subjoins the reason when he says: Who calls the things that are not as though they were, as though he were to say: therefore he speaks of the future by way of the present, because future things are present to God in eternity: and in the same way he beholds those things which are to be done in our time, as those which have been done or are being done. In this way Ambrose explains that passage of the Apostle, in book 8, and many other holy Doctors.

43 It must be said second, according to the mind of the holy Fathers, that absolute future contingents are really and physically present to God from eternity in the measure of his eternity; and that on the ground of this presence they are certainly known by him. Thus the authors just mentioned. The first part, from which the second is sufficiently gathered, is proved first. Because they teach it, Augustine, lib. 83, quaest. quaest. 17, and 4, de Trinit., cap. 17, and lib. 5, cap. 16: With God neither have the past passed away, nor are the future yet made. Richard of St Victor, lib. 2, de Trinit., cap. 23, defends this very point in these words: As nothing is future to God of those things which are not yet, so nothing is past of all those things which are no longer: so nothing is transitory to him of all those things which are already in the present. Peter Damian, tom. 3, Bibliotheca, epist. 4, de Dei omnipotentia, cap. 8: All things (he says) which with us change by the vicissitudes of times, stand with him today (that is, with eternity) and persevere immovably. In that today, namely: that day is still motionless in which this world took its origin: and in that day he is already, and yet he is, in which he is to be judged. And below: Whence it comes about that in his eternity all things remain fixed which, outside it, issue forth unceasingly from the volumes of the ages. For God has one day, which is his eternity: which day he is seen neither to be closed at its end, nor to be opened at its beginning.

And finally this very point was taught by Gregory, lib. 20, Moral., cap. 28; Boethius, lib. 5, de consolatione, prose ult.; Anselm, lib. de casu diaboli, cap. 21, and lib. de concordia praescientiae et praedest., cap. 1; Ambrose, lib. 1, de fide ad Gratianum, cap. 7; Isidore, lib. 1, de summo bono, cap. 6; Prosper, de vocatione gentium, cap. 34; Basil, cap. 3 of Isaiah; Hilary, 10, de Trinitate; and many others. But these things will be explained more fully in the following proof, where

also the evasions of the adversaries are precluded.

44 Secondly, the same assertion is principally proved as regards both its parts. Because the holy Fathers agree in this one point, namely that strictly and properly speaking there is not in God the presence of absolute future contingents; but only metaphorically, in that proportional manner in which penitence is usually attributed to him. And they give the reason, from the fact that foreknowledge is the knowledge of future things, and that nothing which comes to be in the course of time is future to God: therefore they clearly hold that future things are physically and really present to God from eternity in the measure of his eternity; and hence that on the ground of this same presence they are infallibly and certainly known by him. Each of these consequences is clear: otherwise, indeed, there would be no obstacle to their being future with respect to God, and their being really and properly present in God with respect to the same, as will be evident to one who considers.

The antecedent, however, is proved. Because Augustine teaches it, lib. 2, ad Simplicianum, quaest. 2: What is presence, if not the knowledge of future things? And what is future to God, who surpasses all times? Boethius, lib. 5, de consolatione, prose ult., saying: He considers all things which are already being begotten in his simple cognition. For if you would weigh the presence of all things which he distinguishes, you would esteem it not to be the presence of future things, as it were, but the knowledge of an instant that never fails. Gregory, lib. 2, moral., cap. 25, in these words: How is God foreknowing, when those things which are future are foreknown; and we know that nothing is future to God, before whose eyes there are no past things, present things do not pass away, and future things do not come. Anselm, in the opuscule de concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis, in the chapter cited. Hugh of St Victor, in the summa sententiarum, tract. 1, cap. 12. Bernard, serm. 80, in Cant., and Hilary, 12, de Trinitate, and finally many others.

45 This reason is so efficacious that by it alone all the evasions of the adversaries vanish. For in the first place, what some of them say, namely that the holy Fathers speak only of objective presence, and not of real and physical presence in eternity, easily collapses from what was said in the same reason. For objective presence alone cannot remove presence properly so called, nor does it remove the fact that the thing which is known is truly future with respect to the knower: yet the Fathers remove from God foreknowledge properly so called with respect to absolute future things, and deny that anything is future with respect to him: therefore they speak not only of objective presence, but of physical and real presence with respect to eternity, through which they coexist with him from eternity. The consequence seems sufficiently established.

The major, as regards its first part, is also established. First from the very fact itself: because objective presence is nothing other than the thing being actually presented to the knower. Therefore, since this very thing is inseparably involved in the fact that some thing is foreknown, that cannot remove the reason of foreknowledge; then also: because the prophets (according to the probable opinion of many, about whose greater or lesser probability there is no question at present) have foreknowledge of absolute future things properly and simply so called, and nevertheless future things are objectively present to them: since indeed they know them before they are.

The second part, however, is also established. First in the same prophets, with respect to whom the aforesaid absolute future things, according to this mode of speaking, have the ratio of future things, although, as we were saying, they are known by them; then also: because from the very fact that something is known on this day, it is not removed that it is truly future, and hence from the fact that something precisely has objective presence in the intellect of someone, it is not removed that it can have the ratio of the future with respect to the same.

Another evasion of Arrubal.

46 And likewise that which Arrubal answers in the present work, disput. 41, cap. 9, namely that the Fathers speak only of the foreknowledge which is according to the order of the succession of the past and the future, and so of the foreknowledge which is so prior to its object that it vanishes when that object arrives; but not of foreknowledge properly so called and abiding according to duration, that is, of the knowledge which at the same time has to precede the existence of its object, and not to pass away when that arrives, but to coexist with it. This solution, then, easily collapses from what we have said in this reason. For, as is clear from the testimonies of the Fathers, they deny to God foreknowledge properly so called with respect to absolute future things for this reason alone: that none of these future things can have the ratio of the future with respect to him, because he surpasses all times, which are measured by eternity. But this reason always remains in its own being, even if a permanent presence, properly so called, be admitted, which precedes the order of duration of the existence of the aforesaid future things in the measure of eternity, and coexists with them, as is manifest in itself: therefore the aforesaid foreknowledge is denied to God by the Fathers.

47 It is added, firstly, that the aforesaid foreknowledge, which Arrubal admits, is called by him, and deservedly, foreknowledge properly so called. Yet the Fathers proclaim this unanimously, namely that there is not in God such a presence, properly taken, with respect to the aforesaid future things.

It is added, secondly, that from the very fact that the former foreknowledge is denied to God, which is according to the order of the succession of the past and the future, and which passes away — from the very fact, namely, that a future thing is already present — he must also have denied to him this second foreknowledge properly so called, which abides even when the future thing passes from future to present according to real and physical existence. And the reason seems clear. Because, as we shall say in this same disputation, num. 100 and following, from the very fact that something has the ratio of the future with respect to some knowledge, it is necessary that, when the presentiality of the future arrives, and consequently that thing ceases in the ratio of the future with respect to such knowledge, the knowledge by which it was known as future with respect to that one should also cease: otherwise that knowledge would not be true: and consequently neither would it be the same as that which existed before, which had truth in every respect.

48 Whence finally the exposition of Gabriel Vazquez, cited above, is left refuted, which asserts that foreknowledge properly taken involves an imperfection: and that in this sense the Fathers denied it to God.

Against this, however, it may be said that although foreknowledge properly taken with respect to absolute future things does indeed imply an imperfection; yet this imperfection, on account of which it is denied to God by the Fathers, is none other, as is clear from the testimonies of the same just cited, than that the aforesaid future things cannot have the ratio of future things with respect to God, whose understanding is measured by eternity (otherwise eternity would not be an indivisible duration, all at once, and infinite, as will appear from what is to be said in num. 89 and following of this disputation), whereas foreknowledge requires that it be not with respect to a present thing, but a future one; therefore, although the Fathers, on account of the imperfection of foreknowledge with respect to the aforesaid future things, deny it to God with regard to them, it does not follow from this, but rather it is laid down, that they hold that absolute future contingents are really present from eternity with respect to God in the measure of his eternity.

49 From all of which it is also settled that which the adversaries object, namely that foreknowledge is many times attributed to God in Scripture, as in Wisdom 19: God foreknew their future things. And to the Romans 8: Those whom he foreknew, he also predestined. And in the same chapter 11: God did not reject his people whom he foreknew. And 1 Peter 1, and likewise Acts 2. Which Augustine also asserts in 5, de civit., cap. 8 and 9, and the Master of the Sentences in 1, dist. 36 and 38. For the answer is given from what has been said: that there is in God a foreknowledge with respect to future things which is not properly and formally such, but only metaphorically, in that same proportional manner in which penitence is usually attributed to him.

§ III. It is established that the same affirmative part is that of the Angelic Doctor.

50 It must be said thirdly that absolute future contingents, according to the mind of St Thomas, have the aforesaid presence with respect to eternity: and that on the ground of this they are certainly and infallibly known by God. This assertion is held by all the Doctors mentioned above in favour of it, whom we shall adduce individually in num. 79 of this disputation.

First, and not ineffectively, the testimony in favour of this assertion is that very testimony which the adversaries adduce for themselves, namely that which the Holy Doctor teaches in the body of the present article. For from it he concludes that his intuition is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality, and consequently that they are objectively present to him, because his knowledge is measured by eternity, as his being is, and eternity, existing all at once, encompasses all time: and therefore all things ought to be present to the divine intuition in the same manner in which they are present to eternity; so that, just as with respect to eternity itself absolute future contingents do not have being really and physically future, but present, so they have this same relation with respect to the divine intuition, as measured by eternity.

51 Whence, to explain this, the Angelic teacher brought forward the following words: Although contingents come to be actually successively, yet God does not know contingents successively, as they are in their being, as we do, but simultaneously. And he gives the reason: Because his knowledge is measured by eternity, as also his being is: eternity, existing all at once, encompasses all time, as has been said above. And from this he immediately infers: Whence all things which are in time are present to God from eternity, not only by that reason whereby he has the reasons of things present with himself, as some say, but because his intuition is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality. And from these he again gathers: Whence it is manifest that contingents are infallibly known by God, insofar as they are subject to the divine regard according to their presentiality, and yet they are absolute future contingents by comparison with their causes.

The force of this testimony is explained and weighed, and how it cannot be understood as concerning objective presence alone, as the adversaries intend. First, because the Holy Doctor had said in the immediately preceding words that an absolute future contingent, as such, that is, as it precisely has contingent futurition in its cause, is not certainly knowable, and thence he immediately infers that it is certainly known by God insofar as his intuition is borne upon it as present, from the fact that the aforesaid intuition is measured by eternity, and eternity, existing all at once, encompasses all time: therefore the Holy Doctor cannot be conveniently explained as speaking of objective presence alone. The consequence is evident. Because otherwise he would involve simultaneous contradictions, when he said at the same time that an absolute future contingent cannot be certainly known in the sense of such, and at the same time that it is of itself certainly knowable: since indeed objective presentiality, as distinct from true and real physical presentiality, is nothing other than the object itself, insofar as it has certain knowability. Therefore, when the Angelic Doctor denied that an absolute future contingent, as such, or as it remains under the ratio of the future, is certainly knowable, he also denied it objective presentiality; and consequently, for its certain knowability, one must have recourse to its own existence, really present in the measure of eternity, according to which it is drawn out of the ratio of the future with respect to him.

52 Then also: because for this reason the Holy Doctor infers that God infallibly knows the aforesaid future things, and that his intuition is borne upon them as present, because such an intuition is measured by eternity, and eternity, existing all at once, encompasses all time; and consequently that all times, whether present, past, or future, are actually present to him, as we shall say more fully in the following difficulty: therefore he is not speaking of objective presence alone: since the assertion that future things are present only objectively to the divine intellect does not suit him on the ground of eternity, but on the ground of himself, considered precisely within his own line: from the fact that within the aforesaid line he has infinite perfection. Whence either eternity cannot be the reason of any presence of the divine intuition to future things from eternity, or it can only be the reason of the thing of real and physical presence. For since, by the force of its line, it is not cognitive, it follows that, just as it cannot be the root of knowing, so neither is it the root of objective presence, through which it should be present from eternity to future things as to objects known; and consequently it can only be the reason from eternity of physical and real presence with respect to them.

Then, next: because otherwise absolute future contingents would have the ratio of future things not only with respect to us, but also with respect to God, since the fact that something is present only objectively with respect to one does not remove the fact that it is truly and really future with respect to that one: and yet St Thomas, from the fact that the intuition of God is borne upon future things as upon a representation, from the fact that such an intuition is measured by eternity, infers that such future things are not future with respect to God, but only with respect to us.

53 Then, finally: because if St Thomas were treating only of objective presence, and not at the same time of physical and real presence, it would follow that, when he gave the reason on account of which absolute future contingents are known by God from eternity, from the fact that his intuition is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality, and because all things are present to eternity, he would then have committed a manifest petitio principii. For since it is the same for an absolute future contingent to be present from eternity objectively with respect to God as to be known by him from eternity, it would be the same to say that contingents are known by God from eternity as future, because they are objectively present to him, or as they are in their objective presentiality, as to say that they are known by God from eternity because they are known by him.

54 It is added, that even precisely in those words which the adversaries adduce for themselves, namely: All things which are in time are present to God from eternity, not only by that reason whereby he has the reasons of things present with himself, but because his intuition is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality, this real and physical presence is denoted, which future things have from eternity with respect to eternity. First, because the Holy Doctor deliberately did not say: But because his knowledge, etc., but he said: But because his intuition is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality: so as to signify that this knowledge is intuitive, and consequently that it is of a thing really and physically present in the same measure of eternity in which the divine intuition exists: since indeed, in the way of the Holy Doctor, this presence is required for the intuitive knowledge of God, as will appear more fully from what is to be said in the last testimony in favour of this assertion.

Then also: because, as is clear from what we said in this same tractate, disp. 5, dub. 2 and 3, the knowledge of vision, or intuitive knowledge, is the cause of things; and so it is equivalently to say that the intuition of God is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality, as to assert that he causes them and grants them present being, not indeed with respect to our time, but with respect to eternity, as a surpassing measure, with respect to which whatever is future with respect to us ought to be actually present: since, as we hinted above, the whole of this is required for the knowledge of vision.

55 The aforesaid testimony is further confirmed and weighed from other words of the same Holy Doctor, in which he explains what he taught in this article, and gives the reason why absolute future contingents are known to God but not to an angel, from the fact that they are present to the divine duration and not to the angelic. And so in the same place he denotes these two presences of those same future things, namely the objective, and also the physical and real with respect to God, and he denies both of them to those same future things with respect to the angel. His words, golden, are found below in quaest. 57, art. 3: God (he says) sees all things in his eternity: which, since it is simple, is present to all time, and encompasses it. And therefore the one intuition of God is borne upon all things which are done throughout all time, as if in the present; and he sees all things as they are in themselves, as has been said above, when the knowledge of God was treated. The angelic intellect, however, and any created intellect, falls short of the divine eternity. Whence the future thing, as it is in its being, cannot be known by any created intellect.

56 The second, and principal, testimony in favour of the assertion is found with the Holy Doctor in 1, contra Gent., cap. 66, ratione 6, where, from the presence of things in eternity, he infers their presence with respect to divine knowledge, measured by eternity: and at the same time he adds that the things themselves, being simultaneously present with respect to eternity and to divine knowledge, are not present in respect to each other. Now if he were speaking only of objective presence, not only would all future things be simultaneously present with respect to divine knowledge, but also with respect to themselves mutually: since indeed all things have being simultaneously present objectively to the divine intellect. Whence, just as future things would be known from eternity to be future with respect to the divine nature and to divine knowledge, and yet would have objective simultaneity from eternity with that knowledge, because they are known simultaneously with it, so too, although some things were known to be future or past with respect to others, they would yet, for the same reason, have objective simultaneity in respect to each other.

It is confirmed and explained from the same Holy Doctor in 1, dist. 38, quaest. unica, art. 5, in the body, in these words: Every knowledge is according to the mode of the knower. Since, therefore, God is eternal, it is necessary that every knowledge of his have the mode of eternity, which is to be all at once without succession. Hence, since although time is successive, yet his eternity is present to all times, one and the same, and indivisible, as now standing, so also his knowledge beholds all temporal things (although successive to it) as present to itself, nor is anything of them future with respect to itself; but one with respect to another. And finally he concludes: Since, therefore, God with one eternal intuition, not successive, sees all temporal things, he sees absolutely all contingent things existing in diverse times with presentiality from eternity, and not merely as having being in his knowledge.

57 In this testimony three things are to be weighed. The first is what we have often noted in other places, namely that in it the Holy Doctor distinguishes a twofold presence of future things: one indeed with respect to eternity; the other, however, with respect to knowledge measured by eternity: and from the former he infers the latter: and consequently it is false what the adversaries intend, that the Holy Doctor affirms that future things are present to eternity for no other reason than that they are known by him from eternity, or are objectively present to him.

The second is that, from the fact that every knowledge is according to the mode of the knower, and God is eternal, the Holy Doctor infers that divine knowledge must have the mode of eternity; and consequently that things must be present to the aforesaid knowledge in the same way in which they are present to eternity, by a presentiality corresponding to that same eternity. Now if future things were not present to eternity from eternity in the very now of eternity, but only successively while they exist, it could not be inferred thence that God beholds all future things from eternity; rather the opposite would have to be inferred: since, as the Holy Doctor teaches, divine knowledge, in as far as it is borne upon future things and is present to them, must have that mode of presence which eternity has with respect to them.

The third is that the Angelic Doctor concludes that God with one eternal intuition, not successive, beholds with presentiality all contingent things existing in diverse times, and not merely as having being in his knowledge: where, over and above the aforesaid presence in his knowledge, which is none other than objective presence, he grants those same future things another presence with respect to God. This, however, as is clear, cannot be any other than real and physical presence in eternity.

58 Finally, the same assertion is proved by the best testimony of the same Holy Doctor, art. 9 of this question, where, speaking of those things which God knows by the knowledge of vision, he says: Among those things which are not actually in act, a certain diversity is to be noted. For some things, although they are not now in act, yet either were or will be: and all such things God is said to know by the knowledge of vision. Because the understanding of God, which is his being, is measured by eternity, which, existing without succession, comprehends all time, the present intuition of God is borne over all time, and over all things which are in any time whatever, as over things present to itself with presentiality. But some things there are which are in the power of God, or of a creature, which yet neither are, nor will be, nor have been. And with respect to these he is not said to have the knowledge of vision, but of simple intelligence. Which is said for this reason, because those things which are seen with us have being distinct from the one who sees.

59 In this testimony two things are to be weighed. The first is what we noted in other testimonies, namely that St Thomas did not say that all things are present to God and to his eternity because he beholds them; but, on the contrary, that he beholds time, and the things which are in time, because his eternity comprehends all time: so that he might thus explain how this presence is not founded in knowledge, and consequently is not objective alone, but lies in the comprehensiveness of eternity itself, which, speaking most formally, is not a comprehensiveness of knowledge: since indeed eternity does not contain time by knowing, but by measuring: and if, impossibly, God were not knowing, his eternity would nonetheless contain time, as a surpassing measure, so that all its differences would be actually present to him and from eternity, on account of its utter simplicity and immutability, as will appear more fully from what is to be said in the following difficulty.

The second is that the Holy Doctor gives the reason why the knowledge of possibles, which will never be, is of simple intelligence and not of vision, from the fact that Those things which are seen with us have being distinct from the one who sees: so that by this too he denoted that things which are seen by the knowledge of vision must not only have being, or objective presence, but also real presence. For objective presence alone is only the presence of knowledge: whereas this is not the presence by which things known have being distinct from the knower, or from the one who sees: yet it is highly probable that the presence required for vision, according to St Thomas, must be of such a kind that through it the things seen have being distinct from the one who sees: and consequently it must also be real and physical presence, and not objective alone.

60 All of which things can finally be confirmed from several other testimonies of St Thomas which Capreolus reports in 1, dist. 38, and dist. 36, art. 2, and especially from 1, contra Gent., cap. 66, and quaest. 2, de Verit., art. 12, where he says thus: Something is then known as future, when between the knowledge of the knower and the event of the thing there is found an order of past to future. But this order cannot be found between divine knowledge and any contingent thing whatever; rather the order of divine knowledge to any thing whatever is always that of a present thing to a present thing. These words can be expounded as follows. For the order of past to future which, according to the mind of the Holy Doctor, must be between the knowledge and the future event, so that the thing may be known as future, is not in objective or known being; for when it is known that, for example, there will be a lecture tomorrow, then such a lecture cannot fail to be objectively present to that knowledge; but he speaks of the order of past to future according to physical and real being: and so, when he denies that an order of past to future can be found between divine knowledge and any future effect whatever, it must be understood of that same order of past to future according to the aforesaid real being: and consequently, when he says that divine knowledge always has an order to any thing whatever (understand a future thing, of which he is speaking here) as that of a present thing to a present thing, it must be understood of the order of real and physical presence between the knowledge of God and the event which is future to us.

Whence, so that the Holy Doctor might explain this point more fully, he added: The difficulty, however, arises from this, that we cannot express divine knowledge except by expressing it through the mode of our knowledge, indicating the differences. For if it were expressed as the knowledge of God is, it would have to be said rather that God knows this to be, than that he knows it to be future, because future things never are so to him, but always present.

Assuredly, if future things really and physically had the ratio of future things in comparison with God, this difficulty would have to arise from the fact that we could not express the knowledge of God except through the mode of knowledge, indicating the differences of time; although, if it were expressed as it is in itself, it ought to be expressed otherwise. Because divine knowledge rather could and ought to be expressed truly as it is in itself, indicating the aforesaid differences; so that, just as our knowledge terminates in those things which truly are past, present, and future with respect to it, and is truly expressed by indicating these differences of time, and so ought to be expressed; in like manner this very thing would have to be said with proportion about divine knowledge.

61 And likewise, if something were truly future with respect to the aforesaid knowledge of God, there would be no reason why, if it were expressed as the knowledge of God is, it should rather be said that God knows this to be than that he knows it to be future: since indeed just as future things, when they afterwards are, have being really present to God, so while they are not present in their own difference of time, they would have being really future with respect to him, and would be present to him only objectively. And just as the knowledge of God, as it is in itself, knows them to be present, so will it know them to be future: and consequently, being expressed by such a knowledge as it is, it would also be expressed both as that of one who knows a present thing and as that of one who touches a future thing. And finally, if future things were present to God only objectively, there would be no reason (as we said above) why it should be said absolutely that nothing is future to God: since indeed objective presence alone does not remove this, as is observed in us.

§ IV. The arguments opposed to the opinion are solved.

62 To the first, the minor is to be denied, as regards both parts. And for the proof of the first, the major having been conceded, the minor is to be denied. For a thing does not have being in eternity except in view of that difference of time in which it is produced: yet divine eternity encompasses that from eternity in act, as we shall explain more fully in the following difficulty: and consequently such a thing is not supposed to have being before it is produced in time: because that very difference of time in which it is produced is itself present in eternity from eternity, even according to its own proper duration.

For the proof, however, of the second part of that minor, one will answer by distinguishing the antecedent, and conceding it as regards the coexistence of two things in some duration which is proper and adequate with respect to each of them: but denying the assertion itself as regards the coexistence of two things in some duration which is proper and adequate with respect to one of them, but inadequate and surpassing with respect to the other, and so the consequent is to be denied. Because in order to say simply that God precedes creatures in duration, it is enough that he himself from eternity be in his own proper and adequate measure: although, because his eternity encompasses all time without succession, and whatever is contained in it, it has future things physically present. But as to these, let those who will speak in the following difficulty see what remains to be said.

63 To the second, in the second part of the same opinion, one will answer that the holy Fathers speak of creatures by reference to their own proper duration, and not by reference to a surpassing and common measure, namely eternity. And therefore they say absolutely and simply that they began in time; because according to the common and usual mode of speaking, whenever it is said absolutely and simply that something is, it is understood that it is in its own proper and adequate duration. And therefore this proposition: The Antichrist is from eternity, absolutely uttered, denotes according to the common and frequent usage and manner of conceiving, that in his own measure he is from eternity, that is, that his own proper and adequate duration is infinite on the part before and in itself, and that of itself he has endured from eternity; but not that he is precisely from eternity on account of eternity virtually extending itself, by reason of its infinity, to the Antichrist and to his duration which is actually encompassed: and by reason of this, both the Antichrist himself and his duration are present to him in the same now of eternity.

Whence accordingly we do not assert absolutely that future things are present to God from eternity, but we add that they are present to him from eternity in the measure of eternity. By which also the first confirmation is evident. For the Council and Athanasius establish a distinction between the Son of God and creatures, in that the former is eternal in his own proper and adequate duration: and in this sense they condemn that impious saying of Arius reported above; whereas creatures in their own proper and adequate duration began to be in time.

64 To the second confirmation, from that twofold testimony adduced by Arrubal, one will answer that that twelfth book, in which the first testimony is said to be contained, has only 27 chapters. Then we add that the aforesaid testimony has not yet been found by us in the chapters having a number, cited in a similar number of chapters. We add, finally, that from the very fact it is gathered that things before they were made in eternity had not yet been in eternity itself: which, however, is not against us. Because although both the effecting of the thing and its being are present to God from eternity in eternity; yet the production of the thing is understood to be present before its being; although each of the two coexists at the same time with that same eternity, and in the now of eternity.

To the second testimony, however, one will answer that Augustine did not say Not in their nature, as Arrubal reports, but asserted Not in his own nature: and he speaks of the elect, not only when they exist, but also when they lack existence in their own duration; these, however (he says), God has within himself, not because he has them within his nature, or intrinsically joined to himself by any special union, but because they and their eternal salvation are in the presence of God; although in the same place he does not deny that they are also present to the divine eternity, according to real and physical presence. In which sense also the Master of the Sentences speaks, whom the same Arrubal elsewhere adduces on his own behalf.

To the third confirmation it will be evident from what we shall say in num. 69.

To the third, in the third part of the same opinion, it is evident from what has been said in favour of the third assertion.

65 To the first confirmation the answer is that St Thomas, in the first testimony, is speaking of formal truth, which, speaking absolutely and simpliciter, is found from eternity only in the act of the divine intellect. As for things, however, he does not treat of them there, nor does he deny that they are in eternity: any more than he denies that the formal truth which is afterwards in time in a created intellect is present from eternity; not indeed absolutely and simpliciter, or in its own measure, but with the qualification, namely, in the nunc of eternity, as in a superabundant measure, in the same way as that intellect itself and all other future things are present from eternity.

As to the second testimony of the same confirmation, it must be said that St Thomas, in the first part of it, wishes only to say that creatures are not contained formally and physically in God according to their formal being. In the last part of the same testimony, on the other hand, he speaks of practical cognition and of the science of vision: in which, in the way explained above, the physical and real presence of things with respect to eternity is involved.

From this too it is evident, with regard to the third testimony of the aforesaid confirmation, that that testimony makes rather for us than against us. Because there he says that future things are present to eternity insofar as they are known by God and preordained. Now it is certain that the aforesaid preordination, of which he speaks there, denotes practical and intuitive cognition, through which, as we have just said, things are constituted present from eternity, not in their own measure, but in the measure of eternity.

66 To the second confirmation, the major is to be granted and the minor denied. And to the first proof, Corneto answers well in the present work, disput. 1. dub. 2, and very many other Thomists, in maintaining that there is a distinction between eternity and the age. In that eternity is not only a measure more perfect than all the others, but is also a superior measure containing within its ambit all other measures; just as the concavity of the outermost heaven, which is the common place, contains all the other particular places: and consequently all things which are contained in the inferior measures, namely in time and in the age, are also contained in eternity, as in a measure inadequately to them and superabundant. The age, however, although it be a measure more excellent than all times, is not superior with respect to them, nor does it contain them within its ambit, however indivisible and far greater than all times its duration may be.

From this it follows that eternity coexists with all things and all times, as their truly superabundant and superior measure, containing them all within its ambit; so that it coexists with them not only when they exist as far as we are concerned, but also before they thus exist: whereas the age is said to coexist with temporal things only when they do not exist as far as we are concerned, and not before: because they do not exist in the age itself, as in a superior measure, but rather the age and time hold themselves to each other as two unlik measures.

67 And this can be explained, first, by the example of the mode in which, so far as it is indivisible in itself, the soul is in the body, which although it be a more perfect mode of union than that by which the form of the stone informs the matter of that same stone, nevertheless the information, or mode of union, of the soul does not measure the information of the form of the stone. And similarly by the example of the mode of existing which Christ has in the Sacrament, which is a more perfect mode of existing than that of quantity, and yet does not contain or measure it. And the place of Rome is greater than the place of some small town, and nevertheless the latter is not contained or measured by the former. And all these things thus hold themselves as unlik things, and are not compared after the manner of a containing thing and a contained thing.

Further still, from the fact that the age is a measure not wholly immutable, but admitting potentiality and an order towards succession. And so it can coexist in a mutable way, or a new relation of presentiality intrinsically inherent in it can arrive; and consequently it is not able to draw successive things to itself in an immutable manner, so as to measure them always and immutably, and to extend itself always and immutably towards them. Eternity, on the other hand, is a measure by the manner of a most pure, infinite and immutable act: and therefore its measurement ought to be most actual, and to be made in an immutable manner. And therefore it measures always and from eternity whatever is to be measured by it; and it then draws to itself immutably those things which otherwise are mutable. Just as the divine intellect contains intelligibly and immutably those things which otherwise are mutable.

As to the second proof, the answer is, premising that although eternity is formally indivisible and all at once, it is virtually divisible and successive through coexistence with successive and divisible things, as we shall show in the following difficulty: namely, because by reason of its infinity, in the notion of duration, it contains all conceivable differences of time.

68 Whence it is that eternity can be considered in a twofold way. In one way partially, insofar as it coexists with time precisely past, or present, or future, by reason of the virtual divisibility which it has. And considered in this way, then, insofar as it coexists precisely with present time, it does not coexist with past: and insofar as it is coexistent with future, it does not coexist with present, and conversely. In another way it can be considered adequately, insofar as it coexists in itself with all the differences of time, by reason of its formal indivisibility, and as encompassing all of them. And in this way the very same eternity which coexists with the past must also coexist with the future, without any other succession or formal divisibility.

Hence, then, the answer to the aforesaid proof is to grant the antecedent in the sense just explained, and to deny the consequent. In support of which the sequel is to be denied. Because from this head future contingent things do not coexist with eternity insofar as it virtually contains both present time and past and future, whether real or imaginary; but insofar as it contains precisely that future time, they are contained in it, and coexist with it in that same measure of eternity inadequately to them, and as a superabundant and superabounding measure. And therefore it is not necessary that they exist in every difference of time, whether present, past or future, as in their own and adequate measure; but it is enough that in this way they exist in that future difference of time for which, in fact and in fact as with us, they will have existence, as we touched upon above, and as we shall explain more fully in the following difficulty: and consequently eternity will thereby have a far greater virtual duration than those future things have in their own proper duration and as they exist with us.

Moreover, since the very same eternity is formally indivisible and all at once, and by reason of its simplicity and immutability must encompass all the differences of time in the most simple and immutable manner, as we shall say at num. 79 and thereafter: therefore, from this head, eternity itself from eternity, insofar as it virtually contains that future difference of time, must actually and immutably contain those same future things, as present to it in that same measure of eternity. And for the same reason it is enough that future things coexist with us in their own difference of time only, in order that eternity may extend itself by reason of its virtual extension, and may encompass the aforesaid future things, and be present to them, as will be more fully explained in the following difficulty.

As to the last point, it is evident from what has been said.

69 From these things too it is evident with regard to the third confirmation of the second argument, adduced on behalf of the second part of the opposing opinion at num. 77, whose solution we have deferred to this place. For the meaning of those words of Isidore amounts only to this: that if times, for example the present time, were always present to God adequately, so as to entail this by its own force, with the opposite conflicting with it, it would not be time but eternity: because it would thereby be an unfailing duration, and would be, and would not be, time; but he does not deny that, inadequately and in the manner explained, they can and ought to be present to it. But all these things will be elucidated more fully in the following difficulty.