Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Because the divine decree precedes in some way the presence of things in eternity, we shall therefore treat in this disputation of that decree, and of the presence of things in eternity, and of how these lead to this conclusion, that God certainly and infallibly knows absolute future contingents; and we inquire in the first place about the divine decree, whether those future things are certainly attained by God in his knowledge within it?

§ I. Explanation of the title.

But so that the title may be better understood, it must first be noted that the particle Cuncta futura contingentia absoluta was deliberately placed in it. For absolute future contingents can stand under a twofold difference. Some indeed, namely those which depend on the divine will alone, such as the creation of an angel, and the other miraculous works which are done by God alone. Others, however, have also some dependence on secondary free causes, such as the free volitions of created will, and other effects which in some way depend on it. And although it is commonly received among all, or almost all, the Doctors, that God certainly knows those first future contingents in the decree of his will, as we shall say at once; nevertheless, in order to set down the general doctrine concerning the manner in which God certainly knows future contingents, we have therefore raised this difficulty in a universal way about all absolute future contingents.

2 Secondly, it must be noted that, the matter being treated in this same title, we have added another particle, namely: Antecedenter, ad quamlibet eorum infallibilem futuritionem. For it could be understood in two ways, that God holds a decree concerning absolute future contingents. In one way, after the foreknowledge of their future existence in a conditional state: in such a way, namely, that God should first have foreknown what created will would have done, if it were placed in this or that series and order of things and occasions; and, having once foreknown its consent if it were placed in this series, and its dissent if it were constituted in that one, that God should then decree to constitute it in that series in which he foreknew its consent; but not in that one in which he foreknew that dissent was to be drawn out from it. And thus the will of God to constitute created will in the aforesaid already foreknown series will be the will of the aforesaid consent, depending nonetheless upon that same consent as foreknown in the conditional state as future. In another way, before the foreknowledge of any future existence of them under any state whatsoever.

The title, therefore, is to be understood not of God's certain knowledge in the prior decree, but of the latter. First, because that prior decree is not antecedent to any infallible future existence of contingents; secondly also because, from what has been said in the difficulties of the immediately preceding disputation, and from what will be said in the two following disputations, it will be sufficiently clear that, existing within his decree, God cannot in any way know the future existence of any thing. And therefore in the title we have also added that particle: In decreto exercito, that is, in the decree actually existing in God, because, granting what we have said in the preceding difficulties, so far as the decree existing as such, it can alone be doubted whether God knows absolute future contingents in that decree, whether they are considered in a conditional state or in an absolute one.

§ II. A twofold opinion is brought forward.

3 The first opinion asserts that God certainly knows none of the aforesaid future contingents in the aforesaid decree, that is, in his essence determined by such a decree, in such a way that this might be the sufficient reason of the aforesaid knowledge. This opinion, as regards the future things also depending on created will, is defended by those writers of whom we shall speak in support of the following opinion, as regards the second part of it. As regards all future things, however, Vazquez defends it in the present disputation 65. And it is proved on this single foundation.

Because the aforesaid future things cannot be certainly known in the divine essence, taken nakedly: therefore neither in the same essence as determined by its decree. The antecedent is clear from what has been said. The consequence, however, is proved. Because the decree adds only over and above the naked essence of God a certain relation of reason; but this can contribute nothing to the effect that those future things be known in the same essence: since what is nothing can contribute neither to the real; nor to the infinite knowledge, in such a way that in it other things be known.

4 The same is confirmed by Vazquez himself. Because the decree, according to what it adds over and above the divine essence, and thus under the concept of a decree, is known by the force of the knowledge of the future effects about which it turns: therefore those future things are not known in the same decree previously known. The consequence seems clear. Because otherwise, with respect to the same thing, it would be at once prior and posterior known. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because a relation is not known unless its foundation and its terminus be known first; wherefore, since future contingents, whose existence is determined by that decree, are the terminus of the relation of reason which the decree adds over and above the essence, it follows that the aforesaid relation, and consequently the decree under the concept of a decree, cannot be known unless those future things be known first.

5 The second opinion teaches that, in the aforesaid decree, God certainly and infallibly knows the absolute future contingents which depend on his will alone; but not those which have had a dependence on a secondary cause. In such a way that the first part is held by all, or almost all, the Theologians. The second part, however, is attributed to this opinion by Cajetan in 1. dist. 38. art. 2. quaest. 1. on the arguments of Durand against the first conclusion. And Palatius teaches it there, quaest. 2. near the end, in the appended difficulty; Franciscus a Christo, dist. 39. quaest. 6. Vazquez, in the cited present disputation; Molina, disp. 13. Suarez, lib. 1. de scientia absoluta futurorum conting. cap. 8. Arrubal, in the present; Herice, tractatus de scientia Dei disp. 6. cap. penult.; and nearly all the other Fathers of the Society.

This opinion, as regards the first part, namely as regards the future contingents depending on the divine will alone, is urged by this single and sufficient reason. For every effect is certainly known in its one and total cause, which cannot be impeded; therefore the future contingents depending on the divine will alone will certainly be known by God in the efficacious decree concerning their future existence. The antecedent needs no proof; because, the total and unimpedible cause of the future existence of an effect being known, it is certainly known that the aforesaid effect is future. The consequence, however, is proved. Because the efficacious decree of the divine will concerning future things of this kind is the one and total cause of their future existence; otherwise they would not depend on it alone: and moreover the aforesaid decree is an unimpedible cause; because it can be impeded neither from without, as is clear from that which is said ad Roman. 9. Who can resist his will? nor from within, from the fact that, once God has held an absolute and efficacious decree about the future existence of some thing, it is repugnant that he have the opposite decree about the same thing not existing; otherwise the divine will would be mutable, just as on this account created will is mutable: therefore, in the aforesaid decree, God will certainly know the future contingents which depend on the aforesaid decree without the intervention of other secondary causes.

6 Next, the second part of the same opinion, namely that absolute future contingents depending on secondary causes cannot be certainly known by God in the aforesaid decree, is proved first by the testimonies of St. Thomas. For as often as he treats of their certain knowledge by God, so often does he have recourse to their presence in eternity; but not to the determination of their causes, and consequently neither to the decree, and the free and efficacious determination of the divine will in regard to their production. Whence, in 1. dist. 38. quaest. 1. art. 5., after he has said that the aforesaid future things cannot be known in their causes, immediately explaining in what way they can be known, he says: But when they are brought about in the nature of things, then they have determinate being: and therefore when they are in act, they are certainly known: and so nothing prevents God from having certain knowledge of future contingents, when his glance is directed towards the thing according as it is presentially in act, and already has determinate being. And in the answer to the second: A future contingent is not determinately true before it happens, because it has no determinate cause; but while it is in act, it is determinately true. And to the third: A future (he says) contingent, referred to God's knowledge, is necessary, because it is not directed towards itself except according as it is in actual being. And in the solution to the sixth: The knowledge of God (admittedly) does not look upon a contingent thing except as it is presentially in its actual being. And further on: If God had seen the cause but had not seen the effect immediately in its own being, He could never have known it with certainty.

7 This is confirmed first. For according to the holy Doctor, future contingents cannot be certainly known, so long as they are future, that is, for as long as they have the character of future things: therefore neither in their determinate causes; and consequently neither in the divine decree determining the divine will towards their production. This second consequence is clear from the first. The first, however, is from the antecedent. Because future things known in their determinate causes are known as future: therefore, and so on. The antecedent, however, is asserted by St. Thomas, q. 2. de Veritate art. 12, in these words: A contingent, as future, cannot be known by any knowledge, under which falsity cannot lie. Whence, since falsity does not lie under divine knowledge, nor can lie, it would be impossible that God should have knowledge of future contingents, if he knew them as future things. And in the solution to the first: Although a contingent be not determinate so long as it is future, yet once it has been produced in the nature of things, it has determinate truth: and in this way the glance of divine knowledge is directed towards it.

This is confirmed secondly from the same Angelic Doctor. For the prophecy of threat is not always certain, and yet through it the future is revealed such as it is in its determinate created and uncreated causes, directed towards producing it: therefore the aforesaid future thing cannot be certainly known in the determination of its causes, and consequently neither in the determination of the divine will. The major is by St. Thomas, 2. 2. quaest. 171. art. 6. ad 2., and is clear from the prophecies of the death of Ezechias and of the devastation of the Ninevites, which were not fulfilled. The minor, however, is proved. Because the aforesaid future things are not revealed such as they are in themselves; otherwise they would be the very things; nor such as they are in their undetermined causes, otherwise they would not be revealed more as future than as not future: therefore they are revealed in determinate causes, the most powerful of which is the divine will determined by its decree.

8 Secondly, the same part is proved principally. Because, any decree being posited, created will remains indifferent toward each of the two alternatives: therefore, from the force of the knowledge of such a decree, a future contingent, for example a free act depending on that will, cannot be known with certainty. The consequence seems certain. For just as from the force of the knowledge of that same will, taken precisely as such, its future acts cannot be certainly known, from the fact that it is itself indifferent toward each of the two alternatives, and that in an indifferent cause as such it cannot be certainly known toward which side it is to be inclined, so likewise, if the decree of the divine will does not remove the aforesaid indifference of created will, the future acts of the aforesaid will will not be able to be known with certainty from the force of the knowledge of that same decree: since such a decree does not remove the root from which the uncertainty of the future existence of its acts proceeds, namely the indifference toward each of the two alternatives. The antecedent, however, needs no proof. Especially because, if created will were freed by that decree, then its acts would not be among the number of the future contingents of which we are speaking, namely those which in some way depend on secondary free causes, as such.

This is confirmed. For the aforesaid decree either has an infallible and necessary connexion with that future contingent, or only a fallible one. If the first, then the freedom of created will is removed as regards the influx which it will give to the production of such a future thing: since, the aforesaid decree being posited, which precedes its concurrence, and the positing or removal of which is not in its power, the aforesaid future thing cannot be posited otherwise than so that there be a fallible connexion between it and the divine decree. If, however, the second is said, then from the force of the knowledge of such a decree the aforesaid future thing will not be able to be known with certainty: since from the force of the knowledge of anything that has a fallible connexion with another, this latter cannot be known certainly and infallibly.

Lastly. Because future contingents, at least those involving sin, will not be able to be certainly known by God in the free decree of his will: since God does not will that sins be committed; as is defined in Concil. Trident. sess. 6. can. 10. and 17.

§ III. In accordance with the mind of Scripture and of the Fathers, the knot of the difficulty is untied.

9 Nevertheless it must be said that God certainly and infallibly knows all absolute future contingents in the efficacious decree of his will. This seems to be expressed in Isaiah 14: The Lord of hosts hath sworn, saying: If it be not as I thought, so shall it be; and as I have purposed in my mind, so shall it come to pass, that I will break the Assyrian in my land. And with a few words intervening, this is added: This is the counsel which I have purposed over all the earth; and the Lord of hosts hath decreed: and who can weaken it? and his hand is stretched out; and who can turn it back? Where God said that the destruction of the Assyrians was certainly and infallibly future, because he himself had decreed it, to whom no one can resist. And so, in his decree infallibly bringing about the aforesaid destruction, he foreknew it, although such a devastation in some way depended on the will of the Assyrians, by which they came freely into the land of the Lord, in which they were to be broken.

10 Nor is the solution of Valentinus Herice sufficient, namely that it is not proved from this testimony that the decree of God concerning the breaking of the Assyrian army was altogether efficacious and absolute, and that it expected no condition and no foreknowledge on the part of free choice. For the opposite is the case. First, because in the preceding words the sacred text sufficiently indicates that that event was future: because God purposed it in his mind, and not the other way round. And so he says: The Lord of hosts hath sworn; if it be not as I thought, so shall it be, and as I have purposed in my mind, so shall it come to pass; and then also: because in this testimony God glories in the efficacy and power of his decree, so that precisely by the very fact that he himself is the one who decreed it, no one is able to weaken it. If, however, that decree were infallibly efficacious because the future event was foreknown, then there would be no greater glory to God than to a creature determining that very thing, nor would there be required for this the infinitude of divine power and will, which no one can weaken; but a creature could glory in the same way, that with it determining such a devastation, and employing means towards it, and the future effect being foreknown, no one could resist: whence those words and that mode of speaking of Isaiah have greater energy than the force allowed them by Herice.

11 The same thing seems to be expressed in that Psalm 134: Whatsoever the Lord pleased, he did in heaven and in earth. And ad Roman. 9: Who can resist his will? These testimonies, says Augustine elegantly in Enchirid. ad Laur. cap. 95, are to be understood not only of the future things which depend on the divine will alone, but also of those which have a dependence on both wills, the uncreated and the created alike. There, in order to show how much certainty, immutability and efficacy the will of God has towards adults, whom he wills to obtain eternal beatitude, and whose salvation depends not only on the will of God but also on their own free consent, he brings the aforesaid words of the Psalm: Whatsoever the Lord pleased, he did; and he adds: Which would not be true, if he had willed anything to do and had not done it. And what is more unworthy: he did it not because he should not do what he willed, the will of the man hindered the omnipotent. And shortly after: Unless we believe this, the very beginning of the confession of our faith is in danger, in which we confess that we believe in God the Father almighty. For he is not truly called almighty for any other reason than because he can do whatsoever he wills, and the effect of the omnipotent will is hindered by the will of no creature. Where, as will be evident to the one who considers, he attributes an excellent and supreme efficacy to the divine decree, on account of which, while the freedom of created choice is preserved, God can infallibly do whatsoever has pleased his infinite will: and hence, while in this decree he infallibly brings about any future things whatever, God will be able and will be bound to know all future contingents with certainty.

12 Whence this very thing is maintained by St. Thomas, first, contra Gentes cap. 68, where, treating in particular of created volition, he said in the first reason that God knows it, insofar as he knows his own essence. And in the second reason, that he knows the same through his own essence, just as through the knowledge of a cause the effects are known. And then he subjoins: Therefore God knows all things, by knowing his own essence, to which his causality extends; and it extends to the operations of the intellect and of the will. Now he is speaking of created acts of the will, not as of possible ones; for about the possible ones in general he had treated in cap. 66, but about those existing for some duration, as is clear from that whole chapter.

And q. 2. de Veritate art. 12, he plainly teaches that God knows future contingents in himself, as being in their cause: and hence in himself, as determined by decree, according to which relation he is their cause. For in the fourth argument in support of his opinion he thus says: God knows things, insofar as he is their cause: but God is not only the cause of necessary things, but also of contingent ones: therefore he knows both necessary and contingent things. And in the sixth argument he thus has it: To know is to know the cause of a thing: but God knows the causes of all contingent things, for he knows himself, who is the cause of all things: therefore he himself knows contingent things. And in the solution to the last he plainly teaches that he knows future contingents in himself, as in the mean: because the divine essence, although it be not the mean proportional and adequate to any creature, is nevertheless the mean proportional with respect to individual things. Wherefore, since it is a mean and a cause only when determined by decree, it follows that in it, so taken, it attains the aforesaid future things.

13 The same thing is also taught in art. 9 of this question, in the solution to the third: where he says: The knowledge of God is the cause of things, joined to the will: whence it is not necessary that whatsoever God knows be, or have been, or be future; but only those which he wills to be, or permits to be. In these words he plainly teaches that the future existence of things must be inferred with reference to the divine will ordaining or permitting them: and so, this will having been once known, the future effect will be known in it infallibly. Just as, the cause of the possibility of things, namely divine omnipotence, being known, as it contains, for example, a horse, the possibility of that same horse cannot but be known with certainty.

15 Wherefore, in order that the holy Doctor might explain more fully how the divine will is the reason and cause of the future existence, for example, of a pious consent, and not only a concomitant condition, he says that future things are not known by God because they are future, but conversely. For the future existence does not precede the knowledge, but follows it (as he also teaches in article 8 of this question, and first, contra Gentes cap. 67, ratione 6) — not indeed any future existence whatever, but insofar as it has the will joined to it, as he asserts in that same eighth article, and so thenceforth he infers in the aforesaid ninth article that not all things which God knows are future, but those which he wills. Where, as you see, he attributes to the divine will that it is of itself the efficacious cause of the future existence of a contingent thing, prior to the foreknowledge of it: otherwise he would not have said: therefore they are future, because they are known by God; but rather the opposite ought to have been asserted, namely: therefore they are known, because they are future: and consequently, this efficacious decree having been once known, efficiently bringing about the future existence of contingents, the same future existence cannot but be known in it.

The holy Doctor has the same thing in that testimony, which was brought forward in the preceding difficulty, namely in this first part, q. 16. art. 7. ad tertium, where he says: That which now is, was future before it was, because it was in its cause that it should come to pass. Whence, the cause being removed, that thing would not be future. But the first cause alone is eternal. Whence it does not follow that those things which are should always have been truly future, except insofar as they were in the eternal cause, that they should be future: which cause is God alone. Where, as you see, he reduces the eternal future existence of things to God alone, as to the one eternal cause of it: and since he himself causes it through the will (in the manner, however, just now pointed out, and explained in disput. 5. dub. 3), it follows that he reduces it in the same way to that same will: and thenceforward, the aforesaid will, or decree, being known as the cause of it, the aforesaid future existence cannot but be known.

14 Lastly, the holy Doctor taught this same thing below in q. 19. art. 8, and q. 6. de Veritate art. 3. ad quartum. For when it had been put to him that every certainty which is with the supposition of something is not absolute certainty: as, for example, it is not certain that the Sun will cause fruit in the plant, unless with this condition, namely that the generative power of the plant be well disposed: from the fact that the power of the Sun supposes the power of the plant, as it were a secondary cause: and consequently, for the same reason, if the certainty of predestination is with the presupposition of a secondary cause, it will not be absolute certainty, but only conditional. The same Angelic Doctor answers: The secondary cause which must be supposed in order to induce the effect of predestination is itself subject to the order of predestination. It is not so, however, in the inferior powers with respect to any superior power acting. And therefore the order of divine predestination, although it is with the supposition of human will, nevertheless has absolute certainty, even if the contrary appears in the example introduced.

Where, as is clear from the diametrical opposition, St. Thomas is set against the adversaries, who deny that the decrees of God are absolute and efficacious, and who admit only a decree founded on conditional knowledge, and who wait upon the operation of the secondary cause. And moreover he adds that there is absolute certainty in divine predestination; and that this arises from the order and causality of predestination itself; from the fact that whatsoever is supposed, or required, in order to induce the effect of predestination, is subject to the order of predestination; although whatsoever is required for the causality of the Sun with respect to the fruits in the plant is not subject to its causality, that is, is not infallibly inferred from the causality of the Sun: and hence even the future things which depend on secondary free causes, such as the effects of predestination, will be known by God with absolute certainty, by the force of that same predestination, as being their cause; and consequently by the force of the efficacious decree involved in it, on account of which predestination has the way just now pointed out of efficiently inferring the aforesaid effects: but not because divine knowledge waits to see what is to be done by the secondary causes, in order from this to behold the future effects antecedently with conditional certainty.

15 Other holy Fathers taught the same thing, especially Augustine, de praedestinatione Sanctorum, cap. 10, and lib. 26. contra Faustum, cap. 4; Hilary, 9. De Trinitate, a little after the beginning: where he says: What God decreed to do, he knew in his will: but he decreed to do all things which are done, because his purpose works all things: therefore the things which are future are known by him in the decree of his will. And several other of the holy Fathers, whom Alvarez refers to in lib. 3. de auxiliis divinae gratiae, disput. 22, but to whom, as well as to the other places of Scripture, in particular, we refer, we abstain: because in tract. de Voluntate

Dei art. 8, we shall return to this point expressly, when there we shall have explained, as in its proper place, the supreme efficacy of the divine will: and how, while the freedom of created choice is preserved, it efficaciously predefines all its works by the decree by which it wills them, or efficaciously permits them.

And lastly, the Scholastics maintain this same opinion, as Ricardus in 1. dist. 38. art. 1. quaest. 5; Scotus, dist. 39. quaest. unica, and in quodlib. quaest. 14; Herveus there, quaest. unica, and dist. 46. quaest. 2; Ludovicus Vives, on the 5th book of St. Augustine's De Civitate Dei; Leonardus Coquaeus at the place below in disput. 10. num. 128, referring; Cajetanus, Bannez, Zumel, Nazarius, Gonzalez, Machin, Petrus Corneio in the present, Alvarez lib. 2. de auxiliis divinae gratiae, disp. 10 and 11; Ledesina, lib. de auxiliis, disput. de scientia futurorum conting. dub. 3, about the solution of the 4th argument; Aestius in 1. sentent. dist. 38. § 7; and very many others.

§ IV. A single and fundamental reason in support of the assertion.

16 But before we prove the assertion, we must explain it briefly: for in it we do not intend to determine whether God knows absolute future contingents in his decree, as in the object that is in every way primary and, as it were, specifying that knowledge. Or whether the divine essence alone, determined however by decree, is the primary and, as it were, specifying object of it: for this is sufficiently clear from what we said in this same tract. disp. 3. num. 17; but it is clear only from the very fact that, when an efficacious decree about a future existence, for example that of Antichrist, is said to be in God, the divine essence itself at once represents it to God's intellect. And so, the divine essence, and the aforesaid decree being known, or the divine essence being known, determined however by the aforesaid decree, the aforesaid future thing cannot but be known in it.

Now the fundamental reason of the assertion thus explained was touched upon by St. Thomas in the places cited, and we shall pursue it more broadly in the treatise on the Will of God, and it can be reduced to this form. Since the divine will is the most universal and the most efficacious: therefore it must efficaciously predefine, both as regards substance and as regards mode, whatever is to be done by God outwardly, or whatever is afterwards to happen by any secondary causes whatsoever; so that all these things infallibly come to pass according to the prescript of that same will: therefore, in this predefining decree, God will be able and will be bound to know all future contingents with certainty. This second consequence follows clearly from the first. Because it does not stand that the knowledge of the divine decree, or (which amounts to the same for the present) of the divine essence as determined by such a decree, which certainly and infallibly infers the future existence of any future contingent, and yet that the aforesaid future existence is not known with certainty.

17 The first consequence, however, also follows from the antecedent. For if the divine will did not predefine all those things, both as regards substance and as regards mode, it would not be the most universal: since it would not extend to all future things that can be willed by it, either as regards their substance or as regards their modes, namely necessity, or contingency, and freedom: just as likewise it would not be the most efficacious, if all things did not come to pass infallibly just as it itself decrees, that is, if, when it decrees that they happen necessarily, that is, by means of secondary causes operating necessarily, they did not happen necessarily; and when it decrees that they be produced freely, they then did not happen freely yet infallibly, that is, in fact and in deed they would not be so, although they are able not to be so, from the fact that in this manner they are predefined: since for a will to be the most efficacious, it must be efficacious both about the substance and about the mode of the thing to be done. If, however, all things did not come to pass in the mode in which the divine will decreed, in the sense explained, that they would come to pass, then it would not extend efficaciously, either as regards the substance or as regards the mode of all future things, so that they would come to pass just as they are predefined by it: therefore, and so on.

The antecedent, however, is proved. Because God is the most universal and the most efficacious agent, from the fact that he is the most universal being, having infinite efficacy for operating: therefore, since he also acts through the will, it is necessary that his will be the most universal in willing and the most efficacious in causing, or inferring whatever falls under his volition, and in the mode in which it falls under it.

This is confirmed and explained firstly, by a reason drawn from the same holy Doctor. Since God certainly knows all possible things in his essence, as in a cause known beforehand: therefore he will also certainly know all future things in that same essence, as in a cause known beforehand: and consequently in the efficacious divine decree, or (which amounts to the same) in that same essence determined by such a decree. This last consequence follows clearly from the first. Since the divine essence is not the cause of the aforesaid future things unless determined by its own efficacious decree. The first consequence, however, is clear from the antecedent. Because the whole reason on account of which possible things are certainly known in the divine essence, as in a cause known beforehand, is that they are contained in it as effects are contained in their cause, from which they receive their whole entity and intelligibility: and thus they are only secondary objects with respect to divine knowledge: which therefore, by the force of that knowledge, as a previously known object, must be attained. This reason, however, has an equal force with respect to future creatures, so that in the same essence determined by the aforesaid decree and known beforehand, they may be certainly known, as will be evident to the one who considers. The antecedent, however, is sufficiently clear from what we said above in art. 5 and 6 and in tract. de Visione Dei art. 8, and is admitted by nearly all the adversaries.

This is confirmed and explained secondly, by a reason of the same holy Doctor. Since the divine will is not the cause of things in any and every way, but the first cause, and consequently its efficacy is independent of any other efficacy of secondary will, although it infers that efficacy: therefore, when God in that same will efficaciously decrees the future existence of any future thing, he will certainly know that it is future, just as it is decreed by the divine will. The consequence seems clear. The antecedent, however, is clear as regards the first part. As regards the second, it is likewise plain. For just as with respect to the relation of secondary will there is a dependence in its own volition and efficacy upon the first will, so conversely, with respect to the relation of the first will there will be an independence in its own volition and efficacy from the second will, although as often as it wills the concurrence of that same secondary will, it must, by the reason of its efficacy, infer it in the mode in which it has willed it.

§ V. Solutions of the adversaries, and refutation of them.

19 This reason with its confirmations is so efficacious, that from the mere unfolding of them the evasions which the adversaries bring forward easily collapse. For in the first place, some say that from this it does not follow that the knowledge of the divine decree suffices with respect to the future things which depend on a free created cause: from the fact that the divine will is not the total and adequate cause of them: whereas an effect is not known certainly and infallibly in its cause unless that cause be adequate.

Against this, the solution from what has been said in our reason and confirmations, especially if they are weighed a little, sufficiently collapses it. First, because, although the created cause does concur many times in the production of the future things depending on it; nevertheless it is not so situated with respect to the divine will, as we were saying above from St. Thomas, as a plant is with respect to the Sun with regard to the production of the fruit contained in it: because the latter is not at all subject to the power of the Sun, on account of the limitation of that same Sun: which cannot always infer the disposition required on the part of the plant, which is to operate together with it in the production of the fruit. On the other hand, on account of its infinite universality and efficacy, every secondary will is altogether subject to the divine will, so that in it and with it it can do whatever pleases itself, and in the mode in which it pleases. For just as necessary secondary causes obey at the nod of the divine will, according to their own mode, that is, in a necessary manner, so also free causes obey it even at the nod, according to their own proper mode, that is, in a free manner; otherwise the divine will would not be the first, nor infinitely efficacious in willing, as is clear from what has been said.

Then also because, although created will does concur simultaneously with uncreated will in the production of many future contingents, namely of free acts proceeding from it; nevertheless on that account the divine will does not produce that whole act and totally, that is, so that there be in it some formality, or mode of formality, which is not in everything it says, attained by the divine will in its own proper mode; otherwise there would be some created being, or formality, or mode of it, which would escape the divine causality; and hence there would be, and yet there would not be, a being by participation, as will be evident to the one who considers. It is clear, however, that this mode of causing is sufficient for this, that once the decree of the aforesaid will is known, any future effect may be certainly known in it: since according to everything it has, it proceeds from that will. But concerning these things, let them see what our Complut. assert in lib. Physicor. disp. 15. num. 59.

20 Next, others object that it does not follow from the reason made that God certainly knows in his decree the future contingents, although their future existence follows from the divine decree. For the first free act of a man follows from the natural judgment, not however from a free judgment, or one commanded by the will, in such a way that such a judgment determines that will towards the aforesaid act: and yet the Angel, knowing this natural judgment, does not thereby know the free act caused from it; otherwise the acts of a free man would be open to the Angel, whose opposite the Theologians commonly say in the matter of Angels; therefore, from the fact that God knows his own decree, and this is the cause of the future existence of contingent things, it does not follow that such future things ensuing from it will be known.

21 For the opposite of this is the case, that, as St. Thomas teaches in prima secundae, q. 9. art. 4 and 6. ad tertium, and Cajetan there, the first volition which a man has is of a universal good, and from a divine motion, and consequently is necessary: from this volition, however, the will determines itself, in the way explained elsewhere, God giving it, towards these or those particular objects to be willed, and therefore consequently it can move the intellect to have efficacious dominion, by which it determines that same will towards this, that it may elicit an act about some particular object: and this dominion, and judgment, is that which moves the will to the exercise of a free act with respect to a particular object.

Wherefore, because such a dominion partakes of freedom, it is not known by the Angel: and consequently neither is the act which it determines. If, however, the aforesaid dominion were known by the Angel, then, because it does not determine in any and every way, but in such a way that the commanded free act infallibly follows from it, then such an act would undoubtedly be attained by the Angel, and thenceforward, since from the free efficacious decree of God all future contingents predefined by God infallibly follow, it would be necessary that, the aforesaid decree being known, those future things ensuing from it should be known with that same certainty. But concerning these things, let them see what we shall say in tract. de Praedestinatione disp. 2. from num. 76 up to 84.

22 Furthermore, Suarez and others answer, first, that God cannot predefine future contingents, depending on created freedom, by a decree which efficaciously and infallibly infers them, unless he first foresee through conditional knowledge what the aforesaid will would be willing in such an occasion, or with such circumstances; lest, if he predefined otherwise, the freedom of that same will be removed. Then also, that in order to preserve in the divine will the relation of first cause, and the dependence of any future thing upon it, it is not necessary that it be the first cause of the future existence, by reason of an efficacious decree, which in their opinion follows upon middle knowledge; but by reason of another inefficacious will, preceding it. For with regard to such knowledge, by which God knows that Peter will consent on the hypothesis that he be placed in this or that occasion, and with these or those circumstances, there is presupposed in God a will by which he wills to grant him concurrence for whatever he himself may wish to do; yet not determining that such concurrence be towards this or that determinate act, nor with respect to this or that determinate object; but either passing over those, or with respect to this determinate act and object, under the condition, if created will should wish it: and with respect to another act and object, if that same will should so wish: and this conditional will of God, preceding that created consent, is the first root and first cause of the future existence of such a consent: and it becomes absolute and efficacious, the condition being posited, namely that Peter, for example, wills to operate and to consent.

23 On the other hand, although this solution must be impugned by several in tract. de Voluntate Dei art. 8, where we shall show that the efficacious predefinition of God, prior to all middle knowledge, by which he predefines the free acts of created will, not only does not remove freedom in them, but even posits it. And likewise, although the aforesaid solution remains impugned by what was said in the preceding difficulties, in which we proved that before the efficacious decree of the divine will no absolute future thing can be known with certainty and infallibility by any knowledge; for the reasons there given prove nothing about the conditional future, as will be evident to the one who considers, and as will be evident from what is to be said in the following dispu-

tationibus, will be evident: and lastly, although the impossibility of this middle knowledge must be shown especially in disput. 10 and 11, and also 12 of this treatise, nevertheless the aforesaid solution, from the mere wider unfolding of the reason made and of its confirmations, easily collapses.

For in the first place, what is contained in it in the first place, namely that God cannot, with the freedom of created choice preserved, efficaciously predefine the future consent foreknown through middle knowledge, is sufficiently proved to be false from the efficacy, universality and priority which we have said to be in the divine will. For these things look to it, that both the substance of the act and its mode, namely freedom, in whatever state, whether absolute or conditional, should proceed from the efficacy of the divine will, in such a way that therefore the act is so made both as regards substance and as regards mode, because God wills it to be so; but not conversely: otherwise such a will would neither be the first, as is clear, nor the most universal in causing, nor finally supremely efficacious: since any efficacy of created will under some state does not arise from its efficacy. But if an efficacious consent of the will had to be foreknown first, if the will were placed in this or that occasion, before the divine will efficaciously predefined the aforesaid act as regards its substance and its mode, then this would be a true causal proposition: Therefore God wills and decrees that Peter read, because he himself wills or is going to will to read; since the conditional knowledge, by which this appears, presupposes its object, namely the aforesaid volition; but does not cause it. And likewise this would be a false causal proposition: Therefore Peter wills or is going to will to read, because God wills and decrees that he read. And so created will would be the first cause and the first root of the future existence of its act, and God would be the secondary cause of it: and consequently he would neither be the most universal nor the most efficacious cause of it: since the first beginning of such a future existence would proceed not from the will of God but from that of man.

24 Nor does that which the same solution brings forward in the second place, about that inefficacious and conditional will preceding middle knowledge, favour it in this, that it preserves the universality, priority, and — much less — the efficacy of the divine will. For from the fact that God has that inefficacious and conditional will with respect to the free act of created will, it does not follow that the aforesaid act, considered specifically and individually, is future, because God wills it with that inefficacious and conditional will: therefore by reason of the aforesaid will it cannot be preserved that God is the first and most universal cause of the whole future existence of such an act, and of any other whatsoever, much less that he has supreme efficacy. The consequence seems clear from what has been said.

The antecedent, however, is urged. Because under that will of God this act does not fall determinately, and rather in the individual than the opposite, or its omission: since that will extends only to giving assistance and concurrence to created freedom, in order that it may freely will or not will; or in order that it may will this or that, according as it has determined itself by its own freedom, so that as far as this act itself is concerned, for the sign by which such a will is posited, it has no more the character of a future thing than any other: because this is left, according to this mode of speaking, to the innate freedom of created will; therefore it will be false that created will has, or will have on the hypothesis, this very act here and now, because God wills it with that antecedent and conditional will: and consequently neither is it preserved that that act is so made in the individual because God wills it to be made, nor that the divine will is the first, most universal, and most efficacious in causing.

25 This is confirmed and explained. Because at the most it follows from that will that God is the first cause with respect to the free act of created will taken in general, or vaguely; but not in particular, and considered in species and in the individual; since through that will God does not will, as yet ineffectively, this act in particular rather than another; but only that the will elicit this act, or its opposite, or its omission, or another which may please it: but that it elicit this rather than that is left to its own will; therefore neither is preserved the priority worthy of the most universal cause, such as is the divine will. For this must extend, by the mode of a first cause, to all future things according to species and individual, so that therefore they are future, because God wills them. But concerning this solution, as we intimated a moment ago, we shall return to the matter in this same treatise, where it will be more fully impugned.

26 Lastly. A certain junior brings forward another solution to our principal reason.

namely that from it is proved at the most that God certainly knows all absolute future contingents in the decree of his will, not indeed with respect to what they are, but only with respect to whether they are. For from the relation of one thing to another, such as is that in the divine decree with respect to the future things, the knowledge at the most is collected of that thing to which the aforesaid relation is terminated; not indeed perfect in being and quiddity, but only with respect to whether it is, just as from the knowledge of a power of sight, which says of a relation towards the visible, the quiddity-knowledge of that same visible does not follow, but only whether it is.

But this solution vanishes before the reason made. Because future contingents are not known in the decree, or (which is the same for the present) in the divine essence, as determined by it, by reason of the relation which the aforesaid decree bears towards them: but by reason of the connexion of cause with its effect, insofar as the whole entity of those future things, as such, is contained as in a cause in the divine essence, as determined by its own decree: it is clear, however, that the knowledge of anything in another, as in its cause wholly containing it, can be quiddity-knowledge, precisely because it is knowledge a priori, and through something of it, namely through the cause, which is deemed to be something of the effect. And therefore the knowledge of those same future things, as of possible things, and residing in the divine essence and omnipotence, as in their cause according to this reasoning, is knowledge with respect to what those things are, and not only with respect to whether they are.

From which it is also clear that the example of sight and of the visible thing, even if we grant that from the knowledge of the sight a quiddity-knowledge of the visible does not follow, is not to the point: since the sight is not the cause of the visible. But if it were its cause, then, the sight being penetrated and known quidditatively, the visible could be known quidditatively from the force of that knowledge.

§ VI. A way is opened against the single foundation of the first opinion.

27 For the foundation of the first opinion, the antecedent must be granted and the consequence denied. And for the proof, it must be said that, although the divine decree founds a relation of reason towards future things, as towards an effect and object; nevertheless such a relation does not belong intrinsically to it, nor does it complete it under the aspect of such, but it is enough that the necessary volition of God connotes by the reason of its eminence this object rather than that one, and an effect, and infers it, as to be posited in view of a future time, in order that there be a free volition of its future existence, as is explained at length in tract. de Volunt. Dei disput. 7. from num. 58 up to num. 72. Whence, just as in order that there be in God a free and efficacious decree of the future existence of things, it is not necessary that such a decree add anything intrinsic, even by virtual addition, over and above the necessary act of the divine volition, but the aforesaid connotation is enough; so also, in order that the same decree be the reason of knowing future contingents, it is not necessary that it add anything intrinsic, virtually distinct from the necessary volition; but it will suffice that it connotes, in the manner stated, this object rather than that one. Let them see, however, what we said in tract. de Visione Dei disp. 7. dub. 3, and what we shall say in tract. de Voluntate Dei in the place cited.

Add that, as is explained there, it is sufficiently probable that a free act of God, as such, adds something intrinsic and virtually distinct over and above the necessary volition. How, however, this is consistent with the fact that the free act of God, by which he decreed the production of the world, was able not to be in him, and yet not on that account was anything intrinsic and real in him able to be absent, is explained by us in the same disputation and in tract. de Voluntate Dei from num. 72 up to num. 90.

28 From which, for its confirmation, it is sufficiently clear. Because although we should grant that the knowledge of the relation must precede the knowledge of the foundation and of the terminus (of which elsewhere), nevertheless nothing follows against us in the present matter: since, as we were saying a moment ago, the relation of reason, formally taken, in no way pertains to the concept and the intrinsic completion of the free act, and although the future object is an indispensable connotation of the decree, by which God wills that it be future, it is nevertheless not a connoted antecedent, but rather a consequent, and brought in from the force of that same free act, so that it is collected not a priori, but only a posteriori, that there would not have been in God such an act, if there had not been such an object, or if there had not been such a thing as future: and thus the knowledge of the future does not precede the knowledge of the decree; but rather the other way round. Just as possible creatures are an indispensable connotation of divine power, they are nevertheless a subsequent and supervening connotation, not however an antecedent. And therefore from the impossibility of all creatures the impossibility and the involvement of divine power is collected not a priori but a posteriori; and the knowledge of possible things does not precede, but follows, by a subordination explained elsewhere, the knowledge of omnipotence. But these things are explained at length in the cited tract. de Voluntate Dei disp. 7. from num. 54 up to num. 58.

§ VII. An answer is given to the first argument, and to the confirmations of it in favour of the second opinion as adduced on its second part.

29 To the foundation of the second opinion with respect to its first part, there is no need to give an answer: because it is rather for us than against us.

But to the first argument for the second part of the same opinion, which is composed from various testimonies of St. Thomas, what has been said sufficiently establishes how the holy Doctor admits a predefining decree, efficaciously inferring the future existence of absolute contingents with respect to our question; and consequently how those future things can be certainly known in it. Whence, although when he treats of their certain knowledge he has recourse to their presence in eternity, it must nevertheless be denied that he does not have recourse there, either expressly, as in the places cited by us, or virtually and implicitly, to the aforesaid decree; for those future things do not become present in eternity except by means of the decree. And so, although he does not have recourse to the proximate causes of the aforesaid future things in order to assign the certainty of divine knowledge, so that they are not understood to be determined by the decree (of which determination alone we are speaking in the present, not caring whether any other determination of secondary causes results from this decree, preceding their causality or not: because by the decree of our most holy Lord Paul V. it is provided that that which concerns the aids and predeterminations of divine grace, explaining what their efficacy is, shall not be sent to press) — yet those testimonies bear well upon the decree itself, precisely because they say that he knows those things according as they are present, not indeed in their own adequate measure, but in the measure of eternity.

30 Whence all the testimonies adduced in support of this argument are of no hindrance to us, but rather help us. Because the decree of God is of such a condition that without it absolute future things cannot have being present in eternity (of which presence St. Thomas speaks in them, as will be evident to the one who considers), and precisely from the fact that it is posited, the presence is at once posited of the thing which is said to be future in eternity, and of everything necessary to it. And therefore, of the divine essence, insofar as it is determined by its own decree to be the cause of the future existence of things, it cannot be verified what the Angelic Doctor teaches in that solution to the sixth, adduced in the last place, namely: That if God had seen the cause, and had not seen the effect immediately in its being, He could never have known it with certainty: because although other causes may be seen without the effect being seen immediately at the same time in its being; nevertheless the divine decree, as it is the cause of absolute future things, cannot be seen without the effect being seen immediately at the same time in its being, that is, existing actually in the measure of eternity.

It must be added, however, that although we granted that St. Thomas, when he treats in particular of the knowledge of future absolute contingents, did not have recourse expressly to the efficacious decree of the divine will, nevertheless nothing follows from that against us. For the same Angelic Doctor treated universally in art. 5 of this question of the mean in which God knows all creatures: and there he teaches that he sees them in his essence, as in their cause, and hence that he knows future contingents in that same essence, as determined by decree, according to which relation he is their cause. And thus it was not necessary (although he did so, as is clear from what has been said) that, treating in particular of the knowledge of future contingents, he should express the mean in which they are known by him: just as it was not necessary either when he treated in particular of the knowledge of other things.

31 From which an answer is given to the first confirmation, that St. Thomas speaks of absolute future contingents: and of these he teaches that they are not known as future, that is, as future to themselves; but as future to us, and as present to themselves. From this, however, it does not follow that they cannot be certainly known by him in the efficacious decree of his will: since, as we were saying a moment ago, this decree is of such a condition that by the very fact that it is given, the aforesaid future things are drawn out, in the manner intimated above, beyond the state of possibility, and become future to us, and actually present with respect to God and his eternity. And thus to be known in it, is to be known in the decree itself, in so far as they have at once being future to us and present to eternity; but not to be known precisely as future. For to be known precisely as future contingents and to be known with certainty, are opposed.

From which it also follows that, if it is once true that from the divine decree there results, on the outside, some physical premotion and predetermination, by which secondary causes, even free ones, are applied by God towards free acts, whether natural or supernatural (about which we do not dispute in the present, as we have already intimated), then in that premotion, or in created will, as premoted by it and present to eternity, a free future contingent can be known certainly and infallibly, according to the mind of St. Thomas. Because it is not foreknown as future precisely by the force of such a cause, but as future with respect to us, and at the same time as present in eternity: because the aforesaid premotion does not stand, nor can stand, in the composite sense, without the presence of presentiality of the act to which it is given.

32 To the second confirmation the answer is given that through the prophecy of threat the future is revealed such as it has being in its determinate proximate causes, with a fallible determination, and also in the divine will, according to the exigency of such causes; but the impediments which can impede the proximate causes, and which proceed from the will of God, are not revealed, since he considers superior reasons: as is clear in the revelation by which he revealed to Isaiah the death of Ezechias, attending to his natural disposition, and to what the divine will demanded, according to the exigency of such a disposition, and also according to the exigency of his own justice, by which he willed to punish Ezechias with death: because he had not given thanks to God for the victory obtained in war, and because he had not taken a wife, so that the line of David might be continued through Solomon up to the Nativity of Christ. But this determination, and the will of the sign, which God had with respect to this death, was impeded by that same will, according as he regarded the superior causes, namely in order that God might fulfil the promise which he had made to the house of David, that Christ would be born from the lineage of Solomon: and because this impeding cause was not revealed to Isaiah, therefore he did not know the death of Ezechias in all its determinate causes: and so it is no wonder that such a prophecy was not certainly fulfilled. It would be otherwise, however, if Isaiah, prophesying that future thing, had known it in the efficacious decree of the divine will: in which, all things being considered, he decreed absolutely and efficaciously that Ezechias should recover from that illness. For then he could have predicted with certainty his recovery, and that prediction would have been certainly fulfilled by the recovery which in fact he obtained.

§ VIII. An answer is given to the other arguments of the same opinion.

33 To the second principal argument, the antecedent having been granted, the consequence is to be denied. And for the proof, the answer is given that the reasons are dissimilar. Because created will, according to itself, and taken precisely as such, is so free that it is not determined by a free mode infallibly towards one part, but is indifferent towards each of the two alternatives without the aforesaid determination. But the will and the divine essence determined by its own decree has a free and infallible determination towards one part, and so in it, so determined, the future contingents which are predefined by it can be known with certainty. How, however, created freedom is maintained consistently with this infallible predefinition, is explained more broadly in tract. de Voluntate Dei art. 8: and it is clear from what was said in this difficulty in num. 17 and 19: since the form (so to speak) of this decree is: Let the free act be done, for example the conversion of St. Peter in a free manner, that is, such that although in the act it were never verified that it would not happen, it can nevertheless not happen, and this be verified. And thus, on the side on which it is efficaciously decreed that it be done, it will certainly be done: and on the side on which it is established that it can not be done, it will be done in a free manner.

34 It will also be clear, for the confirmation, from what is to be said in tract. de Voluntate Dei disp. 10. num. 78 and onwards, and it is clear from what was said in dub. 2 of the preceding disputation, as well as from what we were saying a moment ago, how between the decree and the future thing predefined by it there is an infallible connexion, although not necessary with a necessity which simply removes freedom: from the fact that freedom is not removed, but rather it is decreed that the aforesaid act be done in such a way that it can not be done.

We have said: Although not necessary, with a necessity which simply removes freedom: because in truth that connexion is altogether necessary, insofar as the efficacious decree of God, by reason of its infinite efficacy, indispensably requires the sequence of the thing decreed by it: nevertheless, because that which it requires is this whole conjunction, namely that the act of created will be done, and that it be done in a free manner, that is, that it be done in such a way that it can not be done, freedom is therefore not harmed, but rather it follows from it that it is altogether necessary that that free act be done in a free manner. For just as that which is fallible cannot be infallible; yet it can indeed be infallible that that which is fallible should be so free as to be able not to be done, so likewise a free act, as such, cannot be necessary: nevertheless it is necessary that that which is intrinsically free be done in a free manner, and have the character of a free act.

To the last, the sequence is to be denied. And for the proof, although God does not will sins, formally taken; nevertheless he wills to permit them: and moreover he has an efficacious decree concerning the substance of other sinful acts: and in these decrees he can certainly know them. But concerning this, let them see what we shall say in tract. de Volunt. Dei disp. 10. dub. 5.