Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

1 Because it is easier to explain about divine things what they are not, or how they are not disposed, than what they are, or how they are disposed; for this reason, in the doubts of the preceding disputation we explained what divine knowledge does not have with regard to absolute future contingents, as we shall now explain in this disputation how it is disposed with regard to them, that is, how it is able to know them with certainty.

Because the divine decree precedes in some way the presence of things in eternity, we shall therefore treat in this disputation of that decree, and of the presence of things in eternity, and of how these lead to this conclusion, that God certainly and infallibly knows absolute future contingents; and we inquire in the first place about the divine decree, whether those future things are certainly attained by God in his knowledge within it?

§ I. Explanation of the title.

But so that the title may be better understood, it must first be noted that the particle Cuncta futura contingentia absoluta was deliberately placed in it. For absolute future contingents can stand under a twofold difference. Some indeed, namely those which depend on the divine will alone, such as the creation of an angel, and the other miraculous works which are done by God alone. Others, however, have also some dependence on secondary free causes, such as the free volitions of created will, and other effects which in some way depend on it. And although it is commonly received among all, or almost all, the Doctors, that God certainly knows those first future contingents in the decree of his will, as we shall say at once; nevertheless, in order to set down the general doctrine concerning the manner in which God certainly knows future contingents, we have therefore raised this difficulty in a universal way about all absolute future contingents.

2 Secondly, it must be noted that, the matter being treated in this same title, we have added another particle, namely: Antecedenter, ad quamlibet eorum infallibilem futuritionem. For it could be understood in two ways, that God holds a decree concerning absolute future contingents. In one way, after the foreknowledge of their future existence in a conditional state: in such a way, namely, that God should first have foreknown what created will would have done, if it were placed in this or that series and order of things and occasions; and, having once foreknown its consent if it were placed in this series, and its dissent if it were constituted in that one, that God should then decree to constitute it in that series in which he foreknew its consent; but not in that one in which he foreknew that dissent was to be drawn out from it. And thus the will of God to constitute created will in the aforesaid already foreknown series will be the will of the aforesaid consent, depending nonetheless upon that same consent as foreknown in the conditional state as future. In another way, before the foreknowledge of any future existence of them under any state whatsoever.

The title, therefore, is to be understood not of God's certain knowledge in the prior decree, but of the latter. First, because that prior decree is not antecedent to any infallible future existence of contingents; secondly also because, from what has been said in the difficulties of the immediately preceding disputation, and from what will be said in the two following disputations, it will be sufficiently clear that, existing within his decree, God cannot in any way know the future existence of any thing. And therefore in the title we have also added that particle: In decreto exercito, that is, in the decree actually existing in God, because, granting what we have said in the preceding difficulties, so far as the decree existing as such, it can alone be doubted whether God knows absolute future contingents in that decree, whether they are considered in a conditional state or in an absolute one.

§ II. A twofold opinion is brought forward.

3 The first opinion asserts that God certainly knows none of the aforesaid future contingents in the aforesaid decree, that is, in his essence determined by such a decree, in such a way that this might be the sufficient reason of the aforesaid knowledge. This opinion, as regards the future things also depending on created will, is defended by those writers of whom we shall speak in support of the following opinion, as regards the second part of it. As regards all future things, however, Vazquez defends it in the present disputation 65. And it is proved on this single foundation.

Because the aforesaid future things cannot be certainly known in the divine essence, taken nakedly: therefore neither in the same essence as determined by its decree. The antecedent is clear from what has been said. The consequence, however, is proved. Because the decree adds only over and above the naked essence of God a certain relation of reason; but this can contribute nothing to the effect that those future things be known in the same essence: since what is nothing can contribute neither to the real; nor to the infinite knowledge, in such a way that in it other things be known.

4 The same is confirmed by Vazquez himself. Because the decree, according to what it adds over and above the divine essence, and thus under the concept of a decree, is known by the force of the knowledge of the future effects about which it turns: therefore those future things are not known in the same decree previously known. The consequence seems clear. Because otherwise, with respect to the same thing, it would be at once prior and posterior known. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because a relation is not known unless its foundation and its terminus be known first; wherefore, since future contingents, whose existence is determined by that decree, are the terminus of the relation of reason which the decree adds over and above the essence, it follows that the aforesaid relation, and consequently the decree under the concept of a decree, cannot be known unless those future things be known first.

5 The second opinion teaches that, in the aforesaid decree, God certainly and infallibly knows the absolute future contingents which depend on his will alone; but not those which have had a dependence on a secondary cause. In such a way that the first part is held by all, or almost all, the Theologians. The second part, however, is attributed to this opinion by Cajetan in 1. dist. 38. art. 2. quaest. 1. on the arguments of Durand against the first conclusion. And Palatius teaches it there, quaest. 2. near the end, in the appended difficulty; Franciscus a Christo, dist. 39. quaest. 6. Vazquez, in the cited present disputation; Molina, disp. 13. Suarez, lib. 1. de scientia absoluta futurorum conting. cap. 8. Arrubal, in the present; Herice, tractatus de scientia Dei disp. 6. cap. penult.; and nearly all the other Fathers of the Society.

This opinion, as regards the first part, namely as regards the future contingents depending on the divine will alone, is urged by this single and sufficient reason. For every effect is certainly known in its one and total cause, which cannot be impeded; therefore the future contingents depending on the divine will alone will certainly be known by God in the efficacious decree concerning their future existence. The antecedent needs no proof; because, the total and unimpedible cause of the future existence of an effect being known, it is certainly known that the aforesaid effect is future. The consequence, however, is proved. Because the efficacious decree of the divine will concerning future things of this kind is the one and total cause of their future existence; otherwise they would not depend on it alone: and moreover the aforesaid decree is an unimpedible cause; because it can be impeded neither from without, as is clear from that which is said ad Roman. 9. Who can resist his will? nor from within, from the fact that, once God has held an absolute and efficacious decree about the future existence of some thing, it is repugnant that he have the opposite decree about the same thing not existing; otherwise the divine will would be mutable, just as on this account created will is mutable: therefore, in the aforesaid decree, God will certainly know the future contingents which depend on the aforesaid decree without the intervention of other secondary causes.

6 Next, the second part of the same opinion, namely that absolute future contingents depending on secondary causes cannot be certainly known by God in the aforesaid decree, is proved first by the testimonies of St. Thomas. For as often as he treats of their certain knowledge by God, so often does he have recourse to their presence in eternity; but not to the determination of their causes, and consequently neither to the decree, and the free and efficacious determination of the divine will in regard to their production. Whence, in 1. dist. 38. quaest. 1. art. 5., after he has said that the aforesaid future things cannot be known in their causes, immediately explaining in what way they can be known, he says: But when they are brought about in the nature of things, then they have determinate being: and therefore when they are in act, they are certainly known: and so nothing prevents God from having certain knowledge of future contingents, when his glance is directed towards the thing according as it is presentially in act, and already has determinate being. And in the answer to the second: A future contingent is not determinately true before it happens, because it has no determinate cause; but while it is in act, it is determinately true. And to the third: A future (he says) contingent, referred to God's knowledge, is necessary, because it is not directed towards itself except according as it is in actual being. And in the solution to the sixth: The knowledge of God (admittedly) does not look upon a contingent thing except as it is presentially in its actual being. And further on: If God had seen the cause but had not seen the effect immediately in its own being, He could never have known it with certainty.

7 This is confirmed first. For according to the holy Doctor, future contingents cannot be certainly known, so long as they are future, that is, for as long as they have the character of future things: therefore neither in their determinate causes; and consequently neither in the divine decree determining the divine will towards their production. This second consequence is clear from the first. The first, however, is from the antecedent. Because future things known in their determinate causes are known as future: therefore, and so on. The antecedent, however, is asserted by St. Thomas, q. 2. de Veritate art. 12, in these words: A contingent, as future, cannot be known by any knowledge, under which falsity cannot lie. Whence, since falsity does not lie under divine knowledge, nor can lie, it would be impossible that God should have knowledge of future contingents, if he knew them as future things. And in the solution to the first: Although a contingent be not determinate so long as it is future, yet once it has been produced in the nature of things, it has determinate truth: and in this way the glance of divine knowledge is directed towards it.

This is confirmed secondly from the same Angelic Doctor. For the prophecy of threat is not always certain, and yet through it the future is revealed such as it is in its determinate created and uncreated causes, directed towards producing it: therefore the aforesaid future thing cannot be certainly known in the determination of its causes, and consequently neither in the determination of the divine will. The major is by St. Thomas, 2. 2. quaest. 171. art. 6. ad 2., and is clear from the prophecies of the death of Ezechias and of the devastation of the Ninevites, which were not fulfilled. The minor, however, is proved. Because the aforesaid future things are not revealed such as they are in themselves; otherwise they would be the very things; nor such as they are in their undetermined causes, otherwise they would not be revealed more as future than as not future: therefore they are revealed in determinate causes, the most powerful of which is the divine will determined by its decree.

8 Secondly, the same part is proved principally. Because, any decree being posited, created will remains indifferent toward each of the two alternatives: therefore, from the force of the knowledge of such a decree, a future contingent, for example a free act depending on that will, cannot be known with certainty. The consequence seems certain. For just as from the force of the knowledge of that same will, taken precisely as such, its future acts cannot be certainly known, from the fact that it is itself indifferent toward each of the two alternatives, and that in an indifferent cause as such it cannot be certainly known toward which side it is to be inclined, so likewise, if the decree of the divine will does not remove the aforesaid indifference of created will, the future acts of the aforesaid will will not be able to be known with certainty from the force of the knowledge of that same decree: since such a decree does not remove the root from which the uncertainty of the future existence of its acts proceeds, namely the indifference toward each of the two alternatives. The antecedent, however, needs no proof. Especially because, if created will were freed by that decree, then its acts would not be among the number of the future contingents of which we are speaking, namely those which in some way depend on secondary free causes, as such.

This is confirmed. For the aforesaid decree either has an infallible and necessary connexion with that future contingent, or only a fallible one. If the first, then the freedom of created will is removed as regards the influx which it will give to the production of such a future thing: since, the aforesaid decree being posited, which precedes its concurrence, and the positing or removal of which is not in its power, the aforesaid future thing cannot be posited otherwise than so that there be a fallible connexion between it and the divine decree. If, however, the second is said, then from the force of the knowledge of such a decree the aforesaid future thing will not be able to be known with certainty: since from the force of the knowledge of anything that has a fallible connexion with another, this latter cannot be known certainly and infallibly.

Lastly. Because future contingents, at least those involving sin, will not be able to be certainly known by God in the free decree of his will: since God does not will that sins be committed; as is defined in Concil. Trident. sess. 6. can. 10. and 17.

§ III. In accordance with the mind of Scripture and of the Fathers, the knot of the difficulty is untied.

9 Nevertheless it must be said that God certainly and infallibly knows all absolute future contingents in the efficacious decree of his will. This seems to be expressed in Isaiah 14: The Lord of hosts hath sworn, saying: If it be not as I thought, so shall it be; and as I have purposed in my mind, so shall it come to pass, that I will break the Assyrian in my land. And with a few words intervening, this is added: This is the counsel which I have purposed over all the earth; and the Lord of hosts hath decreed: and who can weaken it? and his hand is stretched out; and who can turn it back? Where God said that the destruction of the Assyrians was certainly and infallibly future, because he himself had decreed it, to whom no one can resist. And so, in his decree infallibly bringing about the aforesaid destruction, he foreknew it, although such a devastation in some way depended on the will of the Assyrians, by which they came freely into the land of the Lord, in which they were to be broken.

10 Nor is the solution of Valentinus Herice sufficient, namely that it is not proved from this testimony that the decree of God concerning the breaking of the Assyrian army was altogether efficacious and absolute, and that it expected no condition and no foreknowledge on the part of free choice. For the opposite is the case. First, because in the preceding words the sacred text sufficiently indicates that that event was future: because God purposed it in his mind, and not the other way round. And so he says: The Lord of hosts hath sworn; if it be not as I thought, so shall it be, and as I have purposed in my mind, so shall it come to pass; and then also: because in this testimony God glories in the efficacy and power of his decree, so that precisely by the very fact that he himself is the one who decreed it, no one is able to weaken it. If, however, that decree were infallibly efficacious because the future event was foreknown, then there would be no greater glory to God than to a creature determining that very thing, nor would there be required for this the infinitude of divine power and will, which no one can weaken; but a creature could glory in the same way, that with it determining such a devastation, and employing means towards it, and the future effect being foreknown, no one could resist: whence those words and that mode of speaking of Isaiah have greater energy than the force allowed them by Herice.

11 The same thing seems to be expressed in that Psalm 134: Whatsoever the Lord pleased, he did in heaven and in earth. And ad Roman. 9: Who can resist his will? These testimonies, says Augustine elegantly in Enchirid. ad Laur. cap. 95, are to be understood not only of the future things which depend on the divine will alone, but also of those which have a dependence on both wills, the uncreated and the created alike. There, in order to show how much certainty, immutability and efficacy the will of God has towards adults, whom he wills to obtain eternal beatitude, and whose salvation depends not only on the will of God but also on their own free consent, he brings the aforesaid words of the Psalm: Whatsoever the Lord pleased, he did; and he adds: Which would not be true, if he had willed anything to do and had not done it. And what is more unworthy: he did it not because he should not do what he willed, the will of the man hindered the omnipotent. And shortly after: Unless we believe this, the very beginning of the confession of our faith is in danger, in which we confess that we believe in God the Father almighty. For he is not truly called almighty for any other reason than because he can do whatsoever he wills, and the effect of the omnipotent will is hindered by the will of no creature. Where, as will be evident to the one who considers, he attributes an excellent and supreme efficacy to the divine decree, on account of which, while the freedom of created choice is preserved, God can infallibly do whatsoever has pleased his infinite will: and hence, while in this decree he infallibly brings about any future things whatever, God will be able and will be bound to know all future contingents with certainty.

12 Whence this very thing is maintained by St. Thomas, first, contra Gentes cap. 68, where, treating in particular of created volition, he said in the first reason that God knows it, insofar as he knows his own essence. And in the second reason, that he knows the same through his own essence, just as through the knowledge of a cause the effects are known. And then he subjoins: Therefore God knows all things, by knowing his own essence, to which his causality extends; and it extends to the operations of the intellect and of the will. Now he is speaking of created acts of the will, not as of possible ones; for about the possible ones in general he had treated in cap. 66, but about those existing for some duration, as is clear from that whole chapter.

And q. 2. de Veritate art. 12, he plainly teaches that God knows future contingents in himself, as being in their cause: and hence in himself, as determined by decree, according to which relation he is their cause. For in the fourth argument in support of his opinion he thus says: God knows things, insofar as he is their cause: but God is not only the cause of necessary things, but also of contingent ones: therefore he knows both necessary and contingent things. And in the sixth argument he thus has it: To know is to know the cause of a thing: but God knows the causes of all contingent things, for he knows himself, who is the cause of all things: therefore he himself knows contingent things. And in the solution to the last he plainly teaches that he knows future contingents in himself, as in the mean: because the divine essence, although it be not the mean proportional and adequate to any creature, is nevertheless the mean proportional with respect to individual things. Wherefore, since it is a mean and a cause only when determined by decree, it follows that in it, so taken, it attains the aforesaid future things.

13 The same thing is also taught in art. 9 of this question, in the solution to the third: where he says: The knowledge of God is the cause of things, joined to the will: whence it is not necessary that whatsoever God knows be, or have been, or be future; but only those which he wills to be, or permits to be. In these words he plainly teaches that the future existence of things must be inferred with reference to the divine will ordaining or permitting them: and so, this will having been once known, the future effect will be known in it infallibly. Just as, the cause of the possibility of things, namely divine omnipotence, being known, as it contains, for example, a horse, the possibility of that same horse cannot but be known with certainty.

15 Wherefore, in order that the holy Doctor might explain more fully how the divine will is the reason and cause of the future existence, for example, of a pious consent, and not only a concomitant condition, he says that future things are not known by God because they are future, but conversely. For the future existence does not precede the knowledge, but follows it (as he also teaches in article 8 of this question, and first, contra Gentes cap. 67, ratione 6) — not indeed any future existence whatever, but insofar as it has the will joined to it, as he asserts in that same eighth article, and so thenceforth he infers in the aforesaid ninth article that not all things which God knows are future, but those which he wills. Where, as you see, he attributes to the divine will that it is of itself the efficacious cause of the future existence of a contingent thing, prior to the foreknowledge of it: otherwise he would not have said: therefore they are future, because they are known by God; but rather the opposite ought to have been asserted, namely: therefore they are known, because they are future: and consequently, this efficacious decree having been once known, efficiently bringing about the future existence of contingents, the same future existence cannot but be known in it.

The holy Doctor has the same thing in that testimony, which was brought forward in the preceding difficulty, namely in this first part, q. 16. art. 7. ad tertium, where he says: That which now is, was future before it was, because it was in its cause that it should come to pass. Whence, the cause being removed, that thing would not be future. But the first cause alone is eternal. Whence it does not follow that those things which are should always have been truly future, except insofar as they were in the eternal cause, that they should be future: which cause is God alone. Where, as you see, he reduces the eternal future existence of things to God alone, as to the one eternal cause of it: and since he himself causes it through the will (in the manner, however, just now pointed out, and explained in disput. 5. dub. 3), it follows that he reduces it in the same way to that same will: and thenceforward, the aforesaid will, or decree, being known as the cause of it, the aforesaid future existence cannot but be known.

14 Lastly, the holy Doctor taught this same thing below in q. 19. art. 8, and q. 6. de Veritate art. 3. ad quartum. For when it had been put to him that every certainty which is with the supposition of something is not absolute certainty: as, for example, it is not certain that the Sun will cause fruit in the plant, unless with this condition, namely that the generative power of the plant be well disposed: from the fact that the power of the Sun supposes the power of the plant, as it were a secondary cause: and consequently, for the same reason, if the certainty of predestination is with the presupposition of a secondary cause, it will not be absolute certainty, but only conditional. The same Angelic Doctor answers: The secondary cause which must be supposed in order to induce the effect of predestination is itself subject to the order of predestination. It is not so, however, in the inferior powers with respect to any superior power acting. And therefore the order of divine predestination, although it is with the supposition of human will, nevertheless has absolute certainty, even if the contrary appears in the example introduced.

Where, as is clear from the diametrical opposition, St. Thomas is set against the adversaries, who deny that the decrees of God are absolute and efficacious, and who admit only a decree founded on conditional knowledge, and who wait upon the operation of the secondary cause. And moreover he adds that there is absolute certainty in divine predestination; and that this arises from the order and causality of predestination itself; from the fact that whatsoever is supposed, or required, in order to induce the effect of predestination, is subject to the order of predestination; although whatsoever is required for the causality of the Sun with respect to the fruits in the plant is not subject to its causality, that is, is not infallibly inferred from the causality of the Sun: and hence even the future things which depend on secondary free causes, such as the effects of predestination, will be known by God with absolute certainty, by the force of that same predestination, as being their cause; and consequently by the force of the efficacious decree involved in it, on account of which predestination has the way just now pointed out of efficiently inferring the aforesaid effects: but not because divine knowledge waits to see what is to be done by the secondary causes, in order from this to behold the future effects antecedently with conditional certainty.

15 Other holy Fathers taught the same thing, especially Augustine, de praedestinatione Sanctorum, cap. 10, and lib. 26. contra Faustum, cap. 4; Hilary, 9. De Trinitate, a little after the beginning: where he says: What God decreed to do, he knew in his will: but he decreed to do all things which are done, because his purpose works all things: therefore the things which are future are known by him in the decree of his will. And several other of the holy Fathers, whom Alvarez refers to in lib. 3. de auxiliis divinae gratiae, disput. 22, but to whom, as well as to the other places of Scripture, in particular, we refer, we abstain: because in tract. de Voluntate

Dei art. 8, we shall return to this point expressly, when there we shall have explained, as in its proper place, the supreme efficacy of the divine will: and how, while the freedom of created choice is preserved, it efficaciously predefines all its works by the decree by which it wills them, or efficaciously permits them.

And lastly, the Scholastics maintain this same opinion, as Ricardus in 1. dist. 38. art. 1. quaest. 5; Scotus, dist. 39. quaest. unica, and in quodlib. quaest. 14; Herveus there, quaest. unica, and dist. 46. quaest. 2; Ludovicus Vives, on the 5th book of St. Augustine's De Civitate Dei; Leonardus Coquaeus at the place below in disput. 10. num. 128, referring; Cajetanus, Bannez, Zumel, Nazarius, Gonzalez, Machin, Petrus Corneio in the present, Alvarez lib. 2. de auxiliis divinae gratiae, disp. 10 and 11; Ledesina, lib. de auxiliis, disput. de scientia futurorum conting. dub. 3, about the solution of the 4th argument; Aestius in 1. sentent. dist. 38. § 7; and very many others.

§ IV. A single and fundamental reason in support of the assertion.

16 But before we prove the assertion, we must explain it briefly: for in it we do not intend to determine whether God knows absolute future contingents in his decree, as in the object that is in every way primary and, as it were, specifying that knowledge. Or whether the divine essence alone, determined however by decree, is the primary and, as it were, specifying object of it: for this is sufficiently clear from what we said in this same tract. disp. 3. num. 17; but it is clear only from the very fact that, when an efficacious decree about a future existence, for example that of Antichrist, is said to be in God, the divine essence itself at once represents it to God's intellect. And so, the divine essence, and the aforesaid decree being known, or the divine essence being known, determined however by the aforesaid decree, the aforesaid future thing cannot but be known in it.

Now the fundamental reason of the assertion thus explained was touched upon by St. Thomas in the places cited, and we shall pursue it more broadly in the treatise on the Will of God, and it can be reduced to this form. Since the divine will is the most universal and the most efficacious: therefore it must efficaciously predefine, both as regards substance and as regards mode, whatever is to be done by God outwardly, or whatever is afterwards to happen by any secondary causes whatsoever; so that all these things infallibly come to pass according to the prescript of that same will: therefore, in this predefining decree, God will be able and will be bound to know all future contingents with certainty. This second consequence follows clearly from the first. Because it does not stand that the knowledge of the divine decree, or (which amounts to the same for the present) of the divine essence as determined by such a decree, which certainly and infallibly infers the future existence of any future contingent, and yet that the aforesaid future existence is not known with certainty.

17 The first consequence, however, also follows from the antecedent. For if the divine will did not predefine all those things, both as regards substance and as regards mode, it would not be the most universal: since it would not extend to all future things that can be willed by it, either as regards their substance or as regards their modes, namely necessity, or contingency, and freedom: just as likewise it would not be the most efficacious, if all things did not come to pass infallibly just as it itself decrees, that is, if, when it decrees that they happen necessarily, that is, by means of secondary causes operating necessarily, they did not happen necessarily; and when it decrees that they be produced freely, they then did not happen freely yet infallibly, that is, in fact and in deed they would not be so, although they are able not to be so, from the fact that in this manner they are predefined: since for a will to be the most efficacious, it must be efficacious both about the substance and about the mode of the thing to be done. If, however, all things did not come to pass in the mode in which the divine will decreed, in the sense explained, that they would come to pass, then it would not extend efficaciously, either as regards the substance or as regards the mode of all future things, so that they would come to pass just as they are predefined by it: therefore, and so on.

The antecedent, however, is proved. Because God is the most universal and the most efficacious agent, from the fact that he is the most universal being, having infinite efficacy for operating: therefore, since he also acts through the will, it is necessary that his will be the most universal in willing and the most efficacious in causing, or inferring whatever falls under his volition, and in the mode in which it falls under it.

This is confirmed and explained firstly, by a reason drawn from the same holy Doctor. Since God certainly knows all possible things in his essence, as in a cause known beforehand: therefore he will also certainly know all future things in that same essence, as in a cause known beforehand: and consequently in the efficacious divine decree, or (which amounts to the same) in that same essence determined by such a decree. This last consequence follows clearly from the first. Since the divine essence is not the cause of the aforesaid future things unless determined by its own efficacious decree. The first consequence, however, is clear from the antecedent. Because the whole reason on account of which possible things are certainly known in the divine essence, as in a cause known beforehand, is that they are contained in it as effects are contained in their cause, from which they receive their whole entity and intelligibility: and thus they are only secondary objects with respect to divine knowledge: which therefore, by the force of that knowledge, as a previously known object, must be attained. This reason, however, has an equal force with respect to future creatures, so that in the same essence determined by the aforesaid decree and known beforehand, they may be certainly known, as will be evident to the one who considers. The antecedent, however, is sufficiently clear from what we said above in art. 5 and 6 and in tract. de Visione Dei art. 8, and is admitted by nearly all the adversaries.

This is confirmed and explained secondly, by a reason of the same holy Doctor. Since the divine will is not the cause of things in any and every way, but the first cause, and consequently its efficacy is independent of any other efficacy of secondary will, although it infers that efficacy: therefore, when God in that same will efficaciously decrees the future existence of any future thing, he will certainly know that it is future, just as it is decreed by the divine will. The consequence seems clear. The antecedent, however, is clear as regards the first part. As regards the second, it is likewise plain. For just as with respect to the relation of secondary will there is a dependence in its own volition and efficacy upon the first will, so conversely, with respect to the relation of the first will there will be an independence in its own volition and efficacy from the second will, although as often as it wills the concurrence of that same secondary will, it must, by the reason of its efficacy, infer it in the mode in which it has willed it.

§ V. Solutions of the adversaries, and refutation of them.

19 This reason with its confirmations is so efficacious, that from the mere unfolding of them the evasions which the adversaries bring forward easily collapse. For in the first place, some say that from this it does not follow that the knowledge of the divine decree suffices with respect to the future things which depend on a free created cause: from the fact that the divine will is not the total and adequate cause of them: whereas an effect is not known certainly and infallibly in its cause unless that cause be adequate.

Against this, the solution from what has been said in our reason and confirmations, especially if they are weighed a little, sufficiently collapses it. First, because, although the created cause does concur many times in the production of the future things depending on it; nevertheless it is not so situated with respect to the divine will, as we were saying above from St. Thomas, as a plant is with respect to the Sun with regard to the production of the fruit contained in it: because the latter is not at all subject to the power of the Sun, on account of the limitation of that same Sun: which cannot always infer the disposition required on the part of the plant, which is to operate together with it in the production of the fruit. On the other hand, on account of its infinite universality and efficacy, every secondary will is altogether subject to the divine will, so that in it and with it it can do whatever pleases itself, and in the mode in which it pleases. For just as necessary secondary causes obey at the nod of the divine will, according to their own mode, that is, in a necessary manner, so also free causes obey it even at the nod, according to their own proper mode, that is, in a free manner; otherwise the divine will would not be the first, nor infinitely efficacious in willing, as is clear from what has been said.

Then also because, although created will does concur simultaneously with uncreated will in the production of many future contingents, namely of free acts proceeding from it; nevertheless on that account the divine will does not produce that whole act and totally, that is, so that there be in it some formality, or mode of formality, which is not in everything it says, attained by the divine will in its own proper mode; otherwise there would be some created being, or formality, or mode of it, which would escape the divine causality; and hence there would be, and yet there would not be, a being by participation, as will be evident to the one who considers. It is clear, however, that this mode of causing is sufficient for this, that once the decree of the aforesaid will is known, any future effect may be certainly known in it: since according to everything it has, it proceeds from that will. But concerning these things, let them see what our Complut. assert in lib. Physicor. disp. 15. num. 59.

20 Next, others object that it does not follow from the reason made that God certainly knows in his decree the future contingents, although their future existence follows from the divine decree. For the first free act of a man follows from the natural judgment, not however from a free judgment, or one commanded by the will, in such a way that such a judgment determines that will towards the aforesaid act: and yet the Angel, knowing this natural judgment, does not thereby know the free act caused from it; otherwise the acts of a free man would be open to the Angel, whose opposite the Theologians commonly say in the matter of Angels; therefore, from the fact that God knows his own decree, and this is the cause of the future existence of contingent things, it does not follow that such future things ensuing from it will be known.

21 For the opposite of this is the case, that, as St. Thomas teaches in prima secundae, q. 9. art. 4 and 6. ad tertium, and Cajetan there, the first volition which a man has is of a universal good, and from a divine motion, and consequently is necessary: from this volition, however, the will determines itself, in the way explained elsewhere, God giving it, towards these or those particular objects to be willed, and therefore consequently it can move the intellect to have efficacious dominion, by which it determines that same will towards this, that it may elicit an act about some particular object: and this dominion, and judgment, is that which moves the will to the exercise of a free act with respect to a particular object.

Wherefore, because such a dominion partakes of freedom, it is not known by the Angel: and consequently neither is the act which it determines. If, however, the aforesaid dominion were known by the Angel, then, because it does not determine in any and every way, but in such a way that the commanded free act infallibly follows from it, then such an act would undoubtedly be attained by the Angel, and thenceforward, since from the free efficacious decree of God all future contingents predefined by God infallibly follow, it would be necessary that, the aforesaid decree being known, those future things ensuing from it should be known with that same certainty. But concerning these things, let them see what we shall say in tract. de Praedestinatione disp. 2. from num. 76 up to 84.

22 Furthermore, Suarez and others answer, first, that God cannot predefine future contingents, depending on created freedom, by a decree which efficaciously and infallibly infers them, unless he first foresee through conditional knowledge what the aforesaid will would be willing in such an occasion, or with such circumstances; lest, if he predefined otherwise, the freedom of that same will be removed. Then also, that in order to preserve in the divine will the relation of first cause, and the dependence of any future thing upon it, it is not necessary that it be the first cause of the future existence, by reason of an efficacious decree, which in their opinion follows upon middle knowledge; but by reason of another inefficacious will, preceding it. For with regard to such knowledge, by which God knows that Peter will consent on the hypothesis that he be placed in this or that occasion, and with these or those circumstances, there is presupposed in God a will by which he wills to grant him concurrence for whatever he himself may wish to do; yet not determining that such concurrence be towards this or that determinate act, nor with respect to this or that determinate object; but either passing over those, or with respect to this determinate act and object, under the condition, if created will should wish it: and with respect to another act and object, if that same will should so wish: and this conditional will of God, preceding that created consent, is the first root and first cause of the future existence of such a consent: and it becomes absolute and efficacious, the condition being posited, namely that Peter, for example, wills to operate and to consent.

23 On the other hand, although this solution must be impugned by several in tract. de Voluntate Dei art. 8, where we shall show that the efficacious predefinition of God, prior to all middle knowledge, by which he predefines the free acts of created will, not only does not remove freedom in them, but even posits it. And likewise, although the aforesaid solution remains impugned by what was said in the preceding difficulties, in which we proved that before the efficacious decree of the divine will no absolute future thing can be known with certainty and infallibility by any knowledge; for the reasons there given prove nothing about the conditional future, as will be evident to the one who considers, and as will be evident from what is to be said in the following dispu-

tationibus, will be evident: and lastly, although the impossibility of this middle knowledge must be shown especially in disput. 10 and 11, and also 12 of this treatise, nevertheless the aforesaid solution, from the mere wider unfolding of the reason made and of its confirmations, easily collapses.

For in the first place, what is contained in it in the first place, namely that God cannot, with the freedom of created choice preserved, efficaciously predefine the future consent foreknown through middle knowledge, is sufficiently proved to be false from the efficacy, universality and priority which we have said to be in the divine will. For these things look to it, that both the substance of the act and its mode, namely freedom, in whatever state, whether absolute or conditional, should proceed from the efficacy of the divine will, in such a way that therefore the act is so made both as regards substance and as regards mode, because God wills it to be so; but not conversely: otherwise such a will would neither be the first, as is clear, nor the most universal in causing, nor finally supremely efficacious: since any efficacy of created will under some state does not arise from its efficacy. But if an efficacious consent of the will had to be foreknown first, if the will were placed in this or that occasion, before the divine will efficaciously predefined the aforesaid act as regards its substance and its mode, then this would be a true causal proposition: Therefore God wills and decrees that Peter read, because he himself wills or is going to will to read; since the conditional knowledge, by which this appears, presupposes its object, namely the aforesaid volition; but does not cause it. And likewise this would be a false causal proposition: Therefore Peter wills or is going to will to read, because God wills and decrees that he read. And so created will would be the first cause and the first root of the future existence of its act, and God would be the secondary cause of it: and consequently he would neither be the most universal nor the most efficacious cause of it: since the first beginning of such a future existence would proceed not from the will of God but from that of man.

24 Nor does that which the same solution brings forward in the second place, about that inefficacious and conditional will preceding middle knowledge, favour it in this, that it preserves the universality, priority, and — much less — the efficacy of the divine will. For from the fact that God has that inefficacious and conditional will with respect to the free act of created will, it does not follow that the aforesaid act, considered specifically and individually, is future, because God wills it with that inefficacious and conditional will: therefore by reason of the aforesaid will it cannot be preserved that God is the first and most universal cause of the whole future existence of such an act, and of any other whatsoever, much less that he has supreme efficacy. The consequence seems clear from what has been said.

The antecedent, however, is urged. Because under that will of God this act does not fall determinately, and rather in the individual than the opposite, or its omission: since that will extends only to giving assistance and concurrence to created freedom, in order that it may freely will or not will; or in order that it may will this or that, according as it has determined itself by its own freedom, so that as far as this act itself is concerned, for the sign by which such a will is posited, it has no more the character of a future thing than any other: because this is left, according to this mode of speaking, to the innate freedom of created will; therefore it will be false that created will has, or will have on the hypothesis, this very act here and now, because God wills it with that antecedent and conditional will: and consequently neither is it preserved that that act is so made in the individual because God wills it to be made, nor that the divine will is the first, most universal, and most efficacious in causing.

25 This is confirmed and explained. Because at the most it follows from that will that God is the first cause with respect to the free act of created will taken in general, or vaguely; but not in particular, and considered in species and in the individual; since through that will God does not will, as yet ineffectively, this act in particular rather than another; but only that the will elicit this act, or its opposite, or its omission, or another which may please it: but that it elicit this rather than that is left to its own will; therefore neither is preserved the priority worthy of the most universal cause, such as is the divine will. For this must extend, by the mode of a first cause, to all future things according to species and individual, so that therefore they are future, because God wills them. But concerning this solution, as we intimated a moment ago, we shall return to the matter in this same treatise, where it will be more fully impugned.

26 Lastly. A certain junior brings forward another solution to our principal reason.

namely that from it is proved at the most that God certainly knows all absolute future contingents in the decree of his will, not indeed with respect to what they are, but only with respect to whether they are. For from the relation of one thing to another, such as is that in the divine decree with respect to the future things, the knowledge at the most is collected of that thing to which the aforesaid relation is terminated; not indeed perfect in being and quiddity, but only with respect to whether it is, just as from the knowledge of a power of sight, which says of a relation towards the visible, the quiddity-knowledge of that same visible does not follow, but only whether it is.

But this solution vanishes before the reason made. Because future contingents are not known in the decree, or (which is the same for the present) in the divine essence, as determined by it, by reason of the relation which the aforesaid decree bears towards them: but by reason of the connexion of cause with its effect, insofar as the whole entity of those future things, as such, is contained as in a cause in the divine essence, as determined by its own decree: it is clear, however, that the knowledge of anything in another, as in its cause wholly containing it, can be quiddity-knowledge, precisely because it is knowledge a priori, and through something of it, namely through the cause, which is deemed to be something of the effect. And therefore the knowledge of those same future things, as of possible things, and residing in the divine essence and omnipotence, as in their cause according to this reasoning, is knowledge with respect to what those things are, and not only with respect to whether they are.

From which it is also clear that the example of sight and of the visible thing, even if we grant that from the knowledge of the sight a quiddity-knowledge of the visible does not follow, is not to the point: since the sight is not the cause of the visible. But if it were its cause, then, the sight being penetrated and known quidditatively, the visible could be known quidditatively from the force of that knowledge.

§ VI. A way is opened against the single foundation of the first opinion.

27 For the foundation of the first opinion, the antecedent must be granted and the consequence denied. And for the proof, it must be said that, although the divine decree founds a relation of reason towards future things, as towards an effect and object; nevertheless such a relation does not belong intrinsically to it, nor does it complete it under the aspect of such, but it is enough that the necessary volition of God connotes by the reason of its eminence this object rather than that one, and an effect, and infers it, as to be posited in view of a future time, in order that there be a free volition of its future existence, as is explained at length in tract. de Volunt. Dei disput. 7. from num. 58 up to num. 72. Whence, just as in order that there be in God a free and efficacious decree of the future existence of things, it is not necessary that such a decree add anything intrinsic, even by virtual addition, over and above the necessary act of the divine volition, but the aforesaid connotation is enough; so also, in order that the same decree be the reason of knowing future contingents, it is not necessary that it add anything intrinsic, virtually distinct from the necessary volition; but it will suffice that it connotes, in the manner stated, this object rather than that one. Let them see, however, what we said in tract. de Visione Dei disp. 7. dub. 3, and what we shall say in tract. de Voluntate Dei in the place cited.

Add that, as is explained there, it is sufficiently probable that a free act of God, as such, adds something intrinsic and virtually distinct over and above the necessary volition. How, however, this is consistent with the fact that the free act of God, by which he decreed the production of the world, was able not to be in him, and yet not on that account was anything intrinsic and real in him able to be absent, is explained by us in the same disputation and in tract. de Voluntate Dei from num. 72 up to num. 90.

28 From which, for its confirmation, it is sufficiently clear. Because although we should grant that the knowledge of the relation must precede the knowledge of the foundation and of the terminus (of which elsewhere), nevertheless nothing follows against us in the present matter: since, as we were saying a moment ago, the relation of reason, formally taken, in no way pertains to the concept and the intrinsic completion of the free act, and although the future object is an indispensable connotation of the decree, by which God wills that it be future, it is nevertheless not a connoted antecedent, but rather a consequent, and brought in from the force of that same free act, so that it is collected not a priori, but only a posteriori, that there would not have been in God such an act, if there had not been such an object, or if there had not been such a thing as future: and thus the knowledge of the future does not precede the knowledge of the decree; but rather the other way round. Just as possible creatures are an indispensable connotation of divine power, they are nevertheless a subsequent and supervening connotation, not however an antecedent. And therefore from the impossibility of all creatures the impossibility and the involvement of divine power is collected not a priori but a posteriori; and the knowledge of possible things does not precede, but follows, by a subordination explained elsewhere, the knowledge of omnipotence. But these things are explained at length in the cited tract. de Voluntate Dei disp. 7. from num. 54 up to num. 58.

§ VII. An answer is given to the first argument, and to the confirmations of it in favour of the second opinion as adduced on its second part.

29 To the foundation of the second opinion with respect to its first part, there is no need to give an answer: because it is rather for us than against us.

But to the first argument for the second part of the same opinion, which is composed from various testimonies of St. Thomas, what has been said sufficiently establishes how the holy Doctor admits a predefining decree, efficaciously inferring the future existence of absolute contingents with respect to our question; and consequently how those future things can be certainly known in it. Whence, although when he treats of their certain knowledge he has recourse to their presence in eternity, it must nevertheless be denied that he does not have recourse there, either expressly, as in the places cited by us, or virtually and implicitly, to the aforesaid decree; for those future things do not become present in eternity except by means of the decree. And so, although he does not have recourse to the proximate causes of the aforesaid future things in order to assign the certainty of divine knowledge, so that they are not understood to be determined by the decree (of which determination alone we are speaking in the present, not caring whether any other determination of secondary causes results from this decree, preceding their causality or not: because by the decree of our most holy Lord Paul V. it is provided that that which concerns the aids and predeterminations of divine grace, explaining what their efficacy is, shall not be sent to press) — yet those testimonies bear well upon the decree itself, precisely because they say that he knows those things according as they are present, not indeed in their own adequate measure, but in the measure of eternity.

30 Whence all the testimonies adduced in support of this argument are of no hindrance to us, but rather help us. Because the decree of God is of such a condition that without it absolute future things cannot have being present in eternity (of which presence St. Thomas speaks in them, as will be evident to the one who considers), and precisely from the fact that it is posited, the presence is at once posited of the thing which is said to be future in eternity, and of everything necessary to it. And therefore, of the divine essence, insofar as it is determined by its own decree to be the cause of the future existence of things, it cannot be verified what the Angelic Doctor teaches in that solution to the sixth, adduced in the last place, namely: That if God had seen the cause, and had not seen the effect immediately in its being, He could never have known it with certainty: because although other causes may be seen without the effect being seen immediately at the same time in its being; nevertheless the divine decree, as it is the cause of absolute future things, cannot be seen without the effect being seen immediately at the same time in its being, that is, existing actually in the measure of eternity.

It must be added, however, that although we granted that St. Thomas, when he treats in particular of the knowledge of future absolute contingents, did not have recourse expressly to the efficacious decree of the divine will, nevertheless nothing follows from that against us. For the same Angelic Doctor treated universally in art. 5 of this question of the mean in which God knows all creatures: and there he teaches that he sees them in his essence, as in their cause, and hence that he knows future contingents in that same essence, as determined by decree, according to which relation he is their cause. And thus it was not necessary (although he did so, as is clear from what has been said) that, treating in particular of the knowledge of future contingents, he should express the mean in which they are known by him: just as it was not necessary either when he treated in particular of the knowledge of other things.

31 From which an answer is given to the first confirmation, that St. Thomas speaks of absolute future contingents: and of these he teaches that they are not known as future, that is, as future to themselves; but as future to us, and as present to themselves. From this, however, it does not follow that they cannot be certainly known by him in the efficacious decree of his will: since, as we were saying a moment ago, this decree is of such a condition that by the very fact that it is given, the aforesaid future things are drawn out, in the manner intimated above, beyond the state of possibility, and become future to us, and actually present with respect to God and his eternity. And thus to be known in it, is to be known in the decree itself, in so far as they have at once being future to us and present to eternity; but not to be known precisely as future. For to be known precisely as future contingents and to be known with certainty, are opposed.

From which it also follows that, if it is once true that from the divine decree there results, on the outside, some physical premotion and predetermination, by which secondary causes, even free ones, are applied by God towards free acts, whether natural or supernatural (about which we do not dispute in the present, as we have already intimated), then in that premotion, or in created will, as premoted by it and present to eternity, a free future contingent can be known certainly and infallibly, according to the mind of St. Thomas. Because it is not foreknown as future precisely by the force of such a cause, but as future with respect to us, and at the same time as present in eternity: because the aforesaid premotion does not stand, nor can stand, in the composite sense, without the presence of presentiality of the act to which it is given.

32 To the second confirmation the answer is given that through the prophecy of threat the future is revealed such as it has being in its determinate proximate causes, with a fallible determination, and also in the divine will, according to the exigency of such causes; but the impediments which can impede the proximate causes, and which proceed from the will of God, are not revealed, since he considers superior reasons: as is clear in the revelation by which he revealed to Isaiah the death of Ezechias, attending to his natural disposition, and to what the divine will demanded, according to the exigency of such a disposition, and also according to the exigency of his own justice, by which he willed to punish Ezechias with death: because he had not given thanks to God for the victory obtained in war, and because he had not taken a wife, so that the line of David might be continued through Solomon up to the Nativity of Christ. But this determination, and the will of the sign, which God had with respect to this death, was impeded by that same will, according as he regarded the superior causes, namely in order that God might fulfil the promise which he had made to the house of David, that Christ would be born from the lineage of Solomon: and because this impeding cause was not revealed to Isaiah, therefore he did not know the death of Ezechias in all its determinate causes: and so it is no wonder that such a prophecy was not certainly fulfilled. It would be otherwise, however, if Isaiah, prophesying that future thing, had known it in the efficacious decree of the divine will: in which, all things being considered, he decreed absolutely and efficaciously that Ezechias should recover from that illness. For then he could have predicted with certainty his recovery, and that prediction would have been certainly fulfilled by the recovery which in fact he obtained.

§ VIII. An answer is given to the other arguments of the same opinion.

33 To the second principal argument, the antecedent having been granted, the consequence is to be denied. And for the proof, the answer is given that the reasons are dissimilar. Because created will, according to itself, and taken precisely as such, is so free that it is not determined by a free mode infallibly towards one part, but is indifferent towards each of the two alternatives without the aforesaid determination. But the will and the divine essence determined by its own decree has a free and infallible determination towards one part, and so in it, so determined, the future contingents which are predefined by it can be known with certainty. How, however, created freedom is maintained consistently with this infallible predefinition, is explained more broadly in tract. de Voluntate Dei art. 8: and it is clear from what was said in this difficulty in num. 17 and 19: since the form (so to speak) of this decree is: Let the free act be done, for example the conversion of St. Peter in a free manner, that is, such that although in the act it were never verified that it would not happen, it can nevertheless not happen, and this be verified. And thus, on the side on which it is efficaciously decreed that it be done, it will certainly be done: and on the side on which it is established that it can not be done, it will be done in a free manner.

34 It will also be clear, for the confirmation, from what is to be said in tract. de Voluntate Dei disp. 10. num. 78 and onwards, and it is clear from what was said in dub. 2 of the preceding disputation, as well as from what we were saying a moment ago, how between the decree and the future thing predefined by it there is an infallible connexion, although not necessary with a necessity which simply removes freedom: from the fact that freedom is not removed, but rather it is decreed that the aforesaid act be done in such a way that it can not be done.

We have said: Although not necessary, with a necessity which simply removes freedom: because in truth that connexion is altogether necessary, insofar as the efficacious decree of God, by reason of its infinite efficacy, indispensably requires the sequence of the thing decreed by it: nevertheless, because that which it requires is this whole conjunction, namely that the act of created will be done, and that it be done in a free manner, that is, that it be done in such a way that it can not be done, freedom is therefore not harmed, but rather it follows from it that it is altogether necessary that that free act be done in a free manner. For just as that which is fallible cannot be infallible; yet it can indeed be infallible that that which is fallible should be so free as to be able not to be done, so likewise a free act, as such, cannot be necessary: nevertheless it is necessary that that which is intrinsically free be done in a free manner, and have the character of a free act.

To the last, the sequence is to be denied. And for the proof, although God does not will sins, formally taken; nevertheless he wills to permit them: and moreover he has an efficacious decree concerning the substance of other sinful acts: and in these decrees he can certainly know them. But concerning this, let them see what we shall say in tract. de Volunt. Dei disp. 10. dub. 5.

35 In the title under consideration the question is not asked absolutely concerning the eternal presence of future things with respect to eternity, but according to the mind of Scripture and of the Fathers, and especially of the Angelic Doctor. For many contend strongly that this presence is not of the mind of Scripture and of the Fathers, and particularly not of St Thomas. Hence, since the principal proof of this presence — and therefore of the reason on account of which future contingents are certainly known by the divine intellect — depends on this, we therefore raise this difficulty on its own, and for the sake of greater clarity to explain the matter.

Just as, with studied care, that clause has also been added to the same title: really and physically present to God. For presence is twofold: one kind is objective, the other is real and physical. For the former kind, nothing further is required than that the thing which is said to be present in this way be known: for it is proper to the power of the knower to draw things to itself. For the latter kind, however, it is further required that the thing should be truly present according to its true essence and existence in some true duration; so that even if, impossibly, there were no possible knowledge by reason of which it should be objectively present to the cognitive power, it would nevertheless truly be present according to its essence and existence in the aforesaid duration.

The title, therefore, is not to be understood as concerning only that former, objective presence. Because, as is clear from what has been said, God certainly knows absolute future contingents, so that they cannot but be objectively present to him; but it concerns the latter presence, in such a way that from this the former may be inferred: namely, from the fact that the real and physical presence which future things have from eternity in eternity is, at least insofar as it is taken on God's side, in some way the reason for knowing the aforesaid future things. And although others raise this difficulty as to its first part in other words — namely, whether absolute future contingents truly and really are future with respect to eternity, or are rather always really present to it — nevertheless both modes of inquiry coincide in the same point, as will be evident to one who considers.

§ I. The opinion denying it.

36 The part which denies, as regards everything contained in the title, is followed by Suarez, lib. 1, de scientia futurorum absolutorum, cap. 7; Vazquez, in the present work, disp. 64; Arrubal, disput. 41, cap. 4; and many others, to be mentioned in the following difficulty. This opinion, as regards its first part, namely, that the aforesaid presence of future things in eternity is not drawn from Scripture: nay rather, according to it, the opposite must be said.

It is proved first. For it is said in Genesis 1: In the beginning (that is, in time) God created heaven and earth. And in Psalm 89: Before the mountains were made, or the earth and the orb was formed: from eternity, and unto eternity thou art God. From these passages the following argument is derived. For, as you see, both that things are said to have begun to exist in time through creation, and that God precedes them in duration are asserted; but these cannot be verified, if things were physically present from eternity in eternity: therefore they are present to him only objectively, and not physically. The minor, as regards the first part, is proved. Because a thing which begins to be through creation is not supposed to have any being before it; but it is made out of nothing: yet if it physically coexisted with eternity from eternity, it would be supposed to exist before its creation in time with some being: therefore it cannot be verified that such a thing began to have being in time through creation.

The minor is likewise evident as regards the second part. Because when two things physically coexist at the same time, neither precedes the other in duration: therefore, precisely because creatures were physically present from eternity to eternity, and consequently to God himself, it could not be verified what Scripture teaches, namely that God precedes them in duration.

37 Secondly, for the other part, namely for the second part of the same opinion, namely that the aforesaid presence of future things is not to be admitted according to the mind of the Fathers, the argument is as follows. For when the Fathers and the Councils state that God alone was from eternity and that all creatures began in time, they speak absolutely; therefore they hold that future things are not present to God from eternity in eternity: otherwise they would not have had to deny absolutely the presence of future things from eternity, but with this qualification, namely, in the measure of our time.

It is confirmed first from the Council of Nicaea in the Creed of faith, and from Athanasius, oration 2, contra Arianos: where, when they condemn as impious that word of Arius about the Son of God, sounding out: He was when he was not, they wish to denote some measure of duration in which the Son of God always was, but not a creature: therefore, since such a measure is none other than eternity, it follows that, according to the mind of the Council and of Athanasius, future creatures were not present to God in the measure of eternity.

It is confirmed secondly from the twofold testimony of Augustine which Arrubal adduces. The first indeed, in lib. 12, de Civit. Dei, cap. 28, in these words: If God were to withdraw his power from things, they would not be as they were before they came to be, and had not been: "before" I mean in eternity, not in time. The second, however, in serm. 11, de verbis Apostoli, where he says thus: God has the elect within himself, not in their nature, but in his foreknowledge. Now if the elect, before they existed in their own proper duration, had been really and physically present in eternity, then he would have them within himself not only in his foreknowledge, but also in their nature.

It is confirmed thirdly from Isidore, lib. de sum. bono, cap. 8, in these words: If the times were always present to God, they would not be times, but eternity, because they would not change, but would stand.

Thirdly.

38 Thirdly, for the third part of the same opinion, namely that according to the Angelic Doctor the aforesaid real and physical presence of future things in eternity, which is from eternity, is not to be admitted, but only objective presence, the argument is as follows. For the Holy Doctor, after he had said in this article that all things which are in time are present to God from eternity, immediately, in order to explain what kind of presence this was, added that they are present to HIM from eternity. Not only by that reason whereby he has the reasons of things present with himself, as some say; but because his intuition is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality. Where, as you see, the Angelic Doctor teaches that future things are present to God from eternity to this extent, namely that his intuition is borne from eternity over them, or (which comes to the same) because he knows them from eternity. But it is clear from this alone that only objective presence is conceded, on the ground of knowledge; and not physical and real presence, which would be from eternity in eternity.

It is confirmed.

It is confirmed first. For the same Angelic Doctor says below, quaest. 16, art. 7, that truth is not found from eternity except only in the divine intellect. Because the divine intellect alone is eternal, and in it alone does truth have eternity. Now if future things were really present to God from eternity in eternity, then, just as from eternity they would be present to God in eternity outside the divine intellect, so also they would have outside it an eternal truth. And in quaest. 20, art. 2, ad 2, he says: Creatures were not in God from eternity, yet he loved them from eternity, because he knew them from eternity. In which words it is openly taught that they were present to God from eternity only on the ground of objective presence, and not of physical presence.

And likewise in 1, 2, quaest. 91, art. 1, ad 1, speaking of the eternal law, and explaining how it was from eternity, when it was not yet imposed upon anyone, he says thus: It must be said that those things which are not in themselves exist with God, insofar as they are known and preordained by him, according to that of Romans 4: he who calls the things that are not as though they were. Where it clearly appears to hold that things are present to God only insofar as they are known by him, and consequently in objective being, and not physically and really.

39 It is confirmed secondly. For if, for some reason, absolute future contingents were present to God from eternity in the measure of eternity, according to the mind of St Thomas — and all the more because the Holy Doctor himself often says that eternity is an indivisible measure, and all at once, and infinite, as we shall say from the passages in this same following difficulty — then also because this very fact, that eternity is indivisible, and all at once, and infinite, makes it appear that what is future with respect to us would never be future with respect to eternity, but present; otherwise it would be future with respect to the whole eternity, and would be outside that whole, and consequently would never be present: since indeed no presence can be given to a created thing which lies outside the whole eternity encompassing infinite duration, both (so to speak) on the part before and on the part after: just as the same presence cannot exist outside the whole imaginary time, which is in like manner infinite.

The minor is proved. First, because the age of an angel is in duration indivisible, and all at once, and infinite on the part after; and yet absolute future contingents have the character of future things with respect to it, and are not present to him until they are actually in their own measure: otherwise the angel could by his own power know them, as he knows those things which are present in their own measure, the opposite of which the theologians commonly teach in the matter of angels; then also: because although eternity is all at once, and has infinite being in the ratio of duration, future things are nevertheless not contained in it adequately, but inadequately, and as in a surpassing measure: therefore they will not be coexistent with it from eternity and unto eternity: otherwise they would coexist with it adequately, and would not be in it as in a surpassing measure.

The last part of the same opinion, namely that the aforesaid presence in eternity cannot lead to this, that absolute future contingents are certainly known by God, evidently follows from the other parts already proved: since the assertion that future things are certainly known by God on the ground of the presence which they have from eternity in the measure of eternity supposes that this presence is possible.

§ II. It is established that the part affirming it is that of Scripture and of the Fathers.

40 It must nevertheless be said first, according to the mind of Scripture, that absolute future contingents are really and physically present to God from eternity in the measure of eternity, and are certainly known by God on the ground of this presence. Thus all the Doctors who are to be mentioned in the following difficulty in favour of our opinion.

Now, before we prove the assertion, this much must be noted about it, in proportion to what we noted in like manner about the assertion of the preceding difficulty, namely, that we do not wish to determine in its second part whether God certainly knows absolute future contingents in his eternity, or on the ground of eternity itself, as though it were the primary object, and as it were specifying; because, as we said there, this is clear from the passages of disp. 3, num. 43, of this tractate; but only this, that eternity, insofar as it is taken on God's side, leads on God's side to the certain knowledge of absolute future contingents: and hence that it is in some way the reason why God certainly knows them. Just as also (a point which follows from what precedes) this same presence, insofar as it is taken on the part of the aforesaid future things, is the condition for their terminating in some way the aforesaid knowledge on their own side.

And although this assertion still stands in need of a fuller explanation: since, however, it will be explained in the following difficulty, where we shall treat not so much of the mind of Scripture and of the Fathers as of the thing itself in itself, we therefore refer this point to the following difficulty.

41 The second part of this assertion, therefore, clearly follows from the first, as is manifest in itself: and it will be still clearer from what is about to be said. The first part, however, is proved. First, from that of Job 14: The number of his months is with you; that is, with respect to you my months are never future; but always present and standing firm: because your being is measured by eternity. Hence St Gregory, 12, Moral., cap. 1, expounding these words, says: Because with almighty God even things that glide stand, he declares that the number of our months is to be with him. It is clear, however, that things which glide cannot stand, except insofar as those which happen successively are stably present to God from eternity in the measure of his eternity.

The same is also gathered from those words of Ecclesiasticus 39: He beholds all the works of every creature before him from eternity, and unto eternity: and there is nothing wonderful in his sight. Where two things are asserted. The first is, that all our works are present to him from eternity: which is denoted by that clause, before him from eternity. The second is, that he perceives them intuitively from eternity: for this is signified by that clause beholds, and by what is immediately subjoined, namely: There is nothing wonderful in his sight. Where it must also be weighed, first, that the presence of our works in eternity is posited in the first place. Then, that the intuitive knowledge of God with respect to them, so that it might be shown how this presence, at least insofar as it is taken on God's side, is in some way the reason for certainly knowing our works, which are future with respect to us; and that, insofar as it is taken on the part of those same works, it is the condition for their terminating in some way the aforesaid knowledge infallibly on their own side.

Then also, from the very fact that it is said that God knows our works intuitively from eternity, it is hinted in the same place that they are really and physically present to him from eternity: since it is highly probable, in the way of the Holy Doctor, that the aforesaid presence is required altogether for intuitive knowledge, as will appear more fully from what we shall say in this same disputation from num. 59 up to 62.

42 The same is also proved from that of Hebrews 1, where it is said of the Son of God: Through whom he also made the ages. Yet among the ages some are past and some are future: but all things are said to have been made by God: because in eternity all things are present: otherwise it could not be verified that all those things have already been made. Likewise also in Isaiah 45, that which there is signified as future is said to have been created by God: yet future things are said to have been made by God, because in his eternity all things are present, as though made, nor is anything future or past with respect to him; although something is said to be past with respect to one part of our time, and future with respect to another.

Finally, for this opinion the passage of the Apostle to the Romans 4 is to be noted, where it is said of Abraham: I have set thee, father of many nations, before God, who calls the things that are not as though they were. Where, by this which is said, before God, he explains what he had said of the past, I have set thee. For although that were future, yet because it was present to God in eternity, therefore he said, I have set thee. And he subjoins the reason when he says: Who calls the things that are not as though they were, as though he were to say: therefore he speaks of the future by way of the present, because future things are present to God in eternity: and in the same way he beholds those things which are to be done in our time, as those which have been done or are being done. In this way Ambrose explains that passage of the Apostle, in book 8, and many other holy Doctors.

43 It must be said second, according to the mind of the holy Fathers, that absolute future contingents are really and physically present to God from eternity in the measure of his eternity; and that on the ground of this presence they are certainly known by him. Thus the authors just mentioned. The first part, from which the second is sufficiently gathered, is proved first. Because they teach it, Augustine, lib. 83, quaest. quaest. 17, and 4, de Trinit., cap. 17, and lib. 5, cap. 16: With God neither have the past passed away, nor are the future yet made. Richard of St Victor, lib. 2, de Trinit., cap. 23, defends this very point in these words: As nothing is future to God of those things which are not yet, so nothing is past of all those things which are no longer: so nothing is transitory to him of all those things which are already in the present. Peter Damian, tom. 3, Bibliotheca, epist. 4, de Dei omnipotentia, cap. 8: All things (he says) which with us change by the vicissitudes of times, stand with him today (that is, with eternity) and persevere immovably. In that today, namely: that day is still motionless in which this world took its origin: and in that day he is already, and yet he is, in which he is to be judged. And below: Whence it comes about that in his eternity all things remain fixed which, outside it, issue forth unceasingly from the volumes of the ages. For God has one day, which is his eternity: which day he is seen neither to be closed at its end, nor to be opened at its beginning.

And finally this very point was taught by Gregory, lib. 20, Moral., cap. 28; Boethius, lib. 5, de consolatione, prose ult.; Anselm, lib. de casu diaboli, cap. 21, and lib. de concordia praescientiae et praedest., cap. 1; Ambrose, lib. 1, de fide ad Gratianum, cap. 7; Isidore, lib. 1, de summo bono, cap. 6; Prosper, de vocatione gentium, cap. 34; Basil, cap. 3 of Isaiah; Hilary, 10, de Trinitate; and many others. But these things will be explained more fully in the following proof, where

also the evasions of the adversaries are precluded.

44 Secondly, the same assertion is principally proved as regards both its parts. Because the holy Fathers agree in this one point, namely that strictly and properly speaking there is not in God the presence of absolute future contingents; but only metaphorically, in that proportional manner in which penitence is usually attributed to him. And they give the reason, from the fact that foreknowledge is the knowledge of future things, and that nothing which comes to be in the course of time is future to God: therefore they clearly hold that future things are physically and really present to God from eternity in the measure of his eternity; and hence that on the ground of this same presence they are infallibly and certainly known by him. Each of these consequences is clear: otherwise, indeed, there would be no obstacle to their being future with respect to God, and their being really and properly present in God with respect to the same, as will be evident to one who considers.

The antecedent, however, is proved. Because Augustine teaches it, lib. 2, ad Simplicianum, quaest. 2: What is presence, if not the knowledge of future things? And what is future to God, who surpasses all times? Boethius, lib. 5, de consolatione, prose ult., saying: He considers all things which are already being begotten in his simple cognition. For if you would weigh the presence of all things which he distinguishes, you would esteem it not to be the presence of future things, as it were, but the knowledge of an instant that never fails. Gregory, lib. 2, moral., cap. 25, in these words: How is God foreknowing, when those things which are future are foreknown; and we know that nothing is future to God, before whose eyes there are no past things, present things do not pass away, and future things do not come. Anselm, in the opuscule de concordia liberi arbitrii et praedestinationis, in the chapter cited. Hugh of St Victor, in the summa sententiarum, tract. 1, cap. 12. Bernard, serm. 80, in Cant., and Hilary, 12, de Trinitate, and finally many others.

45 This reason is so efficacious that by it alone all the evasions of the adversaries vanish. For in the first place, what some of them say, namely that the holy Fathers speak only of objective presence, and not of real and physical presence in eternity, easily collapses from what was said in the same reason. For objective presence alone cannot remove presence properly so called, nor does it remove the fact that the thing which is known is truly future with respect to the knower: yet the Fathers remove from God foreknowledge properly so called with respect to absolute future things, and deny that anything is future with respect to him: therefore they speak not only of objective presence, but of physical and real presence with respect to eternity, through which they coexist with him from eternity. The consequence seems sufficiently established.

The major, as regards its first part, is also established. First from the very fact itself: because objective presence is nothing other than the thing being actually presented to the knower. Therefore, since this very thing is inseparably involved in the fact that some thing is foreknown, that cannot remove the reason of foreknowledge; then also: because the prophets (according to the probable opinion of many, about whose greater or lesser probability there is no question at present) have foreknowledge of absolute future things properly and simply so called, and nevertheless future things are objectively present to them: since indeed they know them before they are.

The second part, however, is also established. First in the same prophets, with respect to whom the aforesaid absolute future things, according to this mode of speaking, have the ratio of future things, although, as we were saying, they are known by them; then also: because from the very fact that something is known on this day, it is not removed that it is truly future, and hence from the fact that something precisely has objective presence in the intellect of someone, it is not removed that it can have the ratio of the future with respect to the same.

Another evasion of Arrubal.

46 And likewise that which Arrubal answers in the present work, disput. 41, cap. 9, namely that the Fathers speak only of the foreknowledge which is according to the order of the succession of the past and the future, and so of the foreknowledge which is so prior to its object that it vanishes when that object arrives; but not of foreknowledge properly so called and abiding according to duration, that is, of the knowledge which at the same time has to precede the existence of its object, and not to pass away when that arrives, but to coexist with it. This solution, then, easily collapses from what we have said in this reason. For, as is clear from the testimonies of the Fathers, they deny to God foreknowledge properly so called with respect to absolute future things for this reason alone: that none of these future things can have the ratio of the future with respect to him, because he surpasses all times, which are measured by eternity. But this reason always remains in its own being, even if a permanent presence, properly so called, be admitted, which precedes the order of duration of the existence of the aforesaid future things in the measure of eternity, and coexists with them, as is manifest in itself: therefore the aforesaid foreknowledge is denied to God by the Fathers.

47 It is added, firstly, that the aforesaid foreknowledge, which Arrubal admits, is called by him, and deservedly, foreknowledge properly so called. Yet the Fathers proclaim this unanimously, namely that there is not in God such a presence, properly taken, with respect to the aforesaid future things.

It is added, secondly, that from the very fact that the former foreknowledge is denied to God, which is according to the order of the succession of the past and the future, and which passes away — from the very fact, namely, that a future thing is already present — he must also have denied to him this second foreknowledge properly so called, which abides even when the future thing passes from future to present according to real and physical existence. And the reason seems clear. Because, as we shall say in this same disputation, num. 100 and following, from the very fact that something has the ratio of the future with respect to some knowledge, it is necessary that, when the presentiality of the future arrives, and consequently that thing ceases in the ratio of the future with respect to such knowledge, the knowledge by which it was known as future with respect to that one should also cease: otherwise that knowledge would not be true: and consequently neither would it be the same as that which existed before, which had truth in every respect.

48 Whence finally the exposition of Gabriel Vazquez, cited above, is left refuted, which asserts that foreknowledge properly taken involves an imperfection: and that in this sense the Fathers denied it to God.

Against this, however, it may be said that although foreknowledge properly taken with respect to absolute future things does indeed imply an imperfection; yet this imperfection, on account of which it is denied to God by the Fathers, is none other, as is clear from the testimonies of the same just cited, than that the aforesaid future things cannot have the ratio of future things with respect to God, whose understanding is measured by eternity (otherwise eternity would not be an indivisible duration, all at once, and infinite, as will appear from what is to be said in num. 89 and following of this disputation), whereas foreknowledge requires that it be not with respect to a present thing, but a future one; therefore, although the Fathers, on account of the imperfection of foreknowledge with respect to the aforesaid future things, deny it to God with regard to them, it does not follow from this, but rather it is laid down, that they hold that absolute future contingents are really present from eternity with respect to God in the measure of his eternity.

49 From all of which it is also settled that which the adversaries object, namely that foreknowledge is many times attributed to God in Scripture, as in Wisdom 19: God foreknew their future things. And to the Romans 8: Those whom he foreknew, he also predestined. And in the same chapter 11: God did not reject his people whom he foreknew. And 1 Peter 1, and likewise Acts 2. Which Augustine also asserts in 5, de civit., cap. 8 and 9, and the Master of the Sentences in 1, dist. 36 and 38. For the answer is given from what has been said: that there is in God a foreknowledge with respect to future things which is not properly and formally such, but only metaphorically, in that same proportional manner in which penitence is usually attributed to him.

§ III. It is established that the same affirmative part is that of the Angelic Doctor.

50 It must be said thirdly that absolute future contingents, according to the mind of St Thomas, have the aforesaid presence with respect to eternity: and that on the ground of this they are certainly and infallibly known by God. This assertion is held by all the Doctors mentioned above in favour of it, whom we shall adduce individually in num. 79 of this disputation.

First, and not ineffectively, the testimony in favour of this assertion is that very testimony which the adversaries adduce for themselves, namely that which the Holy Doctor teaches in the body of the present article. For from it he concludes that his intuition is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality, and consequently that they are objectively present to him, because his knowledge is measured by eternity, as his being is, and eternity, existing all at once, encompasses all time: and therefore all things ought to be present to the divine intuition in the same manner in which they are present to eternity; so that, just as with respect to eternity itself absolute future contingents do not have being really and physically future, but present, so they have this same relation with respect to the divine intuition, as measured by eternity.

51 Whence, to explain this, the Angelic teacher brought forward the following words: Although contingents come to be actually successively, yet God does not know contingents successively, as they are in their being, as we do, but simultaneously. And he gives the reason: Because his knowledge is measured by eternity, as also his being is: eternity, existing all at once, encompasses all time, as has been said above. And from this he immediately infers: Whence all things which are in time are present to God from eternity, not only by that reason whereby he has the reasons of things present with himself, as some say, but because his intuition is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality. And from these he again gathers: Whence it is manifest that contingents are infallibly known by God, insofar as they are subject to the divine regard according to their presentiality, and yet they are absolute future contingents by comparison with their causes.

The force of this testimony is explained and weighed, and how it cannot be understood as concerning objective presence alone, as the adversaries intend. First, because the Holy Doctor had said in the immediately preceding words that an absolute future contingent, as such, that is, as it precisely has contingent futurition in its cause, is not certainly knowable, and thence he immediately infers that it is certainly known by God insofar as his intuition is borne upon it as present, from the fact that the aforesaid intuition is measured by eternity, and eternity, existing all at once, encompasses all time: therefore the Holy Doctor cannot be conveniently explained as speaking of objective presence alone. The consequence is evident. Because otherwise he would involve simultaneous contradictions, when he said at the same time that an absolute future contingent cannot be certainly known in the sense of such, and at the same time that it is of itself certainly knowable: since indeed objective presentiality, as distinct from true and real physical presentiality, is nothing other than the object itself, insofar as it has certain knowability. Therefore, when the Angelic Doctor denied that an absolute future contingent, as such, or as it remains under the ratio of the future, is certainly knowable, he also denied it objective presentiality; and consequently, for its certain knowability, one must have recourse to its own existence, really present in the measure of eternity, according to which it is drawn out of the ratio of the future with respect to him.

52 Then also: because for this reason the Holy Doctor infers that God infallibly knows the aforesaid future things, and that his intuition is borne upon them as present, because such an intuition is measured by eternity, and eternity, existing all at once, encompasses all time; and consequently that all times, whether present, past, or future, are actually present to him, as we shall say more fully in the following difficulty: therefore he is not speaking of objective presence alone: since the assertion that future things are present only objectively to the divine intellect does not suit him on the ground of eternity, but on the ground of himself, considered precisely within his own line: from the fact that within the aforesaid line he has infinite perfection. Whence either eternity cannot be the reason of any presence of the divine intuition to future things from eternity, or it can only be the reason of the thing of real and physical presence. For since, by the force of its line, it is not cognitive, it follows that, just as it cannot be the root of knowing, so neither is it the root of objective presence, through which it should be present from eternity to future things as to objects known; and consequently it can only be the reason from eternity of physical and real presence with respect to them.

Then, next: because otherwise absolute future contingents would have the ratio of future things not only with respect to us, but also with respect to God, since the fact that something is present only objectively with respect to one does not remove the fact that it is truly and really future with respect to that one: and yet St Thomas, from the fact that the intuition of God is borne upon future things as upon a representation, from the fact that such an intuition is measured by eternity, infers that such future things are not future with respect to God, but only with respect to us.

53 Then, finally: because if St Thomas were treating only of objective presence, and not at the same time of physical and real presence, it would follow that, when he gave the reason on account of which absolute future contingents are known by God from eternity, from the fact that his intuition is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality, and because all things are present to eternity, he would then have committed a manifest petitio principii. For since it is the same for an absolute future contingent to be present from eternity objectively with respect to God as to be known by him from eternity, it would be the same to say that contingents are known by God from eternity as future, because they are objectively present to him, or as they are in their objective presentiality, as to say that they are known by God from eternity because they are known by him.

54 It is added, that even precisely in those words which the adversaries adduce for themselves, namely: All things which are in time are present to God from eternity, not only by that reason whereby he has the reasons of things present with himself, but because his intuition is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality, this real and physical presence is denoted, which future things have from eternity with respect to eternity. First, because the Holy Doctor deliberately did not say: But because his knowledge, etc., but he said: But because his intuition is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality: so as to signify that this knowledge is intuitive, and consequently that it is of a thing really and physically present in the same measure of eternity in which the divine intuition exists: since indeed, in the way of the Holy Doctor, this presence is required for the intuitive knowledge of God, as will appear more fully from what is to be said in the last testimony in favour of this assertion.

Then also: because, as is clear from what we said in this same tractate, disp. 5, dub. 2 and 3, the knowledge of vision, or intuitive knowledge, is the cause of things; and so it is equivalently to say that the intuition of God is borne from eternity over all things, as they are in their presentiality, as to assert that he causes them and grants them present being, not indeed with respect to our time, but with respect to eternity, as a surpassing measure, with respect to which whatever is future with respect to us ought to be actually present: since, as we hinted above, the whole of this is required for the knowledge of vision.

55 The aforesaid testimony is further confirmed and weighed from other words of the same Holy Doctor, in which he explains what he taught in this article, and gives the reason why absolute future contingents are known to God but not to an angel, from the fact that they are present to the divine duration and not to the angelic. And so in the same place he denotes these two presences of those same future things, namely the objective, and also the physical and real with respect to God, and he denies both of them to those same future things with respect to the angel. His words, golden, are found below in quaest. 57, art. 3: God (he says) sees all things in his eternity: which, since it is simple, is present to all time, and encompasses it. And therefore the one intuition of God is borne upon all things which are done throughout all time, as if in the present; and he sees all things as they are in themselves, as has been said above, when the knowledge of God was treated. The angelic intellect, however, and any created intellect, falls short of the divine eternity. Whence the future thing, as it is in its being, cannot be known by any created intellect.

56 The second, and principal, testimony in favour of the assertion is found with the Holy Doctor in 1, contra Gent., cap. 66, ratione 6, where, from the presence of things in eternity, he infers their presence with respect to divine knowledge, measured by eternity: and at the same time he adds that the things themselves, being simultaneously present with respect to eternity and to divine knowledge, are not present in respect to each other. Now if he were speaking only of objective presence, not only would all future things be simultaneously present with respect to divine knowledge, but also with respect to themselves mutually: since indeed all things have being simultaneously present objectively to the divine intellect. Whence, just as future things would be known from eternity to be future with respect to the divine nature and to divine knowledge, and yet would have objective simultaneity from eternity with that knowledge, because they are known simultaneously with it, so too, although some things were known to be future or past with respect to others, they would yet, for the same reason, have objective simultaneity in respect to each other.

It is confirmed and explained from the same Holy Doctor in 1, dist. 38, quaest. unica, art. 5, in the body, in these words: Every knowledge is according to the mode of the knower. Since, therefore, God is eternal, it is necessary that every knowledge of his have the mode of eternity, which is to be all at once without succession. Hence, since although time is successive, yet his eternity is present to all times, one and the same, and indivisible, as now standing, so also his knowledge beholds all temporal things (although successive to it) as present to itself, nor is anything of them future with respect to itself; but one with respect to another. And finally he concludes: Since, therefore, God with one eternal intuition, not successive, sees all temporal things, he sees absolutely all contingent things existing in diverse times with presentiality from eternity, and not merely as having being in his knowledge.

57 In this testimony three things are to be weighed. The first is what we have often noted in other places, namely that in it the Holy Doctor distinguishes a twofold presence of future things: one indeed with respect to eternity; the other, however, with respect to knowledge measured by eternity: and from the former he infers the latter: and consequently it is false what the adversaries intend, that the Holy Doctor affirms that future things are present to eternity for no other reason than that they are known by him from eternity, or are objectively present to him.

The second is that, from the fact that every knowledge is according to the mode of the knower, and God is eternal, the Holy Doctor infers that divine knowledge must have the mode of eternity; and consequently that things must be present to the aforesaid knowledge in the same way in which they are present to eternity, by a presentiality corresponding to that same eternity. Now if future things were not present to eternity from eternity in the very now of eternity, but only successively while they exist, it could not be inferred thence that God beholds all future things from eternity; rather the opposite would have to be inferred: since, as the Holy Doctor teaches, divine knowledge, in as far as it is borne upon future things and is present to them, must have that mode of presence which eternity has with respect to them.

The third is that the Angelic Doctor concludes that God with one eternal intuition, not successive, beholds with presentiality all contingent things existing in diverse times, and not merely as having being in his knowledge: where, over and above the aforesaid presence in his knowledge, which is none other than objective presence, he grants those same future things another presence with respect to God. This, however, as is clear, cannot be any other than real and physical presence in eternity.

58 Finally, the same assertion is proved by the best testimony of the same Holy Doctor, art. 9 of this question, where, speaking of those things which God knows by the knowledge of vision, he says: Among those things which are not actually in act, a certain diversity is to be noted. For some things, although they are not now in act, yet either were or will be: and all such things God is said to know by the knowledge of vision. Because the understanding of God, which is his being, is measured by eternity, which, existing without succession, comprehends all time, the present intuition of God is borne over all time, and over all things which are in any time whatever, as over things present to itself with presentiality. But some things there are which are in the power of God, or of a creature, which yet neither are, nor will be, nor have been. And with respect to these he is not said to have the knowledge of vision, but of simple intelligence. Which is said for this reason, because those things which are seen with us have being distinct from the one who sees.

59 In this testimony two things are to be weighed. The first is what we noted in other testimonies, namely that St Thomas did not say that all things are present to God and to his eternity because he beholds them; but, on the contrary, that he beholds time, and the things which are in time, because his eternity comprehends all time: so that he might thus explain how this presence is not founded in knowledge, and consequently is not objective alone, but lies in the comprehensiveness of eternity itself, which, speaking most formally, is not a comprehensiveness of knowledge: since indeed eternity does not contain time by knowing, but by measuring: and if, impossibly, God were not knowing, his eternity would nonetheless contain time, as a surpassing measure, so that all its differences would be actually present to him and from eternity, on account of its utter simplicity and immutability, as will appear more fully from what is to be said in the following difficulty.

The second is that the Holy Doctor gives the reason why the knowledge of possibles, which will never be, is of simple intelligence and not of vision, from the fact that Those things which are seen with us have being distinct from the one who sees: so that by this too he denoted that things which are seen by the knowledge of vision must not only have being, or objective presence, but also real presence. For objective presence alone is only the presence of knowledge: whereas this is not the presence by which things known have being distinct from the knower, or from the one who sees: yet it is highly probable that the presence required for vision, according to St Thomas, must be of such a kind that through it the things seen have being distinct from the one who sees: and consequently it must also be real and physical presence, and not objective alone.

60 All of which things can finally be confirmed from several other testimonies of St Thomas which Capreolus reports in 1, dist. 38, and dist. 36, art. 2, and especially from 1, contra Gent., cap. 66, and quaest. 2, de Verit., art. 12, where he says thus: Something is then known as future, when between the knowledge of the knower and the event of the thing there is found an order of past to future. But this order cannot be found between divine knowledge and any contingent thing whatever; rather the order of divine knowledge to any thing whatever is always that of a present thing to a present thing. These words can be expounded as follows. For the order of past to future which, according to the mind of the Holy Doctor, must be between the knowledge and the future event, so that the thing may be known as future, is not in objective or known being; for when it is known that, for example, there will be a lecture tomorrow, then such a lecture cannot fail to be objectively present to that knowledge; but he speaks of the order of past to future according to physical and real being: and so, when he denies that an order of past to future can be found between divine knowledge and any future effect whatever, it must be understood of that same order of past to future according to the aforesaid real being: and consequently, when he says that divine knowledge always has an order to any thing whatever (understand a future thing, of which he is speaking here) as that of a present thing to a present thing, it must be understood of the order of real and physical presence between the knowledge of God and the event which is future to us.

Whence, so that the Holy Doctor might explain this point more fully, he added: The difficulty, however, arises from this, that we cannot express divine knowledge except by expressing it through the mode of our knowledge, indicating the differences. For if it were expressed as the knowledge of God is, it would have to be said rather that God knows this to be, than that he knows it to be future, because future things never are so to him, but always present.

Assuredly, if future things really and physically had the ratio of future things in comparison with God, this difficulty would have to arise from the fact that we could not express the knowledge of God except through the mode of knowledge, indicating the differences of time; although, if it were expressed as it is in itself, it ought to be expressed otherwise. Because divine knowledge rather could and ought to be expressed truly as it is in itself, indicating the aforesaid differences; so that, just as our knowledge terminates in those things which truly are past, present, and future with respect to it, and is truly expressed by indicating these differences of time, and so ought to be expressed; in like manner this very thing would have to be said with proportion about divine knowledge.

61 And likewise, if something were truly future with respect to the aforesaid knowledge of God, there would be no reason why, if it were expressed as the knowledge of God is, it should rather be said that God knows this to be than that he knows it to be future: since indeed just as future things, when they afterwards are, have being really present to God, so while they are not present in their own difference of time, they would have being really future with respect to him, and would be present to him only objectively. And just as the knowledge of God, as it is in itself, knows them to be present, so will it know them to be future: and consequently, being expressed by such a knowledge as it is, it would also be expressed both as that of one who knows a present thing and as that of one who touches a future thing. And finally, if future things were present to God only objectively, there would be no reason (as we said above) why it should be said absolutely that nothing is future to God: since indeed objective presence alone does not remove this, as is observed in us.

§ IV. The arguments opposed to the opinion are solved.

62 To the first, the minor is to be denied, as regards both parts. And for the proof of the first, the major having been conceded, the minor is to be denied. For a thing does not have being in eternity except in view of that difference of time in which it is produced: yet divine eternity encompasses that from eternity in act, as we shall explain more fully in the following difficulty: and consequently such a thing is not supposed to have being before it is produced in time: because that very difference of time in which it is produced is itself present in eternity from eternity, even according to its own proper duration.

For the proof, however, of the second part of that minor, one will answer by distinguishing the antecedent, and conceding it as regards the coexistence of two things in some duration which is proper and adequate with respect to each of them: but denying the assertion itself as regards the coexistence of two things in some duration which is proper and adequate with respect to one of them, but inadequate and surpassing with respect to the other, and so the consequent is to be denied. Because in order to say simply that God precedes creatures in duration, it is enough that he himself from eternity be in his own proper and adequate measure: although, because his eternity encompasses all time without succession, and whatever is contained in it, it has future things physically present. But as to these, let those who will speak in the following difficulty see what remains to be said.

63 To the second, in the second part of the same opinion, one will answer that the holy Fathers speak of creatures by reference to their own proper duration, and not by reference to a surpassing and common measure, namely eternity. And therefore they say absolutely and simply that they began in time; because according to the common and usual mode of speaking, whenever it is said absolutely and simply that something is, it is understood that it is in its own proper and adequate duration. And therefore this proposition: The Antichrist is from eternity, absolutely uttered, denotes according to the common and frequent usage and manner of conceiving, that in his own measure he is from eternity, that is, that his own proper and adequate duration is infinite on the part before and in itself, and that of itself he has endured from eternity; but not that he is precisely from eternity on account of eternity virtually extending itself, by reason of its infinity, to the Antichrist and to his duration which is actually encompassed: and by reason of this, both the Antichrist himself and his duration are present to him in the same now of eternity.

Whence accordingly we do not assert absolutely that future things are present to God from eternity, but we add that they are present to him from eternity in the measure of eternity. By which also the first confirmation is evident. For the Council and Athanasius establish a distinction between the Son of God and creatures, in that the former is eternal in his own proper and adequate duration: and in this sense they condemn that impious saying of Arius reported above; whereas creatures in their own proper and adequate duration began to be in time.

64 To the second confirmation, from that twofold testimony adduced by Arrubal, one will answer that that twelfth book, in which the first testimony is said to be contained, has only 27 chapters. Then we add that the aforesaid testimony has not yet been found by us in the chapters having a number, cited in a similar number of chapters. We add, finally, that from the very fact it is gathered that things before they were made in eternity had not yet been in eternity itself: which, however, is not against us. Because although both the effecting of the thing and its being are present to God from eternity in eternity; yet the production of the thing is understood to be present before its being; although each of the two coexists at the same time with that same eternity, and in the now of eternity.

To the second testimony, however, one will answer that Augustine did not say Not in their nature, as Arrubal reports, but asserted Not in his own nature: and he speaks of the elect, not only when they exist, but also when they lack existence in their own duration; these, however (he says), God has within himself, not because he has them within his nature, or intrinsically joined to himself by any special union, but because they and their eternal salvation are in the presence of God; although in the same place he does not deny that they are also present to the divine eternity, according to real and physical presence. In which sense also the Master of the Sentences speaks, whom the same Arrubal elsewhere adduces on his own behalf.

To the third confirmation it will be evident from what we shall say in num. 69.

To the third, in the third part of the same opinion, it is evident from what has been said in favour of the third assertion.

65 To the first confirmation the answer is that St Thomas, in the first testimony, is speaking of formal truth, which, speaking absolutely and simpliciter, is found from eternity only in the act of the divine intellect. As for things, however, he does not treat of them there, nor does he deny that they are in eternity: any more than he denies that the formal truth which is afterwards in time in a created intellect is present from eternity; not indeed absolutely and simpliciter, or in its own measure, but with the qualification, namely, in the nunc of eternity, as in a superabundant measure, in the same way as that intellect itself and all other future things are present from eternity.

As to the second testimony of the same confirmation, it must be said that St Thomas, in the first part of it, wishes only to say that creatures are not contained formally and physically in God according to their formal being. In the last part of the same testimony, on the other hand, he speaks of practical cognition and of the science of vision: in which, in the way explained above, the physical and real presence of things with respect to eternity is involved.

From this too it is evident, with regard to the third testimony of the aforesaid confirmation, that that testimony makes rather for us than against us. Because there he says that future things are present to eternity insofar as they are known by God and preordained. Now it is certain that the aforesaid preordination, of which he speaks there, denotes practical and intuitive cognition, through which, as we have just said, things are constituted present from eternity, not in their own measure, but in the measure of eternity.

66 To the second confirmation, the major is to be granted and the minor denied. And to the first proof, Corneto answers well in the present work, disput. 1. dub. 2, and very many other Thomists, in maintaining that there is a distinction between eternity and the age. In that eternity is not only a measure more perfect than all the others, but is also a superior measure containing within its ambit all other measures; just as the concavity of the outermost heaven, which is the common place, contains all the other particular places: and consequently all things which are contained in the inferior measures, namely in time and in the age, are also contained in eternity, as in a measure inadequately to them and superabundant. The age, however, although it be a measure more excellent than all times, is not superior with respect to them, nor does it contain them within its ambit, however indivisible and far greater than all times its duration may be.

From this it follows that eternity coexists with all things and all times, as their truly superabundant and superior measure, containing them all within its ambit; so that it coexists with them not only when they exist as far as we are concerned, but also before they thus exist: whereas the age is said to coexist with temporal things only when they do not exist as far as we are concerned, and not before: because they do not exist in the age itself, as in a superior measure, but rather the age and time hold themselves to each other as two unlik measures.

67 And this can be explained, first, by the example of the mode in which, so far as it is indivisible in itself, the soul is in the body, which although it be a more perfect mode of union than that by which the form of the stone informs the matter of that same stone, nevertheless the information, or mode of union, of the soul does not measure the information of the form of the stone. And similarly by the example of the mode of existing which Christ has in the Sacrament, which is a more perfect mode of existing than that of quantity, and yet does not contain or measure it. And the place of Rome is greater than the place of some small town, and nevertheless the latter is not contained or measured by the former. And all these things thus hold themselves as unlik things, and are not compared after the manner of a containing thing and a contained thing.

Further still, from the fact that the age is a measure not wholly immutable, but admitting potentiality and an order towards succession. And so it can coexist in a mutable way, or a new relation of presentiality intrinsically inherent in it can arrive; and consequently it is not able to draw successive things to itself in an immutable manner, so as to measure them always and immutably, and to extend itself always and immutably towards them. Eternity, on the other hand, is a measure by the manner of a most pure, infinite and immutable act: and therefore its measurement ought to be most actual, and to be made in an immutable manner. And therefore it measures always and from eternity whatever is to be measured by it; and it then draws to itself immutably those things which otherwise are mutable. Just as the divine intellect contains intelligibly and immutably those things which otherwise are mutable.

As to the second proof, the answer is, premising that although eternity is formally indivisible and all at once, it is virtually divisible and successive through coexistence with successive and divisible things, as we shall show in the following difficulty: namely, because by reason of its infinity, in the notion of duration, it contains all conceivable differences of time.

68 Whence it is that eternity can be considered in a twofold way. In one way partially, insofar as it coexists with time precisely past, or present, or future, by reason of the virtual divisibility which it has. And considered in this way, then, insofar as it coexists precisely with present time, it does not coexist with past: and insofar as it is coexistent with future, it does not coexist with present, and conversely. In another way it can be considered adequately, insofar as it coexists in itself with all the differences of time, by reason of its formal indivisibility, and as encompassing all of them. And in this way the very same eternity which coexists with the past must also coexist with the future, without any other succession or formal divisibility.

Hence, then, the answer to the aforesaid proof is to grant the antecedent in the sense just explained, and to deny the consequent. In support of which the sequel is to be denied. Because from this head future contingent things do not coexist with eternity insofar as it virtually contains both present time and past and future, whether real or imaginary; but insofar as it contains precisely that future time, they are contained in it, and coexist with it in that same measure of eternity inadequately to them, and as a superabundant and superabounding measure. And therefore it is not necessary that they exist in every difference of time, whether present, past or future, as in their own and adequate measure; but it is enough that in this way they exist in that future difference of time for which, in fact and in fact as with us, they will have existence, as we touched upon above, and as we shall explain more fully in the following difficulty: and consequently eternity will thereby have a far greater virtual duration than those future things have in their own proper duration and as they exist with us.

Moreover, since the very same eternity is formally indivisible and all at once, and by reason of its simplicity and immutability must encompass all the differences of time in the most simple and immutable manner, as we shall say at num. 79 and thereafter: therefore, from this head, eternity itself from eternity, insofar as it virtually contains that future difference of time, must actually and immutably contain those same future things, as present to it in that same measure of eternity. And for the same reason it is enough that future things coexist with us in their own difference of time only, in order that eternity may extend itself by reason of its virtual extension, and may encompass the aforesaid future things, and be present to them, as will be more fully explained in the following difficulty.

As to the last point, it is evident from what has been said.

69 From these things too it is evident with regard to the third confirmation of the second argument, adduced on behalf of the second part of the opposing opinion at num. 77, whose solution we have deferred to this place. For the meaning of those words of Isidore amounts only to this: that if times, for example the present time, were always present to God adequately, so as to entail this by its own force, with the opposite conflicting with it, it would not be time but eternity: because it would thereby be an unfailing duration, and would be, and would not be, time; but he does not deny that, inadequately and in the manner explained, they can and ought to be present to it. But all these things will be elucidated more fully in the following difficulty.

70 Now that we have explained what, according to the mind of Scripture and of the Fathers, is to be said of that which is present from eternity in the measure of eternity, and at the same time in what way, according to their opinion, eternity is the reason of knowing the aforesaid futures, it remains for us to explain by what sufficient reason that very point is proved. We have divided, therefore, this question from the preceding one, so that we may proceed more clearly and more distinctly § I. The first opinion is introduced.

The first opinion denies both parts of the title. Thus Scotus in 1. distinct. 38. quaest. 1.; Durandus quaest. 3.; Gabriel, Gregorius, Okamus, and Aureolus in the same distinct. 38.; Suarez, lib. 1. de scientia futurorum absolutorum, cap. 7.; Herveus, Hispalensis in 1. distinct. 38.; Sylvester in constat. 1. part. quaest. 14. art. 16.; Aegidius in defensorio D. Thom. on this article; Valentia in praesenti, puncto 5.; Vasquez disput. 64.; Arrubal disp. 41. cap. 4.; Herice disput. 6. cap. 4. Of whom the last eight authors also believe that the opposite opinion is neither of the mind of D. Thom. nor common to the Fathers.

This opinion follows clearly from the former with regard to its second part. With regard to the first part, however, it is proved firstly. Because nothing can really and physically coexist with another in any duration unless it exist in itself in the same way: but future contingents, before they are in their proper measure, or before they exist with respect to us, do not really and physically exist in themselves: therefore neither will they have a coexistence with eternity in the same measure and duration of eternity: and so such a coexistence will not be able to be urged as following from a sufficient reason. This last consequence is clearly evident from the former. The former, however, is evident from both of the premises.

The minor, moreover, is constant. For created things, before they are in their proper measure, are truly and really nothing in themselves: and thus in no manner are they existing in themselves. The major is proved. Because the coexistence of two things in some duration presupposes that each of them has in itself a true, real, and physical existence: otherwise, as is evident from itself, they will not be able to coexist with one another in any duration.

71 It makes no difference if you say that it is enough for that thing to exist in a higher measure, even though it be not in its proper measure, as happens at present.

For against this it must be said that it is repugnant for something to exist physically and really in an alien measure, unless it be a real being in itself in the same way, as seems evident from the terms themselves; therefore it will also be repugnant unless it exist also in its proper measure. The consequence is evident. Because what a thing, as a real being in itself, physically and really, necessarily involves, is that it exist in its proper measure. For just as then it really and physically comes to be when it is produced in its proper and adequate measure, and not before, so in the same way it is a real being in itself when it exists in its proper measure, and not before that.

72 It is confirmed, firstly. Because it is prior for a thing to exist in its own proper measure, or duration, than to exist in an alien and surpassing measure; therefore nothing will be able to exist in an alien measure unless it have existence in its own proper and adequate measure. The consequence needs no proof: for that which is posterior necessarily depends on the prior, and hence cannot be without it. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because a thing is in an alien and superior duration and measure for this reason, that it is in its own proper duration and measure: since an alien and superior measure reaches, by the force of its own line of duration, only the inferior durations, which are the proper durations of things, and which are contained in that same superior measure. And therefore it is prior for a thing to be in its own proper and adequate measure than to be in an alien and surpassing measure.

It is confirmed, secondly. For what is not verified of things with respect to their proper measure cannot be verified of the same things with respect to an alien and surpassing measure, namely the measure of eternity: therefore, from the very fact that it is not verified of them that they exist from eternity with respect to their proper measure, it cannot be verified with respect to the measure of eternity. The consequence is evident. The antecedent, however, is proved. For a common measure does not touch things except according to the condition which is proper to those things themselves: otherwise it would not touch them as they are in themselves; and furthermore it would change their conditions; whereas neither of these two can correspond to the common measure containing the inferior measures. Just as neither can correspond to a common place, namely the concave of the heavens, when compared with the particular places contained in it and measured by it, so, etc.

73 Secondly, and principally. For does the created thing exist from eternity in eternity by its own created existence, or not? This cannot be said according to the second alternative: otherwise it would be only in God's power, and thus in no way could it be verified that it actually and formally exists, and consequently neither that it exists in eternity. If, however, the first is asserted, then that very thing, because it is created, will not be able not to be produced by some action: and consequently all things which exist in some temporal difference will have been from eternity produced and created by a true and real action, the opposite of which faith teaches, as is evident from Genesis 1: In the beginning God created heaven and earth.

74 It makes no difference if you object that from this only it follows that things are produced from eternity in an alien measure, namely in eternity, and with respect to God, but not in their proper measure and with respect to us; and although this latter is inconvenient and against faith, nevertheless the former is not.

For against this it must be said. Then, because the very fact that a thing is created from eternity in an alien measure, namely in eternity, means absolutely and simply that it is created: because God's action from eternity is terminated precisely in that existence of it, which is nothing other than to be created properly, absolutely, and simply. Now it is certain that, according to faith, creatures were properly, absolutely, and simply created only in time; and also because created existence is not produced without its own duration and measure; because this duration has the status of a property with respect to its own existence; therefore, if created existence is from eternity, its own duration and measure will also be from eternity: and consequently, just as they would be from eternity in their own existence, so also in their own duration.

75 Thirdly, the same opinion is proved. For eternity does not have regard to a thing in the same way when it actually exists and when it has being as past or as future: but this diversity consists in this, that actual existences are regarded by eternity as present to it, whereas future and past existences are regarded as not present to it: therefore futures will not be present from eternity to that same eternity. The consequence is sufficiently clear. The minor seems to be constant, because it does not appear in what the aforesaid diversity consists.

The major, however, is urged from this, that the thing itself has regard to eternity in one way when it is present, and in another way when it has the character of a future; for when it is present, it has regard to that same eternity through a real relation of true and real coexistence; whereas when it has the character of a past and a future, it does not have regard to that same eternity through a real, but only a conceptual, relation: therefore conversely eternity itself has regard to the created thing as present in one way, and as future or past in another: since a diversity in one of the relatives requires a diversity in the term, or in the correlate.

76 Fourthly. Because otherwise there would be an actually infinite multitude which really and physically would be actually and simultaneously present in some duration; but this is impossible; therefore, etc. The sequence is proved. For all the thoughts of the blessed are infinite; therefore, if all those thoughts are actually present to God physically and really in the measure of eternity, according to their proper existences, there will be an actually infinite multitude with respect to some duration, namely eternity. The falsity of the consequent, however, follows from this. For as the Complutensian doctors show in lib. Physic. disp. 18. num. 57., the reason on account of which an actually infinite multitude of totally actual entities is repugnant is this, that the aforesaid multitude must be according to some species of number, or according to a proportion and likeness to it; and since every number is a multitude made, or measured, by a unit, it will certainly be against the reason of a number, or of a multitude having a proportion or likeness with it, that it be actually infinite; indeed, since it is repugnant for a thing actually measured by one of those many, of which it consists, to be actually infinite; and consequently it will also be repugnant that it have this in its own duration; and this reasoning seems intended to convict even if such a multitude is posited to be actually infinite in eternity; for there it must preserve the proper character of such a multitude; therefore, etc.

77 Fifthly. For several absurdities follow from the opposite opinion. The first, that the same thing is produced twice. Once, indeed, in eternity and from eternity; but once again in time. Because just as it cannot exist without being produced, so it cannot be from eternity without being produced from eternity; nor can it begin to exist in time unless it also begin to be produced in time.

Second, that of the Antichrist this could be verified in this instant, namely that which he is in this very instant and in every other instant of our time. For just as it follows well: the Antichrist is in eternity: therefore the Antichrist is, so also it is very well inferred: the Antichrist, who in every instant of time is in eternity, is therefore now, and in every other instant of our time.

Third, that things cannot be created, or produced from nothing in time: for they are already presupposed with their real and physical being in eternity. And thus they would not be produced in time simply from nothing; but at most with a limitation, namely from nothing in time.

Fourth, that Adam and the Antichrist coexist with one another, if they coexist with eternity only once. For just as those things which are the same in relation to one and the same third are the same among themselves; so those things which coexist from eternity with one and the same third will certainly coexist among themselves.

Fifth, that several contradictory propositions would be verified of one and the same thing in one and the same duration, namely in the same instant of eternity; such as that the Antichrist is, and the Antichrist is not, that he is corrupted, and is generated, dies, and exists: for all of these would apply to the Antichrist in eternity. And thus, if all of these apply to him from eternity in the measure of eternity, the aforesaid contradictory propositions will be verified at the same time of him in the same duration: but this seems absurd: for predicates which are contradictory in themselves are always incompatible, in whatever duration they be; from the fact that they are always contradictory in themselves.

78 Lastly, because otherwise the freedom of created choice would be removed. Then, because if the acts of created freedom exist from eternity in eternity, they will certainly have been produced from eternity in it according to all the circumstances which they will have in their own time; therefore it will not be in the power of free choice to do anything, or in any other way, than as it was done in eternity; and so no freedom will remain in it; and also because a future contingent and free thing is not in eternity except through that very being which it will have in time: but if in time it were to have being before it were done by free choice, it would be neither contingent nor free: therefore the same must be said if it has being in eternity before it is produced in time by free choice.

§ II. The true opinion is proposed and explained.

79 Nevertheless, it must be said that it is proved by a sufficient reason that absolute future contingents were from eternity, and are now really and physically present to God in the measure of eternity, and that by reason of this presence they are known with certainty by him. Thus Ferrara 1. contra Gent. cap. 66.; Corduba, quaest. 35. disp. 8.; Capreolus in 1. dist. 38. quaest. 1. art. 2., and dist. 36. quaest. 1. art. 2.; Ricardus in 1. dist. 38. quaest. 5.; Caietan.; Bannez, Ripa, Zanzardus, Zumel here; Nazarius controv. 3.; Navarrete controv. 52.; Gonzalez disp. 43. sect. 3.; Corneio disp. 1. dub. 3.; Alvarez disp. 8. de auxiliis; Abulensis super Math. cap. 18. quaest. 36. And from the Fathers of the Society, Fonseca 6. Metaphys. cap. 2. quaest. 4. sect. 2.; Christophorus Gil. tract. 10. de aeternitate cap. 16.; Granado tract. 5. de scientia Dei disp. 3. sect. 2. And Molina holds this as probable in the present disput. 13., although in the following disputation he embraces the opposite. And finally, commonly, the holy Fathers, whom we mentioned in the preceding question. Because all of those, led by the true reason, admit the aforesaid presence of futures in eternity, and say that by reason of that same presence they are known with certainty and infallibly by God.

Moreover, because this assertion requires explanation, therefore, once the explanation adduced in num. 35. and 40. has been presupposed, it will have to be further explained and then proved.

80 For its explanation, then, it must be noted, firstly, that when it is said that future contingents were from eternity, and are now present to God and to eternity, there are involved there both the last term of the coexistence and also the duration in which they coexist, or the measure by which the aforesaid coexistence is measured. Just as when we say that Peter and Paul coexisted yesterday, and coexist now, there are involved there Peter and Paul coexisting with one another, and the duration and measure in which they coexist, by which such coexistence is measured, namely the external day and the present instant, or the external day reaching up to the present instant.

The last terms, then, of this coexistence, of which we are speaking at present, are on the one hand God, as he is eternal; on the other hand, future contingents. Now the duration which measures does not measure only the truth of the proposition by which it is stated that the aforesaid futures coexisted from eternity, and coexist now with God and eternity, but also the coexistence of the last terms; it is not the instant of our time, or the remaining instant of imaginary time which, according to our mode of understanding, and according to what the Complutensian doctors teach in lib. Physic. disp. 29. num. 50., are understood from eternity as having preceded an imaginary, or a real instant, which is now understood to exist really or imaginarily; but it is eternity itself, or that now of eternity which is indivisible and always stands, which is a measure formally indivisible, and wholly unfailing and unchangeable.

For in this instant of our time it is evident that the Antichrist does not exist: as it is also evident that in the preceding instants, whether real or imaginary, which have preceded, he did not yet have existence; but in relation to our time his existence begins to be in that future time, for which he will really exist. Hence we hold as of faith that, speaking of the production of created things, as measured by our time, then all creatures began in time, as is evident from Genesis 1: In the beginning God created heaven and earth, and from the Council of Nicaea cited above. And therefore, in order to denote this very point, and in order that every equivocation on this account be removed, the particle In the measure of eternity has been added both in the title and in the assertion, so that it may be denoted which duration is the one measuring this coexistence and this presence of futures to eternity.

81 From this it follows that eternity undergoes a twofold office in this coexistence. One indeed, insofar as it has the character of the last term coexisting and at the same time lasting with the futures. The other, insofar as it has the character of the measuring duration, of the truth of the proposition by which the aforesaid coexistence is affirmed, and also of the coexistence itself. Just as when it is said that Peter coexists with the duration of the first heaven, then the duration of the first heaven has both the office of the last term lasting together with Peter, and the office of the measure measuring such coexistence.

We have said that the measuring duration, which measures not only the truth of the proposition but also the coexistence of the last terms, is not this instant of our time, or another which preceded that same instant: because if we speak of the measure measuring only the truth of the proposition, then this proposition, the Antichrist is present now in eternity, is true even if that now denotes the present instant of our time: and consequently the aforesaid now can be the measure of that proposition so taken. For it yields this sense, that in this instant of our time it is true to say that future contingents are present to God in eternity, and that they coexist with him in the same measure of eternity measuring the coexistence of the last terms.

82 Secondly, it must be noted that when it is further said that future contingents were, or are from eternity present to eternity in the same measure of eternity, and that they are also now present to it, with the word now designating eternity, as the measure of this coexistence, this can be understood in a twofold way. First, indeed, that the future contingents themselves, existing in their own proper duration, namely for the future time, are understood according to their existence formally or virtually to be extended, and as it were drawn back, so that from the duration in which they will have being they reach up to the eternal duration itself on the part before that same eternity. Secondly, however, not so that the futures themselves should be extended, and (as we may say) drawn back in this way; but because eternity itself, from the fact that it is infinite in its duration, and consequently has virtually every conceivable extension within this line, extends itself virtually as much as is necessary, so that always and from eternity, and without succession on the part of eternity, or on the part of contact, it may reach up to the future itself, and to its duration for that future temporal difference for which it will be verified that they actually have being, and so in the said sense may encompass and contain all of them.

In that proportional way in which, if time were given from eternity, and were to last on this side into eternity, then if we imagined by an impossibility that the aforesaid time stood with all its parts at once, and at the same time had that formal extension, it would be necessary that from eternity, and still at the same time on the part of contact, it should reach up to the Antichrist, and to all past or future things without limit on the part of the future; not indeed because those past or future things should be extended, so as to be drawn back from their own determined duration, in which they are, as much as would be necessary in order that from there it should reach up to that whole infinite duration on the part of the past; but because time itself would formally be extended, so that at once, and once for all, and without succession, even on the part of contact, it should reach from eternity into eternity; and consequently up to all things, and to the intrinsic durations of them, which are found in that whole latitude, or which exist in any difference of time.

83 When, therefore, we say that future contingents coexist from eternity with eternity in the now of that same eternity, we do not mean that the aforesaid coexistence is given from the fact that the future contingents themselves should be extended from their own temporal difference, for which they will exist in the future time, by as much as suffices in order that they may reach up to the eternal duration on the part before eternity, or to this, namely that they may coexist with it always on the part of the past; but because eternity itself, by reason of its infinitude and virtual extension, extends itself from eternity by as much as suffices in order that it may reach up to the aforesaid futures, and encompass them. And therefore, in order to explain this presence and its mode, it is commonly said by the Thomists, together with D. Thom., that all past and future things are actually encompassed, contained, and concluded in the now of eternity.

And the reason for this mode of philosophising with regard to this is that, in order that future contingents should coexist with eternity in the former way, it would have been necessary that they should have in their own and adequate duration an existence lasting from that temporal difference, in which they will exist, up to the infinite duration on the part before that same eternity, or of imaginary time on the part before the infinite, and conversely; and consequently they would be, and would not be, future. Just as, in order that eternity should extend itself in this way from eternity up to the futures themselves, it is required that it have in its own duration an existence by which from eternity it may reach up to such futures. And therefore, because eternity by reason of its infinitude can have this whole duration, hence it is that futures can coexist with it from eternity in the now of that same eternity, and conversely.

84 Thirdly, for the sake of greater light on these matters, it should be recalled to memory, and illustrated more fully, what we touched upon in num. 67. and 68., namely, that when it is said that future contingents are from eternity present to eternity in the now of that same eternity, from the fact that they are virtually extended, or that they virtually have the parts of duration, namely past, present, and future; and that by reason of these they include all of them within themselves, this can still be understood in a twofold way. Either in such a way that eternity, by reason of all its parts, virtually such, reaches immediately and proximately to each future; or in such a way that it is not by reason of all its virtual parts that it has this, but that, insofar as it virtually contains, for example, tomorrow's duration, it coexists from eternity with the future day, and with all the things which will have existence in it itself; although at present, that is, in the now of our time, they do not have it; and insofar as it virtually contains the day immediately following after tomorrow, and those things which are now future with respect to that same day, they too coexist from eternity with it. Just as also, according to the fact that it contains all the times which have preceded up to the present instant, they always coexist with all past things, as will be explained more fully below.

85 When, therefore, it is said that future contingents always coexist, and from eternity, with God and eternity in the now of eternity, from the fact that they are extended virtually as much as suffices in order that from their own eternal duration on the part of the past they may reach up to the duration of the futures, the sense is not that, by reason of all the virtual parts of their duration, it immediately and proximately concludes and contains within itself each future and its created duration; but that, insofar as it contains that duration in which the Antichrist will be, it encompasses and concludes him; and so with respect to the other temporal differences preceding that one, whether real or imaginary.

And the reason is manifest. Because a thing encompassed and concluded by eternity lasts in its own duration for as long as that virtual part has of virtual extension, by reason of which eternity immediately and proximately concludes and encompasses it. Just as the same thing has as much duration in its own intrinsic measure as is required of the extension of duration formal in the time of the first heaven, in order that it may contain within itself, and encompass, by reason of its parts, that same thing immediately. Hence, if the Antichrist, for example, were contained immediately and proximately by eternity by reason of all its virtual parts, it would be necessary that he should last in his own proper duration as long as eternity is: and consequently he would be formally extended in his character of lasting as much as eternity is virtually extended according to all of itself. Wherefore, since the Antichrist lasts in his own proper measure only from the future time, in which he will be, until the end of his life, hence it is that eternity does not encompass him immediately and proximately, nor coexist with him as present and having existence, except insofar as it contains that whole future duration, and not another.

86 We have said immediately, and proximately, because although in order that eternity may reach from its infinite duration on the part of the past up to the future duration of the Antichrist, and to the Antichrist himself, it is required that it should reach also to all the preceding differences of time; nevertheless not in such a way that it should reach to this one immediately and proximately, but that it reaches to those; but because, by reason of its infinitude, formally indivisible in its duration, it was necessary for this, in order that it might reach to that one, that it should encompass all those which precede it; although it immediately and proximately encompasses only the difference of time in which the Antichrist will be, and his existence, because it contains and encompasses the aforesaid difference of time.

Hence the Thomists very well say that there are in eternity several and diverse folds virtually, and that in one fold there is actually, for example, the Antichrist, and in another Adam, and so on with the rest, according to the various differences of time in which they were, or will exist.

87 From which a fuller explanation follows of those things which we introduced in num. 68., namely, that in as far as future contingents coexist with eternity proximately and immediately only insofar as eternity has for each of them that quasi-private fold corresponding to it, or according as it precisely contains that private difference of time for which, with respect to us, they will exist, it is not necessary for this coexistence already mentioned that they should always exist with respect to us, or that they should have and should have had at the same time, always, existence in their own and adequate measure, as is evident from what has been said. But since from its source eternity contains at the same time virtually and actually, without succession and without formal divisibility, both that difference of time and all those preceding and following it, it is necessary that, always and from eternity, and without succession, on the part both of itself and of the actual virtual extension, or of contact with things or durations which are future with respect to us, it should extend itself to the actual encompassing of all of them, and to concluding them within its own quasi-fold corresponding to each of them, and to each thing measured by that duration, contained and concluded within the same fold.

Just as, if a year had from the beginning of its being that whole formal extension which it has in the course of time, and this were to stand, by an impossibility, always throughout that whole year, then from the beginning of its being it would actually encompass all things which would be done in the tenth month of it, by reason of that part of the formal extension which would correspond to it from that same tenth month, the others standing at the same time, by an impossibility; and for this, namely, that the same year should encompass those things from the beginning of its being, it would be enough that those things should have existence in the tenth month, as in a measure adequate to it.

88 From all of which it finally follows that this question, and the difficulty of it, is not about the name alone, as some of the adversaries wish, but about the thing itself. For although all the Doctors agree in this, that the Antichrist, for example, is not present to eternity in the now of our time, as being in a measure measuring the coexistence of these last terms: and likewise that those same futures coexist, speaking absolutely and simply, in the now of eternity, because eternity is a measure equivalent to infinite time, both on the part of the past and on the part of the future, and all at once; and therefore, just as each future ought to exist in some part of infinite time (if there were such), and to coexist with it, so it also ought to be in eternity, and to have coexistence with it; nay, because it is formally indivisible and all at once, it is necessary that they all coexist with that whole eternity. The Fathers, however, and especially D. Thom., hold that this coexistence of eternity with futures has always been, and has been from eternity, without any succession, not only on the part of eternity, but also on the part of contact (as we may say) which is virtual, or of actual coexistence with them, and conversely. The adversaries, however, deny this: and they say only that this coexistence was not, or was not from eternity, but began in time; not indeed on account of a succession of eternity and of its duration, but on account of the succession, and limitation of the things coexisting with it, and consequently on account of the succession of the contact itself, which arises precisely from this limitation and succession of created things. But these diverse manners of speaking, it is evident, are not about the name or the mere word, but altogether about the thing itself.

§ III. The prior and fundamental reason of the true opinion.

89 The assertion, thus explained, follows clearly in its second part from its first part. For from the very fact that a future contingent is really and physically present, it has a certain and determinate knowability with respect to that to which it is present; and by reason of this presence, it can be known with certainty by him: therefore, from the very fact that future contingents are present in the said way to eternity, and to God by reason of eternity, they will be able to be known with certainty by him by reason of this presence. Let, however, those things which we noted in num. 40. be considered.

With regard, however, to the first part, it is proved, firstly, by the fundamental reason which has already been touched upon in the explanation of this same assertion, and which is drawn from D. Thom. and from the other holy Fathers in the places cited in the preceding question; and it can be reduced to this form. Because eternity is a duration all at once and infinite in its duration; such that at once and once for all it is equivalent to infinite time, both on the part of the past and on the part of the future: therefore, at once and once for all, and from eternity, it coexists in its own proper measure of that same eternity with all future differences of time, and it actually encompasses and contains them all, and all the things which have coexisted in them. The antecedent as regards the first part is evident from itself: otherwise there would be in it a past and a future, and consequently a succession and an imperfection of mutability. The second part, however, is also constant. Because whatever is in God must be infinite within its own line; and consequently it must at once and once for all be equivalent to all created things which look to that same line: therefore, since the line of eternity is the line of duration, it will have to be infinite in this respect, and at once and once for all to be equivalent to infinite duration of time, both on the part of the past and on the part of the future, if this were given; that this can be given is very well proved by the Complutensian doctors in lib. Phys. disp. 29. num. 46. and afterwards.

90 The consequent, however, is proved. Because if eternity did not contain at once, and once for all, and from eternity, all the future differences of time, and all the things existing in them, it would not coexist from eternity with them in the same measure of eternity; then it would not be infinite in its duration, and all at once. Because a duration which is all at once and infinite in its duration, both on the part of the past and on the part of the future, must always, and from eternity, extend itself virtually in such a way that it may reach up to all the differences of time, encompassing them, and coexisting with them from eternity, and with the things existing in them.

Just as that which were infinite in its duration, not indeed so as to be all at once, but successively and formally extended, would have to encompass future things not indeed at once, but successively, and by reason of its future parts, and coexist with them; and if it did not have this, it would not be infinite in its duration considered as successive. And likewise, as we were saying a moment ago, if by an impossibility it were given that a year, for example, of the time of the first heaven had its whole formal extension at once, and standing always, then from the beginning of that same being it would encompass all the differences of time existing intrinsically in those lower things which would be given in the aforesaid year, and it would coexist with all the things which would be done in that year. And if it did not have this, then precisely for that reason it would not have from the beginning of its being that whole formal extension of duration standing always.

91 It is confirmed by the reason of D. Thom. in the places cited. For from the very fact that eternity is a perfectly infinite duration, and all at once without any succession, it must be a measure measuring, in an infinite and unchangeable way, all future created durations, and whatever is contained in them: therefore, always and from eternity, and in an unchangeable way, it must measure them all, and all the things which will have been in them, and contain them actually, and coexist with them.

The antecedent is proved. For although not every duration is a measure of another, and so the age of an angel may indeed have a considerable uniformity, nevertheless it does not measure our motions from the fact that they do not depend on it; yet a duration which is more uniform in itself, and from which other inferior durations depend, must be, according to its own mode, a measure of them, and of the things which are contained in them: therefore, since eternity is not only a duration more uniform than others, but infinitely more uniform and infinitely perfect and unchangeable by God; and since all other durations depend on it, it will be necessary that it be a measure of all other things in an infinite and unchangeable way.

The consequent, however, is proved. Because if it did not always, and from eternity, and in an unchangeable way, measure and contain the aforesaid things, but sometimes began to measure some of them, and ceased to measure them; and again measured others, and ceased from this measurement, then there would be in it a succession in its character of measure, and in its character of duration, by reason of which it measures; and thus it would not measure in a perfectly infinite and unchangeable way.

92 The adversaries object, both to the reason given and to its confirmation. As regards the reason, indeed, they say that in order that eternity be an infinite duration and all at once, it is not necessary that it should always, and from eternity, coexist with all differences of time and with the things existing in them; but it is enough that, as far as it is of itself, it be able to coexist with them: and consequently that the defect of this coexistence should not arise from a defect of eternity and of its infinite duration, but from a defect of time and of the things existing in it; which, because they begin to exist in time, and also cease to exist in time, for that very reason cannot coexist from eternity with that same eternity.

This, however, they explain by the example of immensity: which, although it be infinite within its own line, nevertheless does not fill future places, but only existing ones; not indeed from a defect of its own, but from a defect of theirs: from the fact that so long as they are existing, they are not capable of that aforesaid filling.

From this, also, they answer with regard to the confirmation, that eternity, as far as it is of itself, is an unchangeable measure, because although it now measures present things, but not future things, and those having passed and these existing, it may cease to measure the being of those and begin to measure the being of these: yet this is not on account of a defect, a changeability, or a succession of eternity, but of created things, which flow according to their being, and succeed one another in turn; whereas eternity always remains fixed and unmoving, at least in that proportional way in which a tree in a river remains always unmoved, and successively coexists with the flowing waters: and if it were their measure, it would measure them successively; although this would not arise from the flowing of the tree, but of the waters.

93 Moreover, neither of these solutions satisfies. Not, indeed, the former. For from the very example which they bring forward on their own behalf, and from the difference which obtains between immensity and eternity, it is very efficiently proved that eternity must always, and from eternity, coexist with every future duration and with the things existing in it. For immensity is not infinite in its duration, but only in its immensity, and (as we may say) in its power of filling the whole place: and therefore, by reason of this infinitude taken precisely, it must actually and at the same time fill all places; not indeed future ones, but existing ones, and that whether they are distant from one another or not: and from the very fact that it did not fill them and reach them at the same time, it would follow that the aforesaid immensity was not infinite in its power of filling places: therefore, because eternity is infinite in its duration, it will be necessary that it should at once, and once for all, contain and actually encompass all the differences of time, and everything which has been in them; and consequently that it should touch them, as it were, from eternity, and coexist with them, however distant from one another the things themselves may be in their duration: therefore, since the differences of duration, that is, of our time, are past, present, and future, eternity will have actually, and from eternity, to encompass all these differences of time, and whatever is contained in them.

Otherwise, if by reason of its virtual extension it did not extend itself to the aforesaid things, such that at once, and once for all, and consequently from eternity, it did not reach up to them, and actually encompass them, and coexist with them, it could not be infinite in its duration. Just as, likewise, it could not have the aforesaid infinitude, if it did not grant to immensity that, by reason of itself, according to which it is measured by eternity, it should coexist and should fill future places; because this whole matter belongs to immensity, not indeed taken precisely, but as it looks to the line of eternity, insofar as it is measured by it as by its proper measure.

94 Hence the force of the reason of D. Thom. consists in this, that just as before and after, above and below, near and far with respect to place, there are differences contained within the line of a place that can be filled, but not present, past, and future; so all the differences of time, namely present, past, and future, are differences pertaining to the line of duration: therefore, just as because immensity, taken precisely, is infinite in its power of filling places, it cannot fail to actually and at the same time fill and touch all the aforesaid places, however distant from one another, from the very fact that they exist, but not from the very fact that they are future or past, because these differences of durations do not pertain to the line of immensity: so, from the fact that eternity is infinite in its duration, it will not be able to fail to contain at once, and simultaneously, and as it were to touch, every duration of time, from the very fact that it is present, past, or future: since each one of these pertains to the line of duration: just as any existing place looks to the line of immensity taken precisely.

95 It is confirmed and explained from another difference which turns on the distinction between immensity and eternity. For it is proper to a measuring duration to contain and to conclude within itself a thing lasting in it, especially if it be a surpassing and superior duration and measure; whereas the power filling a place does not contain within itself the place which it fills, but rather it is itself in that place: therefore, since eternity is an infinite and surpassing duration, it will contain within itself every created and lasting thing: just as, because immensity is infinite in its power of filling places, it does not contain within itself the places which it fills, but rather God, as immense, will be intimately in the things filled by him: therefore, since each one is received, or contained, according to the mode of the receiver or of the container, it follows that both that the things actually contained in eternity, or coexisting with it, are contained, and are in it according to the mode of eternity, namely wholly immutably, and consequently always and from eternity. And also that, if immensity were not eternal, it would extend itself only towards filling all the places in so far as they precisely exist, and consequently towards filling them temporally: just as the things in which God is intimately infused by reason of immensity have their being only in time, so as to be in their own and adequate measure; although, because that same immensity is measured by eternity, as by its proper measure, it must by reason of that same eternity fill them from eternity, and encompass them, and coexist with them. But this distinction will be treated of again in the treatise on the Angels, and it must be understood according to what is said there.

96 From this, also (let us say so in passing)¹, another solution of that same reason remains refuted, namely, that for the reason of infinite duration it is not necessary that it should always coexist with future things, and with every future duration; but it is enough that, eminently and from eternity, it contain their perfection, setting aside imperfections: just as in general every cause contains the perfection of its effect; yet it does not thereby always coexist with it. The print numbers this passage “97” (p. 557, col. 1), repeating the number of the preceding passage and leaving 96 unassigned; the next paragraph is again numbered 97 and the following one 98, so the series runs 94, 95, 96, 97, 98. It is read here as 96; the prose itself is untouched.]

From what has been said, then, this solution remains refuted. For just as from the very fact that knowledge is infinite within the line of knowledge, and contains eminently the perfection of the creatures to be known, it cannot fail to contain from eternity within itself, in an unintelligible way, those same creatures, knowing whatever is found in them according to their own being; and this for no other reason than because such containment pertains to the line of knowledge: so, from the very fact that eternity is infinite in its duration, and contains eminently in its entity every created duration, setting aside imperfections, it must furthermore, by the mode of an extrinsic and superior measure actually measuring, encompass from eternity, and as it were touch, created duration which is at some time future, and whatever will be in it: and consequently it must also coexist from eternity with those same things: because this whole matter pertains to the line of infinite duration, as has been shown.

97 Nor, likewise, does the solution which we set out from the adversaries for the confirmation of the reason of D. Thom. satisfy. For in the first place, the example of the tree immovably corresponding on its part to the flowing waters, which they bring forward in their own favour, can be turned back against this solution. For just as, if that tree were formally extended as much as the whole river, then it would coexist at once and once for all with those same waters flowing among themselves, by reason of its various parts; and if that tree were formally indivisible, and at once and once for all had as much virtual extension as the whole river has formal, then according to all of itself it would coexist at once and once for all with the whole river and with all its parts, and any part of the water would touch the whole tree, although one part of the water would not touch another: so, because eternity contains at once and once for all, virtually and in an infinite way, the whole extension of time, both present, and past, and future, it will be able, and it will be obliged, at once and once for all, and consequently from eternity, actually to contain, and measure, and coexist with any part of time, provided that the thing itself is destined to have existence at some time.

We have said, provided that the thing itself is destined to have some existence. For just as through the knowledge of vision things are not actually seen unless they are things which are at some time to come to be, because this knowledge presupposes a decree about their futurition; so eternity does not actually contain, measure, or as it were touch created duration, unless it is at some time destined to have existence; because in the same way it presupposes an efficacious decree about the futurition of things.

98 Next, against that same solution it is urged that it cannot cohere internally that eternity should admit some succession in its contact or coexistence with created things lasting in some difference of time, and that this succession should arise from the relation of created things, and not from a defect of eternity. And the reason seems evident from what has been said. For then some duration and measure would have a defect of its own in that it does not always and immutably coexist with created things, and touch them in the aforesaid way, whereas it is not repugnant to those things, that, once their own futurition is supposed, they should always and immutably be touched by some superior measure and duration, and should immutably coexist with it; nevertheless such a duration does not always and immutably touch them in this way, or coexist with them, but rather with created things existing successively in some difference of time, whether present, or past, or future, it is not repugnant that they should always and from eternity be immutably touched by a superior and most eminent duration: therefore, from the very fact that that superior duration, namely eternity, does not always and immutably touch them, or does not coexist with them immutably, this will arise from a defect of the immutability of that same eternity.

The major needs no proof. For from the very fact that it is not repugnant to created things, their own futurition having been supposed, that this contact and immutable coexistence with the aforesaid superior duration should obtain, it is necessary that, if this duration does not touch them, and coexist with them always and immutably, that this should arise from a defect, and from the mutability, of that same eternity. But this is against the adversaries, and against what they were saying in num. 22.: maintaining that this succession in the contact of eternity with created things arises from their relation, and not from a defect of eternity.

The minor, however, also follows from those things which we were just saying. Because from the very fact that a thing should have existence at some time in some difference of time, whether present, or past, or future, it is of itself always and immutably touched by an infinite duration, which always and immutably has a virtually infinite extension in its duration, and consequently has at once and once for all that whole duration which is in every duration of time, whether present, or past, and future: otherwise, indeed, all these differences of time would not be contained within the line of duration, nor would eternity itself be virtually infinitely extended within that same line.

99 It is confirmed. For divine intellection is always, and from eternity, and immutably terminated with respect to things existing in some difference of time precisely from the fact that they exist in one of them, in such a way that there is then, neither on the part of the things nor on the part of the intellection, any succession with regard to the aforesaid termination, because it is an intellection measured by eternity (which indeed we say, in proportion, of the divine will), and therefore, if it were not measured by eternity, it would not be repugnant that it should terminate in time, and mutably, with respect to them: and from the very fact that it should thus terminate with respect to them, there would then be a succession on the part of each of the two extremes, namely of the intellection, for example, and of the things understood: therefore, with so much the greater reason will eternity itself be terminated in its measurement with respect to those same things existing in some difference of time in an unchangeable way, and consequently always and from eternity; and from the very fact that it does not terminate with respect to them in this way, there will be a succession both on the part of created things and on the part of eternity.

The antecedent seems to be certain. For this is the reason why our intellect is terminated with respect to things existing in some difference of time, because it is not measured by eternity as by its own and adequate measure: and so, if it were measured by it in this way, it would not admit any succession or changeability; since eternity presupposes, or necessarily includes, unchangeability in every respect. And likewise, from the very fact that our intellect terminates mutably, a succession and a changeability intervene there on the part of each of the two extremes, namely on the part of our intellect and of the things understood; otherwise, indeed, it would be enough for this, namely in order that the intellect should terminate in time, and mutably, with respect to the things understood, that there should be some succession on their part, even if there were no succession on the part of the intellect and of the intellection: and thus the divine intellect could, without any change of its own, be terminated in time with respect to things existing temporally, the opposite of which we shall show below. The consequent, however, is proved from that common axiom: on account of which each particular thing is so, and that one more so.

§ IV. A second reason is proposed in support of the assertion.

100 The second fundamental reason of our assertion, however, is taken from the same Angelic Doctor in the places cited, and in art. 15. of this question, and it can be reduced to this form. Because divine knowledge is unchangeable: therefore no future has, physically and really, the character of a future with respect to it; such that from eternity it is not present to it, and physically coexisting with it: therefore, since it does not have this presence in the now of our time, it will certainly have it, from the fact that the aforesaid knowledge is measured by eternity, and with respect to eternity no future has the character of a future which does not physically coexist from eternity in relation to it. The antecedent is commonly admitted by theologians; because otherwise there would be in divine knowledge some imperfection of potentiality and of succession.

The first consequence, however, in which the second part rests, follows from the antecedent. For if the Antichrist, for example, were from eternity physically and really a future with respect to divine knowledge, but were not from eternity coexisting with it in the now of eternity, but only temporally, and in the course of time, then the aforesaid knowledge would be changed. For from eternity it would have known the Antichrist as future to it; and when that time arrived at which he would be physically present to it, that knowledge would cease, insofar as it was terminated with respect to him as actually future, and another would begin, which would know him as actually present to it in the measure of eternity; and consequently there would be an intrinsic change in divine knowledge.

101 The Angelic Doctor drew this reason from Augustine, lib. 2. ad Simplician. quaest. 2., in these words: What then is future for God, who surpasses all times? For if he holds things themselves in knowledge, they are not future, but present, and so it can no longer be called foreknowledge, but only knowledge. But if, just as in the order of temporal creatures, so also with respect to him those things which are future are not yet, but he anticipates them by knowing: therefore he feels them twice, indeed in one way according to the foreknowledge of futures, but in another way according to the knowledge of present things. Something, therefore, is added temporally to God's knowledge, which is most absurd and most false.

And indeed this reason is so efficacious that, if it be weighed alone, it easily destroys the evasion of the adversaries, when they inquire whether it follows from this that there is a change in divine knowledge, from the fact that God from eternity knew the Antichrist to be future, present, and past with respect to eternity and to his own knowledge; not indeed in one and the same difference of time, but in different ones, such that from eternity he knows that from eternity up to the time of the Antichrist's birth he is future to him, and from his birth up to his death he is present to that same divine knowledge and to eternity, and from his death onwards to infinity he is also past to him; in that proportional way in which, according to our opinion, there follows no change in that same knowledge from the fact that it knows that same Antichrist as now future to us, and afterwards present to others, and at length as past with respect to others: because it knew all of this always and from eternity.

From what has been said, therefore, and from any mere weighing of the reason of D. Thom., this solution falls to the ground. For in this, namely that God has known from eternity that the Antichrist is present, past, and future to him in distinct differences of time, there is necessarily involved that he should know that he is not physically and really present to him from eternity in the measure of eternity, but that he is future to him from eternity up to the time of his birth, and that when such a time arrives, he cannot know that he is then future to him, since that knowledge would be false, but that he then knows that he is physically and really present to him in the same measure of eternity, and not future, or past: therefore, when the aforesaid birth arrives, that knowledge will cease, by which he was known as future: for in truth he is then no longer future, but present; and another will begin, by which he is known as then present to him; and thus there will be a change in divine knowledge.

102 It is confirmed and explained. For according to this solution God does not have only the knowledge the Antichrist is physically and really present to my infinite knowledge and to eternity, otherwise (as we were just saying) divine knowledge would be deceived: but he does well have this, the Antichrist is future to my infinite knowledge and to eternity. And then, when the birth of that same Antichrist arrives, God cannot have a knowledge by which he judges that he is then future to him, since this is altogether false; but he does well have this, the Antichrist is now present to my infinite knowledge and to eternity, whereas throughout the whole preceding time he could not have had the aforesaid knowledge by which he judges that at that time he has that same Antichrist physically and really coexisting with him; therefore there will have to be some change in divine knowledge: for from the time of the Antichrist's birth he has some knowledge which he could not have had from eternity.

103 It cannot be answered by admitting that in truth, besides that knowledge by which he knew from eternity that the Antichrist was future, past, and present to him in different differences of time, God has, when the birth of that same Antichrist arrives, this knowledge: Antichristus is now physically and really present to my infinite knowledge and to eternity, and is neither future nor past; and that, when his death arrives, he has this: the Antichrist is now neither present, nor future, to my knowledge and to eternity, but only past. Yet this does not arise from the changeability and mutation of divine knowledge, but only from the variation and defect of the object.

For against this it must be said, first, that this solution is expressly against D. Thom. in this question, art. 15., in the answer to the second, where he has it thus: But from the fact that he knows that some things can be which are not, or even that some are not which are, it does not follow that his knowledge is changeable, but that he knows the changeability of things. Yet if there were something which God previously did not know, and afterwards came to know, his knowledge would be changeable: but this cannot be, because whatever is, or can be, at some time, God knows in his eternity. And therefore, from the fact that it is posited that something is at whatever time, it must be posited that it is known by God from eternity. And therefore it must not be admitted that God is able to know more than he knows. Because this proposition involves that he did not know it before, and knows it afterwards.

And also, that the denomination knowledge is not an extrinsic, but an intrinsic denomination, and one according to the mode of the knower himself; and consequently, as we shall explain at once, measured by eternity; therefore it cannot be changed from any heading, but all things connoted and objectified which are required for it must, from the supposition that they in some way concur to it, be immutable, or immutably coexist with eternity, as with a superior and excellent measure.

104 It is confirmed and explained, and at the same time a certain tacit objection is dissolved. For although it can happen that some intrinsic and immanent denomination should begin anew without any intrinsic change of that of which it is the denomination, but only through a change of the object, or of something connoted, from the fact that that connoted thing was required for the aforesaid denomination: as happens, according to the probable opinion, in the angelic species, which before the existence of any individual did not represent it as existing, but only the specific nature under which it will be contained; yet well when the existence of that same individual arrives: and thus they are anew intrinsically denominated as representing it, through the sole change of the object: yet this happens for this reason, that those species, under that express concept and denomination under which they are conceived as representing the aforesaid individual as existing, are not measured with regard to that exercise, according as they hold themselves on their part by that same measure so fixed and immovable as they are measured with regard to their intrinsic entity under the express and most formal concept, under which they are conceived as representing that same nature, and its individuals as possible. For according to this latter consideration they are measured by the age, no less than the angelic substance itself, with which they begin, and which they always and inseparably accompany; whereas according to the former consideration they are measured by angelic time. And thus, if according to either consideration they were measured by the same measure, they would have to have, according to either, the same stability and immovability; therefore, since the denomination of the knower, according as, on the part of God, it is terminated, is measured by eternity, not only in the act of signification but in the act of exercise with respect to creatures, from the very fact that it is in God, it is necessary that it always be fixed and stable; and consequently that it persevere from eternity and unto eternity; otherwise it would not be measured by eternity as by its own and adequate measure; and consequently it must from eternity have all things connoted which are required in order that that denomination should exist from eternity.

105 It is confirmed and explained, secondly. For although it can happen that some intrinsic denomination should apply to God from time to time, not indeed with regard to what it strictly imports, but that what it adequately says, from the fact that such a denomination connotes some created object as it is present in its own and adequate duration, and thus the aforesaid denomination, with regard to what it adequately says, is measured by eternity as by its own and adequate measure, nor yet with regard to what it holds on the part of God and in the act of exercise; yet an intrinsic denomination which applies to God by connoting a created thing, not according to the mode in which it is in itself, but according to the mode in which it is in God, cannot fail to be measured by eternity as by its proper measure, at least with regard to what it holds on the part of God in the act of exercise: for it is proper to knowledge, and to the denomination of the knower, that it should be referred to things according to the mode of the knower himself, and according to the being which they have in him, because knowledge is by the fact that the thing known, in a manner explained elsewhere, is in the knower: therefore the denomination of the knower in God must, with regard to its actual exercise, according as it holds itself on the part of God, be measured by eternity as by its proper measure, and all things connoted and required for it must be fixed and immovable in eternity: and consequently God cannot come to know again in time something which he did not know before, nor be physically and really present again to that which was not previously present to him in this way.

106 The minor, together with each of the consequences, seems sufficiently to be constant. The major, however, with regard to the second part, because it is briefer and easier to urge, is shown thus. Because the exercise which is in a knower about a thing according to the mode of being in which it is in that knower, must be measured as by its proper measure, by the proper measure of the one exercising: and in God there is no other measure proper and adequate to him except eternity alone; and thus all things connoted which are extrinsic to the aforesaid exercise and required must be stable and fixed, and measured by that same eternity as by a common and surpassing measure: otherwise, indeed, the aforesaid exercise, according as it holds itself on the part of God, could not (as we were just saying) be measured by eternity as by its proper measure.

With regard, however, to the first part, the same major is urged. Then, because for the aforesaid denomination, taken adequately, something temporal is required, as it is in itself present in its own duration: and thus so considered it cannot be measured by eternity: just as neither can that which holds itself on the part of God, and in the act of exercise, be measured by it as by its own and adequate measure. Because for this exercise, under the concept of such a denomination, the aforesaid connoted thing is required as it is present in its own difference of time: and therefore at most the aforesaid denomination is measured by eternity as by its own and adequate measure with regard to the divine entity, and consequently also with regard to what holds itself on the part of God in the act of signification.

And also: because in the relations of the Lord and Creator, taken fundamentally, as also in the intrinsic denomination by which the Word is denominated as united to the humanity, this is clearly seen. For just as it is united by the mode of a pure act, so it is itself the last term that can be united, and that union on its part, and consequently such a denomination, is intrinsic to it: although, because such a union connotes the union of the humanity as it is in its own duration, to the Word, the exercise of the aforesaid union, according as it holds itself on the part of the Word, is not measured by eternity as by its own and adequate measure: not indeed from a defect of the Word, and of the entity of that union of that same Word, but from a defect of the humanity, and of the union which holds itself on the part of it, and is terminated at the Word itself.

107 D. Thom. has set all of this out elegantly in art. 15. of this question, in the answer to the first, where, having raised for himself the objection: Knowledge is said to be relative to the knowable: but those things which import a relation to a creature are said of God from time, and are varied according to the variety of creatures: therefore the knowledge of God is changeable according to the change of creatures, he answers in this way: It must be said that the Lord, the Creator, and things of this kind import a relation to creatures according as they are in themselves; but the knowledge of God imports a relation to creatures according as they are in God: because according to this each thing is actually understood which is in the understander: created things, however, are in God unchangeably, but in themselves changeably. Or it must be said otherwise, that the Lord, the Creator, and things of this kind import relations which follow upon acts which are understood to be terminated at those very creatures according as they are in themselves. And therefore relations of this kind are said variously of God according to the variety of creatures. But knowledge, and love, and things of this kind import relations which follow upon acts which are understood to be in God. And therefore they are predicated of God unchangeably. But concerning these things, and in order that what the holy Doctor teaches about love may be understood, let those things be seen which he himself teaches below in quaest. 19. art. 7., and which we shall note there in turn.

108 It makes no difference if you press the point that from this doctrine it would rather seem to follow that that knowledge by which God knows that this whole universe is now really and physically present to his eternity and to his knowledge should be terminated at it as it is in itself, and thus that this intuitive knowledge could begin in time with regard to its actual exercise, even on the part of God, not indeed from a defect of its own, but from a defect of the connoted thing, namely of this universe: which has its being only in time.

This, therefore, makes no difference. For just as when it is said that possible things are known from eternity by God according to the being which they have in him, or that divine knowledge is terminated at them according to the mode of the knower himself, the sense is not that the aforesaid knowledge does not have, as it were, a transition to the knowing of those same creatures with regard to their own proper being; but that the knower touches things by drawing them to itself; and the reason of touching them is the being which they have in the knower: so, conversely, when it is said that existing creatures are known by God intuitively, as they are in themselves, the sense is not that the reason of knowing them is the being which they have in themselves; but that the knowledge has, as it were, a transition to the touching of them with regard to the being of the exercise of existence which they have in themselves, and which really and physically coexists with them: although it is necessary that the knower, namely God, should draw them to himself, and that they should have being in him: and the reason of this transition and of this knowledge is the being which they have in God: and consequently they must be drawn and represented in the divine essence in an unchangeable way: for the thing known must be drawn and be in the knower according to the proper mode of that knower himself; and since the being of the existence of created things cannot be drawn and represented in that same essence unchangeably, unless it be unchangeably and fixedly present, and since this cannot have a created being in its own duration, it is necessary that as a remedy for this there be given eternity, and a fixed and immovable presence of created things in that same eternity, so that thus they may be represented in the divine essence firmly and immovably; and so that that knowledge may be perfected according to the mode of the knower, and the being which it has in him. But concerning these things, let those be seen which the Complutensian doctors teach in lib. de Anima, disp. 21. quaest. 5., and especially in num. 94.

109 From which it finally follows that it is of no avail that the adversaries, in the former solution of this reason, num. 101., brought forward that, just as according to our opinion God knows from eternity the Antichrist as future to us, and as present to those who will coexist with him at the same time in the future time, and nevertheless no change follows in divine knowledge from this, so God may know the Antichrist as at some time future to him, and not present, and conversely, and from this it may be gathered that there is some change in that same knowledge.

This, therefore, is of no avail. Because according to our opinion the futurition of the Antichrist with respect to us, and his presence with respect to others, is always and immutably present with respect to God: and therefore it can always and unchangeably be known by God. According, however, to the mode of speaking of the adversaries, and to the solution which they have adopted, from the very fact that the Antichrist is at some time future with respect to God, but not present, he has presentiality and futurition variably with respect to God himself, and therefore he cannot be unchangeably known by God, as has been shown.

§ V. An answer is given to the foundations of the opposite opinion.

110 As regards the first point, it is constant from what has been said how, in order that something be present in eternity, as in a surpassing and common measure and duration, it is enough that it have existence in itself for the future time. For from the very fact that eternity, by reason of its infinite virtual extension in its duration, extends itself to the actual encompassing of that thing, and to touching it as it were, and because it has that whole duration at once and from eternity, it extends itself at once, and from eternity, to containing it, and to coexisting with it.

Hence, in the form of the argument, the major must be distinguished: unless in itself it exists in the same way, either in the present time or at least in the future, is to be granted with respect to a surpassing duration, such as eternity: unless in itself it exists in the same way, precisely in the present time, is to be denied with respect to that same surpassing measure, or with respect to eternity. And then in the same proportional way the minor must be distinguished: and if the sense is that future contingents, before they are in their proper measure, neither have de praesenti nor de futuro a physical existence in themselves in that same measure, it must be denied; but otherwise, if the sense is that before they are in their proper measure, they do not have de praesenti a physical existence in themselves. And therefore the consequence must be denied. Because, as we were just indicating, in order that something should coexist from eternity with eternity in the now of eternity itself, it is enough that it exist in some difference of time. By which, also, the proof of the major and of the minor adduced there is sufficiently constant.

111 Or it may be met in other words by distinguishing the same major in the form of the same argument: unless in itself it exists in the same way, either in its own and adequate duration, or in another surpassing one, namely eternity, is to be granted: unless in itself it exists in the same way in its proper measure, is to be denied. And in the same proportional way let the minor be distinguished: that they do not really and physically exist in themselves in their own and adequate duration, let it be granted; in an alien and surpassing one, that is, in eternity, let it be denied. And then the consequence must be denied. For futures exist, and coexist with eternity, in the same way. Because just as they do not exist in themselves in their proper measure, but in the measure of eternity, so they do not coexist with it in their own measure, but in the measure of eternity: although, as we were just saying, for this, namely that a thing should always be existing in eternity, it is enough that from eternity it have a future being: because it is not existing from eternity in eternity except by reason of that existence which it will have for the future time: and not by reason of another existence which it had before: for, as we have already said, from the very fact that it will have existence for the future time, eternity extends itself from eternity to the actual encompassing of that thing, and to its coexisting with it from eternity.

112 Wherefore the solution given there is the best. And as regards the proof, it is evident from what has been said how the antecedent must be distinguished: unless in itself it be a real being in the same way, either in the present time or in the future, is to be granted: unless in itself it be a real being in the same way, in the present time, is to be denied; or in other words: unless in the same way it be a real being in itself, in its proper or in an alien measure, can be granted; in the proper measure only, of a thing existing de praesenti, it must be denied.

And in the same proportional way the consequent must be distinguished, according to the former distinction: either the consequence is to be denied according to the latter, if the consequent is understood to be about existence in the proper measure for the present time alone. And as regards the proof, it is constant from what has been just said how, in order that something should be a physical and real being in itself, or in order that it should have an actual and real entity, it is required that it exist, and that it come to be; yet in order that it exist in an alien measure, virtually and infinitely extended, it is enough that it have that aforesaid reality and actuality in some difference of time.

By which, as regards the first confirmation, it is sufficiently constant. Because the antecedent is true if the sense of it is that it is prior for a thing to exist in its own proper measure or duration, either in the present time or in the future, than to exist in an alien and surpassing measure; otherwise, if the sense of it is that it is prior for a thing to exist in its proper measure in the present time only, than to exist in the aforesaid surpassing measure, as is evident from what has been said.

113 To the second confirmation it will be answered, that all the aforesaid predicates which suit a thing in eternity also belong to it in its proper measure, except that aforesaid predicate in which the mode of being of a thing in eternity is explained. For since that mode is different from that which belongs to the thing in its proper measure, it must not belong to it in its own proper measure. And thus it is false that a thing exists from eternity in its proper measure, if the words in its proper measure import the proper duration of the thing measuring its coexistence with eternity, although it can be true if it is only meant by this that the thing is contained from eternity together with its proper measure in eternity: from the fact that eternity, by reason of its infinite duration, extends itself at once, and immutably, so as to reach every difference of time which exists at some time, and whatever thing is contained in it. Nevertheless, because this proposition, a thing exists from eternity in its proper measure, taken absolutely according to the common mode of conceiving, yields the former sense and not the latter, for that reason it is to be denied absolutely.

And this can be explained by the example of the most holy Sacrament of the Eucharist, in which all the aforesaid predicates which suit Christ outside the sacrament also belong to him in the sacrament, and conversely, except for those aforesaid predicates in which the modes of being in him, or outside him, are imported: and thus outside the sacrament he is not under the appearances, nor is he present in the sacrament in a quantitative manner.

114 To the second point, a good answer is given there, provided that that solution is understood according to what has been just said. And to the first proof to the contrary, the antecedent must be denied. Because a thing does not have being absolutely and simply, and according to the common mode of conceiving, except when it exists in its own and adequate measure. Just as, likewise, it does not have being created absolutely and simply, and according to the same mode of conceiving, except when it comes to be in that same proper and adequate measure.

As regards the second proof, however, it is constant from what has been said that the antecedent is to be granted, and the first consequence in the sense already indicated, and that the consequent of the second is to be distinguished. Hence, if the sense of it is that, just as things are from eternity in their own existence, so also in their own duration, as being in the measure measuring that coexistence with eternity, the consequence is to be denied. But if the sense is that, just as a thing is from eternity with its own existence in the measure of eternity, so also with its own duration, because each of the two is contained in it, the consequence will have to be granted.

115 As regards the third point, the major is to be granted, according to what we shall say at once, and the minor is to be denied. Because the diversity according to which eternity has regard to a thing when it actually exists, and when it has being as past or as future, does not consist in this, that these should be regarded by it successively; such that futures should be regarded by it precisely as futures, or precisely as things not coexisting with it but to coexist with it: because, as we have often said, eternity always, and in an unchangeable way, has regard to present, past, and future things, and at once and immutably coexists with all of these, and all of these with it. But the diversity consists in this, that eternity, insofar as it virtually contains the time in which, for example, Abraham was present, coexists from eternity with it as it is present according to its existence; and insofar as it contains the future time in which the Antichrist will be present, it must also coexist with him from eternity. Just as also, according as it precedes that time which is prior to the existence of Abraham, in which it was verified, not indeed that Abraham was, but that he was future, the futurition of that same Abraham must be coexisting from eternity, or the determination of causes, by reason of which he was future: and insofar as it contains the time subsequent to the life of that same Abraham, it cannot fail to coexist with his pastness; so that both the futurition and the pastness, in the same way in which they can have being, must immutably coexist with eternity.

116 Hence, when according to our opinion it is said that nothing is future or past with respect to eternity, but that all things are present to it, the sense is not that the pastness and the futurition of a thing, in the way in which they can have being, are not from eternity in it; otherwise it would not itself contain at once and once for all all the differences of time, namely present, past, and future; but that nothing is present to it from eternity precisely according to the state of futurition, such that it is not at the same time present to it according to the state of existence and of presentiality (which we say the same of pastness, proportion being preserved), and therefore, distinguishing in a future thing, for example, those two times which we said in disp. praeced. num. 116. are included in it, namely the present time, in which it is future and does not have being, and the future time, in which it will be verified that it has being, then it is not to be said that it successively coexists with eternity; such that it first coexists with it precisely according to what it has in the present time, in which it is future, namely according to the negation of existence which it has de praesenti, and the determination to exist which belongs to it in its causes; but that it does not then coexist with that same eternity according to the being of existence which it will have for the future time; and likewise, when the future time and the existence of the future thing arrive, it does not coexist with it in the character of a future, but only in the character of a present; but it must be asserted that in the same measure of eternity it coexists with it at once and once for all, as containing those diverse times, both according to what the aforesaid future says for the present time, in which it is future and does not have being in itself, but only a determination in its causes to exist, and according to what it brings for the future time, in which it will be verified that it is present.

We think the same must be said, in proportion, of the past, which includes two other times, namely the present, in which it is not, and the past, in which it was verified of it that it is. And therefore, according to this mode of speaking, that relation of reason by which the pastness of Abraham, according to what it says de praesenti, has regard to eternity, is always, and from eternity, present to it in its own way in the now of eternity. Just as the real relation which, for the time for which he was present, is encompassed by that same eternity, is always, and from eternity, encompassed by the same.

117 As regards the fourth point, it will be answered by denying the sequence. And to the proof, it will be answered together with our Complutensians, in lib. Physic. disputat. 18. from num. 62. up to num. 65., that there is a difference between things which coexist actually in their own and adequate measure, and between those very same things as they coexist precisely in eternity, as in a surpassing and superior measure. For those things which coexist in their own and adequate duration are simply and actually at the same time: and thus an infinite multitude is involved, which is actually at the same time in its own and adequate duration. Those, however, which coexist in the now of eternity, need not be simply and absolutely at the same time, but with a qualification, namely simultaneity in the now of eternity. Because things, however essentially successive they may be, and so much so that speaking simply they cannot be at the same time, can nevertheless coexist at the same time in eternity: from the fact that, as we have often said, eternity is a superior, indivisible, and all-at-once measure, encompassing by reason of its infinite perfection both past things, and present, and future. And therefore some things may remain simply infinite in potency, and at the same time be present in eternity.

Wherefore, from the fact that that whole multitude of thoughts is at the same time in eternity, it does not follow that it is actually infinite, or that it is actually contained in some species of number, or in some species of multitude having a proportion or likeness with the species of numbers; but only that there is given an infinite multitude in potency, which is in potency in some species of multitude: and this involves no inconvenience whatever, as the aforesaid Complutensian Fathers well explain. For from the fact that when it is said that that whole infinite multitude is infinite in potency, in potency in some species of multitude, already explained, the sense is not that this potency is for this, namely that that multitude according to all of itself should be at the same time, and actually, in some one species of number; but only for this, namely that according to some of those thoughts it should be actually in some one, or in some few, species of number: in such a way, however, that those to which it actually belongs should always be finite, although the rest, which are only in potency species, and which will become actually such, from the very fact that they are multitudes measured by a unit, should be of such a condition that, any one of them being given, another, and another, can be given without limit. From which, as is evident, no inconvenience follows, but only this, that an infinite in potency can be given.

118 As regards the fifth point, namely that it results from the various absurdities brought against our opinion, it is to be denied that those follow from it. And to the first absurdity, the antecedent must be denied. Because just as the future does not have the character of a present, or of an existing thing in itself with respect to eternity, except by reason of that existence which it will have for the future time, and not by reason of another which it had before, so it is not necessary that another action be made, but the very same which will be present for the future time: from the fact that eternity, by reason of its infinite virtual extension, which it has all at once, extends itself as much as suffices so as always to reach, and from eternity, up to that action, and to the difference of time in which it is contained.

119 And to the second absurdity, the antecedent can be granted, if the words in this instant, and in every instant of our time, denote precisely the instant measuring the truth of the proposition. Because then only this is meant: that in every instant of our time it is true that the Antichrist always exists to eternity in the very measure of eternity. And for this it is enough that the Antichrist be future from eternity, or that he exist at some time in some difference of time: for by that very fact eternity will extend itself, by reason of its virtual extension, to the actual encompassing of him. The same antecedent, however, must be denied, if the words in the instant, and in every instant of our time, denote the instant measuring the eternal coexistence of the Antichrist with eternity, as has been shown. And to the proof to the contrary, the antecedent is to be denied. Because it does not follow well: the Antichrist is in eternity: therefore the Antichrist is; from the fact that, in order that he be in eternity, as we have often said, it is enough that he be at some time in himself in some difference of time; and consequently it is enough that he have existence at some time, that is, for the future time; but, as we indicated above, by the very fact that it is said absolutely and simply that the Antichrist is, it is indicated according to the common mode of speaking and conceiving that he is in himself de praesenti in his own and adequate measure. Hence it is argued virtually in the same place from the more extensive to the less extensive affirmatively: as if it were said, the Antichrist is, or will be: therefore the Antichrist is; for in order that the Antichrist be in eternity, it is enough that he be actually existing in himself, or that he will be existing for the future time: and in order that it be said absolutely and simply that he is, it is required that he have de praesenti and actually in himself, and in his own measure, namely in the now of our time, his existence.

120 To the third absurdity, the sequence must be denied. And to the proof it must be said that although things which are future with respect to us are presupposed to be already present in eternity, they are nevertheless not made in time from that being which they have in eternity, as from a term a quo, because that is the very thing which they will have for the future time: from the fact that eternity, by reason of its virtual and infinite extension, which it has from eternity, extends itself as much as suffices so as always to reach any future thing through the whole eternity: but it is evident that nothing can be made from itself, as from a term a quo: but they are made from non-being, which they have both in the preceding time and in eternity; because, as we touched upon in num. 116., just as the being which the Antichrist will have in the future time is present from eternity in eternity, so as to encompass that difference of time, the non-being of that which he now has is also present from eternity to that same eternity, in as far as it contains this difference of time.

121 To the fourth absurdity, the sequence must also be denied, if it is understood to be about the mutual coexistence of the Antichrist and Adam in the own and adequate duration of each. And to the proof to the contrary, it must be said that just as those things which are adequately identified with one and the same third are so identified ² that each of them is adequately identified with it, and then they are identified among themselves according to their proper realities, so those things which coexist adequately with one and the same third in the same way coexist among themselves according to their proper durations. But the Antichrist and Adam do not coexist adequately with eternity, but inadequately, and as with a superior and surpassing measure. For each of them coexists with it as containing its own proper time; but not as containing the time in which another had, or will have, being: and therefore it is not necessary that they coexist among themselves according to their proper durations, but rather the opposite follows from this.

And this can be explained by the example of the evening and the morning lectures, which are on the same day; and yet they do not coexist with one another according to their proper durations: because they do not coexist adequately with that day, but inadequately, and by reason of its various formal parts. Thus likewise Adam and the Antichrist coexist in eternity by reason of the various virtual parts contained in it, and therefore they do not coexist among themselves according to their proper durations.

122 To the fifth absurdity, the sequence must also be denied. For in the first place those two propositions, namely the Antichrist is, and the Antichrist is not, if the word is denotes being in eternity, are not both verified of the Antichrist. For the negative one is false: because it absolutely denies that the Antichrist is in eternity; and thus it denies that he is still in it, according as eternity contains the future time in which it will be verified that the Antichrist is in his own proper duration: because that negation is of the nature of a malignant thing, denying whatever it finds after itself. And then the remaining propositions introduced there, namely that the Antichrist is corrupted, and is generated, dies, and exists, are not contradictory. Because they yield only this sense, namely that the generation and the corruption of the Antichrist are in eternity; and that his existence is in eternity; and likewise his non-existence; and this involves no inconvenience whatever, because neither of these is adequate in it; but only insofar as it contains those diverse times in which each of them exists. Just as it involves no inconvenience that, if the copula unites for the whole year, as it unites for the whole eternity, then these two propositions should be true, Peter is existing, Peter is not existing, Peter dies, Peter is generated. Because neither death, nor generation, nor his being, nor his non-being coexist adequately with that same year.

123 To the last absurdity, the sequence must be denied. And to the first proof, the antecedent having been granted, and the first consequence being understood in the compound sense, as indeed it is understood there, the second is to be denied, if the consequent yields the divided sense, although it can be granted if it yields the compound sense: otherwise, by the same reasoning it would be proved that it is not in the power of free choice to do anything, precisely because God foreknew from eternity that that act was to be freely done by that same freedom. But concerning these things, let those be seen which we said in dub. 2. of the preceding disputation in a similar case, as also those things which we shall say concerning the compound and the divided sense in tract. 4. disp. 10. num. 84. and onwards.

As regards the second proof, however, both premises having been granted, the consequent must be denied. And the reason of the disparity is this. For if a future contingent had being in time before it was produced by free choice, with respect to that choice it would be purely passive, as Luther said: because it would receive only the action produced by another, and not by itself. Hence, with respect to that choice it would not be a free cause: but this does not follow from the fact that future contingents, and free things, have being in eternity before they are produced with respect to us in time. For indeed, just as God beholds in his eternity our free act, which will be in such and such a time, so also he beholds in that same eternity the free cause of that act, freely producing it: although with respect to our time that production is future.

124 After we have explained how the presence of future things from eternity in the now of eternity leads to the result that God certainly knows them, it remains to explain whether it is not only conducive, but even altogether necessary for God to have the aforesaid infallible knowledge of them? And so, in order to explain this, we raise the present difficulty. And although the decision of this difficulty follows well enough from what precedes, nevertheless, so that the true opinion of D. Thom. and the other Fathers may be better established as to the manner of knowing the aforesaid future things, and so that the objections of adversaries may be met, we have raised it in its own right.

Moreover, in order that the decision may be better grasped, it should be noted that we have consulted the heading and found that that clause is twofold, namely: But eternity, and the presence of future things in it, already explained, etc. so as to denote that this difficulty can be discussed in a twofold sense, or hypothesis. First, whether eternity is so necessary for knowing future contingents before they are, that, if impossibly divine knowledge were measured on the part before by an everlasting aeon, indeed on the part after as well, and consequently by a duration deficient in itself, God could nevertheless know them with perfect certainty and infallibility before they were? And to denote this it was inquired into in the heading whether eternity is altogether necessary for the aforesaid knowledge. Second, however, whether, if the divine being, and those things which are in God, could on the one part be measured by eternity, and on the other part not coexist from eternity with future things — which nevertheless implies that, as we have seen, being measured by eternity as by one's own and adequate measure, and actually coexisting from eternity with all existing things in some difference of time, are altogether the same thing — nevertheless even then God could certainly and infallibly know future contingents from eternity, and before they were as far as we are concerned, or not?

§ I. The prior opinion is adduced.

125 The first opinion asserts that eternity, in each of the two respects explained from the senses, is altogether necessary for the result that God certainly and infallibly knows the aforesaid future things before they are present in their own and adequate measure. Whence it asserts that, although the divine being and knowledge are not, impossibly, measured by eternity, and consequently neither do the future things physically and really coexist with them from eternity, but are only measured by an aeon; nevertheless God could know the aforesaid future things before they were, in their own and adequate duration, in their objective truth, and antecedent to the efficacious divine decree. Thus the Doctors whom in each of the preceding difficulties we cited for the contrary opinions.

And it is proved first. For if, impossibly, God were to cease to be before he produced Antichrist, he would know him with certainty and infallibility: and yet he would not be present to God according to actual existence in eternity; nor would his being or operation be measured by that same eternity, but at most by an aeon: therefore, although eternity, or the aforesaid presence, may lead to the certain and infallible knowledge of him, it will not nevertheless be altogether necessary for it. The major seems certain. For the essence of God is his infinite knowledge: therefore such knowledge would extend itself to Antichrist, even if, impossibly, he were at some time to cease to be: otherwise, throughout that whole duration in which God would persevere in his being, he would not have infinitely perfect knowledge.

The minor, however, is proved as to the first part. For what is present to God in eternity must coexist with him in some difference of time: but in the case of the argument, God and Antichrist would never coexist in any difference of time, as is evident in itself; therefore, etc. As to the second part, however, it also stands; because what is measured by eternity, as by its own measure, must endure without defect.

126 Second. For the certain and infallible knowledge of God precedes, in the order of reason, the presence of things in eternity; therefore it does not receive its certainty from such presence, as from an altogether necessary reason; therefore neither does it receive it from eternity, even though that could be set aside from such presence. This last consequence is evident from the preceding one. Since also, if eternity could be set aside from the fact that it actually surrounds all future things from eternity, and coexists with them, it would be posterior in the order of reason to the certain and infallible knowledge of them: since the duration of any operation is posterior in the order of reason than the operation itself: therefore it could not be the reason of the certain and infallible knowledge of them.

From which the first consequence seems certain. For that from which knowledge receives its certainty, as from an altogether necessary reason for it, must precede it, and not follow it. The antecedent, however, is proved. For the presence of things in eternity supposes the will of God willing those creatures; but the volition of them presupposes a certain and infallible knowledge of them: therefore, etc.

It is confirmed. For God receives no perfection from creatures, as is evident in itself; therefore, since the certainty of his knowledge is the greatest perfection of it, he will not receive this from those same creatures as present in eternity; therefore neither from eternity itself, taken with the precision indicated. This last consequence is evident from what was just said. The first, however, is clear from the antecedent. For this presence of them is something created: and consequently the certainty of divine knowledge will not be received from those same creatures as present.

127 Third. For the efficacious decree of the divine will concerning future contingents has an infallible connection with them, as is evident from what was said in this disputation, num. 9 and the following: and it would have it even if neither God nor his operations were measured by eternity; otherwise such a decree would not be efficacious; therefore God cannot know this decree without also knowing the same future things; therefore neither eternity nor the presence of those same future things in eternity will be necessary in order that God have a certain knowledge of them.

This last consequence is evident from the preceding one. Because, even if there were no eternity in God, and the things were not present in him from eternity, they could nevertheless be known in the aforesaid decree; since it has an infallible connection with their futurity. The first consequence, however, follows from the antecedent. Because it is repugnant for something to be known perfectly and to have an infallible connection with another without that other thing, with which it is connected, being known; and so God, knowing perfectly his own decree, which has an infallible connection with future creatures, will not be able not to know infallibly their futurity.

It is confirmed. Because God knows conditioned future things in the efficacious and conditioned decree which he has concerning them, as we shall say in the following disputation, num. 67; but the aforesaid future things are never present in eternity; since they will never exist: therefore for a certain knowledge of absolute futures it will not be altogether necessary that there be a presence which is from eternity to eternity (about which we are speaking at present), but the efficacious decree concerning their futurity will suffice: and consequently neither will eternity, under the precision already stated, be necessary for that.

128 Fourth. Future contingents can be known in that duration in which they are not present to the created intellect, yet he himself, precisely in so far as he is such, is not measured by eternity as by his own and adequate measure, as is evident in itself; therefore much more can they certainly be known by God, even if they were not present to him from eternity in his eternity, and if there were no eternity in him. The consequence seems clear. The antecedent, however, is proved. Both because we certainly know by faith that Antichrist is future, and other things of this kind, even though these future things are not present to us. And also because the blessed certainly know many future contingents which are not really and physically present to them. And finally because Christ our Lord now knows all future contingents by infused knowledge, as D. Thom. teaches in 3. part. qaest. 11. art. 1. and yet he does not now really and physically coexist with them.

It is confirmed. For either future contingents have a determined futurity in that duration in which they are not present, or they do not? If the second is said, they will not be able to be certainly attained by any intellect in the aforesaid duration, the contrary of which is evident from the instances just adduced. But if the first is asserted, therefore their determined truth in that duration will be able to be attained by the divine intellect, even if they are not present from eternity to his eternity, and even if, impossibly, they were measured by nothing except an everlasting aeon on the part before, or on the part before as well as on the part after: since whatever is knowable must precisely be attained by the aforesaid intellect; otherwise he would not be infinite in the force of knowing.

§ II. The opinion of St Thomas is explained by two assertions.

129 It must nevertheless be said, first, that for the infallible knowledge by which God knows absolute future contingents, before they are actually present to us in their own duration, it is required per se that the divine being and its operations be measured by eternity as by their own and adequate measure; and consequently, if, impossibly, they were measured by an aeon deficient in itself, God could not have the aforesaid knowledge of them before they were as far as we are concerned: thus D. Thom. in the places cited at dub. 2, and as is common among his disciples.

And the reason is drawn from the same holy Doctor. Since absolute future contingents can be known with certainty only in themselves, or in their causes, namely in the divine decree, or in other secondary causes to which they are subject: but if the divine being and its operations, and consequently its willing, were not measured by eternity as by its own measure, they could not be known with certainty in any of these; therefore, etc. The major follows from what was said in this and the preceding disputation. The minor, however, as regards the knowledge of futures in themselves, is evident. Because before they are as far as we are concerned, they cannot be known in themselves, as is evident, unless not only eternity is given, but also the presence of things in eternity: because this, by reason of its own eminence, extends itself so far as to reach from eternity to coexisting with future things.

130 The same minor, however, also stands as to the second part. Because if the divine decree were not measured by eternity, but by an everlasting aeon, then just as that everlasting aeon itself, precisely in so far as it is such, or precisely in so far as it were distinguished from eternity, would be deficient and variable, so too would the aforesaid decree measured by it; therefore, insofar as God knew his decree, he could not before the aforesaid future was in its own and adequate duration, or before it was as we are, have infallible knowledge of that future: because before its existence he could not know whether the decree itself would persevere up to that duration; or whether instead of it he would have the opposite decree; since that decree and its measure are deficient: and just as they might not persevere, so too they might not persevere up to the aforesaid duration.

It is confirmed, and explained. For the efficacious decree of God, on the supposition that it is, has altogether invariable and indefectible being because it is measured by eternity, which admits of no variability and mutability; whereas on the hypothesis made the divine decree would not be measured by eternity, but by an aeon: which, although it can be without a beginning and an end, is not nevertheless of necessity without them; but just as it can lack a beginning and an end, so too it can be terminated by them: and so it has nothing at all infallible, by reason of which it would be infallibly or necessarily determined to this, that it must lack a beginning and an end; therefore the aforesaid decree would not yet, on the supposition of itself, be altogether invariable; and consequently through its force the future contingent about which it turns could not be known altogether certainly and infallibly.

131 It makes no difference if, against this assertion and its reason, you object that the angelic aeon, although deficient in itself, nevertheless, on the supposition that it once is, will never, speaking naturally, fail; therefore by the same reasoning, even if the divine willing were measured by an aeon deficient in itself, it would nevertheless never fail in fact, and consequently through its force, precisely in so far as it is efficacious, the future contingent would be infallibly known before it was. The first consequence seems to stand from the parity of reasoning. The second, however, follows well enough from the first. Because for the infallible knowledge of some thing it is enough that in fact, and as it is, it will never fail, although it might fail. Just as for the infallible connection of two things it is enough that in fact they are always connected with one another, although they might not be connected, as is evident in the decree of God as it now stands; which indeed is infallibly joined to the thing about which it turns, for example to a created free act: because, although once the decree is posited, the aforesaid act might still not be, it nevertheless in fact, and as it is, will not be.

It makes no difference, then, for one could answer first by granting the antecedent and denying both consequences. And to the proof of the former, on which the proof of the latter depends, the parity of reasoning is to be denied; from the fact that the angel's aeon now has something external from which in fact it never fails, although it is deficient in itself, namely the decree of God, invariable and indefectible, and measured by eternity, by which it is established that it always is. But with respect to the aeon by which the divine willing would be measured in that impossible hypothesis, there would be nothing from which it would in fact always be; because, as is supposed in it, no free act of God would be measured by eternity.

Whence, in accordance with this mode of speaking, the angel's aeon, although it has nothing from which to ask that it be annihilated and fail, nevertheless has nothing from which to ask the opposite: so as to be distinguished in this way from the instant of our time, which asks only for a duration and a momentary continuance, and which at once ceases to be; and also from the instant, or the angelic time, each of which asks, so as not to endure without end.

132 Second, and better, it will be answered that just as from the fact that the angelic willing were measured by an aeon, which in fact will never fail, speaking naturally, there would follow only that in the efficacious decree of the same about some object such an effect could be known with an infallibility by the order to the ordinary power, and to the connatural manner of operating of that same angel; but not with an altogether unqualified infallibility, and by the order to the absolute power of God: so too, from the fact that the divine willing were measured by an aeon, there would not follow the altogether unqualified infallibility of which we are speaking, but an infallibility by the order to the connatural manner of operating of God; and consequently an infallibility against which, absolutely and simply, fallibility would not be repugnant, if attention is given to the absolute, extraordinary and supernatural manner of operating of God.

Because, although once, God naturally determining something, he cannot, on the supposition of this decree and in the composite sense, determine something else from which variability of the prior decree would follow: so too the things which are determined by it now will have, on the supposition and in the composite sense, invariable being, even by the order to the supernatural manner of operating of God, because the aforesaid decree is measured by eternity; but that would not be the case then in the hypothesis of which we are speaking: since the decrees of God would not be measured by eternity.

By which also the objection drawn from created free acts, which have an infallible connection and in no way a fallible one with the divine decree, is sufficiently met, in as far as it can be turned against us. Because the aforesaid acts, on the supposition of the decree and in the composite sense, cannot fail to be; although in the divided sense they can fail to be: but in the hypothesis of the assertion, although the decree of God would always be, speaking naturally, it is not repugnant to it that it should nevertheless fail, even in the supposition and composite sense, that it is once made. Whence what we say in our assertion is to be understood in accordance with these things.

133 It is to be said, second, that for the infallible knowledge of God with respect to contingents, before they are in their own duration, or as far as we are concerned, it is necessarily required that the aforesaid future things be actually and physically present to God in eternity; so that, once it is granted that the divine being and its operations are measured by eternity, he could in no way know the future things before they existed in the manner now stated, unless they were physically and really present to him from eternity. Thus D. Thom. in the present question, and qaest. 2. de Veritate art. 12. and in the places adduced in this disputation from num. 20 to 52, and 1. contra Gentes cap. 66. There, as to the certain knowledge of future contingents which he sought ¹, namely the knowledge of all their causes, and consequently of the divine decree, he infers their actual presence in eternity: and also (which follows from the preceding) that that knowledge does not rest precisely in the knowledge of their causes; but that it passes on to the knowledge of those same future things according as they are in themselves in that same eternity. And so, after the sixth reason, he says thus: Now the things which are present, past, or future to us, God knows according as they are in his power, and in their own causes, and in themselves: and the knowledge of these is called knowledge of vision: for God does not see of things which are not yet with us only that which they have in their causes, but also that which they have in themselves, in as far as his eternity is present with its indivisibility to all time. Whence the holy Doctor is commonly followed by his disciples. Gonzal. in praesenti disp. 43. sect. 4. Alvarez lib. 2. de auxiliis disp. 9. Caiet. in praesenti, Nazarius controv. 3. and many others.

134 The reason, however, for this conclusion was adduced above at num. 100 and following, from D. Thom.; and its force consists in this, that once it is granted, impossibly, that the future things are not present to God from eternity in the now of eternity, then, even if divine knowledge were measured by eternity, nevertheless, when afterwards they were present to him, the aforesaid knowledge of them would at least change on this account from an abstractive to an intuitive knowledge. And again, God would have in time some knowledge which he did not have from eternity, namely this: Now Antichrist is present to my infinite knowledge and to my eternity. And likewise there would fail another knowledge which he had from eternity up to the time of Antichrist, namely this: From eternity up to the time of Antichrist, with respect to my infinite knowledge and my eternity, Antichrist is really and physically future, as we showed in the place cited; but this is repugnant with respect to divine knowledge, as is evident from what was said there: indeed it entails that the aforesaid knowledge is measured on the one part by eternity, as is supposed, and on the other part is not measured by it, since it would be variable: therefore, etc.

135 Nor is the evasion which we indicated there from the adversaries enough, namely that all these things could come to pass in time by reason of an external change of the object, and not of God: and so God could have the aforesaid knowledge without mutability and variation.

It is not enough, then. Both because that was sufficiently refuted in the place cited. And also because the refutation then adduced can be explained and pressed even further from what Corneio teaches in the present question, and the Thomists commonly. For although in the case of which we are speaking we should grant that that variation of knowledge would be taken radically from the part of the things known, it would nevertheless redound into knowledge itself.

And the reason is. Because, the impossible case being granted, in which God produced today some creature which he had not decreed from eternity to produce, then not only would the divine will be changed by a new act of volition not held from eternity, as we suppose (whether that change were truly physical and real, or only quasi-moral, which is called a change of intention and entails an inconstancy and imprudency of soul, as is said above in qaest. 9. and below in qaest. 19.) but the divine intellect would also be changed by a new act even of intuitive cognition, not held from eternity; therefore, although a variation of the object from possibility to futurity, when it is made from eternity, does not entail an intrinsic variation in knowledge, just as it does not entail it in the will through the free act of God held from eternity; but it does indeed entail one when such a variation is made in time: therefore by the same reasoning, although the variation of the same object from pure possibility to that which it is to be from eternity present in the now of eternity, and to that which it is to be from eternity the object of God's intuitive knowledge, does not entail a variation in divine knowledge, it does entail one if these two things occur in time.

The consequences seem clear, and the antecedent is proved. Because, just as there would be a change in the will because it was not terminated from eternity toward that creature, as actually future, or existing; but precisely as possible, and in time it began to be terminated toward it as existing: in exactly the same way the divine intellect was not terminated toward it as actually existing, or future, but only as possible; therefore in time it too began to receive it as future, or existing: therefore there is a change in one or the other of the two, or in neither.

136 Nor does it stand in the way if, along with Suar., disp. 30. Metaphys. sect. 9. num. 55. you object that the immutability of the knowledge of vision in God is not founded on the immutability of the divine will: and so even if, impossibly, God were to begin to will something new, or were to cease to will what he willed from eternity, the knowledge of vision would nevertheless be unchanged: because from eternity he would know such a decree as to be new in the future, and the mutation that would be future in it according to its times, in the same way as he will know these same things invariably of the created will.

The answer to this is that, precisely because this new act of the divine will held in time, or this new relation, or quasi-relation of the divine will toward that creature was not from eternity, but new and in time, as is supposed, it must be that the aforesaid creature, about which it turns, did not have from eternity the character of a future; therefore it could not have been known by God from eternity through the knowledge of vision, but precisely through the knowledge of simple intellection under the character of a possible; therefore the knowledge of vision would begin only in time, and consequently the mutability or immutability of divine knowledge will depend on the mutability or immutability of the divine will.

THESE last two consequences plainly seem to follow from the first. The first, however, is proved. Because, as has often been said, the futurity of a thing supposes the prior divine will, just as an effect supposes its cause. Nor is it the same with the mutation of the acts of the human will. Because this supposes a free act of God from eternity, by which such a mutation was willed: and so it is known from eternity through the knowledge of vision, although the mutation itself is exercised in time.

§ III. A corollary worthy of notice.

137 From all of which there follows a corollary worthy of notice concerning the manner of reconciling divine knowledge and its infallibility with regard to absolute future contingents and created freedom. For it must be said that this real presence, in the manner in which we explained it in the preceding difficulties, is the proximate and sufficient reason for reconciling the certainty of divine knowledge with the freedom of our choice. Thus D. Thom. 1. cont. Gent. cap. 67. and de Verit. quaest. 2. art. 12. in these words: Since, therefore, our sight is not deceived in seeing contingents as they are present, and yet it is not thereby removed that they happen contingently, so God infallibly sees all contingents, because they are not future to him, but he beholds them to be then when they are. Whence it is not thereby removed that they happen contingently. Where, from the fact that God's intuition attains them as really present, he infers the agreement of the infallibility of God's knowledge with their contingency: for just as the contingency of Peter's sitting is not removed by the fact that we see him sitting while he sits, so the contingency of things is not removed by God's knowledge, which is terminated toward things as they are really present to him.

138 And this can be further elucidated. Because through that very production and existence by which things are in time, they coexist from eternity with God himself in the measure of his divine knowledge, which is eternity: therefore through this coexistence and presence with divine knowledge the contingency of things is not removed; indeed, it is rather the sufficient reason for reconciling the infallibility of God's knowledge with the contingency of the things themselves. The consequence is evident. Because through their contingent production, by which they come to be in time, they coexist with God himself through the relation to the now of his eternity, and are subject in the manner of presence to his divine knowledge.

We say that the aforesaid real presence in the now of eternity, explained in the manner stated, is the proximate and sufficient reason for reconciling the certainty of divine knowledge with the freedom of our choice, so as to denote by this that, if we speak of a more remote and radical reason, then the aforesaid reason will be the divine essence, determined however by its own efficacious decree, and its highest eminence, and sweetest but strongest efficacy, by which he not only wills that effects or acts be free, but that they be free; and consequently that they be such that they can fail to be. Whence, on the part on which he wills that they be, they will certainly come to be infallibly: and on the part on which he wills that they be free, they will be so; and consequently they will be such that they can fail to be. But these things were explained at greater length in the preceding disputation, dub. 2, and in this one, dub. 1 and 2, and are to be understood in accordance with what was said there.

§ IV. An answer is given to the arguments of the opposing opinion.

139 To the first, the major is denied, and to the proof the consequence is to be denied. Because in that event Antichrist would not be knowable before he was with altogether complete certainty and infallibility; but only with infallible knowledge by the order to the connatural manner of operating of God, which in that event would be his due, and not by the order to the extraordinary and supernatural manner of operating of God: and consequently the aforesaid knowledge would not have to be infallible with such an infallibility that fallibility would be repugnant to it.

140 To the second, it is to be said that knowledge and the will of God are the cause of the things being contained in eternity; but not in such a way that eternity itself does not concur toward that end after the manner of a kind of formal cause, containing and measuring the things contained in it. Whence it does not follow that, by priority in quo, God knows future things prior even in the order of reason than the fact that they are contained in eternity; and much less that eternity contains and measures them. For by knowing them practically he makes them subsist in eternity, eternity nevertheless concurring as the cause of the measurement, intrinsic indeed to God, but extrinsic to the things measured. And so although the knowledge precedes as causing, it is not nevertheless prior by priority in quo, even according to reason. Just as if the sight of a bodily eye were to produce a wall, the wall in terminating the sight would be at once with the production, and simultaneous with the sight in quo: and yet the sight, insofar as it is causing, would precede the wall by priority a quo.

141 To the confirmation it is to be said that the presence of future things in eternity can be taken in a twofold way, namely on the part of eternity toward them, or on the part of the future things toward that same eternity. If it is taken according to the first consideration, it can be in some way the reason of the certainty and infallibility of divine knowledge. But according to the second consideration it holds itself by way of a condition on the part of the object, namely of the future creatures, and necessarily brought about by the force of the infallibility and certainty of divine knowledge with respect to them. Because, as we said in disput. 5, num. 16, art. 9, the knowledge of vision of God is practical and productive of things: and consequently it places them from eternity within the measure of eternity. Whence it never follows that something created gives to God his certainty; but rather the opposite.

142 To the third, it is evident from what was said for the first assertion. Wherefore, although in that event the decree of God, in itself, would have a fallible efficacy; nevertheless it would not have infallible efficacy unless it persevered up to the time for which the future things have being: and because before it persevered up to the duration, for example, of Antichrist, it would not be infallible that it would persevere up to the aforesaid time; therefore it will not be efficacious infallibly with respect to that same Antichrist, but only fallibly; and so from the force of that knowledge precisely, Antichrist could not be known with certainty before he was.

143 To the confirmation we grant the major and the minor, and we deny the consequence. Because for the certain knowledge of conditioned future things the efficacious decree measured by eternity now suffices. Because precisely in so far as it is, it is invariable and immutable; and consequently precisely in so far as it is, it has infallible efficacy, conditioned however in the manner explained below. But in the event of the first assertion the decree would not have variability, nor infallible efficacy: and so from its force the future could not be infallibly known before it was.

And although for the infallible knowledge of a conditioned future it is not necessary that it exist from eternity in eternity, but it suffices that the decree about it be measured by eternity itself, from the fact that the aforesaid future things are not capable of existing in it except according to the being which they have in the decree, since it is only according to this being that they exist; nevertheless it is to be said otherwise of absolute futures. And the reason for the disparity is. Because just as a conditioned future never exists in itself, so it does not at one time exist in itself and at another not exist in itself: and therefore it is not necessary, in order that it exist invariably in some measure, and consequently in order that it be invariably known, that it be present from eternity in it, provided some infinite and invariable measure is given which surrounds it from eternity: and with respect to which the future itself always and invariably has being present in the manner already explained. Moreover, since the opposite occurs in the case of an absolute future, as is evident from what has been said, therefore, in order that it be invariably known before it is, and consequently in order that it be certainly known absolutely and simply by God, in whom all variable knowledge is repugnant, it must have the aforesaid presence in eternity, and it does not suffice that, impossibly, the decree of God about it should have these two things, namely that it be measured by eternity and at the same time not coexist from eternity with future things and with all differences of time.

144 To the fourth, for the present let the antecedent pass, and the consequence is to be denied. Because divine knowledge, precisely in so far as it is such, must have that altogether complete invariability and immutability already explained; and so it requires in the futures their presence invariable with respect to some measure: whereas created knowledge precisely as such does not.

We have said that let the antecedent pass; we have not, however, granted nor denied that, so as to abstract for the present from those questions, namely, whether the infused knowledge of Christ our Lord and the beatific knowledge are measured by participated eternity, and so really and physically coexist with future things before they are in their duration? For this is to be treated expressly in 3. part. tract. de Scientia Christi.

To the confirmation it is to be said that future contingents do not have a determined and infallible truth in that duration in which they are not present, except by means of the divine decree: and not considered in any way whatever, but as measured by eternity. And then we say that this decree measured by eternity does not suffice for them to have a determined truth in the duration in which they are not; but it is required that, although in their own duration, or as far as we are concerned, they do not exist, they nevertheless have presence with respect to eternity, and in the now of eternity. Because, as we have already explained, they are not otherwise knowable by God through invariable knowledge, and consequently neither through divine knowledge: and consequently they will not be able to be known by a creature either: since any created knowledge presupposes divine knowledge about that object, and those things which are required for it.