Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

75 With respect to the heading of the chapter, it should be noted that, precisely because the discussion in it concerns divine knowledge before the decree of his will, we are not speaking here of the secondary causes as determined and completed by efficacious premotion and predetermination to do what is called the future. For, since this predetermination — whose possibility or necessity in the present instant we do not discuss, so that in every respect we may comply with the decree of our most holy Lord Paul V — were the effect of the efficacious decree of the divine will, and consequently posterior to it, it is certain that when we speak of the knowledge of future contingents in the comprehension of the secondary causes, antecedent to the divine decree, such a premotion, or a secondary cause as completed by it, cannot be understood under the name of the aforesaid causes; but only the secondary causes themselves, taken in themselves, and according to the other conditions prerequisite for acting.

Having consulted the heading, however, we have hinted that the discussion there concerns absolute future contingents, in some way dependent on created freedom, so as to make it clear that the discussion is either about free acts, which are elicited by the will, or about other effects which can be freely commanded or impeded by it.

§ I. The prior opinion is proposed.

76 The affirmative part is held by Durandus in 1. dist. 38. quaest. 3. num. 9. Thom. de Argentina in 2. dist. 40. art. 1. in so far as they say that God knows free future contingents in their proximate causes, not indeed taken bare, but as applied here and now, with this judgement, this object, this inclination, and these circumstances; although these authors speak confusedly, not determining, or counting among the circumstances and determinations, the decree of the divine will and efficacious premotion. The same opinion was taught more clearly by Molina in the present disputation, disp. 14. concl. 1. ratione 2. and disp. 2. § according to that, therefore, whom Martinus Becanus follows in tomo 1. summae Theologicae cap. 10. quaest. 9.

It is proved first. Since the angel knows conjecturally, and very probably, the aforesaid future in the comprehension of the created will, and of the remaining causes and of the circumstances that occur; therefore God will attain to those things certainly and infallibly, precisely because he comprehends them all. The antecedent is evident in itself, and is commonly received among theologians. The consequence, however, is proved. For since the knowledge by which God comprehends the proximate causes and the circumstances occurring, which are prerequisite to the production of these future contingents, is infinitely more perfect than the knowledge by which the angel comprehends all these things, the consequence is that if the angel's knowledge with respect to the aforesaid future things is only within the limits of very probable knowledge, then divine knowledge will extend beyond the limits of probable knowledge, and will reach the point of being a certain and infallible knowledge of the same things.

It is confirmed, and explained. Since the angel's knowledge with respect to the secondary causes and to the circumstances concurring with the coming-to-be of the aforesaid contingents is only a comprehension, and not a supercomprehension; whereas the knowledge of God supercomprehends all the aforesaid things; therefore, just as by the angelic knowledge comprehending the aforesaid causes with their circumstances, any future contingents proceeding from them are known under the character of possibles, so too by the supercomprehension of God, which infinitely exceeds this comprehension, the aforesaid future things will be attained under the character of future things. The consequence is evident. Since through a supercomprehension infinitely exceeding a given cause, more must be known of it than through comprehension alone; therefore, if through the latter the cause itself is attained, according to its essence, as well as all the possible effects contained in it, those same future effects of it cannot fail to be known also through supercomprehension: since nothing else remains besides these effects which could be attained by this knowledge and not be attained by pure comprehension.

77 Second. For as a natural effect has its dependence from a natural cause, so a free and contingent effect has it from a free and contingent cause; therefore, just as precisely because God comprehends a natural cause, he cannot fail to know with certainty a naturally future effect, even though that cause can be impeded from without and naturally, so too, by comprehending a free and contingent cause, he will know with certainty a free and contingent effect future from it. The antecedent needs no proof. The consequence, however, also stands. For as the natural effect will infallibly proceed from the natural cause, if it is not impeded, so too the contingent and free effect will infallibly proceed from a contingent and free cause, if it is not impeded in the same proportional manner.

§ II. The opinion of St Thomas is more acceptable.

78 It must nevertheless be said that God does not know with certainty the aforesaid future things in the comprehension of the proximate causes and of the circumstances occurring, antecedent to the divine decree. Thus D. Thom., De Malo, q. 16, a. 7, in these words: Some future things are in their causes in a threefold way. In one way only according to potency: namely, those which can equally well be or not be, and these are called contingents to either side. But some are in their causes not only according to potency, but according to the active cause, which cannot be impeded in its effect: and these are said to happen by necessity. But some are in their causes both according to potency and according to the relation of the active cause: which nevertheless can be impeded in its effect: and these are said to happen for the most part. Since, however, each thing is known according as it is in act, and not according as it is in potency, as is said in 9. Metaphys.; it follows that those things which are to either side cannot be foreknown in their causes determinately, but under a disjunction, namely that they will be or will not be: for thus they have truth. Those, however, which are in their causes as proceeding from them by necessity, can be known with certainty in their causes. Those, however, which happen for the most part, can be known in their causes not by an altogether certain knowledge, but by a certain conjectural knowledge. The same distinction is laid down in 1. sententiarum dist. 38. quaest. 1. art. 5, where he says: It must be understood, therefore, that before a thing is, it has no being except in its causes; but some causes are those from which the effect necessarily follows, which cannot be impeded, and in these causes the caused being is certain and determinate: so far indeed that it can be known there demonstratively, as the rising of the sun, and an eclipse, and the like. But some are causes from which effects follow in the greater part, yet fail in the smaller part. Whence in these causes the future effects do not have absolute certainty, but a certain degree of it, insofar as the causes are more determined to one thing than to another: and therefore from these causes a conjectural knowledge of the future can be taken, which will be so much the more certain as the causes are more determined to one thing; as is the physician's knowledge of the future health, and death, and the astrologer's judgement about future winds and rains. But some causes are such that they bear on both alternatives, and in these causes future effects have no certainty or determination at all; and therefore contingents to either side can in no way be known in their causes. The same author taught also in this article, in these words: In another way the contingent can be considered as it is in its cause; and thus it is considered as future, and as a contingent not yet determined to one thing; because a contingent cause bears on opposites. And thus a contingent is not subjected by certainty to any knowledge. Whence whoever knows a contingent effect only in its cause has nothing of it except a conjectural knowledge. And finally the holy Doctor maintains this very point in 1. contra Gentes, cap. 66. and 67. and in this 1. part. qaest. 57. art. 4. and qaest. 86. art. 4. as also in 2. 2. quaest. 171. art. 6. ad 2. and elsewhere often.

Whence the holy Doctor is followed by Capreolus in 1. distinct. 38. quaestione 1. art. 2. conclusione 1. Ferrara 1. contra Gent. capit. 66. Caietanus in praesenti § as to the second, Bannez, Nazarius, Gonzalez, Ripa, Machin. ad praesentem articulum, Gaspar Ram. relectione 2. de praescientia futurorum absolutorum, Scotus, and Okamus with his followers in 1. distinct. 38. quaest. 1. Curiel lib. 2. controvers. disputat. 4. a num. 134. Alvarez lib. 1. Responsionum cap. 5. Ledesma lib. de auxiliis disputat. 2. affin. de scientia futurorum contingent. dub. 2. Corneio tomo 1. in 1. part. tract. 1. circa quaest. 14. art. 3. disp. 2. dub. 3. Arrubal in praesenti disput. 42. Herice tract. 1. disput. 6. cap. 2. num. 14. et 30. where he also reports the whole school of the Society as holding this opinion, except Molina and Martinus Becanus. And finally our Complutensian college, lib. 2. Perihermen. a num. 6. usque in finem.

79 The fundamental reason, however, for this assertion is drawn from the aforesaid places of D. Thom., and can be proposed in the following form. Since a free cause, however much it is united with all the circumstances and dispositions antecedent to the free decree of God, always remains indifferent to either side; therefore from the force of its comprehension a future contingent cannot be known with certainty and determinately, nor can that which is to be elicited from it, namely that such is the free act of the cause itself, or, depending on it, is to be produced immediately or proximately by other secondary causes. We suppose the antecedent to be certain, and it is commonly admitted by philosophers and theologians; otherwise the aforesaid future things would not be the future contingents of which we are speaking; since they would not depend on a free cause as such. The consequence, however, as to the first part, is proved. Since in a cause indifferent to either side, for example toward loving or not loving, or toward hating, from the force of its comprehension it cannot be known with certainty that he will infallibly and determinately love, and will not hate. Just as in a cause determined toward one part, namely toward love, it cannot be known with certainty that he will love indifferently and indeterminately, or will not love; but that he will love determinately.

From this, also, the same consequence stands as to the second part. Since the fact that a future contingent is to be produced immediately, or proximately, by other causes, means that it also depends on a free will which is indifferent to either side, it cannot be known with any greater certainty from this head, through the force of the comprehension of the aforesaid will, than free future contingents, which are immediately elicited from the same will; therefore, just as these cannot be known with certainty from the force of the comprehension of the will, so neither will those be able certainly to be attained through the force of the comprehension of their causes, from which they are immediately produced, and of that same will, on which they also depend.

80 It makes no difference if, along with Molina, you say that it is rightly proved from this reasoning that the aforesaid future contingents are not known by the force of the comprehension of the secondary causes alone; but not, however, by the force of supercomprehension. Since, as was hinted at num. 76, supercomprehension of causes extends by reason of its own eminence to all effects, even future ones, just as comprehension does to possibles.

It makes no difference, then, for this solution collapses from the mere extension of the reasoning already made. For an effect cannot be known in its causes, and by the force of the supercomprehension of them, except in the manner in which it is contained in them: but future contingents, taken precisely together with their secondary causes antecedent to the divine decree, are not contained in them as determinedly future, but as indifferent to this, that they be or not be; therefore from the force of the aforesaid supercomprehension they will not be able to be known as determinedly future, but as indifferent to this, that they have or have not being. The consequence seems clear. The minor, too, is evident. Since, as we were just saying, a cause indifferent to either side, and not more determined to love infallibly, for example, than to hate, cannot contain as determinedly and infallibly future love rather than hatred: and so love cannot be contained in it, thus taken, as determinedly and infallibly future, but as indifferently and indeterminately future. The major, too, stands. For however much a cause be supercomprehended, that cannot be elicited from it which is not contained in it; and therefore, however much a plant be comprehended, from it, taken precisely, the possibility of a horse or a lion cannot be known, from the fact that these are not pre-indicated in it; therefore, if a future contingent, as determinedly and infallibly future, is not contained in its proximate causes, taken precisely and in the sense already stated, but only as indifferently, and as determinedly future, or as it is indifferent to this, that it be or not be, it will not be able, through the force of such a supercomprehension, to be known as determinedly and infallibly future, but only as indifferent to this, that it have or not have being: otherwise such a supercomprehension would not only not have the character of such a one, but would not even have the character of a comprehension of a cause: since it would not attain the causes, nor their effects, in the manner in which they are in them.

81 It is confirmed, and explained, first. For either this supercomprehension means an excess of perfection on the part of the knower alone, and not on the part of the thing known, over pure comprehension; or it means an excess of perfection over that on the part of the thing known itself, such that supercomprehension extends to something which holds on the part of the thing known and is knowable in it, to which comprehension does not extend? If the first is said, then this supercomprehension will not be distinguished from comprehension in this, that supercomprehension attains something of the comprehended thing, or something contained in it, which comprehension does not attain; but only in this, that it comprehends it with a clearer and more perfect manner on its own part than the comprehended thing demands; whereas this other supercomprehension does not: otherwise, as is evident from the terms themselves, the aforesaid excess would not be on the part of the knower alone, but also on the part of the thing known. But the second cannot be said: otherwise the created will could be comprehended by God alone: since for comprehension it is required that nothing of the comprehended thing escape the knower, that is, that neither the thing itself, nor anything of it, nor finally anything contained in it and knowable in it escape the comprehender, as is evident from what has been said in the tract. de Visione Dei. And so, if the determined futurity of the free act of the human will escapes the created intellect, which is not able to know in the will itself what it will determinately will, when nevertheless this is knowable in it and is manifested only to the divine intellect, the consequence will be that the aforesaid will could be comprehended by the intellect of God alone.

82 It is confirmed, and explained, second. Since this infinite excess of supercomprehension is not required on the part of the thing known itself toward its most perfect comprehension, but only on the part of the knower; therefore nothing further will be known of the comprehended thing through it than would be known through pure comprehension: and consequently, if future contingents cannot be known through it by the force of the comprehension of their causes, taken in the manner stated, neither can they be known through supercomprehension. The antecedent seems clear. Because the divine intellect comprehends most perfectly the essence of God on the part of the thing comprehended, otherwise he would not be as great on the part of the knower as the divine essence is on the part of the knowable; and yet he does not supercomprehend it, nor exceed it on the part of himself.

The first consequence, however, from which the second plainly follows, also stands. Since precisely because the aforesaid excess is not required on the part of the comprehended thing toward the most perfect comprehension, it is a sign that it is on the part of itself, in the character of the knowable, equal to the comprehension which does not have the aforesaid excess; so that it is not further knowable from itself, nor is there any mode, or formality, or content in it which is not attained by pure and most perfect comprehension: and hence nothing further will be known of the things contained in it through any supercomprehension than would be known through pure comprehension: otherwise comprehension would not be equal to it as regards the knowability which it has on its own part, that is, as regards all the things which are contained in it in the character of the knowable.

83 There is added, in support of the greater refutation of this solution adduced by Molina, the point that it does not fit together with what the same Molina teaches. Namely, that God in the comprehension of his will does not know its free determinations: and yet in the comprehension of the created will he knows the free acts which are to be elicited from it. Now it is clear that these two things do not fit together. First, because although God supercomprehends the created will, but not his own will; yet the former, as supercomprehended, is not known more perfectly than the divine will as merely comprehended; otherwise, speaking absolutely and simply, the created will would be known more perfectly by God — which is the more remote object — than the divine will, which is the more proximate object, and more immediate to the divine essence, which, as is clear, is plainly false; therefore, if that knowledge, as terminated to the divine will, and as being its comprehension, cannot certainly attain its free decrees within it, neither will it be able certainly to attain, as terminated to the created will, and as being its supercomprehension, the free future acts of that same will; or, if it can be certainly terminated to the former, it can to the latter as well.

The consequence is evident. Because to know or not to know anything which is contained in some way in a cause belongs to the perfection of knowledge: and so, if the knowledge terminated to the divine will and to the created will is of the same perfection as the comprehension of the one and the supercomprehension of the other, the consequence will be that if through its force, as supercomprehension, the free acts of the created will are certainly attained, then the free decrees of the divine will will also be known with certainty through its force, as comprehension.

84 Then too: since precisely because the determination of God's will is not known, the determination cannot be known in the created will as being, in the cause, the future determination of that will itself; therefore, if God, before his own free determination, does not fail to know with certainty that same determination, neither will he be able to attain the determination of the created will. The consequence seems clear. The antecedent, however, is also evident. Since the created will cannot determine itself, or be the cause of its own determination, without the determination of the divine will; especially so, because its determination proceeds from the determination of God's will: and so the aforesaid determination of the created will will not be able to be known from the force of the knowledge of that same will, as being the cause of it, unless the determination of the divine will be known.

This same proof is confirmed, and explained. For as often as an effect has a dependence per se from two causes, it is necessary, in order that it be known in its cause as determinedly and simply future, that the determination of each of the causes be known; otherwise it would not depend per se on either: therefore, precisely because God then does not attain the decree of his will with respect to some effect of the created will, he will not be able certainly to attain its futurity in that same created cause: since the futurity of that will depends both on the determination of the divine will and on the determination of the created will.

§ III. The arguments of the first opinion are met.

85 To the first, the antecedent being granted, the consequence is to be denied. And to the proof it is to be said that from the infinite excess of divine knowledge over angelic knowledge it is not rightly concluded that God certainly knows the determined futurity of the aforesaid contingents in the comprehension of their secondary causes, antecedent to the divine decree, if the angel once conjecturally and very probably attains it in the aforesaid causes. For such a future is not certainly knowable, as being infallibly future, in its causes thus taken: and so it does not pertain to the infinite perfection of divine knowledge that it attain that as infallibly future; but only that it perceives its indifference to being and not being with greater clarity to an infinite degree, in such a way that it knows both the indifference and the degree, or (so to speak) the quantity of the indifference, which it has with respect to this, that it be or not be.

It will not follow from this, as Alvarez well noted in lib. 2. de auxiliis disput. 15, that in God strictly speaking there is conjectural knowledge. For a knowledge of some thing can be conjectural in a twofold way. First, on the part of the knowledge itself, and with respect to the knower, who is led by conjectures to pronounce a judgement about the determined futurity of some thing: as the physician conjecturally judges future illness from certain signs. Second, on the part of the object known, as when someone knows the disposition which causes have with respect to their effects, which proceed from them in the regular course of things; yet, not being led by the aforesaid conjectures, he sees them as not determinedly future; but only clearly knows that there is such a propensity in the causes, that they are accustomed, for the most part, or frequently, so to happen. Wherefore, since that former knowledge, to which falsity can underlie, is not in God, especially since he certainly knows that nothing is determinedly and completely future except after the decree of his will, and dependently upon it; yet the latter does indeed subsist in him: from the fact that it pertains to the perfection of divine knowledge that he know each thing according to its merits, and hence that he certainly know that what is regularly future is in that way future: hence it follows that conjectural knowledge is not in him properly, and speaking absolutely, because thus taken it stands for the conjectural knowledge in the first manner; but not for conjectural knowledge in the second manner.

86 To the confirmation, let the antecedent pass, and the consequence be denied. To the proof, however, the antecedent is to be denied. Because this whole excess, as has been said, holds on the part of the knower. And so nothing is known on the part of the thing known through supercomprehension which is not known through comprehension: and consequently neither is that very thing which is known as possible by the comprehender, namely a free act, to be known as future by the supercomprehender, if only attention is given to the secondary causes of the aforesaid future contingents, taken in the manner stated; but they are only known as possibles, though with infinitely greater clarity on the part of the supercomprehender.

87 To the second, let the antecedent also pass, and let the consequence be denied in like manner. And to the proof it is to be answered that the reasoning is dissimilar. For a necessary cause is presupposed to be determined toward a future effect: and therefore, the cause itself being known, as also the other necessary causes which might otherwise have impeded its influx, and which are likewise determined toward it, for example, toward not being impeded, the effect can also be known as a determined future, at least as far as it pertains to the secondary causes. But free causes are not determined toward producing it, if they are taken in the manner in which at present we take them; nor is it determined that they are not, for example, to be impeded; but this too is in itself contingent and free: and so in their comprehension, or supercomprehension, it cannot be known that their effect is infallibly and determinately future.