Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

44 The decision on this difficulty has been reached in the preceding question; and therefore, so that what was hinted at there may be explained more fully, we at once start a new question immediately after the preceding one.

§ I. The prior opinion is proposed.

The affirmative part is held by Suarez, lib. 2. de scientia Dei, cap. 8. num. 6 and 11; by Fonseca, 3. tom. of his Metaph., lib. 6. cap. 2. quaest. 4. sect. 10. § Sed quaerat aliquis; and is favoured by Cabrera, 3. part. quaest. 1. art. 3. num. 393.

It is proved, first. For God, in that signum of reason, before he is understood to have a free decree, comprehends his own essence and will: therefore he knows what his will will be willing in the following sign: therefore in those future decrees he will certainly know future contingent things. This last consequence is evident from the first. Because it does not stand that God should certainly know a decree concerning the futurity of some thing, unless he should know that very thing to be future in the same way. The first consequence, on the other hand, seems clear from the antecedent. Since that very knowledge is comprehensive, it must be most perfect in every respect; and consequently it must extend to every truth: therefore through it will be known what the divine will will be willing in the following sign concerning the production, for example, of this world, or of another. The antecedent, however, is proved. For from that knowledge, according to what belongs to it in the aforesaid sign, the divine Word proceeds: since it is prior that it should proceed than that there should be a decree concerning the production of creatures: therefore such a knowledge is comprehensive of that which is prior: otherwise the Word would not proceed from the comprehension of the essence, and consequently not from the most perfect knowledge of it.

It is confirmed and explained from the difference that obtains between the comprehension by which an Angel comprehends himself and his own will, and the comprehension of the divine essence and attributes. For since the former is not infinitely perfect, there is no need that it extend itself to the free acts of that same Angel: because they have no necessary connexion with him. But since the comprehension of the divine essence is a knowledge infinitely perfect, it follows that, although on that ground the free decrees have no necessary connexion with the essence, they yet ought not to be known in that prior instant, in which they precede themselves as existing; but on the other hand by that ground on which the aforesaid knowledge is asked for, to the end that it be comprehensive, to the effect that it be infinitely perfect: and consequently it demands that it extend itself to every truth, whether present or future, etc.

45 Second. Because the free decrees of God in that sign, in which the knowledge of God precedes the decrees themselves, are not understood to be actually present in themselves, but only future: therefore they are known by God as future: therefore in themselves, when known, future contingent things are also known, which are decided by them. This last consequence plainly seems to follow from the first. The first, however, follows from the antecedent. Because whatever has some mode of being, whether of possibility, or of futurity, or of presence, must, for some prior reason, also be known by God for that same reason: otherwise his knowledge would not be infinitely perfect: for there would be something knowable to which it would not extend. The antecedent, however, as regards the first part, seems certain. For since they follow upon the knowledge of God, by which they are directed, and are posterior in the collation compared with it, and consequently are in the following sign, it must be that in that sign in which the knowledge precedes them, they are not understood to be present in themselves. From this too the same antecedent is clear as regards the second part. For since in the following sign they are to have existence, although for the preceding sign they do not have it, they cannot but be future in that same preceding sign: since of everything which is not in some sign and is thereafter to have existence, it is rightly predicated in time, or in the preceding sign, that it is future.

46 Third, this very thing is proved, and at the same time the preceding argument is confirmed. For in that sign in which God precedes his own free decrees, for example, the decree of creating this universe, this proposition is false: God will not decree in the following sign to create this universe: and its contradictory, namely, God will decree in the following sign to create this universe, is true: therefore the aforesaid decree will have in the preceding sign the character of a future decree: and consequently in that same sign, known by God, the creation of this universe will also be known. This last consequence is sufficiently clear from itself and from what has already been said.

The first consequence, however, is clear from the antecedent. Because that proposition could not be true in the preceding sign, namely, God will decree in the following sign to create this universe, unless the decree were future in that same preceding sign. Since it is the same for a thing to be future in some preceding sign, and to be what it will be in the following sign, either as to duration or otherwise. The antecedent, however, as regards the first part is sufficiently clear. For since in the following sign God will have decreed to create this universe, that proposition could not but be false, God will not decree in the following sign to create this universe. From this too the same antecedent is proved as regards the second part. Both because from two contradictories, whenever the one is false, the other must be true. And also because, since in the following sign God will have the aforesaid decree, it follows that that enunciation which affirms this very thing must be true.

47 And this very thing can be confirmed and explained. For this disjunctive proposition, namely, The decree of creating the world will be, or will not be, in the following sign, cannot but be true for every preceding sign: therefore this too, God will have in the following sign the decree of creating the world, will be true in the same way. The antecedent seems certain from that principle known by the light of nature, namely: that either being or not being of anything whatever must necessarily affirm one part of the contradiction. The consequence, however, is proved. For the truth of a disjunctive proposition depends on the truth of one of its parts: therefore since the other part of the aforesaid proposition, namely, God will not have in the following sign the decree of creating the world, is false, because it is certain by faith that he had it, that other proposition, namely, God will have in the following sign the decree of creating the world, must be true.

§ II. The true opinion of the Angelic Doctor, and its first foundation.

48 It must nevertheless be said that the divine decrees do not have the character of future things: and consequently that God does not certainly know future contingent things in the aforesaid decrees, as future. Thus the Angelic Doctor, de Veritate, quaest. 6. art. 3. ad 10, where, speaking of predestination that includes, or connotes, the proposal of the divine will, says: Speaking absolutely, God can predestinate each one, or not predestinate him: and can have predestinated him, or not have predestinated him — because the act of predestination, when measured by eternity, never falls into the past: just as it is never future. Whence it is always considered as issuing from the will by the mode of liberty. In which words, as you can see, the character of pastness, or of futurity, is denied to predestination that concerns the proposal of the efficacious will of God; and only the character of presentiality is granted to it: and consequently in it, or in its future decree, future contingent things will not be able to be known, according to the mind of the Holy Doctor.

Which the same Holy Preceptor also taught: both where, close by, art. 4. ad 8; and in 1. sent. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 1. ad 1, where, speaking of the knowledge of vision, which concerns the decree of the will, he says: The act of the divine knowledge never passes into the past; but it is always in act: and therefore it always remains in the liberty of the divine will; and thereafter it can no longer be future: since what can be future can also pass into the past in the same proportional way. Then afterwards, in this same article and below, quaest. 88. art. 3 and 4, and 1. cont. Gent. cap. 67; as likewise de Verit. quaest. 2. art. 12, and quodlib. 12. quaest. 3; and finally in all the other places in which he teaches that future contingent things cannot be certainly known by God, such as they are in their indifferent causes. For if the free decrees of God are future, and as such are certainly known by God, they would have to be known in their (so to speak) cause, or in the will of God, as free and indifferent, quasi in the first act, and from the comprehension of it, as the opposite opinion teaches, as will become plain from what is said immediately below.

Whence the Holy Doctor is commonly followed by his disciples, Capreolus, in 1. dist. 38. quaest. 1; Cajetan, Bannez, and Ripa in the present place; Ledesma, lib. de auxiliis divinae gratiae, disp. 2. de scientia futurorum conting. dub. 6, in the 2nd difficulty of it, fol. 585; Nazarius, in the present controversy, 1. conclus. 5; Gonzalez, disp. 45. sect. 5; Gaspar Ramon, relectione 3. de infallibilitate scientiae divinae circa conditionaliter futura, fol. 59. columna 2; Machin, quaest. 14. art. 13; disput. 27. sect. 1; Petrus de Corneio, tom. 1. in 1. part. tract. 1. circa quaest. 14. art. 13. disp. 2. dub. 2; Alvarez, lib. de auxiliis divinae gratiae, disput. 7, and lib. 1. responsionum, cap. 1. num. 12; the most learned Lord Alfonsus Curiel, in certain manuscripts on the third part, quaest. 11. art. 1, which in the last year of his life we took down at his dictation. And from the Fathers of the Society, Arrubal in the commentaries on this article, disput. 47. cap. 4. num. 13; Vazquez in this 1. part. disp. 65. cap. 4; Molina, disp. 17; Granado, tract. 4. disp. 1. sect. 3. num. 15; Herice, tomo 1. in 1. part. disp. 7. cap. 9; and finally many others, whom we shall mention in disput. 10. from num. 126 as far as num. 131, against conditional knowledge.

49 The prior and fundamental reason of this assertion, however, was touched upon by St. Thomas in the place cited, in the question de Verit.; and he also hints at it in this article, and it can be proposed under this form. Because the free acts of God are measured by eternity, which is their own and adequate measure: therefore it is repugnant for them to have the character of future things: and consequently it will also be repugnant that in them, so known by God after the manner of future things, the future contingent things that are decided by them should be certainly known, or known as future. The antecedent needs no proof: for the aforesaid acts, being uncreated, must endure with an uncreated duration, as being their own proper measure; and it is clear that there is no other uncreated duration than eternity. The first consequence, however, seems clear from the antecedent. Because just as it is of the character of eternity that it be a single now always present, because it is an infinite duration, comprehending on both the before and the after side, and virtually containing every other duration and every sign of durations; so it is of the character of that which is measured by eternity that it be always, and in whatever sign be present, and never have the character of a future thing. From this too the second consequence is sufficiently clear. Because that which in no way has the character of a future thing cannot by any means be certainly known by God as future: otherwise the divine knowledge would err: and consequently neither in that known sign will future contingent things be able to be known.

50 It is confirmed and explained by a reason taken from the same Holy Doctor. For that which is eternal with uncreated eternity cannot pass into the past, otherwise it would not be eternal, since that which passes into the past, quatenus it is such, still contains as much as it does of every time as it is of itself, and its opposite is what the thing that has the character of the eternal seeks: therefore neither will it be able to be future. The consequence is evident. Then, because that which is future can pass into the past. Then also: because by the same reasoning it would not be eternal: since by that very fact, that it would be future, it would already, according to its actual being of essence, not be present to every duration and to all its signs.

It is confirmed and explained, second, by a reason which the same Holy Doctor hints at. Because it is repugnant for a thing to be immense, and not to be present, so far as it is of itself, to all and every place, and to their indivisibles taken in any way; and likewise for a thing to be infinite in the ratio, for example, of light, or of cognitive power, and not to embrace actually in some sign every knowable in that same sign, as is clear from itself: therefore it will also be repugnant for a thing to be eternal with uncreated eternity, and not to be actually present, at least so far as it is of itself, to any other lasting thing, or to anything able to last, or not to embrace actually any conceivable created duration, or any of its signs. The consequence is evident. Because uncreated duration, and that which lasts by it, as by its own proper measure, is no less infinite in the ratio of duration, or of a lasting thing, than immensity, or uncreated cognitive power within its own bounds: therefore just as, by reason of the infinity in the ratio of the immense, or in the ratio of cognitive power, God cannot but, so far as he is of himself, be present to every place, and to every indivisible of it; and likewise cannot but extend himself actually in every sign to every knowable in it, so that which will be infinite in the ratio of duration must actually be present to every other duration, and to every sign of duration, and must actually embrace any created duration, and any of its signs: and consequently it will not be able to be future: because what is future cannot, according to this reasoning, be actually present to any other duration, or to any sign of duration, as is clear from the very terms.

§ III. Objections against the first foundation of St. Thomas, and their solution.

51 This reasoning, however, of St. Thomas does not please Francisco Suarez; and so against it, first, he objects. For although the decree of God is eternal in itself, and actually present, nevertheless it can be known quasi independently of its actual presence, which is indeed explained most excellently by this hypothesis. Namely, that if, by an impossibility, that decree were not eternal, but God were to have it in the following time; nevertheless he would always have known that his will would, so to speak, elicit the aforesaid decree: therefore also, if it is now eternal, it will be knowable after the manner of a future thing, and independently of the actual presence: because this alone is denoted by the statement that a thing is known beforehand, by reason, as future.

52 Second. For although the divine free decree is measured by eternity, as by a measure proportionate to itself, nevertheless by reason we understand first that God knows his will, insofar as it is capable of freely willing, than that he is actually willing this or that object: therefore likewise he will be able, notwithstanding that the will and the divine willing are eternal, by reason to perceive it first as one that will will, than as one actually willing. The consequence is evident. Then, from the parity of the reasoning. Then also: because the indivisibility and infinitude of the instant of eternity is repugnant to any division of diverse real signs, and to its not actually embracing them; but it is not repugnant to a division of diverse signs, or of instants, by reason: therefore, just as for this reason God can, by reason, before he knows his actual decree, know his will as being able to will, notwithstanding that each of the two is measured by eternity, so for the same reason he will also be able, by reason, before he attains to the aforesaid decree as actually possessed, to attain to it as one that is to be possessed, or as future.

53 It is confirmed and explained, first. Because the fact that the free decree of God is eternal is no obstacle to its being known as possible; otherwise it could not be: therefore it is likewise no obstacle to its being future, and to its being known as such by God. The consequence is evident. Because possible is more distant from actual being and from presence than future is: therefore if the decree to be eternal does not remove that greater distance, neither will it remove this lesser one; but both are compatible with eternity, provided that all these are found in the same real instant.

It is confirmed and explained, second. For if an Angel were created by God from eternity, loving him freely, then the aforesaid Angelic love could be known by God, not only as present, but also as future, that is, as one that in that subsequent sign is to have existence: because in fact in that sign following upon the essence of the Angel he will have it: therefore the fact that the decree of God is eternal will be no obstacle to our philosophising about it, after the same proportional manner: since that decree is to have existence, as it were dependently upon the divine will, and consequently in the posterior sign following upon it.

54 Third, the same reasoning can be objected to. For eternity, by reason, belongs to the divine essence and its necessary perfections before it belongs to free decrees: therefore in that prior respect the free decrees are not understood to be actually lasting, notwithstanding that in fact, and correspondingly with respect to a real instant of true or imaginary time, they always last. The antecedent seems certain. Both because eternity belongs necessarily to necessary perfections, whereas it belongs to free decrees only freely; for it is clear that what is necessary is prior and more intrinsic than what is free. Then also: because by reason God is omnipotent, for example, before he freely wills the creation of the world: since the willing to create the world supposes his omnipotence. The consequence, however, is clear from the antecedent. Because in that prior respect in which eternity is understood to belong first to necessary perfections, it is not understood to belong to free decrees: since these exist only in the subsequent posterior respect, therefore in that prior antecedent respect the aforesaid decrees are not understood to be actually lasting.

It is confirmed. Because here we are enquiring not about formal futurity, but only about fundamental futurity with respect to our intellect, which considers the distinct signs with a foundation in the thing, one indeed of futurity, the other of existence, whether, namely, we rightly understand with a foundation that these two signs are given with respect to the divine decree? and that God in that prior sign of futurity certainly knows the decree before he perceives it as existing? But for this it is enough that being and eternity belong to the free decrees later than to the attributes, because by that very fact in that prior antecedent respect we can understand that God knows that in the posterior sign the aforesaid decrees will be, although they are not in that prior one: therefore, and so on.

55 Fourth, at length, it can be objected. Because, notwithstanding that the free decrees are eternal, nevertheless they can be compared after the manner of intention and of election, and therefore we say that there is in God an intention of an end and an election of means: therefore by that very fact one decree will have to be future by reason of another. The consequence is evident, because election of its own nature has the character of a future thing by reason of the intention; and an efficacious intention of an end infers an efficacious futurity of the means.

56 But these do not press very hard. Whence, to the first of these objections, the antecedent is to be denied, understood of the decree with respect to the one that knows it quiddatively, and insofar as it is in itself, as it occurs in God. Wherefore that conditional brought forward in this first objection is false, as will be more clear from what is said in dub. 6.

57 To the second, the antecedent is to be denied if it is understood of the priority of reason in which, and with a foundation in the thing: otherwise, however, if it is understood either of the priority of reason from which, both on the part of knowledge and on the part of the object, whether that priority be virtual or eminent, or of the priority of reason in which without a foundation in the thing, and precisely on the part of our mode of conceiving. And then the consequent must in like manner be distinguished, and the consequence concerning the priority of reason from which already stated is to be granted, but not that concerning the priority of reason in which. And for the first proof of that same consequence it is clear from what has been said that a parity is preserved between the antecedent and the consequent. For the second proof, however, it must be said that although the division of diverse signs by reason, which do not have among themselves an order of priority and posteriority in which according to reason, but only from which, is no obstacle to the indivisibility and infinitude of eternity, and of the eternal thing, nevertheless the division of the aforesaid signs, if they do have among themselves an order of priority and posteriority in which still according to reason with a foundation in the thing, that is to say, although it is no obstacle to the indivisibility and infinitude of eternity, and of the eternal thing, that something measured by it should depend, or as it were depend according to reason, yet with a foundation in things, on something existing in God and also measured by eternity, whether this quasi-dependence be virtual or only eminent: and consequently that a priority and posteriority from which according to reason, founded however in things, is not repugnant to the character of the eternal thing: since this quasi-dependence founds, so far as it is of itself, such an order of prior and posterior. Yet it is an obstacle to the indivisibility and infinitude of eternity, and of the eternal thing, that with a foundation in the thing it can be conceived in some sign as not existing: because by that very fact it will not be infinite in the ratio of the lasting, as was shown above. And so although it can be conceived with a foundation in the thing as it were depending on another, nevertheless if it is then conceived as it ought to be conceived, it must be understood to be one with the other, and always to exist together with it, and in every sign.

58 This is explained. For although by priority of reason in which we understand first that God knows his will, insofar as it has the power to will freely, than that he is actually willing this or that object, this priority is nevertheless only a priority in which of reason without a foundation in the thing, and holding only on the part of our mode of conceiving and of signifying. For since the knowledge which God has of his will and of free willing is the knowledge of a thing such as it is in itself, and consequently the knowledge of the existing thing for every sign of reason in which founded in things, from the fact that it is the knowledge of the will and of the willing, having eternity as its own proper measure, it must be that the divine knowledge attains to this very thing: and it cannot conceive with a foundation in the thing that his will is prior, by priority of reason in which already stated, than his free willing: and consequently this object cannot furnish us with a foundation for this, that, still according to reason, we may first conceive in which the will as having the power to will, rather than as actually willing. Although willing does in some way depend, or as it were depend, upon the will, so that the knowledge of the will is prior from which, whether virtually or eminently, both on the part of the knowledge itself and on the part of the object, to the knowledge of the free willing.

59 We have said, whether virtual or eminent, in order to abstract from that question, namely, whether the knowledge of God, insofar as it terminates on the divine will, is virtually distinguished from itself, insofar as it terminates on free willing? or whether the same knowledge by the reason of its eminence, and without any virtual distinction, terminates on both? from the fact that although it is equivalent to diverse created acts of knowing, nevertheless these do not belong to a distinct line, which was nevertheless required for a virtual distinction of the divine knowledge: and likewise whether free willing and the divine will are virtually distinguished, or not? For if the necessary knowledge of God of his will, and the free knowledge of free willing, are virtually distinguished, then on the part of knowledge there will be a priority from which, whether virtual, or with a foundation in the thing, between them; otherwise, however, if they are not distinguished in this way. For then there will only be an eminent priority, that is, a certain eminence equivalent to diverse created acts of knowing, which have among themselves a priority from which, yet which belong to the same line. Just as if free willing and the will of God are virtually distinguished from each other, then on the part of the object of the divine knowledge there will be a priority from which, virtual, between the will and the aforesaid willing; otherwise, however, if there is not such a distinction, but only an eminence, by reason of which it is equivalent to things belonging to the same line; for then there will only be, in the sense explained, an eminent priority on the part of the object. Yet a priority in which, even according to the fundamental reason in things, must never be admitted there. Because the aforesaid division of signs in which, according to reason, removes the infinitude of eternity, and of the lasting thing as measured by it, as was explained above. And therefore St. Thomas, in the place cited, speaking of predestination, and of the mode of conceiving which predestination itself demands and founds, said: That it is always considered as issuing from the will by the mode of liberty: and consequently not as one that has issued, or is to issue, but by the mode of a present thing: which presupposes nothing else, by the mode of a prior thing, by priority in which, already stated.

60 Nor is there an obstacle, if one presses the point, that the divine Word does not proceed from the knowledge of the free acts of God, as St. Thomas and his disciples teach in common, and as we shall say more fully in the treatise on the Trinity: therefore, in that sign of reason in which the eternal Father is understood to comprehend himself and the divine essence, he does not know the aforesaid acts. The consequence is evident. Because if in that sign of reason he knew those acts, there would be no reason why the Word should not proceed from the knowledge of them, and consequently from the knowledge of future creatures, as it proceeds from the knowledge of the divine essence and of its attributes, as well as of possible creatures, from the fact that all these things are known together in that prior instant.

It makes no difference, then. Because, the antecedent being granted, the consequence is to be denied. And for the proof, the antecedent is to be denied. Because, since the divine Word is a being necessary in every respect, it requires two things on the part of the knowledge from which it proceeds. First indeed, that such a knowledge be in the same sign in which the aforesaid Word is understood to proceed; otherwise it could not proceed from that knowledge. Second, however, that it be of an altogether necessary object, and not of a free one; and consequently that it be a knowledge simply necessary: which indeed is lacking to the divine knowledge, insofar as it terminates on the free acts of God himself. And so the aforesaid acts, and their knowledge, are there concomitantly in the same sign in which, still according to reason: not indeed on account of the procession of the Word, but because although they could have not existed, yet, supposing that they do exist, they must be measured by eternity: and consequently in every sign in which, with a foundation in the thing, they must be present.

61 To the first confirmation, the antecedent is to be denied, understood of possibility properly, and taken in the strict sense. For that confirmation requires that what is called possible be an effect of the divine power, having its own true cause, which yet does not in the least belong to the free acts, which are identified with God. Otherwise, however, if it is understood of possibility, insofar as it only says that what is possible does not oppose its being, whether it has its own true cause, or only a reason a priori, or finally whether it is of itself without dependence, or quasi-dependence, on another, whether as on a cause or as on a reason a priori. And therefore the divine essence, by the very fact that it exists of itself, and independently of another, as of a cause, or as of a reason a priori, must be something that does not oppose its being of itself.

Add, moreover, that this confirmation also does not convince the intention, from another head. Because over and above the fact that the antecedent is false, the consequence must also be denied. And for the proof of the consequence, insofar as it can be brought in some way against what has been said, it will be answered that although possibility properly, and taken in the strict sense, is further removed, according to the common laws, from actuality of being than the future is, insofar as the future does not pass to being except by means of futurity; nevertheless by the divine power it is not necessary for it to be so, suppose that some Angel were created by God from eternity: because then he would pass immediately from possibility to being, not by means of futurity, as we have said elsewhere. And likewise things which are not properly possible, since the divine attributes are possible, that is, not involving that they be, and along with this not repugning, have immediately the actual being of existence, without its being preceded by, or serving as a mean to, futurity. But between the futurity of a thing and the actual being of existence there must intervene either some real duration, if this futurity is formally such, or some sign of reason in which with a foundation in the thing, if such a futurity is feigned to be only virtual; each of which is at variance with what is eternal, as has been said.

62 By this too it is sufficiently clear, both as regards the second confirmation. Because the antecedent is false, and its proof only convinces as to posteriority from which: not, however, in which, even according to reason with a foundation in the thing. Then also as regards the third objection. Because the antecedent is true only of a priority from which: and therefore the consequence must be denied. Because it is argued from a priority from which according to reason, to a priority in which, even according to reason, but founded however in things. That mode of arguing is of no value; nor does its proof convince of anything other than a priority from which. Then afterwards as regards the confirmation of that same third objection. Because even granting the major, the minor is to be denied, understood of a priority from which. And for the proof it must be said that, supposing that fundamental futurity were granted, it was required that the free act, as future, should precede by some sign in which of reason, itself as actually present; the opposite of which we have said occurs.

63 To the fourth, the antecedent being granted, the consequence is to be denied. And for the proof, the antecedent is to be denied, understood universally. Because for the character of the election of the means it is enough that it be posterior in posteriority from which to the intention: it is not, however, necessary that it be posterior in posteriority in which than the intention; and so both the intention and the election are from eternity in God, and each has being from eternity present; in such a way that neither precedes the other by priority in which with a foundation in the thing; but only the election has being posterior in posteriority from which, whether virtual or eminent, to the intention.

§ IV. The second foundation in favour of the opinion of St. Thomas is examined.

64 The second, and principal, foundation of the assertion is hinted at by the same Angelic Doctor in the place cited above, and can be proposed under this form: for if the free decrees of the divine will have the character of future things, then in that sign in which they are understood beforehand as future the will of God will be determined to have in the following sign those decrees which are future, and not to have those which are not future: therefore by that very fact the liberty of the divine will would be wounded. Wherefore, since this cannot be admitted, as is clear from itself, it follows that the aforesaid decrees neither have the character of future things, nor can be known by God as such. The antecedent seems clear. Because that which is future, by the very fact that it is such, has a determination to be; just as that which is not precisely possible, but moreover has being not-future, must by that very fact have a determination not to be, as will be more fully clear from itself and from what is said in the tract. de Volunt. Dei, disp. 5. dub. 3: therefore if some of these divine free decrees are future, and others are not, the consequence will be that the will of God, in that preceding sign in which it is presupposed with respect to all its decrees, will be understood beforehand to be determined to have those which in that sign are future, and not to have those which are not future.

The first consequence, however, is clear from the antecedent. Because since this determination of the divine will is presupposed with respect to all its free decrees, there must be a prior determination, and one that simply necessitates, and that removes liberty: since whatever belongs to God before every free act of his will belongs to him necessarily, and without liberty. And therefore, because the knowledge of the divine essence, and of possible creatures, as well as the love with which God loves himself, belong to him before every free determination of his will, these things all therefore belong to him altogether necessarily, and God himself by the prior determination is determined to have them.

65 It is confirmed. Because by the very fact that God certainly knows towards which part his will is to be inclined, before the free election of it is given, such a knowledge must be independent of the aforesaid election, or free decree, both as to its substance and as to its mode: since that which is prior does not depend on the posterior: therefore the divine intellect, having the aforesaid certain and infallible knowledge, would not propose to his will indeterminately and indifferently either part, but only the one, namely, in which he would know that his will was to be determined: and consequently the will would not remain with sufficient formal indifference for choosing either part, but only for that which has been proposed to it by the intellect. This last consequence plainly follows from the first. Because formal indifference cannot be given on the part of the will unless radical indifference is given on the part of the intellect: from the fact that it proposes either part indifferently and indeterminately. The first consequence, however, is clear from the antecedent. Because there cannot be present in the divine intellect at the same time an infallible knowledge of the future election of the one part, and a judgement by which it moves and directs itself, with indifference on its own part, towards choosing whichever of them.

66 The adversaries raise objections, both against this reasoning and against its confirmation. To the reasoning indeed, that although the determination which belongs to the divine will before every decree existing in it, and which does not arise at the same time from the supposition of the futurity of those decrees, is indeed a prior determination, and one that removes liberty, as one may see in the examples brought forward in this reasoning, it is not, however, a determination that arises from the presence of the decree, or from its futurity, as occurs in the present case: because this is only a determination from the supposition of futurity, which does not remove liberty, just as neither does the supposition of presentiality.

From this they answer, to the confirmation, that as Christ the Lord knew through his blessed knowledge what his will was infallibly going to will: and likewise St. Peter knew from the revelation of Christ that his triple denial was infallibly future, and nevertheless neither the liberty of Christ nor of St. Peter was wounded, either on the part of the intellect or on the part of the will itself; so, although God foreknows the infallibility of the futurity of his decree, for example, of creating the world, his liberty will not on that account remain wounded. And the reason is the same in both cases. Because these things are not foreknown as future except in the same way in which they are future, that is, freely: and it is prior that they have the aforesaid free futurity than that they be seen. Whence from the fact that they are foreknown to be freely future, so far is it from liberty and consequent indifference of judgement being removed, that rather the aforesaid liberty is gathered from this.

67 But against it. For in this solution there seems to be involved a plain entanglement; namely, that the divine will is only determined to have the decree, for example, concerning the creation of the world, from the supposition of its futurity, and consequently that there is only (so to speak) infallibility with regard to it, and not necessity simply: and on the other side, that this necessity is a necessity simply, and from the intrinsic nature of the will itself, and not from any consequent supposition. Since, however, the former is sufficiently clear from the aforesaid solution, therefore we shall show the latter in this way.

Now, that which is, namely, that the divine will in that prior instant before the decree of creating the world is determined to have it, in such a way that in the composite sense of this determination it cannot have the opposite act, cannot proceed from the supposition of the presentiality of such a decree, nor from the supposition of its futurity: therefore it is a sign that it proceeds from the determination, and from the absolute necessity, of the divine will; but not from a necessity secundum quid, and from a supposition; and consequently, by the very fact that the aforesaid decree is foreknown as future, it will not be foreknown as only infallibly, and freely, but as necessarily, and with all-determination, both on the part of the intellect and of the divine will, to be future.

This last consequence is plainly clear from the first. The first, however, is clear from the antecedent. Because every determination of any will which does not arise from some supposition of a divine decree, whether present or at least future, is altogether prior, and removes liberty: since the indifferent principle, as such, is not of itself determined infallibly towards one part rather than another being had, unless some supposition be superadded, which, in the present case, as is clear to one considering it, can be nothing other than either the presentiality of the divine decree, or its futurity. The antecedent, however, as regards the first part is clear. Because according to the opposite opinion, in that prior instant that decree does not have the character of a present thing, but only of a future one: therefore the divine will cannot be understood beforehand to be determined from the supposition of the decree, as present.

68 As regards the second part, however, the same antecedent is proved. Because that which is, namely, that the divine will in that prior instant is determined freely to will the creation of this world, is some real reason, existing in act there, and in exercise, and bearing itself after the manner of an affection of the will itself; and so by reason of it the will has, so to speak, in act and in exercise, a peculiar (so to say) habituation towards this universe, which it does not have towards another universe, since by reason of this determination it regards, as it were, this universe after the manner of a future thing, but not another: therefore such a determination demands in God some reason a priori, from which, actively or quasi-actively, it proceeds: therefore it will be repugnant for the reason a priori of the aforesaid determination to be the futurity of that same decree.

This last consequence is evident. Because that which is an active, or quasi-active, reason a priori of another must, in that prior instant in which it quasi-causes, be existing, and present by true and real existence, or at least must have the being of an actual essence, such as the being of an actual essence is distinguished from the being of a future essence, as is clear by induction: but the future, as such, does not exist, nor has its own being of an actual essence, such as the being of an actual essence is distinguished from the being of a future essence: therefore, insofar as it is such, that actual and existing-in-nature determination by which the divine will is understood beforehand to be determined to the futurity of this decree rather than of another cannot proceed, in such a way that in the composite sense it cannot have the opposite decree.

69 It is confirmed and explained. Because according to this mode of speaking, not only is that attributed to the divine will which all theologians in common teach, namely, that it is indifferent as to this, that it should terminate on this object rather than on that; and that for this indifference it is enough for it that in act it have that termination, or that exercise of its will rather than the other; but moreover it is attributed to it that before the actual termination, or volition, it is determined to will this, for example, the creation of this world rather than another: therefore since this determination cannot proceed from the supposition of the futurity of such a decree, as has been shown, it must arise from elsewhere, namely, from the nature of the will itself: therefore by that very fact the will will not remain indifferent to either, but will be altogether necessitated.

The antecedent as regards the first part is evident. As regards the second, however, it is also clear. Because by the very fact that the decree concerning the creation of the world is infallibly future, the divine will cannot but have that in the composite sense: and consequently it cannot but have some determination to have it. The first consequence, however, is clear from the antecedent and from what has already been said. The second, moreover, is evident as well. Because that which is indifferent to either, such that so far as it is of itself it can be composed with either, cannot of itself precisely be more determined infallibly towards having one part rather than another: therefore if the divine will is of itself determined infallibly to have the decree concerning the creation of the world, it cannot remain with indifference, and with liberty, as regards not having it.

70 This very thing is finally confirmed and explained. Because this supposition, and determination of futurity, if it is true and is not feigned altogether, cannot belong to the divine decree according to the being which it has in that prior instant in itself: therefore it must belong to it according to the being which it has in its principle, or quasi-principle, namely, in the divine will: therefore the aforesaid will will be of itself determined to the futurity of that decree; and will in no way be indifferent. The antecedent is evident: because that which is future, as long as it is future, does not have being in itself. The first consequence, however, is clear from the antecedent. Because any determination, true and not feigned altogether, must belong to a thing according to some true and real being which it has, since a determination is the mode of a thing; and consequently a true determination, and not feigned altogether, must be the mode of a thing according to its true and real being: therefore since a thing can have being only in itself, or in its principle, or quasi-principle, it must correspond to it according to the mode of being it has by one of these: and consequently according to that which belongs to it as it is in its quasi-principle, if once it cannot correspond to it according to the being which it has in itself, as occurs in the present case.

From this too the second consequence is sufficiently clear. Because the decree, as it is in the divine will as it were in its principle (so to speak) quasi-elicitively of it, says only as much as that same will according to what it has of itself and intrinsically: therefore if, as it is there, it has a determination to be, it follows that the divine will is of itself determined to quasi-elicit that, so to speak (as we say); and consequently that it is not of itself indifferent to either; nor can, so far as it is of itself, be composed with any decree whose opposite is required for liberty. And so that is obtained which we said at the beginning of this refutation, namely, that on the one hand this determination is from the supposition of futurity, as the aforesaid solution hinted; and on the other hand that it is a determination simply, and arising from the nature of the will itself. But on this confirmation we shall return below in this same disputation, num. 115 as far as num. 122, where it will be treated more fully, and the solutions which will be brought forward in its favour will be refuted.

71 Nor does that which this solution brought forward in its own favour concerning Christ the Lord, and blessed Peter, help it, but rather hinders. Because the fact that the free acts, for example, of Christ the Lord and of St. Peter, were infallibly future, had its origin in the supposition of the divine decree actually existing in God; the effect of which was to make them infallibly, and freely, future. Because the aforesaid decree, by the very fact that it is actually in God, is the first root, and efficient cause, of the free futurity of the thing which, by it, is decreed to be done freely. And so such a futurity, and the determination to it, did not have its origin in a determination proceeding from the nature of the created will alone, but from the aforesaid supposition: and consequently it could be compatible with the innate and intrinsic indifference, and liberty, of that will (which was the same, in due proportion, when the triple denial of St. Peter is compared with the permissive, yet efficacious, decree which God had concerning it, as we have said). Just as, for the opposite reason, no determination to the infallible futurity of any decree can be compatible with the divine liberty: since, as has been shown, there is no source from which the aforesaid determination could arise, except from the nature of the will itself, and consequently except if its own indifference is removed.

§ V. An answer is given to the foundations of the prior opinion.

72 To the first, the suppositum of the antecedent is to be denied, which is hinted at there, namely, that there is some sign of reason in which God comprehends his essence, and does not understand, or have, his free decrees. Because these signs of reason in which ought not to be distinguished with respect to the divine intellect, which knows itself such as it is in itself, and by a single and the same most simple intuition measured by eternity, touching all things; indeed, nor even with a foundation in God himself, ought the aforesaid signs be distinguished with respect to our intellect, when it comes to know the mode by which God comprehends himself, as has been shown. Although between the aforesaid comprehension and the free decree there is its priority from which already stated.

Whence the first consequence is to be denied, understood properly and formally. Because from that antecedent, in the sense explained, it follows only that God knows what his will then wills; but not what it will be willing in the following sign in which. Because for this a multiplicity of signs in which according to reason with respect to the divine intellect would be required, and consequently that that volition should have the character of a future thing. For the other point, however, it is enough that in that prior in which it have being present, and that that volition which God in fact had be understood as present; although it is posterior in posteriority precisely from which to the comprehensive knowledge of God. And for the proof of that same consequence it is clear from what has been said that the antecedent, and the first consequence, are to be granted, but the second to be denied; since it is not true that God in the following sign in which, still according to reason, is going to will anything, but only that in that same sign in which he wills in the present. And so from the fact that that knowledge is comprehensive, and most perfect, it does not follow that through it what the divine will will be willing in the following sign is to be known. Wherefore that is false which is hinted at in the proof of the antecedent of this argument, namely, that the divine Word proceeds from the knowledge of God, such as in some sign in which, still according to reason, is presupposed with respect to free decrees, as was touched upon above in this difficulty.

By this too it is sufficiently clear as regards the confirmation. Because we do not deny that the comprehensive knowledge of God extends to his free acts, but that it extends to them as future: from the fact that they do not have the character of future things. Whether, however, the aforesaid comprehensive knowledge ought to attain to them precisely because it is comprehensive, and because this is required by the character of the divine comprehension, or for some other reason? That is another question, which little serves the solution of this confirmation.

73 To the second, the antecedent is to be denied, and for the proof, as regards the first part, it is clear from what has been said that free decrees do not follow upon the knowledge of God by a succession of posteriority in which, still according to reason, but only by the posteriority from which already explained. And so in that sign in which they are understood to be present in themselves together with the divine knowledge. By this too, as regards the second part of the proof of that same antecedent, it is clear that those decrees are to be denied, as being to have existence in the following sign, and as not having it with respect to the preceding sign: because there is no priority in which, still according to reason with a foundation in the thing, between things which are measured by eternity, as by their own proper measure.

74 To the third, the suppositum of the antecedent is to be denied, if it is understood of a sign of reason in which, so that God in the aforesaid sign precedes his decrees. If, however, it is understood of a sign of reason from which, then the suppositum of the antecedent being granted, the antecedent itself is to be denied, if the discourse is (as it is in the present difficulty) about the truth determined in that sign, in relation to the divine intellect (for we shall speak more fully, in dub. 6. of this disputation, of its truth in relation to our intellect, or of the objective truth in any way). The reason, however, for which the aforesaid antecedent is denied, is clear from what has been said. Because when the verb he will decree, or he will not decree, signifies something about the future, and the act of the divine will, by which God is determined, is present to him in every sign in which, still according to reason, from the fact that it is measured by eternity, and consequently with respect to the divine intellect is never future, it must be that with respect to that same intellect that proposition about the future, God will decree, is always false; and that its contradictory, namely, God will not decree in the future, is always true. As for the proof of the antecedent, it is clear from what has been said.

As regards the confirmation, let the antecedent pass, and let the consequence be denied. And for the proof, let the antecedent also pass for the present, but the consequence must be denied. Because in it that other proposition is supposed, namely, God will not have in the following sign the decree of creating the world, to be false; whereas it is true, if it is understood (as it ought to be understood) in relation to the divine intellect, of which we are speaking: since, as we said a little while ago, the free act of God, both according to the thing and according to its own character, or according to its own mode of being conceived, is always present to him, and never future. And so in relation to the aforesaid intellect it will always be falsely enunciated that the decree of creating the world will be in the following sign: and it will always be truly enunciated that it will not be in the following sign, because it always is, and in whatever sign it is.