Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

26 Once it has been explained whether there is divine knowledge about future contingents, or free absolutes, the mind is immediately prompted to inquire how God has knowledge of them. And so, in order to explain this exactly, both this difficulty and the following difficulties of this disputation are raised.

In this difficulty, however, we suppose something as certain, and we call something else into controversy. For we suppose, with St Thomas, in the present place and in the following question, as also De Veritate, q. 2, a. 7, ad 6, and q. 3, a. 6, and 1 Contra Gentes, c. 66 — whom Capreolus follows in 1 Dist. 38, q. 1, a. 2, on the arguments of Scotus, Cajetan, Zumel, Báñez, Nazarius, González, Ripa, and commonly his disciples, and many others — that God certainly knows absolute future contingents through his own essence and the divine ideas. Because the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, and the divine ideas, insofar as they are exemplars of all creatures, are infinitely perfect as regards representing; and therefore each of these can, within its own genus, at least if it is determined by the decree of the divine will, represent any creature whatever, whether existing or future. And thus they will be able to serve the divine intellect, which operates after the manner of an artisan, with a view to the aforesaid knowledge. We call into controversy, however, whether the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, and the divine ideas, have this function antecedent to the decree by which God determines that the aforesaid future contingents exist in some difference of time; and consequently whether divine knowledge certainly knows them through its own essence and the divine ideas antecedent to such a decree.

§ I. The affirmative opinion.

27 The affirmative part is held by Aegidius Romanus in 1 Dist. 38, q. 1, a. 2, in the body near the end, and q. 2, a. 1; by Henry of Corduba, reported in book 1 of the Questions, q. 55, dub. 8, who favours it; and St Bonaventure favours it in 1 Dist. 39, a. 2, q. 3. For this opinion Suarez, Molina, and others could be cited; but their positions, because they involve special difficulties, we shall propose in the following difficulties.

It is proved first, by the testimony of St Thomas in this article, where he says that God certainly knows future contingents, not only by that reason whereby he has present to himself the reasons of things, namely the ideas, but also because they themselves are present: therefore he holds that God knows the aforesaid future contingents through his own essence and the divine ideas; and not in just any way, but antecedent to his free decree. The consequence is evident. Because beyond that mode of knowing future contingents, or free things, insofar as they themselves are present, and consequently by reason of the decree, by which they coexist with God in eternity, he admits another, namely insofar as he has present to himself the reasons of all things, and consequently not by reason of the decree, or dependently upon it, but antecedent to it.

28 Second. Because the divine essence and the ideas, antecedent to the free decree, are infinite in representing; therefore in that prior state they will represent future contingents, and consequently antecedent to the decree God will be able certainly to know them through his own essence and the ideas. This last consequence is evident from the former. Because whatever is represented to God's intellect through the divine essence and the ideas antecedent to the divine decree can, in that prior state, be certainly known by him, as is clear inductively. The first consequence, however, follows from the antecedent. Both because otherwise the essence and the divine ideas would not be infinite in representing: for they would not extend to future contingents. And also because otherwise their representation would vary: since after the decree they would represent something which before they did not represent. The antecedent, however, is sufficiently clear. Because when the divine essence and the divine ideas are infinitely perfect within their own line, the former indeed as regards the character of an intelligible species, the latter as regards that of ideas, it follows that they must be infinite as regards representing: since being representable, although in a different way, belongs to the line of each of the two.

It is confirmed. Because no perfection can accrue to the essence or the divine ideas from the decree: therefore, since it is certain that after the decree they represent future contingents, it must also be certain that before it they represent those things and their truth; and consequently that God can have knowledge of the aforesaid future things through his own essence and the ideas in that prior state. The antecedent seems certain. For just as the free decree of itself brings no perfection — in that that perfection would be free, and consequently some perfection, which is in God and is God, could fail to be in him, and he would not be God — so neither can any perfection accrue from the decree to the essence and the divine ideas. The first consequence, however, follows from the antecedent. Because representing objects belongs to the perfection of the divine essence insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, and of the ideas: therefore, if no perfection can accrue to it by reason of the decree, it follows that if after the decree it represents those things, they were also represented by it before the decree.

29 Third. Because the divine ideas, insofar as they most formally have the character of ideas and of exemplars, are nothing except with respect to future creatures: therefore in them — yet with the divine essence, which has the character of an intelligible species, as intermediary — God will be able, antecedent to the decree, to know absolute future contingents. The antecedent seems to be expressed by divine Thomas in the following question, a. 3, in the body and on the second. The consequence, however, is evident. Because an idea is a necessary form, and not a free one. Both because it is one of the divine attributes: for the divine attributes are perfections that necessarily belong to God. And also because it is not just any attribute, but an intellectual one, and pertaining to the intellect: for the intellectual attributes are of themselves prior to the attributes of the will, and much more so to the decrees proceeding from that same will: and consequently they do not depend upon them; nor do they have free being from them; therefore, if the idea, insofar as it is such, is with respect to future things, it will represent them after the manner of a natural form, and naturally before the divine decree: and consequently God will be able, in them, with the divine essence as intermediary, as an intelligible species, to know all future things before such a decree.

30 Fourth. Because if, impossibly, God were not freely willing future contingents, but they were by chance with respect to him, either because they would be produced by a secondary cause alone independently of the first, or because they would be made by another God, nevertheless he would have knowledge of them: therefore it is a sign that the knowledge God has of future contingents does not depend upon his free decree, but that he is able to know them in his essence and the divine ideas antecedent to such a decree. The consequence seems certain. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because, the aforesaid impossibility being granted, the divine knowledge would still be infinite, and so could not fail to terminate upon those future contingents: for they would have a truth that can be known, and consequently one attainable by a knowledge of infinite perfection, such as the knowledge of God would then be.

§ II. According to the mind of St Thomas the knot of the difficulty is untied.

31 It must nevertheless be said that God cannot know absolute future contingents through his essence (insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species) and the ideas antecedent to the free and efficacious decree of his will, existing in it. Thus St Thomas, De Veritate, q. 3, a. 6, in these words: An idea can be of that which neither is, nor will be, nor was; yet not in the same way as that of those things which are, or were, or will be: because for those things which are, or were, or will be to be produced, [the idea] is determined from the purpose of the divine will; but not for those things which are not, nor will be, nor were. And thus they have, in a certain sense, undetermined ideas. Where, as you see, according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor, the divine ideas do not represent determinately future contingents unless they are determined by the purpose, or efficacious decree, of the divine will; and consequently they cannot be certainly and determinately known by divine knowledge before such a purpose: and since the divine essence, insofar as with respect to creatures it has the character of an intelligible species, is co-measured with itself, as it is the object, or the idea, as the holy Doctor often teaches, it follows that, according to his mind, that same essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, does not represent determinately the aforesaid future things before the aforesaid purpose and efficacious decree of the divine will.

The holy Doctor teaches the same thing also in 1 Dist. 39, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1. Where, speaking of the knowledge of future things, he says: Just as the act of knowing itself is subject to the freedom of the will, so also the idea, according as the act of divine knowledge terminates upon it, is like the knowledge of the artisan with respect to the form of the thing he devises; and therefore there is the same reasoning about the idea and about the act of knowing. For just as it cannot be maintained that the act of knowing is in a thing and that it was not [there], so it cannot be asserted that the idea is in a thing and was not [there]; yet with respect to both, freedom of the will can be asserted. Where, as you see, both the knowledge of future things and their ideas are said to be subject to the freedom of the divine will, and consequently neither will knowledge terminate upon the aforesaid future things, nor will the ideas in any way certainly represent what is known, except with subjection and (so to speak) dependently upon the free and efficacious decree of divine liberty.

And at length he indicates this very point in 1 Dist. 36, q. 2, a. 13, and often elsewhere.

Hence the holy Doctor is followed by Capreolus in 1 Dist. 38, q. 1, a. 2; by Cajetan in the present place, § ad secundum autem, et reliqua negatur antecedens, quod est radix omnium [on the second, then, the antecedent is denied in the remainder, which is the root of all], and q. 15, a. 3; by Zumel, tom. 3 of the Opuscula, fol. 24, § ex dictis colligo [from what has been said I gather]; by Báñez on this article; by Gaspar Ramus, relectio 2 on the infallibility of the divine cognition about absolute future things, assertio 4, fol. 39; by Alvarez, De auxiliis divinae gratiae, disp. 14, and in his replies to the objections against the agreement of free choice with divine foreknowledge, ch. 1, 2 and 5; by Henriquez, Ult. lib. de fine hominis, ch. 4, num. 2; by Ledesma, lib. 2, De auxiliis, disp. 2, in the second part of it; by Guillielmus Estius in 1, disp. 41, § 7; by Leonardus Coquaeus, Doctor of Paris, at the place cited below in disp. 10, dub. 8, num. 128, by reference; by Nazarius, controversia 1 and 2; by González, disp. 43, 44 and 45; by Ripa in this article; by Corneius in the present place, disp. 2, dub. 1; and commonly by the disciples of St Thomas and very many others, whom we shall refer to below in disp. 10, from num. 126 to 131.

32 The fundamental reason of this assertion has been touched on by St Thomas in the places cited, and can be reduced to this form. Since the essence of God, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, or of an idea, and the reasons of things, does not represent creatures, or future contingents, as they actually exist and are in act in some difference of time, unless they are determined by the purpose of the divine will: therefore God will not be able to know through them future contingents antecedent to the aforesaid decree. The consequence is evident. Because nothing can be known by God through them unless it be represented by them: therefore, if in that prior state, before they are determined by the efficacious decree of the divine will, they do not represent future contingents, as existing in act in some difference of time, neither will divine knowledge be able to terminate upon the aforesaid future things in that prior state. The antecedent, however, is likewise evident. Because the divine essence, insofar as it has the character of an intelligible species, or insofar as it is the idea and the reasons of things, before it is determined by the purpose of the divine will, represents absolutely, naturally and necessarily: since whatever is in God before every free determination of his will is absolutely necessary, so that it can neither now nor ever have been otherwise: therefore that representation can be only with respect to necessary objects, which can neither now nor ever have been otherwise: and consequently future contingents will not be able to be represented through it, which do not have necessary being, but can be otherwise.

33 It is confirmed by a reason drawn from St Thomas in the places cited, disp. 7, num. 96 and following, and disp. 8, num. 12, of this treatise. Because future contingents, antecedent to the decree of the divine will, do not have the character of future things: therefore antecedent to that decree they cannot be represented as future through the essence or the divine ideas: and consequently neither can they be certainly attained, as such, by divine knowledge. This last consequence is evident from the former. Hence St Augustine, book 1 of De Anima et eius origine, c. 12: Foreknowledge itself (he says) is utterly emptied, if that which is foreknown is not to be: for how is that said to be foreknown as future which is not future? Which is also taught in the book De praedestinatione Sanctorum, c. 4. The first consequence, however, follows from the antecedent. For as antecedent to the divine power nothing can be represented as possible, because all possible things have such being from it, as from the first source and root of their possibility, so too, because all future contingents have the character of future things from the decree of the divine will, as from the first source and root of their futurition (though this was explained elsewhere above), they therefore cannot be represented as future antecedent to the aforesaid decree.

The antecedent, however, is proved. Because no created thing has, from its own nature and from its own termini, to exist in some difference of time. For to exist in this way is proper to the divine essence alone: of which it is the very concept that it is to exist. Nor, then, can any created thing transfer itself into the state of futurition; for as long as it is under the status of possibility, nothing is in itself: and so it cannot exercise any causality towards itself. And finally, although it may have some other secondary cause of its futurition, yet in order to be future in the thing itself, and completely, that effect must be reduced to the first cause: therefore, since the first cause is not understood to cause before the act of its will — since God is a free agent ad extra — it follows that no future thing, and consequently no future contingent, has its futurition before the decree of the divine will.

We have said that the free decree of God is the first root of the futurition of creatures — though this was explained elsewhere, in order that these matters might cohere better with what was asserted above in disp. 5 of this treatise, num. 43 and following. For although, as we showed there, the immediately executive power is the practical knowledge of God, yet this knowledge, insofar as it actually influences with a view to the future production of some creature, presupposes a free intention and application of the divine will towards that future thing, on account of which the knowledge of God is applied to the aforesaid production of it; wherefore the futurition of any created effect is attributed to the free decree of the divine will, as to the first source and principle, not indeed immediately executive, but initiatory of that futurition.

§ III. A multiplicity of answers to the opponents, and their refutation.

34 In a number of ways one could answer this reasoning from the opinion of the opponents. First, indeed, for the purpose that future things be freely represented as present on the part of the object through the essence of God and the ideas, the objective truth which they have antecedent to the decree is sufficient. But we shall say more about this answer below in this disputation, dub. 6.

Secondly, one could proceed in another way, both against the reason and against its confirmation. Against the reason, indeed, [one could] establish that before the purpose of the divine will future contingents cannot be represented, as future, through the divine essence or the ideas: yet not before the aforesaid purpose, as formally existing in God. Because it is enough that such a purpose, or decree, should have existence in the following instant, for this, that dependently upon it, and by an order towards it, the aforesaid future things may be freely represented: so that if in the following instant God has the decree of creating the world, or that some free action be exercised by the created will, then in the preceding instant the world is represented, through the divine essence and its ideas, as future, or that free action as future. If, however, in the same instant God has decreed not to create the world, or that that free action is not to be exercised, then in the preceding instant these two are represented as future.

35 Against the confirmation, however, one could also proceed from the aforesaid doctrine: that it is enough, for this, that absolute and created future contingents have future being antecedent to the decree of the divine will as exercised, and consequently that they can be represented as future, that in that prior state the decree by which in the following instant God would determine their futurition should be future. For from the very fact that the decree of creating the world is future in that instant, the world cannot fail to have something more than the character of the possible: since the possibility of that decree was already enough for this; and since that which is immediately added to possibility with a view to being can be nothing else than futurition, it follows that the world is said to be future in that instant dependently upon the futurition of the aforesaid decree.

But although this answer will remain sufficiently refuted by what we shall set out in the following difficulty, num. 48 and following, showing that the free decree of God can neither have the character of the future, nor, in that instant, before God is understood to determine, that is, before the first act of his free will, be certainly represented or known through the divine essence; nevertheless it can be refuted for the present briefly, though effectively. Because a future contingent has the character of the future from the divine will, as from the efficient cause of that futurition. Both because this follows from what has been said. And also because a thing has from that same efficient cause both that it be future and that it exist in act and in exercise: and nothing created exists unless through the decree of the divine will: therefore it is repugnant for a future contingent in that prior state to have the character of the future while its efficient cause, namely the divine decree, does not exist in the same instant: and consequently, before such a decree exists in God, no creature will be able to be represented through the divine essence or the ideas as future.

This last consequence is evident from what has been said, and from the former. The first, however, is also evident. Both because the efficient cause is here distinguished from the formal or material cause, since these do not demand of the force of their own line, indispensably and necessarily, that they exist, in order to cause; whereas the efficient cause, as the Complutensians explain in Phys., disp. 3, num. 62, does: and hence it is commonly said by the philosophers that an efficient cause does not cause except according as it is in act. And also because for this reason a present effect cannot be produced by the Antichrist, or by any other created cause that is future immediately: because the Antichrist, or that future thing, does not exist.

36 It is confirmed and explained. Because from the fact that possible creatures have the character of possible things from the divine omnipotence, as from a cause, or reason a priori of their possibility, it follows that they cannot be possible until omnipotence has its actual essence: and so in that prior state, before omnipotence is understood, possible creatures are not yet understood in the character of possible things: therefore, from the very fact that the free decree of God is the first source and origin of the futurition of creatures, they will not be able to have their futurition before the aforesaid decree has its actual being: otherwise the effect in act, that is, that futurition, would not presuppose its cause in act.

From which, too, a certain evasion remains refuted, advanced by some of the junior men, namely this: that from the force of the futurition of the decree, which is to be posited in the following instant, it follows at least that that which, by means of it, is to have existence should at least have the futurition of its futurition in the preceding instant, in which such a decree is said to be future. For as the futurition of the effect proceeds from the decree, as from an existing thing, so the futurition of that futurition proceeds from the same decree, as from a future thing: for, as was said in the preceding answer, from the fact that the decree of the production of the world is not only possible, but future, the world does not have precisely being possible, but moreover something else, and a greater approach to existence, than those things which are purely possible: and since it does not have existence, or futurition, it cannot have anything else by which it might approach existence more closely, except only that of its own futurition, as will be evident to one who considers it. This, however, will be enough for this, that that thing be represented through the divine essence and the ideas as destined to have futurition, which is manifest of itself; nay, as future: because in that futurition of its futurition it has a sufficient determination to this end, that it be known to be future immediately.

From what has been said, therefore, this evasion remains sufficiently refuted. Because from those premises it is sufficiently established that this futurition of a futurition is impossible; for this futurition of a futurition must be reduced to God, as to the first efficient cause of it, and consequently to the divine decree: therefore, since an efficient cause cannot cause until it exists, and from the very fact that the aforesaid decree exists the thing defined by it already determinately has being future, it follows that the aforesaid decree can never cause the futurition of a futurition, but the being future of future things; and consequently that the possible must be immediately joined with its futurition or non-futurition: and consequently that no thing has the futurition of its own futurition.

37 Nor does it make any difference, if, to nearly everything that we have said so far, one answers that a thing's being future is not some effect existing in the nature of things: and so it is not necessary that an efficient cause be assigned to it, which is supposed to exist with a view to the aforesaid effect.

It makes no difference, then, in this respect: for although we granted that the aforesaid effect does not require an efficient cause, it nevertheless cannot fail to require a formal cause extrinsic to the future thing, and intrinsic to another, which is presupposed to exist. And the reason is plain. For although the being future is not some being real intrinsic belonging intrinsically to the future thing, according as it has being in itself, yet it is a true and real extrinsic denomination coming to it from the free act of the divine will, as was proved in num. 33: therefore it is repugnant for the aforesaid extrinsic denomination to belong truly and really to it, unless the divine decree about its futurition, by which it is truly and really denominated future, should actually exist. Just as it would be repugnant for a thing seen to be denominated extrinsically, truly and really in the same way, unless from a vision which truly, really, and actually existed.

38 Secondly, it is false that a thing's being future does not depend upon the decree of God, as upon the first efficient cause of its futurition. Of this a twofold account can be given. The first, indeed. Because every truth which is not such by essence, and hence is not God himself, must be such by participation: and consequently, if there be a truth determined to a free thing, and one which could have been otherwise, it must be such by means of the free divine will: on account of which effects are determined indifferently to being and not being, and have a determined truth, from the fact that the will itself is the first indifferent, and the first thing that determines itself.

The second, however. Because as the possibility of creatures, insofar as it is an effect external to the divine power, and a real denomination from it, as proceeding from an extrinsic formal cause, must arise from that same omnipotence, as from the first efficient cause of that possibility, so being future, which is an effect external [to it], and an extrinsic denomination, proceeding from the free decree of God, as from an extrinsic formal cause, must proceed from that same decree, as from the first efficient [cause].

39 This second reason, too, can be explained: from the fact that as when a form, which by the mode of an extrinsic formal cause, in the manner explained above, gives to some effect its existence dependently upon another, as upon an efficient cause, then that which is the efficient cause of the form, as of that which denominates, also causes efficiently the effect that arises from the extrinsic denomination, and from that which is denominated (as is clear in the extrinsic denominations visible and seen. For from the fact that the denomination of being visible proceeds from the visive power, as from an extrinsic formal cause, hence the efficient cause of the visive power is also the efficient cause of the aforesaid denomination and of the effect. And likewise, because to be seen is a denomination and an effect external to the vision, therefore the sight that causes the vision efficiently is also the cause of the aforesaid effect just mentioned), so a form which independently of another, as of an efficient cause, gives to some extrinsic effect its existence by the mode of an extrinsic formal cause, is also the first efficient cause of that effect: because to every effect that has a true extrinsic formal cause there must correspond an efficient cause of it; which in the aforesaid event can be none other than that same extrinsic formal cause: for indeed, as we suppose, it gives its effect independently of another, as of an efficient cause. Hence God, precisely insofar as he is omnipotent, without any other thing being needed for this on his part, is the true efficient cause of the possibility of creatures, which coalesces from the non-repugnance on their part and from that real extrinsic denomination which proceeds from that same omnipotence: because the being possible of creatures demands no other causality, action, or passion. And likewise, precisely from this, that he freely wills the futurition of some thing, by reason of that decree he is the true efficient cause of the aforesaid futurition, which arises from that extrinsic denomination and from the presupposed possibility. Nor does it in the least stand in the way of this efficient causality that the form which denominates extrinsically be uncreated: for God can indeed be the efficient cause of the total effect, which coalesces from the form and from the matter underlying it, without being the cause of the form, or of that extrinsic denomination, insofar as this is what is meant by the formal [cause]. Just as the eternal Father can be the productive principle of the divine Word without producing the divine essence, which is the formal terminus of that production. And likewise God is the efficient cause of Christ the Lord, who coalesces from the personality of the Word and from humanity, and yet he cannot be the cause of the personality.

§ IV. He meets the arguments of the first opinion head-on.

40 To the first it is to be answered that the sense of that testimony of St Thomas is only this, that God does not know future contingents only as they are represented in the divine ideas, insofar as these are the reasons of things — that is, as they represent those things according to their essence, or according to their possible being — but also because his intuition is carried above them, as they are in act and exist in exercise

in the now of eternity. That this is indeed the mind of St Thomas is clear from what follows. Because it is familiar with him that by the ideas, insofar as they are the reasons of things, he understands those very ideas, insofar as they precisely influence towards the knowledge of the essences of possible things.

41 To the second, the antecedent being granted, both consequences must be denied. And with respect to the first proof of the former, upon which the latter rests, the sequence must be denied. Because for the infinity of that representation it is enough that they represent all contingents: for as antecedent to the decree of God about their futurition they do not have future being, so neither can they be represented as future antecedent to it. With respect to the second proof, however, the sequence must be denied, if we are to speak properly and in strictness. Because variation of representation, taken properly, denotes that there was previously a representation of something, and that afterwards it ceased to be: which, however, cannot be found in the divine essence or in the ideas measured by eternity. Nevertheless, granting this much, that the divine essence, when the decree is added, represents a future contingent which before it did not represent: not indeed from a defect of its own, but from a defect of the object, which, for that prior state, just as it did not have the character of the future, so neither had it the being representable as future: and so, from the very fact that in the following instant it has the character of the future, it will be represented as such by the divine essence and the ideas without any variation of theirs.

With respect to the confirmation, the antecedent being granted, the consequence must be denied; and with respect to the proof, the antecedent must also be granted and the consequence denied. Because the fact that the divine essence and the ideas do not represent future contingents before the decree does not arise from a defect of perfection, but from a defect of the object, which requires, for its own futurition and consequently for this, that it be represented, that the aforesaid decree precede: and consequently the same thing arises from a defect of determination, of that perfection which pre-existed in the divine essence. For that perfection was indifferent as to representing the futurition or non-futurition of a contingent thing, according to the prescription of the divine will. And so, from the very fact that the aforesaid decree of futurition is added, the futurition is represented: just as if, in its place, a decree of non-futurition were added, then the non-futurition of the same thing would be represented. How, however, the free decree of God does or does not signify a perfection, and how, from the fact that some decree is present or absent in God, no intrinsic variation is inferred in God himself, will be explained more fully in the treatise on the Will of God, a. 3.

42 To the third it is to be answered that the ideas can be taken, besides other acceptions, in a twofold way: that is, either in the first act, that is, insofar as they are precisely practical principles within their own line, with a power of concurring towards the production of creatures, or in the second act, that is, insofar as they actually influence together with the decree and the practical knowledge of God, with a view to the actual production of those same creatures: and though they are considered in the second way, they are then only with respect to future things. Now on this second consideration they presuppose the efficacious decree of the divine will, although on the first consideration they do not presuppose it: but they represent things only as possible. Hence, in the form of the argument, the antecedent concerning the ideas taken in the second act being granted, the consequence must be denied. And with respect to the proof, the antecedent concerning those same ideas in the second act must be denied. Because although the idea is an intellectual attribute, yet insofar as in the second act it influences together with knowledge and will, with a view to the actual production of creatures, it can, no less than knowledge itself, quasi depend upon the actual decree, insofar as it influences only as determined by the divine decree: from the fact that God, as he is an agent ad extra, must operate freely.

43 To the fourth it is to be said that, that impossibility being granted, God would not know such a future thing: because in that event it would not be contained in his essence, as in a cause. And so he would not be able to know it in that, as in a known mean: and consequently he could not in any way attain it, lest, if he knew it otherwise, he should receive his knowledge from things, that is, from the future thing itself. Which, indeed, is repugnant to the perfection of the divine intellect, as is sufficiently clear from what has been said above.