Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Because the question an est? must precede other questions; therefore, in the first place, after the explanation of the nature and multiplicity of the future contingent, in which the terms desired for the understanding of this and the following doubts were defined, we ask an est? concerning God’s knowledge with regard to absolutely future contingents.

§ I. The denying position.

5 Those who follow the denying position are the Commentator, 12. Metaphysic. text. 62., as D. Thom. reports in 1. dist. 48. They attribute this error to Aristotle, Clement of Alexandria, lib. 1. Stromatum, and Gregory of Nyssa, lib. 8. of his Philosophia, although D. Thom., de Veritate, quaestione 2. art. 2, 3, et 4, defends him from the aforesaid error. Cicero also taught it in part in libro 2. de Divinitate, and libro 2. de Natura Deorum. D. August. reports it in libro 5. de Civitate Dei, cap. 9, when he says that, although God knows future contingents which proceed from a natural cause, He nevertheless does not know those which occur from free causes. The Egyptians finally held this same error, concerning whom it is said in Psalmo 93: The Lord will not see, neither will God understand Jacob, since, namely, the things done freely by men have been made free.

It is proved first, because otherwise either God’s knowledge would be fallible, or that future contingent which is said to be known by God would be necessary, or not contingent—which, as is clear, is altogether false. This consequence is sufficiently evident. For could that future contingent occur otherwise, or could it not occur otherwise? If the first, therefore God’s knowledge can be deceived: for what is known through it can be otherwise than it is known to be. If the second, therefore the aforesaid future event will be altogether necessary: for it cannot not be future.

6 It is confirmed first. For the very fact that God’s knowledge is not fallible with respect to any object means that it cannot be otherwise than it is, or cannot be terminated toward an object otherwise than it is terminated: therefore its object cannot be otherwise either, because the proportion that must obtain between knowledge and object demands this: therefore the object of the aforesaid knowledge cannot be a future contingent, whose very nature is that it can occur otherwise.

It is confirmed second. For if God knows future contingents, for example Peter’s bitter weeping, it will not be in Peter’s power to remove this antecedent, namely: That God foresaw that weeping. First, because this seems to follow from itself. Then also, because that knowledge is eternal; but what is eternal is invariable and immutable: therefore neither will it be in Peter’s power to remove the consequent, namely: That he will in fact weep; but he will necessarily weep, because in a valid consequence whoever cannot remove the antecedent cannot remove the consequent; otherwise someone could cause that, in a legitimate consequence, the antecedent should be true and false together; and thus, if Peter cannot remove the consequent without God’s having foreseen his weeping, he cannot remove it without such a weeping following.

7 Second, this same point is proved principally, by proceeding along the same route. In every true conditional, if the antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent must also be necessary in the same way, because the consequent always follows the antecedent, and what follows the necessary is never anything but necessary; just as what is false never follows what is true, as is proved in Posteriorum textu 17. But the antecedent of this conditional, Socrates will run, if it is foreknown by God, is absolutely necessary: therefore the consequent too, namely, that Socrates will run; and consequently, since the contingency of future contingents cannot stand with God’s knowledge, their contingency cannot stand. The minor, in which the difficulty lies, is proved: because everything past is necessary; and therefore it cannot not be past.

It is confirmed first. For according to the Philosopher in lib. Priorum, from the major concerning necessity and the minor concerning existence, the conclusion concerning necessity follows: therefore, if future contingents are known by God, then from this wholly necessary major, namely: Everything known by God must be true, and from this minor, namely: This future contingent, namely, Peter will run, is known by God, this necessary conclusion will follow, namely: Therefore it will be necessary that it be true that Peter will run; and consequently it will be necessary that he actually run; otherwise it will not be necessarily true that he runs.

It is confirmed second. For God’s knowing is His very being; but He cannot not be: therefore He cannot not know what He knows: therefore He will be unable to know future contingents. The consequence is evident, because these things are of such a nature that, just as they can be and not be, so one who knows them can know and not know them.

8 Third, knowledge must be of necessities, which cannot be otherwise, as is clear from 1. Posteriorum cap. 2. But future contingents, precisely because they are not necessities, cannot fall under the object of supremely necessary knowledge, such as divine knowledge.

It is confirmed. A contingent thing cannot be known through a necessary means, because if the means is necessary, the conclusion will also be necessary; but God knows everything that He knows through a necessary means, namely through His essence: therefore He cannot know anything contingent.

9 Finally. For if God certainly knew future contingents, all human providence, care, and solicitude, which each person ought to have concerning his own affairs, and especially his spiritual salvation, would be removed, contrary to 2 Peter 1: Save yourselves by good works, making your calling sure. The consequence is proved. For each person could prudently say within himself: Does God know that I will consent to His calling and experience sorrow for my sins? Or does He know that I will not consent? If the second, I will never consent, however much I strive to do so on my part; but if He knows the first, however I act, I will consent, even if I exercise no diligence, because my consent is future; since it is foreknown by God: therefore I may be idle and devoted to pleasure, and unconcerned about my conversion.

§ I. The true and Catholic position.

10 Nevertheless, it must be said that God certainly knows absolutely future contingents. Thus it is found throughout Sacred Scripture, Psal. 138: You have understood my thoughts from afar: You have examined my path and my cord: You have foreseen all my ways. Dan. 13: Lord, who knows all things before they are. Eccles. 23: To Lord God, all things are known before they were created. Therefore in Isa. 41 it is specially attributed to God, as a sign of His divinity, that He knows future things; whence it is said: Announce the things that are to come, and we shall know that you are gods. For this reason the Lord Christ says in John 14: Now I have told you beforehand, so that when it has happened, you may believe: namely, that I am God, to whom alone it belongs to foreknow future things. These testimonies are understood as concerning certain and infallible knowledge by the Fathers and all theologians.

And then all the prophecies contained in Sacred Scripture confirm this same point. For the entire certitude of prophecy rests on this knowledge and certain cognition of God: since the prophecies are therefore believed and revealed by the Prophets as infallible, because they are revealed as things said by God as certainly future; yet God could not thus foretell them unless He knew them in the same way. Hence Tertullian most excellently said, in lib. 2. contra Marcionem, that God’s foreknowledge has as many witnesses as there are prophecies. Finally, the Fathers themselves teach this, as we have just indicated. Augustine, lib. 5. de Civit. Dei, cap. 9, where he attacks Cicero, who denied to God knowledge of future contingents proceeding from created will, says: Because He made men free, He made them sacrilegious. And speaking there against the same Cicero, he says: He who is not foreknowing all future things is certainly not God. The same is taught, lib. 4. de Trinit. cap. 8, and likewise by Fulgentius, de fide ad Petrum, cap. 31 et 32; Jerome, Isaiae 41 and Ezechiel 2; Basil, Isaiae 3; Dionysius, de divin. nominibus, cap. 9; Cyril, lib. 9. cap. 10. in Joan.; Nyssaenus, lib. 8. cap. 4; Anselm, lib. de praescientia et praedestinatione liberi arbit. c. 1; and D. Thom. in this article, and below, quaest. 86. art. 3 ac 4, in 1. dist. 38. art. 5, and in the same place ad Anibaldum, 1. cont. Gent. cap. 67, de Verit. quaest. 2. art. 12, and quodlib. 12. quaest. 3. The philosophers also accepted the same truth, as did Seneca, lib. de providentia, and Plutarch, lib. de sapientia Aegyptiorum, and almost all nations; for this reason they have always held divine oracles concerning future things in the highest veneration.

11 The prior and fundamental reason for this truth, however, was given by D. Thom. in the place cited from 1. contra Gent., and from the passages cited in locis disput. 5. num. 43 et 49 of this treatise; and it can be reduced to the following form. For God’s knowledge, by connoting His will, or His practical knowledge, is the cause of the future existence of all future contingents, as is clear from the statements made there, and will be shown more fully below: therefore the aforesaid future contingents cannot fail to be certainly known through it. The consequence is evident. For as heat cannot produce heat unless by heating, nor can water cause cold unless by making cold, so knowledge cannot be the cause of the future existence of contingents unless by knowing them, and consequently unless by knowing them with certainty.

12 The second reason, which the same Saintly Doctor indicates, can be proposed in this form. For it is certain that God knows future contingents when they have existence in themselves in their determinate time: therefore it is also certain that He has known them from eternity. The consequence is evident. For otherwise God’s knowledge would be changeable, so that it could suffer addition or diminution in time, and consequently would not be infinitely simple or a most pure act. The antecedent, however, is proved. First, because in us it belongs to perfection to know contingents when they are: therefore this must not be denied to God. Then also, because if God did not know contingents even when they are, He could not be judge of the actions of the free will created, and consequently could not give them their due reward or punishment. Finally, because future contingents, so long as they exist in themselves, have a certain and determinate entity, according to that saying: Everything which is, when it is, must be; therefore they likewise have a determinate and necessary knowability: and thus they can then be certainly known by God.

§ III. The arguments initially proposed are dissolved.

13 To the first, the consequence must be denied. And in answer to the proof, the first part of that dilemma must be chosen; but the consequence drawn from it must be denied. For when God knows that future contingent which will in fact occur in the way in which it is future, and that mode consists in the fact that, although in its determinate time it will afterward have existence in fact, it nevertheless may not have it; it follows that because the aforesaid future thing could not exist, divine knowledge is not deceived, nor can it be deceived; but rather it would be deceived, or fallible, if such a future thing could not not be, or if in fact it were not given.

14 It makes no difference if one objects that, if Peter’s future conversion, for example, and his bitter weeping were not given in fact, divine knowledge, which foreknew the aforesaid conversion, would be deceived: therefore, if that weeping could not be, the aforesaid knowledge could certainly be deceived. The consequence is evident. Because what an act does in actuality, a power does in potency: therefore, if through the actual omission of that weeping God’s knowledge would be deceived, it follows that if such an omission can occur, divine knowledge can also be deceived.

For it is answered by conceding the antecedent and denying the consequent. Because, as we shall explain more fully in tract. de Voluntate Dei, disp. 10. num. 93 et 94, the argument is virtually made from one [proposition] in the composite sense, and from another in the divided sense, to another in the composite sense: a defective mode of arguing. For there the following syllogism is formed by virtue of this: If Peter’s conversion, for example, and his bitter weeping were not given in fact, divine knowledge would be deceived; but such weeping can fail to occur; therefore divine knowledge can be deceived. Since among these three propositions the first yields the composite sense, the second the divided sense, and the third again the composite sense, as will be explained in the place cited; it follows that virtually the argument is made from one in the composite sense, and another in the divided sense, to another in the composite sense.

And in answer to the proof to the contrary, the antecedent is conceded if it is understood—and as it truly ought to be understood—of the act and its corresponding potency, while the consequent is denied: because the consequent does not posit the proper potency corresponding to that act. For the act conditionally posited there is not the weeping conjoined with God’s knowledge of the future existence of the weeping, and its existence for the future time, and therefore conjoined with the future existence of that same weeping and its existence at the foretold time; whereas the potency admitted there is not a potency to posit a non-weeping conjoined with all these things, but a potency to posit non-weeping itself according to its own nature: and consequently the proper potency corresponding to the aforesaid act is not posited.

15 This solution will remain the more clearly explained if it is noted that, once the free future existence of that weeping and the adequate determination of all causes with respect to it are supposed, God foreknew that there would be such a weeping, not in any manner whatever, but in a free manner; and consequently that it would be in the way it was for the time for which it was, so that its omission could also have occurred, although in fact it would not occur. Then also, once the entire future existence of the weeping on the part of the determination of all causes, and consequently its being in fact at the due time, is supposed, its omission cannot be composed, or posited simultaneously. And thus, if, after the further supposition that Peter freely weeps—and consequently that he can refrain from weeping—it were granted either that it is impossible for him to weep, or that he cannot refrain from weeping, or, supposing that he weeps, that the omission of such a weeping were granted simultaneously, then in one of these events, and in no other, God would be deceived in act and in exercise: because only then would the opposite of what God foreknew be given in act and in exercise, as will be clear to the observer.

Hence, in order that the potency corresponding to this act—namely, that God be deceived—should be granted, it was necessary either that that weeping be impossible, or that it not be able not to be, or that, supposing it, its omission be able to be composed with it, and consequently with God’s knowledge of such a future weeping. It is not sufficient that such omission be able to be, or that, without making the aforesaid supposition of the weeping and knowledge of it, the aforesaid omission be given in act. Therefore, since these are not granted, and no potency can be granted, it follows that in this objection no argument is made from the act to the corresponding potency. Thus, from the fact that, supposing that future event, its omission would be given, and consequently divine knowledge would be deceived, it is not correctly inferred that it can be deceived from the possibility of the omission of that weeping; but, as we recently said, this could only be inferred either from the impossibility of the weeping, or from the fact that it cannot not be, or from the possibility of composing the aforesaid omission with the future weeping, and consequently with the knowledge of it: because only from one of these, or from one of them, does it follow that God’s knowledge would be deceived in act and in exercise.

16 It makes no difference if one insists that the things we have said in this solution cannot be coherent with one another. For, according to Aristotle, that is called possible in which, when it is posited, no impossibility follows. But if Peter did not in fact weep over his sin, an impossibility would follow, namely that God’s foreknowledge concerning that weeping would be deceived, as we recently asserted: therefore, the possibility of the omission of the aforesaid weeping cannot be coherent with this.

For it is answered that the definition of a possible thing given by Aristotle must be understood whenever the possibility of a thing is not conjoined with the infallible and certain future occurrence of its opposite. For if this were conjoined, it would not be admissible to posit such a possible thing as existing, because its existence would thereby have to be conjoined with the existence of its opposite; and thus, in the case of the objection, Peter’s weeping and its omission would have to be granted simultaneously, which is absurd. Hence, because the foreknowledge of the aforesaid weeping is infallible and altogether certain, it is certain that in act and in exercise such a weeping will be given; therefore its opposite, namely actual non-weeping, must never be posited, even though it is possible absolutely and simply.

17 To the first confirmation it is answered by distinguishing the antecedent: and if it is understood of an inability in the composite sense, arising from some supposition, or from the fact that Everything which is, when it is, must be, which amounts to the same thing, or of consequent inability, it must be conceded; but if it is understood of inability in the divine sense, or simply such an inability, or antecedent inability, it must be denied. The consequent of the first consequence must likewise be distinguished proportionally in the same way. Then the second consequence must be denied. For in order for it to be valid, it would be necessary that the antecedent, and likewise the consequent of the first consequence, were true in the latter sense.

This is explained as follows. From the fact that God’s knowledge is not fallible and is terminated toward some future contingent which will in fact occur, knowing that it will in fact have existence although it may not have it, it follows only that God cannot in the composite sense, or simultaneously, know the non-existence of that future thing, and consequently cannot know the possibility of its opposite in the composite sense: for these things alone are required for its infallibility, as we recently said. Yet no inconvenience follows from this. For God’s inability to know the things we have mentioned arises from the composite sense and from the supposition that whatever thing is, while it is, must be, and that its opposite is not composable with it; or, which amounts to the same thing, it is only consequent impossibility arising from the existence both of divine knowledge and of the future event: but the aforesaid impossibility is not in the divine sense, nor is it an impossibility absolutely and simply such, or—which amounts to the same thing—antecedent impossibility, either on the part of the object or on the part of knowledge, consisting in the fact that, without any supposition of divine knowledge, of the future occurrence of the effect, and of its existence with respect to eternity, neither the object can be otherwise nor could divine knowledge have been otherwise terminated toward that object. For if this impossibility were antecedent impossibility, then through it God’s knowledge would not know the aforesaid contingent as contingent: for to know it as contingent, it is not enough to know that it will have existence for that determinate time for which it is said to have it; but one must also know simultaneously that it may nevertheless not have it, and that divine knowledge, in the prior state before it is terminated toward the future and before the future occurrence of the effect and its foreknowledge in eternity is supposed, could have failed to be terminated toward it as future.

18 And thus from this we obtain only that that future contingent, in the composite sense of future occurrence and of the existence possessed for the time for which it is said to have it, cannot occur otherwise; or that, supposing its future occurrence and existence, it cannot by consequent power fail to be future. But not that, absolutely and simply, or by antecedent power, or in the divided sense, it cannot fail to be. For not this last point, but the former, is required for the notion of a future contingent. Let those who wish to understand these matters see what we shall say in tract. de Volunt. Dei, disp. 10. num. 84 et sequentib., where the composite and divided senses are explained expressly: and once that has been explained and correctly understood, all these matters will be sufficiently clear.

This solution is drawn from D. Thom., now from de Verit. quaest. 6. art. 3. ad 10, and art. 4. ad 8, and quaest. 24. art. 1. ad 13, and 1. part. quaest. 19. art. 8. ad 1 et ad 3, and also from 1. dist. 39. art. 1. ad 3, in these words: That which is must be while it is, but absolutely it is not always necessary that it be; thus also it is necessary that God know while He knows, but it is not necessary that He know except by the necessity of immutability, which does not exclude the freedom of the will, and this freedom is signified when it is said that God can not know this. Then also from 1. cont. Gent. cap. 67, in these words: Each thing is known by God as it is seen presentially: thus it will be necessary that God know it, as it is necessary that Socrates be sitting from the fact that he is seen sitting.

19 To the second confirmation it is answered first by distinguishing the antecedent: It will not be in Peter’s power to remove this antecedent, namely that God foresaw that weeping is conceded with absolute power together with the power of infallibility; but if it is understood precisely with absolute power, which is compatible with the possibility of the infallibility of that foreknowledge, or with the fact that it is infallible that God foresaw that weeping, although absolutely He can not foresee it, it must be denied. The first part of the consequent must likewise be distinguished in the same way; and then the consequent must altogether be denied with respect to its second part.

And in answer to the proof of the antecedent, insofar as it can oppose the distinction given, it must be said that from the eternity of God’s knowledge concerning the future occurrence of that weeping, it can only be inferred that, precisely because it is actually terminated toward it, it must be terminated toward it invariably. But this argues only that it is necessary by the necessity arising from the supposition of presence, not simply by necessity; and consequently it does not follow that He does not terminate freely toward the aforesaid weeping. For even if we grant that the free act by which God willed to produce this entire universe is measured with respect to its termination by eternity, it does not follow that it is necessary simply and incompatibly with freedom, but only by a qualified necessity and from the supposition of presence. This solution is taken from D. Thom. in 1. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 1. ad 1, and de Veritate quaest. 16. art. 3. ad 10. In answer to the proof of the consequent, however, the antecedent is conceded according to the distinction given. And the consequent, with respect to its last words, namely: He will not be able to remove it without such a weeping following, must be denied if it is understood of absolute and simple power.

20 This is made clear. For although Peter did not have, together with absolute and simple power, the power of infallibility for removing God’s knowledge concerning his weeping—that is, although he could not do what was infallible, namely, that God not foresee the aforesaid weeping, and consequently did not have the power not to weep, which is incompatible with the knowledge of a weeping that is future in act—yet he did have precisely absolute and simple power to remove God’s knowledge concerning his weeping, in this limited sense, because he could not have the weeping; for if he did not have it, the knowledge of the weeping would not have been present in God, but rather its omission: and therefore he had a power to remove the aforesaid knowledge compatible with the infallibility of the same divine knowledge concerning the weeping, or with the fact that God in fact and actually foresaw that weeping. Thus it can never be verified in fact and actually that God foresaw it absolutely. Hence it is also compared proportionally in the same way with the future weeping, which is the consequent inferred from that antecedent, namely from God’s knowledge. For although it does not have absolute power together with the power of infallibility not to weep—which power is indeed incompatible with the weeping—yet it has precisely absolute power not to weep, which is compatible with a weeping that is future infallibly. This power, however, is sufficient to preserve freedom and to ensure that the future weeping remains within the notion of a future contingent.

21 Therefore the rules of the Dialecticians advanced in this confirmation are not thereby weakened. Not the first rule. For according to this mode of speaking, we posit equal power or inability with respect to removing the antecedent and the consequent, so that in the sense in which the antecedent can be removed or not removed, the consequent can also be removed or not removed. Nor is the second rule. For in order that, in a good consequence, someone may not be able to cause the consequent to be false when a true antecedent is given, it is enough that the consequent be infallibly true, or—which amounts to the same thing—that it be true in such a way that it is never false in fact. For this purpose it is enough that, presentatively considered, Peter not have the absolute power together with the power of infallibility of his not weeping; but that it be impossible for him by the possibility of infallibility, and possible by absolute possibility, compatible with the possibility of the infallibility of the opposite act, namely weeping.

We have said that it amounts to the same thing whether the consequent is true in such a way that it is never false, or whether it is infallibly true: because from the very fact that the consequent is true in actuality, it must be necessary by a suppositional and qualified necessity, insofar as everything which is, as long as it is, from the supposition that it is, must be: for a necessity arising from a supposition, or a qualified necessity, or in the composite sense of the thing’s existence, coincides with infallibility, and conversely.

22 Second, in answer to the same second confirmation, it must be said that the rule: Whoever cannot remove the antecedent cannot remove the consequent is understood with this limitation, namely, provided that the antecedent is necessary and necessarily infers the consequent; but not if the proper causality of the antecedent consists in freely inferring that consequent, or in causing the aforesaid consequent to be caused freely. For then the removal of the antecedent is not necessary in order that the consequent be able to be removed; but just as its being posited is required in order that the consequent may freely occur and be inferred, so it is required in order that it may fail to follow. Therefore, since from the knowledge by which God foresaw Peter’s future weeping freely this consequent is inferred, namely the weeping of the same Peter, and the proper effect of that knowledge is to make Peter weep freely; it follows that in order that this consequent be able to be removed, it is not necessary that the aforesaid antecedent, namely God’s knowledge concerning it, be able to be removed.

Add that, as D. Thom. well noted in the present discussion in the answer to the second, and indicates in 1. dist. 39. quaest. 1. art. 1. ad quartum, when the antecedent contains a word designating an act of the soul, the rule applies: whoever cannot remove the antecedent cannot remove the consequent, insofar as it depends on that antecedent; but he can indeed remove it absolutely. Hence, because in this antecedent, God knew Peter would weep, the word knew designates an act of the soul; therefore whoever cannot remove the aforesaid antecedent cannot remove the consequent, namely Peter will weep, insofar as it depends on that antecedent. But since it depends on it insofar as it is present in eternity, he cannot remove it insofar as it is present and from the supposition of presence; but he can remove it absolutely: and thus freedom remains. First, because necessity arising from the supposition of presence does not remove freedom. Then also, because the inability to remove that consequent insofar as it depends on the aforesaid antecedent, or insofar as it is inferred from it, means only an inability to remove it in the composite sense, that is, by composing, or causing, that God’s knowledge of that weeping and the non-occurrence of such a weeping should be simultaneous; not that, absolutely and simply, the aforesaid non-weeping cannot fail to be posited. Because, as we recently said, that antecedent, namely God’s knowledge, infers only that the non-weeping is not composed with the weeping, nor can be composed with it; but not that that non-weeping cannot be, but rather it infers its possibility.

23 To the second, the major must be conceded and the minor denied. And in answer to the proof, it must be said that the antecedent of that proposition, Socrates will run, if it is foreknown, is not truly concerning the past, although in its superficial appearance and according to its words it seems to concern the past, as D. Thom. most excellently noted in 1. sentent. dist. 39. art. 1. ad 1, saying: The act of divine knowledge never passes into the past, but is always present in act: and therefore always remains within the freedom of the divine will. For the same reason, speaking of predestination in de Veritate quaest. 6. art. 3. ad 10, he says: Absolutely speaking, God can predestine anyone or not predestine him, or have predestined him or not have predestined him; because the act of predestination, when measured by eternity, never falls into the past, just as it is never future. Hence it is always considered as proceeding from the will by way of freedom. Nevertheless, from the supposition this becomes impossible: for He cannot not predestine, supposing that He has predestined, or conversely. And in art. 4. ad 8 he asserts that the same must be understood of foreknowledge. Add that what we said concerning the second confirmation of the preceding argument sufficiently solves this second argument, as will be clear to the observer.

From what has been said, it is clear concerning the first confirmation how necessity of something, or of some premises, does not follow into the consequent except insofar as it depends on and is inferred from the antecedent; and how from those premises only this consequent follows, namely: Peter will run, if it is known by God to be true: not indeed by absolute necessity, but insofar as it depends on the antecedent, that is, as it is present in eternity, and by reason of that presence, and consequently only by a necessity arising from a supposition, which does not remove freedom.

Add (as D. Thom. well noted, de Verit. quaest. 2. art. 12 ad 4) that when it is said that everything known by God must be true, it can be understood in two ways: either as referring to the statement, or as referring to the thing itself. If it refers to the statement, then it is composite and true, and yields this meaning: that it is impossible for God to know something and for that thing not to be simultaneously. If, however, it refers to the thing itself, then it is divided and false, because it means that what is known by God is necessary and has necessary truth. This, as is clear, is openly false: for things known by God do not necessarily occur on that account. Hence, from that major posited in this confirmation and from the minor immediately subsumed under it, it follows only that what is necessarily true in the composite sense is that Peter will run, if it is known by God to be true, that is, that God’s knowledge of Peter’s running cannot be composed with Peter’s not running; but not in the divided sense. For freedom, it is enough that Peter can refrain from running in the divided sense, as we shall say in tract. 4. disp. 10. num. 84.

It is clear from what is to be said in tract. 4. disp. 7. num. 47 et deinceps concerning the second confirmation.

24 To the third, it is enough for knowledge that what is known through it be necessary by the necessity arising from the supposition of presence, according to that axiom: Everything which is, when it is, must be. But future contingents are attained by God insofar as they are present in eternity, as D. Thom. teaches in the present article and in disp. 8. num. 40, and as we shall say thereafter: where we shall also explain how, in absolutely future contingents, it amounts to the same thing to be seen in the decree and from the supposition of that decree, and to be seen as present in eternity: and consequently that it also amounts to the same thing to be necessary by a necessity arising from the supposition of presence and by a necessity arising from the supposition of the divine decree.

To the confirmation it is answered, with the same Angelic Doctor, de Veritat. quaest. 2. art. 12. ad 12, in these words: There are two means of cognition. One is the means of demonstration: and this must be proportioned to the conclusion, so that, when it is posited, the conclusion is posited; and such a means of cognition is not God with respect to contingents. The other means of cognition is the likeness of the thing known: and such a means of cognition is the divine essence; yet it is not adequate and proportioned to any one thing, though it is proper to each individual.

Add that the divine essence in itself is not a means of cognizing determinate future contingents, except insofar as it presupposes God’s free decree. Hence the means of cognition is not necessary, as it is opposed to freedom, but rather includes it.

25 Finally, the wisest Master Cornelio answers most excellently, 1. tom. in 1. part. tract. 1. circa quaest. 14. art. 13. disp. 1. dub. 2. num. 6, by denying the consequence. For although it is certain that God knows that it is future that you should repent your sins efficaciously, since God does not know this by excluding your diligence and solicitude, but by means of it, it clearly follows that your solicitude is not frustrated but is altogether required, so that what was foreknown to happen may happen by no other means than through it. A similar argument is also foolish in human affairs: Did God foreknow that I would take food today, or did He foreknow that I would not take it? If He foreknow that I will take it, there is no reason for me to be diligent, and I will not do what is within my power in order to take it, because it is certain. But if He foreknow that I will not take it, whatever I do, I will not take it, because God’s knowledge is infallible: therefore I would be idle; and there is no reason for me to care about taking food. The reason is the same. For although it is certain that you will take food, because it is foreknown by God, nevertheless, since God did not foreknow it except by means of your care and diligence freely applied, it is foolish for you not to apply it.

And certainly the same argument can be made, even if God were not foreknowing future things by an impossibility. For in fact and in reality, setting aside God’s foreknowledge, is this effect future, or is it not future? If it is future, then human diligence and care are importunate and superfluous, because it will be future even without them. But if it is not future, our diligence will be of no avail to make it occur, however efficaciously it may be exerted: therefore there is no reason for us to be solicitous and diligent concerning our affairs, but rather we should leave everything to fate and fortune. For that consequence is invalid and foolish: because from the supposition that such an effect is future, it does not follow that it is future except in dependence upon these means.