Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem
Collegii Salmanticensis Cursus Theologicus, tomus I
First published 1870
The Cursus Theologicus of the Discalced Carmelites of Salamanca (the 'Salmanticenses'), tomus I, in the 1870 Paris reprint. Contains the Prooemium and the three great treatises of this volume: De principio individuationis (a digression on the principle of individuation), De Visione Dei (in quaest. 12), and De Scientia Dei (in quaest. 14, including the extended rejection of middle knowledge). The edition prints St Thomas's Prima Pars text alongside; that text is not republished here.
Prooemium, and the Division of the whole Work
Quaestio I: On the Simplicity of God
Tractatus I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance and of Its Accidents
Disputatio I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance
Dubium I: Whether the substantial form is itself individuated, and the first principle of the individuation and of the purely individual distinction of the whole composite?
Dubium II: Whether matter, taken by itself and precisely, or matter marked by quantity, is the first and radical principle of the individuation of the whole substantial composite
Dubium III: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to constitute a composite of matter and quantity as an inhering and constituting form, is the first root of the individuation of the composite
Dubium IV: Whether matter determined by quantity, insofar as it denotes a certain substantial mode, is by the very nature of the thing distinct from matter and determines it toward having this quantity rather than that, is the first root of the individuation of material substance and of its substantial form?
Dubium V: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to possess by a radical mode this quantity rather than that, is the first root of the completed material substance and therefore of its substantial form
Disputatio II: On the Principle of the Individuation of Accidents
Dubium I: Whether the subject is the first root and principle of the individuation of accidents and of their purely individual distinction
Dubium II: Whether quantity claims for itself a peculiar principle, so that it is individuated from itself as though it were the first root
Dubium III: Whether essential repugnance exists between purely numerical distinction of accidents, as such that two of them differ only numerically in the same subject
Tractatus II: In quaest. 12 of the First Part of St. Thomas: On the Vision of God
Quaestio I: How God is known by us
Disputatio I: On the Possibility and Appetitability of the Vision of God by Essence
Dubium I: Whether the clear vision of God by essence is possible to the created intellect?
Dubium II: Whether the Holy Fathers knew that vision of God by essence is possible to a created intellect
Dubium III: Whether the possibility of vision of God by essence can be clearly known to a created intellect by the light of nature
Dubium IV: Whether the intellectual nature considered by itself has an innate appetite for the vision of God by essence
Dubium V: Whether an elicited and natural appetite is given in the intellectual creature considered by itself with regard to the clear vision of God
Disputatio II: On the Likeness, or Form, Required for a Clear Vision of God
Dubium I: Whether, according to the mind of St Thomas, some created likeness is admitted in order to elicit the clear vision of God
Dubium II: Whether the divine essence is in fact united to the intellect of the blessed man by way of an intelligible species, with a view to the clear vision of God?
Dubium III: Whether the divine essence, as it has the character of an intelligible form, actively concurs to the clear vision of God
Dubium IV: Whether by divine power a created impressed species is possible, through which God may be seen in a quidditative way, such as He is in Himself?
Dubium V: Whether the first reason which D. Thom. adduces in this article sufficiently proves the impossibility of an impressed species representing God quidditatively and clearly?
Dubium VI: Whether from the second reason of St. Thomas the impossibility is sufficiently inferred of an impressed form representing God quidditatively, and clearly, as He is in Himself
Dubium VII: What specially stands against the second reason of St. Thomas, and how it is to be solved
Dubium VIII: Whether the last reason of the article proves the impossibility of a created intelligible species representing God quidditatively: where the arguments also are dissolved which we brought from the opponents in dub. 4 of this disputation?
Dubium IX: Whether in the blessed there is necessarily and indispensably given a word, or expressed form, representing God quidditatively, as He is in Himself
Dubium X: Whether the impossibility of a created word representing God clearly and quidditatively is rightly proved from the fact that God is essentially itself the being quidditatively understood, and thus cannot be quidditatively understood through a created word?
Disputatio III: On the Impossibility of the Vision of God, As He Is in Himself, by Created Powers of the Natural Order, or Such as Are Connatural to Some Created Intellect
Dubium I: Whether by the absolute power of God there is possible some intellect which by the powers proper to it of the natural order could see God as He is in Himself
Dubium II: Whether by divine power there can be possible some substances and some intellects for which the light of glory is connatural, and which can see God by essence by their own powers?
Disputatio IV: On the Necessity of the Light of Glory for Seeing the Divine Essence As It Is in Itself
Dubium I: Whether the light of glory concurs to the vision of God, as He is in Himself, after the manner of an impressed form
Dubium II: Whether the light of glory is a necessary disposition, in order that the divine essence, in the ratio of form or of intelligible species, be united to the intellects of the blessed?
Dubium III: Whether the light of glory is necessarily desired for the receiving of the vision of God?
Dubium IV: Whether by the absolute power of God the created intellect can, without the light of glory, by its own obediential power alone, though with a concomitant influx superadded in the vision, but not by any other previous [influx], elicit that vision in the same intellect
Dubium V: Whether by divine power the divine essence can be united, in the ratio of light, to the created intellect, and thus constitute it, without a created light, in the first act for seeing God as He is in Himself?
Disputatio V: On the Quality and Inequality of the Visions in the Blessed
Dubium I: Whether an inequality is found among the beatific visions
Dubium II: Whether the inequality found among the beatific visions is not only intensive and extensive, but also essential and specific
Dubium III: Whether an intellectual power that is better, with equal light of glory, sees the divine essence more clearly
Disputatio VI: On the Incomprehensibility of God to the Created Intellect
Dubium I: Whether by divine power the created intellect can comprehend God?
Disputatio VII: On Those Things Which, God Having Been Seen, Are Seen in Him, or Can Be Seen
Dubium I: Whether those who see God see everything absolutely which is formally and of necessity contained in Him
Dubium II: Whether the divine essence can be seen without the persons, or one person without another?
Dubium III: Whether the blessed can, by the force of the vision of the divine essence, see, and in fact see, the free decrees of God?
Dubium IV: Whether from the force of the vision of the divine essence the effects existing under some difference of time can, or ought to, be seen
Dubium V: Whether by the force of the vision of the divine essence possible creatures can be seen?
Tractatus III: In quaest. 14 of the First Part of the Angelic Doctor: On the Knowledge of God
Quaestio I: De Scientia Dei
Dubium I: Whether those things which St. Thomas teaches in the Prooemium of this question are true
Disputatio I: De scientia Dei, quoad an est?
Dubium I: Whether intellectual knowledge is formally in God?
Dubium II: Whether from the fact that God is most immaterial the Angelic Doctor rightly proves that He is most intelligent?
Dubium III: Whether there is in God knowledge strictly so called and formally, and with respect to things
Dubium IV: Whether the knowledge of God is an attribute of Him?
Disputatio II: On the Twofold Distinction Which D. Thom. Constitutes in This Article Between Things Known and Things Not Known
Dubium I: Whether the first distinction which St. Thomas assigns between things that know and things that do not know is true, namely that these have only their own form, whereas those have also the forms of other things
Dubium II: Whether knowing things have not only the form of another thing, but also become by identity other things in being knowable, that is, representatively?
Disputatio III: On the Intellection and Knowledge of God with Respect to Its Primary Object
Dubium I: Whether God understands Himself primarily
Dubium II: Whether the object per se, first and specificative of the essential intellection of God is the divine essence, as distinguished from the attributes and the relations: or whether all these are formally and expressly meant?
Disputatio IV: On Understanding by God with Respect to the Power It Has to Constitute the Divine Essence and Nature
Dubium I: Whether the constitutive [element] of the divine essence, or nature, is the sole reason of a spiritual substance in itself, or of such by essence, as distinct virtually from the reason of a subsisting intellectual substance, whether radically and in the first act, or in the second act
Dubium II: Whether what constitutes the divine essence, or nature, is the ratio of substance alone, essentially and per essentiam intellectual, as virtually distinct from intellection by essence, or whether without any virtual distinction it is intellection itself?
Disputatio V: On the Knowledge of God with Respect to Its Causality toward Creatures
Dubium I: Whether divine knowledge is in some way the cause of things
Dubium II: What the knowledge of God is as cause of things
Dubium III: Whether just as the knowledge of God, taken formally, is the cause directing toward the production of creatures, so too it is the immediate effective principle and the executor of their production?
Disputatio VI: On Divine Knowledge Collated with Evils
Dubium I: Whether God knows evils?
The decision of this doubt is brief and easy, although there are not lacking reasons for doubting which seem to urge that there is no knowledge of evils in God.
§ I. Reasons for doubt.
1 The first reason for doubt is drawn from Sacred Scripture. For concerning God it is said in Habacuc. 1.: Your eyes are pure; you cannot look upon iniquity. And in Jeremiae 19. it is said of certain sins that they did not ascend into God's heart.
This is confirmed from Origen, who says in Psalm. 33. homil. 3. et 4. in Genesi, et ad Roman. 8. on the text: We know that those who love God, etc., that according to the usage of Scripture God is not said to know evils, but goods.
2 The second. Since the object of the divine intellect is the good—not indeed any good whatever, that is, only according to estimation, but true good, although not under the ratio of the good but of the true—therefore it cannot extend to evils, which are good only according to estimation. The consequence is evident: no power can extend beyond its adequately corresponding object.
3 Nevertheless, it must be said that God knows evils, whether of fault or of punishment. This is an article of faith, and D. Thom. proves it in praesenti from Prov. 15. Hell and perdition are before the Lord, and 2. contra Gent. from Psal. 68. My sins are not hidden from you, and it is said in Job 11.: He knows the vanity of men, and seeing, does he not consider iniquity? Hence all the Fathers and theologians commonly defend this assertion.
4 It is proved first by the reason of D. Thom. from 1. cont. Gent. cap. 71., which he adduces in these words: It is true that the good of the intellect consists in this: for an intellect is said to be good because it knows the true; but the true is not only that it is good to be good, but also that it is bad to be evil. For just as it is true to be what is, so it is true not to be what is not. The good of the intellect, therefore, also consists in the knowledge of evil. But since the divine intellect is perfect in goodness, none of the intellectual perfections can be lacking to it. Therefore, the knowledge of evils is present to it.
5 It is confirmed by the reason of the same S. Doct. ibidem, which he reduces to this form: For the knowledge of evils is never blameworthy in itself, insofar as it belongs to knowledge; that is, insofar as it is the judgment formed concerning evils, but only accidentally, insofar as through the consideration of evils someone is sometimes inclined toward evil. This, however, is not in God, because he is immutable. Therefore, nothing prevents God from knowing evils. This reason also demonstrates the point concerning penal evils: although it may be blameworthy to incur them on account of their own faults, it is not so insofar as knowledge in itself is of them; otherwise the reasoning concerning the supreme judge and governor, for whom penal evils must necessarily be known so that he may punish sinners, would be blameworthy.
6 Secondly, it is proved by the reason of the same Holy Doctor in this article, which he proposes in this form: It must be said that whoever perfectly knows something must know everything that can happen to it. Now there are some goods which can be corrupted by evils happening to them. Therefore, God would not perfectly know goods unless he also knew evils.
§ II. The reasons for doubt initially proposed are answered.
7 To the first reason it will be answered that those and similar testimonies which deny that God knows sins must be understood as referring to knowledge through the knowledge of approval and complacency. Thus D. Greg. 11. Moral. cap. 7. et lib. 23. cap. 1. et lib. 28. cap. 3. D. August. quaest. 152. in Exod. et lib. 83. quaestionum, quaest. 60. et 65. Add that it is also said that he does not know sins because he conceals them, as Ambros. explains in lib. 5. de Fide cap. 8. ad Theophyl. Lucae 13.; and that it is likewise said that he does not know them either according to operation, because he cannot be the cause of them, as Epiphanius says in lib. de Haeresibus, or because he does not know them through his own idea, but through created good, against which they oppose, as D. Thom. explains in praesenti. By this also its confirmation is sufficiently clear.
To the second reason it will be answered that, so that knowledge may not be carried beyond its formally adequate object, which is to be true good, it is enough that he know evils through the good; for the knowledge of opposites is the same.