Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

34 On consultation, that clause was added to the title: divine knowledge, taken formally, so that the discussion in it is understood to concern divine knowledge insofar as it is virtually distinct from the intellect and from any other knowledge or attribute of God; and not that in which it is identified with that same intellect, art, or other of the divine attributes. For although several of the interpreters of St Thomas customarily raise this doubt about knowledge, confusing it with the intellect or with any other divine knowledge; and so they ask whether besides the knowledge, or the intellect and the knowledge of God, and also his will, there is given in him a power immediately productive, virtually distinct both from the knowledge, or the intellect and knowledge of God, and from his will — whether these two, namely knowledge taken in the aforesaid sense and the will, be taken separately or taken together — yet so that the aforesaid power ex-

ecutive on an equal footing, and by way of a mode of excluding and of being excluded is distinguished from them: nevertheless, because the reason of divine knowledge and also of its efficacy will shine forth more clearly if the present doubt is decided in the formal sense, and speaking of God's knowledge insofar as it is virtually distinct from the other attributes; it was therefore resolved to propose and to decide it in that same sense.

It is supposed, then, in the same title, that something is held as certain and something is called into question. For it is supposed that the knowledge of God influences the production of creatures by way of directing, as all the theologians commonly teach: because it is proper to every practical knowledge to direct towards the work. It is called into question, then, whether besides this concurrence it has another, by way of an immediately efficient principle, or by way of a power which immediately executes and carries out the production of those same creatures, so that no other executing power intervene between it and the aforesaid production? Hence others raise this doubt in other words: whether, besides the knowledge of God taken formally, though connoting the will, there is given in God another power or virtue immediately ex-

§ I. The first opinion is reported.

35 Durandus in 1. dist. 38. Vazquez in praesenti disp. 81. cap. 2. Zumel infra quaest. 25. cap. 1. conclus. 3. Suar. in sua Metaphys. disp. 30. sect. 17. from num. 49 to 55. Herice in praesenti tract. 1. disp. 10. cap. 1. at the end, and others hold that the knowledge of God, taken formally, is not an immediately efficient principle executing the production of creatures; but that it concurs only in the genus of a directive cause; and consequently that beyond the aforesaid knowledge there is given in God a power immediately productive, virtually distinct from it. And although all the cited Doctors are not to be distinguished on this point, they do not defend that view by the same argument.

This opinion, as regards that in which its followers agree, is proved first from the testimony of St Thomas, 1. part. q. 19. a. 4. in the 4th, where he says: Of the same effect knowledge is the cause, as directing, and the will, as commanding; but power is the cause that executes,

because it names the immediate principle of operation. In these words they clearly distinguish the executing power from the knowledge as directing and from the will as commanding; and consequently also from the knowledge as connoting the will. Which he taught even more expressly below in q. 25. a. 1. in the 4th, where he says thus: Power is not posited in God as something distinct from knowledge and will according to reality, but according to reason, namely insofar as power imports the reason of a principle executing that which the will commands and to which knowledge directs. Which three things are equally proper to God.

36 Secondly, it is proved by reasoning. For the knowledge of God and the productive power look upon creatures in different ways: therefore they will be virtually distinct from each other; and consequently knowledge taken formally will not be a power immediately productive with respect to creatures. This last consequence is clear from the preceding one. The first, however, from the antecedent. Because the attributes which are in God in relation to creatures are virtually distinguished by the different mode of looking upon those creatures. The antecedent, then, is proved. Because knowledge looks upon creatures by directing the divine will towards the produc-

tion by presupposing the will already directed, and by immediately executing such production. Now these are different ways of looking upon creatures, as is clear from itself: therefore, etc.

It is confirmed. Because the primary object of divine knowledge is the Divinity, as is clear from itself; but the primary object of the productive power is not the Divinity itself: therefore knowledge and productive power are virtually distinguished. The consequence is clear. Because those things which have distinct primary objects cannot fail to be virtually distinguished.

It is confirmed secondly. Because the knowledge of God deals both with created and with uncreated things, and so demonstrates properties, or attributes, both about God and about his creatures; but the productive power deals only with creatures, which alone are capable of being made: therefore knowledge and productive power will be virtually distinct; since one and the same virtue cannot, without a virtual distinction of itself, be narrowed to creatures alone and at the same time extended beyond them, as is clear from the terms themselves.

37 Thirdly. Because the act of the productive power, namely execution and the actual production of creatures, is not necessarily conjoined with its principle, however perfect that principle may be: and so such an execution is really successive, however eternal the productive power of God may be: hence the power in question will then be virtually distinguished from the knowledge of God, and consequently this will not be the immediate efficient principle of creatures without some other productive power. The consequence is clear. Because the act of divine knowledge, namely to know, must necessarily be conjoined with God: and consequently befit him from eternity; otherwise, since such an act is of its own kind immanent, God would be changed if he had it anew, and in time.

It is confirmed. Because by the very fact that execution, which is the act of the productive power, is in time, it must necessarily be a transient action, lest it be immanent and arriving again, God be changed by it, as we were just saying; but the act of knowledge, since it is the act of the intellect, cannot fail to be immanent: therefore the knowledge and the productive power of God are virtually distinguished from each other; since virtues to which acts differing in their own kind — such as transient and immanent acts — correspond cannot, at least not virtually, be distinguished in God, and really in creatures. And therefore the heating virtue and the seeing virtue are really distinguished, because a transient act of its own kind corresponds to the former, namely heating; but an immanent act corresponds to the latter, namely sight.

38 Fourthly. Because in us the productive power is really distinguished from the intellect and from its knowledge, and also from the will: therefore in God these three will be distinguished at least virtually.

The antecedent is proved. Because the productive power, for example the progressive motion, resides in the limbs; and so, this failing or being impeded, we cannot move locally, however much the will may will it and the intellect may dictate or command the aforesaid motion through its knowledge or cognition: but it is clear that a power subjected in the limbs is really distinct from the will and from the intellect, and also from any intellectual virtue of his. The consequence, however, is proved. Because those things which are really distinguished in creatures must, when transferred to God, be virtually distinguished; because the divine essence is equivalent, by reason of them, to several others that are really distinct, no less than if it were several: in which indeed the virtual distinction of those things which are in God consists: therefore, etc.

39 Fifthly. Because the divine essence, connoting the will, can of itself, without the addition of any other productive power virtually distinct from it, immediately execute the production of creatures: therefore knowledge, which is virtually distinct from the divine essence, as is discussed in 1. num. 68 and thenceforward shown, will not be a power immediately executing and producing creatures. The consequence is clear. The antecedent, however, is proved. First, because it seems to be St Thomas's view below in q. 25. a. 5. in the 1st, where he says: God is something because he wills; not therefore because he wills that he can; but because he is such in his nature. Then also: because the fact that in creatures there is given a productive power distinct from their essence arises from their finitude and limitation: therefore since the divine essence is infinite in the genus of being, and so possesses in the most perfect way every notion of created and creatable being, there will be no reason why an executing power should be assigned to it, namely knowledge virtually distinct from it. Most of all because

30 of which, superadded, is a more perfect mode of operating, in that it denotes a greater perfection and fecundity in the divine essence itself; but the most perfect mode of operating of all is to be ascribed to God.

Then lastly: because the power nearest to operating and the essence, from which it flows, are really distinct in creatures, because to be corresponds to the essence, and to operate corresponds to the power nearest to operating, and these are really distinguished, as our Complutenses most excellently teach and prove in the Book on Physics, disputation 10, num. 22. But in God to be and to operate are virtually distinguished; since his to be is his own to operate, that is, his own to understand: therefore in him the essence and the power nearest to operating and producing creatures will not be distinguished even virtually.

40 It is confirmed firstly. Because God does not act outwardly insofar as he is only in the role of one who knows and wills, but insofar as he is infinite simpliciter in the role of being; for this whole infinity is necessary in order to create, and to act without de-

pendency on anything superior, in which way God always operates: therefore the productive power does not befit him by reason of knowledge or of will; but by reason of his very being through essence, insofar as it is infinite and eminently includes every communicable perfection: therefore since this reason of being through essence belongs to the intrinsic concept of God, as is presupposed in regard to his attributes, according to what is discussed in 4. num. 54 and thenceforward; the consequence is that the reason of the productive power befits him only by reason of his essence, or (which comes to the same thing) that it be the divine nature itself, insofar as it is infinite through essence.

41 It is confirmed secondly. Because God is not omnipotent because he knows all things, but rather he knows all things because he is omnipotent, and eminently contains them; and hence the theologians commonly teach, with Dionysius and St Thomas, that God, by knowing himself and his power, knows all possible creatures: therefore the knowledge of creatures is distinguished by reason from omnipotence, and presupposes it: therefore the aforesaid omnipotence, taken strictly and formally, will be nothing but the divine nature. This last consequence is clear. Because God in his essence alone, as in the object first known, cog-

nows — just as the divine essence alone has the role of an intelligible species in relation to their being known, so that same essence alone suffices in the role of the object first known, in order that they be attained by God.

42 It is confirmed finally. Because the angelic intellect, though connoting the will, is a power immediately productive with respect to those things which it works outwardly, as is clear from what St Thomas teaches, 1. part. q. 54. a. 5., and the Thomists commonly with him: therefore God, precisely by reason of his essence, though connoting the will, will execute outwardly whatever pleases him. The consequence is clear. Because in him the intellect is not yet virtually distinguished from the essence itself: and so if the angelic intellect, of itself formally, has the reason of the productive power in the aforesaid manner, the divine intellect also, which is entirely the same as the nature of God, and consequently the divine nature itself, as presupposed in relation to knowledge, will have the reason of the productive power; otherwise the intellect of the angel would be more perfect in its order than the divine intellect in its: if in fact-

he has such great power and perfection in his order, that he can of himself immediately be a productive power; whereas the divine intellect in its own order, and considered with precision, cannot.

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§ II. The truer opinion of St Thomas; and his first reason.

43 It must be said, however, that the practical knowledge of God, taken formally and connoting the will, is the principle, or the power immediately productive, by which he immediately operates outwardly; and consequently that it does not need any other productive power virtually distinct from it, by which to produce creatures. Thus St Thomas in this article, where he speaks of divine knowledge, says: It is necessary that the form of the intellect be the principle of operation, just as heat is the principle of heating. And he immediately adds that this does not belong to knowledge unless the will be joined to it. Since therefore heat is the principle that immediately executes heating, the consequence will be that the knowledge of God, with the will joined, or connoted, will also have the role

of a productive power with respect to those things which are caused by God.

The holy Doctor teaches the same thing below in q. 25. a. 1. in the 4th, in the second solution, where, speaking of the productive power of God, he says: Or one may say that knowledge itself, according as it is an efficient principle, has the role of power. Which he also taught in 1. dist. 38. q. 1. a. 1., and in 1. Contra Gentiles, ch. 61 and 62, and On Truth, q. 2. a. 14, as we shall examine more fully at once. Hence the holy Doctor is followed by Alvarus, Book 3 on Auxiliary Grace, disp. 17; Nazarius, in this article, controversy 2; Gonzalvus, in the present disputation 38, sect. 4; Caietanus, below in q. 25. a. 1. and q. 54. a. 5, saying that this opinion is the more probable. Which opinion is also held by several of the disciples of St Thomas.

44 The first and fundamental reason is drawn from St Thomas, in the cited place, from q. 2. On Truth. Which can be reduced to this form. Because those things which have a mutual congruence according to some form must be such that one of them be the immediately efficient, or productive, cause of the other; or that both be immediately produced by one and the same cause: but the knowledge which God has of created things, and the things themselves, have a mutual congruence according to some form: therefore either the knowledge of God is the immediately efficient cause and the producer of the things, or conversely; or finally that both be caused by some other third thing: therefore since the knowledge of God, being eternal and uncreated, cannot have any efficient cause of itself, the consequence is that it is itself the immediately productive cause of the things known.

Both consequences seem clear. The minor, however, is evident too. First, because the things known by God are such as his practical knowledge dictates that they be. Then also: because created things have some congruence and similarity with God's act of understanding, as constituting it, because it contains them most perfectly, namely in an intelligible or intellectual way. Since therefore divine knowledge contains those same created things intelligibly, they cannot fail to have congruence and similarity with it.

The major, however, is proved. First, because from the fact that Peter, for example, and Paul have a congruence in form, or in nature, it follows that either one of them is immediately produced by the other as by an efficient cause, or each of them by some other third thing. And likewise, because two artefacts have some congruence between them, therefore as often as one is not produced by the other, so often each of them is produced by some other third thing, namely by the art, with which they also have their own congruence and similarity. Then also: because since effects cannot be simpler than their causes, it is necessary that any effect be reduced to some single cause, just as all hot things are reduced to one hot thing, namely fire. And so, since each of them is caused by that with which it has some congruence, it will be necessary that those things which have congruence with each other be such that either one be immediately caused by the other, or each of them by some other third thing, with which they also have their own similarity and congruence.

§ III. Objections against this first reason of St Thomas, and their solution.

45 It makes no difference if you object first against this reason that, although those things which have congruence in some form must be in such a condition that either each be made by one third thing, or one by the other, it does not follow from this that the knowledge of God, which is congruent with creatures on the part of form, will be the immediately efficient cause and the productive power of the things known. Because since divine knowledge is not capable of being made by another, as by an efficient cause, it is nonetheless capable of this, which is to flow from another, as from a prior reason, namely from the divine nature; and since the things known are capable of having an immediately productive efficient cause of themselves, in this way both knowledge and the created things known can proceed from some other third thing, so that knowledge may proceed from the divine nature as from a prior reason, and the things known may proceed from that same divine nature as from an efficient cause and immediately productive power.

It does not bear on the point, then. Because what will suffice in answer to this objection will be clear from those things which we shall say in the solution to the fifth argument.

46 Nor does it bear on the point if you object, secondly, against the reason made, that if from the similarity of creatures with the knowledge of God it is concluded that it is itself the cause immediately executing their production, then it ought rather to be inferred from this similarity that the divine essence, insofar as it has the role of an intelligible species, or of an idea, is the power immediately executing the aforesaid production, rather than the knowledge. Then, because creatures are not formally similar to knowledge, which is found in God by way of a most pure act, if it is taken according to its precise role; but only if it is considered as identified with the other things which are within God: since, as we said above, no act of the intellect taken formally represents the thing understood, nor has similarity with it, and conversely. Then also: because even granting this, creatures are assimilated more to the ideas, or to the divine essence, insofar as it has the role of an intelligible species, than to knowledge: as may be seen when created knowledge is compared with the idea of a thing, or with the intelligible species of a thing known.

You will confirm this from the fact that, if the reason made proved anything, it would prove also that eternity and divine goodness are powers immediately productive of created goodness and duration; since these also have a congruence in form with the goodness and eternity of God: which, because of their infinite eminence, can neither be caused by created goodness and duration, nor by any other cause; and not just somehow, but in such a way that the fact that they are what they are, their not being able to be caused in respect of goodness and eternity from some cause, corresponds in a manner special to the aforesaid attributes beyond the one which is common to all attributes, namely that each of them, for example eternity, is first in its own genus, or order; and so it is the measure and the exemplar of similar perfections which are found in creatures.

47 For it will be answered that, as St Thomas teaches most excellently, 1. dist. 38. q. 1. a. 1., in the reason of the productive power of an intellectual nature as such, operating in an intellectual way, it is not necessary that there be between the effect and it a formal similarity, or a congruence in some formally such reason; but an analogous congruence suffices, found in some reason formally in creatures, and at least eminent, and discovered in a virtual way in the aforesaid productive power. And so in the angels the intellect, connoting the will, is the power immediately productive of them, and nevertheless the congruence which is between the intellect and the effects produced by it is not formal; but it suffices that it be virtual and analogous. And likewise the art in us is an intellectual habit immediately operative of the artefact, and yet the congruence which is between it and the artificial thing is not in a form which according to formal being is in both; but in a form, or formal reason, which is formally found in the artefact and virtually in the art itself. Nevertheless it must be held that the intellectual productive power, operating in an intellectual way, must formally assimilate the effect, not indeed to itself, but to the divine ideas; because the idea is that towards which the aforesaid productive power and the art corresponding to it aim, and by aiming at it they operate, so as to express it in the effect.

48 This solution is hinted at by St Thomas, q. 5. On Truth, a. 1. in the 7th, in these words: We must say that in the divine attributes we find a twofold reason of causality: one by way of exemplaryness, as we say that from the first one all things proceed, one; and from the first being all beings, and from the first good all goods, and this reason of causing is common to all attributes. The other reason is according to the relation to the object of the attribute, as we say that power is the cause of possible things, and knowledge of things known, and will of things willed; and in this way it is not necessary that the thing caused have a similarity to the cause. For what is done through knowledge ought not to be knowledge, but things known; and in this way the providence of God is posited as the cause of all things.

49 In confirmation it will be answered that, as St Thomas teaches most excellently, 1. dist. 38. q. 1. a. 1., the attributes of God are in a twofold difference: some, which express a respect towards something extrinsic, namely towards creatures, or (as we shall say better) have them as their object. Others, however, which in their formal concept do not express the aforesaid respect, or do not have creatures as their object in this special way. Between these lies the distinction that attributes which do not express the aforesaid order towards creatures, or which do not have them as their object in that special way, cannot in this respect be an immediately productive power of similar properties which are found in them: because it is of the role of an immediately productive power of creatures that it express the aforesaid order towards them, or that it have them, in the way explained, as its object, as we shall explain more fully in the following reason. Since therefore the goodness and eternity of God, considered under the most formal reasons, are not of the genus of those attributes which, taken formally, express that respect towards creatures, or (as we shall say better) have them as their object in the way indicated; and so, considered in this way, they can be defined best by way of a quasi-definition, with no mention being made of the aforesaid respect towards creatures, or of their being touched upon as their object in the way explained; hence it is that they cannot have the role of an immediately productive power with respect to similar attributes, or properties, which are found in creatures.

50 Therefore the major proposition of St Thomas's reason must be understood of a congruence according to some form which, of itself, in the way described, looks upon something extrinsic; or (as we shall say better) which of itself has something extrinsic as its object in that special way. For those things which have congruence in the aforesaid form must be so compared with each other that, as far as the force of this head extends, they are fitted for this, that either one be the cause of the other, or each be caused by some other third thing. And so, since the practical knowledge of God is of the number of those attributes which, by that special reason already explained, look upon something extrinsic, namely creatures, or have them as their object in the way described, as will be clear to one considering it; hence it is that St Thomas's reason most excellently proves his intention in this respect. We have said: As far as the force of this head extends, they are fitted, etc., on account of those things which we shall say at once.

51 But you will press. That although it be granted that those things which have congruence in a form looking, in the way described, upon something extrinsic, must be so compared with each other that either one be caused somehow by the other, or each by some third thing; it is nevertheless not granted that this causality be immediate, and by way of a power immediately executing: since two fires considered in the being of being radically heating have congruence in a form looking upon something extrinsic, namely things capable of being heated; and nevertheless it is not necessary that each be immediately caused by some other third thing, nor that one immediately cause the other; but it suffices that one be radically productive of the other: therefore, etc.

52 It is confirmed. Because there are several attributes expressing that special order towards creatures, or having them as their object in a special way, with which the creatures themselves have congruence in form; and nevertheless they are not powers immediately executing their production: therefore, etc. The major is clear enough in the will, the art, and the divine ideas; all of which look upon something extrinsic in that special way, as will be clear to one considering it: and moreover created things have congruence with them on the part of form, or of the formal reason imported through them. For created will has congruence in form with the divine will: and consequently it contains them virtually, or has efficacy for producing them. They also have congruence on the part of form with art; and consequently art is defined by this, that it be a right ratio of things makeable; just as also all those things are similar to the divine ideas and exemplars, according to whose likeness they are made.

The minor, however, is clear. Because otherwise there would have to be given in God several productive powers of creatures mutually distinct according to their species, namely knowledge, art, etc.; which yet derogates from the infinite perfection of divine power. Just as this would also be derogated from if several intellects or wills were given in God: because it is of the role of the intellect, infinite and perfect, that it be extended to all intelligible things.

53 To this objection it will be answered that the sense of the major proposition brought forward in St Thomas's reason is that those things which have congruence in form must be so compared with each other that either each be immediately caused by some third thing, which is one and the same either according to number or according to species; or that, if neither be caused by the aforesaid third thing, then one be the immediate cause of the other, either by itself or by its own virtue, or by an immediately operative power. In such a way, however, that if this congruence is in a form constituting nature, then the aforesaid nature concurs by way of a first and radical principle: because it does not, per se first or quasi per se first, look upon anything extrinsic; which mode of looking is required for the role of an immediately operative and effectively efficient principle with respect to something extrinsic, as our Complutenses expound in the Book on Physics, disp. 10, num. 23. But if the aforesaid congruence is in a form not constituting nature, but having the role of the first attribute, or of the property of that nature, as radically operating, then the aforesaid attribute, at least in intellectual natures, is itself the power immediately productive of that same nature, insofar as it is intellectual. Because by the very fact that nature, insofar as it is radically operative, explains in itself, as in its own virtue and nearest principle, the operative power which belongs to it, as is seen, for example, in man, in whom the intellect is the first property corresponding to him as radically intellectual. And consequently the nature of man explains in him, as in the principle and in its own nearest power, the force for understanding which he has.

54 Therefore, because even granting that two fires, as radically heating, have congruence in a form looking upon something extrinsic (of which we shall speak below), nevertheless this congruence is in a form constituting nature, it suffices that one fire, by its own immediately operative power, be the immediate cause of the other, or that each be caused by some third fire; which is one and the same either according to number or according to species.

Since, however, created things have congruence with the practical knowledge of God, as with the first attribute and property of it as radically operative towards things outside, and consequently as radically intellectual, it itself has the role of an immediately productive power of those same creatures.

The reason, however, for which knowledge is the first attribute among those which have congruence with God considered as radically operative towards things outside, and consequently as radically intellectual, is this: among the attributes which contain creatures in an intellectual way, and consequently correspond to the divine nature as containing them radically, it holds the most excellent place, as is clear from the more universal and more perfect object which it has. And so it must be most intimately conjoined with that same divine essence, as it is radically operative towards things outside.

We have said: That a form constituting nature does not look, per se first or quasi per se first, upon anything extrinsic, on account of those things which we shall add in this difficulty. We added, however, that looking, per se first or quasi per se first, upon something extrinsic, or having it as an object per se first or quasi per se first in such a way, is required for the role of a principle immediately effective, or for the role of a power immediately productive, so that these may cohere with those things which we set forth in the treatise De Visione Dei, disputation 6, num. 22 and 23: by which, as is clear from what is said there, not a little of the nature of divine omnipotence, or of the immediately productive power, is explained. Nevertheless, when we ask for the aforesaid respect towards creatures, we are not speaking of a respect that is real and actual, still transcendental, but one that is real and fundamental.

55 In confirmation, it is clear from what has been said how the congruence in form with the first attribute corresponding to God as radically operative towards things outside, and consequently as containing in an intellectual way the created effects nearest, just as the divine essence has them radically, and in that same intellectual way, infers that such an attribute (though connoting the will) is the immediately productive power itself, but not a congruence in form with any other attribute.

Nevertheless it stands that, from the congruence of creatures in form with any other attribute, it follows that that attribute, according to its own nature and line, is in some way immediately effective of them. And so, because it is proper to the will, both created and uncreated, to apply other powers to operate, and if such a will be the divine uncreated will, and consequently the first among all wills, it is proper to it that, since it has the role of the object known, it be the exemplary cause of other wills (which is the same as the proportionality of uncreated mercy with respect to created mercy): therefore the divine will immediately concurs by way of a power, or of a power applying the other operative powers of God outwardly towards any effects whatever, and it has peculiarly the role of an exemplar with respect to created will: just as also divine mercy (and so of the others) has the role of an exemplar with respect to created mercy.

And likewise, because it is proper to art to have an influence by way of a habit, or as it were a habit, or (as we shall say better) by way of an intellectual virtue; and under another formal reason together with the power immediately executing the artefact, therefore divine art immediately executes the production of creatures: not indeed as a habit, but as an intellectual virtue immediately affecting knowledge, which holds itself by way of a productive power.

56 And lastly, because it is proper to ideas to have an influence immediately and executively, not indeed as something holding itself on the part of the radical principle, and consequently not by way of a productive power properly and in the strict sense of such, but as something holding itself on the part of the object, and as an object known; hence it is that the divine ideas influence in this way immediately in the execution of creatures; but not by way of a power immediately executing, such as it is properly and in the strict sense.

Hence the major proposition of St Thomas's reason is understood of a congruence of two things according to some form, which either constitutes nature, and consequently is executed immediately, not only per se but by its own immediately operative power, as by a productive power, of that thing which has congruence with it; or, if it does not constitute nature, is nevertheless the first attribute, and the first property, or quasi-property, holding itself on the part of the form that constitutes nature, or on the part of it insofar as it is a radical principle. From the fact that it is proper to the immediately productive power as such, that it hold itself on the part of the radical principle from which it arises; but not on the part of the object as of something influencing by way of an object known, towards which the craftsman aims and by aiming operates: since beyond that which influences in this way on the part of the object, a mediating power must necessarily be admitted which effects what shines forth in the exemplar.

57 Nor does it bear on the point, lastly, if you press again that although it be granted that the knowledge of God is the first attribute, which belongs to it insofar as it contains creatures, it will not follow from this that it is a productive power of them; but at most that it influences immediately efficiently in the way in which art influences: because each of them is an intellectual virtue holding itself as it were by way of a habit; and so neither has the role of a power. And consequently neither of them corresponds to the productive power of the angels, after whose likeness we must conceive the productive power of God, which is purely intellectual; but to the habits and intellectual virtues found in the angels.

For it will be answered that, just as supernatural habits, because of their eminence, have something of powers and something of habits, and so confer a can properly speaking in the supernatural order, and an easy can, so the knowledge of God, because of its supreme eminence, has something of an intellectual virtue, according as an intellectual virtue is distinguished from a power and does not confer (so to speak) a proximate can, and one properly speaking such, and has something of a power conferring the aforesaid can properly speaking. From these, the first belongs to it according as it deals with God, and according as it is speculative: because it presupposes the divine act of understanding itself, according as it has the nearest force for dealing with God, and with creatures by speculating on them. And so it only determines the divine act of understanding by way of a pure intellectual virtue, or (so to speak) by way of a quasi-habit for this, that it may so determine it in this way; namely by a cause, or prior reason, it deals with God as with a subject, about which it demonstrates the predications, or quasi-predications, and also with creatures as with a thing to be known through its causes. But this latter belongs to that same knowledge according as it is practical, according to which sense it does not presuppose a can properly speaking in relation to the production of creatures, that is, a can which is also proximate; but only a can which is first and radical, as we shall explain in the following reason: and consequently it has not the task of determining a first can by way of a quasi-habit, but of conferring it: and so according to this consideration it has the role of a power.

§ IV. Two foundations highly noteworthy for deducing the second reason in favour of the opinion of St Thomas.

58 The second reason, and the principal one, in favour of the assertion is drawn from St Thomas in this article. But so that this may be grasped better, it is to be noted from the same holy Doctor that although none of the things which are found in God can, by reason of its own eminence, look upon anything extrinsic as a formal specificative of itself, it can nevertheless be terminated towards that as towards a virtual (so to speak) such specificative, that is, one which is of such a condition that if, impossibly, God could have some specifier outside himself, he would then be specified by this extrinsic thing rather than by another. Hence, although divine mercy cannot have formally such a specificative outside God, it can nevertheless have as its specificative (so to speak) one which is virtually such. And so, if impossibly it could be specified by something outside God, it would then have created wretchedness as its specificative, to be relieved. And therefore the aforesaid wretchedness and the mercy of God are so connected with each other that mercy cannot be known under its own proper and formal concept without created wretchedness also being conceived in some way there, as the thing to be relieved, as the matter about which divine mercy can be exercised.

The same must be said of the other attributes necessarily connected with creatures, as with their proper matter about which. And so omnipotence, or the productive power of God outwardly, can and must have as its extrinsic specificative, not indeed formally but virtually such, something extrinsic, namely creatures, as things to be made by it, because these are its proper matter, about which the divine power must deal: and consequently it cannot be understood under its own proper and expressed concept without them being understood. Although, impossibly, the aforesaid omnipotence could be specified by something extrinsic, it would then have no other extrinsic specificative than everything creatable, as what is to be commanded to execution. And therefore, both in the treatise De Visione Dei and in this difficulty, we shall say more than once, that for the role of omnipotence it is required that, quasi per se first, it look towards creatures that are capable of being made, with respect not to a respect that is real and actual and still transcendental, but to one that is real and fundamental: because for this respect, in the way in which it looks upon all things, it is required only that it have them as a virtually such specificative.

59 Secondly it is to be noted that although several of the divine attributes can and must have an extrinsic specificative virtually such in the sense explained, nevertheless the divine essence, as presupposed in relation to its attributes and properties, says, by reason of its own eminence, such a perfection above all the other divine attributes that they cannot have as their specificative, even a virtually such one, anything extrinsic.

And the reason is this. Because in those things which are only virtually specifiable by something extrinsic, one must philosophize after the fashion of those which can have something extrinsic as a formally such specificative. Since, therefore, in creatures, in which it is not repugnant to have a formally such specificative, things are so situated that although the properties and attributes of a created and complete substance can be specified by something extrinsic, or by something existing outside the aforesaid substance, as by a formally such specificative, nevertheless the very quiddity and essence of the complete substance cannot be specified in this way, either by something existing outside it, or by anything belonging to another genus, as our Complutenses expound most excellently in the Book on Physics, disput. 10, num. 23: hence it follows that in those things which are only virtually specifiable by something extrinsic, as happens in the divine things, the divine formal reasons also must be so disposed that although the attributes of God can be specified by something extrinsic, as by a virtual specificative, nevertheless the essence and nature of God, considered under the precise concept, and the formal concept of nature, cannot: because it is a substance which is most complete and most perfect, and by reason of its highest perfection it surpasses all the attributive reasons found in God.

60 This reason is confirmed and explained, and at the same time a certain tacit solution is overturned. Because although having something extrinsic as a virtual specificative does not mean imperfection, it does mean not having every conceivable perfection in the reason of most absolute formality: therefore although having the aforesaid specificative can befit the divine attributes, it cannot befit the first and most perfect formality of God, namely his nature, considered under such a concept. The antecedent as regards the first part needs no proof: and therefore the divine attributes, as we were just saying, which are free of all imperfection, can have something extrinsic as a virtual specificative. As regards the second part, however, it is clear too. Because this, namely to have some formality connected with something extrinsic, to have that as a virtual specificative, is not to have every conceivable perfection in the reason of most absolute formality: indeed, it would be more absolute, and would signify a greater perfection under this concept, if it were absolute and free from every extrinsic specificative, whether formal or virtual.

The consequence, however, is proved. Because since the line of the divine nature, and the other lines of attributes having a connection with creatures, are lines of absolute formalities free from a formally such extrinsic specificative, and the line of nature must be, because of its greater perfection, even more absolute than the line of these attributes, it must be that although it agrees with them in this, that it is absolute from a formally such extrinsic specificative, nevertheless it surpasses them in the reason of most absolute formality in this, that it is also absolute from a specificative which is not only formal but even virtual: indeed, to have being so absolute adds the highest conceivable perfection within the reason, as it were the generic one, of absolute formality: and so it must belong to the atomic, absolute, and most perfect of all formalities, such as is the formality of the divine nature. Just as, although both the divine essence and the attributes are pure acts, insofar as a pure act excludes every admixture of potentiality, in that not to be such a pure act means imperfection, nevertheless not to be such a pure act as to reach the point of being its own being of an existence without a virtual distinction does not mean imperfection, even though to be such a pure act means every conceivable perfection and purity within the line as it were generic of a pure act: consequently this mode of purity and perfection within this line cannot belong to the attributes, as is clear from what is said in disput. 4. num. 29 and 30, and again from num. 36 to num. 44; it can, however, and must belong to the divine nature, because of the greater perfection which is as it were generic within this line of a pure act, which it ought to have.

61 It makes no difference if you object. First, that by the same argument it would be proved that the divine essence is not necessarily connected with possible creatures: since it must be a most absolute formality, and it would be more absolute if it were so absolute that it had not even a necessary connection with something extrinsic, namely with possible creatures. Then also [you object] that the divine nature as such has an infallible and necessary connection with creatures: since it is at least a radical principle of their being made, and if, impossibly, there were no possible creatures, it would follow most excellently a priori that God would not have nature in the way in which he has it: therefore the divine nature will have creatures as its extrinsic specificative, at least a virtual one: because for this kind of specificative, free from imperfections and not requiring a real relation of being specified to the specificative, nothing other than this connection seems to be required.

For it will be answered to the first of these attacks by denying the antecedent. And to the proof it is to be said that, just as it does not belong to the highest simplicity and unity of God — which is nevertheless most eminent and free from the imperfections of limitation — that it be so one and so simplest as to exclude distinction and virtual multiplication, otherwise it would not be equivalent to several things looking towards distinct lines, and consequently God would not be God: so, for the divine nature to be most absolute, not anyhow, but with the highest eminence, and consequently with the highest fecundity, it is not required that it not have a necessary connection with possible creatures, otherwise it would not be most fecund; but rather that, having the aforesaid connection, it possess it in a manner so eminent that it is compared with them neither as with a formal nor as with a virtual specificative.

62 As to the second attack, it is clear from what has been said that this, namely to have some divine formality to have something extrinsic as a virtually such specificative, does not strictly mean that it have a connection with it; but that the connection of that extrinsic thing with the divine formality is not with it as with a remote and fontal principle, which would therefore be connected in the most eminent way, among all things conceivable, with the aforesaid extrinsic thing: indeed, this mode of connection requires a connection by way of the absolution of formality, which some other divine formalities lack, which are not so absolute as to be absolved from a virtually such specificative: and consequently it postulates a connection with that extrinsic thing absolved from the circumstance that it have it as a virtual specificative.

From which it also follows that the aforesaid connection, inducing that the divine formality has a virtually such extrinsic specificative, requires that the connection of that extrinsic thing be a connection with a divine formality which is of such a condition that it can correspond in creatures to those formalities which have something created as a formally such specificative: and so it also requires that that divine formality not be conceived under an expressed concept as to anything proper to it as such, that expressed extrinsic thing not being conceived. It is clear, however, that the divine essence does not correspond in creatures to formalities having something extrinsic as a formally such specificative, and that it can be conceived by us under the concept of the divine nature as to something proper to it as such, without our conceiving expressly that it is connected with creatures. And therefore the divine nature could be described most excellently by way of a quasi-description in this way: that it is its own being, or that it is its own intellection, without an expressed mention of creatures: yet omnipotence, for example, or mercy cannot yet be conceived inadequately with respect to those things which are proper to it, such as is mercy, without creatures being expressly involved there.

§ V. From the two foundations just laid down the second reason in favour of the opinion of St Thomas is deduced.

63 These things being supposed, then, the reason drawn from St Thomas can be reduced to this form. For God's act of understanding is his very being, and its quiddity: therefore God causes all things through his act of understanding, as through a purely radical principle, and not as through a proximate principle, or a power immediately productive: therefore the power immediately productive, by which he immediately concurs, will be his knowledge, connoting the will. The antecedent is clear from those things which we set forth in disput. 4. num. 43. The first consequence, however, is clear from the first and the second of the things noted above: because the immediately productive power is of the genus of those things which have something extrinsic as an object virtually specificative of them, and the divine essence, being most perfect in the reason of a complete substance and complete nature, cannot have the aforesaid specificative: and so it cannot be an immediately productive power; and consequently it will influence only by way of a primordial and radical principle: of which it is of the role not to have as an object a specificative something existing outside itself. Just as neither in created and complete substances is it of their role to look, as a formally such specificative, upon something extrinsic, or something existing outside them.

The second consequence, however, seems to follow from this first one. Because by the very fact that God's act of understanding precisely has being as the first and radical principle with respect to the production of creatures, and consequently cannot influence actually without some nearest and immediately productive power being superadded to it, this office must be attributed to divine knowledge connoting the will, or to the knowledge of approval. Because this attribute is very well proportioned to the carrying out of this office: since, just as essential intellection contains, intellectually and intelligibly, by way of a first and fontal principle, all created effects, so knowledge connoting the will contains those same effects in an intellectual and intelligible way by way of a property and of the virtue of that same essential intellection. Hence just as heat, which by way of a property of fire contains¹ non-intelligently the heating which is contained in fire in the same way (though as in a radical and first principle) is very well proportioned to this, that it be the power immediately productive of that heating; so also in the present case, the proportion being preserved, one must philosophize.

64 It is confirmed and explained from the same holy Doctor. Because by the very fact that constitutive intellection of God contains created effects intellectually, or intelligibly, and precisely by way of a radical principle, the immediately productive power of those effects must be something that holds itself by way of a property and attribute of God, and contains those same effects immediately and in the nearest way, in an intellectual and intelligible manner: but among the properties of God which contain creatures in an intellectual way, the knowledge of approval alone is more proportioned to the office to be discharged: therefore it itself, and not another of the divine properties or attributes, will be the power of God immediately productive outwardly. The consequence seems clear. The major, as regards the first part, is clear from itself: because whatever is absolute in God, such as the immediately productive power, must either hold itself by way of the constitutive element of the divine essence, or by way of a property or attribute: and so, by the very fact that the essence of God is only radical, and not immediately productive of creatures, the immediately productive power must be something of the attributes. As regards the second part, namely that it must contain creatures in an intellectual way, that too is clear. Because this is demanded by the proportion which must be between a radical principle operating outwardly and its nearest and immediately productive power.

65 The minor, however, once an induction has been made in the intellectual virtues superadded to the essence of God, which alone can contain creatures in an intellectual way, will be clear enough. For the intelligence, which is as it were the habit of first principles, is terminated only to the divine essence according to itself, as that which is known per se; but not so that creatures can be deduced from it, which they are (so to speak) after the fashion of conclusions, from the divine essence, as from a principle from which they can be deduced. And so, just as creatures are not known from the force of it, so neither can they be contained or produced in an intellectual way from its force: and consequently this attribute does not flow from the divine essence as containing creatures radically.

Wisdom, however, is not yet virtually distinguished from the knowledge of God, as is clear from what is said in disput. 1. num. 86: and so it comes to the same thing that knowledge, or that wisdom, are properties containing intelligibly the created effects nearest. Prudence, however, does not deal immediately with things makeable, but only with things to be done: and so it will not be a property of God containing intelligibly creatures immediately, which look to things makeable, but not to things to be done, as is clear from what is said in disput. 1. num. 87. And lastly knowledge and art are so compared with each other that although each is a property of God containing intelligibly immediately things makeable, namely creatures, nevertheless knowledge is prior to art in God's regard, even if God be considered not only as he is radically operative outwardly, but also according to himself: because in those things which have at once knowledge and the art of making a thing, it is necessary that the knowledge which is through the art follow the scientific knowledge, through which the thing to be made is known by its cause, as also the way in which it is to be made: and consequently art is subordinated to knowledge, but not conversely. Hence, although both must influence and execute the effect, from the fact that they contain it intelligibly, nevertheless divine knowledge, being prior, will influence and execute it by way of a power immediately productive; whereas art will do so by way of a virtue, or as it were an intellectual habit, not taking away from knowledge the role of an immediately productive power: just as neither does the immediate influx of intellectual habits in creatures, for example in the angels, take away from the productive power outwardly corresponding to them, namely from their intellect, which in the role of an immediately productive and nearest power influences absolutely immediately.

66 It is confirmed and explained again by the reason which the Angelic Doctor hints at in the cited places and below in q. 54. a. 5, which can be proposed in this form. Because by the very fact that the primordial act of understanding of God, and consequently also the intellect, is constitutive of the divine nature, and according as it is act of understanding it executes by way of a principle precisely radical the production of creatures, the immediately productive power of them must be one of the intellectual virtues affecting the intellect, or the will itself, or finally one of the virtues pertaining to the will: but neither the will nor any of the virtues pertaining to it can have the role of an immediately productive power: therefore the aforesaid reason of power will belong to one of the intellectual virtues, namely to knowledge, or to wisdom, which is the knowledge of God itself without any virtual distinction. The major seems certain. Because a purely intellectual nature, such as the divine nature, constituted by the primordial act of understanding of God, can have only a twofold kind of powers, or operative virtues, namely those which pertain to the intellect, and those which look to the will: and consequently all its operation is enclosed under intellection and volition. The minor, however, is clear too. Because this, namely to contain by way of a nearest virtue the whole breadth of created being, indicates a certain maximum in the virtue and the highest perfection of that which contains: and consequently it must belong to one of the virtues and attributes which are nobler in their own genus: therefore since the will and its virtues are in their own genus less noble than the attributes pertaining to the intellectual part, as distinguished from the affective part of the intellectual nature, it will follow that neither the will nor any of the affective virtues can have the role of an immediately productive power of the production of creatures.

From which also the consequence is clear enough. Because knowledge, or wisdom, among the attributes looking to the intellectual part, as distinguished from the affective part, is the noblest of all attributes, as we said in num. 54: and consequently it has a more universal, or larger, object than they. Hence, if the role of an immediately productive power, importing that highest perfection already mentioned, must belong to one of the intellectual virtues, it must be this that is knowledge, or (which is the same thing) wisdom, which is the highest attributive knowledge of things, and proceeds through their highest causes.

§ VI. Unravelling of the first argument brought forward in favour of the first opinion.

67 To the first of those two testimonies of St Thomas it will be answered that the holy Doctor meant in the first of them only that of the same effect knowledge is the cause, as directing, and the will, as commanding, and finally power, as executing, and that these things are distinguished in creatures according to reality: but in God all these things are one, that is, all these things taken together constitute one and the same attribute, namely omnipotence, which imports knowledge directly and the will obliquely, or (which comes to the same thing) the practical knowledge of God, insofar as it has efficacy with respect to things known.

And so, after the words quoted in this testimony, the holy Doctor immediately adds: But all these things in God are one, that is, they constitute one and the same attribute. Hence with the Doctors the complete principle of some operation is often numbered together with those things out of which it is coalesced: and the different mode of influencing is attributed both to it and to those out of which it arises, notwithstanding that those out of which it coalesces, if taken together and under one and the same collection, are one and the same, or are the aforesaid principle: and so of the complete principle of intellection, coalescing from the intellect and from the intelligible species, it is commonly said that the intellect influences the intellection by way of a power, and of a woman bringing forth, and the species by way of the fertilizing seed of the male: and that this conjunction coalescing from the intellect and the species is by way of a complete principle, and entirely complete: which indeed can be said with a peculiar right, in that it names the reason of a principle absolutely, and simply such, with respect to the intellection.

68 We have said that all these things taken together constitute one and the same attribute, in order to denote by this that, just as matter is distinguished from substantial form, and conversely form from matter, and nevertheless matter and form united and taken together constitute one and the same natural being, which is not distinguished directly, and under one and the same collection, from that same matter, form, and union, and taken at once, although it is distinguished from each of these taken singly, as the Complutenses show from the mind of St Thomas in the Book on Physics, disput. 6, num. 58 and 61, so knowledge directly and will obliquely, if taken together and under one and the same collection, constitute one and the same attribute of omnipotence, which is identified with practical knowledge without a virtual distinction; yet knowledge itself, taken singly, is virtually distinguished from the will, and the will from that same knowledge. ²

69 And then as to the second testimony it is to be said that the Angelic Doctor, in that solution to the fourth, met the aforesaid argument by a twofold method. First indeed (in which the words quoted in this testimony are contained) that the knowledge of God, as directing, and the will, as commanding, and finally power, as executing that which the former directs and the latter commands, are not distinguished according to reality, although they are distinguished according to reason, that is, according to a ratiocinative, or virtual, reason. And according to this mode of speaking, knowledge, formally speaking, consists precisely in the cognition and the direction with respect to the production of the effect: yet it does not, by its own reason, still connoting the will, execute that effect.

The second, however, namely that the knowledge, or the divine will, insofar as it has efficacy for the production of the willed creature, is, speaking most formally, the power of God itself. And so, after the words brought forward in this testimony, the holy Doctor immediately adds: Or one may say that knowledge itself, or the divine will, according as it is an efficient principle, has the role of power.

From these two ways, however, we choose this latter one, laying aside the former: because, as Alvarez well noted in the cited place, by this last way, put forward last of all, the holy Doctor in some way corrected the former; namely because it did not cohere so well with the principles of his doctrine: because, as is clear from what he teaches below in q. 54. a. 5, in a purely intellectual nature, such as the divine one, there cannot be given a power which does not pertain to the intellectual part: and consequently which is not the intellect, or some virtue of it, or finally the will. And although St Thomas in this second solution did not determine whether knowledge connoting the will, or the will itself connoting knowledge (for without the other, certainly nothing can be executed) has the role of power, nevertheless we assert definitively that knowledge, connoting the will, is formally the power of God itself, so that between the two there is no virtual distinction: because that this is the mind of the holy Doctor is clear enough from other places cited by us. Nor should any fault (so to speak in passing) be imputed to St Thomas for having given a solution not so consonant with his own doctrine: because this is sufficiently usual among all the Doctors, whenever an argument is met by a twofold method, opposed to each other, as happens in the present case.

70 It should be added, however, for a fuller explanation of this second testimony, that it is more probable that St Thomas in it does not wish that knowledge and will, taken together — the former directly and the latter obliquely — should be distinguished from the productive power according to reason, that is, according to a ratiocinative, or virtual, reason; but according to reason, that is, according to a ratiocinative reason, or on the part of our mode of conceiving and signifying: because knowledge and will taken in the way described, that is, the practical knowledge of God, by reason of its own eminence, carries out within its own line all those offices. For according as it involves the will, it commands, or applies; and according as in a way proper to itself it attains the thing to be made and the way of making it, it directs; and finally according as it commands by a command properly so called, which is the act of the intellect and of knowledge, it has it in its power to execute that which it itself directs, and the will (speaking of command more broadly) commands; or (which comes to the same thing for the present) applies. And so power executes that which, by reason of the will brought into its presence, it applied itself to, and with respect to which, by reason of the office of directing, it directs.

71 Hence the second solution, which the holy Doctor immediately gives (so that a certain tacit objection which could have been made here may remain answered) does not differ from the first in this, that according to the former, power is virtually distinguished from knowledge and will, whereas according to the latter it is not; but in this, that according to the former the role of a productive power is attributed to knowledge and will: to the former indeed directly, as being placed in the first place; but to the latter obliquely, and less principally, as being brought forward in the second place, because each of them directly and on an equal footing could not constitute one and the same attribute, as is clear from itself. In the second, however, it is not definitively granted to knowledge, that is, to knowledge connoting the will, or conversely to the will connoting knowledge, the role of a productive power; but to one or to the other, without saying to which of them rather than the other this belongs. Not indeed because St Thomas does not hold that knowledge directly and the will obliquely have the role of a productive power; but because for the solution of that fourth argument which he wished to solve, this was not needed. For in the aforesaid argument the holy Doctor only object to himself: That the knowledge of God and the will are the cause of things, but cause and principle are the same: therefore it is not necessary to assign power in God, but only knowledge and the will. It is clear, however, that in answer to this argument it was enough to say: that power, or omnipotence in God, is the same as knowledge, or the will in the way described, that is, either knowledge connoting the will, or the will connoting knowledge. And so from the fact that knowledge and will are the cause of things, it is not taken away, but rather it is posited, that there must be given in God a power.

§ VII. Solution of the other arguments of the first opinion.

72 As to the second, the antecedent of the understanding of practical knowledge, of which we are speaking here, must be denied. And to the proof it is to be said that the practical knowledge of God, by reason of its own eminence, performs that twofold office, distinguished on the part of the mode of signifying alone, namely that of directing and of executing the work towards which it directs: and so only on the part of the mode of signifying and of conceiving; and not on the part of the thing conceived, nor virtually distinguished from the productive power, which under this precise concept, and as it were said, is distinguished from practical knowledge according to that former office, only signifies that same knowledge as productive by its command, of that effect towards which it directs.

From which it is clear enough for the first confirmation. Because the primary object of the practical knowledge of God and of omnipotence, or of the productive power, is one and the same, namely the Divinity itself, as it is the reason of making creatures, although the aforesaid object is not called made, nor is makeable; but only the secondary object, namely creatures. For just as, in order that divine goodness be the primary object of the will of God and of the love of charity, by which he loves rational creatures and produces them with respect to a supernatural end, it is not necessary that divine goodness be made or makeable, but it suffices that it be loved as the primary object which, and as the reason of loving the aforesaid creatures, and these alone are so called and are makeable: so, in order that the essence of God, insofar as it is the reason of making creatures, be the primary object of divine omnipotence, it is not required that it be makeable, but that it be understood through practical knowledge, as it has the role of a productive power, as its primary object, and as the reason of making creatures: and consequently that creatures alone be so called, and be made or makeable.

By which also it is clear as to the second confirmation. Because both practical knowledge and the productive power deal, in the way described, with God and with creatures. And so, just as the will, by loving divine goodness, passes, in a way proper to itself and already indicated, to the production of creatures: so also knowledge, by attaining the divine essence as it is the reason of producing creatures, passes, or is extended, to executing and producing creatures known in that same essence.

73 As to the third, it will be answered that the actual execution, as he calls the temporal production of creatures, is not the act corresponding to the productive power of God, so as to be the actual producing on the part of God itself, as the Angelic Doctor most excellently noted, 1. part. q. 25. a. 1. in the 2nd and 3rd; but that it is only the passive production of those same creatures: and consequently that it is counted among the effects of divine omnipotence, consisting in the most pure act itself of knowing, according as it is only virtually transient, and formally and from eternity is immanent in God, and according to the prescription of the divine will has, by reason of its own eminence, the role of inferring the passive and temporal production of creatures, although it is itself from eternity. Nevertheless it stands that the actual and active production of creatures (not indeed taken adequately, but according to the actuality which he calls the actuality on the part of God, namely the actuality of divine knowledge required in order that, as far as the actuality is concerned, nothing be lacking for its being in the second act as cause) always and necessarily agrees with God, even if it does not always, by reason of its own eminence, but according to the prescription of the divine will, connoting the passive and temporal production of those same creatures: and consequently it is not called, absolutely and simply, the actual production of them. From this, however, it does not follow that the aforesaid actuality of the active production, according to what is posited of it in God, and the divine knowing, should be virtually distinguished; but that the very same knowing has diverse inadequate connotations, and that, insofar as it is precisely the knowing of creatures according to their quiddity, it connotes only those same creatures as possible; whereas, insofar as it is precisely the knowing of them as existing in some difference of time, it connotes them as future in time and as existing in eternity: and just as the actual active production of them has to connote the passive production of them in time, so that although the whole actuality of that active production, according as it holds itself on the part of God, is from eternity, it is nevertheless not called the actual production of them except in time: because this naming requires the aforesaid temporal connotation of them: and finally, as he says the actuality required on its part in order that it should cause them from eternity, should the divine will so dispose, he says the same divine knowledge connoting the actuality of the divine will. By which also it is clear enough as to the confirmation.

74 As to the fourth, it will be answered that the antecedent can be granted most probably in the way of St Thomas, as the Complutenses noted most excellently in the Book on the Soul, disput. 7, num. 28; but the consequence must be denied. And to the proof the antecedent is to be granted, if it be understood of those things which in creatures are really distinguished, in such a way that of themselves they belong to a distinct line; but otherwise if they look to the same line, and are really distinguished by reason of the imperfection of creatures and of the mode of belonging limited to that line: and consequently, although volition and will are really distinguished in creatures, nevertheless in God they are virtually diverse: because each of them belongs to the same line. Hence, since the role of knowledge and of the productive power belongs to the same line of practical knowledge, as has been shown, it cannot be inferred from the fact that these two are really distinguished in creatures that, when transferred to God, they must differ virtually; but only that in one and the same most simple formality of practical knowledge each of the two has the office of directing and of executing.

Secondly it will be answered that, in the way of the holy Doctor, it is more probable that the productive power corresponding to us, insofar as we are rational, is not really distinguished from the intellect and the will, as the Complutenses explain at length in the cited disputation, num. 29 and the following. And to the proof it will be answered, together with the same Complutenses, that that power residing in the external members, by whose defect we are often unable to move at the command of the intellect, is not an active productive power, but a passive one rendering the members easily movable by the intellect and the will: just as also in brutes the aforesaid power is not the immediate principle, neither efficient nor active, of motion, but a passive one: because the immediate active principle of these is some internal cognitive sense, such as phantasy or imagination, though connoting the sensitive appetite.

75 As to the fifth, the antecedent must be denied. And to the first proof it will be answered that the holy Doctor is speaking only of the primordial and radical reason of acting outwardly. For this is the divine nature alone; and not some attribute of it. As to the second proof, however, the antecedent is to be granted, understanding of the real distinction between the created essence and its productive power. For this arises from the imperfection and limitation of creatures. Hence this distinction is not to be posited in God; but a virtual distinction between his essence and his omnipotence is indeed to be granted. Because this arises rather from the highest perfection of the divine essence above all the other divine formalities, as has been explained. And in this way (so to speak in passing) that is to be understood which the Complutenses teach in the Book on Physics, disput. 10, num. 28, so that they themselves, advising us, answered. And so they take an entirely real identification, as opposed to an identification admitting something of distinction from the nature of the thing, or formal, with the intellect alone excluded; but not as opposed to an identification admitting a virtual distinction; because for the matter of which it was treated there, that sufficed. Therefore it is to be denied what is added there, namely that to be able to act outwardly without the addition of any formality virtually distinct is a more perfect mode of operating. For by that very fact its essence would not be so perfect that, according to itself, it would be incapable of having as a virtually such specificative something extrinsic, as is clear from what has been said, from num. 58 to 64.

As to the last proof, the major is to be granted and the minor denied, if it be understood of operating, which is most formally the same as practical knowing. For this knowing is virtually distinguished from being, or existence, through which the divine essence exists; but otherwise if it be understood of operating, according as it is said of essential and constitutive understanding of God. For the aforesaid being and operating are identified without any virtual distinction between them: and consequently, although in God the force for understanding and for existing cannot be virtually distinguished, the radical force for producing creatures and the force executing them nearest may indeed be so distinguished.

76 As to the first confirmation, it will be answered that if we speak of the reason of acting outwardly, and radically, God acts because he is infinite in the reason of being: since he acts through his essential and constitutive act of understanding, which is not virtually distinguished from the reason of being through essence, as we explained in disput. 4, num. 54 and thenceforward. But if we speak of the reason of acting nearest, then he acts outwardly insofar as he is infinite in the reason of practical knowing, yet in such a way that through the mode of the transcendent the whole reason of being through essence is transfused into this attribute, and according to its mode. For all things makeable are known practically by this knowledge, and by reason of its own eminence it has an efficacious command, by virtue of which they are commanded to execution outwardly.

The reason, however, on account of which this diverse mode of infinity is required in order to act outwardly by way of a radical or proximate principle, is this: because to act by way of a radical principle is to act independently of another, not only as of a cause, but also as of a prior and fontal reason: but here is the nobler mode of operating, which can belong to the divine nature alone, and so expresses a greater infinity and a better mode of having it than acting by way of a proximate principle: and consequently dependently on another, as on a first and fontal prior reason, as happens in omnipotence, or practical knowledge. Which, although it does not depend on another as on a cause, and so can be infinite in the reason of knowledge, and transfuse according to its mode the whole reason of being, not as its differential reason, but through the mode of the transcendent, nevertheless it depends, or as it were depends, on another, as on a first and fontal prior reason, and on its very root, namely on the divine essence; and so, as far as the force of its own line is concerned, and according to what it has of itself, it does not signify an infinity so perfect as a radical and fontal principle of acting outwardly.

77 As to the second confirmation, it is to be said that God is not omnipotent because he knows all things; and does not know those things because he is omnipotent, if quia on both sides renders a prior reason formally such and virtually distinct: but otherwise if it indicates only an equivalently such prior reason, according to what we have said above, or if it indicates only distinct offices of one and the same attribute, having on the part of our mode of conceiving and signifying some quasi-order. Hence on the part of our mode of conceiving, God is conceived by us first as one knowing speculatively than practically, and again first as one knowing practically with respect to the office of directing than with respect to the office of executing: yet so that, once a comparison has been made between God as one who knows and as one who has the force to execute, this priority is then, on the part of our mode of conceiving, not yet a priority in which, but only from which, as often as our intellect not only knows that God knows creatures, but also the way in which he knows them. Because God in himself, as omnipotent, or in his knowledge, as having the force to execute creatures, has the knowledge of them: and so if the way in which he knows creatures is known by us, his omnipotence and his force of executing must be conceived. Just as he himself, through essential intellection, or intellection constitutive of himself in the being of God, understands creatures, so he can be considered as perceiving them in his essence, as in the primordial and radical principle of them; and consequently as understanding them in his constitutive act of understanding: and then only on the part of our mode of conceiving is there a priority among these offices, and this priority, still on the part of that same mode of conceiving, is not in which, but from which, if the way in which God has, according to this consideration, knowledge of creatures, is conceived.

From which it is clear enough as to the proof of the antecedent, how, in order that God, by knowing himself and his power, may know possible creatures, it is not necessary that his knowledge of himself and his omnipotence be virtually distinguished. Just as, in order that by understanding his essence through the act of understanding constitutive of it he may understand creatures, it is not required that the aforesaid act of understanding and his essence, as that in which he perceives them, be virtually distinguished; but a distinction on the part of our mode of conceiving and signifying suffices, or such great eminence that it would be equivalent to several things pertaining to the same line, as is clear from what is said in disput. 4, num. 75.

As to what is added there, namely that just as the divine essence alone is united with the intellect of God in the reason of an intelligible species, so in it alone creatures can be known, it is to be said that although the essence alone has the reason of an intelligible species, nevertheless it represents all the divine things no less than if they were united with it in the reason of an intelligible species: and so, once the divine practical knowledge, or omnipotence, has been represented through it, creatures will be able to be known, in the manner touched upon elsewhere, and being touched upon, to be known and to be known in it, or known. And so creatures will be able to be known and to be known in it, or known.

78 As to the last confirmation, the antecedent is to be granted along with St Thomas and our Complutenses in the cited place, but the consequence must be denied. And the reason of the disparity is clear from what has been said. Because the angelic intellect, by the very fact that it is not of the essence of the angel, but is its property, can have that which is required for the role of created productive power, among other things, namely to look upon something extrinsic, as that which in some way specifies it; but the intellect of God, by the very fact that it is of his essence, cannot look upon anything extrinsic in such a way as to have it as a virtually such specificative; which, however, is required for the role of the divine productive power, as has been explained.

Hence it does not follow that this confirmation intends that the angelic intellect be more perfect in its order than the divine intellect in its own, as is clear from what is said in disput. 3, num. 43. For the fact that the angelic intellect is a power immediately producing, and not the essence of the angel, or something pertaining to it intrinsically and essentially, does not arise from its perfection as such, but from its imperfection when compared with the essence, namely from the fact that it is something specifiable by something extrinsic, which nevertheless does not befit the essence: and hence it does not follow that the angelic intellect is more perfect in its order than the divine intellect in its own.

And this can be explained by the example of the example brought forward there, of divine mercy, for example: which, although it does not of itself bring its own existence, as we shall say in volume 2 in the treatise on the Trinity; yet exists through the existence of the divine essence: and created mercy has its own existence of itself: nevertheless created mercy is not for that reason more perfect in its order than divine mercy in its own: although having its own existence signifies something of perfection. For this does not befit created mercy from its perfection as such, but as involved with imperfection, as we explained in disput. 4 of this treatise, num. 7 and thenceforward.

79 Nor does it bear on the point if, against those things which we said in the solution of nearly all the arguments of the contrary opinion, you object that practical knowledge is not virtually distinguished from speculative knowledge: therefore if the former is the power immediately productive of creatures, so is the latter too. Which, however, cannot be said: because speculative knowledge does not pass to the execution of the work. For it will be answered by granting the antecedent, and likewise the consequence, if we speak of the speculative knowledge of God on the part of the thing conceived, and according to what it imports adequately within its own line, which is one and the same with the line of practical knowledge; but not if the question is about it on the part of our mode of conceiving and signifying, and insofar as it is conceived by us precisely as exercising an inadequate office of speculating, and is equivalent only to purely speculative knowledge. And to the proof it is to be said that although knowledge which is only speculative does not pass to the work, nevertheless that which is formally and eminently both speculative and practical at once has to pass to the work, at least by directing, and if it be most eminent, it passes to the work, immediately executing it.

80 These things are explained further by the example of the angelic intellect, which, as the Complutenses teach most excellently in the Book on the Soul, disput. 19, num. 21, is not virtually distinguished, that is, on the part of the thing conceived, in the reason of the practical and the speculative, but the very same intellect has both offices of speculating and of practicing; indeed and the office of a power immediately productive, as is gathered from what those same Fathers teach in the aforementioned books, disput. 7, num. 29: and consequently on the part of the thing conceived it has not distinct adequate connotations, but inadequate ones, and insufficient to found in it in any way a virtual distinction, such as these are, that with respect to some acts it connotes the will, and with respect to others it does not connote it. Nevertheless it stands that according to the aforesaid offices it is distinguished on the part of our mode of conceiving and signifying, insofar as with a single concept we conceive it itself as speculative, conceiving nothing on our part of the same as practical, or immediately productive of external effects: and that, as it is precisely conceived, as having the office of speculating and equivalent to precisely speculative powers, it is not conceived, as far as our concept is concerned, as practical or immediately productive, except insofar as it is understood as having other offices, and as equivalent to practical and immediately productive forces. And so if it had, on the part of the thing conceived, precisely that which it is then expressly conceived to have according to this office, or that which, as far as our mode of conceiving is concerned, is then conceived of it, it would not be conceived as practical, nor immediately productive of the external effects which are made by an angel: and consequently this is false: That the intellect, according to what it precisely expresses by the force of the concept by which it is conceived as speculative, or according to what it has as far as that concept of ours is concerned by which we conceive it as speculative, has being practical: because although in the thing itself, on the part of the thing conceived and without virtual distinction, it is practical, it is nevertheless so by no virtue of that other expressed office, which is implicit, which it has on the part of the thing conceived: so, therefore, in the present case, the proportion being preserved, one must philosophize.

The conclusion is affirmative.

Around this article it is customary to inquire whether things of reason are known by the divine intellect, and whether they come to be. But because our Didacus a Jesu treats and explains this question most excellently in his Logic, disput. 3, q. 3, and nothing occurs to be said beyond what is said there, we abstain here from a discussion of this question, commending that what is said there be carefully looked into.

The first conclusion is affirmative.

Second conclusion: God knows evil things through good things.