Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

9 For the understanding of the title it is to be noted first, from St. Thomas in this Question, in the following article, and in article 12; as also in On the contrary to the Gentiles, ch. 66, and in Questions on the Sentences, bk. 1, d. 38, q. 1, a. 4, that the knowledge of God with respect to creatures is divided into knowledge of vision and knowledge of simple understanding — not indeed so that these two members constitute two attributes of knowledge, but so that they signify a twofold, unequal termination of divine knowledge. For the knowledge of simple understanding signifies, at least among other things, the divine knowledge insofar as it is terminated to creatures according as they are possible, or according to their individual natures, prescinding from actual existence absolutely, exercised in some difference of time. The knowledge of vision, on the other hand, with respect to creatures signifies that same knowledge, insofar as it is terminated to creatures in the way just described, existing in some

Lastly, this was established from what was to be said in the following difficulty.

10 Secondly, it is to be noted that the knowledge of God with respect to creatures is not divided in any way whatever into knowledge of vision and knowledge of simple understanding with respect to them, but so that this division is an equal one. The reason for which St. Thomas gives in On Truth, q. 2, a. 9, ad 1, and which we have recently indicated. Because this division is not given of the knowledge of God on the part of the knower, but on the part of the things known, insofar as one of them has to exist in itself beyond causes in the way described, whereas the other does not. Therefore, since between existing and not existing in this way in itself no middle can be devised, from the fact that between these two members an oppositional contradiction is given, it follows that the knowledge of God with respect to creatures is equally divided into the knowledge of simple understanding and of vision with respect to them.

Moreover, since this stands, as will be evident to the reader, that the knowledge of vision can be subdivided into that which is of vision alone, whether properly or reductively, so that it cannot be of approval; and into that which is at the same time of approval. The former turns about those evils which are not caused by God, but permitted by him: yet in such a way that if these evils, insofar as they are such, consist in something positive, then such knowledge is properly of vision alone: because it turns about a thing properly existing, though not approved by the divine will; but if the aforesaid evils consist only formally in something privative, then that knowledge is only reductively the knowledge of vision, and in the way described, inasmuch as it is not of a thing properly existing, nor approved by the will of God.

Second proof: the knowledge of vision, which is at the same time of approval, turns about future things which fall under the divine will and are approved by it, inasmuch as they have the character of the good. Therefore the sense of the title is: whether the knowledge which is the cause of things is the knowledge of simple understanding? or rather the knowledge of vision and approval?

§ I. The prior position is treated.

11 The first position asserts that the knowledge of simple understanding, and not the knowledge of vision and approval, is the cause of things. So Molina in this Question, disputation 17, in the sections explained above. Valencia at the present point 4, in those sections, yet without their opposing. Vazquez, disputation 68, ch. 6. Suarez, De cursu Dei, bk. 13, n. 15, and bk. 3 De attributis, ch. 4, n. 13. Arrubal, disputation 32, ch. 3, and many others of the Society of Jesus.

It is proved first by a reason drawn from St. Thomas in this article, which we have already brought forward for proving the assertion of the preceding difficulty, in so far as it lay on that side. For that knowledge of God is the cause of things which corresponds to the knowledge that is in a created craftsman, through which he causes artificial things; but this in God is not the knowledge of vision, but of simple understanding: therefore this, and not that one, will be the cause of things. The major seems to be St. Thomas's in this article. And furthermore it is argued from the fact that just as God understands and wills by those powers and faculties which correspond to the intellectual and volitional powers and faculties that are in creatures, setting aside their imperfections, so, by that very fact, because he causes things by his knowledge, as supreme craftsman, he must cause those things by that knowledge which corresponds to the knowledge of the created craftsman, through which he causes his artificial things.

The minor too is proved. Because the created craftsman, who works through a knowledge directing his executive power, does not cause that which corresponds to the knowledge of vision of God; but through another relation of knowledge, through which the nature of the effect is attained under the relation of the effectible, as also the reason and the manner of making it, all of which corresponds to the knowledge of simple understanding of God: therefore the divine knowledge corresponding to the knowledge of the created craftsman, cause of artificial things, is not the knowledge of vision, but of simple understanding.

It is confirmed. Because for the direction of any executing power, it is not necessary per se that there be a knowledge which contemplates the effect as existing; but it is enough that it prescribe the manner in which it can and ought to be done: therefore the knowledge which is the cause of things will not be the knowledge of vision, and of its intuitiveness, but the knowledge by which the nature of the work to be done is known, and the manner in which it ought to be done: although accidentally, or concomitantly, or subsequently, the knowledge of vision, or the intuitive knowledge of that same effect, may be joined to it there.

12 Secondly. Because future things are prior to being known and seen by God through the knowledge of vision: therefore the knowledge which causes future things will not be the aforesaid knowledge, but another prior one, namely that of simple understanding. The consequence seems certain: since a cause ought not to follow, but rather to precede its effect. The antecedent, however, is also established. Because the knowledge of vision follows upon the efficacious determination of the divine will, by which God willed to produce creatures; and therefore it is freely fitting to God: therefore it will also follow upon the coming-to-be of those same things: since indeed in the same sign in which God willed to produce things efficaciously, they are understood to be future.

It is confirmed. For the knowledge of vision is intuitive; and therefore it presupposes the thing as existing, otherwise it could not intuit it: just as the bodily eye cannot see a color which is not presupposed as existing for its vision: therefore the aforesaid knowledge cannot have the relation of a cause with respect to things.

13 Thirdly. For the Fathers, speaking of the knowledge of vision, say that things are not future because God knows them; but rather that God knows them because they are future: therefore the aforesaid knowledge will not be the cause of things. The consequence is manifest. Because if such knowledge were the cause of things, then this consequence would be altogether true, namely: Therefore a thing is future because God knows through the knowledge of vision that it is future. The antecedent, however, is proved. For this is taught by Origen, bk. 7, on Matthew 63; Damascen, On Manichaeans; Jerome, on Jeremiah 26, Noli subtrahere verbum; Boethius, Consolation 5, gloss 3; Bede, Questions vol. 8, q. 13; the Master in Sentences 1, d. 38, and in the same place; Albert, Bonaventure, and Alens.

§ II. The position of St. Thomas is preferred.

14 For the decision of this question it is noted, from St. Thomas below in article 16, ad 1, that of the divine knowledge, insofar as it is the cause of things, we can speak either insofar as it is a cause precisely, as it were in the first act, or in potency, that is, insofar as it has precisely the power of operating; or insofar as it is a cause, as it were in the second act, applied to the causing of creatures.

This being supposed, it is to be said first that, if we speak of the knowledge which is the cause of things by potency, or in the first act, then such knowledge is the knowledge of simple understanding. This assertion is held by St. Thomas, article 16 cited above, in the solution to the first, in these words: The knowledge of God is a cause, not indeed of itself, but of others: of some indeed in the act, namely of those which happen according to some time; of others, however, by potency, namely of those which he can make, and which nevertheless never happen. Where, as you see, the Sacred Doctor attributes to that knowledge that it is by potency the cause of things which is terminated to things which never happen, yet can be made by God. Therefore, since this knowledge is the knowledge of simple understanding, and not of vision, it follows that, according to the mind of the Sacred Doctor, that, and not this, is the cause in the first act, or by potency, of the aforesaid things: and since the same must be the cause by potency, and in the first act, of possible things, and of those same things when in the following sign they pass to being future, if they are considered precisely in that sign prior to this transition, according to which relation they are compared with divine knowledge, or with its cause, as it is considered precisely by way of a cause by potency, and in the first act alone; hence it is that the knowledge of simple understanding, and not the knowledge of vision, is the cause of all things by potency, and precisely in the first act.

Therefore St. Doctor's disciples follow him in common, Capreolus in bk. 1

sect. 2, and many others of the younger Thomists.

15 The fundamental reason, however, of this assertion is drawn from St. Thomas, and can be briefly reduced to this form. Because the knowledge of God, which by potency, and as it were in the first act, is the cause of things, must precede the free act of the divine will: but the knowledge of simple understanding alone precedes it, and not the knowledge of vision: therefore that, and not this, will be the cause of things in the way described. The minor, with its consequence, is sufficiently established from itself and from what has been said. The major, however, is proved. First, because the knowledge of God is the cause of things in that proportional manner by way of the first act, and in its own genus, in which art is the cause in the first act with respect to artificial things: but the art which has the aforesaid causating power is art insofar as it precedes every act of the craftsman's will, because by its own nature it is a habit, or an operative intellectual power in the first act: therefore, etc.

Also then: because the practical knowledge of God has from its own nature a causating power over creatures: but the notion of practical knowledge does not agree with knowledge from the free will of the knower, otherwise there would be no practical knowledge from its own nature, but only from without and accidentally: therefore neither does the aforesaid causating power agree with it from the act of the divine will, but per se, and insofar as it precedes it. Then furthermore: because the knowledge of God has power in the first act to produce creatures, from the fact that it contains within its own order the perfection of all of them: but this agrees with it according to what it has from itself, and not according to what agrees with it from the will; since indeed, according to what it has from itself, it is at least directive with respect to the production of creatures: therefore the aforesaid knowledge, independently of the free act of the will, and consequently just as it precedes it, will have at least by way of a directive principle a causating power with respect to creatures.

Lastly, because the will is determined as to the species of the act by the intellect; and the knowledge, although each of the two is determined as to its exercise by the will itself: therefore with respect to those things which are caused by the intellect and the knowledge, a causating power in the first act must be posited in each, prior to the act of the will. The consequence is manifest. Because the causating power in the act, that is, insofar as it is actually applied to causing, is considered, and depends upon, the motion and the determination of the will.

16 It is to be said, secondly, that if we speak of the knowledge of God insofar as it actually causes creatures, then the knowledge in this way, and in its own order causing them, at least by way of a directive principle, is not the knowledge of simple understanding as such; but the knowledge which is at the same time of vision and of approval. So St. Thomas in On Truth, q. 2, a. 13, in these words: The knowledge of God, insofar as it is ordered to the work which the will performs, is as much knowledge of things present, past, or future. Where he attributes to the knowledge alone of things existing in some difference of time, that it is ordered to the work which the will actually performs, and consequently that it actually causes the aforesaid work: and therefore he attributes that causality to the knowledge of vision alone, which is at the same time the approval of such a work: for it is repugnant that a work caused by God through his knowledge should not be caused through the knowledge which approves it. The same is also held by St. Thomas in this article and elsewhere, as we shall examine at once.

The fundamental reason, however, of this assertion is drawn from the same St. Thomas in this article. For that knowledge is the cause actually causing, in its own genus, creatures which follow upon the free and absolute determination of the divine will: but this is not the knowledge of simple understanding, but the knowledge of vision, or of approval: therefore this, and not that, will be the cause actually causing creatures. The major is shown by the Angelic Doctor. Because the intelligible form has a relation to opposites, from the fact that it is the same knowledge of opposites: and so it would not produce a determinate effect in the act unless it were determined to one by appetite: and consequently unless the free and absolute determination of that same appetite were presupposed, by which it were applied to the production of this effect rather than of another, or of its opposite.

The minor, however, as regards the first part, needs no proof, and is established both from what we said in the explanation of the title of this difficulty, and also from the common opinion of theologians: indeed not even as regards the second, namely as regards the knowledge of vision, or of approval: for the knowledge: for this knowledge is directed to the thing absolutely future, and existing in some difference of time: but a thing is not future in that way unless dependently upon the absolute and efficacious decree of the divine will: and consequently neither will the knowledge be terminated to it as future, or as existing in some difference of time, unless after the aforesaid efficacious act of that same will.

17 It is confirmed by a reason taken from St. Thomas, q. 2, On Truth, a. 14, and below in q. 16, a. 1. Because the knowledge of vision, or of approval, must be the cause of things: but it cannot be a cause, insofar as a cause signifies a causating power in the precise first act: therefore it will be a cause, insofar as a cause signifies a cause actually causing. The minor, with its consequence, is sufficiently established. The major, however, is proved. Because otherwise the truth and the perfection of the knowledge of vision would be measured and caused by the truth and the perfection of the things known through it: since indeed a knowledge which were not the cause of its object would be caused and measured by it, as will be made more apparent from what is to be said.

§ III. Objections against the foregoing, and their solution.

18 But an objection is made first, that what we have said in these two assertions does not rightly cohere with itself. Because that very cause which is causating in the first act some effect must actually, and in its exercise, cause it: since an effect is not caused in the second act except by a cause having power in the first act to cause it: therefore, if the knowledge of simple understanding is a cause in the first act with respect to creatures, it will also be their cause in the second act: or if it is not a cause in the second act, neither will it be a cause in the first act, nor will it be able to have the relation of a cause in the second act.

19 Secondly, an objection is made against the first assertion and its reason, to the effect that these two things cannot stand together: that the knowledge of God should be causating of things in the first act, and that it should have this prior to the free act of the divine will, or independently of it: therefore the knowledge of simple understanding, which precedes the aforesaid act and is independent of it, will not be able to be causating of things. And likewise the reason of the assertion, which rests on this, that knowledge which has anything of will, will be of no force whatsoever.

The antecedent is proved from St. Thomas in this article, where he says that the form does not denominate the principle of action, and therefore neither the causating power according as it is in a subject, but according as it signifies the inclination toward the effect; and that in an intelligible form, such as knowledge is, this inclination comes to it from the divine will, or from his free volition, by which he is inclined toward this effect rather than toward that.

It is confirmed. Because although the evils of sin may be known through the knowledge of simple understanding, nevertheless such knowledge, or any other divine knowledge, cannot be the cause of them, whether in the first act or in the second act; from the fact that there cannot be given a free act of the divine will inclining some one of the divine knowledges to causing the aforesaid evils: therefore it is a sign that the knowledge causating things cannot be that which precedes the free act of the divine will; but rather that which follows upon it, and turns about the object willed through such an act.

20 Lastly, an objection is made against the confirmation of the second assertion, to the effect that from it follows that the knowledge of vision of God, as regards the termination which it is said to have to creatures existing in some difference of time, derives its perfection and is measured from the aforesaid creatures: but this is in no way inconvenient: therefore, etc. The sequence is manifest. Because the aforesaid knowledge regards only creatures as existing in some difference of time, by reason of the aforesaid termination: since indeed this termination alone is added over and above the knowledge of simple understanding.

The minor, however, is also established. Because such a termination signifies only a certain relation of reason, since it could be, and not be, in God; and nothing real existing in God could fail to be in him: therefore it is not inconvenient that the aforesaid termination be measured, or derived, from future things.

It is confirmed. Because the knowledge which God has of sins as such is not the cause of them, as we were just saying: and yet such knowledge is not measured, nor does it derive its specification from them: therefore it is falsely said in the same confirmation that a knowledge which is not the cause of its object is measured by it, and derives its specification from it, and consequently that the knowledge of God toward creatures ought to be the cause of them, so that it be not measured and specified by them.

21 To the first of these objections it is replied that, although the same ought to be the cause in the first act and in the second act of some effect; it is not so, however, that when it is understood to be the cause in the second act, it is not understood in some way, or with some termination or application, at least proceeding from the will, on account of which it has in some way actual causation. Whence, as many times as a cause is conceived and considered by us, at least on the part of our manner of conceiving and signifying, as happens at present, insofar as it is precisely causating, it cannot stand under such a concept and manner of signification, as conceived and signified, as it is actually causing; but by that very fact that it is conceived and signified as actually causing, it is not conceived or signified as precisely causating.

Therefore, since the knowledge of simple understanding, insofar as it has the relation of a knowledge in some way practical, denotes the divine knowledge insofar as it is precisely causating of creatures; but not insofar as it adds the manner, termination, and application required for causing; whereas the knowledge of vision, or of approval, signifies that same knowledge, insofar as it adds the aforesaid termination and application; and by that very fact that this adds them, it is not considered that the knowledge, insofar as it stands under such a termination, remains under the concept and signification of the knowledge of simple understanding, but under the concept and expression of the knowledge of vision: hence it is that, although it is the same cause causating and causing, yet with a new termination; nonetheless the knowledge of simple understanding, insofar as it is under this concept and expression, will not be an actually causing cause, although it is causating: because, as we were saying, when it is signified by the name of the knowledge of simple understanding, it signifies it as standing in potency with respect to causing; on the contrary, however, the knowledge of vision removes that standing as it were in merely causating power, and signifies that same power as actually causing.

How, then, the knowledge of vision adds the aforesaid termination and application over and above the knowledge of simple understanding, and yet is not virtually distinguished from the knowledge of simple understanding, was established from what we shall say in the treatise On the Will of God: because knowledges, or effective powers, and so of the rest, are not virtually distinguished with respect to terminations, or unequal connotations, but at most with respect to terminations and equal connotations, in the manner, however, indicated there.

22 To the second, the antecedent is to be denied, and as to the proof it is to be said that St. Thomas does not speak of an inclination giving causating power in the first act, but of an inclination giving the application to this effect rather than to that: and therefore he does not speak of the principle of action insofar as it is precisely causating, but insofar as it is actually causing, and consequently determined and applied to causing.

To the confirmation it is replied that, although from an effect one may collect a posteriori that divine knowledge does not cause, nor can cause, the evils of sin, from the fact that there is neither given nor can be given a free act of God in which he should will them; nevertheless the reason a priori for this is that he truly does not contain them: from the fact that by reason of its own highest perfection it cannot be a knowledge admixed with imperfections, or deviating from the rule of reason: and so it contains from itself, by way of cause, those things the containing of which argues no imperfection in the cause containing them; although it always connotes the act of the free-

will of the divine will, not indeed as exercised, but (so to speak) as possible, or (more clearly speaking) the divine will, insofar as it can freely terminate, and not terminate, toward willing the aforesaid effect.

23 As to the third objection it will be clear from what is to be said in the treatise On the Will of God, article 2, how nothing divine, even with an active termination taken in this way, or insofar as it is taken on God's part, can be measured by, or take its perfection and its character from, creatures, although some created thing may be the reason for them, so that they fall under the termination of the knowledge and will of God, or under their passive termination: not indeed so that per se, and by reason of some created thing, they have it formally in the passive way, but so that they terminate passively in the material way: because they do not terminate passively formally unless they stand in some way under the divine relation specifying both the knowledge and the will, and their active terminations.

Nor is it true that which is added there, namely that the termination of knowledge, already described, signifies only a certain relation of reason, as will be clear from what is to be said in tract. 4, disputation 7, n. 31 and 32.

where we shall also explain, from difficulty 7 of the same disputation through to its end, how these two things can cohere. Namely, that the free act as such, or the knowledge of God insofar as it is of vision, and insofar as it is subject to divine freedom, should signify something real, and that the aforesaid act, as free, as well as the knowledge according to the relation explained, could not be in God; and yet nothing real could fail to be in HIM.

24 To the confirmation it is replied that, although the knowledge of God is not the cause of sin formally taken, it is nevertheless the cause of that which is material in sin, as well as of the opposite good, to which sin is opposed. And therefore it is the proximate measure of the material relation of sin, and, remotely and mediately, it is the measure of the same sin formally taken, insofar as it is precisely the measure of the opposed goodness, to which sin is opposed either positively or privatively. For just as the knowledge of God is not terminated to the evils of sin formally taken by reason of its own proper nature, but by reason of the good and created uprightness, which it privates, as will be explained in the following disputation, so it is enough that it be the measure of those same things as such, remotely and mediately, insofar as it is the measure of good-

ness and of the created uprightness already described: and consequently it will also be enough that it be the cause of that uprightness, which it measures most proximately and immediately.

Hence, since in the confirmation of the second assertion we said that a knowledge which is not the cause of its object is measured by it, and derives from it its specification and its perfection, this must be understood through a fitting (so to speak) distribution: so that with respect to an upright object, or one not deviating from the rule of reason, it ought to be the cause of that object formally taken, and moreover to measure it most proximately and immediately: but with respect to an unupright object, it is enough that it be the cause of it as to its materiality, and that it be the proximate measure of that same object as to this relation, and that it measure it remotely and mediately as to what is formal, insofar as it precisely measures and causes the goodness which it is opposed to. For by that very fact such knowledge will not be able to be measured by such an object; from the fact that it is the measure of its own measure, namely of the goodness and uprightness to which it is opposed.

§ IV. The argument of the first position is satisfied.

25 To the first, the major being granted, the minor must be distinguished: and it is to be granted of the knowledge causating by potency, or precisely having power to cause; but to be denied of the knowledge actually causing. And in the same way the antecedent, by which the minor is proved, must be distinguished. And nothing else did the Sacred Doctor intend in the reason he brings forward here, than is clear from what has been said. By which it is also clear with respect to the confirmation.

And although this solution needs to be illustrated further from what is said immediately below, nevertheless it can be elucidated by a certain testimony of St. Thomas in Sentences 1, d. 38, q. 1, a. 1, in the body, where he says: Just as the causality of the craftsman is through his art, so the causality of divine knowledge is to be considered. This, therefore, is the process in the production of the artificial thing: first the artificial knowledge shows the end, secondly the will intends that end, thirdly the will commands the act, by which the work is produced, about which work the knowledge of the craftsman places the conceived form. Whence knowledge behaves as showing the end,

and the will as directing the act, and informing the work. Where, as you see, to the created knowledge connoting the will to perform the work the Sacred Doctor attributes that it be the actual cause of the work's being performed, and consequently the same is attributed to the knowledge corresponding to the divine knowledge of vision and approval: and likewise to the knowledge preceding the act of the craftsman's will, nothing is attributed except that it show the end, and consequently that it be causating in the first act, and by potency. For that showing of the end, and of the manner in which the execution is to be enjoined, which precedes the act, cannot (as we were saying above) cause this effect rather than its opposite: from the fact that through that knowledge both are shown indifferently.

26 It should be noted, however, that although the knowledge of a created, and of an uncreated, craftsman agree in this, they differ from each other, as Gonzalez well noted in the present disputation 38, sect. 2, in that the knowledge of the created craftsman is after the fact of the artificial thing purely speculative, and therefore distinct from the knowledge causing the artificial thing, from the fact that the artificial thing depends only on being made by the created craftsman, and not on being preserved: whereas the artificial thing made by the uncreated craftsman, and by his knowledge, depends not only-

in the second act, by which it is attained by him in being made, is also attained in being preserved. And after it has been made, it is preserved through it. And therefore, just as it is presupposed in the reason of the knowledge of vision that it be made, so also that it be preserved. Add, moreover, that they differ in this, that the uncreated knowledge can cause an external artificial thing in its own genus in an instant: but not so the created knowledge, at least the human: because it depends on several things, which must be applied successively.

27 To the second, the antecedent is to be denied. And as to the proof, the antecedent having been granted, the consequent must be distinguished: and the consequence concerning the inchoate and initiative coming-to-be of things is to be granted; but that concerning the complete and equal coming-to-be is to be denied. And so there remains room for the knowledge of vision to cause even future things.

This is explained. For to the coming-to-be of things there concur both the knowledge of simple understanding (in the manner explained above), prescribing the manner in which those things can be made, and also the divine will, intending efficaciously their coming-to-be; and from the force of this will they have the initiative relation of future things. But once this determination and efficacious intention has been posited, the knowledge of simple understanding, which according to itself, and taken with precision, retains the relation and concept of such knowledge, that is, of being subject to the divine will and to its free intention, is under the concept of the knowledge of vision as such: and so it is itself that which afterwards directs toward the work, and which influences both the election of means, which follows; and also (in the manner however explained below) the command, which is given after the election, and from eternity, on account of which things are equally future, namely both in the order of intention and of execution.

And the reason is manifest from what has been said. Because a knowledge which directly directs toward the work intended by the divine will by actually causing it, must not be indifferent with respect to the work to be done and to its opposite: whereas the knowledge of simple understanding, under its proper concept, is indifferent with respect to that work and to its opposite: because it regards all possible things indifferently. And so the knowledge of vision too, under the concept of the knowledge of vision, is the cause of the coming-to-be of things.

28 To the confirmation, its antecedent having been granted in respect of its object, but rather the contrary, it can be intuitive, even granting that it does not yet presuppose inchoately the thing as existing, provided that it itself causes the existence of that thing in the same instant, both as to reality and as to reason, in which. Because although for the relation of intuitive vision it is required that the vision and the object seen be simultaneously in the same sign, both as to reality and as to reason, in which; nevertheless it is not required that the object be prior in priority from which, existing, unless that knowledge be imperfect, and measured (as we say elsewhere) by its object.

Nor does the instance adduced there about the bodily eye, whose vision is purely speculative, and imperfect, and measured by its object, stand in the way.

And this can be explained by the example of the divine persons, among whom there is given an order of origin, and yet the Father through the intuitive vision of his essence, and of the persons, produces the Son: because that priority, or order of origin, is not a priority, or order, in which also according to reason. And so, just as the Father is always understood as coexisting with the Son in any sign, even of reason, so the same Father can always, through his intuitive vision, intuit him,

29 To the last, St. Thomas replies in this article, in the solution to the first, in these words: It must be said that Origen spoke, attending to the relation of knowledge, to which the relation of causality does not belong unless the will be added, as has been said. But what he says, that God foreknows things because they are future, is to be understood according to the cause of the consequence, not according to the cause of being. For it follows that if some things are future, God has foreknown them; but future things are not the cause that God should know them.

Where, as you see, the Sacred Doctor intimates two things. The first is that, when it is said that things are not future because they are known by God, this must be understood only of knowledge according to the general relation of knowledge as such, or of divine knowledge, according to which relation it prescinds from the efficacious will of God. For the knowledge of God according to this relation is not the actual cause of things, and so it is not verified of it that things are future because they are known by God through his knowledge, according to that which agrees with it from the general relation of knowledge as such; otherwise this would agree with every knowledge: nor according to that which agrees with it with the efficacious act of the divine will; for otherwise, by that very fact that they would be known through the knowledge of simple understanding, they would be future. And therefore the Angelic Doctor said that Origen, in saying that a thing is not future because it is known by God, spoke attending to the relation of knowledge, to which the relation of causality (understand actual causality) does not belong unless the will be added.

30 The second is that this proposition, Because a thing is future, God knows it, is only true with the Fathers according to the explanation of the Sacred Doctor, insofar as the particle quia is taken illatively, on account of the necessary connection which is between the knowledge of vision of things and their coming-to-be; but not in the causal sense, in that proportional manner, namely, in which this proposition, Because Peter is laughable, he is rational, contains truth, if the particle quia is taken illatively, or according to the cause of the consequence; but not if it is taken in the causal sense, or according to the cause of being: for taken in that way it is false: since indeed laughability is not the reason, or cause, of rationality, but rather the contrary.

Which solution is taken from St. Augustine, On the Trinity 6, ch. 10, and bk. 15, ch. 13,

whose words are: All creatures indeed, both spiritual and corporeal, are not known by God because they are, but they are because they are known: for therefore, since he knew them, he created them: not because he created them, did he know them. Which the Master on the Sentences also taught in bk. 1, d. 38, lit. C, where he thus has it: Nor are future things the cause of God's foreknowledge: for although they would not be future unless they were foreknown by God; nevertheless they are not foreknown because they are future. For if this were so, then of that which is eternal something would exist that is alien to it, diverse from it, and the knowledge of the Creator would depend on creatures, and the created thing would be the cause of the uncreated.

31 Secondly, it is replied with the same Sacred Doctor, q. 2, On Truth, a. 14, ad 1, in these words: It must be said that the intention of Origen is to say that the knowledge of God is not a cause which induces necessity in the knower, so that from this it were forced that something should happen because God knows it. But what he says, that it is because it is future that it is known by God, does not import a cause of being, but only a cause of inference.

Moreover, neither of these solutions pleases Suarez. First, because among the Dialecticians the particle ideo, or quia, is taken not only illatively, but causatively, from the fact that it is a mark of causality: therefore, since the Fathers, dialectically and properly, contrapose those two propositions, the first of which is: Therefore God knows future things, because they are future. The second, however: Not therefore are they future, because he knows them; and consequently they hold this one to be false: Therefore they are future, because he knows them. Wherefore, so that no equivocation be committed, that particle quia, or ideo, must be taken in all these propositions in the same sense, whether causal or illative: and consequently the Fathers are not rightly explained by this, that in the former proposition only the illative sense be made, and in the latter the causal sense.

Lastly: because if that proposition, Because a thing is future, it is known by God, is taken only illatively, and only through it is signified that God does not induce necessity through his knowledge; then it would follow that just as this proposition is granted, Therefore a future sin is known, because it is future, so this ought likewise to be granted, Therefore a sin is future, because it is known by God: since indeed the same illation and the same connection are present in both propositions, and the same defect of necessity induced on the part of divine knowledge with respect to sin.

32 It is replied, however, to the first of these objections, that even among the Dialecticians that particle, quia, or ideo, is taken in the illative sense, and that this acceptance is not improper and metaphorical, but proper.

To the second, the antecedent is to be denied. Because those propositions are put forward by the Fathers, both as true: and for this, that they be both true, it is required, as is clear from what has been said, that they be taken insofar as they do not have an altogether complete contraposition with respect to the thing itself, properly and formally, but with respect to the words: because they are not understood of the divine knowledge taken according to the same relation. And then it is to be said that that third proposition, namely: Therefore things are future, because God knows them, is true if it is understood of the knowledge of God insofar as it is of vision and approval; but that it is false if it is understood of the knowledge of God according to the general relation of knowledge as such, or of divine knowledge as such. Whence it is not inconvenient that, a merely material contraposition having been made between those two former propositions, that particle quia, or ideo, be taken in either of them diversely, and according to the subject matter: since the signification of the words is according to the matter,

the illation of a good consequence from the part of either extreme: and causality can properly belong to the knowledge of vision with respect to the things known, but not the contrary: therefore, when it is truly said, as happens at present: God knows future things, because they are future, it must be understood in the illative sense through a good consequence: but when it is truly asserted with respect to the present: A thing is not future because God knows it, this proposition is to be understood of the knowledge of God according to the general relation of knowledge, or of divine knowledge as such, without connoting the will. Because according to this relation it is neither the cause of future things, nor does it infer their coming-to-be through a good consequence. And finally, because the knowledge of vision and approval is the cause of things, as has been shown, therefore when it is truly affirmed that a thing is future because God knows it, it must be understood of that same knowledge of vision, and that particle ideo renders both the causal and the illative sense: because through a good consequence it also infers the coming-to-be of things, by that very fact that it is the cause of them.

33 To the third, the sequence is to be denied. Because the Holy Fathers, when they ascend in the order toward the foreknowledge of God, intend to declare that it is not the cause of those things, nor does it compel our will to commit sins, as we were saying from St. Thomas: but this is well explained by that proposition, Therefore a future sin is known, because it is future, if those particles quia and ideo are taken illatively: and therefore the Fathers grant it in order to denote this. But that other proposition, Therefore a sin is future, because it is known by God, although rightly explained in the illative sense, and in the manner related in this refutation, can be granted: because however, from the manner of signifying it does not declare the freedom of our will, which the Fathers do intend to declare through those particles, quia and ideo, therefore absolutely, and simply, and without the aforesaid explanation, it is not to be granted, nor do the Fathers grant it.