Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem
Collegii Salmanticensis Cursus Theologicus, tomus I
First published 1870
The Cursus Theologicus of the Discalced Carmelites of Salamanca (the 'Salmanticenses'), tomus I, in the 1870 Paris reprint. Contains the Prooemium and the three great treatises of this volume: De principio individuationis (a digression on the principle of individuation), De Visione Dei (in quaest. 12), and De Scientia Dei (in quaest. 14, including the extended rejection of middle knowledge). The edition prints St Thomas's Prima Pars text alongside; that text is not republished here.
Prooemium, and the Division of the whole Work
Quaestio I: On the Simplicity of God
Tractatus I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance and of Its Accidents
Disputatio I: On the Principle of the Individuation of Material Substance
Dubium I: Whether the substantial form is itself individuated, and the first principle of the individuation and of the purely individual distinction of the whole composite?
Dubium II: Whether matter, taken by itself and precisely, or matter marked by quantity, is the first and radical principle of the individuation of the whole substantial composite
Dubium III: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to constitute a composite of matter and quantity as an inhering and constituting form, is the first root of the individuation of the composite
Dubium IV: Whether matter determined by quantity, insofar as it denotes a certain substantial mode, is by the very nature of the thing distinct from matter and determines it toward having this quantity rather than that, is the first root of the individuation of material substance and of its substantial form?
Dubium V: Whether matter marked by quantity, insofar as it is said to possess by a radical mode this quantity rather than that, is the first root of the completed material substance and therefore of its substantial form
Disputatio II: On the Principle of the Individuation of Accidents
Dubium I: Whether the subject is the first root and principle of the individuation of accidents and of their purely individual distinction
Dubium II: Whether quantity claims for itself a peculiar principle, so that it is individuated from itself as though it were the first root
Dubium III: Whether essential repugnance exists between purely numerical distinction of accidents, as such that two of them differ only numerically in the same subject
Tractatus II: In quaest. 12 of the First Part of St. Thomas: On the Vision of God
Quaestio I: How God is known by us
Disputatio I: On the Possibility and Appetitability of the Vision of God by Essence
Dubium I: Whether the clear vision of God by essence is possible to the created intellect?
Dubium II: Whether the Holy Fathers knew that vision of God by essence is possible to a created intellect
Dubium III: Whether the possibility of vision of God by essence can be clearly known to a created intellect by the light of nature
Dubium IV: Whether the intellectual nature considered by itself has an innate appetite for the vision of God by essence
Dubium V: Whether an elicited and natural appetite is given in the intellectual creature considered by itself with regard to the clear vision of God
Disputatio II: On the Likeness, or Form, Required for a Clear Vision of God
Dubium I: Whether, according to the mind of St Thomas, some created likeness is admitted in order to elicit the clear vision of God
Dubium II: Whether the divine essence is in fact united to the intellect of the blessed man by way of an intelligible species, with a view to the clear vision of God?
Dubium III: Whether the divine essence, as it has the character of an intelligible form, actively concurs to the clear vision of God
Dubium IV: Whether by divine power a created impressed species is possible, through which God may be seen in a quidditative way, such as He is in Himself?
Dubium V: Whether the first reason which D. Thom. adduces in this article sufficiently proves the impossibility of an impressed species representing God quidditatively and clearly?
Dubium VI: Whether from the second reason of St. Thomas the impossibility is sufficiently inferred of an impressed form representing God quidditatively, and clearly, as He is in Himself
Dubium VII: What specially stands against the second reason of St. Thomas, and how it is to be solved
Dubium VIII: Whether the last reason of the article proves the impossibility of a created intelligible species representing God quidditatively: where the arguments also are dissolved which we brought from the opponents in dub. 4 of this disputation?
Dubium IX: Whether in the blessed there is necessarily and indispensably given a word, or expressed form, representing God quidditatively, as He is in Himself
Dubium X: Whether the impossibility of a created word representing God clearly and quidditatively is rightly proved from the fact that God is essentially itself the being quidditatively understood, and thus cannot be quidditatively understood through a created word?
Disputatio III: On the Impossibility of the Vision of God, As He Is in Himself, by Created Powers of the Natural Order, or Such as Are Connatural to Some Created Intellect
Dubium I: Whether by the absolute power of God there is possible some intellect which by the powers proper to it of the natural order could see God as He is in Himself
Dubium II: Whether by divine power there can be possible some substances and some intellects for which the light of glory is connatural, and which can see God by essence by their own powers?
Disputatio IV: On the Necessity of the Light of Glory for Seeing the Divine Essence As It Is in Itself
Dubium I: Whether the light of glory concurs to the vision of God, as He is in Himself, after the manner of an impressed form
Dubium II: Whether the light of glory is a necessary disposition, in order that the divine essence, in the ratio of form or of intelligible species, be united to the intellects of the blessed?
Dubium III: Whether the light of glory is necessarily desired for the receiving of the vision of God?
Dubium IV: Whether by the absolute power of God the created intellect can, without the light of glory, by its own obediential power alone, though with a concomitant influx superadded in the vision, but not by any other previous [influx], elicit that vision in the same intellect
Dubium V: Whether by divine power the divine essence can be united, in the ratio of light, to the created intellect, and thus constitute it, without a created light, in the first act for seeing God as He is in Himself?
Disputatio V: On the Quality and Inequality of the Visions in the Blessed
Dubium I: Whether an inequality is found among the beatific visions
Dubium II: Whether the inequality found among the beatific visions is not only intensive and extensive, but also essential and specific
Dubium III: Whether an intellectual power that is better, with equal light of glory, sees the divine essence more clearly
Disputatio VI: On the Incomprehensibility of God to the Created Intellect
Dubium I: Whether by divine power the created intellect can comprehend God?
Disputatio VII: On Those Things Which, God Having Been Seen, Are Seen in Him, or Can Be Seen
Dubium I: Whether those who see God see everything absolutely which is formally and of necessity contained in Him
Dubium II: Whether the divine essence can be seen without the persons, or one person without another?
Dubium III: Whether the blessed can, by the force of the vision of the divine essence, see, and in fact see, the free decrees of God?
Dubium IV: Whether from the force of the vision of the divine essence the effects existing under some difference of time can, or ought to, be seen
Dubium V: Whether by the force of the vision of the divine essence possible creatures can be seen?
Tractatus III: In quaest. 14 of the First Part of the Angelic Doctor: On the Knowledge of God
Quaestio I: De Scientia Dei
Dubium I: Whether those things which St. Thomas teaches in the Prooemium of this question are true
Disputatio I: De scientia Dei, quoad an est?
Dubium I: Whether intellectual knowledge is formally in God?
Dubium II: Whether from the fact that God is most immaterial the Angelic Doctor rightly proves that He is most intelligent?
Dubium III: Whether there is in God knowledge strictly so called and formally, and with respect to things
Dubium IV: Whether the knowledge of God is an attribute of Him?
Disputatio II: On the Twofold Distinction Which D. Thom. Constitutes in This Article Between Things Known and Things Not Known
Dubium I: Whether the first distinction which St. Thomas assigns between things that know and things that do not know is true, namely that these have only their own form, whereas those have also the forms of other things
Dubium II: Whether knowing things have not only the form of another thing, but also become by identity other things in being knowable, that is, representatively?
Disputatio III: On the Intellection and Knowledge of God with Respect to Its Primary Object
Dubium I: Whether God understands Himself primarily
Dubium II: Whether the object per se, first and specificative of the essential intellection of God is the divine essence, as distinguished from the attributes and the relations: or whether all these are formally and expressly meant?
Disputatio IV: On Understanding by God with Respect to the Power It Has to Constitute the Divine Essence and Nature
Dubium I: Whether the constitutive [element] of the divine essence, or nature, is the sole reason of a spiritual substance in itself, or of such by essence, as distinct virtually from the reason of a subsisting intellectual substance, whether radically and in the first act, or in the second act
Dubium II: Whether what constitutes the divine essence, or nature, is the ratio of substance alone, essentially and per essentiam intellectual, as virtually distinct from intellection by essence, or whether without any virtual distinction it is intellection itself?
Disputatio V: On the Knowledge of God with Respect to Its Causality toward Creatures
Dubium I: Whether divine knowledge is in some way the cause of things
Deliberately there has been added to the title the particle in some way, because in this doubt we do not inquire into the manner of causality which divine knowledge has with respect to creatures, but
only whether it is in some way the cause of them, whether by directing them, or by properly and strictly effecting them, or finally whether it is in some way by influencing their production.
§ I. Reasons for doubting.
The first is this, that the divine ideas are the primary cause of creatures: therefore knowledge will not be their cause. The consequence is evident. Because there cannot be a multiple primary cause of one and the same thing, especially if it be of the same order, namely either created or divine, as happens here. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because created effects are assimilated most of all to the ideas; but that to which an effect is most assimilated is the primary cause with respect to it.
2 Second. Because otherwise creatures would be from eternity, and contingency would be removed from things; whereas these things are absurd, as is clear from itself: therefore, etc. The consequence as to the first part is proved. Because, the cause being posited, the effect is posited: therefore, if the knowledge of God is the cause of things, and this is from eternity, as is clear from itself, the effects, namely creatures, cannot fail to be from eternity, and consequently will be from eternity with regard to the first part, and absolutely, without any contingency of effect. But the knowledge of God belongs to it necessarily: therefore, if it is itself the cause of things, the effects will follow it necessarily; and so contingency would be removed from created effects.
3 The third is this. Because neither the knowledge of simple intelligence nor the knowledge of vision can be the cause of things: therefore none. The consequence is evident. Because God has no other knowledge concerning creatures than these two, since the knowledge of simple intelligence terminates on them according to their essence, prescinding from actual existence, and the knowledge of vision terminates on them according as they exist actually under a difference of time. Hence, since all creatures must be under one of these states, they cannot escape falling under one of the aforesaid knowledges.
The antecedent, however, as to the first part, is proved from what has just been said. Because the knowledge of simple intelligence prescinds from the actual existence of its object; but knowledge, which is the cause of things, does not prescind from it, but rather involves it, since it must be the cause of the future-being and of the existence of those very things. As to the second part, however, the same antecedent seems manifest. Because the knowledge of vision presupposes the existence of the thing seen, just as bodily vision presupposes the thing seen, from the fact that both cognitions are intuitive, and consequently of the thing as present; whereas knowledge, which is the cause of things, does not presuppose existence, but rather posits it and causes their existence 1: therefore, etc.
§ II. The common and true opinion drawn from St. Thomas.
4 Nevertheless it must be said that the knowledge of God is the true cause of things. This assertion is held, Psal. 103: You have made all things in wisdom, and Psal. 135: Who made the heavens in his understanding: that is, in wisdom, as the Gloss explains, and as it is said in Wisdom 8 in the book on divine knowledge: Who of them that are is more the craftsman than she?, and Proverbs 3: The Lord founded the earth in wisdom. Whence this assertion is commonly held by the Fathers and Theologians, and especially by St. Thomas here, and in the first of distinctione 38, art. 1, and in the first book contra Gentes, cap. 61 and 62, and also in De Veritate qu. 2, art.
from the illustration of natural light, as Aristotle, 12 Metaphys. cap. 2, and 8 Physic. text. 37, and 3. de Anima, text. 4, where he approves the opinion of Anaxagoras, asserting that the first principle of all things is the intellect that moves all things: for an intellect moving all things cannot fail to be an intellect imbued with knowledge, and using it for this end, namely to move those things, as will be clear from what is to be said at once.
It is proved, first, by a reason taken from St. Thomas in this article, which can be proposed in the following form. Because the knowledge of God is compared to created things as the knowledge of a created craftsman is compared to artificial things; but the knowledge of a created craftsman is the cause of artificial things: therefore the knowledge of God will also be the cause of created things. The major is sufficiently evident. Because the intellectual powers of art and of knowledge are found in God, as is clear from what was said in art. 1 of this question: therefore his knowledge will be compared to created things which fall under it, in that proportionate manner in which the knowledge of a created craftsman, in whom knowledge and art are found together, is compared to artificial things falling under that knowledge and art. The minor, too, is evident. Because the knowledge of a created craftsman prescribes the manner according to which the artifact ought to be made, and directs it, and influences it with respect to it; and consequently it will be the true cause of it.
5 It is confirmed by the reason of the same Holy Doctor in this article and in other places. Because the being of God is to understand: therefore he contains, and causes on his part things in an intelligible manner: therefore through his knowledge. The antecedent is clear from what was said in the preceding disputation. The first consequence, however, follows from the antecedent. Because every cause will contain, and cause on its part, effects according to the manner of being of a cause: therefore a cause whose being is to understand will contain, and cause, effects in an intelligible manner. The second consequence, however, from this former one seems sufficiently clear. Because a cause causing effects in an intelligible manner, and having knowledge of them, uses its knowledge in order to cause them: because that knowledge directs towards such a work, and prescribes the manner in which it is to be made most perfectly; otherwise it would not be the most perfect knowledge of that work, such as is found in God.
6 Secondly, it is proved by the reason of St. Thomas, Quaest. 3. de Potentia, art. 18, and 2. contra
Gentes, operating most perfectly: but the manner of operating ad extra through knowledge and will is most perfect: therefore it is due to God here, who is the first and most perfect cause; and consequently through his knowledge he will be the cause of things. Both consequences, with the major, are sufficiently manifest. The minor, however, is also evident. Because the agent operating ad extra through knowledge and will directs the agent operating after the manner of nature, and uses it as an instrument: therefore the manner of acting through knowledge and will will be most perfect.
§ III. An answer is given to the reasons for doubting set out at the beginning.
7 To the first, it is not incongruous that within the divine order several reasons for causing created things be given, any one of which is primary, provided that all of them influence in different manners, as happens here. For the idea influences after the manner of an exemplar and of a known object; knowledge, however, in that it holds itself on the part of the principle, and in that it has the character of practical knowledge, as well of the exemplar as of the exemplified.
8 To the second, the consequence must be denied as to both parts. And as to the proof of the first part, it will be answered from St. Thomas here, that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things except according to the prescription and the application of the divine will; yet although he wills the effects from eternity, he does not will them to be from eternity, but in time determined by him. From which it also follows as to the proof of the second part of that same consequence. Because the effect can follow contingently upon a cause necessary with regard to its entity, but freely applied.
To these one may also add, from St. Thomas, in the question cited, De Veritate, art. 14, ad 3, where he says: The effect follows the necessity of the proximate cause, which can also be the means of demonstrating the effect; but it is not necessary that it follow the necessity of the first cause, because the effect can be hindered from the second cause, if that is contingent. As is evident in the effects which are produced in general and corruptible things by the motion of the heavenly bodies, the lower powers being the intermediaries. For the effects are contingent because of the defectibility of the powers of natu-
Finally this is made clear from what is to be said in the following doubt.