Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

30 In the preceding difficulty we explained only expressly whether the reason of a spiritual substance as such, as distinguished from intellectual being, whether in actu primo or in actu secundo, is the constitutive principle of the divine essence. And so it remains to be explained whether intellectual being itself, taken strictly and radically and essentially, or else being intelligible in actu secundo, that is, as extending to actual intellection as such, has the role of the constitutive principle of the divine essence, or of the divine nature. And therefore, in order that this be explained better and more precisely, the present difficulty is raised.

But in order that the title of that question may be better understood, it must be noted that by "intellection as such" is not meant any sort of divine intellection, such as scientific intellection, or that of an art, and other similar ones, which correspond to our intellectual habits and to the intellections elicited by them; but rather the first intellection of God, corresponding to the adequate act of our intellect and to the power which by its own proper nature we have as radically intellectual, in as much as, just as our being intelligible, whether radical or actual, is either a radical or an actual intellection of whatever intelligible thing is intelligible under the reason of the intelligible, so: that first intellection of God and his intellectual power, being altogether identified one with the other without any virtual distinction between them, as we shall show at once, is the intellection of all divine things, and of whatever other intelligible things there are, under the reason nonetheless (so to speak) of the divine intelligible, that is, through all its amplitude, as it is his own being both in the entitative and in the intelligible order, and according to that most formal consideration by which he is the most universal reason, under which all things are understood by God; but not in as much as that same essence which of necessity includes, so as to have its own being in either order, has a peculiar reason for attaining these rather than those, or in this determinate way rather than that one, namely, of understanding in a determinate way through a cause, or by something similar, in correspondence with that determinate mode of understanding which is found in the acts elicited by our intellectual habits, in as much as they are such.

§ I. The first opinion is proposed.

31 The first opinion asserts that the constitutive principle of the divine essence and of the divine nature is not distinguished from it, on account of those things which we set forth in the preceding difficulty. It asserts, however, that intellection as such is not its constitutive principle, in as much as virtually distinguished from its attributes; but that it is constituted only by being radically and essentially intellectual in actu primo, or by the being that elicits the divine intellection. Thus Curiel, in his Controversies, book 2, controversy 3, number 166; Arubaltom, book 1 on the first part, disputation 28, chapters 3 and 4; Albertinus, Corollary 24 on relation, question 14, difficulty 2; and others of the later school.

It is proved firstly. Because the nature of man is constituted by this, that it be radically intellectual by human intellection, and the nature of an Angel by this, that it be radically intellectual by Angelic intellection; but not by this, that they be understanding through intellections corresponding to them: therefore the divine nature is constituted by this, that it be radically intellectual by divine intellection, that is, essentially; but not by the intellection itself.

32 The consequence is clear. Then because that very thing which is the constitutive principle of created intellectual nature must be the constitutive principle, with imperfections removed, of uncreated intellectual nature. But in this, namely, that the nature of God is constituted by precisely this, that it be radically intellectual by divine intellection, just as human nature is, by this, rather, an infinite power which is of necessity required for understanding through such intellection: therefore, etc.

Then also: because being intellectually by radical human intellection is the constitutive principle of human nature, because it is the first predicate which is proper to it in the intellectual order; but being radically intellectual by divine intellection is the first predicate which is proper to God in the intellectual order, such that it belongs to him alone and not to another, since by this predicate he is first distinguished from created intellectual natures, with which he agreed in intellectual being, and also from every other created nature: therefore, etc.

33 Secondly. Because sanctifying grace is a formal participation of the divine nature, as all theologians commonly admit, and therefore through it we are made sons of God; but through sanctifying grace, taken formally and with precision, it is being radically intellectual as it is in itself that is participated, and not intellection itself, or the vision of God, as it is in itself, as it is clear from itself: therefore it is a sign that the divine nature consists in the intellectuality already spoken of, and not in understanding itself.

It is confirmed. Because otherwise we should not be made sons of God until we should see him himself, and consequently there would be in us no right to the eternal inheritance before the aforesaid vision; which is very absurd, and against the common opinion of theologians: therefore, etc. The consequence is clear. Because if the nature of God consisted in understanding itself, then, just as we should not participate in the understanding which is constitutive of God, or that understanding by which he, as he is in himself, is understood by himself until we should see him, so neither should we have his nature; and consequently neither should we be sons, or heirs, of him.

34 Thirdly. Many things are contained in God's understanding, which yet are not contained in his being, or nature: therefore it is a sign that understanding is not the constitutive principle of the divine essence, or of the divine nature; and so the constitutive principle of that essence will be the sole radical power of understanding through divine intellection. This second consequence is clear from the first. Because the nature of God, being most perfect, must pertain to the order of consisting in this, that it be the radical power of understanding through such intellection. The first consequence, however, is clear from the antecedent.

Then, because whatever is contained in the constitutive principle of any nature must be contained in the nature itself. Then also: because, if understanding is the constitutive principle of the divine nature, it will pertain to its line, and will not be distinguished from it even virtually, as is clear from what has often been said: therefore whatever is contained in God's understanding must be contained in the divine nature, and conversely; otherwise two contradictory predicates would be verified of that same most simple formality, wholly undistinguished, namely, to contain something and not to contain it.

The antecedent, however, is proved. Because sin is contained formally in the divine understanding, yet is not so far contained eminently in the essence and nature of God: because although he understands it, he does not however cause it: therefore, etc.

35 It makes no difference if one says that, in order that contradictory predicates be verified of the same thing, it is enough that there intervene between them a distinction on the part of the mode of conceiving and signifying, or of the reason of the reasoning subject, even though there be no virtual distinction, as happens here; because in that very way they are not verified of one and the same thing which is in every way the same. And thus God and Divinity may be distinguished only on the part of our mode of conceiving; nevertheless this is true: God begets, and also this: Divinity does not beget. And then synonyms are distinguished only grammatically, or by the reason of the reasoning subject, and not virtually, or by the reason of the reasoned, and yet these statements are true: A garment is of neither gender: a dress is not of neither gender. And lastly Peter is distinguished from himself by the sole reason of the reasoning subject; yet it is verified of him that he is the same as himself, and that he is not the same, if the affirmative be understood of real identity and the negative of identity of reason; because at least by reason he is distinguished from himself.

For against this it must be said that although a distinction of the reason of the reasoning subject suffices to remove contradiction in predicates which agree with something through the sole operation of the intellect, without foundation in the thing, as is seen in the two examples given above; yet it does not suffice at all in the case of predicates which are verified, together with the divine intellection, and are not contained in the divine being, of God on the part of the thing, all operation of our intellect being set aside, as is clear from the thing itself and from what has been said: therefore, in order that the contradiction be removed, some distinction at least virtual is necessary on the part of the thing between the essence of God and his intellection. The consequence together with the minor appears sufficiently plain. The major, however, is proved: because a distinction must be posited there where, if there were none, a contradiction would be verified; but on the part of the thing it is verified that the divine essence does not contain evils, while the divine understanding does contain them: therefore some distinction, at least fundamental, or virtual, must be posited on the part of the thing between the essence, or nature, of God and this understanding of his.

36 Add that the instance adduced in the first place in this solution does not favour it, but rather presses against it. For in that proposition, God begets, the subject, namely God, is not supposed for the concrete of Divinity, that is, for one having Divinity, so as to abstract from persons: because here God, as the notion common to the three persons, cannot be the principle of a notional act, nor produce anything ad intra, since he is not really distinguished from any person, but is supposed for the Father alone determinately, as the holy Doctor teaches in question 39, article 4, from the fact that the subject is restricted by the predicate; and consequently that the word God, as the subject of this proposition, God begets, is virtually distinguished by the reason of Paternity from the divine essence taken precisely, which is the subject of the other proposition, namely: Essence does not beget.

37 Fourthly. Because the divine essence, or nature, is constituted by that through which it has in the first place to contain all creatures, since the nature of God is that which in the first place contains every other created nature; but that through which the divine nature has in the first place to contain every created nature is not understanding itself in actu secundo, but being radically, or in actu primo, intellectual through the highest of all intellections, namely, the divine: therefore, etc. The minor with respect to the second part is plainly clear from the first. Because the divine nature must in the first place contain every other created nature through something pertaining to the intellectual order: from the fact that just as the mode of acting intellectually is the noblest of all, so is the mode of containing natures: therefore, if it does not contain creatures in the first place through understanding, it will certainly contain them through radical intellectual being itself, or in actu primo.

The same minor, however, is proved with respect to the first part. Then because understanding does not contain the thing understood in entitative and natural being, but only in intelligible and intentional being: and so this containment will not be sufficient to cause creatures in entitative being. Hence the divine omnipotence, in which the radical and primary power which is in the nature of God for the production of creatures shines forth most, just as it produces them ad extra according to their entitative being, so contains them in entitative and natural being. Then also: because God understands all created natures, because they are represented in his essence as in a cause; since he knows them in his essence, as in a cause and in a foreknown object: therefore that he contain creatures precedes that he understand them: therefore that by which in the first place he contains them will not be his understanding.

38 Fifthly. Because intellection cannot, even in God, be prior to the reason of the true and the intelligible: therefore it cannot be the very essence of God. The antecedent is clear: because otherwise it would be prior to its own object, which is self-contradictory. And the consequence is proved. Because intelligibility, or truth, supposes from the nature of the thing an entity, since it is predicated of it as its affection: therefore such intelligibility as the divine is must be supposed from the nature of the thing to be such an entity, namely, a divine one, constituted in its quasi-species: therefore intellection itself, which is not prior to the reason of the true and the intelligible, supposes that same entity, or (which comes to the same) the divine nature, constituted in its quasi-species.

39 Lastly. Because understanding essentially has the true operation of an intellectual nature, even in God: therefore it is not constitutive of it, but supposes the nature and essence of God already constituted; and consequently the radical intellectuality alone, or that already explained in actu primo, will be the constitutive principle of the aforesaid essence or nature. This last consequence is clear from what has just been said. The first, however, is clear from the antecedent. Because it belongs to the reason of an operation that it presuppose, at least virtually, the being of the agent: since whatever acts, acts according to The antecedent, however, is proved. Then because understanding, according to its proper reason, is an immanent operation looking to the intellectual order, or essentially including it: therefore even in God it will retain this reason of intellectual operation. Then also: because understanding is the most perfect act, by which an intellectual nature lives most perfectly and in actu secundo; but a most perfect life, though in actu secundo, consists in an operation, according to the common opinion of all philosophers: therefore understanding, from its own reason, and consequently also in God, will be a true operation. Then lastly, because the beatitude of God even now consists in an operation; since our beatitude, which is a formal participation of the divine beatitude, consists in an operation, as in the matter of beatitude it is commonly shown to consist: but the divine beatitude consists in intellection, as the holy Doctor teaches below, question 26, article 2: therefore, etc.

40 It makes no difference if one objects in the first place, along with some of the later Thomists, that although it belongs to the reason of a created operation that it proceed from another, it does not belong to the reason of an operation as such, setting aside the fact of its proceeding from another, or its being, speaking most formally, the very agent itself.

For against this it must be said that just as being towards is the proper reason of a relation, so as to abstract from created and uncreated, and therefore a relation taken formally cannot be found in divine things without being towards being found there, so with respect to the reason of an operation, in as much as it abstracts from any operation, the reason is being from. For just as a relation is defined through being towards a term, so an action is defined through the fact of being in some way from the agent; but something implies that it proceeds in some way from another, without its being distinguished in some way, that is, at least virtually, from that other and that other being at least virtually presupposed.

41 Nor does it make a difference if one objects in the second place, along with others, that understanding signifies two things, namely, understanding itself, in as much as it denotes an operation, and a peculiar degree of being, namely, the degree of intellectuality in the ultimate act, subsisting of itself. Hence, although understanding in the first manner supposes the nature of God already constituted, it does not in the second manner; but rather it constitutes it: because the divine nature is constituted by this, that it be an intellectual nature subsisting in the ultimate act.

For in as much as understanding, from its formal and essential concept, has the character of a second vital act and of an operation, as has been said, it cannot abstract from the reason of operation and of a second act; and so it will always have to presuppose the being constituted of the thing understood; all the more so because understanding is said to designate an intellectual degree in the ultimate act precisely because the ultimate act of that degree is an immanent operation, just as the ultimate act of an essence is being: therefore it implies that we conceive of it, as designating an intellectual degree subsisting in the ultimate act, only if we understand it itself under the reason of an operation.

42 It is confirmed, because when understanding is taken as a degree, and then as an operation, either this second acceptance of understanding is understood as a new virtual actuality, somehow virtually distinguished from understanding itself as it is a degree, or is it not? If this second thing is said, therefore the whole actuality of the operation, as it is an operation, is involved in the concept of it as a degree: and consequently the reason of a degree cannot be abstracted from the reason of an operation. If, however, the first is asserted, therefore when we conceive of understanding as a degree, we do not conceive of it under the whole actuality of its intelligible kind, and consequently not in the ultimate and pure act, but only in the first act: and so the constitutive principle of the divine nature will be only understanding in the first act.

It is confirmed. Because either divine understanding, in as much as it constitutes a degree, is the actual perception of an object, or is not? If the second, therefore it says only understanding in the first act, and consequently will not say a degree of intellectuality in the ultimate act. If the first, therefore understanding is understanding by way of an operation: since actually to perceive an object is actually to contemplate it, and actual contemplation is actual operation of the intellect.

§ II. The more accurate opinion of the holy Doctor.

43 It must nevertheless be said that the constitutive principle of the divine essence, or nature, is not that by which it is radically and essentially intellectual, in as much as this reason is virtually distinguished from actual intellection, as was explained in number 30; but rather that it extends to this, that without any fundamental distinction, or any virtual distinction, understanding itself is the understanding by essence: and consequently that the aforesaid intellectuality is by way of the most pure and ultimate act, that is, that understanding itself is the constitutive principle of the divine essence or nature.

This assertion the holy Doctor taught in this article at the end of the body of the article: where, as we reported in the preceding difficulty, he thus concludes: From this it is clear that, because God is said to be understanding, no multiplicity is posited in his substance. But if understanding, of which the holy Doctor speaks, that namely which we explained in the number just cited, and which alone belongs to him so as to be altogether one and the same, that is, without any virtual distinction with the intellect of God, as the holy Doctor had premised in the preceding words, were virtually distinguished from the substance of God, then some multiplicity, namely a virtual multiplicity, would be posited in God by the fact of his being understanding.

44 The same he also asserts below in question 27, article 2, where he teaches that the procession of the Word is a generation because it is the communication of the divine nature, since in God being and understanding are the same. This reason would not be convincing if in it there were question only of real identity: because in this way willing is also God's being: and thus the procession of the Holy Spirit would be a generation, and so the Angelic Doctor, in article 4 in reply to objection 1 of the same question, denies that the reason of generation is to be taken from real identity: therefore it is necessary that it be understood as being about the most formal identity between God's being and his understanding, which excludes even a virtual distinction. And likewise in article 8 of this question, to show that God causes all things through his intellect, or through his understanding, which is identified with the divine intellect without any virtual distinction, as will be clear from what is to be said in the treatise on the Divine Will, disputation 1, number 34, he gives the reason from the fact that his being is his understanding: this reason, however, would be of no weight, if understanding were virtually distinguished from God's being or nature. Just as from the fact that the intellect and the divine will are really identified, and consequently God's willing is identically his being and his understanding, it cannot be said absolutely and simply that the Holy Spirit proceeds through understanding, or through the intellect, and the Word through willing, or through the will. Let those things be seen which we shall say on this matter in the treatise on the Divine Will, disputation 1.

45 And lastly this very thing the holy Doctor taught: then below, in question 18, article 3, and in question 19, article 4, question 26, article 2, in the body, 4 of the Contra Gentiles, chapters 11 and 23; then also in all the places in which he holds that God's understanding and its object must of themselves first agree in the degree of immateriality, that is, in this, that each of them is its own being, or existence, as we set forth in the preceding difficulty with reason 3. Hence the holy Doctor is followed by Zumel, book 1 on the first part, question 27, article 4, question 2; Gonzalez, in the present disputation 36; Ledesma, if his words are duly expounded, in his volume on the Perfection of God, question 12, article 13, conclusions 3 and 6; Nazar, in this question, article 5, controversy 1; Suarez, although led by other foundations, in disputation 30 of his Metaphysics, section 15, and in volume 1 of the book on the first part, book 1, chapter 3; Herice, tractate 1, disputation 3, chapter 3, referring to Aureolus; and in favour of this Ferrara, book 1 of the Contra Gentiles, chapter 50, when he says that understanding taken formally is God's existence, and not only identically, like the other attributes, although he also inclines toward the opposite opinion. And lastly this very thing is maintained by very many of the later disciples of the holy Doctor who have not yet published their writings.

46 The holy Doctor, however, often touches on the fundamental reason of this assertion, and it can be proposed under this form. Because the constitutive principle of the divine nature, or essence, must pertain to the intellectual order, or degree: therefore it must be the reason of an intellectuality of such a condition that it extend to this, that without any virtual distinction understanding as such be itself, by way of the second and ultimate act, and consequently the aforesaid understanding will be the constitutive principle of the essence and nature of God. The antecedent seems sufficiently clear, especially with the supposition of those things which we brought in the preceding difficulty to prove that in God the essence and its nature are not virtually distinguished. For since the constitutive principle of the divine nature must pertain to one of those degrees which are by themselves fit for constituting a nature, such as the degrees of being, feeling, living, and finally of understanding, it follows that the constitutive principle of the divine nature, being among all natures the most perfect, must look to the noblest of these degrees, namely to the intellectual degree.

The first consequence, indeed, upon which the second rests, is established by those things which, in the treatise on the Vision of God, disputation 2, we said, and in the treatise on the Divine Will, disputation 2, number 34, we shall say more. For from the very fact that the constitutive principle of the divine nature pertains to the intellectual order, or degree, it is necessary that it identify with itself, without virtual distinction, the ultimate actuality of this degree, that is, understanding itself. Then because such an intellectuality must be by way of the most pure act, without any trace of potentiality, even according to reason with foundation in the thing. An intellectuality, however, which does not extend to this, of identifying with itself, without any virtual distinction, the ultimate actuality of its line, or the second act, which corresponds to it of itself in the first place, which here is nothing other than the understanding already explained, is not an intellectuality by way of the most pure act, but one admixed with potentiality with foundation in the thing.

47 Then also: because every line, or formal reason taken in its purity, must extend from the first potentiality of that line, or from that which corresponds to the first potentiality which is found in that line in creatures, up to the last and purest act which corresponds to it of itself in the first place; and therefore the line of willing extends from the principle of willing, that is, from the will, up to the volition; and the line of the essence from the essence itself, which is capable of existing, up to existence itself; in such a way that there is no distinction between it and its existence; otherwise that line would not be by way of the most pure act: therefore the line of intellectual nature in its purity, which, as we said in the preceding difficulty, is the same as the line of nature without virtual distinction, must extend from that which corresponds to the first potentiality of this line, which is found in creatures, up to the ultimate actuality and second act, that is, understanding without virtual distinction, in such a way that the aforesaid potentiality be purified of potentiality, and only remain under the reason of the most pure and most actual intellectuality, without any trace of potentiality.

This is confirmed, and explained by the reason which the holy Doctor insinuates in the preceding article, which, in order to be better understood, supposes that the nature and essence in every complete thing is constituted by an actuality: because nothing complete is constituted by that which is in potency, but by that which it actually has; and therefore it is the act which constitutes and distinguishes: but as in the order and constitution of a created thing no act can be understood unless it be limited and determined, so neither in the order and constitution of an uncreated thing can any act be conceived which is not a pure act: and a pure act designates the reason of the ultimate act, since it excludes all potentiality, and consequently all act of lesser perfection and actuality than the ultimate, or all act that rests only in the reason of a first act.

48 Hence the following confirmation is deduced. Because the essence and nature of God must be something most actual, without any trace of potentiality, even according to reason, yet founded in things: therefore it cannot be constituted by the aforesaid radical understanding, taken precisely in the first act, but by understanding in the second act, having the reason of the most pure act.

It is confirmed secondly. Then from those things which we said above in number 19 and following. Then also by the reason which the holy Doctor insinuates in this article, and which we touched on above. Because divine understanding, of which we speak, is the existence of God in the intelligible order, as we shall say in tractate 4, disputation 1, number 21: therefore it must be altogether identified with the essence itself, and with the divine nature as radically intellectual, in such a way that such a nature be the intellection itself, and conversely. The consequence is clear: then because the essence of God is its being without any virtual distinction. Then also: because in God the entitative and intelligible orders are not distinguished with foundation in the thing, as we asserted in the preceding difficulty: therefore neither is entitative existence, of the intelligible order: therefore, just as the essence of God is, without virtual distinction, its own being in the entitative order, because such being pertains to the line of the essence, as its ultimate actuality: so too the same essence will be altogether identified with its understanding, which is its existence in the intelligible order.

§ III. Objections against what has been said.

49 Now, in order that those things which we have said in support of the assertion may be better understood, some objections must be brought against them, because from their solution much will be made clear. The first objection then is that there is some oversight, that of a real constitutive principle, in so far as it is distinguished in some way, that is, at least really or virtually, from the thing constituted; otherwise there would not be there a real constitution, or a real constituting and constituted thing. If, therefore, all things which pertain to the line of the divine nature must, according to what has been said, be altogether the same among themselves, in such a way that they are not distinguished even virtually, how can a real constitution, or a real constituting and constituted thing, be there?

Then. Because it belongs to the reason of an existence that it be a term of the essence, and not the essence itself: and thus the union of humanity to the Word, and to its existence, through which in the manner of the holy Doctor the humanity of our Lord Christ exists, is not a union in essence and nature, but only a union of a term that can be terminated and of a term: indeed, for that reason the sacred humanity can exist through the existence of the Word, because an existence of its own genus does not have the reason of form, but the pure and bare reason of a term: if, therefore, God's understanding has itself by way of an existence in the intelligible order, how can it have the reason of essence and nature without any distinction, even virtual? Because it implies that the term of the nature, taken as such, be the nature itself without the aforesaid distinction, otherwise it would be the very nature itself; but not its term. From which it will also come about that neither can God's entitative existence be the same as its essence, and consequently neither will it pertain to its line.

Furthermore. Because it belongs to the reason of a root that from it in some way, that is, at least virtually, there proceed that whose root it is: if, therefore, we posit in God the reason of a root of the intellect and of the divine intellection, how do we assert that all these things are identified with one another without any virtual distinction? Since between that which flows forth and that from which it flows forth there must be some distinction.

50 The second objection is that, since according to what has been said both being radically intellectual through intellection as such, already explained, and the intellect, understanding, and being understood, as well as the very object understood and the intelligible species, and finally God's existence, or the reason of a thing as such, are identified without any virtual distinction, in such a way that all these things are the very essence and nature of God, it will follow that there is no reason why we should rather say that the aforesaid nature is constituted by understanding, that is, by the understood, or by an existence, than by understanding. This, however, seems false. Because for that reason the holy Doctor taught, not once but often, that understanding is constitutive of God: because it has among the other divine things something peculiar, by reason of which this office is given to it in preference to the others. All the more so because, since it is peculiar in created natures that the reason of radical intellectuality be their constitutive principle, it will also be peculiar in the divine nature that understanding, by way of the most pure act, have the reason of a constitutive principle with respect to it.

§ IV. Solution of the first objection just adduced.

51 To the first of these objections the answer will be given by denying the antecedent. And to the first proof it must be said that the constitution is twofold: one, which takes place through composition, whether real and actual, or real and virtual, or according to reason with foundation in the thing. The other, however, which is the most pure constitution, existing within the pure line of constitution, without any other composition, and which constitution is called constitution by simplicity.

An example of that first constitution we have in the physical constitution of man, which takes place through his composition from matter and form; and in the metaphysical constitution of the same, which takes place through composition from genus and difference. An example, however, of the second constitution is the constitution of the divine person, for instance of Paternity, or of the Father according to those things which he says correctly: where the person of the Father is constituted by Paternity through a certain most pure constitution, free from every composition, whether physical, or metaphysical, or of reason with foundation in the thing.

Wherefore, although we grant that that which is constitutive of something by a constitution of the first reason must be distinguished at least virtually from the thing constituted, and that thus the two extremes of that composition must be given there as virtually different, of which one is compared to an act and the other to a potency; nevertheless, that which is constitutive by a pure constitution, free from all composition, whether metaphysical, or of any other composition out of act and potency according to reason with foundation in the thing, is not necessary that it be distinguished from that which is constituted by it: because for such a constitution it is sufficient that the constituting constitute by simplicity, that is, by positing itself, as happens in the constitution just spoken of, by which divine Paternity formally and directly constitutes the Father: where the constituting and the constituted, taken directly, are distinguished only on the part of the mode of conceiving.

Hence, since the constitution by which divine understanding constitutes the nature of God is of that second kind, and not of that first, it follows that the following coheres very well, that the aforesaid understanding constitutes the essence of God, and yet is not virtually distinguished from it; but that, taken adequately, it is adequately its quiddity, and altogether the very same essence constituted through it. Just as, according to the common opinion of theologians, Divinity constitutes God, so as to abstract from the persons: and yet, because it constitutes him by a constitution through simplicity, Divinity and God are one most simple formality, without any virtual distinction; but only on the part of our mode of conceiving.

52 To the second proof, however, we confess that an existence is a term of nature, and consequently that intellection, as it is the existence of the intelligible order, also has the reason of a term with respect to intellectual nature, in as much as it pertains to the intelligible order, in the manner however indicated above. Now, something can be an existence, or a term of some nature, in a twofold way. Firstly indeed, in such a way that it be formally, and only formally, an existence and a term. Secondly, however, in such a way that it have formally and at the same time eminently the reason of an existence or term with respect to that nature. Therefore, that which has only formally the reason of an existence or term must be distinguished from the thing whose term it was. Now, that which formally and eminently at the same time attains the reason of an existence and of a term with respect to some nature must not be distinguished from that nature, except only on the part of the mode of conceiving; but it must be at once nature and existence and term without any virtual distinction: because that eminence consists in this, that it have what is proper to a nature and what is proper to a term of a nature: and consequently in this, that it is equivalent to other natures and to other terms taken together. Although, because the aforesaid nature and term pertain to the same line, that equivalence is not sufficient to constitute distinct lines, but consists only in formal containment, and eminently of each of the two reasons, with a distinction only on the part of the mode of signifying and conceiving.

Wherefore, since God's existence and his understanding have the reason of an existence, not indeed formally only, but formally and eminently at the same time, and in the same way attain the reason of a term, it follows, very consistently with that, that he be at once the very nature of God and its existence and its term: and that by reason of this eminence, in which the aforesaid being is equivalent both to our essence and to intellection, and also to the existence found in us, he can be united, for example, with the humanity of our Lord Christ, as he is an existence and a term, and not as he holds the office of an essence, indeed as he is the existence of the entitative order and its term, and not as he is the existence of the intelligible order. Although all these reasons are in the aforesaid understanding one and the same most formal identity, yet the eminence is so great, and equivalent to many things pertaining by their own genus to the same line.

53 By this also it is established with regard to the last proof of the same objection. For although the root of understanding, which formally is only a root, must be of such a condition that understanding proceed from it really; nevertheless, if the aforesaid root be formally and eminently such, it is not necessary that the aforesaid understanding proceed from it even virtually; but it is enough that it be equivalent to a created nature which is radically intellectual and to the intellection adequate to it: and thus by reason of this eminence these two offices alone are distinguished in that most simple formality on the part of our mode of conceiving, in as much as through a single concept we can conceive of it as it is the first power of understanding which is found in God, without enquiring whether that very formality is the first power of understanding by way of the most pure act, or the second act, which on the part of the thing conceived would not be distinguished even virtually from the first divine intellection, or whether it be some formality which by the force of its line precisely rests in the first divine power of understanding, and is not at all identified without virtual distinction with the aforesaid intellection. And then by another concept we conceive of that first power which is in God for understanding to be the very intellection itself, constitutive of it: and consequently that that power should not have its own understanding apart from it: or in the same way in which the same divine understanding is conferred by way of a root with willing, from which it is virtually distinguished, and which is contained in it not formally, but virtually.

§ V. Explanation of the second objection, adduced against those things which we have said in support of our opinion.

54 To the second objection it must be confessed that the divine essence, as virtually distinguished from its attributes, consists on the part of the thing conceived, in all and in each of those reasons, or quasi-reasons, enumerated there, in as much as they do not exclude, either in whole or in part, an all-round identity between themselves; but rather they are identified among themselves by their force without any distinction, even virtual, as is clear from what has been said. Now, granted this, such an essence is explained better by this, that it be the understanding itself already spoken of, than by other things.

The reason of this, however, is established from what has been said. Because, since the divine nature must pertain to the highest degree constitutive of nature from itself, namely the degree of understanding, and since within this degree it is to be constituted by the highest and ultimate actuality of that degree, it follows that this constitutive principle is very well explained by this, that it be understanding as such: because this not only identifies with itself what pertains to this line, but explicitly says the highest and ultimate actuality of it, which indeed does not belong to the other things enumerated in the objection. For although each of those identifies in the manner stated whatever pertains to the line of nature, simply by the fact that it has the highest perfection in that office which it expresses, for instance either in the reason of a species, or in the reason of an intellect as such; nevertheless it does not explicitly say the highest and ultimate actuality of this line.

55 This, however, cannot be explained better than by going through them one by one. For in the first place, the intellect, the intelligible species, and the divine essence itself, as expressing the office of a terminating object, certainly do not express the ultimate and highest actuality of the degree of understanding, and God's existence, as is sufficiently clear, does not express the ultimate actuality of the divine nature: since entitative existence is actualized in us through the being of the intelligible order. And thus the intellect informed through the intelligible species, and having the existence of the entitative order, is able to be actualized and terminated through a being looking to the intelligible order, that is, through understanding itself; and therefore, although in God entitative and intelligible being are one and the same, nevertheless the being of the intelligible order expresses a greater actuality than the being of the entitative order: and consequently the nature of God is expressed more aptly by understanding than by being, taken precisely as entitative being.

56 But if being is taken, in as much as without any virtual distinction it says both entitative existence and that of the intelligible order, then each of the two offices is explained better by understanding than by existence: because it is not any sort of understanding, but understanding of itself and from itself, subsisting in an act actually exercised, that is assigned as the constitutive principle of the divine nature: this, however, sufficiently explains both the being of the existence of the intelligible order, as is clear from itself, and also the being of entitative existence: for what it expresses, itself, namely, that as has just been said it subsists of itself and from itself, sufficiently explains itself to be existing even in the entitative order. Now, the word being, subsisting of itself, does not express intelligible being according to the peculiar and vital office which it exercises within the line of existing, but rather says that more implicitly than understanding subsisting of itself expresses being, or entitative existence.

57 And lastly, the reason of a thing as such, in as much as it not only says existence, but the very reason of a thing as such abstracted according to the thing, or from all potentiality, and subsisting of itself: and consequently the very reason of a thing, in as much as it is not from another, either as from a cause or as from a reason a priori, it is plain that it does not, by the force of its expressed formal reason, express any more than the actuality and perfection which understanding as such has: since it does not express vital being, nor the ultimate actuality of the highest degree constitutive of nature, nor, finally, the degree itself, the highest, namely the degree of understanding. Although, simply because such an entity as such is altogether abstract-

ed from potency, and so the entity is in the abstract, it must under the concept of an entity subsisting of itself include and identify with itself without virtual distinction whatever pertains to the line of the divine nature.

58 It makes no difference if you press, in the first place, that the holy Doctor seems to assign the first place among the constitutive predicates of God to being itself; and consequently he holds that the divine essence is better explained by this, that it is its own being, than by understanding: therefore, etc. The antecedent is clear. Because above in question 13, article 11, he says that the most proper name of God is He who is: it is clear, however, that the most proper name of anything signifies its most constitutive reason. And in this article and in book 1 of the Contra Gentiles, chapter 45, from that source he shows that God's understanding is his essence, because understanding is compared to the intellect and to the intelligible species, just as being is to the essence: and thus, because divine being is the very essence of God, understanding also has the reason of an essence. Where the holy Doctor seems to suppose that being itself has what belongs to the principal divine essence: since from that he concludes that understanding is the very essence of God, because it bears itself toward the same God just as being itself does.

This therefore makes no difference. Because the antecedent is false. And to the first testimony it must be said that the holy Doctor is speaking of the name, most proper to God, not indeed as he says precisely the divine nature, as virtually distinguished from the attributes, but as he says the whole perfection of God, as it is one and the same simple formality including both the essence and the attributes. For all these things are signified, in a certain indeterminate way, by this, that God is He who is, in as much as by this it is denoted that he is from himself, that is, not from another, as receiving from a true cause what he is: and consequently as not having being by participation. It is clear, however, that this reason embraces both the essence and the attributes: since nothing that is in God is from another as from a cause, nor has being by participation, but, in the manner indicated above, exists through being itself as such: which explanation is very consonant with the context of the holy Doctor, as will be evident to the one who considers it.

59 To the second testimony, however, it must be said that if we speak of the constitutive principle of God precisely, in as much as it says that which is not virtually distinguished from the divine nature, then it does not follow that the aforesaid reasons of the holy Doctor are less grounded in the fact that he expresses his being in the intelligible order, and that being, or existence, constitutes the divine nature without virtual distinction. Just as also, from the fact that being is identified without virtual distinction with understanding, it is well inferred that being has the reason of a constitutive principle. Now, however, if we speak of the aforesaid constitutive principle, in as much as it explains the divine nature in a better and more perfect way, then all the other things already explained are constitutive, in as much as they are contained without any virtual distinction in understanding itself. And thus the holy Doctor does not infer that understanding is constitutive in this way because it is any kind of being, but because it is the being that follows, not indeed by a virtual succession, but on the part of our mode of conceiving, with respect to the intelligible species as such, and consequently because it is the being of the intelligible order already spoken of, which indeed is the very nature of God.

60 Nor does it stand in the way if you press, in the second place, that the reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted by formal abstraction, is something more abstract according to the aforesaid abstraction than understanding: therefore it expresses a greater perfection; and consequently the essence of God is better explained by the former than by the latter. This last consequence is clear from the first, and from what has already been said. The first, however, is clear from the antecedent. Because a form abstracted by formal abstraction says the same as one abstracted from matter and potentiality. And thus the more abstract a form is in this way, the more actuality, and consequently the more perfection, it says.

The antecedent, however, is proved. Because a form abstracted by formal abstraction is more abstract than another form when it is compared by way of form both with respect to that other form and with respect to those things which, by way of a material reason, are subject under the aforesaid other form. For by that very fact it abstracts by formal abstraction both from that form and from those things which are subject under it by way of a material reason: and thus it cannot but be more abstract by formal abstraction. But the reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted by formal abstraction, says a certain most universal reason, which bears itself by way of form both with respect to understanding itself and with respect to all other things which are compared by way of matter with respect to it; since being, or existence, is the ultimate actuality of all things: therefore, etc.

61 It is confirmed, and at the same time the preceding objection is explained, supposing first, however, that a thing, or being, can be abstracted by a twofold kind of abstractionionis¹ Firstly, by a total abstraction, that is, in the way in which the whole, or quasi-whole, whether potential or universal, is abstracted from its subjective parts, or from its inferiors: and according to this reason it includes them, though implicitly, and consequently includes their whole potentiality: because it is not in the least abstracted from them. Secondly, it can be abstracted by formal abstraction, in the way in which a form, or any formal reason, is abstracted from its matter, or material reason: and in this way it does not include them, as is seen in a thing insofar as it is the object of the Metaphysics. For according to this reason the reason of a thing is only formal in it; the other things, however, which otherwise are contained under it by way of inferiors, are of themselves material, and are considered by way of material reasons: the reason of a thing, on the other hand, is by way of form. And therefore, insofar as it is the object of the Metaphysics, it does not include natural or mathematical things, as we shall say at once: because it does not belong to the reason of form as such to include its matter, or quasi-matter.

62 Hence the following confirmation, and explanation of the preceding objection is drawn. Because although the reason of a thing, or of being itself, which at once has being abstracted both by total and analogous abstraction, and by formal abstraction, includes according to that first abstraction its inferiors, and their potentialities as subjective parts; nevertheless not as abstracted by formal abstraction: therefore, simply by the fact that it is more universal than understanding, it will express a form abstracted from more potentialities than the latter does, and consequently a purer form, and one more fit for explaining the very nature of God.

The antecedent is proved. Because, as we said a little while ago, a thing, insofar as it is properly touched on by the Metaphysics, does not include natural or mathematical things, and consequently these sciences are not subalterned to it, because according to this reason it abstracts from them by formal abstraction, and it does not belong to the reason of form to include its material reason.

63 For the answer will be given by distinguishing the antecedent: and if it is understood as being about the reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason, and about understanding, as it is abstracted in the same way from any understanding, it must be granted that, if by that greater abstraction there is denoted only what is the more universal, or broader, form, that is, what bears itself by way of form with respect to several material reasons. But if it is understood as being about the reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted by formal abstraction according to the thing, and about understanding abstracted in the same way, it must be denied: because thus taken, the one is not more abstract than the other: but they are one and the same most formal reason, distinguished only on the part of the mode of conceiving. And then the first consequence must be denied, if it is understood as being about the reason of a thing abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason, and about understanding abstracted in the same way from any understanding, and about greater perfection, simply and absolutely such, or about a greater perfection excluding every imperfection. And likewise the same consequence must be denied absolutely, understood as being about the reason of a thing, or of being itself, and of intellection, abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason: as well as the second consequence. Because the essence of God must not be explained by that which is more abstract in the aforesaid way by formal abstraction according to reason, but it is enough that it be explained by that which is most abstract by formal abstraction according to the thing: in such a way that there be nothing so abstract as to exceed this, having a peculiar reason on account of which it is explained by the former rather than by other things, as we said happens in understanding abstracted by formal abstraction according to the thing.

64 And with respect to the proof of the antecedent, insofar as it can be pressed against these things, the major must be distinguished, and, understood as being about a form abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason, the greater abstraction already spoken of must be granted, which consists in this, that it be the more universal and broader form, or what bears itself by way of form with respect to several material reasons: but if it is understood as being about the greater abstraction, insofar as it says, or argues, a greater actuality and perfection, this must be distinguished again, and it must be granted when the form from which the other is abstracted by the formal abstraction already spoken of is not of such a condition that a third form is quasi subject under it by way of a quasi-material reason (so to speak), and about whose reason (so to say) it is to embrace and include all the actuality and perfection which is contained in those two prior forms, namely in that most universal form which is abstracted, and in that from which this most universal form is immediately abstracted; but otherwise, if that second form, from which that prior more universal form is immediately abstracted according to reason, from among these three, namely that which extends itself by way of form with respect to several material reasons, is not of such a condition that it is quasi immediately to include, by reason, all the actuality and perfection of those two prior forms. And in the same proportional way the consequent must be distinguished, and according to what has been said the consequence must be denied or granted.

65 And all these things are explained, and first the distinction of the first antecedent. For a thing, or being itself abstracted by formal abstraction and according to reason, both from understanding and from the other things from which it is abstracted, is by way of reason more universal, or broader, than understanding abstracted in the same way, that is, by formal abstraction and according to reason, insofar as by this greater universality, or amplitude, precisely it is denoted that it bears itself by way of form with respect to several material reasons, or quasi-material reasons. If, however, the reason of a thing, or of being itself, is taken according to what it is of itself abstracted by formal abstraction, that is, insofar as it is of itself abstracted and separated both from all potentiality and from every subject, then (speaking of it most formally, and not only in an identical sense) it is not more universal, or broader (so to say), either physically or really, that is, it does not embrace in this way more perfection and actuality, nor is it of itself (speaking still most formally) anything more abstract by the aforesaid formal abstraction, and of itself such, than the aforesaid understanding abstracted in the same way: nor, finally, is it compared with respect to it by way of actuality: because they are one and the same most formal identity, distinguished only on the part of our mode of conceiving, and on the part of the aforesaid mode of conceiving understanding bears itself by way of a quasi reason of a more formal kind, as has been said. And thus, for this reason, and because the divine nature must be explained above all by this, that it consist in the reason which is more abstract according to the thing, of all those things that pertain to its concept, and not in the reason which is more abstract in the aforesaid way according to reason, therefore the nature of God is best signified not by the reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted in any way, but by understanding itself of itself abstract.

66 Then the second distinction, by which we pressed the aforesaid antecedent, can be explained in this way: although some reason be abstracted according to a material reason, nevertheless if under each of them another reason is also contained, of whose concept it is that whatever of perfection and actuality is simply simple is closed up in both, and in all the others from which they are abstracted, then from the fact that that first form abstracted according to reason is broader in the sense explained, it does not follow that it is more actual and more perfect than the second form from which it is immediately abstracted by formal abstraction. Because this second form also contains the whole perfection and actuality which is in that third other form which is otherwise contained under it by way of a subjective part, and which is also abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason.

Hence, because the reason of a thing, or of being itself, abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason, is abstracted from understanding, which otherwise contains immediately under itself divine understanding itself of itself abstract, and this must actually and formally contain whatever of perfection and actuality is simply simple in that reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted by formal abstraction: and consequently this same perfection must also be found in understanding itself abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason from any understanding, because according to this reason it says whatever of actuality there is in those, with potentialities set aside: therefore that reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted according to reason, is not more actual and more perfect than understanding abstracted in the same way, or than divine understanding, or than understanding itself separated and abstracted in itself, although it be, in the aforesaid way, something broader and more universal. Now, although the reason of a thing, or of being itself, or of intellection thus abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason, says the whole perfection and actuality already explained, nevertheless, since the mode of abstraction is only according to reason, for this reason it says the aforesaid actuality in an imperfect way only, and whatever of greater actuality arises from this also involves something of imperfection in that form thus abstracted, by reason of which this mode of abstraction is not found in being itself abstracted according to the thing, or in understanding abstracted in the same way.

67 This too can be made clear by examples: both from the contrary opinion, and from a similar case. In the contrary opinion indeed. For those who say that being, or the entity itself abstracted by formal abstraction and according to reason, is a form more abstract and more actual than understanding, must confess that it is not more abstract and more actual than the very reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted by formal abstraction according to the thing, or than Divinity itself: and this for no other reason than that Divinity, and being itself abstracted by formal abstraction according to the thing, which are otherwise contained under the reason of the entity abstracted by formal abstraction and according to reason, embrace by God and by creatures the whole fullness of the actuality and perfection of the line of nature without any potentiality, and being thus abstracted according to the thing (as they say) is most formally Divinity itself. Similarly, therefore, do we philosophize (which they too must admit) that, because a thing, or being, abstracted by formal abstraction according to the thing, includes understanding itself in its reason, and is included by it, and is not distinguished from it except only on the part of our mode of conceiving, and according to the implicit and explicit reason, without virtual distinction: and understanding itself abstracted by abstraction according to the thing says the whole perfection which being says without any material contraction of its own, or potentiality: therefore the reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason, is neither more actual nor more perfect than understanding abstracted in the same way, for the reason given, or than understanding abstracted by abstraction according to the thing.

68 From a similar case, too, it can be explained in this way from the doctrine of Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics, where it is said that the superior things, in terms of the consequence for existence, are prior to the inferior things: because this holds neither logically nor physically: He is an animal: therefore he is a man; and yet, on the testimony of the holy Doctor, in his opusculum 2, chapter 1, when the superior is analogous with respect to many things, in one of which is found the whole reason and perfection of the other inferiors, that superior thing is not physically prior in the consequence for existence. Hence we cannot verify that a thing exists without verifying that God exists: because in God the whole reason of a thing exists. Wherefore the holy Doctor, above in question 3, article 5, in his argument but against, said that nothing is prior to God according to the intellect: in such a way that it is understood to be prior physically: because although the more universal things are prior in this way, according to the intellect and the consequence for existence, than the inferior things, and a thing is superior to God; nevertheless, then, the more universal things are prior in the manner indicated, according to the intellect and the consequence for existence, only when the inferior does not have imbibed the whole perfection which the superior has: but God has the whole reason and perfection imbibed which a thing, or any other superior predicate, says: and thus none of them can be prior in the aforesaid manner to God.

69 Thus, then, proportionally in the present case, we say that when the reason of potentiality and imperfection is not found in something, but instead an infinite and utmost actuality, or (so to speak better) when in it the whole actuality is found which by its force is found in that which is abstracted from it by formal abstraction according to reason, then that which is abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason from all the other things which contract or determine the same reason is not absolutely and simply more actual with respect to it. Because when it has nothing of potentiality, and says the whole perfection which that abstract reason imports in itself and in all the other things, nothing can be absolutely and simply more actual than it: and thus the reason of a thing, or of being itself, abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason from understanding as such, is not absolutely and simply more abstract than the latter, in as much as it says that being more abstract is absolutely and simply more actual with respect to it, but rather the reverse obtains, as has been explained.

§ VI. The arguments of the first opinion, adduced at the beginning, are dissolved.

70 To the first, the antecedent being granted, the consequence must be denied. And to the first proof the major must be granted and the minor denied. Because the power of understanding, which precisely rests in the first act and does not identify with itself without virtual distinction the intellection corresponding to it of itself in the first place, of necessity includes imperfection; and consequently it cannot be infinite in the reason of intellectual power, nor constitutive of God. From which, with respect to the second proof of the same consequence, the major must be granted and what is assumed in the minor must be denied, inasmuch as it suggests that being radically intellectual by an intellection corresponding to the first act is a predicate proper to God: since the aforesaid predicate of necessity involves imperfection and limitation, by reason of which it does not identify with itself without virtual distinction the intellection pertaining to its line.

71 To the second, the major being granted, and formal participation being understood as analogous, inadequate, and deficient, and the minor being granted as well, the consequence must be denied; because from the fact that grace participates the divine nature by an analogous participation, inadequately, namely with respect to the single office which is in it, it does not follow that there are not in that same divine nature other offices; but rather the opposite follows.

To the confirmation the sequel must be denied. And for the proof, it is clear from what has been said that the nature of God consists, on the part of the thing conceived, both in understanding itself and in the power and root of understanding itself: and thus even if intellection itself, or the vision of God, corresponding to the aforesaid root, is not formally participated, the divine nature is still participated inadequately as it is in itself, whenever sanctifying grace is communicated to someone.

72 It makes no difference if you urge, at least from what has been said, that if the divine nature were participated miraculously by the vision of God as it is in itself, and not by grace, then the divine nature would be better participated by that vision than by the infusion of sanctifying grace taken precisely; but this is against the common opinion of theologians: therefore, etc. The sequel seems certain. Because although the divine nature may consist in the root already explained, and at the same time in the understanding corresponding to it, nevertheless, as we said a little while ago, its constitutive principle is better explained by understanding itself than by the aforesaid root: therefore, since the vision of God is a participation of understanding itself, the consequence will be that the divine nature is better participated by the vision, taken precisely, than by grace taken with the same precision; because through grace alone the reason of the root already spoken of is participated.

For the answer will be given by denying the sequel. This is so true that, if the vision of God as it is in itself were participated, without grace being participated, then not only would there not be given a better participation of the divine nature taken formally, but there would not even be there any participation of the same under the concept and formality of nature, although understanding is in God that nature of his.

which has the mode of a constitutive principle and of the divine nature. For in order that it might be participated according to the aforesaid mode and reason of nature, it would have to be participated such that God is at once the root of understanding and of willing as he is in himself; since this reason is of necessity demanded for the constitution of the divine nature, so as to be participable under the concept of nature, no otherwise than in created intellectual natures, in which nothing can have the reason of nature, nor can it in any way participate in that nature under the concept of nature, unless it be communicated to it by way of the root of understanding and of willing. Wherefore, since the participation of the vision of God as it is in itself, if taken formally, will never be a participation of the aforesaid root of that vision, but rather the participation which takes place through grace; hence it follows that this is always an inadequate participation of the divine nature under the concept of nature; whereas that other participation, which takes place by the vision of God as it is in itself, naturally carries with it the annexed participation of nature which takes place through grace.

This too can be explained by that example already touched on of the hypostatic union, through which the existence of God is communicated to the humanity of our Lord Christ, which in him has, on the part of the thing conceived, the reason of nature; and yet because the reason of that root is not communicated, therefore the nature of God is not communicated through such a union, nor is the aforesaid union a union in nature, as we touched on above, and as theologians commonly teach.

73 To the third it will be answered that those things which are contained in the divine understanding must be contained in the same way in the nature of God; and thus because sin is contained in the divine understanding as a secondary object in the thing understood, it will be contained in the same way in the nature of God, which consists in understanding itself. Now, since it is agreed that it is customary to deny that sin is contained in the divine nature, and to grant that it is contained in God's understanding, from that former mode of speaking there is indicated, on the part of the mode of signifying, that sin is in God either as something pertaining to his nature, or as an effect proper to it which can be caused by it.

74 To the fourth, the major being granted, the minor must be denied. And to the first proof of it with respect to the first part, the antecedent must be denied. Because understanding, constitutive of the divine nature, just as it identifies with itself both the entitative and the intelligible order in the highest degree of perfection, in such a way that this belongs to it

² existing by the proper force of its line, so also it contains both intelligibly and entitatively, and under being natural every created effect, and every effect creatable, from God. As to the second proof of the same minor with respect to the aforesaid part, it must be said that if in it there is question of understanding constitutive of the divine nature, it is not prior by virtual priority, that creatures be represented in the essence of God as in a cause able to produce them, than that they be understood through the aforesaid understanding: since in understanding itself there are not two formalities virtually distinguished, that of understanding and that of being at least able to produce them in a radical way. Hence the aforesaid representation and understanding are distinguished only on the part of our mode of conceiving, and are compared with each other by way of former and latter, in as much as the aforesaid understanding is so eminent that it has formally and eminently to exercise those two offices pertaining to the same line; in such a way, however, that by reason of the aforesaid eminence, and on the part of our mode of conceiving, we understand first that in it there is the office of representing and containing in the aforesaid way, than the office of understanding, not taken in any way whatever, but as it terminates to those same creatures.

We have said: Not taken in any way whatever, but as it terminates to those same creatures, because if understanding constitutive of the divine nature is taken, in as much as it terminates to the divine essence, and as it is the understanding of that essence, then our mode of understanding is satisfied sooner when understanding terminates to the aforesaid essence than when it contains creatures; just as it is sooner that the light of the sun should formally have the reason of light than that by its power it should contain heat.

76 To the fifth, the antecedent being granted at least as to virtual priority, the consequence must be denied. And for the proof the antecedent must be denied. Because although in creatures the reason of the true, or of the intelligible, follows, in the manner indicated elsewhere, on the reason of a thing, in such a way that by the reason of the reasoned they are distinguished from a thing; nevertheless this does not arise from the nature of the thing, that is, from the proper force of its line considered by itself and by its own genus, but by reason of the limitation and imperfection with which it is involved in creatures. Hence it is not strange that in God, in whom the aforesaid line is found in its purity, the opposite occurs.

The reason of this, however, is established both from what has been said in this and the preceding difficulty, and also from those things which in the treatise on the Vision of God, article 2, we asserted for assigning the reason on account of which the divine essence, just as it supplies the reason of an intelligible species with respect to the intellects of the blessed, so also can supply the reason of a word: because, just as it belongs to the essence of that intelligible species to be actually intelligible, and therefore it can be united under the reason of an intelligible species, so also it belongs to its quiddity to be actually understood by God himself, or to be actually terminating the divine intellection: and therefore it can with respect to this office supply the reason of a word.

77 To the last it will be answered first by granting the antecedent and denying both consequences. And for the proof of the first, upon which the second rests, it must be granted that the antecedent is understood of a created operation, involved with imperfections, which has formally, and not formally eminently, the reason of an operation; and it must be denied of an uncreated operation, and the first among all the divine operations. For this must formally and eminently identify with itself, without virtual distinction, whatever pertains to the first intellectual line. Hence the solution given there, and understood in the manner explained, is the best. And for the attack the antecedent must be denied. And the reason of the disparity between the divine relation and the first operation of God can be given from the fact that the divine relation cannot but be opposed relatively to its term: and thus it must be distinguished from it, and be a being towards it. Now the divine operation, the first among all the operations of God, cannot have any opposition, even virtual, with God, nor be distinguished from him, because its essence must consist in the ultimate actuality and operation, as has been explained. And therefore that which is proper to a created operation, which has some opposition with the agent, cannot befittingly be predicated of it, namely, that it proceeds from the agent himself, and is in some way a term of the real relation of the agent towards it.

78 Secondly it will be answered, together with many of the later Thomists, by denying the antecedent. Because understanding, constitutive of God, is an operation only on the part of our mode of signifying and conceiving, and not on the part of the thing conceived; because thus alone does it have the reason of a most pure act, or of a most perfect form subsisting of itself. And for the first proof the antecedent must be denied, understood universally: and thus, although the actual knowledge of God, which is some peculiar intellection existing in him, has on the part of the thing conceived the reason of an operation, nevertheless understanding, constitutive of God, does not have that. By this also it is established with respect to the second proof of the same antecedent.

From which it is clear with respect to the third proof. Because the beatitude of God, taken according to what it means directly, and not adequately according to what it also includes indirectly, does not consist, according to this mode of speaking, in an operation which is such on the part of the thing conceived, but in the most perfect intellection, which on the part of the mode of conceiving and signifying is an operation. Hence the holy Doctor, in the place cited in this argument, can very well be understood and explained in accordance with these things.

Nor does it stand in the way that it is said there, namely, that our beatitude, which is a formal participation of the beatitude of God, consists in an operation on the part of the thing conceived. Because this arises from the imperfection of the participation of the first line, which is found in God; and not from the fact that the formal reason participated demands it.

Conclusion: God knows things other than himself, and in himself.

The conclusion is affirmative.

Concerning these two articles there is nothing to be said, supposing those things which in the treatise on the Vision of God, articles 2, 7, and 8, we said about the mode in which the blessed see creatures in the divine essence first seen. Since with respect to this, philosophically speaking, the same proportional way must be used for God and for the blessed. We have said the same proportional way, because the blessed, not comprehending God, cannot by the force of the divine vision of the essence comprehend or know all the possible creatures, but God can, indeed.

The conclusion is negative.

Concerning which those things seem to be seen which we said in article 1, disputation 1, difficulty 3.