Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

In the present title the inquiry concerns the constitutive principle of the divine essence, or nature, and not indeed the constitutive principle of the divine perfection. For it is certain that all the attributes, and whatever is in God, constitute, or complete, the perfection of God — a perfection which, so to speak, coalesces out of the accumulation of all the aspects that are found in him. This is so true that even the relations, which of themselves do not constitute any perfection, in some way concur in constituting and completing the perfection of God, as will be explained in its place.

However, it is not at all certain among theologians what precisely is the constitutive principle of the divine essence, or nature, taken as virtually distinct from the attributes and the relations, and as the prior basis (ratio a priori) of all of them. For as in creatures there are given an essence and a nature, as well as properties really distinct from it and really flowing forth from it, so in God there must be given some formal reason virtually distinct from the others, which has the character of essence or nature; and again other formalities, diverse even virtually, which have the status of properties of the divine essence or nature, resulting virtually from it. And so, in order to explain what precisely the aforementioned constitutive principle is, it has pleased to raise the present difficulty in detail: because, once it has been shown that the reason of a spiritual substance, such as it is essentially, as virtually distinct from intelligere by essence, whether radicically and in the first act, or in the second act, cannot be the constitutive principle of the divine essence or nature, an easy path is prepared, as will be evident from what is to be said, for explaining the proper and peculiar constitutive principle of the divine essence.

§ I. The prior opinion is proposed.

2 The first opinion distinguishes between the divine essence and the divine nature, and says that the constitutive principle of the divine essence, taken as virtually distinct from the nature of God, is the reason of a spiritual substance by essence, taken as virtually distinct from the reason of an intelligent substance by essence, whether radicically and in the first act, or in the second act; although the constitutive principle of the same, taken as having the character of nature, is divine intelligere. Thus the most learned Magister Petrus de Cornelio, formerly in this Salmantican Academy a most worthy occupant of the Chair of Durand, in article 4 of this question, second difficulty, whom the younger writers follow.

This opinion, with respect to the last part, will be established by what we shall say in the last difficulty of this disputation. As for the prior part, namely that the essence and the nature of God are distinguished in the way just described, it is proved first from St Thomas, 1 part., q. 39, a. 2, in the 3rd, in these words: Because nature designates the principle of an act, whereas essence is so called from being, some things can be said to be of one nature, which coincide in some act, as all heating things; but they cannot be said to be of one essence unless they have one being. And therefore divine unity is expressed better by this, that it is said that the three persons are of one essence, than if it were said that they are of one nature. Where, as you see, he clearly distinguishes virtually, or with a foundation in the thing, essence from nature: for unity in nature can belong to some things to which unity in essence does not belong; and finally unity in essence signifies in divine things a still greater unity than unity in nature.

3 Secondly, the same part is proved by the reason which St Thomas insinuates in the words just quoted. For essence is virtually distinguished in creatures from their nature: therefore also in divine things. The antecedent is shown by our Completenses, 1 De anima, d. 3, q. 2 and 3, from arguments drawn from Aristotle and St Thomas at the places cited there, and it can briefly be argued from them. Then from the fact that the reason of nature looks to the order of acting; whereas the reason of essence pertains only to the order of being, and says nothing looking to the order of operating. And therefore, when Aristotle defines the soul according to the reason of essence, he did not explain it through the order of operation, but through this, that it constitutes the animate being in its own esse, saying: that it is the first act of a physical organic body. ¹ But when he defined it as it is nature, he explained it through the order of operation, saying: The soul is that by which we first live, etc. And likewise, defining nature, he set it forth by this, that it is the first principle of motion and rest: but these two reasons are virtually distinguished, or with a foundation in the thing, as will be clear to the observer: therefore, etc. Then too: because the reason of essence in creatures is prior to the reason of nature. Hence a man is the principle of such or such operations, that is, he has such or such a nature, because he has in himself such or such an esse, which is to have such or such an essence.

The consequence, however, is proved from the feebleness of the argument: and thus we see that God therefore has divine operations, and consequently operations elevated above every created action, because he has within himself a divine esse, elevated above every created esse: which indeed sufficiently indicates that the reason of essence in divine things is, so to speak, the root of that which has the character of nature, and consequently that these two are virtually distinguished from one another.

4 Finally, the second part of the same opinion, namely that the essence of God, as distinct from its nature, is constituted by the reason of a spiritual substance by essence, as distinct from the reason of substance radicically, or in the second act of the intelligent, is proved. For if the divine essence is virtually distinguished from the nature of God, there must be a prior reason to that, which does not express an order to operation, as is evident from what has just been said: therefore such an essence will not be constituted by an esse that is intelligent radicically or in the second act, since that expresses an order to operation, but by this, that it is a spiritual substance of itself, or by essence. The consequence is clear with respect to this second part, which alone requires proof. For a prior reason, which is found in God, in relation to the reason of nature, and which does not express an order to operation, cannot fail to be the reason of substance — not indeed a material reason, or one having something of potentiality, but purely spiritual, without any trace of potentiality, or (which is the same thing) spiritual by essence: for God is intellectual, and intelligent by essence, or understanding, precisely because he is by essence spiritual and immaterial.

5 This is confirmed, firstly. For that is the constitutive principle of some essence which pertains to the order of being and at the same time has the being distinctive of such a thing; for it is the same to be distinctive and to be constitutive: but the reason of a spiritual substance by essence, as virtually distinct from the reason of the intelligent by essence, whether radicically or in the second act, has these two conditions with respect to God: therefore, etc. The major with its consequence requires no proof. The minor, however, is clear as to its first part. As to the second it is proved. Because precisely by this, that some substance is spiritual by essence, it has this, that it is not a created substance or essence, as is evident of itself: therefore, ipso facto, it will be a substance and an uncreated and divine essence, and consequently by this it is distinguished from any other substance or essence.

This is confirmed, secondly. Because the first thing by which a created substance and essence is distinguished and constituted as such is this, that it is a substance by participation, and hence admixed with imperfection and potentiality: therefore, the first thing by which the divine and uncreated substance and essence is distinguished and constituted will be the reason of substance by essence, and consequently without any trace of potentiality and imperfection, which is the same thing as being a spiritual substance by essence.

§ II. The opinion of St Thomas, and its first foundation.

6 It must nevertheless be said that the divine essence and nature are not as yet virtually distinguished, or with a foundation in the thing, but are one and the same formality altogether; and consequently that the divine essence is not constituted in its own species, or quasi-atom of species, by this, that it is a spiritual substance by essence, as this reason is virtually distinguished from the reason of a substance by essence that is intellectual, whether in the first and radical act, or in the second act.

This assertion, as to its latter part, plainly follows from the former: for the reason of the divine nature cannot fail to consist in an esse that is intellectual, whether radical and in the first act, or in the second act, as all theologians teach in common. As to the first part, and consequently to the later of the two, from St Thomas at the places to be cited below in the last difficulty of this disputation, as well as in the present article where, after he has said that intelligere is the very existence of the intelligible order (in which words the truth of our assertion is contained in force, as we shall immediately set out), he added: And thus it is clear that in God the intellect, and that which is understood, and the intelligible species, and intelligere itself are altogether one and the same. Hence it is clear from this that God is said to be understanding in such a way that no multiplicity is posited in his substance. Where, as you see, according to the mind of the holy Doctor, none of the aforementioned things is virtually distinguished in God: otherwise, although they would be one and the same, they would not yet be altogether the same: for altogether identical identity excludes virtual distinction. And therefore the Angelic Teacher immediately added that, by this, that God is said to be understanding — and hence involves all the things already said — no multiplicity is posited in his substance, and consequently neither is there virtual multiplicity, which is a species of multiplicity. But if the essence of God and his nature, namely intelligere, whether in the first act or in the second act, were virtually distinguished, they could not be the same without a virtual distinction between intelligere and the object that is understood, and the intelligible species: for such an object and such an intelligible species would be the very essence of God virtually distinguished from intelligere. Concerning these matters, however, let them be compared with what we said in the preceding disputation, no. 17. The holy Doctor teaches the same above q. 12, a. 4, as we shall set out in no. 19 and following, and in 4 dist. 49, q. 2, a. 6; De veritate, q. 8, a. 3; and 3 contra Gentes, ch. 51. Hence all the Doctors whom we shall adduce in the last difficulty of this disputation for the assertion follow St Thomas.

7 The fundamental and most weighty reason of this assertion, however, St Thomas touched in the present and following article, q. 39, a. 2, as well as at other places cited by our Completenses, 1 Phys., d. 3, dub. 5: which can be put in this form. For in God there is given an esse of existence in the entitative order, and an esse of existence in the intelligible order, namely intelligere; yet in such a way that this twofold esse is not virtually distinguished: therefore neither will the reason of essence and of nature be virtually distinguished, but they will be one and the very same formality, without any distinction: and consequently the divine essence will not be constituted in its quasi-atom of species by this, that it is a spiritual substance by essence, as this reason is virtually distinguished from the reason of a substance by essence that is intellectual, whether considered in the first and radical act, or in the second act.

The antecedent as to the first part is established from those things which we shall say in the treatise On the Will of God, d. 1, no. 21 and following, namely that things looking to the intellectual or intelligible order, taken adequately, exist by an esse that is entitative and natural, and at the same time by an esse of the intelligible order, namely by intelligere itself, which has itself by the mode of existence in this order. Which is also deduced quite clearly from what the Completenses, 3 De anima, d. 18, q. 3 and 4, teach, and what we assert in d. 2, dub. 1 of this treatise, namely that knowers must have in the intelligible order the very same forms and natures as are in the things known under esse natural: and consequently, just as the aforementioned forms and natures, precisely because they are in the objects under the mode of natural being, must also have there an existence in this entitative and natural order, which is nothing other than the ultimate act of the order of entitative being; so, because the same essence must, by means of an intelligible species, be in the knowers under the mode of intelligible being, there will correspond to it there an existence in the intelligible order, which will be nothing other than the ultimate act of this order: and consequently nothing other than the intellection itself, which is the ultimate act of this order, as we explained at the place cited.

8 As for the second part, the same antecedent is argued and explained in this way. For otherwise, from that twofold esse and from those things which are actuated through them, there would result, in the most formal sense, only an accidental one: and yet not a one per se, so that they would be only identically one thing. For as from two existences, or from two beings in act that are really entitatively distinct, it cannot be made one per se really, according to that common saying of the Philosophers, Whatever accrues to a being in act accrues accidentally, so also from two existences formally, or virtually, diverse, or from two formalities in act, or existing through them, it cannot be made, in the most formal sense, anything one per se and the same, but at most something that is only identically one and the same. Hence St Thomas and his disciples infer, 1 part., q. 28, that the divine relations do not have a proper esse of existence virtually distinct from the esse of existence by which the divine essence and its attributes exist: because otherwise there would be constituted from the essence and that relation, in the most formal sense, an accidental one, and not a one per se, although they would be only identically one and the same. And similarly the Angelic Doctor and his school infer from this, 3 part., q. 17, a. 2, that the humanity in Christ does not have a proper esse of existence, because from the Word and the humanity there is made one per se really, and this one per se could not result unless it were only accidentally one, if both the Word and the humanity had a proper esse of existence really distinct.

And finally, along the way of the same holy Doctor and his disciples, as well as of almost all the Metaphysicians, it is inferred from this that if action and passion are identified, and each of them brings its own existence, then, in the most formal sense, they are an accidental one, and only identically one thing. As in the opinion of those who distinguish the relation from the substance only virtually, and attribute to it a proper esse of existence distinguished in the same way, then formally they will be only identically one thing per se; but in the most formal sense they will be an accidental one.

9 From this, too, the first consequence of the first and principal enthymeme of this argument is sufficiently established. For if the divine essence and nature are virtually distinguished, then the esse of existence that is entitative, which would correspond to the essence as looking to the entitative order, and which is proper to it as such, as something pertaining to its line, cannot fail to be virtually distinguished from the esse of existence of the intelligible order, which would correspond to the divine intellectual nature — not indeed as looking to the entitative order, but as, in the most formal sense, looking to the intelligible order, and as actuated by the form or intelligible species of that same order — and which is proper to it so taken, and is taken from it by the force of its own line. For, as we have often said, those things which pertain to distinct lines, or are taken from them by their force, cannot fail to be at least virtually distinguished.

This same proof of the aforementioned consequence can also be explained and confirmed from the fact that in created intellectual natures, in which essence and nature are virtually distinguished, a twofold esse of existence must be given that is not only virtually but also really distinct; one indeed through which the essence exists, namely the entitative esse, and at the same time nature, as they look to that order; another, however, through which that same nature exists insofar as it pertains to the intelligible order. Because although the essence and nature to which they correspond are only virtually distinguished, nevertheless, just as by the reason of their own limitation they cannot identify to themselves really their proper existences, so likewise the existences themselves by the reason of the same limitation cannot be identified with one another: therefore, if in divine things essence and nature are virtually distinguished, then although we granted that by the reason of the infinite perfection of God the existences corresponding to them could be identified with one another, and with the essence, and with the divine nature, they still cannot fail to be virtually distinguished from one another; indeed they would be proper acts corresponding to distinct lines, namely the line of essence and of divine nature. The second consequence, however, of the first and principal enthymeme of this argument follows sufficiently from that antecedent just shown, as is evident from what has been said.

10 Nor does it matter if you say that it is not against the reason of a one per se, taken in the most formal sense, that something should be constituted from a twofold being in act, whether such in part, or subordinate to the other, as would occur in the present case.

It does not matter, then. For although this evasion might be admitted outside the school of St Thomas, it cannot be admitted within it. And therefore all his disciples deny that prime matter has its proper existence, even partial, for the purpose of that a one per se might be constituted by composition from it and from form: and consequently they hold such a subordination between two beings in act, or existences through distinct existences, which suffices for the constituting of a one per se, to be impossible. And so the Complutensians, 1 Physic., d. 3, no. 51 and following, refute this solution expressly and effectively. Let it be seen there.

11 Nor does it stand in the way if you meet with the objection that it is not incongruous for there to be given in God a unity which, in the most formal sense, is only accidentally such, provided that among those things which are posited as being and as constituting an accidental one there is present a unity per se identically, that is, provided they are formally identically one thing per se.

For against this it is that the most formal reason of an accidental unity, taken in the most formal sense, is entangled with imperfections: because taken in this way it is the lowest and imperfect unity which can be conceived within the line of unity formally, and taken from what is proper to it; and so it is a unity only secundum quid: therefore, however much it be identified with something one per se, or the unity be identically one per se, it will nevertheless not be free from imperfections, nor able to be constituted in God. Just as because the reason of an accident, or of inherence, taken in the most formal sense, expresses an imperfection, it is repugnant for it to be found formally in God, however much it be posited as identified with the substance or with the very beingness of God. Indeed, just as this very fact, that the reason of an accident or of inherence, taken in the most formal sense, has this, that it expresses an imperfection from its own most formal reason, involves being identically the divine substance, so too, because an accidental unity taken in the most formal sense expresses an imperfection, it will be repugnant for it to be identified with anything within God.

12 This is confirmed. For it is repugnant that what, from its own most formal reason, has being of such a kind only secundum quid — for example, being goodness, or intelligibility, secundum quid — should be found formally in God, and consequently be identified with him: therefore it will likewise be repugnant that what, from its own most formal reason, is a unity only secundum quid, such as an accidental unity is, should be constituted in God and identified with something of his.

This is confirmed, secondly. For although it does not entail that there be given in God formally a virtual distinction, which of the formal speaks only of such a degree of eminence of that real divine formality that it contains in force the effects which several really distinct things, looking to diverse lines, could produce, it is nevertheless repugnant that any kind of real distinction, actual and formally such, be found in him: therefore, likewise, although it is not repugnant that a unity be found in divine things which is only virtually accidental, it is nevertheless repugnant that there be involved in it some kind of accidental unity which is formally such.

The consequence is clear. For that only a virtually such unity be given in it does not argue that there is in it some defect of unity per se, but only that that divine formality, and one altogether one per se, is so eminent that it provides what several accidental things, pertaining to diverse lines, would provide. Although, that there be formally in God itself an accidental unity in the most formal sense, argues an imperfection, from the fact that such a unity is formally a unity only secundum quid: and therefore it derogates from the highest perfection of God: just as a real distinction actual and formally found in him would derogate from his highest simplicity.

§ III. The opinion of the Angelic Doctor is supported by another reason.

13 The second principal reason for our assertion is also insinuated by the holy Doctor, and can be reduced to this form. Because in creatures essence and nature are virtually distinguished: therefore in God they will be altogether the same without any virtual distinction, but only on the part of the mode of signifying and conceiving. The consequence is proved. Because properties, or other things which are really distinguished in us, and which therefore express a limitation, must not be distinguished in God by so great a distinction, on the ground that in him they cannot be with a limitation, but in a better way, and consequently with greater unity, simplicity, and amplitude: therefore, since the reason of nature and of essence must also be in God in a nobler way, and consequently without any limitation, and with greater unity than in creatures, it is necessary that in him they should not as yet be virtually distinguished, but only on the part of our mode of conceiving and signifying.

14 Nor does it matter if you say that the reason of unity and of goodness are virtually distinguished, or with a foundation in the thing, from our whatness, as the Metaphysicians teach in common, so that whatness does not pertain to it; and yet from the fact that these reasons ought to be in God in a nobler way and without limitation, they ought not to be in him with a lesser distinction, that is, on the part of the mode of signifying alone, since the reason of unity is reckoned among the attributes of God: therefore, from the fact that the reason of essence and of nature, which are virtually distinguished in us, ought to be in God in a nobler way, it is badly inferred that they should be in him with greater unity and without the aforementioned distinction.

For against this it is that the reason of unity is not distinguished in creatures with a foundation in the thing by reason of a limitation, which is found in them, but because unity of its own genus demands to be distinguished, at least virtually, from the thing of which it is the unity: whereas that properties are really distinguished in creatures, and that the reason of nature and of essence are virtually diverse in them, results from the limitation of those creatures themselves, that is, from the defect of immateriality and of infinite purity in creatures: therefore, precisely because they ought to be in God in a better way, that is, with limitations and imperfections set aside, with which they are entangled in creatures, it is necessary that the properties should not be really distinguished in him, and that the reason of nature and of essence should not be virtually diverse either. The major with its consequence is sufficiently clear. The minor, however, as to its first part, namely as regards the properties, is likewise established: otherwise the divine properties would be really distinguished from God. For what belongs to some formal reason of itself and of its own genus, and not by reason of a limitation — according to which they exist in creatures — must also be found in God.

15 As for the second part, in which the difficulty lies, namely that the virtual distinction between created essence and nature arises from the defect of infinite immateriality, it is proved as follows. Because precisely by this, that some essence has infinite immateriality and purity, and consists in this purity, as happens in the divine essence, it cannot fail to carry with it an esse that is most immaterial by the mode of the purest act: therefore it will extend to this, that the divine nature itself is also without any distinction, even virtual, that is, that it is its own intelligere, whether in the second act, or, as others will have it, radicically, yet still by the mode of the purest act, that is, without any potentiality, in which the nature of God is said to consist.

The consequence is clear. For when the aforementioned intelligere by the mode of the purest act carries with it, by the force of its own line, immateriality, and not just any immateriality, but the highest, and by the mode of the purest act, it is necessary that, in the most formal sense, it be the highest immateriality itself by the mode of the purest act. And so if the essence consists in this, that it is most immaterial by the mode of the purest act, it cannot fail to extend to this, that it consist in the purest intelligere itself, and in the most immaterial already described, and consequently in that which, in the most formal sense, has the character of nature.

Most of all, because otherwise, if that reason of a substance, or of a being that is most immaterial, in which the concept of essence is posited, were not, in the most formal sense, its own intelligere, then it would be understanding only in the first act as it were remote, since between it and intellection there would have to intervene the reason of the radicically intelligent, as well as the intellect and the intelligible species: and thus it could not be reduced to the second act of intellection: since it could be reduced neither by another, as is evident, nor by itself: for intelligere by the mode of the second act expresses a greater actuality than intelligere by the mode of the first act taken strictly, and what is of itself only intelligent in the first act cannot of itself alone be reduced to the second act. Hence St Thomas often infers the necessity of the divine decree, efficacious and determinative with respect to creatures, in order that they may operate, from the fact that according to their essence they are not in the second act, but in the first. And therefore, in order that they may issue forth into the second act, which is of greater actuality than the first act, whether habitual or quasi-habitual, it is necessary that they be applied by another, which is essentially the second act, through the aforementioned decree.

16 Nor does it matter, if you say that from the fact that the divine essence expresses the highest immateriality by the mode of the purest act, it ought to identify with itself, without virtual distinction, its own esse of existence, which is the ultimate act within the line of essence, but not the intellection itself that is constitutive of the divine nature: on the ground that this pertains to a distinct line. Just as, although the knowledge of God is most immaterial by the mode of the purest act, and likewise the essence, it is not inferred from this that the divine essence should identify with itself without virtual distinction the divine knowledge: because the latter looks to a distinct line. For against this it is that, once the divine essence is most immaterial by the mode of the purest act, in such a way that it is its own esse of existence without virtual distinction, it is necessary that it should identify with itself, without the same distinction, the reason of an intelligible species and form: therefore likewise the reason of the intellection constitutive of the divine nature: and consequently all these things will look to one and the same line. This last consequence is clear from the former and from what has often been said, namely that those things only which pertain to one and the same line are identified in divine things without virtual distinction. The first consequence, however, follows from the antecedent. Because, as is evident from what has been said both in this difficulty and in the treatise On the Vision of God, d. 2, no. 34, the intelligible species and the intellection are of one and the same line.

17 The antecedent, however, is proved. Then, because precisely by this, that the divine essence is most immaterial by the mode of the purest act, in such a way that in the most formal sense it is its own esse of existence, it must likewise be intelligible by the mode of the purest act, in such a way that in the same sense it is its own intelligibility; otherwise it would not be intelligible by the mode of the purest act; and consequently it would not be an essence most immaterial by the mode of the purest act: therefore it will also be necessary that the reason of the intelligible form, by which the divine essence itself, as having the character of essence, is as if made intelligible, should not as yet be virtually distinguished from itself, as having the character of essence: otherwise it would be unable to be so intelligible as to be, in the most formal sense, its own intelligibility, just as if the same essence were virtually distinguished from its own existence, through which it is as if made existent, it would not so exist as to be, in the most formal sense, its own existere.

18 Then too: because, for example in the Angels, the entitative esse and the intelligible esse are virtually distinguished precisely because that intelligible esse of theirs is an intelligible esse involving potentiality: and consequently they are not their own intelligibility: and therefore in them what is made intelligible, namely their essence, must be virtually distinguished from the intelligible form, which is that by which the aforementioned essence is rendered intelligible: therefore, precisely by this, that the divine essence is its own intelligibility, the reason of an intelligible species, by which it is rendered intelligible by the essence itself, which is and is constituted intelligible, will not be distinguished in it.

Finally, then: because otherwise the divine essence could not be united in the reason of the intelligible form with the intellect of the blessed, as is evident from what we said in the treatise On the Vision of God, disputation 2, no. 47: and consequently it would not be infinite in the reason of the aforementioned form: just as, if divine personality were not unifiable with created natures, it would not be infinite in the reason of personality.

§ IV. The last reason for the opinion of the Saint Doctor.

19. The third reason for the assertion, by which the preceding is confirmed and elucidated, and which has been insinuated above in part by us, is drawn from St Thomas above q. 12, a. 4, and elsewhere often. Because it is necessary that the divine essence, taken in the most formal sense, should be identified without virtual distinction with its own intellect: therefore it will also be necessary that it be identified in the same way with the radical power of understanding, and also with intelligere itself: and consequently it will also be necessary that it be identified without the aforementioned distinction with the nature of God. This last consequence follows clearly from the former. Because the divine nature under the concept of nature cannot fail to consist either in the radical power of understanding, or in intelligere itself. The first consequence, however, as to its first part, is also derived openly from the antecedent. Because the radical power of understanding is joined more immediately with the essence of God than the proximate power, namely the intellect, as is evident of itself: therefore, if the essence of God is necessarily identified by the identity just described with the intellect, it will not be able to fail to be identified in the same way with the radical power of understanding. As for the second part, however, this is clear from this prior [argument], as well as from the antecedent. Because intelligere pertains to the line of the intelligent in a pure act, as we shall say in the following doubt, and consequently it is not virtually distinguished from the radicically intellectual power, as is evident from what we shall say in the treatise, 4, d. 1, no. 34: therefore the divine essence will not be able to be identified by an altogether identical identification with the radicically intellectual power and with its own intellect without also being identified with intelligere.

20 The antecedent, however, in which the difficulty lies, is proved. Because when the intellect of God is borne most connaturally into the divine essence, by understanding and comprehending it, it is necessary that by its own force it have a coincidence with it in the same degree of immateriality, namely in that last and most perfect of all degrees assigned by the Angelic Doctor in the article cited above, a. 4, namely that it be its own esse, or its own existere, just as the divine essence is its own esse and its own existere, as is evident from the holy Doctor himself there, and from what has been said in the treatise On the Vision of God, a. 2: therefore it will also be necessary that the aforementioned intellect be identified altogether, without virtual distinction, with the divine essence as such. The consequence is clear. Because the divine essence alone, and those things which are altogether identified with it, are of their own force its own esse without virtual distinction: whereas the rest exist only through an existence of the divine essence virtually distinct from them, as is evident from what is commonly asserted by the Thomists at the place cited in the material on the Trinity, q. 28.

From this, too, a greater proof of the first consequence, as to its second part, as well as a greater elucidation of the preceding reason, is collected. Because, as is usually shown from the doctrine of St Thomas in the article cited above, a. 4, not only the intellect and the object that is first per se, but intelligere itself as well must coincide in the same degree of immateriality; and consequently divine intelligere, which is borne most connaturally into the essence of God, must be as immaterial as the divine essence. And thus it is not enough for it that it arise from an essence that is most immaterial and that is its own esse without any distinction; but it must consist in the very concept and most formal reason of a being and of a substance that is most immaterial, which without any distinction is its own esse.

21 Nor does it stand in the way, if you object that the knowledge of God is borne into the divine essence as into an object or subject that is most connatural, about which it demonstrates its attributes and properties; and nevertheless it is not necessary for this that it coincide with that same essence in that degree of immateriality, consisting in this, that it be its own esse without virtual distinction: therefore neither, on the ground that the intellect of God is borne into the divine essence as into an object that is most connatural, will it be demanded that it coincide with it in the aforementioned degree of immateriality; but it will suffice on both counts that all these things coincide in this, that they be so pure acts as to be free from any admixture of potentiality; and consequently the degree of immateriality which is demanded per se of the intellect of God and of the divine essence in order that it have the character of an object will be only so much; and not that which extends to this, that it be its own esse without virtual distinction. For we answer by distinguishing the major: as into an object that is most connatural, such that such an object be altogether the most connatural to the divine knowledge per se primo, is to be denied: in such a way that it not have this at all per se primo, but in some way per se secundo, is to be conceded. And similarly the minor, understood of the divine knowledge, is to be conceded according to what it precisely has by the force of its own line; but both of the consequences is to be denied. Because the divine essence has altogether the character of the most connatural object of the intellect of God and of the intellection constitutive of the divine nature per se primo. And therefore the aforementioned intellect and intellection must altogether coincide with it in the degree of immateriality already described, namely in this, that of the force of their own line they are its own esse;

otherwise, the divine essence, for the opposite reason.

22 This is explained. For the most connatural object must coincide in the esse of the thing with the intellect, or with the intellectual power, to which it is most connatural, in the degree of immateriality; and conversely, if such an object has in the esse of the thing its foundation, or its underlying, altogether per se primo, in the objective reason, or the reason under which the aforementioned intellect, or the intellectual power residing in it: but if that object altogether per se primo has its foundation only by the mode of the most connatural object in the objective reason, or the reason under which the intellect, and not in the reason under which that intellectual power, but is compared with it in some way per se secundo, then it is not universally necessary that both the intellect and that intellectual power should coincide with the aforementioned object in every way, in the esse of the thing considered, in the degree of immateriality; but it will suffice that the intellect should have a coincidence with it in every way, or by the force of its own line, and in the esse of the thing, in the aforementioned degree, even if its own intellectual power does not have such a coincidence, but by the force of another line, which is not to have that object at all per se primo, or in every way.

23 And the reason is this. Because, when the aforementioned object, considered in the esse of the thing, founds or subsists altogether per se primo in the reason under which the intellect, but not in the reason under which its intellectual power, and this is demanded intrinsically both from the object and from the intellect and its intellectual power, it follows that the intellect must have altogether, per se primo, an altogether complete coincidence with it in the degree of immateriality: for it is compared with it in the most perfect of all degrees.

Wherefore, since the divine essence, taken in the esse of the thing, is altogether per se primo the most connatural object with respect to the intellect of God and of the intellection constitutive of the divine nature, and in the same way subsists in the reason under which that intellect, but not with respect to the divine knowledge, and this is intrinsically demanded from them, it follows that it is not necessary on this precise head, that the knowledge should terminate in the divine essence as in the object that has just been called most connatural, and that both should coincide in the esse of the thing altogether per se primo, and by the force of their own line, in the degree of immateriality; and, secondly, or by the force of another, that such a coincidence as is found between each of the two, and that this altogether complete coincidence, or that which is altogether per se primo, or that which is by the force of its own line, be found between the divine essence and its intellect, etc.

24 Nor does it stand in the way, if you press: first, that although the divine essence is not compared by the mode of an object that is most connatural altogether per se primo with its own knowledge, nevertheless knowledge is compared with it as with an object that is most connatural to it, which it regards altogether per se primo, in order to demonstrate its quasi-passions about it: therefore it will have to have with it an altogether complete coincidence in the degree of immateriality; and consequently this degree will consist only in the exclusion of all potentiality; and not in this, that the divine essence is its own esse. Then too, that the objective and connatural reason of the Angelic intellect, considered in the esse of the thing, is prior to the reason under which the Angelic intellect is borne toward it, than to that under which knowledge of Angels, which resides in the Angelic intellect, terminates in it, and nevertheless coincides in the degree of immateriality with such an objective reason considered in the esse of the thing no less than the Angelic intellect coincides with it: therefore, etc.

25 For we answer the first of these objections by distinguishing, from what has been said above, what has been said: as with an object that is most connatural to it, taken comparatively, that is, that it has nothing more connatural, let that pass; taken absolutely and simply, that is, that it be to it in every way, or altogether the most connatural per se primo, is to be denied. And then both of the consequences is to be denied: because in order that they be legitimate, the antecedent would have to be true in the latter sense. Hence the fact that the knowledge of God regards the divine essence altogether per se primo, in order to demonstrate its attributes about it, is not a relation that is altogether per se first, absolutely and simply, between knowledge and the divine essence as object, but only altogether per se first with an addition, namely within the line of knowledge; which relation and comparison between the essence of God and its own knowledge is indeed a comparison that is not altogether per se first absolutely and simply: because the line of knowledge is (so to speak) a second line, and presupposes another per se

which, in the sense just described, is found between the divine essence and its intellect: because both that and the former look to one and the same line, as has been explained.

All these things can also be elucidated by the example of the vision of God of the blessed: which, although it terminates in the divine essence as it is in itself, as in an object that is most connatural to it; yet, because the aforementioned essence is only its most connatural object comparatively, and in the sense explained, and not absolutely and simply, it is therefore not necessary that they coincide with that same essence in the degree of immateriality. And similarly, because the divine essence is not compared by the mode of an object that is first per se with the aforementioned vision, but rather it is compared first with the vision by which God himself sees himself, and this intrinsically is demanded by all these extremes, that connaturality is therefore not absolutely and simply most perfect, nor does it demand the coincidence already described. Thus, therefore, in the present case, the proportion being nevertheless kept — because of the greater connaturality that is between knowledge

and the divine essence than between it and the created beatific vision — we must reason philosophically.

26 As for the second objection, it is also clear from what has been said. Because even granting the major, which is not free of its own difficulty, and granting the minor too, absolutely and simply speaking, the consequence is to be denied. Because we want only that from this precise head, that some object considered in the esse of the thing founds, or subsists, altogether first in the reason under which the intellect, terminates in it, rather than subsists in the reason under which knowledge is borne toward it itself, it is not necessary that there be an altogether complete coincidence in the degree of immateriality between knowledge, by the force of its own line, and that object: and as for the fact that the aforementioned coincidence between each of the two is found on other heads, this does nothing against us. The reason, however, on account of which knowledge of Angels, residing in the Angelic intellect, coincides by the force of its own line, that is, by the force of Angelic knowledge as such, with the object most connatural to the Angelic intellect, has been touched on above, namely that that objective reason is not by reason of its own imperfection so immaterial as to surpass the immateriality of accidental powers, namely of the intellect itself: whereas that object which is the most connatural object of the divine intellect, and the object or subject about which the knowledge of God demonstrates its quasi-passions, is by the force of its own line its own esse, and this, although it can befall the divine intellect, does not befall the divine knowledge, as has been shown.

§ V. The foundations of the first opinion are dissolved.

27 To the first [objection], which was drawn from the testimony of St Thomas, we answer that the Angelic Teacher is not speaking there of nature in that very strict sense in which we are speaking of it at present. For it is certain that nature and essence, taken in this way, are so related that whatever has an essence distinct from another thing must be of a diverse nature from it; and conversely, whatever is of the same nature as another thing must be of the same essence with it: and therefore a man and a lion, because they are distinguished in essence, are distinguished in nature, and conversely. But he speaks only in another, broader acceptation of nature, in which those things alone are said to be of one nature, to which there corresponds an action in the esse of the thing of the same reason, whether or not the principles of such actions are essentially distinguished, as happens in the case of the sun and fire with respect to heating. Hence, because unity in nature can be taken in this acceptation; whereas unity in essence is taken for a unity in this, that those things which are thus said to be one have the same esse, or existence; therefore St Thomas said that divine unity is expressed better by this, that it is said that the three persons are of one essence, than if it were said that they are of one nature.

28 To the second, the antecedent being granted, the consequence is to be denied. And the reason for the disparity is drawn from what has been said. Because it does nothing against us that the reasons of the created nature and essence of a man, for example, as they are in act through the existence of the entitative and intelligible order, are accidentally one, as this is repugnant in God. And thus the virtual distinction of nature and essence in creatures, from which this unity follows, will not be repugnant either; but it is so in divine things. And similarly it makes no difference that what is limited and in some way potential has reasons of essence and of nature that are virtually distinct: but it does much against us that an essence that is infinite, and of the highest purity and actuality, should be distinguished from its own nature: and finally, for this, that the created intellect should coincide with its immaterial object in the degree of immateriality, it is not necessary that the essence and the intellectual nature, from which it flows forth, and the intellect itself should be altogether identified with one another; otherwise in divine things, as has been shown. Hence, when it is said that God has divine operations, and operations elevated above every created action, because he has within himself a divine esse, elevated above every created esse, this is not true if it is understood of any divine operation whatever, and that this as causal should thus give a reason that is virtually distinct a priori, or should give a reason that is formally of such a kind a priori: because for the latter a virtual distinction is required between that which is the a priori reason of the other, and that with respect to which it is the a priori reason. It is otherwise, however, if it only explains some function incommensurable with the divine essence, which is prior only on the part of our mode of conceiving; or if it gives an a priori reason equivalently of such a kind: because for this it suffices that one and the same formality, without virtual distinction, may provide for both offices;

provided it be equivalent to several [offices] pertaining to the same line, one of which is the reason of the other.

As for the last point, it is clear from what has been said.

29 For the first confirmation, the major is to be granted and the minor denied. And as for the proof, the assumption made in it is to be denied, namely that a spiritual substance can be given, such as it is essentially, which is virtually distinct from the reason of a substance that is intellectual by essence, as is evident from what has been said. And thus such a substance will be neither created, as is evident of itself, nor uncreated, for the reasons stated; indeed (so as to speak better) it would be at once uncreated: because it is supposed to have being by essence; and created: for precisely by this, that it should be virtually distinguished from the reason of a substance that is intellectual by essence, it would not be of infinite immateriality, as has been shown.

By which, too, it is clear with respect to the second confirmation that the antecedent is to be granted and the consequence denied, and the assumption itself as well, if the reason of substance by essence is taken to be the aforementioned substance, as virtually distinct from the reason of a substance that is intellectual by essence, because, as we were just saying, it involves a repugnancy, namely that some substance should be such by essence, of such perfection as is said in the confirmation, and that it should be virtually distinguished from the reason of a substance that is intellectual by essence. Why, moreover, the constitutive principle of the divine essence and nature is to be explained rather by the intelligere of God than by the reason of a spiritual substance by essence, even if this latter reason were not virtually distinguished from the former — as indeed it is not distinguished — will be explained in the following doubt.