Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

1 Although the decision of this disputation is made up of those things which were said in the preceding doubt, so that this is clear to the one who inspects it: yet since D. Thom. very often, and especially in this article, proves that a thing is cognitive, on the ground that it is immaterial, and hence that it is most cognitive, or most understanding, from the fact that it has the highest immateriality — and this reasoning is not without considerable difficulty — therefore, so that the principal proof which the Holy Doctor adduces here may remain wholly explained, we raise the present doubt for its examination.

In the present title the inquiry concerns the constitutive principle of the divine essence, or nature, and not indeed the constitutive principle of the divine perfection. For it is certain that all the attributes, and whatever is in God, constitute, or complete, the perfection of God — a perfection which, so to speak, coalesces out of the accumulation of all the aspects that are found in him. This is so true that even the relations, which of themselves do not constitute any perfection, in some way concur in constituting and completing the perfection of God, as will be explained in its place.

However, it is not at all certain among theologians what precisely is the constitutive principle of the divine essence, or nature, taken as virtually distinct from the attributes and the relations, and as the prior basis (ratio a priori) of all of them. For as in creatures there are given an essence and a nature, as well as properties really distinct from it and really flowing forth from it, so in God there must be given some formal reason virtually distinct from the others, which has the character of essence or nature; and again other formalities, diverse even virtually, which have the status of properties of the divine essence or nature, resulting virtually from it. And so, in order to explain what precisely the aforementioned constitutive principle is, it has pleased to raise the present difficulty in detail: because, once it has been shown that the reason of a spiritual substance, such as it is essentially, as virtually distinct from intelligere by essence, whether radicically and in the first act, or in the second act, cannot be the constitutive principle of the divine essence or nature, an easy path is prepared, as will be evident from what is to be said, for explaining the proper and peculiar constitutive principle of the divine essence.

§ I. The prior opinion is proposed.

2 The first opinion distinguishes between the divine essence and the divine nature, and says that the constitutive principle of the divine essence, taken as virtually distinct from the nature of God, is the reason of a spiritual substance by essence, taken as virtually distinct from the reason of an intelligent substance by essence, whether radicically and in the first act, or in the second act; although the constitutive principle of the same, taken as having the character of nature, is divine intelligere. Thus the most learned Magister Petrus de Cornelio, formerly in this Salmantican Academy a most worthy occupant of the Chair of Durand, in article 4 of this question, second difficulty, whom the younger writers follow.

This opinion, with respect to the last part, will be established by what we shall say in the last difficulty of this disputation. As for the prior part, namely that the essence and the nature of God are distinguished in the way just described, it is proved first from St Thomas, 1 part., q. 39, a. 2, in the 3rd, in these words: Because nature designates the principle of an act, whereas essence is so called from being, some things can be said to be of one nature, which coincide in some act, as all heating things; but they cannot be said to be of one essence unless they have one being. And therefore divine unity is expressed better by this, that it is said that the three persons are of one essence, than if it were said that they are of one nature. Where, as you see, he clearly distinguishes virtually, or with a foundation in the thing, essence from nature: for unity in nature can belong to some things to which unity in essence does not belong; and finally unity in essence signifies in divine things a still greater unity than unity in nature.

3 Secondly, the same part is proved by the reason which St Thomas insinuates in the words just quoted. For essence is virtually distinguished in creatures from their nature: therefore also in divine things. The antecedent is shown by our Completenses, 1 De anima, d. 3, q. 2 and 3, from arguments drawn from Aristotle and St Thomas at the places cited there, and it can briefly be argued from them. Then from the fact that the reason of nature looks to the order of acting; whereas the reason of essence pertains only to the order of being, and says nothing looking to the order of operating. And therefore, when Aristotle defines the soul according to the reason of essence, he did not explain it through the order of operation, but through this, that it constitutes the animate being in its own esse, saying: that it is the first act of a physical organic body. ¹ But when he defined it as it is nature, he explained it through the order of operation, saying: The soul is that by which we first live, etc. And likewise, defining nature, he set it forth by this, that it is the first principle of motion and rest: but these two reasons are virtually distinguished, or with a foundation in the thing, as will be clear to the observer: therefore, etc. Then too: because the reason of essence in creatures is prior to the reason of nature. Hence a man is the principle of such or such operations, that is, he has such or such a nature, because he has in himself such or such an esse, which is to have such or such an essence.

The consequence, however, is proved from the feebleness of the argument: and thus we see that God therefore has divine operations, and consequently operations elevated above every created action, because he has within himself a divine esse, elevated above every created esse: which indeed sufficiently indicates that the reason of essence in divine things is, so to speak, the root of that which has the character of nature, and consequently that these two are virtually distinguished from one another.

4 Finally, the second part of the same opinion, namely that the essence of God, as distinct from its nature, is constituted by the reason of a spiritual substance by essence, as distinct from the reason of substance radicically, or in the second act of the intelligent, is proved. For if the divine essence is virtually distinguished from the nature of God, there must be a prior reason to that, which does not express an order to operation, as is evident from what has just been said: therefore such an essence will not be constituted by an esse that is intelligent radicically or in the second act, since that expresses an order to operation, but by this, that it is a spiritual substance of itself, or by essence. The consequence is clear with respect to this second part, which alone requires proof. For a prior reason, which is found in God, in relation to the reason of nature, and which does not express an order to operation, cannot fail to be the reason of substance — not indeed a material reason, or one having something of potentiality, but purely spiritual, without any trace of potentiality, or (which is the same thing) spiritual by essence: for God is intellectual, and intelligent by essence, or understanding, precisely because he is by essence spiritual and immaterial.

5 This is confirmed, firstly. For that is the constitutive principle of some essence which pertains to the order of being and at the same time has the being distinctive of such a thing; for it is the same to be distinctive and to be constitutive: but the reason of a spiritual substance by essence, as virtually distinct from the reason of the intelligent by essence, whether radicically or in the second act, has these two conditions with respect to God: therefore, etc. The major with its consequence requires no proof. The minor, however, is clear as to its first part. As to the second it is proved. Because precisely by this, that some substance is spiritual by essence, it has this, that it is not a created substance or essence, as is evident of itself: therefore, ipso facto, it will be a substance and an uncreated and divine essence, and consequently by this it is distinguished from any other substance or essence.

This is confirmed, secondly. Because the first thing by which a created substance and essence is distinguished and constituted as such is this, that it is a substance by participation, and hence admixed with imperfection and potentiality: therefore, the first thing by which the divine and uncreated substance and essence is distinguished and constituted will be the reason of substance by essence, and consequently without any trace of potentiality and imperfection, which is the same thing as being a spiritual substance by essence.

§ II. The opinion of St Thomas, and its first foundation.

6 It must nevertheless be said that the divine essence and nature are not as yet virtually distinguished, or with a foundation in the thing, but are one and the same formality altogether; and consequently that the divine essence is not constituted in its own species, or quasi-atom of species, by this, that it is a spiritual substance by essence, as this reason is virtually distinguished from the reason of a substance by essence that is intellectual, whether in the first and radical act, or in the second act.

This assertion, as to its latter part, plainly follows from the former: for the reason of the divine nature cannot fail to consist in an esse that is intellectual, whether radical and in the first act, or in the second act, as all theologians teach in common. As to the first part, and consequently to the later of the two, from St Thomas at the places to be cited below in the last difficulty of this disputation, as well as in the present article where, after he has said that intelligere is the very existence of the intelligible order (in which words the truth of our assertion is contained in force, as we shall immediately set out), he added: And thus it is clear that in God the intellect, and that which is understood, and the intelligible species, and intelligere itself are altogether one and the same. Hence it is clear from this that God is said to be understanding in such a way that no multiplicity is posited in his substance. Where, as you see, according to the mind of the holy Doctor, none of the aforementioned things is virtually distinguished in God: otherwise, although they would be one and the same, they would not yet be altogether the same: for altogether identical identity excludes virtual distinction. And therefore the Angelic Teacher immediately added that, by this, that God is said to be understanding — and hence involves all the things already said — no multiplicity is posited in his substance, and consequently neither is there virtual multiplicity, which is a species of multiplicity. But if the essence of God and his nature, namely intelligere, whether in the first act or in the second act, were virtually distinguished, they could not be the same without a virtual distinction between intelligere and the object that is understood, and the intelligible species: for such an object and such an intelligible species would be the very essence of God virtually distinguished from intelligere. Concerning these matters, however, let them be compared with what we said in the preceding disputation, no. 17. The holy Doctor teaches the same above q. 12, a. 4, as we shall set out in no. 19 and following, and in 4 dist. 49, q. 2, a. 6; De veritate, q. 8, a. 3; and 3 contra Gentes, ch. 51. Hence all the Doctors whom we shall adduce in the last difficulty of this disputation for the assertion follow St Thomas.

7 The fundamental and most weighty reason of this assertion, however, St Thomas touched in the present and following article, q. 39, a. 2, as well as at other places cited by our Completenses, 1 Phys., d. 3, dub. 5: which can be put in this form. For in God there is given an esse of existence in the entitative order, and an esse of existence in the intelligible order, namely intelligere; yet in such a way that this twofold esse is not virtually distinguished: therefore neither will the reason of essence and of nature be virtually distinguished, but they will be one and the very same formality, without any distinction: and consequently the divine essence will not be constituted in its quasi-atom of species by this, that it is a spiritual substance by essence, as this reason is virtually distinguished from the reason of a substance by essence that is intellectual, whether considered in the first and radical act, or in the second act.

The antecedent as to the first part is established from those things which we shall say in the treatise On the Will of God, d. 1, no. 21 and following, namely that things looking to the intellectual or intelligible order, taken adequately, exist by an esse that is entitative and natural, and at the same time by an esse of the intelligible order, namely by intelligere itself, which has itself by the mode of existence in this order. Which is also deduced quite clearly from what the Completenses, 3 De anima, d. 18, q. 3 and 4, teach, and what we assert in d. 2, dub. 1 of this treatise, namely that knowers must have in the intelligible order the very same forms and natures as are in the things known under esse natural: and consequently, just as the aforementioned forms and natures, precisely because they are in the objects under the mode of natural being, must also have there an existence in this entitative and natural order, which is nothing other than the ultimate act of the order of entitative being; so, because the same essence must, by means of an intelligible species, be in the knowers under the mode of intelligible being, there will correspond to it there an existence in the intelligible order, which will be nothing other than the ultimate act of this order: and consequently nothing other than the intellection itself, which is the ultimate act of this order, as we explained at the place cited.

8 As for the second part, the same antecedent is argued and explained in this way. For otherwise, from that twofold esse and from those things which are actuated through them, there would result, in the most formal sense, only an accidental one: and yet not a one per se, so that they would be only identically one thing. For as from two existences, or from two beings in act that are really entitatively distinct, it cannot be made one per se really, according to that common saying of the Philosophers, Whatever accrues to a being in act accrues accidentally, so also from two existences formally, or virtually, diverse, or from two formalities in act, or existing through them, it cannot be made, in the most formal sense, anything one per se and the same, but at most something that is only identically one and the same. Hence St Thomas and his disciples infer, 1 part., q. 28, that the divine relations do not have a proper esse of existence virtually distinct from the esse of existence by which the divine essence and its attributes exist: because otherwise there would be constituted from the essence and that relation, in the most formal sense, an accidental one, and not a one per se, although they would be only identically one and the same. And similarly the Angelic Doctor and his school infer from this, 3 part., q. 17, a. 2, that the humanity in Christ does not have a proper esse of existence, because from the Word and the humanity there is made one per se really, and this one per se could not result unless it were only accidentally one, if both the Word and the humanity had a proper esse of existence really distinct.

And finally, along the way of the same holy Doctor and his disciples, as well as of almost all the Metaphysicians, it is inferred from this that if action and passion are identified, and each of them brings its own existence, then, in the most formal sense, they are an accidental one, and only identically one thing. As in the opinion of those who distinguish the relation from the substance only virtually, and attribute to it a proper esse of existence distinguished in the same way, then formally they will be only identically one thing per se; but in the most formal sense they will be an accidental one.

9 From this, too, the first consequence of the first and principal enthymeme of this argument is sufficiently established. For if the divine essence and nature are virtually distinguished, then the esse of existence that is entitative, which would correspond to the essence as looking to the entitative order, and which is proper to it as such, as something pertaining to its line, cannot fail to be virtually distinguished from the esse of existence of the intelligible order, which would correspond to the divine intellectual nature — not indeed as looking to the entitative order, but as, in the most formal sense, looking to the intelligible order, and as actuated by the form or intelligible species of that same order — and which is proper to it so taken, and is taken from it by the force of its own line. For, as we have often said, those things which pertain to distinct lines, or are taken from them by their force, cannot fail to be at least virtually distinguished.

This same proof of the aforementioned consequence can also be explained and confirmed from the fact that in created intellectual natures, in which essence and nature are virtually distinguished, a twofold esse of existence must be given that is not only virtually but also really distinct; one indeed through which the essence exists, namely the entitative esse, and at the same time nature, as they look to that order; another, however, through which that same nature exists insofar as it pertains to the intelligible order. Because although the essence and nature to which they correspond are only virtually distinguished, nevertheless, just as by the reason of their own limitation they cannot identify to themselves really their proper existences, so likewise the existences themselves by the reason of the same limitation cannot be identified with one another: therefore, if in divine things essence and nature are virtually distinguished, then although we granted that by the reason of the infinite perfection of God the existences corresponding to them could be identified with one another, and with the essence, and with the divine nature, they still cannot fail to be virtually distinguished from one another; indeed they would be proper acts corresponding to distinct lines, namely the line of essence and of divine nature. The second consequence, however, of the first and principal enthymeme of this argument follows sufficiently from that antecedent just shown, as is evident from what has been said.

10 Nor does it matter if you say that it is not against the reason of a one per se, taken in the most formal sense, that something should be constituted from a twofold being in act, whether such in part, or subordinate to the other, as would occur in the present case.

It does not matter, then. For although this evasion might be admitted outside the school of St Thomas, it cannot be admitted within it. And therefore all his disciples deny that prime matter has its proper existence, even partial, for the purpose of that a one per se might be constituted by composition from it and from form: and consequently they hold such a subordination between two beings in act, or existences through distinct existences, which suffices for the constituting of a one per se, to be impossible. And so the Complutensians, 1 Physic., d. 3, no. 51 and following, refute this solution expressly and effectively. Let it be seen there.

11 Nor does it stand in the way if you meet with the objection that it is not incongruous for there to be given in God a unity which, in the most formal sense, is only accidentally such, provided that among those things which are posited as being and as constituting an accidental one there is present a unity per se identically, that is, provided they are formally identically one thing per se.

For against this it is that the most formal reason of an accidental unity, taken in the most formal sense, is entangled with imperfections: because taken in this way it is the lowest and imperfect unity which can be conceived within the line of unity formally, and taken from what is proper to it; and so it is a unity only secundum quid: therefore, however much it be identified with something one per se, or the unity be identically one per se, it will nevertheless not be free from imperfections, nor able to be constituted in God. Just as because the reason of an accident, or of inherence, taken in the most formal sense, expresses an imperfection, it is repugnant for it to be found formally in God, however much it be posited as identified with the substance or with the very beingness of God. Indeed, just as this very fact, that the reason of an accident or of inherence, taken in the most formal sense, has this, that it expresses an imperfection from its own most formal reason, involves being identically the divine substance, so too, because an accidental unity taken in the most formal sense expresses an imperfection, it will be repugnant for it to be identified with anything within God.

12 This is confirmed. For it is repugnant that what, from its own most formal reason, has being of such a kind only secundum quid — for example, being goodness, or intelligibility, secundum quid — should be found formally in God, and consequently be identified with him: therefore it will likewise be repugnant that what, from its own most formal reason, is a unity only secundum quid, such as an accidental unity is, should be constituted in God and identified with something of his.

This is confirmed, secondly. For although it does not entail that there be given in God formally a virtual distinction, which of the formal speaks only of such a degree of eminence of that real divine formality that it contains in force the effects which several really distinct things, looking to diverse lines, could produce, it is nevertheless repugnant that any kind of real distinction, actual and formally such, be found in him: therefore, likewise, although it is not repugnant that a unity be found in divine things which is only virtually accidental, it is nevertheless repugnant that there be involved in it some kind of accidental unity which is formally such.

The consequence is clear. For that only a virtually such unity be given in it does not argue that there is in it some defect of unity per se, but only that that divine formality, and one altogether one per se, is so eminent that it provides what several accidental things, pertaining to diverse lines, would provide. Although, that there be formally in God itself an accidental unity in the most formal sense, argues an imperfection, from the fact that such a unity is formally a unity only secundum quid: and therefore it derogates from the highest perfection of God: just as a real distinction actual and formally found in him would derogate from his highest simplicity.

§ III. The opinion of the Angelic Doctor is supported by another reason.

13 The second principal reason for our assertion is also insinuated by the holy Doctor, and can be reduced to this form. Because in creatures essence and nature are virtually distinguished: therefore in God they will be altogether the same without any virtual distinction, but only on the part of the mode of signifying and conceiving. The consequence is proved. Because properties, or other things which are really distinguished in us, and which therefore express a limitation, must not be distinguished in God by so great a distinction, on the ground that in him they cannot be with a limitation, but in a better way, and consequently with greater unity, simplicity, and amplitude: therefore, since the reason of nature and of essence must also be in God in a nobler way, and consequently without any limitation, and with greater unity than in creatures, it is necessary that in him they should not as yet be virtually distinguished, but only on the part of our mode of conceiving and signifying.

14 Nor does it matter if you say that the reason of unity and of goodness are virtually distinguished, or with a foundation in the thing, from our whatness, as the Metaphysicians teach in common, so that whatness does not pertain to it; and yet from the fact that these reasons ought to be in God in a nobler way and without limitation, they ought not to be in him with a lesser distinction, that is, on the part of the mode of signifying alone, since the reason of unity is reckoned among the attributes of God: therefore, from the fact that the reason of essence and of nature, which are virtually distinguished in us, ought to be in God in a nobler way, it is badly inferred that they should be in him with greater unity and without the aforementioned distinction.

For against this it is that the reason of unity is not distinguished in creatures with a foundation in the thing by reason of a limitation, which is found in them, but because unity of its own genus demands to be distinguished, at least virtually, from the thing of which it is the unity: whereas that properties are really distinguished in creatures, and that the reason of nature and of essence are virtually diverse in them, results from the limitation of those creatures themselves, that is, from the defect of immateriality and of infinite purity in creatures: therefore, precisely because they ought to be in God in a better way, that is, with limitations and imperfections set aside, with which they are entangled in creatures, it is necessary that the properties should not be really distinguished in him, and that the reason of nature and of essence should not be virtually diverse either. The major with its consequence is sufficiently clear. The minor, however, as to its first part, namely as regards the properties, is likewise established: otherwise the divine properties would be really distinguished from God. For what belongs to some formal reason of itself and of its own genus, and not by reason of a limitation — according to which they exist in creatures — must also be found in God.

15 As for the second part, in which the difficulty lies, namely that the virtual distinction between created essence and nature arises from the defect of infinite immateriality, it is proved as follows. Because precisely by this, that some essence has infinite immateriality and purity, and consists in this purity, as happens in the divine essence, it cannot fail to carry with it an esse that is most immaterial by the mode of the purest act: therefore it will extend to this, that the divine nature itself is also without any distinction, even virtual, that is, that it is its own intelligere, whether in the second act, or, as others will have it, radicically, yet still by the mode of the purest act, that is, without any potentiality, in which the nature of God is said to consist.

The consequence is clear. For when the aforementioned intelligere by the mode of the purest act carries with it, by the force of its own line, immateriality, and not just any immateriality, but the highest, and by the mode of the purest act, it is necessary that, in the most formal sense, it be the highest immateriality itself by the mode of the purest act. And so if the essence consists in this, that it is most immaterial by the mode of the purest act, it cannot fail to extend to this, that it consist in the purest intelligere itself, and in the most immaterial already described, and consequently in that which, in the most formal sense, has the character of nature.

Most of all, because otherwise, if that reason of a substance, or of a being that is most immaterial, in which the concept of essence is posited, were not, in the most formal sense, its own intelligere, then it would be understanding only in the first act as it were remote, since between it and intellection there would have to intervene the reason of the radicically intelligent, as well as the intellect and the intelligible species: and thus it could not be reduced to the second act of intellection: since it could be reduced neither by another, as is evident, nor by itself: for intelligere by the mode of the second act expresses a greater actuality than intelligere by the mode of the first act taken strictly, and what is of itself only intelligent in the first act cannot of itself alone be reduced to the second act. Hence St Thomas often infers the necessity of the divine decree, efficacious and determinative with respect to creatures, in order that they may operate, from the fact that according to their essence they are not in the second act, but in the first. And therefore, in order that they may issue forth into the second act, which is of greater actuality than the first act, whether habitual or quasi-habitual, it is necessary that they be applied by another, which is essentially the second act, through the aforementioned decree.

16 Nor does it matter, if you say that from the fact that the divine essence expresses the highest immateriality by the mode of the purest act, it ought to identify with itself, without virtual distinction, its own esse of existence, which is the ultimate act within the line of essence, but not the intellection itself that is constitutive of the divine nature: on the ground that this pertains to a distinct line. Just as, although the knowledge of God is most immaterial by the mode of the purest act, and likewise the essence, it is not inferred from this that the divine essence should identify with itself without virtual distinction the divine knowledge: because the latter looks to a distinct line. For against this it is that, once the divine essence is most immaterial by the mode of the purest act, in such a way that it is its own esse of existence without virtual distinction, it is necessary that it should identify with itself, without the same distinction, the reason of an intelligible species and form: therefore likewise the reason of the intellection constitutive of the divine nature: and consequently all these things will look to one and the same line. This last consequence is clear from the former and from what has often been said, namely that those things only which pertain to one and the same line are identified in divine things without virtual distinction. The first consequence, however, follows from the antecedent. Because, as is evident from what has been said both in this difficulty and in the treatise On the Vision of God, d. 2, no. 34, the intelligible species and the intellection are of one and the same line.

17 The antecedent, however, is proved. Then, because precisely by this, that the divine essence is most immaterial by the mode of the purest act, in such a way that in the most formal sense it is its own esse of existence, it must likewise be intelligible by the mode of the purest act, in such a way that in the same sense it is its own intelligibility; otherwise it would not be intelligible by the mode of the purest act; and consequently it would not be an essence most immaterial by the mode of the purest act: therefore it will also be necessary that the reason of the intelligible form, by which the divine essence itself, as having the character of essence, is as if made intelligible, should not as yet be virtually distinguished from itself, as having the character of essence: otherwise it would be unable to be so intelligible as to be, in the most formal sense, its own intelligibility, just as if the same essence were virtually distinguished from its own existence, through which it is as if made existent, it would not so exist as to be, in the most formal sense, its own existere.

18 Then too: because, for example in the Angels, the entitative esse and the intelligible esse are virtually distinguished precisely because that intelligible esse of theirs is an intelligible esse involving potentiality: and consequently they are not their own intelligibility: and therefore in them what is made intelligible, namely their essence, must be virtually distinguished from the intelligible form, which is that by which the aforementioned essence is rendered intelligible: therefore, precisely by this, that the divine essence is its own intelligibility, the reason of an intelligible species, by which it is rendered intelligible by the essence itself, which is and is constituted intelligible, will not be distinguished in it.

Finally, then: because otherwise the divine essence could not be united in the reason of the intelligible form with the intellect of the blessed, as is evident from what we said in the treatise On the Vision of God, disputation 2, no. 47: and consequently it would not be infinite in the reason of the aforementioned form: just as, if divine personality were not unifiable with created natures, it would not be infinite in the reason of personality.

§ IV. The last reason for the opinion of the Saint Doctor.

19. The third reason for the assertion, by which the preceding is confirmed and elucidated, and which has been insinuated above in part by us, is drawn from St Thomas above q. 12, a. 4, and elsewhere often. Because it is necessary that the divine essence, taken in the most formal sense, should be identified without virtual distinction with its own intellect: therefore it will also be necessary that it be identified in the same way with the radical power of understanding, and also with intelligere itself: and consequently it will also be necessary that it be identified without the aforementioned distinction with the nature of God. This last consequence follows clearly from the former. Because the divine nature under the concept of nature cannot fail to consist either in the radical power of understanding, or in intelligere itself. The first consequence, however, as to its first part, is also derived openly from the antecedent. Because the radical power of understanding is joined more immediately with the essence of God than the proximate power, namely the intellect, as is evident of itself: therefore, if the essence of God is necessarily identified by the identity just described with the intellect, it will not be able to fail to be identified in the same way with the radical power of understanding. As for the second part, however, this is clear from this prior [argument], as well as from the antecedent. Because intelligere pertains to the line of the intelligent in a pure act, as we shall say in the following doubt, and consequently it is not virtually distinguished from the radicically intellectual power, as is evident from what we shall say in the treatise, 4, d. 1, no. 34: therefore the divine essence will not be able to be identified by an altogether identical identification with the radicically intellectual power and with its own intellect without also being identified with intelligere.

20 The antecedent, however, in which the difficulty lies, is proved. Because when the intellect of God is borne most connaturally into the divine essence, by understanding and comprehending it, it is necessary that by its own force it have a coincidence with it in the same degree of immateriality, namely in that last and most perfect of all degrees assigned by the Angelic Doctor in the article cited above, a. 4, namely that it be its own esse, or its own existere, just as the divine essence is its own esse and its own existere, as is evident from the holy Doctor himself there, and from what has been said in the treatise On the Vision of God, a. 2: therefore it will also be necessary that the aforementioned intellect be identified altogether, without virtual distinction, with the divine essence as such. The consequence is clear. Because the divine essence alone, and those things which are altogether identified with it, are of their own force its own esse without virtual distinction: whereas the rest exist only through an existence of the divine essence virtually distinct from them, as is evident from what is commonly asserted by the Thomists at the place cited in the material on the Trinity, q. 28.

From this, too, a greater proof of the first consequence, as to its second part, as well as a greater elucidation of the preceding reason, is collected. Because, as is usually shown from the doctrine of St Thomas in the article cited above, a. 4, not only the intellect and the object that is first per se, but intelligere itself as well must coincide in the same degree of immateriality; and consequently divine intelligere, which is borne most connaturally into the essence of God, must be as immaterial as the divine essence. And thus it is not enough for it that it arise from an essence that is most immaterial and that is its own esse without any distinction; but it must consist in the very concept and most formal reason of a being and of a substance that is most immaterial, which without any distinction is its own esse.

21 Nor does it stand in the way, if you object that the knowledge of God is borne into the divine essence as into an object or subject that is most connatural, about which it demonstrates its attributes and properties; and nevertheless it is not necessary for this that it coincide with that same essence in that degree of immateriality, consisting in this, that it be its own esse without virtual distinction: therefore neither, on the ground that the intellect of God is borne into the divine essence as into an object that is most connatural, will it be demanded that it coincide with it in the aforementioned degree of immateriality; but it will suffice on both counts that all these things coincide in this, that they be so pure acts as to be free from any admixture of potentiality; and consequently the degree of immateriality which is demanded per se of the intellect of God and of the divine essence in order that it have the character of an object will be only so much; and not that which extends to this, that it be its own esse without virtual distinction. For we answer by distinguishing the major: as into an object that is most connatural, such that such an object be altogether the most connatural to the divine knowledge per se primo, is to be denied: in such a way that it not have this at all per se primo, but in some way per se secundo, is to be conceded. And similarly the minor, understood of the divine knowledge, is to be conceded according to what it precisely has by the force of its own line; but both of the consequences is to be denied. Because the divine essence has altogether the character of the most connatural object of the intellect of God and of the intellection constitutive of the divine nature per se primo. And therefore the aforementioned intellect and intellection must altogether coincide with it in the degree of immateriality already described, namely in this, that of the force of their own line they are its own esse;

otherwise, the divine essence, for the opposite reason.

22 This is explained. For the most connatural object must coincide in the esse of the thing with the intellect, or with the intellectual power, to which it is most connatural, in the degree of immateriality; and conversely, if such an object has in the esse of the thing its foundation, or its underlying, altogether per se primo, in the objective reason, or the reason under which the aforementioned intellect, or the intellectual power residing in it: but if that object altogether per se primo has its foundation only by the mode of the most connatural object in the objective reason, or the reason under which the intellect, and not in the reason under which that intellectual power, but is compared with it in some way per se secundo, then it is not universally necessary that both the intellect and that intellectual power should coincide with the aforementioned object in every way, in the esse of the thing considered, in the degree of immateriality; but it will suffice that the intellect should have a coincidence with it in every way, or by the force of its own line, and in the esse of the thing, in the aforementioned degree, even if its own intellectual power does not have such a coincidence, but by the force of another line, which is not to have that object at all per se primo, or in every way.

23 And the reason is this. Because, when the aforementioned object, considered in the esse of the thing, founds or subsists altogether per se primo in the reason under which the intellect, but not in the reason under which its intellectual power, and this is demanded intrinsically both from the object and from the intellect and its intellectual power, it follows that the intellect must have altogether, per se primo, an altogether complete coincidence with it in the degree of immateriality: for it is compared with it in the most perfect of all degrees.

Wherefore, since the divine essence, taken in the esse of the thing, is altogether per se primo the most connatural object with respect to the intellect of God and of the intellection constitutive of the divine nature, and in the same way subsists in the reason under which that intellect, but not with respect to the divine knowledge, and this is intrinsically demanded from them, it follows that it is not necessary on this precise head, that the knowledge should terminate in the divine essence as in the object that has just been called most connatural, and that both should coincide in the esse of the thing altogether per se primo, and by the force of their own line, in the degree of immateriality; and, secondly, or by the force of another, that such a coincidence as is found between each of the two, and that this altogether complete coincidence, or that which is altogether per se primo, or that which is by the force of its own line, be found between the divine essence and its intellect, etc.

24 Nor does it stand in the way, if you press: first, that although the divine essence is not compared by the mode of an object that is most connatural altogether per se primo with its own knowledge, nevertheless knowledge is compared with it as with an object that is most connatural to it, which it regards altogether per se primo, in order to demonstrate its quasi-passions about it: therefore it will have to have with it an altogether complete coincidence in the degree of immateriality; and consequently this degree will consist only in the exclusion of all potentiality; and not in this, that the divine essence is its own esse. Then too, that the objective and connatural reason of the Angelic intellect, considered in the esse of the thing, is prior to the reason under which the Angelic intellect is borne toward it, than to that under which knowledge of Angels, which resides in the Angelic intellect, terminates in it, and nevertheless coincides in the degree of immateriality with such an objective reason considered in the esse of the thing no less than the Angelic intellect coincides with it: therefore, etc.

25 For we answer the first of these objections by distinguishing, from what has been said above, what has been said: as with an object that is most connatural to it, taken comparatively, that is, that it has nothing more connatural, let that pass; taken absolutely and simply, that is, that it be to it in every way, or altogether the most connatural per se primo, is to be denied. And then both of the consequences is to be denied: because in order that they be legitimate, the antecedent would have to be true in the latter sense. Hence the fact that the knowledge of God regards the divine essence altogether per se primo, in order to demonstrate its attributes about it, is not a relation that is altogether per se first, absolutely and simply, between knowledge and the divine essence as object, but only altogether per se first with an addition, namely within the line of knowledge; which relation and comparison between the essence of God and its own knowledge is indeed a comparison that is not altogether per se first absolutely and simply: because the line of knowledge is (so to speak) a second line, and presupposes another per se

which, in the sense just described, is found between the divine essence and its intellect: because both that and the former look to one and the same line, as has been explained.

All these things can also be elucidated by the example of the vision of God of the blessed: which, although it terminates in the divine essence as it is in itself, as in an object that is most connatural to it; yet, because the aforementioned essence is only its most connatural object comparatively, and in the sense explained, and not absolutely and simply, it is therefore not necessary that they coincide with that same essence in the degree of immateriality. And similarly, because the divine essence is not compared by the mode of an object that is first per se with the aforementioned vision, but rather it is compared first with the vision by which God himself sees himself, and this intrinsically is demanded by all these extremes, that connaturality is therefore not absolutely and simply most perfect, nor does it demand the coincidence already described. Thus, therefore, in the present case, the proportion being nevertheless kept — because of the greater connaturality that is between knowledge

and the divine essence than between it and the created beatific vision — we must reason philosophically.

26 As for the second objection, it is also clear from what has been said. Because even granting the major, which is not free of its own difficulty, and granting the minor too, absolutely and simply speaking, the consequence is to be denied. Because we want only that from this precise head, that some object considered in the esse of the thing founds, or subsists, altogether first in the reason under which the intellect, terminates in it, rather than subsists in the reason under which knowledge is borne toward it itself, it is not necessary that there be an altogether complete coincidence in the degree of immateriality between knowledge, by the force of its own line, and that object: and as for the fact that the aforementioned coincidence between each of the two is found on other heads, this does nothing against us. The reason, however, on account of which knowledge of Angels, residing in the Angelic intellect, coincides by the force of its own line, that is, by the force of Angelic knowledge as such, with the object most connatural to the Angelic intellect, has been touched on above, namely that that objective reason is not by reason of its own imperfection so immaterial as to surpass the immateriality of accidental powers, namely of the intellect itself: whereas that object which is the most connatural object of the divine intellect, and the object or subject about which the knowledge of God demonstrates its quasi-passions, is by the force of its own line its own esse, and this, although it can befall the divine intellect, does not befall the divine knowledge, as has been shown.

§ V. The foundations of the first opinion are dissolved.

27 To the first [objection], which was drawn from the testimony of St Thomas, we answer that the Angelic Teacher is not speaking there of nature in that very strict sense in which we are speaking of it at present. For it is certain that nature and essence, taken in this way, are so related that whatever has an essence distinct from another thing must be of a diverse nature from it; and conversely, whatever is of the same nature as another thing must be of the same essence with it: and therefore a man and a lion, because they are distinguished in essence, are distinguished in nature, and conversely. But he speaks only in another, broader acceptation of nature, in which those things alone are said to be of one nature, to which there corresponds an action in the esse of the thing of the same reason, whether or not the principles of such actions are essentially distinguished, as happens in the case of the sun and fire with respect to heating. Hence, because unity in nature can be taken in this acceptation; whereas unity in essence is taken for a unity in this, that those things which are thus said to be one have the same esse, or existence; therefore St Thomas said that divine unity is expressed better by this, that it is said that the three persons are of one essence, than if it were said that they are of one nature.

28 To the second, the antecedent being granted, the consequence is to be denied. And the reason for the disparity is drawn from what has been said. Because it does nothing against us that the reasons of the created nature and essence of a man, for example, as they are in act through the existence of the entitative and intelligible order, are accidentally one, as this is repugnant in God. And thus the virtual distinction of nature and essence in creatures, from which this unity follows, will not be repugnant either; but it is so in divine things. And similarly it makes no difference that what is limited and in some way potential has reasons of essence and of nature that are virtually distinct: but it does much against us that an essence that is infinite, and of the highest purity and actuality, should be distinguished from its own nature: and finally, for this, that the created intellect should coincide with its immaterial object in the degree of immateriality, it is not necessary that the essence and the intellectual nature, from which it flows forth, and the intellect itself should be altogether identified with one another; otherwise in divine things, as has been shown. Hence, when it is said that God has divine operations, and operations elevated above every created action, because he has within himself a divine esse, elevated above every created esse, this is not true if it is understood of any divine operation whatever, and that this as causal should thus give a reason that is virtually distinct a priori, or should give a reason that is formally of such a kind a priori: because for the latter a virtual distinction is required between that which is the a priori reason of the other, and that with respect to which it is the a priori reason. It is otherwise, however, if it only explains some function incommensurable with the divine essence, which is prior only on the part of our mode of conceiving; or if it gives an a priori reason equivalently of such a kind: because for this it suffices that one and the same formality, without virtual distinction, may provide for both offices;

provided it be equivalent to several [offices] pertaining to the same line, one of which is the reason of the other.

As for the last point, it is clear from what has been said.

29 For the first confirmation, the major is to be granted and the minor denied. And as for the proof, the assumption made in it is to be denied, namely that a spiritual substance can be given, such as it is essentially, which is virtually distinct from the reason of a substance that is intellectual by essence, as is evident from what has been said. And thus such a substance will be neither created, as is evident of itself, nor uncreated, for the reasons stated; indeed (so as to speak better) it would be at once uncreated: because it is supposed to have being by essence; and created: for precisely by this, that it should be virtually distinguished from the reason of a substance that is intellectual by essence, it would not be of infinite immateriality, as has been shown.

By which, too, it is clear with respect to the second confirmation that the antecedent is to be granted and the consequence denied, and the assumption itself as well, if the reason of substance by essence is taken to be the aforementioned substance, as virtually distinct from the reason of a substance that is intellectual by essence, because, as we were just saying, it involves a repugnancy, namely that some substance should be such by essence, of such perfection as is said in the confirmation, and that it should be virtually distinguished from the reason of a substance that is intellectual by essence. Why, moreover, the constitutive principle of the divine essence and nature is to be explained rather by the intelligere of God than by the reason of a spiritual substance by essence, even if this latter reason were not virtually distinguished from the former — as indeed it is not distinguished — will be explained in the following doubt.

30 In the preceding difficulty we explained only expressly whether the reason of a spiritual substance as such, as distinguished from intellectual being, whether in actu primo or in actu secundo, is the constitutive principle of the divine essence. And so it remains to be explained whether intellectual being itself, taken strictly and radically and essentially, or else being intelligible in actu secundo, that is, as extending to actual intellection as such, has the role of the constitutive principle of the divine essence, or of the divine nature. And therefore, in order that this be explained better and more precisely, the present difficulty is raised.

But in order that the title of that question may be better understood, it must be noted that by "intellection as such" is not meant any sort of divine intellection, such as scientific intellection, or that of an art, and other similar ones, which correspond to our intellectual habits and to the intellections elicited by them; but rather the first intellection of God, corresponding to the adequate act of our intellect and to the power which by its own proper nature we have as radically intellectual, in as much as, just as our being intelligible, whether radical or actual, is either a radical or an actual intellection of whatever intelligible thing is intelligible under the reason of the intelligible, so: that first intellection of God and his intellectual power, being altogether identified one with the other without any virtual distinction between them, as we shall show at once, is the intellection of all divine things, and of whatever other intelligible things there are, under the reason nonetheless (so to speak) of the divine intelligible, that is, through all its amplitude, as it is his own being both in the entitative and in the intelligible order, and according to that most formal consideration by which he is the most universal reason, under which all things are understood by God; but not in as much as that same essence which of necessity includes, so as to have its own being in either order, has a peculiar reason for attaining these rather than those, or in this determinate way rather than that one, namely, of understanding in a determinate way through a cause, or by something similar, in correspondence with that determinate mode of understanding which is found in the acts elicited by our intellectual habits, in as much as they are such.

§ I. The first opinion is proposed.

31 The first opinion asserts that the constitutive principle of the divine essence and of the divine nature is not distinguished from it, on account of those things which we set forth in the preceding difficulty. It asserts, however, that intellection as such is not its constitutive principle, in as much as virtually distinguished from its attributes; but that it is constituted only by being radically and essentially intellectual in actu primo, or by the being that elicits the divine intellection. Thus Curiel, in his Controversies, book 2, controversy 3, number 166; Arubaltom, book 1 on the first part, disputation 28, chapters 3 and 4; Albertinus, Corollary 24 on relation, question 14, difficulty 2; and others of the later school.

It is proved firstly. Because the nature of man is constituted by this, that it be radically intellectual by human intellection, and the nature of an Angel by this, that it be radically intellectual by Angelic intellection; but not by this, that they be understanding through intellections corresponding to them: therefore the divine nature is constituted by this, that it be radically intellectual by divine intellection, that is, essentially; but not by the intellection itself.

32 The consequence is clear. Then because that very thing which is the constitutive principle of created intellectual nature must be the constitutive principle, with imperfections removed, of uncreated intellectual nature. But in this, namely, that the nature of God is constituted by precisely this, that it be radically intellectual by divine intellection, just as human nature is, by this, rather, an infinite power which is of necessity required for understanding through such intellection: therefore, etc.

Then also: because being intellectually by radical human intellection is the constitutive principle of human nature, because it is the first predicate which is proper to it in the intellectual order; but being radically intellectual by divine intellection is the first predicate which is proper to God in the intellectual order, such that it belongs to him alone and not to another, since by this predicate he is first distinguished from created intellectual natures, with which he agreed in intellectual being, and also from every other created nature: therefore, etc.

33 Secondly. Because sanctifying grace is a formal participation of the divine nature, as all theologians commonly admit, and therefore through it we are made sons of God; but through sanctifying grace, taken formally and with precision, it is being radically intellectual as it is in itself that is participated, and not intellection itself, or the vision of God, as it is in itself, as it is clear from itself: therefore it is a sign that the divine nature consists in the intellectuality already spoken of, and not in understanding itself.

It is confirmed. Because otherwise we should not be made sons of God until we should see him himself, and consequently there would be in us no right to the eternal inheritance before the aforesaid vision; which is very absurd, and against the common opinion of theologians: therefore, etc. The consequence is clear. Because if the nature of God consisted in understanding itself, then, just as we should not participate in the understanding which is constitutive of God, or that understanding by which he, as he is in himself, is understood by himself until we should see him, so neither should we have his nature; and consequently neither should we be sons, or heirs, of him.

34 Thirdly. Many things are contained in God's understanding, which yet are not contained in his being, or nature: therefore it is a sign that understanding is not the constitutive principle of the divine essence, or of the divine nature; and so the constitutive principle of that essence will be the sole radical power of understanding through divine intellection. This second consequence is clear from the first. Because the nature of God, being most perfect, must pertain to the order of consisting in this, that it be the radical power of understanding through such intellection. The first consequence, however, is clear from the antecedent.

Then, because whatever is contained in the constitutive principle of any nature must be contained in the nature itself. Then also: because, if understanding is the constitutive principle of the divine nature, it will pertain to its line, and will not be distinguished from it even virtually, as is clear from what has often been said: therefore whatever is contained in God's understanding must be contained in the divine nature, and conversely; otherwise two contradictory predicates would be verified of that same most simple formality, wholly undistinguished, namely, to contain something and not to contain it.

The antecedent, however, is proved. Because sin is contained formally in the divine understanding, yet is not so far contained eminently in the essence and nature of God: because although he understands it, he does not however cause it: therefore, etc.

35 It makes no difference if one says that, in order that contradictory predicates be verified of the same thing, it is enough that there intervene between them a distinction on the part of the mode of conceiving and signifying, or of the reason of the reasoning subject, even though there be no virtual distinction, as happens here; because in that very way they are not verified of one and the same thing which is in every way the same. And thus God and Divinity may be distinguished only on the part of our mode of conceiving; nevertheless this is true: God begets, and also this: Divinity does not beget. And then synonyms are distinguished only grammatically, or by the reason of the reasoning subject, and not virtually, or by the reason of the reasoned, and yet these statements are true: A garment is of neither gender: a dress is not of neither gender. And lastly Peter is distinguished from himself by the sole reason of the reasoning subject; yet it is verified of him that he is the same as himself, and that he is not the same, if the affirmative be understood of real identity and the negative of identity of reason; because at least by reason he is distinguished from himself.

For against this it must be said that although a distinction of the reason of the reasoning subject suffices to remove contradiction in predicates which agree with something through the sole operation of the intellect, without foundation in the thing, as is seen in the two examples given above; yet it does not suffice at all in the case of predicates which are verified, together with the divine intellection, and are not contained in the divine being, of God on the part of the thing, all operation of our intellect being set aside, as is clear from the thing itself and from what has been said: therefore, in order that the contradiction be removed, some distinction at least virtual is necessary on the part of the thing between the essence of God and his intellection. The consequence together with the minor appears sufficiently plain. The major, however, is proved: because a distinction must be posited there where, if there were none, a contradiction would be verified; but on the part of the thing it is verified that the divine essence does not contain evils, while the divine understanding does contain them: therefore some distinction, at least fundamental, or virtual, must be posited on the part of the thing between the essence, or nature, of God and this understanding of his.

36 Add that the instance adduced in the first place in this solution does not favour it, but rather presses against it. For in that proposition, God begets, the subject, namely God, is not supposed for the concrete of Divinity, that is, for one having Divinity, so as to abstract from persons: because here God, as the notion common to the three persons, cannot be the principle of a notional act, nor produce anything ad intra, since he is not really distinguished from any person, but is supposed for the Father alone determinately, as the holy Doctor teaches in question 39, article 4, from the fact that the subject is restricted by the predicate; and consequently that the word God, as the subject of this proposition, God begets, is virtually distinguished by the reason of Paternity from the divine essence taken precisely, which is the subject of the other proposition, namely: Essence does not beget.

37 Fourthly. Because the divine essence, or nature, is constituted by that through which it has in the first place to contain all creatures, since the nature of God is that which in the first place contains every other created nature; but that through which the divine nature has in the first place to contain every created nature is not understanding itself in actu secundo, but being radically, or in actu primo, intellectual through the highest of all intellections, namely, the divine: therefore, etc. The minor with respect to the second part is plainly clear from the first. Because the divine nature must in the first place contain every other created nature through something pertaining to the intellectual order: from the fact that just as the mode of acting intellectually is the noblest of all, so is the mode of containing natures: therefore, if it does not contain creatures in the first place through understanding, it will certainly contain them through radical intellectual being itself, or in actu primo.

The same minor, however, is proved with respect to the first part. Then because understanding does not contain the thing understood in entitative and natural being, but only in intelligible and intentional being: and so this containment will not be sufficient to cause creatures in entitative being. Hence the divine omnipotence, in which the radical and primary power which is in the nature of God for the production of creatures shines forth most, just as it produces them ad extra according to their entitative being, so contains them in entitative and natural being. Then also: because God understands all created natures, because they are represented in his essence as in a cause; since he knows them in his essence, as in a cause and in a foreknown object: therefore that he contain creatures precedes that he understand them: therefore that by which in the first place he contains them will not be his understanding.

38 Fifthly. Because intellection cannot, even in God, be prior to the reason of the true and the intelligible: therefore it cannot be the very essence of God. The antecedent is clear: because otherwise it would be prior to its own object, which is self-contradictory. And the consequence is proved. Because intelligibility, or truth, supposes from the nature of the thing an entity, since it is predicated of it as its affection: therefore such intelligibility as the divine is must be supposed from the nature of the thing to be such an entity, namely, a divine one, constituted in its quasi-species: therefore intellection itself, which is not prior to the reason of the true and the intelligible, supposes that same entity, or (which comes to the same) the divine nature, constituted in its quasi-species.

39 Lastly. Because understanding essentially has the true operation of an intellectual nature, even in God: therefore it is not constitutive of it, but supposes the nature and essence of God already constituted; and consequently the radical intellectuality alone, or that already explained in actu primo, will be the constitutive principle of the aforesaid essence or nature. This last consequence is clear from what has just been said. The first, however, is clear from the antecedent. Because it belongs to the reason of an operation that it presuppose, at least virtually, the being of the agent: since whatever acts, acts according to The antecedent, however, is proved. Then because understanding, according to its proper reason, is an immanent operation looking to the intellectual order, or essentially including it: therefore even in God it will retain this reason of intellectual operation. Then also: because understanding is the most perfect act, by which an intellectual nature lives most perfectly and in actu secundo; but a most perfect life, though in actu secundo, consists in an operation, according to the common opinion of all philosophers: therefore understanding, from its own reason, and consequently also in God, will be a true operation. Then lastly, because the beatitude of God even now consists in an operation; since our beatitude, which is a formal participation of the divine beatitude, consists in an operation, as in the matter of beatitude it is commonly shown to consist: but the divine beatitude consists in intellection, as the holy Doctor teaches below, question 26, article 2: therefore, etc.

40 It makes no difference if one objects in the first place, along with some of the later Thomists, that although it belongs to the reason of a created operation that it proceed from another, it does not belong to the reason of an operation as such, setting aside the fact of its proceeding from another, or its being, speaking most formally, the very agent itself.

For against this it must be said that just as being towards is the proper reason of a relation, so as to abstract from created and uncreated, and therefore a relation taken formally cannot be found in divine things without being towards being found there, so with respect to the reason of an operation, in as much as it abstracts from any operation, the reason is being from. For just as a relation is defined through being towards a term, so an action is defined through the fact of being in some way from the agent; but something implies that it proceeds in some way from another, without its being distinguished in some way, that is, at least virtually, from that other and that other being at least virtually presupposed.

41 Nor does it make a difference if one objects in the second place, along with others, that understanding signifies two things, namely, understanding itself, in as much as it denotes an operation, and a peculiar degree of being, namely, the degree of intellectuality in the ultimate act, subsisting of itself. Hence, although understanding in the first manner supposes the nature of God already constituted, it does not in the second manner; but rather it constitutes it: because the divine nature is constituted by this, that it be an intellectual nature subsisting in the ultimate act.

For in as much as understanding, from its formal and essential concept, has the character of a second vital act and of an operation, as has been said, it cannot abstract from the reason of operation and of a second act; and so it will always have to presuppose the being constituted of the thing understood; all the more so because understanding is said to designate an intellectual degree in the ultimate act precisely because the ultimate act of that degree is an immanent operation, just as the ultimate act of an essence is being: therefore it implies that we conceive of it, as designating an intellectual degree subsisting in the ultimate act, only if we understand it itself under the reason of an operation.

42 It is confirmed, because when understanding is taken as a degree, and then as an operation, either this second acceptance of understanding is understood as a new virtual actuality, somehow virtually distinguished from understanding itself as it is a degree, or is it not? If this second thing is said, therefore the whole actuality of the operation, as it is an operation, is involved in the concept of it as a degree: and consequently the reason of a degree cannot be abstracted from the reason of an operation. If, however, the first is asserted, therefore when we conceive of understanding as a degree, we do not conceive of it under the whole actuality of its intelligible kind, and consequently not in the ultimate and pure act, but only in the first act: and so the constitutive principle of the divine nature will be only understanding in the first act.

It is confirmed. Because either divine understanding, in as much as it constitutes a degree, is the actual perception of an object, or is not? If the second, therefore it says only understanding in the first act, and consequently will not say a degree of intellectuality in the ultimate act. If the first, therefore understanding is understanding by way of an operation: since actually to perceive an object is actually to contemplate it, and actual contemplation is actual operation of the intellect.

§ II. The more accurate opinion of the holy Doctor.

43 It must nevertheless be said that the constitutive principle of the divine essence, or nature, is not that by which it is radically and essentially intellectual, in as much as this reason is virtually distinguished from actual intellection, as was explained in number 30; but rather that it extends to this, that without any fundamental distinction, or any virtual distinction, understanding itself is the understanding by essence: and consequently that the aforesaid intellectuality is by way of the most pure and ultimate act, that is, that understanding itself is the constitutive principle of the divine essence or nature.

This assertion the holy Doctor taught in this article at the end of the body of the article: where, as we reported in the preceding difficulty, he thus concludes: From this it is clear that, because God is said to be understanding, no multiplicity is posited in his substance. But if understanding, of which the holy Doctor speaks, that namely which we explained in the number just cited, and which alone belongs to him so as to be altogether one and the same, that is, without any virtual distinction with the intellect of God, as the holy Doctor had premised in the preceding words, were virtually distinguished from the substance of God, then some multiplicity, namely a virtual multiplicity, would be posited in God by the fact of his being understanding.

44 The same he also asserts below in question 27, article 2, where he teaches that the procession of the Word is a generation because it is the communication of the divine nature, since in God being and understanding are the same. This reason would not be convincing if in it there were question only of real identity: because in this way willing is also God's being: and thus the procession of the Holy Spirit would be a generation, and so the Angelic Doctor, in article 4 in reply to objection 1 of the same question, denies that the reason of generation is to be taken from real identity: therefore it is necessary that it be understood as being about the most formal identity between God's being and his understanding, which excludes even a virtual distinction. And likewise in article 8 of this question, to show that God causes all things through his intellect, or through his understanding, which is identified with the divine intellect without any virtual distinction, as will be clear from what is to be said in the treatise on the Divine Will, disputation 1, number 34, he gives the reason from the fact that his being is his understanding: this reason, however, would be of no weight, if understanding were virtually distinguished from God's being or nature. Just as from the fact that the intellect and the divine will are really identified, and consequently God's willing is identically his being and his understanding, it cannot be said absolutely and simply that the Holy Spirit proceeds through understanding, or through the intellect, and the Word through willing, or through the will. Let those things be seen which we shall say on this matter in the treatise on the Divine Will, disputation 1.

45 And lastly this very thing the holy Doctor taught: then below, in question 18, article 3, and in question 19, article 4, question 26, article 2, in the body, 4 of the Contra Gentiles, chapters 11 and 23; then also in all the places in which he holds that God's understanding and its object must of themselves first agree in the degree of immateriality, that is, in this, that each of them is its own being, or existence, as we set forth in the preceding difficulty with reason 3. Hence the holy Doctor is followed by Zumel, book 1 on the first part, question 27, article 4, question 2; Gonzalez, in the present disputation 36; Ledesma, if his words are duly expounded, in his volume on the Perfection of God, question 12, article 13, conclusions 3 and 6; Nazar, in this question, article 5, controversy 1; Suarez, although led by other foundations, in disputation 30 of his Metaphysics, section 15, and in volume 1 of the book on the first part, book 1, chapter 3; Herice, tractate 1, disputation 3, chapter 3, referring to Aureolus; and in favour of this Ferrara, book 1 of the Contra Gentiles, chapter 50, when he says that understanding taken formally is God's existence, and not only identically, like the other attributes, although he also inclines toward the opposite opinion. And lastly this very thing is maintained by very many of the later disciples of the holy Doctor who have not yet published their writings.

46 The holy Doctor, however, often touches on the fundamental reason of this assertion, and it can be proposed under this form. Because the constitutive principle of the divine nature, or essence, must pertain to the intellectual order, or degree: therefore it must be the reason of an intellectuality of such a condition that it extend to this, that without any virtual distinction understanding as such be itself, by way of the second and ultimate act, and consequently the aforesaid understanding will be the constitutive principle of the essence and nature of God. The antecedent seems sufficiently clear, especially with the supposition of those things which we brought in the preceding difficulty to prove that in God the essence and its nature are not virtually distinguished. For since the constitutive principle of the divine nature must pertain to one of those degrees which are by themselves fit for constituting a nature, such as the degrees of being, feeling, living, and finally of understanding, it follows that the constitutive principle of the divine nature, being among all natures the most perfect, must look to the noblest of these degrees, namely to the intellectual degree.

The first consequence, indeed, upon which the second rests, is established by those things which, in the treatise on the Vision of God, disputation 2, we said, and in the treatise on the Divine Will, disputation 2, number 34, we shall say more. For from the very fact that the constitutive principle of the divine nature pertains to the intellectual order, or degree, it is necessary that it identify with itself, without virtual distinction, the ultimate actuality of this degree, that is, understanding itself. Then because such an intellectuality must be by way of the most pure act, without any trace of potentiality, even according to reason with foundation in the thing. An intellectuality, however, which does not extend to this, of identifying with itself, without any virtual distinction, the ultimate actuality of its line, or the second act, which corresponds to it of itself in the first place, which here is nothing other than the understanding already explained, is not an intellectuality by way of the most pure act, but one admixed with potentiality with foundation in the thing.

47 Then also: because every line, or formal reason taken in its purity, must extend from the first potentiality of that line, or from that which corresponds to the first potentiality which is found in that line in creatures, up to the last and purest act which corresponds to it of itself in the first place; and therefore the line of willing extends from the principle of willing, that is, from the will, up to the volition; and the line of the essence from the essence itself, which is capable of existing, up to existence itself; in such a way that there is no distinction between it and its existence; otherwise that line would not be by way of the most pure act: therefore the line of intellectual nature in its purity, which, as we said in the preceding difficulty, is the same as the line of nature without virtual distinction, must extend from that which corresponds to the first potentiality of this line, which is found in creatures, up to the ultimate actuality and second act, that is, understanding without virtual distinction, in such a way that the aforesaid potentiality be purified of potentiality, and only remain under the reason of the most pure and most actual intellectuality, without any trace of potentiality.

This is confirmed, and explained by the reason which the holy Doctor insinuates in the preceding article, which, in order to be better understood, supposes that the nature and essence in every complete thing is constituted by an actuality: because nothing complete is constituted by that which is in potency, but by that which it actually has; and therefore it is the act which constitutes and distinguishes: but as in the order and constitution of a created thing no act can be understood unless it be limited and determined, so neither in the order and constitution of an uncreated thing can any act be conceived which is not a pure act: and a pure act designates the reason of the ultimate act, since it excludes all potentiality, and consequently all act of lesser perfection and actuality than the ultimate, or all act that rests only in the reason of a first act.

48 Hence the following confirmation is deduced. Because the essence and nature of God must be something most actual, without any trace of potentiality, even according to reason, yet founded in things: therefore it cannot be constituted by the aforesaid radical understanding, taken precisely in the first act, but by understanding in the second act, having the reason of the most pure act.

It is confirmed secondly. Then from those things which we said above in number 19 and following. Then also by the reason which the holy Doctor insinuates in this article, and which we touched on above. Because divine understanding, of which we speak, is the existence of God in the intelligible order, as we shall say in tractate 4, disputation 1, number 21: therefore it must be altogether identified with the essence itself, and with the divine nature as radically intellectual, in such a way that such a nature be the intellection itself, and conversely. The consequence is clear: then because the essence of God is its being without any virtual distinction. Then also: because in God the entitative and intelligible orders are not distinguished with foundation in the thing, as we asserted in the preceding difficulty: therefore neither is entitative existence, of the intelligible order: therefore, just as the essence of God is, without virtual distinction, its own being in the entitative order, because such being pertains to the line of the essence, as its ultimate actuality: so too the same essence will be altogether identified with its understanding, which is its existence in the intelligible order.

§ III. Objections against what has been said.

49 Now, in order that those things which we have said in support of the assertion may be better understood, some objections must be brought against them, because from their solution much will be made clear. The first objection then is that there is some oversight, that of a real constitutive principle, in so far as it is distinguished in some way, that is, at least really or virtually, from the thing constituted; otherwise there would not be there a real constitution, or a real constituting and constituted thing. If, therefore, all things which pertain to the line of the divine nature must, according to what has been said, be altogether the same among themselves, in such a way that they are not distinguished even virtually, how can a real constitution, or a real constituting and constituted thing, be there?

Then. Because it belongs to the reason of an existence that it be a term of the essence, and not the essence itself: and thus the union of humanity to the Word, and to its existence, through which in the manner of the holy Doctor the humanity of our Lord Christ exists, is not a union in essence and nature, but only a union of a term that can be terminated and of a term: indeed, for that reason the sacred humanity can exist through the existence of the Word, because an existence of its own genus does not have the reason of form, but the pure and bare reason of a term: if, therefore, God's understanding has itself by way of an existence in the intelligible order, how can it have the reason of essence and nature without any distinction, even virtual? Because it implies that the term of the nature, taken as such, be the nature itself without the aforesaid distinction, otherwise it would be the very nature itself; but not its term. From which it will also come about that neither can God's entitative existence be the same as its essence, and consequently neither will it pertain to its line.

Furthermore. Because it belongs to the reason of a root that from it in some way, that is, at least virtually, there proceed that whose root it is: if, therefore, we posit in God the reason of a root of the intellect and of the divine intellection, how do we assert that all these things are identified with one another without any virtual distinction? Since between that which flows forth and that from which it flows forth there must be some distinction.

50 The second objection is that, since according to what has been said both being radically intellectual through intellection as such, already explained, and the intellect, understanding, and being understood, as well as the very object understood and the intelligible species, and finally God's existence, or the reason of a thing as such, are identified without any virtual distinction, in such a way that all these things are the very essence and nature of God, it will follow that there is no reason why we should rather say that the aforesaid nature is constituted by understanding, that is, by the understood, or by an existence, than by understanding. This, however, seems false. Because for that reason the holy Doctor taught, not once but often, that understanding is constitutive of God: because it has among the other divine things something peculiar, by reason of which this office is given to it in preference to the others. All the more so because, since it is peculiar in created natures that the reason of radical intellectuality be their constitutive principle, it will also be peculiar in the divine nature that understanding, by way of the most pure act, have the reason of a constitutive principle with respect to it.

§ IV. Solution of the first objection just adduced.

51 To the first of these objections the answer will be given by denying the antecedent. And to the first proof it must be said that the constitution is twofold: one, which takes place through composition, whether real and actual, or real and virtual, or according to reason with foundation in the thing. The other, however, which is the most pure constitution, existing within the pure line of constitution, without any other composition, and which constitution is called constitution by simplicity.

An example of that first constitution we have in the physical constitution of man, which takes place through his composition from matter and form; and in the metaphysical constitution of the same, which takes place through composition from genus and difference. An example, however, of the second constitution is the constitution of the divine person, for instance of Paternity, or of the Father according to those things which he says correctly: where the person of the Father is constituted by Paternity through a certain most pure constitution, free from every composition, whether physical, or metaphysical, or of reason with foundation in the thing.

Wherefore, although we grant that that which is constitutive of something by a constitution of the first reason must be distinguished at least virtually from the thing constituted, and that thus the two extremes of that composition must be given there as virtually different, of which one is compared to an act and the other to a potency; nevertheless, that which is constitutive by a pure constitution, free from all composition, whether metaphysical, or of any other composition out of act and potency according to reason with foundation in the thing, is not necessary that it be distinguished from that which is constituted by it: because for such a constitution it is sufficient that the constituting constitute by simplicity, that is, by positing itself, as happens in the constitution just spoken of, by which divine Paternity formally and directly constitutes the Father: where the constituting and the constituted, taken directly, are distinguished only on the part of the mode of conceiving.

Hence, since the constitution by which divine understanding constitutes the nature of God is of that second kind, and not of that first, it follows that the following coheres very well, that the aforesaid understanding constitutes the essence of God, and yet is not virtually distinguished from it; but that, taken adequately, it is adequately its quiddity, and altogether the very same essence constituted through it. Just as, according to the common opinion of theologians, Divinity constitutes God, so as to abstract from the persons: and yet, because it constitutes him by a constitution through simplicity, Divinity and God are one most simple formality, without any virtual distinction; but only on the part of our mode of conceiving.

52 To the second proof, however, we confess that an existence is a term of nature, and consequently that intellection, as it is the existence of the intelligible order, also has the reason of a term with respect to intellectual nature, in as much as it pertains to the intelligible order, in the manner however indicated above. Now, something can be an existence, or a term of some nature, in a twofold way. Firstly indeed, in such a way that it be formally, and only formally, an existence and a term. Secondly, however, in such a way that it have formally and at the same time eminently the reason of an existence or term with respect to that nature. Therefore, that which has only formally the reason of an existence or term must be distinguished from the thing whose term it was. Now, that which formally and eminently at the same time attains the reason of an existence and of a term with respect to some nature must not be distinguished from that nature, except only on the part of the mode of conceiving; but it must be at once nature and existence and term without any virtual distinction: because that eminence consists in this, that it have what is proper to a nature and what is proper to a term of a nature: and consequently in this, that it is equivalent to other natures and to other terms taken together. Although, because the aforesaid nature and term pertain to the same line, that equivalence is not sufficient to constitute distinct lines, but consists only in formal containment, and eminently of each of the two reasons, with a distinction only on the part of the mode of signifying and conceiving.

Wherefore, since God's existence and his understanding have the reason of an existence, not indeed formally only, but formally and eminently at the same time, and in the same way attain the reason of a term, it follows, very consistently with that, that he be at once the very nature of God and its existence and its term: and that by reason of this eminence, in which the aforesaid being is equivalent both to our essence and to intellection, and also to the existence found in us, he can be united, for example, with the humanity of our Lord Christ, as he is an existence and a term, and not as he holds the office of an essence, indeed as he is the existence of the entitative order and its term, and not as he is the existence of the intelligible order. Although all these reasons are in the aforesaid understanding one and the same most formal identity, yet the eminence is so great, and equivalent to many things pertaining by their own genus to the same line.

53 By this also it is established with regard to the last proof of the same objection. For although the root of understanding, which formally is only a root, must be of such a condition that understanding proceed from it really; nevertheless, if the aforesaid root be formally and eminently such, it is not necessary that the aforesaid understanding proceed from it even virtually; but it is enough that it be equivalent to a created nature which is radically intellectual and to the intellection adequate to it: and thus by reason of this eminence these two offices alone are distinguished in that most simple formality on the part of our mode of conceiving, in as much as through a single concept we can conceive of it as it is the first power of understanding which is found in God, without enquiring whether that very formality is the first power of understanding by way of the most pure act, or the second act, which on the part of the thing conceived would not be distinguished even virtually from the first divine intellection, or whether it be some formality which by the force of its line precisely rests in the first divine power of understanding, and is not at all identified without virtual distinction with the aforesaid intellection. And then by another concept we conceive of that first power which is in God for understanding to be the very intellection itself, constitutive of it: and consequently that that power should not have its own understanding apart from it: or in the same way in which the same divine understanding is conferred by way of a root with willing, from which it is virtually distinguished, and which is contained in it not formally, but virtually.

§ V. Explanation of the second objection, adduced against those things which we have said in support of our opinion.

54 To the second objection it must be confessed that the divine essence, as virtually distinguished from its attributes, consists on the part of the thing conceived, in all and in each of those reasons, or quasi-reasons, enumerated there, in as much as they do not exclude, either in whole or in part, an all-round identity between themselves; but rather they are identified among themselves by their force without any distinction, even virtual, as is clear from what has been said. Now, granted this, such an essence is explained better by this, that it be the understanding itself already spoken of, than by other things.

The reason of this, however, is established from what has been said. Because, since the divine nature must pertain to the highest degree constitutive of nature from itself, namely the degree of understanding, and since within this degree it is to be constituted by the highest and ultimate actuality of that degree, it follows that this constitutive principle is very well explained by this, that it be understanding as such: because this not only identifies with itself what pertains to this line, but explicitly says the highest and ultimate actuality of it, which indeed does not belong to the other things enumerated in the objection. For although each of those identifies in the manner stated whatever pertains to the line of nature, simply by the fact that it has the highest perfection in that office which it expresses, for instance either in the reason of a species, or in the reason of an intellect as such; nevertheless it does not explicitly say the highest and ultimate actuality of this line.

55 This, however, cannot be explained better than by going through them one by one. For in the first place, the intellect, the intelligible species, and the divine essence itself, as expressing the office of a terminating object, certainly do not express the ultimate and highest actuality of the degree of understanding, and God's existence, as is sufficiently clear, does not express the ultimate actuality of the divine nature: since entitative existence is actualized in us through the being of the intelligible order. And thus the intellect informed through the intelligible species, and having the existence of the entitative order, is able to be actualized and terminated through a being looking to the intelligible order, that is, through understanding itself; and therefore, although in God entitative and intelligible being are one and the same, nevertheless the being of the intelligible order expresses a greater actuality than the being of the entitative order: and consequently the nature of God is expressed more aptly by understanding than by being, taken precisely as entitative being.

56 But if being is taken, in as much as without any virtual distinction it says both entitative existence and that of the intelligible order, then each of the two offices is explained better by understanding than by existence: because it is not any sort of understanding, but understanding of itself and from itself, subsisting in an act actually exercised, that is assigned as the constitutive principle of the divine nature: this, however, sufficiently explains both the being of the existence of the intelligible order, as is clear from itself, and also the being of entitative existence: for what it expresses, itself, namely, that as has just been said it subsists of itself and from itself, sufficiently explains itself to be existing even in the entitative order. Now, the word being, subsisting of itself, does not express intelligible being according to the peculiar and vital office which it exercises within the line of existing, but rather says that more implicitly than understanding subsisting of itself expresses being, or entitative existence.

57 And lastly, the reason of a thing as such, in as much as it not only says existence, but the very reason of a thing as such abstracted according to the thing, or from all potentiality, and subsisting of itself: and consequently the very reason of a thing, in as much as it is not from another, either as from a cause or as from a reason a priori, it is plain that it does not, by the force of its expressed formal reason, express any more than the actuality and perfection which understanding as such has: since it does not express vital being, nor the ultimate actuality of the highest degree constitutive of nature, nor, finally, the degree itself, the highest, namely the degree of understanding. Although, simply because such an entity as such is altogether abstract-

ed from potency, and so the entity is in the abstract, it must under the concept of an entity subsisting of itself include and identify with itself without virtual distinction whatever pertains to the line of the divine nature.

58 It makes no difference if you press, in the first place, that the holy Doctor seems to assign the first place among the constitutive predicates of God to being itself; and consequently he holds that the divine essence is better explained by this, that it is its own being, than by understanding: therefore, etc. The antecedent is clear. Because above in question 13, article 11, he says that the most proper name of God is He who is: it is clear, however, that the most proper name of anything signifies its most constitutive reason. And in this article and in book 1 of the Contra Gentiles, chapter 45, from that source he shows that God's understanding is his essence, because understanding is compared to the intellect and to the intelligible species, just as being is to the essence: and thus, because divine being is the very essence of God, understanding also has the reason of an essence. Where the holy Doctor seems to suppose that being itself has what belongs to the principal divine essence: since from that he concludes that understanding is the very essence of God, because it bears itself toward the same God just as being itself does.

This therefore makes no difference. Because the antecedent is false. And to the first testimony it must be said that the holy Doctor is speaking of the name, most proper to God, not indeed as he says precisely the divine nature, as virtually distinguished from the attributes, but as he says the whole perfection of God, as it is one and the same simple formality including both the essence and the attributes. For all these things are signified, in a certain indeterminate way, by this, that God is He who is, in as much as by this it is denoted that he is from himself, that is, not from another, as receiving from a true cause what he is: and consequently as not having being by participation. It is clear, however, that this reason embraces both the essence and the attributes: since nothing that is in God is from another as from a cause, nor has being by participation, but, in the manner indicated above, exists through being itself as such: which explanation is very consonant with the context of the holy Doctor, as will be evident to the one who considers it.

59 To the second testimony, however, it must be said that if we speak of the constitutive principle of God precisely, in as much as it says that which is not virtually distinguished from the divine nature, then it does not follow that the aforesaid reasons of the holy Doctor are less grounded in the fact that he expresses his being in the intelligible order, and that being, or existence, constitutes the divine nature without virtual distinction. Just as also, from the fact that being is identified without virtual distinction with understanding, it is well inferred that being has the reason of a constitutive principle. Now, however, if we speak of the aforesaid constitutive principle, in as much as it explains the divine nature in a better and more perfect way, then all the other things already explained are constitutive, in as much as they are contained without any virtual distinction in understanding itself. And thus the holy Doctor does not infer that understanding is constitutive in this way because it is any kind of being, but because it is the being that follows, not indeed by a virtual succession, but on the part of our mode of conceiving, with respect to the intelligible species as such, and consequently because it is the being of the intelligible order already spoken of, which indeed is the very nature of God.

60 Nor does it stand in the way if you press, in the second place, that the reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted by formal abstraction, is something more abstract according to the aforesaid abstraction than understanding: therefore it expresses a greater perfection; and consequently the essence of God is better explained by the former than by the latter. This last consequence is clear from the first, and from what has already been said. The first, however, is clear from the antecedent. Because a form abstracted by formal abstraction says the same as one abstracted from matter and potentiality. And thus the more abstract a form is in this way, the more actuality, and consequently the more perfection, it says.

The antecedent, however, is proved. Because a form abstracted by formal abstraction is more abstract than another form when it is compared by way of form both with respect to that other form and with respect to those things which, by way of a material reason, are subject under the aforesaid other form. For by that very fact it abstracts by formal abstraction both from that form and from those things which are subject under it by way of a material reason: and thus it cannot but be more abstract by formal abstraction. But the reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted by formal abstraction, says a certain most universal reason, which bears itself by way of form both with respect to understanding itself and with respect to all other things which are compared by way of matter with respect to it; since being, or existence, is the ultimate actuality of all things: therefore, etc.

61 It is confirmed, and at the same time the preceding objection is explained, supposing first, however, that a thing, or being, can be abstracted by a twofold kind of abstractionionis¹ Firstly, by a total abstraction, that is, in the way in which the whole, or quasi-whole, whether potential or universal, is abstracted from its subjective parts, or from its inferiors: and according to this reason it includes them, though implicitly, and consequently includes their whole potentiality: because it is not in the least abstracted from them. Secondly, it can be abstracted by formal abstraction, in the way in which a form, or any formal reason, is abstracted from its matter, or material reason: and in this way it does not include them, as is seen in a thing insofar as it is the object of the Metaphysics. For according to this reason the reason of a thing is only formal in it; the other things, however, which otherwise are contained under it by way of inferiors, are of themselves material, and are considered by way of material reasons: the reason of a thing, on the other hand, is by way of form. And therefore, insofar as it is the object of the Metaphysics, it does not include natural or mathematical things, as we shall say at once: because it does not belong to the reason of form as such to include its matter, or quasi-matter.

62 Hence the following confirmation, and explanation of the preceding objection is drawn. Because although the reason of a thing, or of being itself, which at once has being abstracted both by total and analogous abstraction, and by formal abstraction, includes according to that first abstraction its inferiors, and their potentialities as subjective parts; nevertheless not as abstracted by formal abstraction: therefore, simply by the fact that it is more universal than understanding, it will express a form abstracted from more potentialities than the latter does, and consequently a purer form, and one more fit for explaining the very nature of God.

The antecedent is proved. Because, as we said a little while ago, a thing, insofar as it is properly touched on by the Metaphysics, does not include natural or mathematical things, and consequently these sciences are not subalterned to it, because according to this reason it abstracts from them by formal abstraction, and it does not belong to the reason of form to include its material reason.

63 For the answer will be given by distinguishing the antecedent: and if it is understood as being about the reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason, and about understanding, as it is abstracted in the same way from any understanding, it must be granted that, if by that greater abstraction there is denoted only what is the more universal, or broader, form, that is, what bears itself by way of form with respect to several material reasons. But if it is understood as being about the reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted by formal abstraction according to the thing, and about understanding abstracted in the same way, it must be denied: because thus taken, the one is not more abstract than the other: but they are one and the same most formal reason, distinguished only on the part of the mode of conceiving. And then the first consequence must be denied, if it is understood as being about the reason of a thing abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason, and about understanding abstracted in the same way from any understanding, and about greater perfection, simply and absolutely such, or about a greater perfection excluding every imperfection. And likewise the same consequence must be denied absolutely, understood as being about the reason of a thing, or of being itself, and of intellection, abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason: as well as the second consequence. Because the essence of God must not be explained by that which is more abstract in the aforesaid way by formal abstraction according to reason, but it is enough that it be explained by that which is most abstract by formal abstraction according to the thing: in such a way that there be nothing so abstract as to exceed this, having a peculiar reason on account of which it is explained by the former rather than by other things, as we said happens in understanding abstracted by formal abstraction according to the thing.

64 And with respect to the proof of the antecedent, insofar as it can be pressed against these things, the major must be distinguished, and, understood as being about a form abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason, the greater abstraction already spoken of must be granted, which consists in this, that it be the more universal and broader form, or what bears itself by way of form with respect to several material reasons: but if it is understood as being about the greater abstraction, insofar as it says, or argues, a greater actuality and perfection, this must be distinguished again, and it must be granted when the form from which the other is abstracted by the formal abstraction already spoken of is not of such a condition that a third form is quasi subject under it by way of a quasi-material reason (so to speak), and about whose reason (so to say) it is to embrace and include all the actuality and perfection which is contained in those two prior forms, namely in that most universal form which is abstracted, and in that from which this most universal form is immediately abstracted; but otherwise, if that second form, from which that prior more universal form is immediately abstracted according to reason, from among these three, namely that which extends itself by way of form with respect to several material reasons, is not of such a condition that it is quasi immediately to include, by reason, all the actuality and perfection of those two prior forms. And in the same proportional way the consequent must be distinguished, and according to what has been said the consequence must be denied or granted.

65 And all these things are explained, and first the distinction of the first antecedent. For a thing, or being itself abstracted by formal abstraction and according to reason, both from understanding and from the other things from which it is abstracted, is by way of reason more universal, or broader, than understanding abstracted in the same way, that is, by formal abstraction and according to reason, insofar as by this greater universality, or amplitude, precisely it is denoted that it bears itself by way of form with respect to several material reasons, or quasi-material reasons. If, however, the reason of a thing, or of being itself, is taken according to what it is of itself abstracted by formal abstraction, that is, insofar as it is of itself abstracted and separated both from all potentiality and from every subject, then (speaking of it most formally, and not only in an identical sense) it is not more universal, or broader (so to say), either physically or really, that is, it does not embrace in this way more perfection and actuality, nor is it of itself (speaking still most formally) anything more abstract by the aforesaid formal abstraction, and of itself such, than the aforesaid understanding abstracted in the same way: nor, finally, is it compared with respect to it by way of actuality: because they are one and the same most formal identity, distinguished only on the part of our mode of conceiving, and on the part of the aforesaid mode of conceiving understanding bears itself by way of a quasi reason of a more formal kind, as has been said. And thus, for this reason, and because the divine nature must be explained above all by this, that it consist in the reason which is more abstract according to the thing, of all those things that pertain to its concept, and not in the reason which is more abstract in the aforesaid way according to reason, therefore the nature of God is best signified not by the reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted in any way, but by understanding itself of itself abstract.

66 Then the second distinction, by which we pressed the aforesaid antecedent, can be explained in this way: although some reason be abstracted according to a material reason, nevertheless if under each of them another reason is also contained, of whose concept it is that whatever of perfection and actuality is simply simple is closed up in both, and in all the others from which they are abstracted, then from the fact that that first form abstracted according to reason is broader in the sense explained, it does not follow that it is more actual and more perfect than the second form from which it is immediately abstracted by formal abstraction. Because this second form also contains the whole perfection and actuality which is in that third other form which is otherwise contained under it by way of a subjective part, and which is also abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason.

Hence, because the reason of a thing, or of being itself, abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason, is abstracted from understanding, which otherwise contains immediately under itself divine understanding itself of itself abstract, and this must actually and formally contain whatever of perfection and actuality is simply simple in that reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted by formal abstraction: and consequently this same perfection must also be found in understanding itself abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason from any understanding, because according to this reason it says whatever of actuality there is in those, with potentialities set aside: therefore that reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted according to reason, is not more actual and more perfect than understanding abstracted in the same way, or than divine understanding, or than understanding itself separated and abstracted in itself, although it be, in the aforesaid way, something broader and more universal. Now, although the reason of a thing, or of being itself, or of intellection thus abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason, says the whole perfection and actuality already explained, nevertheless, since the mode of abstraction is only according to reason, for this reason it says the aforesaid actuality in an imperfect way only, and whatever of greater actuality arises from this also involves something of imperfection in that form thus abstracted, by reason of which this mode of abstraction is not found in being itself abstracted according to the thing, or in understanding abstracted in the same way.

67 This too can be made clear by examples: both from the contrary opinion, and from a similar case. In the contrary opinion indeed. For those who say that being, or the entity itself abstracted by formal abstraction and according to reason, is a form more abstract and more actual than understanding, must confess that it is not more abstract and more actual than the very reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted by formal abstraction according to the thing, or than Divinity itself: and this for no other reason than that Divinity, and being itself abstracted by formal abstraction according to the thing, which are otherwise contained under the reason of the entity abstracted by formal abstraction and according to reason, embrace by God and by creatures the whole fullness of the actuality and perfection of the line of nature without any potentiality, and being thus abstracted according to the thing (as they say) is most formally Divinity itself. Similarly, therefore, do we philosophize (which they too must admit) that, because a thing, or being, abstracted by formal abstraction according to the thing, includes understanding itself in its reason, and is included by it, and is not distinguished from it except only on the part of our mode of conceiving, and according to the implicit and explicit reason, without virtual distinction: and understanding itself abstracted by abstraction according to the thing says the whole perfection which being says without any material contraction of its own, or potentiality: therefore the reason of a thing, or of being itself abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason, is neither more actual nor more perfect than understanding abstracted in the same way, for the reason given, or than understanding abstracted by abstraction according to the thing.

68 From a similar case, too, it can be explained in this way from the doctrine of Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics, where it is said that the superior things, in terms of the consequence for existence, are prior to the inferior things: because this holds neither logically nor physically: He is an animal: therefore he is a man; and yet, on the testimony of the holy Doctor, in his opusculum 2, chapter 1, when the superior is analogous with respect to many things, in one of which is found the whole reason and perfection of the other inferiors, that superior thing is not physically prior in the consequence for existence. Hence we cannot verify that a thing exists without verifying that God exists: because in God the whole reason of a thing exists. Wherefore the holy Doctor, above in question 3, article 5, in his argument but against, said that nothing is prior to God according to the intellect: in such a way that it is understood to be prior physically: because although the more universal things are prior in this way, according to the intellect and the consequence for existence, than the inferior things, and a thing is superior to God; nevertheless, then, the more universal things are prior in the manner indicated, according to the intellect and the consequence for existence, only when the inferior does not have imbibed the whole perfection which the superior has: but God has the whole reason and perfection imbibed which a thing, or any other superior predicate, says: and thus none of them can be prior in the aforesaid manner to God.

69 Thus, then, proportionally in the present case, we say that when the reason of potentiality and imperfection is not found in something, but instead an infinite and utmost actuality, or (so to speak better) when in it the whole actuality is found which by its force is found in that which is abstracted from it by formal abstraction according to reason, then that which is abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason from all the other things which contract or determine the same reason is not absolutely and simply more actual with respect to it. Because when it has nothing of potentiality, and says the whole perfection which that abstract reason imports in itself and in all the other things, nothing can be absolutely and simply more actual than it: and thus the reason of a thing, or of being itself, abstracted by formal abstraction according to reason from understanding as such, is not absolutely and simply more abstract than the latter, in as much as it says that being more abstract is absolutely and simply more actual with respect to it, but rather the reverse obtains, as has been explained.

§ VI. The arguments of the first opinion, adduced at the beginning, are dissolved.

70 To the first, the antecedent being granted, the consequence must be denied. And to the first proof the major must be granted and the minor denied. Because the power of understanding, which precisely rests in the first act and does not identify with itself without virtual distinction the intellection corresponding to it of itself in the first place, of necessity includes imperfection; and consequently it cannot be infinite in the reason of intellectual power, nor constitutive of God. From which, with respect to the second proof of the same consequence, the major must be granted and what is assumed in the minor must be denied, inasmuch as it suggests that being radically intellectual by an intellection corresponding to the first act is a predicate proper to God: since the aforesaid predicate of necessity involves imperfection and limitation, by reason of which it does not identify with itself without virtual distinction the intellection pertaining to its line.

71 To the second, the major being granted, and formal participation being understood as analogous, inadequate, and deficient, and the minor being granted as well, the consequence must be denied; because from the fact that grace participates the divine nature by an analogous participation, inadequately, namely with respect to the single office which is in it, it does not follow that there are not in that same divine nature other offices; but rather the opposite follows.

To the confirmation the sequel must be denied. And for the proof, it is clear from what has been said that the nature of God consists, on the part of the thing conceived, both in understanding itself and in the power and root of understanding itself: and thus even if intellection itself, or the vision of God, corresponding to the aforesaid root, is not formally participated, the divine nature is still participated inadequately as it is in itself, whenever sanctifying grace is communicated to someone.

72 It makes no difference if you urge, at least from what has been said, that if the divine nature were participated miraculously by the vision of God as it is in itself, and not by grace, then the divine nature would be better participated by that vision than by the infusion of sanctifying grace taken precisely; but this is against the common opinion of theologians: therefore, etc. The sequel seems certain. Because although the divine nature may consist in the root already explained, and at the same time in the understanding corresponding to it, nevertheless, as we said a little while ago, its constitutive principle is better explained by understanding itself than by the aforesaid root: therefore, since the vision of God is a participation of understanding itself, the consequence will be that the divine nature is better participated by the vision, taken precisely, than by grace taken with the same precision; because through grace alone the reason of the root already spoken of is participated.

For the answer will be given by denying the sequel. This is so true that, if the vision of God as it is in itself were participated, without grace being participated, then not only would there not be given a better participation of the divine nature taken formally, but there would not even be there any participation of the same under the concept and formality of nature, although understanding is in God that nature of his.

which has the mode of a constitutive principle and of the divine nature. For in order that it might be participated according to the aforesaid mode and reason of nature, it would have to be participated such that God is at once the root of understanding and of willing as he is in himself; since this reason is of necessity demanded for the constitution of the divine nature, so as to be participable under the concept of nature, no otherwise than in created intellectual natures, in which nothing can have the reason of nature, nor can it in any way participate in that nature under the concept of nature, unless it be communicated to it by way of the root of understanding and of willing. Wherefore, since the participation of the vision of God as it is in itself, if taken formally, will never be a participation of the aforesaid root of that vision, but rather the participation which takes place through grace; hence it follows that this is always an inadequate participation of the divine nature under the concept of nature; whereas that other participation, which takes place by the vision of God as it is in itself, naturally carries with it the annexed participation of nature which takes place through grace.

This too can be explained by that example already touched on of the hypostatic union, through which the existence of God is communicated to the humanity of our Lord Christ, which in him has, on the part of the thing conceived, the reason of nature; and yet because the reason of that root is not communicated, therefore the nature of God is not communicated through such a union, nor is the aforesaid union a union in nature, as we touched on above, and as theologians commonly teach.

73 To the third it will be answered that those things which are contained in the divine understanding must be contained in the same way in the nature of God; and thus because sin is contained in the divine understanding as a secondary object in the thing understood, it will be contained in the same way in the nature of God, which consists in understanding itself. Now, since it is agreed that it is customary to deny that sin is contained in the divine nature, and to grant that it is contained in God's understanding, from that former mode of speaking there is indicated, on the part of the mode of signifying, that sin is in God either as something pertaining to his nature, or as an effect proper to it which can be caused by it.

74 To the fourth, the major being granted, the minor must be denied. And to the first proof of it with respect to the first part, the antecedent must be denied. Because understanding, constitutive of the divine nature, just as it identifies with itself both the entitative and the intelligible order in the highest degree of perfection, in such a way that this belongs to it

² existing by the proper force of its line, so also it contains both intelligibly and entitatively, and under being natural every created effect, and every effect creatable, from God. As to the second proof of the same minor with respect to the aforesaid part, it must be said that if in it there is question of understanding constitutive of the divine nature, it is not prior by virtual priority, that creatures be represented in the essence of God as in a cause able to produce them, than that they be understood through the aforesaid understanding: since in understanding itself there are not two formalities virtually distinguished, that of understanding and that of being at least able to produce them in a radical way. Hence the aforesaid representation and understanding are distinguished only on the part of our mode of conceiving, and are compared with each other by way of former and latter, in as much as the aforesaid understanding is so eminent that it has formally and eminently to exercise those two offices pertaining to the same line; in such a way, however, that by reason of the aforesaid eminence, and on the part of our mode of conceiving, we understand first that in it there is the office of representing and containing in the aforesaid way, than the office of understanding, not taken in any way whatever, but as it terminates to those same creatures.

We have said: Not taken in any way whatever, but as it terminates to those same creatures, because if understanding constitutive of the divine nature is taken, in as much as it terminates to the divine essence, and as it is the understanding of that essence, then our mode of understanding is satisfied sooner when understanding terminates to the aforesaid essence than when it contains creatures; just as it is sooner that the light of the sun should formally have the reason of light than that by its power it should contain heat.

76 To the fifth, the antecedent being granted at least as to virtual priority, the consequence must be denied. And for the proof the antecedent must be denied. Because although in creatures the reason of the true, or of the intelligible, follows, in the manner indicated elsewhere, on the reason of a thing, in such a way that by the reason of the reasoned they are distinguished from a thing; nevertheless this does not arise from the nature of the thing, that is, from the proper force of its line considered by itself and by its own genus, but by reason of the limitation and imperfection with which it is involved in creatures. Hence it is not strange that in God, in whom the aforesaid line is found in its purity, the opposite occurs.

The reason of this, however, is established both from what has been said in this and the preceding difficulty, and also from those things which in the treatise on the Vision of God, article 2, we asserted for assigning the reason on account of which the divine essence, just as it supplies the reason of an intelligible species with respect to the intellects of the blessed, so also can supply the reason of a word: because, just as it belongs to the essence of that intelligible species to be actually intelligible, and therefore it can be united under the reason of an intelligible species, so also it belongs to its quiddity to be actually understood by God himself, or to be actually terminating the divine intellection: and therefore it can with respect to this office supply the reason of a word.

77 To the last it will be answered first by granting the antecedent and denying both consequences. And for the proof of the first, upon which the second rests, it must be granted that the antecedent is understood of a created operation, involved with imperfections, which has formally, and not formally eminently, the reason of an operation; and it must be denied of an uncreated operation, and the first among all the divine operations. For this must formally and eminently identify with itself, without virtual distinction, whatever pertains to the first intellectual line. Hence the solution given there, and understood in the manner explained, is the best. And for the attack the antecedent must be denied. And the reason of the disparity between the divine relation and the first operation of God can be given from the fact that the divine relation cannot but be opposed relatively to its term: and thus it must be distinguished from it, and be a being towards it. Now the divine operation, the first among all the operations of God, cannot have any opposition, even virtual, with God, nor be distinguished from him, because its essence must consist in the ultimate actuality and operation, as has been explained. And therefore that which is proper to a created operation, which has some opposition with the agent, cannot befittingly be predicated of it, namely, that it proceeds from the agent himself, and is in some way a term of the real relation of the agent towards it.

78 Secondly it will be answered, together with many of the later Thomists, by denying the antecedent. Because understanding, constitutive of God, is an operation only on the part of our mode of signifying and conceiving, and not on the part of the thing conceived; because thus alone does it have the reason of a most pure act, or of a most perfect form subsisting of itself. And for the first proof the antecedent must be denied, understood universally: and thus, although the actual knowledge of God, which is some peculiar intellection existing in him, has on the part of the thing conceived the reason of an operation, nevertheless understanding, constitutive of God, does not have that. By this also it is established with respect to the second proof of the same antecedent.

From which it is clear with respect to the third proof. Because the beatitude of God, taken according to what it means directly, and not adequately according to what it also includes indirectly, does not consist, according to this mode of speaking, in an operation which is such on the part of the thing conceived, but in the most perfect intellection, which on the part of the mode of conceiving and signifying is an operation. Hence the holy Doctor, in the place cited in this argument, can very well be understood and explained in accordance with these things.

Nor does it stand in the way that it is said there, namely, that our beatitude, which is a formal participation of the beatitude of God, consists in an operation on the part of the thing conceived. Because this arises from the imperfection of the participation of the first line, which is found in God; and not from the fact that the formal reason participated demands it.

Conclusion: God knows things other than himself, and in himself.

The conclusion is affirmative.

Concerning these two articles there is nothing to be said, supposing those things which in the treatise on the Vision of God, articles 2, 7, and 8, we said about the mode in which the blessed see creatures in the divine essence first seen. Since with respect to this, philosophically speaking, the same proportional way must be used for God and for the blessed. We have said the same proportional way, because the blessed, not comprehending God, cannot by the force of the divine vision of the essence comprehend or know all the possible creatures, but God can, indeed.

The conclusion is negative.

Concerning which those things seem to be seen which we said in article 1, disputation 1, difficulty 3.