Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Whether the object that is per se first and specificative of God's essential intellection is the divine essence, as distinct from the attributes and the relations? Or rather, is this to be understood in the sense that it says all these things formally and expressly?

12 Having explained that God is the primary object of his own intellection, it remains to declare under what reason this office belongs to him; and therefore we raise this difficulty, so that it may be declared exactly.

§ I.

The earlier opinion is set out.

The first opinion teaches that the object per se first and specificative of God's essential intellection is the divine essence, in so far as it comprehends every reason that is formally in God; whether that be the essence itself, as distinct from the attributes and the relations; or any other absolute or relative reason. Thus Gonzalez in the present disputation, 35, no. 4, and others.

13 It is proved, first. For the most perfect intellection, such as is the essential knowledge of God, must have for its object per se first and specifying a being that is most perfect in every way: therefore it must have the divine essence, in so far as it comprehends every formal reason, whether absolute or relative, that is in God; but not in so far as it strictly denotes the essence, as distinct from the relations and the attributes. The antecedent seems certain. For since the perfection of cognition is drawn from its object, it must be that the most perfect intellection have for its specifying object a most perfect being in every way, and consequently a being most perfect in every way. The consequence, moreover, is clear from the antecedent. For the divine essence alone, in so far as it comprehends both the essence and the attributes and the relations, is a most perfect being in every way.

Secondly. For all the things aforesaid can, and must, of themselves be united in the reason of an intelligible species with the divine intellect: therefore they can, and must, be equally the object per se first and specificative of God's intellection. The consequence is evident. Because that which can, and must, of itself be immediately united in the reason of a species with an intellect, is the object most connatural to it; and consequently it pertains to the per se first object of that same intellect. The antecedent, moreover, seems clear: since all those things have the conditions required for this, that of themselves they can, and must, be united in the reason of an intelligible species with the divine intellect; for they are of themselves intelligible, indeed their very being is intelligible, and they have being intimately present and united with the divine intellect, and nothing further is required for the aforesaid union.

14 Thirdly. For the relations cannot pertain to the object per se first of the divine intellection: therefore the attributes and the essence will pertain to it as well; and consequently the divine essence, since it comprehends all these things, will be the object per se first of God's essential intellection. This second consequence is plainly evident from the first. The first, however, follows from the antecedent. Because the essence and the attributes are no less intelligible, and no less intimate to the divine intellect, than the relations are.

The antecedent, moreover, is proved. First, because the object per se first of the essential intellection must be supernatural, since the essential and constitutive intellection of God, in itself, is something supernatural; but God, precisely as one, imports nothing supernatural, because he is attainable by a created intellect by the light of nature; yet, in so far as he has his unique being in the three persons, according to that reason he cannot be attained by the light of nature: therefore, and so forth. Then again: because essential knowledge must be something qualitative and intuitive of God, and consequently it must terminate per se first on God as he is in himself, and consequently as he subsists in the three persons.

15 Fourthly. Because otherwise the Trinity of persons, and the attributes, would be the secondary object of the divine intellection; and so too they would be its object in the same way as the creature; but the consequence seems absurd: therefore, and so forth. The sequence seems certain. Because that which is not the object per se first cannot be anything other than the secondary object: therefore, if the attributes and the relations are not the object per se first of the divine intellection, they will be its secondary object; and consequently they will hold the reason of object in the same way as the creature. The falsity of the consequence, moreover, is evident. For since the Trinity of persons, and the attributes have a being intelligible infinitely more perfect than that of the creature, they must be the object of the divine intellection in a way far more perfect than the creature is.

16 Fifthly. For both the essence, as distinct from the attributes and the relations, and the attributes and the relations themselves, coincide in the same grade of immateriality with the essential knowledge of God: therefore the attributes and the relations will pertain no less to the object per se first and specificative of the divine intellection than the essence itself, as distinct from them. The antecedent seems clear. Because all those things are pure acts within their own line; and consequently they are of the same immateriality as the divine intellection, which is also a pure act. The consequence, moreover, is also clear. Since those things which coincide in the same grade of immateriality with their cognitive power are equally primary objects of the aforesaid power and of that cognition, and equally concur in the specification of it, as is evident by induction.

§ II.

The truer opinion of D. Thomas.

17 It must nevertheless be said that the object per se first and specificative of God's essential, or constitutive, intellection is the divine essence alone, as distinct from the attributes and the relations. Thus D. Thomas in 1 Contra Gentes, ch. 48, and in the present article in these words: For indeed we perceive or understand something in act, which our intellect or our sense is informed in act through a sensible or intelligible species; and according to this alone the sense or the intellect is other from the sensible or the intelligible, because each of the two is in potency. Since therefore God has no potency, but is a pure act, it must be that in him the act of understanding and the intellect are the same in every way. Where, as you see, he establishes an identity in every way between intelligere, that is, the divine intellect, and the understood object, from which it takes its species; and consequently an identity that excludes even virtual distinction, because this identity alone is an identity in every way: and since the divine essence alone, as distinct from the attributes and the relations, is identified in this way with its intelligere and its intellect, it follows that, on D. Thomas's own understanding, it alone, thus distinct, is the object per se first and specificative of the divine intelligere, that is, of God's intellect; which, as is evident from what was said above, is identified in every respect with intelligere. Upon this opinion follow Ferrari in 1 Contra Gentes, ch. 48, reason 1, and several of the later Thomists, and then Scotus in 1, d. 1, q. 2; Suarez, 9 De Trinitate, ch. 5; Vazquez, 2, tom. 1, part 1, disp. 143, ch. 4; and very many others.

18 The prior and fundamental reason of this assertion was touched by D. Thomas in the words cited from this article, which can be proposed and explained in this form. For the intelligere constitutive of God must identify to itself, without any virtual distinction, both the intellect that understands and the object that is understood per se first and specifies the intellection; but the divine essence alone, as distinct from the attributes and the relations, is identified in this way with intelligere constitutive of God: therefore it alone will be the object per se first and specificative of that same intellection. The minor, together with its consequence, is sufficiently evident. The major, as to the first part, is clear. For since the aforesaid intellection is intelligere per se first, subsisting from its own merits, it must be that in it the intelligere itself and that which it understands are identified in every way.

19 As to the second part, namely, that the aforesaid intellection and the object understood per se first must be identified in every respect (upon which the whole force of this reason depends), this is proved. First, because when a union of the intellect with the object understood is required for an intellection, the greater that union is, the more perfect the intellection is; it follows that for the first and most perfect intellection, whether among created things or among the divine, such as is the constitutive intellection of God, the utmost and most perfect union is required, that is, by an identity in every way excluding even virtual distinction between God's intellect and the object understood per se first and specifying that intellection, and consequently between the aforesaid object and the intellection itself constitutive of God, which (as is evident from what has been said) is in every respect the same as the divine intellect.

Then again: because by the very fact that the intellection, in which the divine nature consists, is the first formality constituting the first line among all those that are found in God, it must be that the object understood per se first and specificative of that intellection be the very same in an identity in every way. For the object per se first and specificative, which is not in every respect the same as that of which it is the object, must be prior to it, at least virtually; and so, if the aforesaid object of the constitutive intellection were virtually distinct from it, that intellection could not constitute the first line and first formality among all those that are found in God.

Then finally: because accordingly the divine intellection, under the aspect of knowledge, cannot identify to itself, without virtual distinction, its proper object, or subject, that is, the divine essence, of which it demonstrates the properties, or quasi-properties, since the aforesaid knowledge is not the first formality, nor the first line among the divine things, but supposes another prior line, that is, the line of the essence. And for the same reason the will is not in every respect the same as its own object, because it presupposes that same essence which per se first holds the reason of good per essentiam: therefore, since the constitutive intellection of God is the first formality and the first line among all the divine things, it will identify to itself, without any virtual distinction, its object understood per se first and specificative of it.

The second and principal reason is insinuated by D. Thomas above, q. 1, a. 7, and can be proposed in this form. For that is the object per se first and specificative of any intellect, or intellection, which is identified in every respect with the intellect and with the intelligent nature, and which is attained through itself and by its own reason; but the others are attained only by reason of it: therefore the divine essence alone, distinct from the attributes and the relations, will be the object per se first of the divine intellect and intellection, which is identified in every respect with it and with the divine nature. The antecedent seems certain, as is evident by induction. The consequence, moreover, is proved. Because the divine essence is attained through itself and by its own reason; since it is of itself, and by its own reason, the first being and the first intelligible, whereas the others are attained only by reason of the essence. And so, just as it is itself the first root of their entity, so it is also the first reason of their intelligibility: and just as they are not divine things unless in so far as (let us say so) they participate the divine essence, so they are not formally intelligible unless they participate, in the sense immediately to be explained, the intelligibility of the divine essence.

§ III.

Evasions of the adversaries, and their refutation.

20 These reasons are so efficacious that, once they have been spent to some extent, the solutions that could be applied to them from the doctrine of the adversaries are easily refuted; but this will plainly be clear if we set them out one by one and briefly, and show that they are refuted by the reasons already made.

First, then, they meet the prior reason by denying the major as regards the second part, namely, that God's constitutive intelligere must identify to itself, without even any virtual distinction, the intelligible object specificative of itself. And to the first proof they say that the most perfect intelligere seeks the greatest union possible with its own object: but so great a union is not possible that no virtual distinction should remain between the intelligere and its specificative object. To the second proof, however, they say that the specificative object of an intellection ought to be prior in actum signato, but not in actum exercitum, than the intelligere: and therefore, although God's constitutive intelligere may be virtually distinguished from its own object, it does not follow that it is not the first formality of God in actum exercitum, but only in actum signato: yet this does not seem to be inconvenient, as is evident from what happens in created things. For this reason, the essence of an angel, considered under the aspect of essence, is prior in actum exercitum when taken itself under the reason of the object connatural to its own intellect, and posterior in actum signato: because under the reason of object it has the priority in actum signato with respect to itself considered in actum exercitum. And finally, to the third proof they deny the antecedent: because in it the object is not restored as cause on account of cause; but the cause, or reason, why knowledge does not identify to itself its object without virtual distinction, is that the specificative, or quasi-specificative object of any act must at least be virtually distinguished from it.

21 Next, they answer the second reason by distinguishing whether the intelligibility of divine things is held to proceed, so to speak, from the divine essence in the genus of an efficient cause; or rather, whether it proceeds from that same essence as from a cause in the genus of object, formally conferring on it that being intelligible which is what philosophy attains. Yet although the former of these is true, the latter is not; just as although the intelligibility of a mobile being proceeds from God as from the first efficient, it does not proceed from him as from a formal cause in the genus of object, formally conferring that being intelligible which philosophy attains. Yet for the divine essence alone to be the object per se first of God's constitutive intellection, the former was required, and this latter does not suffice, as is seen in the example proposed. And therefore a noble being has of itself its own intelligibility adequate to and specifying philosophy, although it is the first principle of its efficiency.

22 From what has been said, then, and from some measure of expansion of the reasons we have drawn from D. Thomas, these solutions easily collapse. The first of them, certainly. For from the very fact that the line of God's constitutive intellection is the line of the most perfect union of the intellect with its own object, it follows well that the utmost union is possible between that same intellection and its own object per se first and specificative, reaching to an identity that excludes even virtual distinction between them. And the reason seems clear. For from the fact that the divine essence, as holding the reason of an intelligible species, unites most perfectly, and by the mode of quasi-first act, and within its own line, the object per se first of itself with the intellect, it follows well that it is not, even virtually, distinguished from that same object: and so too, from the fact that the constitutive intellection of God corresponds, per se first and directly, to this species in the manner due to it, as the line of the most perfect union, and by the mode of the second act, of intellection and of the intellect with that same object, it follows rightly that it is not virtually distinguished from that same object per se first and specificative. The consequence seems legitimate. Because the intelligible species and the intellection pertain to one and the same line, as we touched upon in the Tractate on the Vision of God, disp. 2, no. 68, and in that same treatise, in the following disp., no. 54, and we shall say in the Treatise on the Will of God, disp. 2, no. 34: and consequently they are not virtually distinguished, but are one and the same formality. And so, if the intelligible species is identified in God without virtual distinction, and quasi by the mode of the first act, with its own object per se first and specificative, the divine intellection will likewise be identified, without the same distinction, and quasi by the mode of the second act, with that same object per se first and specificative.

The antecedent, however, is proved. For it is of the reason of the divine essence, as holding the reason of an altogether most perfect intelligible species, and one that unites its own object per se first with the divine intellect in the noblest way, that it be without virtual distinction the aforesaid object; otherwise neither would that object be most perfect, nor would it itself be most perfect under the reason of an intelligible species: for the most perfect intelligible object is most immaterial; and consequently it is able of itself, without virtual distinction, to be united under the reason of an intelligible species: and consequently a most perfect intelligible species demands that it be in every respect the same as its own object. Hence, although in created things the object is united of itself with its own intellect under the reason of an intelligible species; nevertheless, because it is not altogether the most perfect intelligible, since it is not a pure act, but has something mixed in of potentiality, therefore in it being entitative and being intelligible are virtually distinguished, as is sufficiently evident from what we said in the treatise on the Vision of God, disp. 2, no. 47: and consequently the aforesaid object and its intelligible species must be virtually distinguished.

23 It is added that, since the line of God's constitutive intellection is the first and fountainhead line among all those that are found in him, it must be the line that identifies to itself, without virtual distinction, its being of existence: therefore it will also be necessary that its object per se first and specificative be the divine essence alone. The antecedent is certain. For since being of existence is the ultimate actuality of the essence, without which the essence is in a state of potentiality, it must pertain to the same line as the essence, as is evident from what we shall say in the treatise on the Will of God, disp. 2, no. 34: and consequently it will also be necessary that the constitutive intellection of God be so far a pure act that it identifies to itself, without virtual distinction, its being of existence. The consequence, too, is clear. Because the object per se first of God's constitutive intellection must coincide in the same grade of immateriality with the intellection itself, as is evident from what we set forth above in the treatise on the Vision of God, disp. 2, no. 152, and shall assert further on: therefore, since the constitutive intellection of God is in a grade of immateriality so perfect and so pure as to reach

(Salmant. Curs. theolog., tom. I.) to this, that it be its own being without virtual distinction; the consequence will be that the divine essence alone is the object per se first and specificative of it, since it alone is its own being without virtual distinction, and the attributes and the relations exist only through the existence of that same essence, virtually distinguished from them.

24 From this, too, it is clear how little force the same solution has with regard to what is brought forward in the second place, to meet the second proof by way of the minor. For although those things which are really distinguished from their existence, or whose most formal concept, as it concerns precisely its own line, is not the actual exercise of existing, can, with foundation in the thing, or in virtual priority, be prior in actum signato, without being prior in actum exercitum; nevertheless that, whose most formal concept is the actual exercise of existing, or the very existing itself, cannot be prior in actum signato without on its part having that same priority in actum exercitum: therefore, from the very fact that the object per se first of God's constitutive intellection must be its own being of existence without virtual distinction, and consequently must denote the very exercise of existing, it cannot have priority in actum signato with respect to the aforesaid constitutive intellection of God without having that same priority in actum exercitum: and consequently such a constitutive intellection of God will be the first formality of it, as is supposed, and will not be the first formality of the same: for the specificative object of the intellection, virtually distinguished from it, must have the aforesaid virtual priority with respect to the intellection itself.

25 From this, too, it is sufficiently clear how the point brought forward in the last place, to answer the last proof of this first reason, vanishes. For from what has been said it is clear how the other divine lines must be virtually distinguished from their own object per se first and specifying object, on this precise ground, that they are (so to speak) second lines, or lines virtually dependent on the first fountainhead line. Nor does the proof added there demonstrate anything. For the terminus of the first and most perfect line, as it regards the absolute order, must be identified with that line without virtual distinction. And therefore, as we said a little while ago, being of existence, which formally and eminently is the terminus of the divine essence, and is something absolute, is identified in this way with the essence itself; but not with the other divine formalities, which are terminated through it by reason of the divine essence.

By this, too, the solution applied to the second reason sufficiently collapses. Because the divine essence ought not only to be the reason a priori from which the attributes flow, as if in the genus of a principle of activity by natural emanation, but also the most formal reason in the genus of object, rendering them, and all the things that are formally intelligible in God, intelligible through the constitutive intellection of God itself: for, as we said a little while ago, the object per se first and specificative of the aforesaid intellection, which cannot fail to be connatural to it, must coincide with it in the same grade of immateriality; and consequently that which, so to speak, carries those things which are attained through that same intellection to this, that they coincide with it in its own grade of immateriality, will be the most formal reason in the genus of object, through which they are constituted most formally under the reason of things attainable: therefore, since the divine attributes and relations do not coincide with the constitutive intellection of God in its own proper grade of immateriality except in so far as they imbibe the divine essence, and by reason of it, the consequence will be that the divine essence is the most formal reason in the genus of object, constituting all those things under the reason of things attainable through the aforesaid intellection.

26 Hence the example of a mobile being, which has its intelligibility from God and yet terminates of itself formally on philosophy by the mode of object, demonstrates nothing against the reason of D. Thomas: for God, in respect of that being, only concurs as efficient, and not formally; indeed, from the force of the aforesaid example a stronger confirmation of our reason can be brought forward. For just as a mobile being is the object adequate to philosophy, but not this or that mobile being, on the ground that particular mobile beings do not terminate formally the habitude of philosophy to them except by reason of a mobile being taken generally, which is included in them, and consequently it is not terminated to man, for example (if we are speaking of the most formal reason of terminating on the part of the intrinsic object), because it is this mobile being, namely, the human mobile being; but because it is a mobile being: so too, because the constitutive intellection of God does not terminate most formally on the attributes, for example, on eternity, because eternity is; but because it imbibes the divine essence, which is its being, therefore that same divine essence is the most formal objective and specificative reason of that same intellection.

27 It is confirmed by a reason drawn from the Angelic Doctor. Because the Divine Word does not proceed, nor can proceed, per se first, like the attributes, nor are the relations of Paternity or of passive Spiration communicated to it, or capable of being communicated: therefore there is a sign that the attributes and the relations cannot be united of themselves; but only by reason of the essence, under the reason of an intelligible species, with the divine intellect: therefore there will also be a sign that they are not per se, and most formally, intelligible to the divine intellect except by reason of the divine essence as the object per se first and specificative. This last consequence is clear from the first. Because if the attributes and the relations were intelligible per se and by their own reason, and not by reason of the essence, through God's intellection, they could be united per se, and by their own reason, and not by reason of the essence, under the reason of an intelligible species with that intellect.

The first consequence, however, is clear from the antecedent. Because if the attributes could be united per se, and by their own reason, under the reason of a species, the Divine Word could not fail to proceed per se first, like them: as, for this reason, it cannot fail to proceed like the essence. And similarly, if the relations of Paternity or of passive Spiration were unible by their own reason by the mode of a species, then from this ground the aforesaid relations would have to be communicated to the Divine Word, and at the same time would have to be not communicated, on account of the relative opposition which they hold with him. The antecedent, however, is sufficiently clear from what is commonly asserted by theologians in the treatise on the Trinity, and which we shall state there together with them.

§ IV. All the arguments of the first opinion are dissolved except the last.

28 To the first argument it will be answered by distinguishing the antecedent: a being most perfect in every way, which can be identified, without any virtual distinction, with that same most perfect intellection, is to be granted; a being most perfect in every way, which cannot be identified, without the aforesaid distinction, with such an intellection, is to be denied: because, as is evident from what has been said, for the most perfect intellection, such as is the first and essential intellection of God, there is required an object which has all the perfections and all the modes of those perfections in such a way that it be capable, in the manner described, of being identified with that same intellection: and since this can coincide with that divine formality only in so far as that formality is in itself the noblest of all, and since it eminently contains, as the first root, all the divine perfections and all the modes of having them, such as is the divine essence, the consequence is that it alone is a being most perfect in every way, as is required with respect to the reason of object of the aforesaid intellection.

29 Secondly, it will be answered by distinguishing the same antecedent in another way: a being most perfect in every way, which of itself and from its own merits precisely had congruence in the grade of immateriality with the constitutive intellection of God, is to be granted; a being most perfect in every way, which of itself and from its own merits did not have this, is to be denied. But the divine essence alone, as distinct from the attributes and the relations, is most perfect in every way in this manner: because it alone is its own being, and not the others except by reason of itself, and in so far as they include it, though as is said in another place.

30 Hence, although divine mercy or justice, for example, according to what they have of themselves and from their own line, pertain to the divine order, because of themselves they are capable of imbibing, according to their own proper mode, the divine essence, as it holds the reason of that which transcends, and of identifying themselves really with it, as it holds the reason of essence and of nature; nevertheless, from the force of their own line, taken precisely, they do not coincide with the divine intellect in the grade of immateriality, even though absolutely and simpliciter they have congruence with it. Because by the very fact that they pertain to the divine order and are in God, they cannot fail to include the essence by the mode of that which transcends: and so of themselves they are most nearly capable of such an inclusion and of congruence in the grade of immateriality: and by reason of the included essence they have such congruence. Just as although the relations, as such, pertain to the divine order, nevertheless of themselves they do not signify goodness and perfection; and consequently they are not the formal object of the divine will, but only by reason of the essence, which they include. And so, from the fact that they are in God and look to the divine order, they are most nearly capable of the inclusion of the essence, and of all the goodness and perfection which it has: and by reason of that same essence they are formally good and perfect, and they pertain formally to the object of the divine will as something that includes the formal object of that will.

31 To the second argument some reply that the attributes and the relations, in so far as they are of themselves, can be united per se, and by their own reason, by the mode of an intelligible species with the divine intellect, although in fact they are not so united: on the ground that this union is preceded by the union of the divine essence, which serves for the knowing both of itself and of all divine things: and consequently any other union, by which the relations are united of themselves and by their own reason by the mode of a species, is superfluous.

32 But although this solution is probable, and therefore we have in some measure insinuated it elsewhere; nevertheless it is more probable, and more consonant with the doctrine of D. Thomas set forth above, that the divine essence alone can be united per se, and by its own reason, with the divine intellect: but the others, only by reason of the essence, and by its means, as will be evident to one who looks at what has been said above.

To these, too, another reason can be added, which we touched upon in the treatise on the Vision of God, art. 2. Because from the fact that the divine essence can be united under the reason of an intelligible species in order to know the relations and the attributes, it is sufficiently inferred that they cannot hold the reason of species with respect to themselves, because that which is of itself, or by its own reason, is actually intelligible with respect to some intellect, cannot be made intelligible by that intellect by reason of another. Just as that which is of itself, and by its own reason, is whiteness itself, cannot be made such by reason of another: therefore, since the intelligible species distinct from the object renders that object intelligible, there is a sign that, if the relations and the attributes are rendered intelligible through the divine essence, as through a species, since all these things are not per se, and altogether completely, intelligible to the divine intellect, so as to be able of themselves, and by their own reason, to hold the reason of species. Wherefore D. Thomas and his disciples, from the fact that the divine essence can of itself, and by its own reason, be united by the mode of an intelligible species with the blessed intellect, and consequently is of itself intelligible with respect to that intellect, infer that there cannot be given a representative species of God distinct from it, so that that which is of its own reason, and intelligible through the essence, be rendered intelligible by something else.

Hence, then, in the manner of speaking described above, the argument is to be answered by denying the antecedent. And to the proof the antecedent must also be denied. Because both of the attributes and of the relations there is lacking this, that they be per se, and by their own reason, their own being: and consequently, that they be per se, and by their own reason, their own being in the intelligible order: for in divine things being, or existing, in the natural and in the intelligible order, are identified without any virtual distinction.

33 To the third argument the antecedent must be denied in the sense already explained. And as to the first proof, it is evident from what was said in the treatise on the Vision of God how, even by the impossible, if God were not Trinity but only One, nevertheless the being that he would have, in so far as he is in himself, could not fail to have the reason of a supernatural being. Hence, in so far as he is supernatural according to the absolute predicates he now has, he cannot be attained by the light of nature, but only by a supernatural light, because he is terminated to a supernatural object only in so far as he is such under the reason of object.

As to the second proof, it must be said that although for intuitive cognition it is required that it attain the thing according to the mode of existing which it has, nevertheless it is not required that the aforesaid mode of existing be the formal reason of terminating, but it is enough that it be attained under the reason of essence.

34 As to the fourth, so that we may answer, it must be noted from Ferrari at the place cited above that a thing can be said to be the object known per se first in two ways. In one way, because it is attained per se, and by its own reason, and at the same time it is itself the formal reason, under which all things are referred to the cognitive power: and so it has at the same time, in the reason of formal object, an adaequate being with respect to the aforesaid cognitive power: because nothing is attained by it except in so far as it is induced into that formal reason, and in some way participates it. In another way, a thing is said to be first and known per se, on this ground, that it is not known in another object really distinct from it and known first, even though it is attained by reason of another, as being the reason under which, or as the most formal object, included in itself.

All of which can be seen in the hearing of an acute sound, where the sound itself, acute, is said to be known per se first by the hearing in this latter way, because it is not perceived in another sound really distinct from it and heard first; nevertheless it is not said to be attained per se first by the hearing in that former way: because the formal reason which holds on the part of the object, under which it is attained, is not the acute sound, because the hearing could otherwise perceive only an acute sound by virtue of the acute, but because it is a sound: and so the reason of sound is included in the acute sound itself, and is attained per se first under the reason of the most formal and specificative object.

35 Therefore, although the divine essence, as distinct from the attributes and the relations, is known per se first in that former way; nevertheless the attributes and the relations are the object per se first of God's constitutive intellection in that latter way: and that former is sufficient for this, that the divine essence should specify God's essential intellection by the reason of that aforesaid primacy. As also in a sound, as such, it is enough that in the same proportional way it terminate the hearing per se first, in order that it be the object per se first and specificative, even though an acute sound also has a mode of its own of terminating the same hearing per se first.

Hence, then, in the form of the aforesaid argument the sequence must be denied, if it is understood, in the most rigorous sense, of the secondary object: but otherwise, if the expression is not taken so rigorously, but is received as embracing whatever has something (so to speak) of secondariness mixed in under the reason of object: because in the manner explained it is attained by reason of another, and consequently it does not specify by its own reason, but by the reason of that from which, in the manner explained, it has its being attained. And as to the proof of the sequence, it is evident from what has been said. Hence the attributes and the relations do not pertain to the secondary object of the divine intellection in the same way as the creatures do: for these do not imbibe, but identify to themselves, the divine essence, as the attributes and the relations do.

§ V. The last argument is met.

36 To the last argument, which is drawn from the congruence in the grade of immateriality of the divine attributes and relations with the essential knowledge of God, it is evident from what has been said how the relations and the attributes are pure acts within their own line: from the fact that for this purity complete separation from matter and from potentiality suffices; nevertheless they do not reach so great an immateriality and actuality as is in the divine essence, as distinct from them, so as to have this per se, and by their own reason: since the divine essence, as distinct from them, is so far a pure act that it reaches to this, that it be most formally its own being, or existing; but the attributes and the relations, only by reason of the essence, and in so far as they include it. Hence the reason of a pure act is found in the essence in a nobler way than in the others: and therefore the divine essence alone can be united with the divine intellect under the reason of a species, because it, and not the attributes and the relations, has congruence with the divine intellect in the purity and actuality already described.

37 It makes no difference if you say that although the divine essence and the essential intellection constitutive of it signify this whole actuality and immateriality, the attributes and the relations, taken according to themselves, do not; nevertheless this immateriality is imported only from the material, and as if by accident, by that same essential intellection, in order to constitute the grade of immateriality due to itself: but per se, and formally, it signifies only that it is a pure act, and of infinite immateriality: yet this agrees also with the divine relations and attributes considered according to themselves: therefore nothing follows from this ground to prevent them from pertaining to the specificative object of the aforesaid intellection no less than the divine essence itself. The minor, with its consequence, is clear from itself and from what we shall say in the treatise on the Will of God, disp. 2, no. 34.

The major, however, is proved. For although the intellections and the intellects of different angels surpass one another in immateriality, on the ground that their immaterialities are specifically distinct; nevertheless this whole excess is of the material, and by accident, as constituting a grade, because separation from all matter, though not from all potentiality, suffices for the grade of angelic intellect and intellection: therefore similarly here, although the divine intellect and the essential intellection surpass the relations and the attributes in immateriality reaching to the identifying of their own being of existence with themselves, without virtual distinction; nevertheless this excess will be of the material, and by accident.

For the grade of the divine intellect and intellection, it suffices that it be separated from all matter and from all potentiality: and therefore this grade can be found only in God.

38 It is confirmed, first. For the immateriality which the relations and the attributes are said to have, in so far as they are distinct from the essence, pertains to some grade, since it is infinitely nobler than the other created immaterialities that constitute the grade; but it does not pertain to any created grade, nor does it correspond per se first to any created intellect: therefore it pertains to the uncreated grade, and it corresponds per se first to a created intellect.

It is confirmed, secondly. For the attributes and the properties of an angel pertain to the same grade of immateriality as the essence of the angel itself, as is sufficiently evident from what we said in the treatise on the Vision of God: therefore the divine attributes and relations will also be in the same grade of immateriality as the divine essence. The consequence is evident. First, from the parity of reason. Then again: because otherwise the properties of the angels would be nobler and more immaterial in their own order than the divine attributes in theirs: for those are in the same grade of immateriality as their own root; whereas these are not so.

39 It is confirmed, finally. For either on this ground, that the attributes and the relations do not reach to this, that according to themselves, and precisely from the force of their own line, they are their own being, do they have something mixed in of potentiality, or not? If the first, then even within their own line they are not pure acts, nor infinitely perfect, nor proper attributes or relations of God formally existing in himself: for this admixture of potentiality is opposed to those things which are formally in God. If, however, the second is said, then they have every conceivable immateriality and purity under the reason of a pure act, such that whether they are or are not their own being adds nothing, or takes anything away, from their immateriality and purity. The consequence is evident. For just as some measure of purity and immateriality under the reason of act excludes some measure of potentiality, and greater purity excludes greater potentiality, so that which has excluded all potentiality will be most immaterial, and most pure, under the reason of act, whether it has or has not identified to itself, without virtual distinction, its own being of existence: pro-

vided, namely, that this identity is not required for this exclusion, and that the defect of the aforesaid identity does not prevent those things which are not so identified from excluding all admixture of potentiality, as can be seen in the divine attributes and relations.

40 For it will be answered by denying the major. And as to the proof, the antecedent being granted, the consequence must be denied. And the reason of the disparity is drawn: first from what has been said in support of the assertion. Then again from this, that the angelic intellect, for example that of Gabriel, or his essence, does not pertain to the grade of immateriality already described, because it is the intellect, or the essence, of Gabriel; but because it is an intellect, or an angelic essence. And therefore, whatever it has of itself by accident with respect to the essence or the angelic intellect, in so far as such, it will also have of itself of the material, and by accident, with respect to that, as constituting the grade; and since with respect to the angelic essence or intellect, taken precisely according to itself, it has by accident that it is the intellect of Gabriel, and consequently that excess of immateriality, by which the aforesaid intellect, in so far as it is Gabriel's, surpasses in immateriality the intellects of the other angels, also is had by accident; hence it is that the aforesaid intellect is imported of the material, and by accident, by that same intellect, in so far as it constitutes the aforesaid grade. Yet the divine essence, and its intellect, constitute a proper grade of immateriality, in so far as it is the essence, and the proper intellect, of God. And so that immateriality which it has not, as if by accident, with respect to the essence and intellect of God, because it is God's, it also will not have of the material, and as if by accident, with respect to those, in so far as they constitute their own proper grade of immateriality; and since with respect to God's essence, as such, it has not, as if by accident, that it is so immaterial and a pure act that it is its own being without virtual distinction, because, as we have often said, the actuality of existence is the ultimate actuality of the essence, and pertains to the same line: and similarly with respect to the divine intellect, in so far as such, it has not, as if by accident, that it is in the same way its own being, since it also pertains to the same line of essence and of intellectual nature, as is evident from what has often been said, it follows that the aforesaid immateriality and purity, which is so great as to reach to this, that it be its own being without virtual distinction, is not had, as if by accident, and of the material, with respect to the intellect and essence of God, in so far as they constitute their own grade of immateriality.

41 It is added (by which this very point is further explained) that since the angelic essence and intellect do not seek the utmost immateriality and actuality in being of a being, the grade of immateriality which they import is therefore not the highest under the reason of a grade of immateriality and of actuality: but it has potentiality mixed in, and by the reasons brought forward in the treatise on the Vision of God, disp. 2, no. 165, it is of itself and of the material in that it is the intellect of Gabriel, or of Michael, and consequently that excess of immateriality by which one of them surpasses the other is also by accident. But the purity and immateriality which the divine intellect and essence must bring of themselves into being of a being must be the highest purity, and the highest immateriality of all that is conceivable. And therefore the grade of immateriality imported of itself by them must be most perfect, and most pure, among all that is conceivable: and since for the highest actuality and immateriality in being of a being it is required that the divine intellect and essence be their own being without virtual distinction, from the fact that, as we were just saying being, or existence, pertains to the same line as the divine essence, and that the things which pertain to the same line must be identified in divine things without the aforesaid distinction, it follows that this same highest purity and immateriality is required in order to constitute the highest and most perfect grade of immateriality of the divine essence, and of its intellect.

Nor does the opposite demonstrate what is brought forward there, namely, that that immateriality which agrees with the divine attributes and relations from the force of their own line cannot be proper to any created being, nor correspond to any created intellect, and consequently must be proper to God and to the divine intellect.

Therefore nothing at all is demonstrated from this, as will be evident from what we shall say at the following number.

42 As to the first confirmation, the major must be distinguished: in so far as they are distinct from the essence they pertain to some grade of immateriality, entirely per se first, is to be denied; they are not to be granted as entirely per se first. And then the minor is to be granted, and the consequence is to be distinguished in the same proportional way. Thus the divine attributes, from the fact that they are separated from all potentiality, pertain to the grade of immateriality of the divine intellect, although not entirely per se first: for by the very fact that they are purified from all potentiality, they are most nearly capable of imbibing the divine essence by the mode of that which transcends, and of being identified with it, as holding the reason of essence, and by its reason they have in themselves something according to which they are their own being without virtual distinction. And therefore, in so far as they have this capacity of themselves, they are outside the whole line of created immateriality, and in some way pertain to the grade of immateriality of the divine intellect: and from this ground, not from the force of their own line, but by reason of the divine essence, which they imbibe, and with which they are identified, they have, with respect to that essence, their own being, and in so far as they are identified with it, but not of themselves, they also have this, that they are their own being without virtual distinction: and therefore they do not pertain entirely per se first to the aforesaid grade.

43 As to the second confirmation, the antecedent is to be granted, and the consequence denied. And as to the first proof, the parity hinted at there must be denied, for the reasons we have already given. As to the second proof, however, the sequence must be denied. For the fact that the properties of the angels pertain to the same grade of immateriality as the essence of the angel arises from the imperfection of that grade; but the fact that the divine attributes, according to what they precisely have from the force of their own line, do not pertain entirely per se first to the same grade of immateriality as the divine essence, arises from the highest perfection of their own over every grade of created immateriality, and from the highest actuality and immateriality of the divine essence, as constituting its own grade of immateriality. And therefore it does not follow that the properties of the angels are nobler and more immaterial in their own order than the divine attributes in theirs. Just as, according to the probable opinion of many, the created word is identified with the dictation by which it is produced: so that one and the same entity holds the reason both of active dictation and of word (which indeed seemed to confer a certain greater amplitude and unboundedness on the aforesaid action); nevertheless, because this in truth does not arise from perfection simpliciter, but from the imperfection of the created word and of the dictation by which it is produced, therefore, although in divine things this identification of word and active dictation is lacking, it is not rightly inferred that created dictation is more perfect in its own order than divine dictation in its own: and similarly, although created wisdom brings its own existence, which imports no small amount of actuality, and divine wisdom does not bring it, nevertheless, because this does not arise from perfection simpliciter, but rather from the imperfection of created wisdom, to which it is not contrary that it should constitute some one thing by accident with an essence: on the contrary, the fact that uncreated wisdom does not bring its own existence arises from perfection simpliciter, that is, from the fact that, speaking most formally, it cannot constitute a unity by accident with an essence, as we shall explain in the following disputation, no. 7, and further on; and therefore from this it cannot be inferred that created wisdom is more perfect and more actual in its own order than uncreated wisdom in its own.

44 As to the last confirmation, it will be answered that, although one could argue for potentiality in the divine essence and intellect, if it did not reach to so great an actuality and immateriality that it was not its own being of existence without virtual distinction, since, as we have often said, being of existence pertains to the line of the essence, and that which does not identify to itself, without virtual distinction, whatever pertains to its own line, is finite and limited in that line, and consequently has an admixture of potentiality; nevertheless, that the divine attributes, for example, from the force of their own line, taken with precision, do not identify to themselves at all, that is, without virtual distinction, the being of existence, does not argue for potentiality in them: because the aforesaid being does not look to the line of the attributes, but to the line of the essence, through whose existence all the things that are in God exist.

Yet although this stands, that although it does not say an admixture of potentiality, and a privative imperfection, it does nevertheless bring (so to speak) a negative imperfection, or (better said) that the attributes, for example, within their own line do not have so great a perfection and actuality as the line of the essence, and as great an actuality and immateriality as the aforesaid line brings; although this greater perfection is not owed to the lines of the attributes, so that they have it precisely from the force of such lines, without their being drawn out to another line and reduced to it: and therefore, that they do not have this excess of perfection, argues in them only an imperfection, so to speak, that is, a negative imperfection, or not having so great a perfection and immateriality as the line of the essence.

Hence, in the form of the confirmation, the latter part of that dilemma must be chosen. And as to the proof to the contrary, the consequence must be distinguished: they have every conceivable immateriality and purity under the reason of a pure act, in so far as a pure act is precisely opposed to an admixture of potentiality, the consequence is to be granted: in so far as a pure act is opposed both to an admixture of potentiality and to any lack of purity, of actuality and of immateriality that can be found in those lines which are not admixed with potentiality, it is to be denied: but from this nothing follows against us. Because in order that the attributes should be of the same immateriality and purity as the divine essence under the reason of a pure act, it was required that they should have the highest purity and actuality in this latter way, and it does not suffice that they have it in that former way. For these two purities, or two ways of having the highest purity, are not necessarily connected, so that within one and the same line they must agree with any divine formality whatsoever. And therefore, because the mercy of God is more excellent than his justice, it is therefore more actual and more pure than that, in so far as by this it is denoted that it has something of greater actuality within one of those lines of theirs which are separated from all potentiality, even though each of the two is most pure and most actual in so far as purity and actuality have precisely that which is opposed to an admixture of potentiality. Yet as to what we have said in this whole section, let them be seen in what is discussed in the following disputation from no. 21 to 27, which we shall set out.

The conclusion is affirmative.

Concerning this article there is nothing to be said beyond what has been supposed in what we set forth in the treatise on the Vision of God, art. 8: where we explained what is required for comprehension, and how the comprehension of the divine essence can belong to God alone, and not to any creature.

The conclusion affirms.