Cursus Theologicus, Tomus I: In Primam Partem

Something is assumed in the title, and something is called in question: for it is assumed that God understands himself; then both because this is clear from Scripture, as is seen in 1. ad Corinth. 2: The things that are of God, no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God. And then also because this is plainly demonstrated by the twofold reason drawn from St. Thomas, 2. contra Gent. cap. 47. The first, namely, because God is most intelligible: therefore he will be intelligible to himself, and thus what is made will be understood by himself to be made. This second consequence is plainly clear from the first. Because that which is to know God actually whatever is intelligible from him is a simply simple perfection, as is clear; and therefore this perfection cannot be absent from him who is a being most perfect in every way. The first consequence, however, is plainly clear from the antecedent: then both because there must be a proportion between the intelligible object and the power of understanding; and therefore an object most intelligible will be able, indeed will have to, be understood by an intellect most knowing, such as the divine is. Then also: because what is intelligible and intimately united with the understanding can be understood by it; therefore, since God is of himself intelligible and understanding, and is united with himself by the greatest union of all, namely by the highest identity, it will follow that he is intelligible by himself. The antecedent, however, is clear from what has been said. Because God is most immaterial, and consequently most intelligible: since immateriality is, in the way explained above, the reason of intelligibility and of the power of understanding.

Second. Because otherwise the understanding of God would not be most perfect, but more obscure than created intellection; whereas this plainly repugns, as is clear from itself: therefore, etc. The consequence as to the first part is evident. Because the understanding of God would not be about the most noble object, namely about God himself; and consequently it would not be most perfect. As to the second part it is likewise plain. Because the vision of the blessed attains God such as he is: therefore, if the understanding of God did not attain itself, it would be more obscure than such created vision, which would not be about an object so noble as the aforesaid vision.

Therefore, what we call in question is only whether the understanding of God terminates primarily and per se in God himself; and although the decision of this doubt is not difficultly gathered from what has just been said and from what was said above, nevertheless, so that everything may remain explained from the root, and better answer may be given to whichever difficulty tells against its decision, we have raised it and decide it briefly.

§ I. Reasons for doubting.

2 The first reason for doubting is on the negative side. Because the understanding of God, speaking most formally, is God himself, as we touched above and shall say more fully in art. 4: therefore the aforesaid understanding will not be able to have God himself as its primary object. The consequence is evident. Because the understanding of God cannot have itself as primary object, it would be a reflexive understanding, namely the understanding of the intellection: therefore, etc.

It is confirmed. Because the first intelligible of any intellect cannot be the first intellection of that intellect itself: therefore, since God is himself the first intellection of his own intellect, so that he is not yet distinguished even virtually from it, he cannot be the first intelligible. The consequence from the antecedent is evident. The antecedent, however, is asserted by St. Thomas, 1. 2. qu. 1, art. 1, where he teaches that the first thing willed of any will cannot be the first volition of that will: because volition essentially presupposes a good to be willed, which is distinct from the volition itself. In the same way, the first intelligible of any intellect cannot be the first intellection of that intellect itself: because intellection necessarily presupposes a true intelligible as the object to be known, which is distinct from the intellection itself.

3 Second. Because between the knower and the primarily known thing there must be at least a transcendental relation, namely that of the measurable to its measure; therefore the knower and the primarily known thing must at least be virtually distinguished; therefore, since God and his intellection are not distinguished in this way, God cannot be the primary object of his own intellection. This second consequence is clear from the first. The first, however, is from the antecedent. Because those things which are not distinguished even virtually cannot be compared after the manner of measure and measurable: for, a comparison having been made between the measure and the measurable thing, the measure is always in some way more perfect than its measurable. The antecedent is likewise clear; because the perfection of the intellection is measured from its primary object; so that the perfection of it is so great, and no greater, as is that of the object considered as object: therefore the primary object is compared after the manner of measure with respect to the intellection, and consequently this has, at least, a transcendental relation to it, as a thing measurable to its own measure.

§ II. Decision of the doubt.

4 Nevertheless it must be said that God is the primary object of his own intellection. So St. Thomas here, and in De verit. qu. 2, art. 2, and also in 1. dist. 35, qu. 1, qu. 1, art. 2, to Anibaldus, and 1. cont. Gent. cap. 48, in these words: From the premises, however, it appears that God first, and per se alone, knows himself. Which all the Theologians follow, and therefore one must refrain from citing them in particular.

The fundamental reason, however, was adduced by the Holy Doctor in the chapter cited in these words: The intellectual operation has its character and its nobility from that which it is per se and primarily understood to be, since this is its object. If therefore God understood anything other than himself per se and primarily, his intellectual operation would have its character and nobility from that which is other than himself; but this is impossible; since his operation is his essence, and this, being a being from itself, cannot take on a character from another distinct from God himself. It is therefore impossible that what is understood by God first and per se should be other than himself.

It is confirmed by the reason of the same Holy Doctor in the same chapter, which he proposes in nearly this form and in these words. For that thing alone is known first and per se by an intellect, whose character, as representing the first per se object, or as being united per se to the first understanding, the intellect understands: but God understands through the character that represents, or unites, his essence per se to his intellect: therefore what is understood by him first and per se is nothing other than himself. The consequence is well known. The minor, however, is also clear. Because, as we shall say in the following doubt, the character through which God understands is his essence; this, then, as it is a character, unites itself per se with the intellect: because it is, in the character of such, nothing other than itself. The major, however, is proved by St. Thomas from the fact that an operation is proportioned to the form which is the principle of the operation; and therefore intellection, elicited, or quasi elicited, by a character, is that of the first per se object understood, whose character is what is first represented per se, or what unites.

5 Second, it is proved by the reason which the same Holy Doctor hints at above, in qu. 12, art. 4, which can be proposed in this form. For the primary object of divine intellection is either God himself, or creatures, or something abstracted from both, but not the latter two: therefore the former. The major, with the consequence, is sufficiently evident. The minor, however, is proved. Because the object that is first and connatural per se to any cognitive power, which is what the object first per se of divine intellection must be when compared with it, and moreover such a power, must agree in the same degree of immateriality, as is clear from what the same Angelic Doctor says in the treatise On the Vision of God, art. 2 and 4, as we have said: but neither creatures nor anything abstracted from God and creatures agrees with the divine intellect in the degree of immateriality, as is clear from what is said there, since God alone is pure act without any potentiality, as is the divine intellect: therefore, etc.

6 Nor does it matter, if you object against this reason that divine understanding, or the divine intellect, attains the divine essence and creatures in exactly the same character of reason, and by the same most simple act: therefore creatures are not the secondary object of divine intellection, but they will have their place among its primary objects; and consequently, in order that something be the primary object of a cognitive power, it will not be necessary that they agree in the same degree of immateriality. This last consequence is clear from the first. The first, however, is likewise clear. Because if God and creatures were compared after the manner of the primary and the secondary object with respect to the divine intellect, the divine essence would be attained in some prior character, in which creatures would not yet be understood to be attained: since through any knowledge what is primary in nature is attained before what is secondary. The antecedent, however, is proved. Because that knowledge by which God knows himself, in whatever character it is infinite, and therefore all-comprehensive of itself, cannot fail to terminate in every character at once on God and on creatures.

For it will be answered by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. Because in order that creatures be after the manner of a secondary object, and the divine essence after the manner of a primary one, it is not necessary that the essence also be attained before the creatures by a priority of reason, so that creatures would not yet be attained by God in that same character of reason; but it is enough that, although divine intellection in any character terminates on both, the essence of God is nevertheless attained per se, and by its own reason, and in itself, whereas creatures are attained only by reason of the essence, and first seen in it: although they may be known at the same time, without any priority either of character, and by the same most simple act and without any virtual distinction, for the following reason: because whenever the secondary object has a necessary connexion in the character of object with the primary, considered as being such, as happens here, the primary cannot be perfectly and comprehensively understood without that secondary object also being known in the same character, and still of reason, and by the same most simple act.

7 Nor does it matter either, if you press the point that if for the character of a secondary object it is enough to be known by reason of something else, even though both be attained at once and in the manner just said, the result will be that creatures also could be said, with respect to some divine knowledge, to be the primary object, and the essence of God the secondary; whereas this is absurd, as it seems clear from itself: therefore, etc. The consequence is proved. Because by the force of that knowledge by which God knows creatures, the relation of dependence which they have upon God himself is also attained; and by the force of the knowledge of that relation, and by reason of it, God knows himself indirectly, and as the term of such a relation: therefore with respect to this knowledge, as indirectly terminated to God himself, these things would have themselves after the manner of a primary object, and God after the manner of a secondary one, if it is true that for the character of a secondary object it is enough to be attained by reason of something else.

For it will be answered by denying the consequence. Because this whole account takes its origin from the divine essence, as from the first and fontal reason known primarily: since by the same knowledge by which God is attained directly, and creatures by reason of him, and first seen in him as a secondary object, God himself is also attained indirectly, and as the term of the relation of creatures; and so they themselves do not concur after the manner of a formal object with respect to the aforesaid knowledge as indirectly terminated to the essence of God, but after the manner of a material and secondary object.

8 Whence (so that a certain tacit objection is answered by this) although it repugns that there should be formally in God an abstractive cognition of that kind which does not have the divine essence as its direct and primary object, but only as an indirect or secondary one, and which does not attain it as to what it is, but precisely as to whether it is, since the aforesaid cognition essentially involves an imperfection; nevertheless a cognition as to whether it is, which is eminently abstractive, and at the same time formally quiddative, and intuitive of that same object, so as to have the character of a primary object, in such a way that these two characters are not distinguished on the part of the thing conceived, whether virtually, as happens here, can well be found in God: because in this no imperfection is involved, but only the fact that that same most simple and all-comprehensive cognition of God terminates per se first on the divine essence, and secondarily on creatures, and at the same time, as we were just saying, attains the relation of their dependence upon God; and consequently God himself is in a certain way indirectly attained, as the term of such a relation.

§ III. An answer is given to the reasons for doubting set out at the beginning.

9 To the first, Father Herice answers, 1. part. tract. 1. disp. 4. cap. 1. that although to understand, constitutive of God, is understood by himself, it is not nevertheless a real object, or a real terminus, of that same intellection: because to be a terminus and a real object of anything presupposes a real, transcendental order between the two, and consequently a real distinction, since between the object and that of which it is the object there must be a real opposition: moreover, in order that something be known by another, it is not necessary that it be really distinguished from it; indeed, not even that a virtual distinction be present between them. And so, although to understand, constitutive of God, is really understood by himself, it is nevertheless not a real object, or terminus, of itself.

But this solution seems to fight with the common consent of the Philosophers and Theologians, who all unanimously grant that every cognition of any cognitive power has its own object from which it derives its character, or quasi character; and especially with the doctrine of St. Thomas below, art. 5, ad 3, where, from the fact that to understand is specified by the object through the medium of a character, he concludes that divine to understand is specified, or quasi specified, by the divine essence, which is the same as its to understand: and throughout this whole question it is often repeated that in God, the intelligible and the intellect, that which is understood and that by which it is understood, are the same divine essence: and it is clear that the intelligible is the same as that which is understood, and as the intelligible object, and as the understood.

Next. Because although the terminus of procession and of origin is really distinguished from the principle from which it proceeds, it is not nevertheless distinguished from that subject, or quasi subject, which it informs, or quasi informs: and consequently there does not intercede between the two any real, even transcendental, relation, as is evident in the divine personalities, which are real termini of the divine nature rendering it incommunicable; and yet they are not really distinguished from it, as St. Thomas teaches below, qu. 28, art. 3. Wherefore, since the terminus of intellection, taken precisely, is said to be its object, it ought not really to proceed from the cognitive power, nor the cognitive power from it, but it is only required that they be intimately united with each other in the character of object and cognitive power; and the more they are one, the better and more perfectly they have the character of object and of the power of understanding. Hence it follows that to be a real object, or (which is the same for the present) a terminus with respect to the intellection, ought not to import a real opposition or distinction, but rather a real identity: and so in God there truly and really exist the intellect, and to understand, and also the intelligible object, or the real object specifying and terminating the intellection after the manner of an object, although all of these are not really distinguished, indeed although no distinction intercedes between them on the part of the thing conceived, or virtually, but only on the part of our manner of conceiving, as will be clear from what has been said and is to be said below.

10 The argument, therefore, must be answered otherwise, by granting the antecedent and denying the consequence. And as to the proof, the antecedent must be denied. As to its proof it must be said that although the constitutive intellection of God cannot be an intellection formally only reflexive upon itself, because at least a virtual distinction between it, as intellection, and the understood object was required for that, yet it can be at once direct and reflexive with respect to itself in a most eminent manner. Because by the very fact that it is the intralineal intellectual constitutive principle of the divine nature, it cannot fail to identify with itself, without any virtual distinction, whatever belongs to the aforesaid line; and consequently the character of intellection, of intelligible character, and of the object understood first and directly per se: and therefore by that very fact it will be reflected upon itself in a most eminent manner, and be at once direct and reflexive. Reflexive indeed, as is clear from itself; but direct, and in the manner just said, because, as it terminates upon itself, it has no other object from which to take its character besides itself: but it is itself the intellection, the intelligible character, and the ultimate object, first per se with respect to itself.

As to the confirmation, the antecedent must be granted if it be understood in creatures; otherwise, however, if it be understood in divine things, on account of the reason just touched upon. And as to the proof drawn from that testimony of St. Thomas, it will be answered that the Holy Doctor must be understood to be speaking of the first thing willed and intelligible in creatures, and not in divine things, where to understand itself is at least the primary object of divine intellection. The reason, however, for which we philosophize differently about creatures and about divine things, is that in creatures intellection is something caused by the object itself together with the intellect, and therefore it cannot be the primary object with respect to itself, lest the same be the true effect truly and really caused by itself; whereas in God the constitutive intellection of him is not something caused by the object, but by the very fact that it is constitutive of God, it must be the very object itself understood first per se by God himself.

11 As to the second, it is clear from what has been said that the antecedent, to be, is true only in creatures, and not in divine things: where the perfection of the constitutive intellection of God is the very primary object itself, without any distinction, not even virtual; and therefore the character of measure and of measurable, distinct from each other, can be found there only on the part of our manner of conceiving.

Angelicus Doctor seems to comprise all these things below, art. 2, ad 2 and 3, where, having set against himself that when a man understands that he understands, this is not to understand anything great or principal that is understood, but to understand something secondary and accessory. If therefore God were to understand itself, then to understand God, to understand himself, would not be to understand the principal thing understood; he answers: It must be said that when that understanding which is not subsistent, nothing great is understood, (and consequently not the principal thing understood) as when we understand our understanding; and therefore the case is not similar with divine understanding, which is subsistent.

The sense of these words is that by the very fact that to understand is subsistent of itself, it is of itself a pure act in the genus of the intelligible; and so it is at once to understand, and the principal object, and the intelligible, and the understood; and consequently the same intellection, in a most eminent manner, is at once direct and reflexive, without there intervening between it and its own object a real relation.